Re: A remark on Richard's paper
On 27 Aug 2012, at 06:34, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Aug 25, 2012 at 06:00:26PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: No. That was what I told him. But he left the place, simply, without further comment, and quite disrespectfully. Many people were shocked by this behavior, but said nothing. I think Chalmers is in part responsible for the spreading of defamation I am living across the ocean, and why nobody dares to mention the first person indeterminacy, or my name. I am afraid he has just been brainwashed by the main victims of a manipulative form of moral harrasment., as I described in the book ordered by Grasset in 1998 (but never published). Well hopefully, we will remedy that soon, in English at least :). There's half a chapter left to translate, and once Kim has a chance at proof reading it, we should be able to get you a draft. Good news. Nice. Thanks for telling me. He is quite plausibly a member of the same sect which put fraternity above facts. It is a form of hidden corporatism. I'm afraid Chalmers might be just an opportunist. Who isn't! This is not a serious charge. He is clearly not a serious scientist, but seems to be an expert in self-marketing. Sadly, one has to be, to be noticed. His fading qualia paper is not so bad, but is hardly original, and lacks many references. The hard problem of consciousness is know by all philosophers of mind since a long time as the mind-body problem, and his formulation is physicalist and not general, also. I had lunch with him in early 2006 in Canberra, and this was after I had sent him a draft of my ToN book, so he is well acquainted with the ideas of this list. My impression was that he has a fairly fixed world view, a steely mind capable of finding flaws in presentations of your argument, and a general intolerance for woolly arguments. This is not a bad thing, but I wasn't quite prepared for it at the time. The subject material in ToN is quite convoluted, and to run through one strand of it with someone like him is likely to run against the ground of some differing conception of other. Marcus Hutter seems to think he might be more predisposed to these ideas though. Nevertheless, I find it hard to believe that he might be spreading malicious gossip about you. ? I have never said that. I said that he has been perhaps *victim* of gossip, about my work or me. All what I say is that he pretended that there is no first person indeterminacy. Like John Clark he confused probably 1-views and 3- views, but unlike John Clark he has some notoriety in philosophy of mind, and is supposed to get that fundamental difference. Unlike John Clark, but like Bill Taylor, (as anyone can verify) he did not answer the question I asked to him, so there is just no hope. It is impossible to communicate with people willingly deaf. Chalmers is just not a scientist, period. And *my* most charitable explanation of his behavior, is that he has been probably brainwashed by my usual opponents (which have dismissed UDA as being too much simple to be accepted as a subject of a thesis, but did not read it). Actually some people confided me that this has been the case, in more than once circle. And my opponents in Brussels are not opponents to my work, as they did not read it (a fact that I can prove, actually), but they oppose me because I am witness of something. I don't want to talk about that now, and its is quite out of the topic of this list. I have only pseudo-problem with those who does not take time to study the work, not with those reading it. With those who read it, I have the typical usual problem on technical points, and most of the time, it is because they are not familiar with elementary logic or with QM or with cognitive science, and they help me to improve the pedagogy. I think the seven first steps are OK now, and that the step 8 can still be improved, so, as you know, I am interested in continuing to discuss it. But there is no need to understand step 8, to understand that the first person indeterminacy already change the common aristotelian picture about the mind-body, or the first-third person relationship, I think. Indeterminacy, non-cloning, and non-locality already follow from uda1-7. It seems crazy for me how many computationalist philosophers neglect computer sciences, but this is due to the arbitrary cut between science and philosophy. My luck was to decide at the start to become a mathematical logician to be sure to be mathematically correct, and have the genuine form of language to handle comp, but then philosophers roar like if science was preparing to invade their territory, like in stone age, apparently. Bruno For one thing, I've never heard him, or anyone else for that matter, even talk about your ideas, aside from participants these mailing lists. More than likely, he dismisses you as a harmless crank, and doesn't think about you at all. For all I know, he may
Re: A remark on Richard's paper
On Sat, Aug 25, 2012 at 06:00:26PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: No. That was what I told him. But he left the place, simply, without further comment, and quite disrespectfully. Many people were shocked by this behavior, but said nothing. I think Chalmers is in part responsible for the spreading of defamation I am living across the ocean, and why nobody dares to mention the first person indeterminacy, or my name. I am afraid he has just been brainwashed by the main victims of a manipulative form of moral harrasment., as I described in the book ordered by Grasset in 1998 (but never published). Well hopefully, we will remedy that soon, in English at least :). There's half a chapter left to translate, and once Kim has a chance at proof reading it, we should be able to get you a draft. He is quite plausibly a member of the same sect which put fraternity above facts. It is a form of hidden corporatism. I'm afraid Chalmers might be just an opportunist. Who isn't! This is not a serious charge. He is clearly not a serious scientist, but seems to be an expert in self-marketing. Sadly, one has to be, to be noticed. His fading qualia paper is not so bad, but is hardly original, and lacks many references. The hard problem of consciousness is know by all philosophers of mind since a long time as the mind-body problem, and his formulation is physicalist and not general, also. Bruno I had lunch with him in early 2006 in Canberra, and this was after I had sent him a draft of my ToN book, so he is well acquainted with the ideas of this list. My impression was that he has a fairly fixed world view, a steely mind capable of finding flaws in presentations of your argument, and a general intolerance for woolly arguments. This is not a bad thing, but I wasn't quite prepared for it at the time. The subject material in ToN is quite convoluted, and to run through one strand of it with someone like him is likely to run against the ground of some differing conception of other. Marcus Hutter seems to think he might be more predisposed to these ideas though. Nevertheless, I find it hard to believe that he might be spreading malicious gossip about you. For one thing, I've never heard him, or anyone else for that matter, even talk about your ideas, aside from participants these mailing lists. More than likely, he dismisses you as a harmless crank, and doesn't think about you at all. For all I know, he may have a similar impression of me :). Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A remark on Richard's paper
On 24 Aug 2012, at 21:07, Jesse Mazer wrote: On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 1:33 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Chalmers followed my talk on the UD Argument at ASSC 4 and leaved the room at step 3, saying that there is no indeterminacy as he will feel to be at both places. Do you have a link to the discussion, or was it not on a public discussion forum? It was live. I wonder if Chalmers might have just meant that he would *define* both copies as himself and thus say that he would be at both places, while at the same time agreeing with you that each copy at a different location would have its own distinct subjective experience (qualia) and that neither would have any conscious awareness of what the other copy was experiencing. No. That was what I told him. But he left the place, simply, without further comment, and quite disrespectfully. Many people were shocked by this behavior, but said nothing. I think Chalmers is in part responsible for the spreading of defamation I am living across the ocean, and why nobody dares to mention the first person indeterminacy, or my name. I am afraid he has just been brainwashed by the main victims of a manipulative form of moral harrasment., as I described in the book ordered by Grasset in 1998 (but never published). He is quite plausibly a member of the same sect which put fraternity above facts. It is a form of hidden corporatism. I'm afraid Chalmers might be just an opportunist. He is clearly not a serious scientist, but seems to be an expert in self-marketing. His fading qualia paper is not so bad, but is hardly original, and lacks many references. The hard problem of consciousness is know by all philosophers of mind since a long time as the mind-body problem, and his formulation is physicalist and not general, also. Bruno This made perhaps some sense in his dualist interpretation of Everett, (if *that* makes sense), but makes no sense at all in comp. I guess that like John Clark he confused the 1-view of the 1-view, with some 3-view on the 1-view. I know only two people stopping at step 3. But if you know others, let me know. (I don't count the person who stop at step 3 because they have something else to do). Bruno On 24 Aug 2012, at 02:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: Jesse, This is what Chalmers says in the 95 paper you link about the second Penrose argument, the one in my paper: 3.5 As far as I can determine, this argument is free of the obvious flaws that plague other Gödelian arguments, such as Lucas's argument and Penrose's earlier arguments. If it is flawed, the flaws lie deeper. It is true that the argument has a feeling of achieving its conclusion as if by magic. One is tempted to say: why couldn't F itself engage in just the same reasoning?. But although there are various directions in which one might try to attack the argument, no knockdown refutation immediately presents itself. For this reason, the argument is quite challenging. Compared to previous versions, this argument is much more worthy of attention from supporters of AI. Chalmers finally concludes that the flaw for Godel, which Penrose also assumed, is the assumption that we can know we are sound. So the other way around, if Godel is correct, so is the Penrose second argument, which Chalmers confirmed. However, Chalmers seems to be saying the Godel is incorrect, hardly a basis for my paper. Personally, when I am sound, I know I am sound. When I am unsound I usually know that I am unsound. However, psychosis runs in my family, and many times I have watched a relative lapse into psychosis without him realizing it. Besides I sent the paper to Chalmers and he had no problem with. But he did wish me luck getting it published. He knew something I had not yet learned. Richard On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 8:19 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: A quibble with the beginning of Richard's paper. On the first page it says: 'It is beyond the scope of this paper and admittedly beyond my understanding to delve into Gödelian logic, which seems to be self- referential proof by contradiction, except to mention that Penrose in Shadows of the Mind(1994), as confirmed by David Chalmers(1995), arrived at a seemingly valid 7 step proof that human “reasoning powers cannot be captured by any formal system”.' If you actually read Chalmers' paper at http://web.archive.org/web/20090204164739/http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-09-chalmers.html he definitely does *not* confirm Penrose's argument! He says in the paper that Penrose has two basic arguments for his conclusions about consciousness, and at the end of the section titled the first argument he concludes that the first one fails: 2.16 It is section 3.3 that carries the burden of this strand of Penrose's argument, but unfortunately it seems to be one of the least convincing sections in the
Re: A remark on Richard's paper
Chalmers followed my talk on the UD Argument at ASSC 4 and leaved the room at step 3, saying that there is no indeterminacy as he will feel to be at both places. This made perhaps some sense in his dualist interpretation of Everett, (if *that* makes sense), but makes no sense at all in comp. I guess that like John Clark he confused the 1-view of the 1-view, with some 3- view on the 1-view. I know only two people stopping at step 3. But if you know others, let me know. (I don't count the person who stop at step 3 because they have something else to do). Bruno On 24 Aug 2012, at 02:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: Jesse, This is what Chalmers says in the 95 paper you link about the second Penrose argument, the one in my paper: 3.5 As far as I can determine, this argument is free of the obvious flaws that plague other Gödelian arguments, such as Lucas's argument and Penrose's earlier arguments. If it is flawed, the flaws lie deeper. It is true that the argument has a feeling of achieving its conclusion as if by magic. One is tempted to say: why couldn't F itself engage in just the same reasoning?. But although there are various directions in which one might try to attack the argument, no knockdown refutation immediately presents itself. For this reason, the argument is quite challenging. Compared to previous versions, this argument is much more worthy of attention from supporters of AI. Chalmers finally concludes that the flaw for Godel, which Penrose also assumed, is the assumption that we can know we are sound. So the other way around, if Godel is correct, so is the Penrose second argument, which Chalmers confirmed. However, Chalmers seems to be saying the Godel is incorrect, hardly a basis for my paper. Personally, when I am sound, I know I am sound. When I am unsound I usually know that I am unsound. However, psychosis runs in my family, and many times I have watched a relative lapse into psychosis without him realizing it. Besides I sent the paper to Chalmers and he had no problem with. But he did wish me luck getting it published. He knew something I had not yet learned. Richard On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 8:19 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: A quibble with the beginning of Richard's paper. On the first page it says: 'It is beyond the scope of this paper and admittedly beyond my understanding to delve into Gödelian logic, which seems to be self- referential proof by contradiction, except to mention that Penrose in Shadows of the Mind(1994), as confirmed by David Chalmers(1995), arrived at a seemingly valid 7 step proof that human “reasoning powers cannot be captured by any formal system”.' If you actually read Chalmers' paper at http://web.archive.org/web/20090204164739/http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-09-chalmers.html he definitely does *not* confirm Penrose's argument! He says in the paper that Penrose has two basic arguments for his conclusions about consciousness, and at the end of the section titled the first argument he concludes that the first one fails: 2.16 It is section 3.3 that carries the burden of this strand of Penrose's argument, but unfortunately it seems to be one of the least convincing sections in the book. By his assumption that the relevant class of computational systems are all straightforward axiom-and-rules system, Penrose is not taking AI seriously, and certainly is not doing enough to establish his conclusion that physics is uncomputable. I conclude that none of Penrose's argument up to this point put a dent in the natural AI position: that our reasoning powers may be captured by a sound formal system F, where we cannot determine that F is sound. Then when dealing with Penrose's second argument, he says that Penrose draws the wrong conclusions; where Penrose concludes that our reasoning cannot be the product of any formal system, Chalmers concludes that the actual issue is that we cannot be 100% sure our reasoning is sound (which I understand to mean we can never be 100% sure that we have not made a false conclusion about whether all the propositions we have proved true or false actually have that truth-value in true arithmetic): 3.12 We can see, then, that the assumption that we know we are sound leads to a contradiction. One might try to pin the blame on one of the other assumptions, but all these seem quite straightforward. Indeed, these include the sort of implicit assumptions that Penrose appeals to in his arguments all the time. Indeed, one could make the case that all of premises (1)-(4) are implicitly appealed to in Penrose's main argument. For the purposes of the argument against Penrose, it does not really matter which we blame for the contradiction, but I think it is fairly clear that it is the assumption that the system knows that it is sound that causes most of the damage. It is this assumption,
Re: A remark on Richard's paper
On 24 Aug 2012, at 03:09, Jesse Mazer wrote: What do you mean the flaw for Godel? There is no doubt that Godel's mathematical proof is correct, and if you think Chalmers is suggesting any such doubt in his paper you are misreading him. I guess so. Chalmers can't be that bad. Did Chalmers offer any detailed commentary suggesting he had read through the whole thing carefully? If not it's possible he skimmed it and missed that sentence, or just read the abstract and decided it didn't interest him, but sent the note out of politeness. That would be astonishing too. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A remark on Richard's paper
On 24 Aug 2012, at 03:15, Richard Ruquist wrote: My apologies. When Chalmers used the words godelian argument I thought he was referring to Godel. Now I can see I misread it. OK. be careful. That is why we have always to separate clearly a pure theory from its application in some domain. But even such an application can be made as clean cut that the pure theory, if we follow the definition and translation rules. In cognitive science, being fuzzy on this can lead to infinite circular boring vocabulary discussion. The last application, to reality, is alway conjectural, in science we never know as such, or we never know for sure. Bruno On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 9:09 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 8:41 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Jesse, This is what Chalmers says in the 95 paper you link about the second Penrose argument, the one in my paper: 3.5 As far as I can determine, this argument is free of the obvious flaws that plague other Gödelian arguments, such as Lucas's argument and Penrose's earlier arguments. If it is flawed, the flaws lie deeper. It is true that the argument has a feeling of achieving its conclusion as if by magic. One is tempted to say: why couldn't F itself engage in just the same reasoning?. But although there are various directions in which one might try to attack the argument, no knockdown refutation immediately presents itself. For this reason, the argument is quite challenging. Compared to previous versions, this argument is much more worthy of attention from supporters of AI. Chalmers finally concludes that the flaw for Godel, which Penrose also assumed, is the assumption that we can know we are sound. So the other way around, if Godel is correct, so is the Penrose second argument, which Chalmers confirmed. However, Chalmers seems to be saying the Godel is incorrect, hardly a basis for my paper. What do you mean the flaw for Godel? There is no doubt that Godel's mathematical proof is correct, and if you think Chalmers is suggesting any such doubt in his paper you are misreading him. The argument he's talking about is one specifically concerning human intelligence, which Godel's mathematical proof says nothing about (Godel did offer some brief comments about the implications of his mathematical proof for human intelligence, but they were very brief and somewhat ambiguous, see http://www.iep.utm.edu/lp-argue/#H4 ). And I already quoted his conclusions about the second argument, after the section you quote above: that although Chalmers agrees that Penrose's second argument does show that *either* our reasoning cannot be captured by a formal system *or* that we cannot be sure our reasoning is sound, Chalmers thinks Penrose is wrong to prefer the first option rather than the second. Personally, when I am sound, I know I am sound. When I am unsound I usually know that I am unsound. However, psychosis runs in my family, and many times I have watched a relative lapse into psychosis without him realizing it. Chalmers/Penrose aren't talking about sound in the ordinary colloquial sense of sanity or anything like that, they're talking about soundness in the sense of perfect mathematical certainty that there is absolutely no chance--not even a chance of 1 in 10^10 or smaller, say--that they might have made an error in their judgement about the truth or falsity of some (potentially very complicated) proposition about arithmetic. Besides I sent the paper to Chalmers and he had no problem with. But he did wish me luck getting it published. He knew something I had not yet learned. Richard Did Chalmers offer any detailed commentary suggesting he had read through the whole thing carefully? If not it's possible he skimmed it and missed that sentence, or just read the abstract and decided it didn't interest him, but sent the note out of politeness. Jesse On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 8:19 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: A quibble with the beginning of Richard's paper. On the first page it says: 'It is beyond the scope of this paper and admittedly beyond my understanding to delve into Gödelian logic, which seems to be self- referential proof by contradiction, except to mention that Penrose in Shadows of the Mind(1994), as confirmed by David Chalmers(1995), arrived at a seemingly valid 7 step proof that human “reasoning powers cannot be captured by any formal system”.' If you actually read Chalmers' paper at http://web.archive.org/web/20090204164739/http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-09-chalmers.html he definitely does *not* confirm Penrose's argument! He says in the paper that Penrose has two basic arguments for his conclusions about consciousness, and at the end of the section titled the first argument he concludes that the first one fails: 2.16 It is section
Re: A remark on Richard's paper
On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 1:33 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Chalmers followed my talk on the UD Argument at ASSC 4 and leaved the room at step 3, saying that there is no indeterminacy as he will feel to be at both places. Do you have a link to the discussion, or was it not on a public discussion forum? I wonder if Chalmers might have just meant that he would *define* both copies as himself and thus say that he would be at both places, while at the same time agreeing with you that each copy at a different location would have its own distinct subjective experience (qualia) and that neither would have any conscious awareness of what the other copy was experiencing. This made perhaps some sense in his dualist interpretation of Everett, (if *that* makes sense), but makes no sense at all in comp. I guess that like John Clark he confused the 1-view of the 1-view, with some 3-view on the 1-view. I know only two people stopping at step 3. But if you know others, let me know. (I don't count the person who stop at step 3 because they have something else to do). Bruno On 24 Aug 2012, at 02:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: Jesse, This is what Chalmers says in the 95 paper you link about the second Penrose argument, the one in my paper: 3.5 As far as I can determine, this argument is free of the obvious flaws that plague other Gödelian arguments, such as Lucas's argument and Penrose's earlier arguments. If it is flawed, the flaws lie deeper. It is true that the argument has a feeling of achieving its conclusion as if by magic. One is tempted to say: why couldn't F itself engage in just the same reasoning?. But although there are various directions in which one might try to attack the argument, no knockdown refutation immediately presents itself. For this reason, the argument is quite challenging. Compared to previous versions, this argument is much more worthy of attention from supporters of AI. Chalmers finally concludes that the flaw for Godel, which Penrose also assumed, is the assumption that we can know we are sound. So the other way around, if Godel is correct, so is the Penrose second argument, which Chalmers confirmed. However, Chalmers seems to be saying the Godel is incorrect, hardly a basis for my paper. Personally, when I am sound, I know I am sound. When I am unsound I usually know that I am unsound. However, psychosis runs in my family, and many times I have watched a relative lapse into psychosis without him realizing it. Besides I sent the paper to Chalmers and he had no problem with. But he did wish me luck getting it published. He knew something I had not yet learned. Richard On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 8:19 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: A quibble with the beginning of Richard's paper. On the first page it says: 'It is beyond the scope of this paper and admittedly beyond my understanding to delve into Gödelian logic, which seems to be self-referential proof by contradiction, except to mention that Penrose in Shadows of the Mind(1994), as confirmed by David Chalmers(1995), arrived at a seemingly valid 7 step proof that human “reasoning powers cannot be captured by any formal system”.' If you actually read Chalmers' paper at http://web.archive.org/web/20090204164739/http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-09-chalmers.htmlhe definitely does *not* confirm Penrose's argument! He says in the paper that Penrose has two basic arguments for his conclusions about consciousness, and at the end of the section titled the first argument he concludes that the first one fails: 2.16 It is section 3.3 that carries the burden of this strand of Penrose's argument, but unfortunately it seems to be one of the least convincing sections in the book. By his assumption that the relevant class of computational systems are all straightforward axiom-and-rules system, Penrose is not taking AI seriously, and certainly is not doing enough to establish his conclusion that physics is uncomputable. I conclude that none of Penrose's argument up to this point put a dent in the natural AI position: that our reasoning powers may be captured by a sound formal system F, where we cannot determine that F is sound. Then when dealing with Penrose's second argument, he says that Penrose draws the wrong conclusions; where Penrose concludes that our reasoning cannot be the product of any formal system, Chalmers concludes that the actual issue is that we cannot be 100% sure our reasoning is sound (which I understand to mean we can never be 100% sure that we have not made a false conclusion about whether all the propositions we have proved true or false actually have that truth-value in true arithmetic): 3.12 We can see, then, that the assumption that we know we are sound leads to a contradiction. One might try to pin the blame on one of the other assumptions, but all these seem quite straightforward. Indeed, these include the sort of
Re: A remark on Richard's paper
Dear Richard, Your paper http://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf is very interesting. It reminds me a lot of Stephen Wolfram's cellular automaton theory. I only have one big problem with it. The 10d manifold would be a single fixed structure that, while conceivably capable of running the computations and/or implementing the Peano arithmetic, has a problem with the role of time in it. You might have a solution to this problem that I see that I did not deduce as I read your paper. How do you define time for your model? -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A remark on Richard's paper
Stephan, Thanks for the compliment. I finally got someone with smarts to read it other than Chalmers and S_T Yau. Time inflates along with 3 dimensions in the big bang. Leaving 6 dimensions behind to compactify or curl up into tiny balls 1000 planck lengths across each with 500 holes. So each 6-d ball is a fixed structure and 10^90/cc of them fill the universe. Hardly a single structure. Well I really cannot say how time works. Don't know if it is linear,or nonlinear, if it inflates or deflates. Most of string theory appears to threat time as part of a 4-D background spacetime. The paper has little to do with time. Perhaps it is required for Pratt theory? Richard On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 6:38 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: Dear Richard, Your paper http://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf is very interesting. It reminds me a lot of Stephen Wolfram's cellular automaton theory. I only have one big problem with it. The 10d manifold would be a single fixed structure that, while conceivably capable of running the computations and/or implementing the Peano arithmetic, has a problem with the role of time in it. You might have a solution to this problem that I see that I did not deduce as I read your paper. How do you define time for your model? -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A remark on Richard's paper
A quibble with the beginning of Richard's paper. On the first page it says: 'It is beyond the scope of this paper and admittedly beyond my understanding to delve into Gödelian logic, which seems to be self-referential proof by contradiction, except to mention that Penrose in Shadows of the Mind(1994), as confirmed by David Chalmers(1995), arrived at a seemingly valid 7 step proof that human “reasoning powers cannot be captured by any formal system”.' If you actually read Chalmers' paper at http://web.archive.org/web/20090204164739/http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-09-chalmers.htmlhe definitely does *not* confirm Penrose's argument! He says in the paper that Penrose has two basic arguments for his conclusions about consciousness, and at the end of the section titled the first argument he concludes that the first one fails: 2.16 It is section 3.3 that carries the burden of this strand of Penrose's argument, but unfortunately it seems to be one of the least convincing sections in the book. By his assumption that the relevant class of computational systems are all straightforward axiom-and-rules system, Penrose is not taking AI seriously, and certainly is not doing enough to establish his conclusion that physics is uncomputable. I conclude that none of Penrose's argument up to this point put a dent in the natural AI position: that our reasoning powers may be captured by a sound formal system F, where we cannot determine that F is sound. Then when dealing with Penrose's second argument, he says that Penrose draws the wrong conclusions; where Penrose concludes that our reasoning cannot be the product of any formal system, Chalmers concludes that the actual issue is that we cannot be 100% sure our reasoning is sound (which I understand to mean we can never be 100% sure that we have not made a false conclusion about whether all the propositions we have proved true or false actually have that truth-value in true arithmetic): 3.12 We can see, then, that the assumption that we know we are sound leads to a contradiction. One might try to pin the blame on one of the other assumptions, but all these seem quite straightforward. Indeed, these include the sort of implicit assumptions that Penrose appeals to in his arguments all the time. Indeed, one could make the case that all of premises (1)-(4) are implicitly appealed to in Penrose's main argument. For the purposes of the argument against Penrose, it does not really matter which we blame for the contradiction, but I think it is fairly clear that it is the assumption that the system knows that it is sound that causes most of the damage. It is this assumption, then, that should be withdrawn. 3.13 Penrose has therefore pointed to a false culprit. When the contradiction is reached, he pins the blame on the assumption that our reasoning powers are captured by a formal system F. But the argument above shows that this assumption is inessential in reaching the contradiction: A similar contradiction, via a not dissimilar sort of argument, can be reached even in the absence of that assumption. It follows that the responsibility for the contradiction lies elsewhere than in the assumption of computability. It is the assumption about knowledge of soundness that should be withdrawn. 3.14 Still, Penrose's argument has succeeded in clarifying some issues. In a sense, it shows where the deepest flaw in Gödelian arguments lies. One might have thought that the deepest flaw lay in the unjustified claim that one can see the soundness of certain formal systems that underlie our own reasoning. But in fact, if the above analysis is correct, the deepest flaw lies in the assumption that we know that we are sound. All Gödelian arguments appeal to this premise somewhere, but in fact the premise generates a contradiction. Perhaps we are sound, but we cannot know unassailably that we are sound. So it seems Chalmers would have no problem with the natural AI position he discussed earlier, that our reasoning could be adequately captured by a computer simulation that did not come to its top-level conclusions about mathematics via a strict axiom/proof method involving the mathematical questions themselves, but rather by some underlying fallible structure like a neural network. The bottom-level behavior of the simulated neurons themselves would be deducible given the initial state of the system using the axiom/proof method, but that doesn't mean the system as a whole might not make errors in mathematical calculations; see Douglas Hofstadter's discussion of this issue starting on p. 571 of Godel Escher Bach, the section titled Irrational and Rational Can Coexist on Different Levels, where he writes: Another way to gain perspective on this is to remember that a brain, too, is a collection of faultlessly functioning element-neurons. Whenever a neuron's threshold is surpassed by the sum of the incoming signals, BANG!-it fires. It never happens that a neuron forgets its arithmetical
Re: A remark on Richard's paper
Jesse, This is what Chalmers says in the 95 paper you link about the second Penrose argument, the one in my paper: 3.5 As far as I can determine, this argument is free of the obvious flaws that plague other Gödelian arguments, such as Lucas's argument and Penrose's earlier arguments. If it is flawed, the flaws lie deeper. It is true that the argument has a feeling of achieving its conclusion as if by magic. One is tempted to say: why couldn't F itself engage in just the same reasoning?. But although there are various directions in which one might try to attack the argument, no knockdown refutation immediately presents itself. For this reason, the argument is quite challenging. Compared to previous versions, this argument is much more worthy of attention from supporters of AI. Chalmers finally concludes that the flaw for Godel, which Penrose also assumed, is the assumption that we can know we are sound. So the other way around, if Godel is correct, so is the Penrose second argument, which Chalmers confirmed. However, Chalmers seems to be saying the Godel is incorrect, hardly a basis for my paper. Personally, when I am sound, I know I am sound. When I am unsound I usually know that I am unsound. However, psychosis runs in my family, and many times I have watched a relative lapse into psychosis without him realizing it. Besides I sent the paper to Chalmers and he had no problem with. But he did wish me luck getting it published. He knew something I had not yet learned. Richard On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 8:19 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: A quibble with the beginning of Richard's paper. On the first page it says: 'It is beyond the scope of this paper and admittedly beyond my understanding to delve into Gödelian logic, which seems to be self-referential proof by contradiction, except to mention that Penrose in Shadows of the Mind(1994), as confirmed by David Chalmers(1995), arrived at a seemingly valid 7 step proof that human “reasoning powers cannot be captured by any formal system”.' If you actually read Chalmers' paper at http://web.archive.org/web/20090204164739/http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-09-chalmers.htmlhe definitely does *not* confirm Penrose's argument! He says in the paper that Penrose has two basic arguments for his conclusions about consciousness, and at the end of the section titled the first argument he concludes that the first one fails: 2.16 It is section 3.3 that carries the burden of this strand of Penrose's argument, but unfortunately it seems to be one of the least convincing sections in the book. By his assumption that the relevant class of computational systems are all straightforward axiom-and-rules system, Penrose is not taking AI seriously, and certainly is not doing enough to establish his conclusion that physics is uncomputable. I conclude that none of Penrose's argument up to this point put a dent in the natural AI position: that our reasoning powers may be captured by a sound formal system F, where we cannot determine that F is sound. Then when dealing with Penrose's second argument, he says that Penrose draws the wrong conclusions; where Penrose concludes that our reasoning cannot be the product of any formal system, Chalmers concludes that the actual issue is that we cannot be 100% sure our reasoning is sound (which I understand to mean we can never be 100% sure that we have not made a false conclusion about whether all the propositions we have proved true or false actually have that truth-value in true arithmetic): 3.12 We can see, then, that the assumption that we know we are sound leads to a contradiction. One might try to pin the blame on one of the other assumptions, but all these seem quite straightforward. Indeed, these include the sort of implicit assumptions that Penrose appeals to in his arguments all the time. Indeed, one could make the case that all of premises (1)-(4) are implicitly appealed to in Penrose's main argument. For the purposes of the argument against Penrose, it does not really matter which we blame for the contradiction, but I think it is fairly clear that it is the assumption that the system knows that it is sound that causes most of the damage. It is this assumption, then, that should be withdrawn. 3.13 Penrose has therefore pointed to a false culprit. When the contradiction is reached, he pins the blame on the assumption that our reasoning powers are captured by a formal system F. But the argument above shows that this assumption is inessential in reaching the contradiction: A similar contradiction, via a not dissimilar sort of argument, can be reached even in the absence of that assumption. It follows that the responsibility for the contradiction lies elsewhere than in the assumption of computability. It is the assumption about knowledge of soundness that should be withdrawn. 3.14 Still, Penrose's argument has succeeded in clarifying some issues. In a sense,
Re: A remark on Richard's paper
On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 8:41 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Jesse, This is what Chalmers says in the 95 paper you link about the second Penrose argument, the one in my paper: 3.5 As far as I can determine, this argument is free of the obvious flaws that plague other Gödelian arguments, such as Lucas's argument and Penrose's earlier arguments. If it is flawed, the flaws lie deeper. It is true that the argument has a feeling of achieving its conclusion as if by magic. One is tempted to say: why couldn't F itself engage in just the same reasoning?. But although there are various directions in which one might try to attack the argument, no knockdown refutation immediately presents itself. For this reason, the argument is quite challenging. Compared to previous versions, this argument is much more worthy of attention from supporters of AI. Chalmers finally concludes that the flaw for Godel, which Penrose also assumed, is the assumption that we can know we are sound. So the other way around, if Godel is correct, so is the Penrose second argument, which Chalmers confirmed. However, Chalmers seems to be saying the Godel is incorrect, hardly a basis for my paper. What do you mean the flaw for Godel? There is no doubt that Godel's mathematical proof is correct, and if you think Chalmers is suggesting any such doubt in his paper you are misreading him. The argument he's talking about is one specifically concerning human intelligence, which Godel's mathematical proof says nothing about (Godel did offer some brief comments about the implications of his mathematical proof for human intelligence, but they were very brief and somewhat ambiguous, see http://www.iep.utm.edu/lp-argue/#H4 ). And I already quoted his conclusions about the second argument, after the section you quote above: that although Chalmers agrees that Penrose's second argument does show that *either* our reasoning cannot be captured by a formal system *or* that we cannot be sure our reasoning is sound, Chalmers thinks Penrose is wrong to prefer the first option rather than the second. Personally, when I am sound, I know I am sound. When I am unsound I usually know that I am unsound. However, psychosis runs in my family, and many times I have watched a relative lapse into psychosis without him realizing it. Chalmers/Penrose aren't talking about sound in the ordinary colloquial sense of sanity or anything like that, they're talking about soundness in the sense of perfect mathematical certainty that there is absolutely no chance--not even a chance of 1 in 10^10 or smaller, say--that they might have made an error in their judgement about the truth or falsity of some (potentially very complicated) proposition about arithmetic. Besides I sent the paper to Chalmers and he had no problem with. But he did wish me luck getting it published. He knew something I had not yet learned. Richard Did Chalmers offer any detailed commentary suggesting he had read through the whole thing carefully? If not it's possible he skimmed it and missed that sentence, or just read the abstract and decided it didn't interest him, but sent the note out of politeness. Jesse On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 8:19 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: A quibble with the beginning of Richard's paper. On the first page it says: 'It is beyond the scope of this paper and admittedly beyond my understanding to delve into Gödelian logic, which seems to be self-referential proof by contradiction, except to mention that Penrose in Shadows of the Mind(1994), as confirmed by David Chalmers(1995), arrived at a seemingly valid 7 step proof that human “reasoning powers cannot be captured by any formal system”.' If you actually read Chalmers' paper at http://web.archive.org/web/20090204164739/http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-09-chalmers.htmlhe definitely does *not* confirm Penrose's argument! He says in the paper that Penrose has two basic arguments for his conclusions about consciousness, and at the end of the section titled the first argument he concludes that the first one fails: 2.16 It is section 3.3 that carries the burden of this strand of Penrose's argument, but unfortunately it seems to be one of the least convincing sections in the book. By his assumption that the relevant class of computational systems are all straightforward axiom-and-rules system, Penrose is not taking AI seriously, and certainly is not doing enough to establish his conclusion that physics is uncomputable. I conclude that none of Penrose's argument up to this point put a dent in the natural AI position: that our reasoning powers may be captured by a sound formal system F, where we cannot determine that F is sound. Then when dealing with Penrose's second argument, he says that Penrose draws the wrong conclusions; where Penrose concludes that our reasoning cannot be the product of any formal system, Chalmers
Re: A remark on Richard's paper
My apologies. When Chalmers used the words godelian argument I thought he was referring to Godel. Now I can see I misread it. On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 9:09 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 8:41 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.comwrote: Jesse, This is what Chalmers says in the 95 paper you link about the second Penrose argument, the one in my paper: 3.5 As far as I can determine, this argument is free of the obvious flaws that plague other Gödelian arguments, such as Lucas's argument and Penrose's earlier arguments. If it is flawed, the flaws lie deeper. It is true that the argument has a feeling of achieving its conclusion as if by magic. One is tempted to say: why couldn't F itself engage in just the same reasoning?. But although there are various directions in which one might try to attack the argument, no knockdown refutation immediately presents itself. For this reason, the argument is quite challenging. Compared to previous versions, this argument is much more worthy of attention from supporters of AI. Chalmers finally concludes that the flaw for Godel, which Penrose also assumed, is the assumption that we can know we are sound. So the other way around, if Godel is correct, so is the Penrose second argument, which Chalmers confirmed. However, Chalmers seems to be saying the Godel is incorrect, hardly a basis for my paper. What do you mean the flaw for Godel? There is no doubt that Godel's mathematical proof is correct, and if you think Chalmers is suggesting any such doubt in his paper you are misreading him. The argument he's talking about is one specifically concerning human intelligence, which Godel's mathematical proof says nothing about (Godel did offer some brief comments about the implications of his mathematical proof for human intelligence, but they were very brief and somewhat ambiguous, see http://www.iep.utm.edu/lp-argue/#H4 ). And I already quoted his conclusions about the second argument, after the section you quote above: that although Chalmers agrees that Penrose's second argument does show that *either* our reasoning cannot be captured by a formal system *or* that we cannot be sure our reasoning is sound, Chalmers thinks Penrose is wrong to prefer the first option rather than the second. Personally, when I am sound, I know I am sound. When I am unsound I usually know that I am unsound. However, psychosis runs in my family, and many times I have watched a relative lapse into psychosis without him realizing it. Chalmers/Penrose aren't talking about sound in the ordinary colloquial sense of sanity or anything like that, they're talking about soundness in the sense of perfect mathematical certainty that there is absolutely no chance--not even a chance of 1 in 10^10 or smaller, say--that they might have made an error in their judgement about the truth or falsity of some (potentially very complicated) proposition about arithmetic. Besides I sent the paper to Chalmers and he had no problem with. But he did wish me luck getting it published. He knew something I had not yet learned. Richard Did Chalmers offer any detailed commentary suggesting he had read through the whole thing carefully? If not it's possible he skimmed it and missed that sentence, or just read the abstract and decided it didn't interest him, but sent the note out of politeness. Jesse On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 8:19 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.comwrote: A quibble with the beginning of Richard's paper. On the first page it says: 'It is beyond the scope of this paper and admittedly beyond my understanding to delve into Gödelian logic, which seems to be self-referential proof by contradiction, except to mention that Penrose in Shadows of the Mind(1994), as confirmed by David Chalmers(1995), arrived at a seemingly valid 7 step proof that human “reasoning powers cannot be captured by any formal system”.' If you actually read Chalmers' paper at http://web.archive.org/web/20090204164739/http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-09-chalmers.htmlhe definitely does *not* confirm Penrose's argument! He says in the paper that Penrose has two basic arguments for his conclusions about consciousness, and at the end of the section titled the first argument he concludes that the first one fails: 2.16 It is section 3.3 that carries the burden of this strand of Penrose's argument, but unfortunately it seems to be one of the least convincing sections in the book. By his assumption that the relevant class of computational systems are all straightforward axiom-and-rules system, Penrose is not taking AI seriously, and certainly is not doing enough to establish his conclusion that physics is uncomputable. I conclude that none of Penrose's argument up to this point put a dent in the natural AI position: that our reasoning powers may be captured by a sound formal system F, where we cannot
Re: A remark on Richard's paper
On 8/23/2012 8:07 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Stephan, Thanks for the compliment. I finally got someone with smarts to read it other than Chalmers and S_T Yau. Dear Richard, You are most welcome. I have learned to value the ideas of other people, simply because one can never know what one has missed in thinking about something. ;-) Time inflates along with 3 dimensions in the big bang. Leaving 6 dimensions behind to compactify or curl up into tiny balls 1000 planck lengths across each with 500 holes. So each 6-d ball is a fixed structure and 10^90/cc of them fill the universe. Hardly a single structure. But isn't the entire 10d structure a single object. It could embedded into a 11+ dimensional space and moved and rotated about, no? Well I really cannot say how time works. Don't know if it is linear,or nonlinear, if it inflates or deflates. Most of string theory appears to threat time as part of a 4-D background spacetime. The paper has little to do with time. Perhaps it is required for Pratt theory? I have thought about time a lot. It is the focus of my research, but I have had to deal with many related issues (such as the mind-body problem) to find a solution. Pratt's theory gives us a way to think about time as a sequential ordering of events (consistent with Leibniz's ideas). Pratt's residuation process can even be thought of as a generator of temporal sequences (for each and every observer). I have found a way to model residuation using the idea of bisimulation which is an equivalence relation between computations and some Category theory. Time is thus understood as a local and first person process that can, via concurrency, become objective (3p via consensus of all bisimulating monads) and thus leading to the appearance of a dimension (since the sequencings allow for mapping to the positive Real Line in the continuum limit). One thing must be understood: to properly understand Pratt's theory we have to adopt a Heraclitian paradigm http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0type=summaryurl=/journals/perspectives_on_science/v009/9.4pitt02.html where becoming (as opposed to Being) is fundamental. The reasoning about time that I used was mostly developed by Prof. Hitoshi Kitada and discussed in his many papers: http://www.metasciences.ac/Articles/works.html Richard On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 6:38 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: Dear Richard, Your paper http://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf is very interesting. It reminds me a lot of Stephen Wolfram's cellular automaton theory. I only have one big problem with it. The 10d manifold would be a single fixed structure that, while conceivably capable of running the computations and/or implementing the Peano arithmetic, has a problem with the role of time in it. You might have a solution to this problem that I see that I did not deduce as I read your paper. How do you define time for your model? -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A remark on Richard's paper
Dear Jesse, Thank you for this very nice remark. I will have to think about it and read your reference. On 8/23/2012 8:19 PM, Jesse Mazer wrote: A quibble with the beginning of Richard's paper. On the first page it says: 'It is beyond the scope of this paper and admittedly beyond my understanding to delve into Gödelian logic, which seems to be self-referential proof by contradiction, except to mention that Penrose in Shadows of the Mind(1994), as confirmed by David Chalmers(1995), arrived at a seemingly valid 7 step proof that human “reasoning powers cannot be captured by any formal system”.' If you actually read Chalmers' paper at http://web.archive.org/web/20090204164739/http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-09-chalmers.html he definitely does *not* confirm Penrose's argument! He says in the paper that Penrose has two basic arguments for his conclusions about consciousness, and at the end of the section titled the first argument he concludes that the first one fails: 2.16 It is section 3.3 that carries the burden of this strand of Penrose's argument, but unfortunately it seems to be one of the least convincing sections in the book. By his assumption that the relevant class of computational systems are all straightforward axiom-and-rules system, Penrose is not taking AI seriously, and certainly is not doing enough to establish his conclusion that physics is uncomputable. I conclude that none of Penrose's argument up to this point put a dent in the natural AI position: that our reasoning powers may be captured by a sound formal system F, where we cannot determine that F is sound. Then when dealing with Penrose's second argument, he says that Penrose draws the wrong conclusions; where Penrose concludes that our reasoning cannot be the product of any formal system, Chalmers concludes that the actual issue is that we cannot be 100% sure our reasoning is sound (which I understand to mean we can never be 100% sure that we have not made a false conclusion about whether all the propositions we have proved true or false actually have that truth-value in true arithmetic): 3.12 We can see, then, that the assumption that we know we are sound leads to a contradiction. One might try to pin the blame on one of the other assumptions, but all these seem quite straightforward. Indeed, these include the sort of implicit assumptions that Penrose appeals to in his arguments all the time. Indeed, one could make the case that all of premises (1)-(4) are implicitly appealed to in Penrose's main argument. For the purposes of the argument against Penrose, it does not really matter which we blame for the contradiction, but I think it is fairly clear that it is the assumption that the system knows that it is sound that causes most of the damage. It is this assumption, then, that should be withdrawn. 3.13 Penrose has therefore pointed to a false culprit. When the contradiction is reached, he pins the blame on the assumption that our reasoning powers are captured by a formal system F. But the argument above shows that this assumption is inessential in reaching the contradiction: A similar contradiction, via a not dissimilar sort of argument, can be reached even in the absence of that assumption. It follows that the responsibility for the contradiction lies elsewhere than in the assumption of computability. It is the assumption about knowledge of soundness that should be withdrawn. 3.14 Still, Penrose's argument has succeeded in clarifying some issues. In a sense, it shows where the deepest flaw in Gödelian arguments lies. One might have thought that the deepest flaw lay in the unjustified claim that one can see the soundness of certain formal systems that underlie our own reasoning. But in fact, if the above analysis is correct, the deepest flaw lies in the assumption that we know that we are sound. All Gödelian arguments appeal to this premise somewhere, but in fact the premise generates a contradiction. Perhaps we are sound, but we cannot know unassailably that we are sound. So it seems Chalmers would have no problem with the natural AI position he discussed earlier, that our reasoning could be adequately captured by a computer simulation that did not come to its top-level conclusions about mathematics via a strict axiom/proof method involving the mathematical questions themselves, but rather by some underlying fallible structure like a neural network. The bottom-level behavior of the simulated neurons themselves would be deducible given the initial state of the system using the axiom/proof method, but that doesn't mean the system as a whole might not make errors in mathematical calculations; see Douglas Hofstadter's discussion of this issue starting on p. 571 of Godel Escher Bach, the section titled Irrational and Rational Can Coexist on Different Levels, where he writes: Another way to gain perspective on this is to remember that a
Re: A remark on Richard's paper
On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 9:44 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 8/23/2012 8:07 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Stephan, Thanks for the compliment. I finally got someone with smarts to read it other than Chalmers and S_T Yau. Dear Richard, You are most welcome. I have learned to value the ideas of other people, simply because one can never know what one has missed in thinking about something. ;-) Time inflates along with 3 dimensions in the big bang. Leaving 6 dimensions behind to compactify or curl up into tiny balls 1000 planck lengths across each with 500 holes. So each 6-d ball is a fixed structure and 10^90/cc of them fill the universe. Hardly a single structure. But isn't the entire 10d structure a single object. It could embedded into a 11+ dimensional space and moved and rotated about, no? Not according to Yau http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Calabi-Yau_manifold#Calabi-Yau_manifolds_in_string_theory Well I really cannot say how time works. Don't know if it is linear,or nonlinear, if it inflates or deflates. Most of string theory appears to threat time as part of a 4-D background spacetime. The paper has little to do with time. Perhaps it is required for Pratt theory? I have thought about time a lot. It is the focus of my research, but I have had to deal with many related issues (such as the mind-body problem) to find a solution. Pratt's theory gives us a way to think about time as a sequential ordering of events (consistent with Leibniz's ideas). Pratt's residuation process can even be thought of as a generator of temporal sequences (for each and every observer). I have found a way to model residuation using the idea of bisimulation which is an equivalence relation between computations and some Category theory. Time is thus understood as a local and first person process that can, via concurrency, become objective (3p via consensus of all bisimulating monads) and thus leading to the appearance of a dimension (since the sequencings allow for mapping to the positive Real Line in the continuum limit). One thing must be understood: to properly understand Pratt's theory we have to adopt a Heraclitian paradigmhttp://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0type=summaryurl=/journals/perspectives_on_science/v009/9.4pitt02.htmlwhere becoming (as opposed to Being) is fundamental. By your method, can you understand why in the GR analysis of a black hole, the time dimension turns into the radial space dimension inside the event horizon. That would seem to give time some credence as a dimension. The reasoning about time that I used was mostly developed by Prof. Hitoshi Kitada and discussed in his many papers: http://www.metasciences.ac/Articles/works.html Richard On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 6:38 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: Dear Richard, Your paper http://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf is very interesting. It reminds me a lot of Stephen Wolfram's cellular automaton theory. I only have one big problem with it. The 10d manifold would be a single fixed structure that, while conceivably capable of running the computations and/or implementing the Peano arithmetic, has a problem with the role of time in it. You might have a solution to this problem that I see that I did not deduce as I read your paper. How do you define time for your model? -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A remark on Richard's paper
On 8/23/2012 11:00 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 9:44 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 8/23/2012 8:07 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Stephan, Thanks for the compliment. I finally got someone with smarts to read it other than Chalmers and S_T Yau. Dear Richard, You are most welcome. I have learned to value the ideas of other people, simply because one can never know what one has missed in thinking about something. ;-) Time inflates along with 3 dimensions in the big bang. Leaving 6 dimensions behind to compactify or curl up into tiny balls 1000 planck lengths across each with 500 holes. So each 6-d ball is a fixed structure and 10^90/cc of them fill the universe. Hardly a single structure. But isn't the entire 10d structure a single object. It could embedded into a 11+ dimensional space and moved and rotated about, no? Not according to Yau http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Calabi-Yau_manifold#Calabi-Yau_manifolds_in_string_theory Dear Richard, Please let me cut and paste the relevant paragraph from that article: They require in particular that the theory takes place in a 10-dimensional space-time. To make contact with our 4-dimensional world, it is expected that the 10-dimensional space-time of string theory is locally the product M4×X of a 4-dimensional Minkowski space M3,1 with a 6-dimensional space X . The 6-dimensional space X would be tiny, which would explain why it has not been detected so far at the existing experimental energy levels. Each choice of the internal space X leads to a different effective theory on the 4-dimensional Minkowski space M3,1 , which should be the theory describing our world. The M4 is what is commonly referred to as space-time in physics. The X is a manifold that is fibered onto each and every point of M4 using the fiber bundle method - standard differential topology stuff. The product of M4 and X is itself a topological space that can be embedded into a higher dimensional space and is subject to transformations on its own. This embedding is not assumed in string theory but it is mathematically possible (i.e. there does exist a 10d subspace of a 11d space that is identical to M4xX). Because of this my claim above stands. Prof. Kitada considered a kind product space-time as a different but equivalent possibility in his work and after some discussions agreed with me that this was problematic as it makes the problem of time impossible to solve. I will not do into the details of the reasoning here as it is long, but please re-think this. This paper discusses Prof. Kitada's reasoning: http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/gr-qc/9708055 Well I really cannot say how time works. Don't know if it is linear,or nonlinear, if it inflates or deflates. Most of string theory appears to threat time as part of a 4-D background spacetime. The paper has little to do with time. Perhaps it is required for Pratt theory? I have thought about time a lot. It is the focus of my research, but I have had to deal with many related issues (such as the mind-body problem) to find a solution. Pratt's theory gives us a way to think about time as a sequential ordering of events (consistent with Leibniz's ideas). Pratt's residuation process can even be thought of as a generator of temporal sequences (for each and every observer). I have found a way to model residuation using the idea of bisimulation which is an equivalence relation between computations and some Category theory. Time is thus understood as a local and first person process that can, via concurrency, become objective (3p via consensus of all bisimulating monads) and thus leading to the appearance of a dimension (since the sequencings allow for mapping to the positive Real Line in the continuum limit). One thing must be understood: to properly understand Pratt's theory we have to adopt a Heraclitian paradigm http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0type=summaryurl=/journals/perspectives_on_science/v009/9.4pitt02.html where becoming (as opposed to Being) is fundamental. By your method, can you understand why in the GR analysis of a black hole, the time dimension turns into the radial space dimension inside the event horizon. That would seem to give time some credence as a dimension. Sure, I am familiar with this transformation (it is a fun exercise to map out the vectors of flows through event horizons that take this into account, it yields a pattern that looks exactly like the field lines of an electrical charge!) but the entire definition of the black hole assumes from the onset the dimensional representation of time. I don't disagree with the math as it is only a representation of an idea (made precisely and consistently), I am just asking
