Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2005-09-20 Thread Hal Ruhl

An analysis I have made of my model:

My model's foundation is not mathematics but the list of potential 
properties of things.  The only mathematical like concepts I then use are 
power set, incompleteness, and inconsistency and these are derived from 
simply parsing the list.  If my list is infinite and countable and its line 
items representable by finite bit strings then my starting point is just 
the natural numbers [including zero] along with an assignment of meaning to 
each.


As I understand it the cardinality of the set of subsets of the natural 
numbers [i.e. the All and its kernels as power set] is the same as the 
cardinality of the reals i.e. c.   One can therefore form a one to one 
correspondence between the kernels and the reals.  In this pairing the real 
member of the pair can be thought of as representing the kernel half of the 
pair.  Therefore the All is just the set of reals with an assigned meaning 
for each.


Hal Ruhl




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2005-09-20 Thread Hal Ruhl

My analysis continued:

Self awareness and consciousness:

If the All is just the set of reals with an assigned meaning for each then 
undoubtedly some of these meanings would be kernels that contain sub 
kernels describing Self Aware Structures [SAS].  Given the random nature of 
the dynamic I derive in my model for the evolution of Somethings, the 
Instantation of Reality given to kernels as they are encompassed by the 
Somethings will have dwells of all durations.  Some dwells for some kernels 
representing states of universes will have a duration that provides an 
apparent connection between states or flow of awareness  [a flow of 
consciousness] for its SAS.


Hal Ruhl




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2005-09-19 Thread Hal Ruhl
I have attached a revision to my model at (9) which makes the driver for 
the evolution of the Somethings more explicit.


Definitions:

The list of all possibilities: The list of all the possible properties and 
aspects of things.  This list can not be empty since there is unlikely to 
be less than nothing and a nothing has at least one property - 
emptiness.  The list is most likely at least countably infinite.


Information: Information is the potential to establish a boundary on the 
list of all possibilities.


Kernel of information: The information relevant to a specific boundary.

The All: The complete ensemble of kernels.

The Nothing: That which is empty of all kernels.

The Everything: The boundary which establishes the All and separates it 
from the Nothing and thus it also establishes the Nothing.  It could be 
said to contain both.


A Something: A division [by a boundary] of the All into two subparts.

True Noise: The inconsistency of the evolution of a Something reflected in 
the course of physical reality given to universes within it.


Model

Proposal: The Existence of our and other universes and their dynamics are 
the result of unavoidable definition and logical incompleteness.


Justification:

1) Notice that Defining is the same as establishing a boundary - on the 
list of all possibilities [1def] - between what a thing is and what it is 
not.  This defines a second thing: the is not.  A thing can not be 
defined in isolation.


2) Given the definitions of the All, the Nothing, and the Everything:

3) These definitions are interdependent because you can not have one 
without the whole set.


4) These definitions are unavoidable because at least one of the [All, 
Nothing] pair must exist.  Since they form an [is, is not] pair they 
bootstrap each other into existence via a single combined definition - the 
Everything.


5) The Nothing has a logical problem: since it is empty of kernels it can 
not answer any meaningful question about itself including the unavoidable 
one of its own stability [persistence].


6) To answer this unavoidable question the Nothing must at some point 
penetrate the boundary between itself and the All [the only place 
information resides] in an attempt to complete itself.  This could be 
viewed as a spontaneous symmetry breaking.


7) However, the boundary is permanent as required by the definitional [is, 
is not] pairing and a Nothing must be restored.


8) Thus the penetration process repeats in an always was and always will 
be manner.


9) The boundary penetration described above produces a shock wave [a 
boundary] that moves into the All as the old Nothing becomes a Something 
and tries to complete itself [perhaps like a Big Bang event].  This divides 
the All into two evolving Somethings - i.e. evolving multiverses.  Evolving 
Somethings are unlikely to reach completeness short of encompassing the 
entire All.  Notice that half the multiverses are contracting - i.e. 
losing kernels [but the cardinality of the number of kernels would be at 
least the cardinality of the list of all possibilities].


10) Notice that the All also has a logical problem.  Looking at the same 
meaningful question of its own stability it contains all possible answers 
because just one answer would constitute an exclusion of specific kernels 
which is contradictory to the definition of the All as the complete kernel 
ensemble.   Thus the All is internally inconsistent.


11) Therefore the motion of a shock wave boundary in the All must echo this 
inconsistency.  That is each step in the motion as it encompasses kernel 
after kernel [the evolution of a Something] can not be completely dependent 
on any past motion of that boundary.


12) Some kernels are states of universes and when the boundary of an 
evolving Something passes about a kernel, the kernel can have a moment of 
physical reality.  [This moment can extend so that successor states can 
have a degree of overlapping physical reality resulting in a flow of 
consciousness for some sequences for universes that contain Self Aware 
Structures.]


13)  From within any Something the future pattern of reality moments due to 
(11) would be non deterministic i.e. suffer True Noise.


14) The All of course contains a kernel re the founding definition and thus 
there is an infinitely nested potential to have All/Nothing pairs.  This 
completes the system in that the origin of the dynamic basically destroys 
[Nothing, All] pairs but there is an infinite potential to form new Nothings.


Hal Ruhl






Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2005-01-01 Thread Hal Ruhl
The following version of my system description may aid reading it.
x
Proposal: The Existence of our and other universes and their dynamics are 
the result of unavoidable definition and logical incompleteness.

Justification:
Definitions:
[1] Information: Information is the potential to establish a boundary.
[2] Kernel of information: The information required for the potential to 
establish a specific boundary.

[3] The All: The complete kernel ensemble.
[4] The Nothing: That which is empty of all kernels.
[5] The Everything: The boundary which contains the All and separates it 
from the Nothing and thus it also contains the Nothing.

[6] A Something: A division [by a boundary] of the All into two subparts.
[7] True noise: An inconsistency of the evolution of a Something reflected 
in the course of physical reality given to universes within it.

Justification steps:
1) Notice that Defining is the same as establishing a boundary between 
what a thing is and what it is not.  This defines a second thing: the is 
not.  A thing can not be defined in isolation.

2) Given definitions [3], [4], and [5]:
3) These definitions are interdependent because you can not have one 
without the whole set.

4) These definitions are unavoidable because at least one of the [All, 
Nothing] pair must exist.  Since they form an [is, is not] pair and the 
boundary between that pair they bootstrap each other into existence as a 
single definition.

5) The Nothing has a logical problem: since it is empty of kernels it can 
not answer any meaningful question about itself including the unavoidable 
one of its own stability [persistence].

6) To answer this unavoidable question the Nothing must at some point 
penetrate the boundary between itself and the All [the only place 
information resides] in an attempt to complete itself.  This could be 
viewed as a spontaneous symmetry breaking.

7) However, the boundary is permanent as required by the definitions and a 
Nothing must remain.

8) Thus the penetration process repeats in an always was and always will 
be manner.

9) The boundary penetration produces a shock wave [a boundary] that moves 
into the All as the old example of Nothing becomes a Something and tries to 
complete itself.  This divides the All into two evolving Somethings - 
evolving multiverses.  Notice that half the multiverses are contracting - 
losing kernels.

10) Notice that the All also has a logical problem.  Looking at the same 
meaningful question of its own stability it contains all possible answers 
because just one would constitute a selection i.e. net internal information 
which is not an aspect of a complete kernel ensemble.   Thus the All is 
internally inconsistent.

11) Therefore the motion of a shock wave boundary in the All must be echo 
this inconsistency.  That is each step in the motion as it encompasses 
kernel after kernel [the evolution of a Something] can not be completely 
dependent on any past motion.

12) Some kernels are states of universes and when the boundary of an 
evolving Something passes about a kernel, the kernel can have a moment of 
physical reality.

13)  From within any Something the future course of reality would be non 
deterministic i.e. suffer True Noise.

14) The All of course contains a kernel re the founding definition and thus 
there is an infinitely nested potential to have All/Nothing pairs.  This 
completes the system in that the origin of the dynamic basically destroys 
[Nothing, All] pairs but there is an infinite potential to form new 
Nothings.  The infinite nesting in this definition does not effect the zero 
information of the All because kernels that are definitions [is, is not] 
pairs can be balanced by an [is not, is] definitional pair kernel which 
defines the same entities.

Hal



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-26 Thread Hal Ruhl
Below is a background for my model and a rewrite of the original post.
My concerns with a TOE which I am trying to resolve are:
I would like to see the theory have a zero information content.
I would like an origin for what we perceive as a changing reality - a dynamic.
Postulating the existence of entities like an Everything or a Plenitude 
etc. seemed to me to leave residual information in the system because the 
definitional structure surrounding these concepts was like a label with an 
unfulfilled potential to distinguish another entity not in the system i.e. 
a Nothing.

This eventually lead to the idea that definition was actually a boundary 
separating what a thing being defined is from what it is not and the is 
not is another thing.  So definition simultaneously defines two entities - 
an [is, is not] pair.

Another Idea I posted on awhile back was that a dynamic could be based on 
the incompleteness of the Nothing.  It could resolve no meaningful 
questions about itself.  Was there such a question?  I proposed that it 
must resolve the question of its own stability - will it 
persist.  Eventually the Nothing would have to spontaneously become 
something to try to resolve this question and this something would then 
evolve as it tried to complete itself and become an Everything.

However if the Everything and the Nothing were a defintional [is, is 
not] pair which seemed reasonable what would give existence preference to 
one over the other and simultaneously put the system in a state of unused 
potential to divide i.e. contain information.

The existence of at least one of the pair seemed assured so could the 
system work if both existed simultaneously?

This eventually resulted in my post which is revised below.
Definitions:
1) Information: Information is the potential to establish a boundary.
2) Kernel of information: The information required for the potential to 
establish a specific boundary.

3) The All: The complete kernel ensemble.
4) The Nothing: That which is empty of all kernels.
5) The Everything: The boundary which contains the All and separates it 
from the Nothing.  Thus it also contains the Nothing.

6) A Something: A division [by a boundary] of the All into two subparts.
7) True noise: An inconsistency of the evolution of a Something reflected 
in the course of physical reality given to universes within it.

Proposal: The Existence of our and other universes and their dynamics are 
the result of unavoidable definition and logical incompleteness.

Justification:
1) Given definitions 3, 4, and 5:
2) These definitions are interdependent because you can not have one 
without the whole set.

3) Notice that Defining is the same as establishing a boundary between 
what a thing is and what it is not.  This defines a second thing: the is 
not.  A thing can not be defined in isolation.

4) These definitions are unavoidable because at least one of the [All, 
Nothing] pair must exist.  Since they form an [is, is not] pair they 
bootstrap each other into existence.

5) The Nothing has a logical problem: since it is empty of kernels it can 
not answer any meaningful question about itself including the unavoidable 
one of its own stability [persistence].

6) To answer this unavoidable question the Nothing must at some point 
penetrate the boundary between itself and the All [the only place 
information resides] in an attempt to complete itself.  This could be 
viewed as a spontaneous symmetry breaking.

7) However, the boundary is permanent as required by the definitions and a 
Nothing must remain.

8) Thus the penetration process repeats in an always was and always will 
be manner.

9) The boundary penetration produces a shock wave [a boundary] that moves 
into the All as the old example of Nothing becomes a Something and tries to 
complete itself.  This divides the All into two evolving Somethings - 
evolving multiverses.  Notice that half the multiverses are contracting - 
losing kernels.

10) Notice that the All also has a logical problem.  Looking at the same 
meaningful question of its own stability it contains all possible answers 
because just one would constitute a selection i.e. net internal information 
which is not an aspect of a complete kernel ensemble.   Thus the All is 
internally inconsistent.

11) Therefore the motion of a shock wave boundary in the All must be echo 
this inconsistency.  That is each step in the motion as it encompasses 
kernel after kernel [the evolution of a Something] can not be completely 
dependent on any past motion.

12) Some kernels are states of universes and when the boundary of an 
evolving Something passes about a kernel, the kernel can have a moment of 
physical reality.

13)  From within any Something the future course of reality would be non 
deterministic i.e. suffer True Noise.

Hal



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-26 Thread Stephen Paul King
Dear Hal,
   About this zero information feature, could it be due to a strict 
communitivity between any given subset of the All/Nothing? I ask this 
because it seems to me that the information content of any string follows 
from the existence of a difference between one ordering of the bits as 
compared to another. Commutativity would erase (bad choice of wording) the 
difference. In your theory, the distinction between what it *is* from what 
it *is not, when we chain it out to tuples, is obviously a 
non-commutativity property, at least.

Kindest regards,
Stephen
- Original Message - 
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, December 26, 2004 1:23 PM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model


Below is a background for my model and a rewrite of the original post.
My concerns with a TOE which I am trying to resolve are:
I would like to see the theory have a zero information content.
I would like an origin for what we perceive as a changing reality - a 
dynamic.

Postulating the existence of entities like an Everything or a 
Plenitude etc. seemed to me to leave residual information in the system 
because the definitional structure surrounding these concepts was like a 
label with an unfulfilled potential to distinguish another entity not in 
the system i.e. a Nothing.

This eventually lead to the idea that definition was actually a boundary 
separating what a thing being defined is from what it is not and the is 
not is another thing.  So definition simultaneously defines two 
entities - an [is, is not] pair.

Another Idea I posted on awhile back was that a dynamic could be based on 
the incompleteness of the Nothing.  It could resolve no meaningful 
questions about itself.  Was there such a question?  I proposed that it 
must resolve the question of its own stability - will it persist. 
Eventually the Nothing would have to spontaneously become something to try 
to resolve this question and this something would then evolve as it tried 
to complete itself and become an Everything.

However if the Everything and the Nothing were a defintional [is, is 
not] pair which seemed reasonable what would give existence preference to 
one over the other and simultaneously put the system in a state of unused 
potential to divide i.e. contain information.

The existence of at least one of the pair seemed assured so could the 
system work if both existed simultaneously?

This eventually resulted in my post which is revised below.
Definitions:
1) Information: Information is the potential to establish a boundary.
2) Kernel of information: The information required for the potential to 
establish a specific boundary.

3) The All: The complete kernel ensemble.
4) The Nothing: That which is empty of all kernels.
5) The Everything: The boundary which contains the All and separates it 
from the Nothing.  Thus it also contains the Nothing.

6) A Something: A division [by a boundary] of the All into two subparts.
7) True noise: An inconsistency of the evolution of a Something reflected 
in the course of physical reality given to universes within it.

Proposal: The Existence of our and other universes and their dynamics are 
the result of unavoidable definition and logical incompleteness.

Justification:
1) Given definitions 3, 4, and 5:
2) These definitions are interdependent because you can not have one 
without the whole set.

3) Notice that Defining is the same as establishing a boundary between 
what a thing is and what it is not.  This defines a second thing: the is 
not.  A thing can not be defined in isolation.

4) These definitions are unavoidable because at least one of the [All, 
Nothing] pair must exist.  Since they form an [is, is not] pair they 
bootstrap each other into existence.

5) The Nothing has a logical problem: since it is empty of kernels it can 
not answer any meaningful question about itself including the unavoidable 
one of its own stability [persistence].

6) To answer this unavoidable question the Nothing must at some point 
penetrate the boundary between itself and the All [the only place 
information resides] in an attempt to complete itself.  This could be 
viewed as a spontaneous symmetry breaking.

7) However, the boundary is permanent as required by the definitions and a 
Nothing must remain.

8) Thus the penetration process repeats in an always was and always will 
be manner.

9) The boundary penetration produces a shock wave [a boundary] that 
moves into the All as the old example of Nothing becomes a Something and 
tries to complete itself.  This divides the All into two evolving 
Somethings - evolving multiverses.  Notice that half the multiverses are 
contracting - losing kernels.

10) Notice that the All also has a logical problem.  Looking at the same 
meaningful question of its own stability it contains all possible answers 
because just one would constitute a selection i.e. net internal 
information which is not an aspect of a complete

Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-26 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Stephen:
Since the Nothing has no information by definition and the boundary between 
them - the Everything - has no potential to divide further [i.e. no 
information] then the All must have no information if the system has no 
information.  I do not think the latter part is controversial.  For this to 
be so, somehow the kernels within the All sum to no net information.  Like 
red, green, and blue can sum to white when viewed from a proper 
perspective.  I used to call these complete sets of counterfactuals.

To finish responding to a previous question in the thread if a complete set 
of counterfactuals was composed of just two kernels these kernels would be 
what I called pair wise inconsistent kernels.

Hal
At 02:45 PM 12/26/2004, you wrote:
Dear Hal,
   About this zero information feature, could it be due to a strict 
communitivity between any given subset of the All/Nothing? I ask this 
because it seems to me that the information content of any string 
follows from the existence of a difference between one ordering of the 
bits as compared to another. Commutativity would erase (bad choice of 
wording) the difference. In your theory, the distinction between what 
it *is* from what it *is not, when we chain it out to tuples, is 
obviously a non-commutativity property, at least.

Kindest regards,
Stephen



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-26 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi John:
At 06:12 PM 12/26/2004, you wrote:
Dear Hal,
is there some draft seeable on the web?
Not yet.  If the idea still looks good at the end of this thread I intend 
to post something on my web page with visual aids etc.

 I thought I am comfortable with your
terminology (whether I understand it or not) but now I wonder:
Is Everything part of All, or All part of Everything? Then again it should
be that Nothing is part of Everything, maybe not necessarily of All. You
cannot say that everything except the nothing, but nothing cannot be part
of All: it is per definitionem the entirety of somethings.
I called the boundary between the Nothing and the All the Everything 
because it being the only boundary of both it contains them both.  The All 
of course contains a kernel re the founding definition and thus there is an 
infinitely nested potential to have All/Nothing pairs.

To the exchange with Stephen:
(My) no-info Plenitude is so, because it contains the 'everything' in a
timeless, dynamic(!!) total symmetry (=invariance of unlimited exchange), so
no observables can be extracted in that atemporality. Then again THIS is
information, so it is not true that it has none. I have a feeling that your
no-info suffers from he same malaise. Unless you separate the information
of the description from the info about the inner components only.
The description of the All is one side of the definitional [is, is not] 
pair.  The description of the Nothing is the other side.  The simultaneous 
existence of both the All and the Nothing eliminates any residual potential 
to establish a boundary [information] that might have been inherent in the 
definition.

Hal 




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-24 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 22:14 19/12/04 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:

Do you mind then a little more non computability re the third person point 
of view as per my dynamic?

I don't understand your dynamic. As for the non-computability, remember 
that with comp, anything like the appearance of a universe cannot be 
emulated by a universal computer. I recall that with comp the mind-body 
problem is partially reduce to the search of an explanation of the apparent 
turing-emulability of our neighborhoods. This follows from the UDA 
reasoning. It is related to the hunting of the white rabbits.



My kernels would be describable by natural numbers so are they actually 
natural numbers?

I don't know. Your notion of kernel has not been defined in a sufficiently 
precise way so that I could figure out if it is reasonable to see them as 
numbers. You didn't answer if we can see your kernels as theories and/or 
programs. More generally, I can attribute too much meaning to your 
sentences; I really think you should invest in some standard basic theories 
for helping you to make more precise statements which we could then 
criticize more constructively.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-22 Thread Hal Ruhl


Hi Jesse:
I think some confusion took place surrounding the posts on or about
12/10.
In my initial post I said:
xx
9) Notice that the All also has a logical problem. Looking at
the same meaningful question of its own stability it contains all
possible answers because just one would constitute a selection i.e. net
internal information which is not an aspect of the complete conceptual
ensemble content of the All. Thus the All is internally
inconsistent.
10) Thus the motion of a shock wave boundary in the All must be
consistent with this inconsistency - That is the motion is at least
partly random
xx
This has still not been commented on in the thread. Things got more
confused when the internal was somehow lost and we got on to
a discussion of specific possible internal components of the All and
their consistency. As I said in an earlier post the All has no net
information so any idea that it is itself - as an entity - is
inconsistent has no basis. It can not be consistent in the
true/false way either. I do not think that anyone has demonstrated
that the All can not have internal components that are true/false
inconsistent. Thus my point in the initial post:
xx
10) Thus the motion of a shock wave boundary [an evolving
Something] in the All must be consistent with this inconsistency -
That is the motion is at least partly random.
xx

Today I would amend # 10 because random is not correct in my
opinion because it has to pay attention to history to know it is indeed
random. So the most recent motion must rather be inconsistent with
its past or future - no accumulating info.
Hal
At 10:04 PM 12/20/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:

I do not think the conversation re:



I can't think of any
historical examples of new mathematical/scientific/philosophical ideas
that require you to already believe their premises in order to justify
these
premises,
has a valid place in this thread. Can you tell me why you
do?
Because you have said that your theory has this feature, and I was trying
to understand if I might be misunderstanding you by asking you for other
examples of theories that you think had this feature--I thought perhaps
we might be understanding the idea of having to believe the
premises in order to justify the premises differently, so that you
might not actually be asking people to accept the tenets of your theory
on blind faith. But if there is no misunderstanding, and you are indeed
saying there is absolutely no justification for believing your theory in
terms of any preexisting concepts we might have, then I suppose there is
no further need to discuss this question.
I still have the feeling that this is not quite the case though, since
you are asking for comments/critiques of your theory, but what possible
basis could comments/critiques have unless you believed we all had some
shared standards for judging the merits of the theory? I think if you are
able to figure out what standards you are using to judge the various
elements of the theory, and what standards you expect others to judge it
by in order to have useful comments about it, then if you can articulate
these standards you may be able to give a clearer explanation of why you
think it makes sense to accept your theory. For example, one of
these standards may be the a theory of everything should have no
arbitrary elements idea, which I think is shared by a lot of people
on this list (I described this as the 'arbitrariness problem' in my post
at

http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2606.html ), and which you
call the no information rule.
Jesse





Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-20 Thread Jesse Mazer
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 11:41 PM 12/18/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
'The laws of logic need not be thought of as rules of discovery, they 
can be thought of purely as expressing
Expressing seems to be a time dependent process.
I don't think it needs to be. When we say a certain set of symbols 
expresses something, in the most abstract sense we're just saying 
there's a mapping between the symbols and some meaning.
That would be static information within a kernel.
So are you agreeing it makes sense to talk about the laws of logic 
expressing some truths without this being a time-dependent process?


 static relationships between static truths, relationships that would 
exist regardless of whether anyone contemplated or discovered them.
As are my kernels of information.
For example, in every world where X and Y are simultaneously true, it is 
also true that X is true, even if no one notices this.'
Sure,  That is a kernel.  Observation does not make a kernel a kernel.
OK, but this isn't really relevant to my question, namely, why does any of 
this require time?
A kernel does not need a set of rules to make the informational 
relationships within it what they are.  The very words rules, laws and 
the like carry the implication of a process where the rules and laws are 
consulted and followed.  This is a hidden assumption of some ordered 
sequence - time.  I do not know how to be clearer than that.
I agree that world/kernels don't need to consult the laws of logic in 
order to avoid logical contradictions. I'm just saying that if you look at 
the facts of each world/kernel and translate these facts into propositions 
like all ducks have beaks (within this particular world/kernel), then you 
will find that no proposition or collection of propositions about a single 
world/kernel violate the laws of logic--for instance, you won't find that a 
proposition and its negation are *both* true of a single world/kernel, in 
exactly the same sense (ie applying to the same 'domain' like I talked about 
earlier).


Likewise, you didn't address my point that I can't think of any 
historical examples of new mathematical/scientific/philosophical ideas 
that require you to already believe their premises in order to justify 
these premises,
I do not believe that Cantor would be sympathetic with that.  I think you 
need to believe in infinity in order to justify working to understand it 
and thus justify it.
Why do you say that? Cantor's ideas about infinity could be justified in 
terms of existing commonly-accepted mathematical notions. For example, 
mathematicians already thought the idea of sets made sense, so he defined 
the notion of special sets called ordinals, each of which was a set of 
smaller ordinals, with the smallest ordinal being the empty set. Then, since 
there seems to be no obvious contradiction in considering the set of all 
countable ordinals, it's easy to see that this set is itself an ordinal but 
cannot be a countable one, so its cardinality must be higher than the 
countable ordinals--he defined this cardinality as aleph-one. Then if you 
consider the set of all ordinals with cardinality aleph-one, this must be an 
ordinal with cardinality higher than aleph-one, which he called aleph-two, 
and so on. See my post at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4919.html 
for a little more explanation. All this could be described in terms of 
preexisting ideas about set theory, he wasn't requiring anyone to already 
believe his ideas about infinities in order to prove them.

I believe Bruno said that some information systems included a set of 
beliefs.  As I recall the premises are these beliefs.  Justification 
comes from emotions [based on other beliefs] surrounding the resulting 
system such as simplicity, elegance of apparent explanation etc.   So it 
seems to me that justification is part of belief.
My point is that if I want to demonstrate the truth of some statement X to 
you (without appealing to new empirical evidence), I look for some set of 
premises that we *already* share, and then try to show how these premises 
imply X. I can't think of any historical example where someone's new idea 
is accepted by other people without the person appealing to common 
premises they already share. Can you?
See above re infinity.
Well, see my comments above, I don't think that's a valid example.
and you didn't address my question about whether you think there could 
be a world/kernel where a vehicle simultaneously
Again time inserts itself as the notion of simultaneously.
Simultaneously shouldn't be taken too literally, X and Y are 
simultaneously true is just a shorthand way of saying that X and Y are 
truths that both apply to exactly the same domain, whether same domain 
means same universe, same time, or whatever. For example, if I say 
Ronald Reagan was President of the U.S. in 1985 and Bill Clinton was 
President of the U.S. in 1995, these are two non-contradictory truths 
that apply to the domain of U.S. 

Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-20 Thread Jesse Mazer
John M wrote:
Dear Jesse,
ashamed for breaking my decision NOT to babble into this discussion with my
personal common sense, here is something to your position from my problems:
(First a bit of nitpicking, as an appetizer)
 For example, in every world where X and Y are simultaneously true, 
it
is also true that X is true, even if no one notices this.'
how can an unnoticed truth be included into noticed (mutual) truth?
*
Time. I tackle a timeless (atemporal) system. The problem is change.
What does a timeless change mean?  One has to eliminate 'sequence', the
result of a change, or: Hal's All is static and includes both ends of all
changes.
Hi John--I would say the idea of timeless changes makes a kind of sense, 
like how the value of f(x)=x^2 changes as x increases. Basically it just 
means that as you vary one thing, another thing varies along with it. And if 
you have a t coordinate marked time, you can say that the state of 
physical systems in 3D space varies as t varies, while at the same time 
believing spacetime as a whole is a timeless entity. See this article by 
physicist Paul Davies on this subject:

http://www.american-buddha.com/myster.flow.physics.htm
You used the 'static' cop-out:
   static relationships between static truths, relationships that would
 exist regardless of whether anyone contemplated or discovered them.
*
Of course a 'change' is meaningless in this case. We speculated a lot about
Process, where change is involved between the endpoints of process.
If All is not static, change is there (time?) if it is static, it is
meaningless as a world. In that case it is a nirvana, static timelessness =
eternity for nothing.
I disagree--if you have a movie film laid out before you, you can see all 
the different frames in a timeless way, but the people on the film seem to 
be perceiving the world in a sequential way. Of course the idea of 
distinguishing first-person perception vs. third-person objective reality 
brings up a whole 'nother set of tricky philosophical questions surrounding 
the nature of consciousness, but without getting into that right now, I 
think my view would be that time exists on a first-person level but not at 
the level of an objective description of the All.

I am afraid, although I never studied formal logic, I have an inherent 
sense
of 'human' logic in my speculations and cannot get over it.
Human logic (formal or formless) is one aspect of nature, not necessarily
the one covering All (of it). (The 1 = 0 case?)
*
Your discussions reached Taoistic levels, the format where not even the
contrary or other variants of a statement may be true.
Well, note that I don't actually believe contradictory statements can both 
be true, I was just arguing that *if* Hal Ruhl does not believe that the 
laws of logic apply to reality as a whole, then he has no reason to deny 
they could be. It was meant as more of a reductio ad absurdum than anything 
else.

I do have some interest in mysticism and in particular the Buddhist notion 
of relative and absolute truth, described at http://tinyurl.com/5eaco , 
but I don't think this notion of two truths expresses an actual logical 
contradiction (two opposite statements which are both true in *exactly the 
same sense*), my feeling is it's something more like the philosophy 
complementarity in quantum physics, two different descriptions of the same 
reality. But what do I know, I'm not a mystic...

Jesse



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-20 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Jesse:
I do not think the conversation re:
I can't think of any historical examples of new 
mathematical/scientific/philosophical ideas that require you to already 
believe their premises in order to justify these premises,
has a valid place in this thread.  Can you tell me why you do?
Hal  




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-20 Thread Jesse Mazer
Hal Ruhl wrote:
I do not think the conversation re:
I can't think of any historical examples of new 
mathematical/scientific/philosophical ideas that require you to already 
believe their premises in order to justify these premises,
has a valid place in this thread.  Can you tell me why you do?
Because you have said that your theory has this feature, and I was trying to 
understand if I might be misunderstanding you by asking you for other 
examples of theories that you think had this feature--I thought perhaps we 
might be understanding the idea of having to believe the premises in order 
to justify the premises differently, so that you might not actually be 
asking people to accept the tenets of your theory on blind faith. But if 
there is no misunderstanding, and you are indeed saying there is absolutely 
no justification for believing your theory in terms of any preexisting 
concepts we might have, then I suppose there is no further need to discuss 
this question.

I still have the feeling that this is not quite the case though, since you 
are asking for comments/critiques of your theory, but what possible basis 
could comments/critiques have unless you believed we all had some shared 
standards for judging the merits of the theory? I think if you are able to 
figure out what standards you are using to judge the various elements of the 
theory, and what standards you expect others to judge it by in order to have 
useful comments about it, then if you can articulate these standards you may 
be able to give a clearer explanation of why you think it makes sense to 
accept  your theory. For example, one of these standards may be the a 
theory of everything should have no arbitrary elements idea, which I think 
is shared by a lot of people on this list (I described this as the 
'arbitrariness problem' in my post at 
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2606.html ), and which you call the 
no information rule.

Jesse



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-19 Thread John M
Dear Jesse,
ashamed for breaking my decision NOT to babble into this discussion with my
personal common sense, here is something to your position from my problems:
(First a bit of nitpicking, as an appetizer)
 For example, in every world where X and Y are simultaneously true, it
is also true that X is true, even if no one notices this.'
how can an unnoticed truth be included into noticed (mutual) truth?
*
Time. I tackle a timeless (atemporal) system. The problem is change.
What does a timeless change mean?  One has to eliminate 'sequence', the
result of a change, or: Hal's All is static and includes both ends of all
changes.  You used the 'static' cop-out:
   static relationships between static truths, relationships that would
 exist regardless of whether anyone contemplated or discovered them.
*
Of course a 'change' is meaningless in this case. We speculated a lot about
Process, where change is involved between the endpoints of process.
If All is not static, change is there (time?) if it is static, it is
meaningless as a world. In that case it is a nirvana, static timelessness =
eternity for nothing.

I am afraid, although I never studied formal logic, I have an inherent sense
of 'human' logic in my speculations and cannot get over it.
Human logic (formal or formless) is one aspect of nature, not necessarily
the one covering All (of it). (The 1 = 0 case?)
*
Your discussions reached Taoistic levels, the format where not even the
contrary or other variants of a statement may be true. The opposite end of
conventional physical thinking and I doubt whether there is a way to combine
the two (maybe more than twoG?) ends of the spectrum into one way (of
thinking)?
Which end would you choose? You underwent a young-age brainwashing for the
(conventional) physicist end and have an open enough mind for the other end.
Can you compensate? can anybody? I am neither a physicist, nor a
philosopher. I got my natural science brainwashing and try to deregulate my
mind (with questionable success).

Regards

John Mikes

- Original Message -
From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Saturday, December 18, 2004 11:41 PM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model


 Hal Ruhl wrote:

Snip, 2 quotes above included




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-19 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Bruno and Jesse:
At 10:23 AM 12/18/2004, you wrote:
At 21:48 17/12/04 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
Can a kernel of information be self inconsistent?  From Bruno's last post 
I think it is possible to impose this idea on the All.

I'm afraid I said the contrary (unless I misunderstand what you are 
pointing at through the expression kernel of information). If you agree 
that a kernel of information is like a theory or any finitely describable 
machine, then only such a thing can be said inconsistent.
At this point I have talked myself into the position that since the All is 
absent information then we have no way to describe it as consistent or 
inconsistent in the usual logic meaning that I understand.  It may contain 
self inconsistent kernels or pair wise inconsistent kernels but this seems 
to sum to a neutral position.

Pair wise [or better group wise] inconsistent kernels would differ in the 
truth value assigned to the same internal component but sum to a neutral 
position to maintain the overall nature of the All.  I am not saying they 
exist but allow for it.

The All, I put it on the semantical side, I don't see how that can be 
made inconsistent in any interesting way. It is *our* attempts to manage 
the All which can lead to our inconsistencies. In case we discover some 
of those inconsistencies we better should backtrack. I think. No?
I now agree with this as above.
Next post:
At 11:28 AM 12/18/2004, you wrote:
At 20:39 17/12/04 -0800, Pete Carlton wrote:
As usual when I ask a question like this, if the answer is available in a 
text on logic or elsewhere, please just tell me where to look.

..I'm also interested in the implicit use of time, or sequence, in many 
of the ideas discussed here.

For instance you might say that some of your Somethings are 'bitstrings' 
that could make up one of Bruno's or Jürgen's worlds/observers.
Remember that comp, as I present it, make worlds non computable. It is a 
consequence of
of the self-duplicability, when distinguishing 1 and 3 person points of view.
Do you mind then a little more non computability re the third person point 
of view as per my dynamic?

Part of our idea of a string is the convention that one element comes 
first, then the second, then the third, et cetera.
However, the information that accounts for that convention is not 
contained in the string itself.   'Taking' a Something as a bitstring 
involves some degree of external convention.
Indeed, it needs a universal machine, and even an infinity of them. But 
all that exists and describes by the set of (sigma1) true arithmetical 
propositions. See Podniek's page
http://www.ltn.lv/~podnieks/gt.html
I may not have time left for yet another schooling but I intend to take a 
much closer look at your material after I resolve my issues with residual 
information and the origin of the dynamic which this thread might accomplish.

So my question is, what do you mean when you say a universe that has a 
sequence of successive states that follow a set of fixed rules?  What 
could make one state give rise to the next state?Citing 
causality just gives a name the problem; it doesn't explain it.
I completely agree with you. The primitive causality of the comp 
platonist is just the
implication of classical propositionnal logic. Most of the time (sorry 
for the pun) time of a computation can be described using no more than the 
axioms of Peano Arithmetic, including especially the induction axioms: 
that if P(0) is true and if for all x (P(x) -P(x+1) ) then for all x we 
have P(x).

(Witten B(0)  Ax(B(x)-B(Sx)) - AxB(x) in
http://www.ltn.lv/~podnieks/gt3.html#BM3
(S x) is x + 1
As I said in another post I think the idea of one state giving rise to the 
next creates issues with accumulating algorithmic complexity.  However, a 
sequence in which each state is independent of any other state could look 
causal for long strings of states.

And I don't think introducing a Turing machine helps with this basic 
problem, since in any automaton you have rules that say e.g. state X at 
time T begets state Y at time T+1, again placing a convention of sequence 
(time, here) external to the system itself.

But that time can be substituted by natural numbers, enumerating for 
exemple the states of some universal machine (itself described in arithmetic).
This sounds like kernels to me.

This question doesn't engage with your schema head-on; it's more of a 
side detour I've thought of asking about many times on the list; I 
thought it might get explained at some point.  Well, now I'm asking.

Now, if you ask where natural numbers comes from, that's a real mystery.
But then I can explain you why no Lobian Machine can solve that mystery, 
and why, if we want to talk about all the natural numbers, we are obliged 
to postulate them at the start.
My kernels would be describable by natural numbers so are they actually 
natural numbers?

Next post:
At 11:45 AM 12/18/2004, you wrote:
At 03:31 18/12/04 -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote:
I 

Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-18 Thread Jesse Mazer
Hal Ruhl wrote:
As to the Laws of Logic with respect to information [and I think I said 
this earlier] the information in a kernel is indeed static.  The laws of 
Logic are just our locally grown [and apparently sequential] way of 
revealing it.  The question I raise is the implicit inclusion of time in 
this process.
I think it would be simpler if you responded directly to quotes from my 
previous post, rather than just making general statements about issues 
raised in that post. For example, here you continue to *assert* that there 
is something inherently time-based about logical statements, but you don't 
in any way explain what is wrong with my counterargument from that post:

'The laws of logic need not be thought of as rules of discovery, they can 
be thought of purely as expressing static relationships between static 
truths, relationships that would exist regardless of whether anyone 
contemplated or discovered them. For example, in every world where X and Y 
are simultaneously true, it is also true that X is true, even if no one 
notices this.'

Likewise, you didn't address my point that I can't think of any historical 
examples of new mathematical/scientific/philosophical ideas that require you 
to already  believe their premises in order to justify these premises, and 
you didn't address my question about whether you think there could be a 
world/kernel where a vehicle simultaneously had different numbers of wheels, 
or my question about whether, when you make statements about your theory as 
a whole like the information re the Nothing is in the All so they are 
infinitely nested you are assuming that the negation of these statements 
(in this case, 'the information re the Nothing is not in the All so they are 
not infinitely nested') is false.

Should we have the hubris to impose this somewhat questioned concept on all 
other universes?  In my view the states of all universes preexist in the 
All [as some of the kernels] and Physical Reality washes over them in 
some sequentially inconsistent way.
So do believe the statement the states of all universes don't preexist in 
the All, and 'Physical Reality' does not wash over them in any sequentially 
inconsistent way would be false? If so, it seems that you yourself have the 
hubris to apply the logical law of noncontradiction to statements about 
reality as a whole.

I do not agree with your rather based cancelation of the residual 
information issue since I see it as an unnecessary complication of my own 
method.
I'm not sure what you mean by rather based cancellation. If you're talking 
about my point that every statement could be simultaneously true and false 
if you throw out the laws of logic, obviously *I* don't believe this is a 
good way to solve the residual information issue, since I think it's 
nonsensical to allow logical contradictions. But since you seem to be saying 
the laws of logic aren't absolute, I was just pointing out that you would 
have no basis for denying that statements about reality can be 
simultaneously true and false. If you say that it is an unnecessary 
complication to allow statements about reality as a whole to be both true 
and false, then you are in effect saying it would be an unnecessary 
complication to claim that the laws of logic don't apply to reality as a 
whole!

Can a kernel of information be self inconsistent?  From Bruno's last post I 
think it is possible to impose this idea on the All.
I don't think Bruno's last post was really implying that everything would 
be inconsistent, I thought his point was more that you can't consider things 
like the collection of all possible sets to itself be a set.

My current view is that each state of that dynamic has to be completely 
independent of the current state.
Does that mean you say the statement each state of the dynamic is 
completely dependent on the current state is false?

The way I describe this is to say that the dynamic is inconsistent.   It 
helps this idea if there are kernels that are pairwise inconsistent.
I don't understand what this means--can you give a concrete example of two 
kernels that are pairwise inconsistent?

I think that is straight forward enough.   If there are kernels that are 
self inconsistent then all the better.  Why should they be selected out?
Then why did you earlier say I am not ready to include a two wheeled 
tricycle that is simultaneously a one, three, or four wheeled tricycle?

As to does mathematics contain information, mathematics has the potential 
to erect boundaries so by my definition it is information.
But doesn't *any* statement you make about reality as a whole, like each 
state of that dynamic has to be completely independent of the current 
state, erect a boundary between itself and its negation, in this case 
each state of the dynamic is completely dependent on the current state?

Jesse



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-18 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 21:48 17/12/04 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
Can a kernel of information be self inconsistent?  From Bruno's last post 
I think it is possible to impose this idea on the All.

I'm afraid I said the contrary (unless I misunderstand what you are 
pointing at through the expression kernel of information). If you agree 
that a kernel of information is like a theory or any finitely describable 
machine, then only such a thing can be said inconsistent. The All, I put 
it on the semantical side, I don't see how that can be made inconsistent in 
any interesting way. It is *our* attempts to manage the All which can 
lead to our inconsistencies. In case we discover some of those 
inconsistencies we better should backtrack. I think. No?

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-18 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 20:39 17/12/04 -0800, Pete Carlton wrote:
As usual when I ask a question like this, if the answer is available in a 
text on logic or elsewhere, please just tell me where to look.

..I'm also interested in the implicit use of time, or sequence, in many of 
the ideas discussed here.

For instance you might say that some of your Somethings are 'bitstrings' 
that could make up one of Bruno's or Jürgen's worlds/observers.
Remember that comp, as I present it, make worlds non computable. It is a 
consequence of
of the self-duplicability, when distinguishing 1 and 3 person points of view.


Part of our idea of a string is the convention that one element comes 
first, then the second, then the third, et cetera.
However, the information that accounts for that convention is not 
contained in the string itself.   'Taking' a Something as a bitstring 
involves some degree of external convention.
Indeed, it needs a universal machine, and even an infinity of them. But all 
that exists and describes by the set of (sigma1) true arithmetical 
propositions. See Podniek's page
http://www.ltn.lv/~podnieks/gt.html



So my question is, what do you mean when you say a universe that has a 
sequence of successive states that follow a set of fixed rules?  What 
could make one state give rise to the next state?Citing 
causality just gives a name the problem; it doesn't explain it.
I completely agree with you. The primitive causality of the comp 
platonist is just the
implication of classical propositionnal logic. Most of the time (sorry 
for the pun) time of a computation can be described using no more than the 
axioms of Peano Arithmetic, including especially the induction axioms: that 
if P(0) is true and if for all x (P(x) -P(x+1) ) then for all x we have P(x).

(Witten B(0)  Ax(B(x)-B(Sx)) - AxB(x) in
http://www.ltn.lv/~podnieks/gt3.html#BM3
(S x) is x + 1
And I don't think introducing a Turing machine helps with this basic 
problem, since in any automaton you have rules that say e.g. state X at 
time T begets state Y at time T+1, again placing a convention of sequence 
(time, here) external to the system itself.

But that time can be substituted by natural numbers, enumerating for 
exemple the states of some universal machine (itself described in arithmetic).


This question doesn't engage with your schema head-on; it's more of a side 
detour I've thought of asking about many times on the list; I thought it 
might get explained at some point.  Well, now I'm asking.

Now, if you ask where natural numbers comes from, that's a real mystery.
But then I can explain you why no Lobian Machine can solve that mystery, 
and why, if we want to talk about all the natural numbers, we are obliged 
to postulate them at the start.

Kind Regards
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-18 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 03:31 18/12/04 -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote:
I don't think Bruno's last post was really implying that everything 
would be inconsistent, I thought his point was more that you can't 
consider things like the collection of all possible sets to itself be a set.

Exactly. It is the machine which gives a name to something too big which 
will take the risk of being inconsistent. The big all is not made 
inconsistent by allowing the possibility of inconsistent machines.

Remark.
Actually it is already consistent for a consistent loebian machine to be 
inconsistent, and this is not only true *about* any consistent Lobian 
machine, but it is communicable by any of them (provable by G* but already 
by G). Cf FU.
It is again the second incompleteness theorem: (t = true or p_p)
CONSISTENT t - NOT(PROVABLE(CONSISTENT t)), or by the duality between 
CONSISTENT and PROVABLE:
CONSISTENT t - CONSISTENT (NOT (CONSISTENT t))

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-18 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Jesse:
At 03:31 AM 12/18/2004, you wrote:
I think it would be simpler if you responded directly to quotes from my 
previous post, rather than just making general statements about issues 
raised in that post. For example, here you continue to *assert* that there 
is something inherently time-based about logical statements, but you don't 
in any way explain what is wrong with my counterargument from that post:
  I was still having reading difficulties with my new lenses so this was 
easier for me.

'The laws of logic need not be thought of as rules of discovery, they 
can be thought of purely as expressing
Expressing seems to be a time dependent process.
 static relationships between static truths, relationships that would 
exist regardless of whether anyone contemplated or discovered them.
As are my kernels of information.
For example, in every world where X and Y are simultaneously true, it is 
also true that X is true, even if no one notices this.'
Sure,  That is a kernel.  Observation does not make a kernel a kernel.

Likewise, you didn't address my point that I can't think of any 
historical examples of new mathematical/scientific/philosophical ideas 
that require you to already  believe their premises in order to justify 
these premises,
I believe Bruno said that some information systems included a set of 
beliefs.  As I recall the premises are these beliefs.  Justification 
comes from emotions [based on other beliefs] surrounding the resulting 
system such as simplicity, elegance of apparent explanation etc.   So it 
seems to me that justification is part of belief.

and you didn't address my question about whether you think there could be 
a world/kernel where a vehicle simultaneously
Again time inserts itself as the notion of simultaneously.
had different numbers of wheels,
If the world was a CA and half the applicable cells were in a two wheel 
state and half in a three wheel state what would that be?

What would be the concept of number in such a place?
 or my question about whether, when you make statements about your theory 
as a whole like the information re the Nothing is in the All so they are 
infinitely nested you are assuming that the negation of these statements 
(in this case, 'the information re the Nothing is not in the All so they 
are not infinitely nested') is false.
See below

Should we have the hubris to impose this somewhat questioned concept on 
all other universes?  In my view the states of all universes preexist in 
the All [as some of the kernels] and Physical Reality washes over them 
in some sequentially inconsistent way.
So do believe the statement the states of all universes don't preexist in 
the All, and 'Physical Reality' does not wash over them in any 
sequentially inconsistent way would be false? If so, it seems that you 
yourself have the hubris to apply the logical law of noncontradiction to 
statements about reality as a whole.
I am just try to think of the simplest system that contains no information 
and yet has a dynamic that could support what might be the universe some 
may believe they inhabit.

But then is there really a process like think?
The All as I defined it [my current proposed belief] contains a kernel for 
the Nothing as well as a kernel for the All thus the nesting.

From the inside perspective we are forced to be in, all we have to justify 
such a belief system is our own beliefs re efficiency, beauty, etc. etc. so 
our beliefs justify our beliefs.  Is this not self referential?  I do not 
intend to impose that on the system as a whole.


I do not agree with your rather based cancelation of the residual 
information issue since I see it as an unnecessary complication of my own 
method.
I'm not sure what you mean by rather based cancellation. If you're 
talking about my point that every statement could be simultaneously true 
and false if you throw out the laws of logic, obviously *I* don't believe 
this is a good way to solve the residual information issue, since I 
think it's nonsensical to allow logical contradictions. But since you seem 
to be saying the laws of logic aren't absolute, I was just pointing out 
that you would have no basis for denying that statements about reality can 
be simultaneously true and false. If you say that it is an unnecessary 
complication to allow statements about reality as a whole to be both true 
and false, then you are in effect saying it would be an unnecessary 
complication to claim that the laws of logic don't apply to reality as a whole!
I just believe in my own sense of neatness.  You gave two apparently 
contradictory statements which when put in the same pot seem to sum to what 
I propose for the whole system absent the rather.  I wish to avoid 
including our laws of logic as a necessary component of a kernel.

Further a kernel contains information but the whole system does not so how 
does logic apply to the whole system in the first place.

Can a kernel of information be self inconsistent?  From 

Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-18 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Pete:
At 11:39 PM 12/17/2004, you wrote:
As usual when I ask a question like this, if the answer is available in a 
text on logic or elsewhere, please just tell me where to look.

..I'm also interested in the implicit use of time, or sequence, in many of 
the ideas discussed here.

For instance you might say that some of your Somethings are 'bitstrings' 
that could make up one of Bruno's or Jürgen's worlds/observers.  Part of 
our idea of a string is the convention that one element comes first, then 
the second, then the third, et cetera.
However, the information that accounts for that convention is not 
contained in the string itself.   'Taking' a Something as a bitstring 
involves some degree of external convention.
One could argue that the rules for decoding a string are in the string 
itself.  So a given string would represent all structures that are such a 
parsing of the string.

So my question is, what do you mean when you say a universe that has a 
sequence of successive states that follow a set of fixed rules?  What 
could make one state give rise to the next state?
The rules contained in the string read the string and generate the next 
string.  In my view this can cause problems [or point to explanations] re 
accumulating algorithmic complexity.

Citing causality just gives a name the problem; it doesn't explain 
it.  And I don't think introducing a Turing machine helps with this basic 
problem, since in any automaton you have rules that say e.g. state X at 
time T begets state Y at time T+1, again placing a convention of sequence 
(time, here) external to the system itself.
Yes a dynamic [why that], and who ordered the computer [residual 
information] in the first place.

I try to give a base for a dynamic and allow that some sequences could look 
computer generated but there seems to me to be a need [as payment for the 
dynamic] to also allow input to the computer that is inconsistent with any 
of its prior states.  I think Bruno might call it a little third person 
indeterminacy if I sufficiently remember and understand his material.

Hal




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-18 Thread Jesse Mazer
Hal Ruhl wrote:

I think it would be simpler if you responded directly to quotes from my 
previous post, rather than just making general statements about issues 
raised in that post. For example, here you continue to *assert* that there 
is something inherently time-based about logical statements, but you don't 
in any way explain what is wrong with my counterargument from that post:
  I was still having reading difficulties with my new lenses so this was 
easier for me.
OK, no problem.

'The laws of logic need not be thought of as rules of discovery, they 
can be thought of purely as expressing
Expressing seems to be a time dependent process.
I don't think it needs to be. When we say a certain set of symbols 
expresses something, in the most abstract sense we're just saying there's 
a mapping between the symbols and some meaning.

 static relationships between static truths, relationships that would 
exist regardless of whether anyone contemplated or discovered them.
As are my kernels of information.
For example, in every world where X and Y are simultaneously true, it is 
also true that X is true, even if no one notices this.'
Sure,  That is a kernel.  Observation does not make a kernel a kernel.
OK, but this isn't really relevant to my question, namely, why does any of 
this require time?

Likewise, you didn't address my point that I can't think of any 
historical examples of new mathematical/scientific/philosophical ideas 
that require you to already  believe their premises in order to justify 
these premises,
I believe Bruno said that some information systems included a set of 
beliefs.  As I recall the premises are these beliefs.  Justification 
comes from emotions [based on other beliefs] surrounding the resulting 
system such as simplicity, elegance of apparent explanation etc.   So it 
seems to me that justification is part of belief.
My point is that if I want to demonstrate the truth of some statement X to 
you (without appealing to new empirical evidence), I look for some set of 
premises that we *already* share, and then try to show how these premises 
imply X. I can't think of any historical example where someone's new idea is 
accepted by other people without the person appealing to common premises 
they already share. Can you?

and you didn't address my question about whether you think there could be 
a world/kernel where a vehicle simultaneously
Again time inserts itself as the notion of simultaneously.
Simultaneously shouldn't be taken too literally, X and Y are 
simultaneously true is just a shorthand way of saying that X and Y are 
truths that both apply to exactly the same domain, whether same domain 
means same universe, same time, or whatever. For example, if I say 
Ronald Reagan was President of the U.S. in 1985 and Bill Clinton was 
President of the U.S. in 1995, these are two non-contradictory truths that 
apply to the domain of U.S. history in our universe, so in that sense they 
are simultaneous truths about this domain even though they refer to 
different dates. On the other hand, if I said Ronald Reagan was President 
of the U.S. in 1985 and Lex Luthor was President of the U.S. in 1985, and 
both applied to the domain of U.S. history in our universe, then this 
would be a contradiction. But if I made clear that the first statement 
applied to the domain of U.S. history in our universe and the second 
applied to the domain of U.S. history in an alternate universe then there 
would no longer be any contradiction in these statements.

had different numbers of wheels,
If the world was a CA and half the applicable cells were in a two wheel 
state and half in a three wheel state what would that be?
I can't really picture a CA where the state of a cell specified a number of 
wheels, but never mind--this would clearly involve no contradiction, because 
the statements the cell is in a 2-wheel state and the cell is in a 
3-wheel state would not apply to the same domain, since they refer to two 
*different* cells. There is only a logical contradiction here if both apply 
to exactly the same domain--in this case, the same cell in the same world 
at a single time. Do you think it could be possible for two contradictory 
statements about the state of a single cell at a single moment in a single 
world to *both* be true?

Should we have the hubris to impose this somewhat questioned concept on 
all other universes?  In my view the states of all universes preexist in 
the All [as some of the kernels] and Physical Reality washes over them 
in some sequentially inconsistent way.
So do believe the statement the states of all universes don't preexist in 
the All, and 'Physical Reality' does not wash over them in any 
sequentially inconsistent way would be false? If so, it seems that you 
yourself have the hubris to apply the logical law of noncontradiction to 
statements about reality as a whole.
I am just try to think of the simplest system that contains no information 
and yet has a dynamic 

Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-17 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Jesse:
I think I respond to most earlier questions and comments below:
As to the Laws of Logic with respect to information [and I think I said 
this earlier] the information in a kernel is indeed static.  The laws of 
Logic are just our locally grown [and apparently sequential] way of 
revealing it.  The question I raise is the implicit inclusion of time in 
this process.  Should we have the hubris to impose this somewhat questioned 
concept on all other universes?  In my view the states of all universes 
preexist in the All [as some of the kernels] and Physical Reality washes 
over them in some sequentially inconsistent way.  Just like being in 
Bruno's transporter etc. we would never notice.

My approach is designed to address the residual information problem and 
provide a basis for a dynamic.

I do not agree with your rather based cancelation of the residual 
information issue since I see it as an unnecessary complication of my own 
method.

Can a kernel of information be self inconsistent?  From Bruno's last post I 
think it is possible to impose this idea on the All.

My interest was to have a dynamic which did not impose any residual 
information on the All.  My current view is that each state of that dynamic 
has to be completely independent of the current state.  The way I describe 
this is to say that the dynamic is inconsistent.   It helps this idea if 
there are kernels that are pairwise inconsistent.  I think that is straight 
forward enough.   If there are kernels that are self inconsistent then all 
the better.  Why should they be selected out?

Can any of this exclude a universe that has a sequence of successive states 
that follow a set of fixed rules?  I think that one must insist that the 
inconsistency permeate every corner of the dynamic i.e. some level of 
external noise impressed on all state sequences.

As to does mathematics contain information, mathematics has the potential 
to erect boundaries so by my definition it is information.  It also seems 
possible that there is room for what might be called bifurcated boundaries 
- inconsistencies.

Hal

  




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-17 Thread Pete Carlton
As usual when I ask a question like this, if the answer is available in 
a text on logic or elsewhere, please just tell me where to look.

..I'm also interested in the implicit use of time, or sequence, in many 
of the ideas discussed here.

For instance you might say that some of your Somethings are 
'bitstrings' that could make up one of Bruno's or Jürgen's 
worlds/observers.  Part of our idea of a string is the convention that 
one element comes first, then the second, then the third, et cetera.  
However, the information that accounts for that convention is not 
contained in the string itself.   'Taking' a Something as a bitstring 
involves some degree of external convention.

So my question is, what do you mean when you say a universe that has a 
sequence of successive states that follow a set of fixed rules?  What 
could make one state give rise to the next state?Citing 
causality just gives a name the problem; it doesn't explain it.  And 
I don't think introducing a Turing machine helps with this basic 
problem, since in any automaton you have rules that say e.g. state X at 
time T begets state Y at time T+1, again placing a convention of 
sequence (time, here) external to the system itself.

This question doesn't engage with your schema head-on; it's more of a 
side detour I've thought of asking about many times on the list; I 
thought it might get explained at some point.  Well, now I'm asking.

Best regards
Pete
On Dec 17, 2004, at 6:48 PM, Hal Ruhl wrote:
snip
My interest was to have a dynamic which did not impose any residual 
information on the All.  My current view is that each state of that 
dynamic has to be completely independent of the current state.  The 
way I describe this is to say that the dynamic is inconsistent.   It 
helps this idea if there are kernels that are pairwise inconsistent.  
I think that is straight forward enough.   If there are kernels that 
are self inconsistent then all the better.  Why should they be 
selected out?

Can any of this exclude a universe that has a sequence of successive 
states that follow a set of fixed rules?  I think that one must insist 
that the inconsistency permeate every corner of the dynamic i.e. some 
level of external noise impressed on all state sequences.

As to does mathematics contain information, mathematics has the 
potential to erect boundaries so by my definition it is information.  
It also seems possible that there is room for what might be called 
bifurcated boundaries - inconsistencies.

Hal





Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-13 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 23:12 12/12/04 -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 09:35 PM 12/12/2004, you wrote:
Godel's theorem would also apply to infinite axiomatic systems whose 
axioms are recursively enumerable (computable). But sure, if you allow 
non-computable axiomatic systems, you could have one that was both 
complete and consistent.
A complete axiomatized arithmetic would be I believe be inconsistent as 
supported by to Bruno' post.
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m5812.html
No, I'm sure Bruno was only talking about recursively enumerable axiomatic 
systems. He said himself that the set of all true statements about 
arithmetic would be both complete and consistent, so if you allow 
non-computable sets of axioms you could just have every true statement 
about arithmetic be an axiom.

Yes indeed. Most books give different definition of axiomatic and 
recursively enumerable, but there is
a theorem by Craig which shows that for (most) theories, the notion are 
equivalent. (See Boolos and Jeffrey for
a proof of Craig's theorem).

Also, consistency is a pure syntactical notion, at least for theories 
having a symbol for falsity or having a negation connective. A theory (or 
a theorem proving machine) is consistent iff there is no derivation in it 
of the falsity (or of a proposition and its negation). Now, for the 
important class of first order logical theories (like Peano Arithmetics, 
Zermelo Fraenkel Set theory, etc.) the completeness theorem of Godel (note: 
the completeness, not the incompleteness one!) gives that being consistent 
is equivalent with having a model.

But I do think, and perhaps that's related with Hal intuition (I'm not 
sure), that any theory which try to capture too big things will be 
inconsistent. Classical example is the naive idea of set which leads to 
Frege theory and this one was shown inconsistent by Russell. Church's 
logical theory based on his Lambda calculus was inconsistent, etc. What is 
a little bit amazing is Hal insistence that the ALL should be inconsistent. 
This is not an uninteresting idea, but it is a risky idea which is in need 
of handling with care (like in the paraconsistent logic perhaps?).
I agree also with Jesse that to explain something to someone else there is 
a need to find common grounds.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-13 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Jesse and Bruno:
To consolidate my response:

Yes indeed. Most books give different definition of axiomatic and 
recursively enumerable, but there is
a theorem by Craig which shows that for (most) theories, the notion are 
equivalent. (See Boolos and Jeffrey for
a proof of Craig's theorem).

Also, consistency is a pure syntactical notion, at least for theories 
having a symbol for falsity or having a negation connective. A theory 
(or a theorem proving machine) is consistent iff there is no derivation in 
it of the falsity (or of a proposition and its negation). Now, for the 
important class of first order logical theories (like Peano Arithmetics, 
Zermelo Fraenkel Set theory, etc.) the completeness theorem of Godel 
(note: the completeness, not the incompleteness one!) gives that being 
consistent is equivalent with having a model.
The All contains all information [is this controversial?] but that must add 
up to no net information content if my total system is to have no 
information.  The small amount of external information necessary to define 
the All is balanced to zero net information by the other components of the 
system.

I do not think that all information adding up to no net information is 
controversial.

Further there is a dynamic within the All [computer simulations etc.] in 
the majority of positions I am aware of on this list - including my own - 
resulting in evolving universes.

I give a justification for that dynamic based in the incompleteness of one 
of the components of my system - the Nothing.

Now to maintain a zero net information within the All this dynamic must be 
devoid of selection and plan.

I used to think that the solution was to say the dynamic was random.  I now 
think that this is not correct.  Random after all is a selection in its own 
right and pays attention to past behavior.  But to say that the dynamic is 
inconsistent with its past seems to retire the problem.

To me to say that the All is inconsistent carries benefits when explaining 
our universe not disadvantages.

I am not a mathematician by formal training but it seems to me that there 
may be additional justification for my position in what Bruno says below.

But I do think, and perhaps that's related with Hal intuition (I'm not 
sure), that any theory which try to capture too big things will be 
inconsistent. Classical example is the naive idea of set which leads to 
Frege theory and this one was shown inconsistent by Russell. Church's 
logical theory based on his Lambda calculus was inconsistent, etc. What is 
a little bit amazing is Hal insistence that the ALL should be 
inconsistent. This is not an uninteresting idea, but it is a risky idea 
which is in need of handling with care (like in the paraconsistent logic 
perhaps?).
As to the Laws of Logic I do not see that each kernel of information as I 
call them requires the presence of anything of the sort to be.  The laws 
of Logic [in my opinion]  are rather a way to progressively decompress the 
information in such a kernel.  Turing said that to prove is the same as 
to compute.  So I seem to be in good company.   To us compute is a 
process and thus assumes that time exists.  This assumption is today 
suspect.  Why should we impose it on other universes?

Hal




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-13 Thread Jesse Mazer
Hal wrote:
Hi Jesse and Bruno:
To consolidate my response:
Are you going to respond to my most recent post? It made points that you did 
not really address in your response to Bruno.

The All contains all information [is this controversial?] but that must add 
up to no net information content if my total system is to have no 
information.  The small amount of external information necessary to define 
the All is balanced to zero net information by the other components of the 
system.
It is controversial that mathematics contains any information in the first 
place--by the most commonly-accepted definition of information in 
information theory, I don't think it would, simply because there is no room 
for multiple possible answers to a given question.

Jesse



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-13 Thread Jesse Mazer
Hal Ruhl wrote:
I will go over the thread and try to clear things up but I am having eye 
surgery in the morning and ran out of time.
Take your time, there's no hurry...hope all goes well tomorrow morning.
Why would mathematics be the only thing in the All?  Is that not a 
selection?
That's an interesting question...but if it's true that our own world is just 
a piece of mathematics, then I'm not sure if we can conceive of anything 
that is *not* mathematics, in some sense, so maybe there isn't really a 
selection here. Also, even if there were nothing rather than something, 
wouldn't a statement like 1+1=2 still be true? The truth of the statement 
does not seem to require that there actually are two objects anywhere, it 
can be understood more like a hypothetical claim that if you *did* have one 
object and another, together there would be two...

It is controversial that mathematics contains any information in the first 
place--by the most commonly-accepted definition of information in 
information theory, I don't think it would, simply because there is no 
room for multiple possible answers to a given question.
Then does not all information include multiple possible answers?
I think it does, at least as it is defined in information theory. So by this 
definition, mathematical statements do not really contain any information.

Jesse


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-13 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Jesse:
I will go over the thread and try to clear things up but I am having eye 
surgery in the morning and ran out of time.

Why would mathematics be the only thing in the All?  Is that not a selection?
At 07:38 PM 12/13/2004, you wrote:
It is controversial that mathematics contains any information in the first 
place--by the most commonly-accepted definition of information in 
information theory, I don't think it would, simply because there is no room 
for multiple possible answers to a given question.

Then does not all information include multiple possible answers?
Later
Hal


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-12 Thread Hal Ruhl
At 07:28 PM 12/11/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
You wrote:
Well, what I get from your answer is that you're justifying the idea 
that the All is inconsistent in terms of your own concept of evolving 
Somethings, not in terms of inconsistent axiomatic systems.
Just the reverse.  The evolving Somethings inevitably encompass the 
inconsistencies within the All [all those inconsistent systems [self or 
pairwise] each with their full spectrum of unselected meaning.  That is 
why the Somethings evolve randomly and inconsistently.
OK, since I don't really understand your system I should have said 
something more general, like you're justifying the idea that the All is 
inconsistent in terms of your own theoretical framework, not in terms of 
inconsistent axiomatic systems.
Do you grant that the All which contains all information contains a 
completed axiomatized arithmetic?

 So, again, you don't have any way of showing to a person who doesn't 
share your theoretical framework in the first place that everything, 
i.e. the All, need be inconsistent.
I expect that this is a common problem for anyone's ideas.
I do not believe in TOE's that start with the natural numbers - where did 
that info come from?
I don't consider that to be information because it seems logically 
impossible that a statement such as one plus one equals two could be false.
Why? Is there no universe [state] wherein the transitory meaning assigned 
to these symbols makes the sentence false?

You might as well ask, where do the laws of logic come from? Do you 
consider the laws of logic to be information?
The Laws of Logic [at least as we have assembled them in our little 
corner of our multiverse] establish a process designed to discover the 
information compressed into a system.  A process takes place in a dimension 
we call time.  Thus time is a hidden assumption in the Laws of 
Logic.  This assumption is suspect.  What is the justification for this 
ordered sequence called time?   So the Laws of Logic are not only just 
a locally grown way of finding preexisting potential to divide 
[information] and not such a potential themselves but they are also highly 
suspect.  What is the justification for imposing them on all the other 
universes and multiverses?


 If you don't think the laws of logic can be taken for granted, you could 
just solve the information problem by saying it is simultaneously true 
that there is something rather than nothing and also nothing rather 
than something, even though these facts are contradictory.
There would still be the information contained in the existence of the 
contradiction which divides it from systems that are not contradictory.

If you grant that the laws of logic and mathematics contain no 
information because there is no possible world in which they could be 
otherwise, then you could always adopt a theory like Tegmark's which just 
says that the everything consists of all possible mathematical 
structures, although you might still have a problem with picking a measure 
on these structures if you want a notion of probability (to solve things 
like the 'white rabbit problem'), and if there is any element of choice in 
picking the measure that would be form of arbitrariness or information 
(see my post at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2606.html ).
See above re the Laws of Logic.
Hal 




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-12 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Jesse:
At 04:46 PM 12/12/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:

OK, since I don't really understand your system I should have said 
something more general, like you're justifying the idea that the All is 
inconsistent in terms of your own theoretical framework, not in terms of 
inconsistent axiomatic systems.
Do you grant that the All which contains all information contains a 
completed axiomatized arithmetic?
No, because Godel proved that no axiomatic system can generate the set of 
all statements that would be true of our model of arithmetic (at least not 
without also generating false statements).
Except an infinite one.
 So, again, you don't have any way of showing to a person who doesn't 
share your theoretical framework in the first place that everything, 
i.e. the All, need be inconsistent.
I expect that this is a common problem for anyone's ideas.
Not really, usually when people try to convince others of new ideas they 
appeal to some common framework of beliefs or common understanding they 
already share--that's why people are capable of changing each other's mind 
through reasoned arguments, rather than everyone just making arguments 
like if you grant that the Bible is the word of God, I can use passages 
from the Bible to show that it is indeed the word of God.
Well ideas of this nature then where the framework shifts.
I do not believe in TOE's that start with the natural numbers - where 
did that info come from?
I don't consider that to be information because it seems logically 
impossible that a statement such as one plus one equals two could be false.
Why? Is there no universe [state] wherein the transitory meaning assigned 
to these symbols makes the sentence false?
I intentionally wrote the statement out in english words to convey the 
notion that I was making a meaningful statement about our model of 
arithmetic, rather than quoting a string of arbitrary symbols which can be 
mapped to the model in a certain way but don't have to be. There is no 
logically possible universe where the *idea* I am expressing in english 
when I say one plus one equals two is false, although of course we can 
imagine a universe where a non-english-speaker might use that particular 
string of letters to mean something different, like my thorax is on fire 
(as we would translate the meaning of his statement in english).
Again we deal with logically possible - see below.

You might as well ask, where do the laws of logic come from? Do you 
consider the laws of logic to be information?
The Laws of Logic [at least as we have assembled them in our little 
corner of our multiverse] establish a process designed to discover the 
information compressed into a system.  A process takes place in a 
dimension we call time.  Thus time is a hidden assumption in the 
Laws of Logic.
I disagree. X AND Y - X does not imply that first you have X AND Y 
and then it somehow transforms into X at a later date, it just means if 
it is true that statements X and Y are both true, then statement X must be 
true.
You miss my point.  As I said in earlier posts the information is static, 
the process of uncovering it is not.  Try to stop thinking and reach a 
decision or uncover a truth.  But what keeps thinking and deciding from 
being local illusions.

 If you don't think the laws of logic can be taken for granted, you 
could just solve the information problem by saying it is simultaneously 
true that there is something rather than nothing and also nothing 
rather than something, even though these facts are contradictory.
There would still be the information contained in the existence of the 
contradiction which divides it from systems that are not contradictory.
No it wouldn't, because if you abandon the laws of logic you can say that 
it is also true that this system is not contradictory--in other words, 
although it's true that both these contradictory statements are true (so 
the 'system' containing both is contradictory), it's also true that one is 
true and one is false (so the system containing both is not 
contradictory). Of course, you can now say the meta-system containing both 
the statements I just made is contradictory, but I can apply the exact 
same anti-logic to show this meta-system is not contradictory. And you can 
also use anti-logic to show that every statement I have made in this 
paragraph about the implications of anti-logic is false, including this 
one. Once you abandon the principle that if a statement is true, its 
negation must be false and vice-versa, then anything goes.
And why is anything goes a problem?  Anything goes includes universes 
such as ours.

Hal  




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-12 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Jesse:
At 09:35 PM 12/12/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl:
Hi Jesse:
At 04:46 PM 12/12/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:

OK, since I don't really understand your system I should have said 
something more general, like you're justifying the idea that the All 
is inconsistent in terms of your own theoretical framework, not in 
terms of inconsistent axiomatic systems.
Do you grant that the All which contains all information contains a 
completed axiomatized arithmetic?
No, because Godel proved that no axiomatic system can generate the set 
of all statements that would be true of our model of arithmetic (at 
least not without also generating false statements).
Except an infinite one.
Godel's theorem would also apply to infinite axiomatic systems whose 
axioms are recursively enumerable (computable). But sure, if you allow 
non-computable axiomatic systems, you could have one that was both 
complete and consistent.
A complete axiomatized arithmetic would be I believe be inconsistent as 
supported by to Bruno' post.  http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m5812.html


 So, again, you don't have any way of showing to a person who doesn't 
share your theoretical framework in the first place that 
everything, i.e. the All, need be inconsistent.
I expect that this is a common problem for anyone's ideas.
Not really, usually when people try to convince others of new ideas they 
appeal to some common framework of beliefs or common understanding they 
already share--that's why people are capable of changing each other's 
mind through reasoned arguments, rather than everyone just making 
arguments like if you grant that the Bible is the word of God, I can 
use passages from the Bible to show that it is indeed the word of God.
Well ideas of this nature then where the framework shifts.
Since I don't understand your ideas I can't really comment. But I can't 
think of any historical examples of new 
mathematical/scientific/philosophical ideas that require you to already 
believe their premises in order to justify these premises.
But you do not understand my ideas so how does this apply?

You might as well ask, where do the laws of logic come from? Do you 
consider the laws of logic to be information?
The Laws of Logic [at least as we have assembled them in our little 
corner of our multiverse] establish a process designed to discover the 
information compressed into a system.  A process takes place in a 
dimension we call time.  Thus time is a hidden assumption in the 
Laws of Logic.
I disagree. X AND Y - X does not imply that first you have X AND Y 
and then it somehow transforms into X at a later date, it just means if 
it is true that statements X and Y are both true, then statement X must 
be true.
You miss my point.  As I said in earlier posts the information is static, 
the process of uncovering it is not.
So why couldn't the static ideas expressed by the laws of logic be 
timelessly true, even if we can only see the relationships between these 
truths in a sequential way?
You still miss what I am saying.  The laws of logic are designed to 
discover preexisting information.  The preexisting information is 
static.  Discovery is a time dependent process.  It assumes time 
exists.  Why that?  How is it justified?


Try to stop thinking and reach a decision or uncover a truth.  But what 
keeps thinking and deciding from being local illusions.
I don't know, the justification of beliefs is a part of the field of 
epistemology, and I don't have any good theory of epistemology. But I 
generally trust my thought-processes nevertheless.
I trust mine as well, but on reflection I can not verify that my 
thought-processes even take place.


 If you don't think the laws of logic can be taken for granted, you 
could just solve the information problem by saying it is 
simultaneously true that there is something rather than nothing and 
also nothing rather than something, even though these facts are 
contradictory.
There would still be the information contained in the existence of the 
contradiction which divides it from systems that are not contradictory.
No it wouldn't, because if you abandon the laws of logic you can say 
that it is also true that this system is not contradictory--in other 
words, although it's true that both these contradictory statements are 
true (so the 'system' containing both is contradictory), it's also true 
that one is true and one is false (so the system containing both is not 
contradictory). Of course, you can now say the meta-system containing 
both the statements I just made is contradictory, but I can apply the 
exact same anti-logic to show this meta-system is not contradictory. And 
you can also use anti-logic to show that every statement I have made in 
this paragraph about the implications of anti-logic is false, including 
this one. Once you abandon the principle that if a statement is true, 
its negation must be false and vice-versa, then anything goes.
And why is anything goes a problem?  Anything 

Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-12 Thread Jesse Mazer
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 09:35 PM 12/12/2004, you wrote:
Godel's theorem would also apply to infinite axiomatic systems whose 
axioms are recursively enumerable (computable). But sure, if you allow 
non-computable axiomatic systems, you could have one that was both 
complete and consistent.
A complete axiomatized arithmetic would be I believe be inconsistent as 
supported by to Bruno' post.  
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m5812.html
No, I'm sure Bruno was only talking about recursively enumerable axiomatic 
systems. He said himself that the set of all true statements about 
arithmetic would be both complete and consistent, so if you allow 
non-computable sets of axioms you could just have every true statement about 
arithmetic be an axiom.

If you don't believe me, though, you can ask him about this.
 So, again, you don't have any way of showing to a person who doesn't 
share your theoretical framework in the first place that everything, 
i.e. the All, need be inconsistent.
I expect that this is a common problem for anyone's ideas.
Not really, usually when people try to convince others of new ideas they 
appeal to some common framework of beliefs or common understanding they 
already share--that's why people are capable of changing each other's 
mind through reasoned arguments, rather than everyone just making 
arguments like if you grant that the Bible is the word of God, I can 
use passages from the Bible to show that it is indeed the word of God.
Well ideas of this nature then where the framework shifts.
Since I don't understand your ideas I can't really comment. But I can't 
think of any historical examples of new 
mathematical/scientific/philosophical ideas that require you to already 
believe their premises in order to justify these premises.
But you do not understand my ideas so how does this apply?
Because when you said well ideas of this nature then where the framework 
shifts, I assumed you meant that your ideas *cannot* be justified in terms 
of any common framework, that you can only justify your theory in the terms 
of the theory itself. So I don't need to understand your theory to see that 
it is circular in this way, I just need to take your word for it. And like 
I said, I can't think of any past cases in math, science or philosophy of 
new theories that gained acceptance without appealing to a common framework 
or common understanding. So when you said well ideas of this nature then 
where the framework shifts, it seems there are no other ideas in history 
that were of that nature.

I disagree. X AND Y - X does not imply that first you have X AND Y 
and then it somehow transforms into X at a later date, it just means if 
it is true that statements X and Y are both true, then statement X must 
be true.
You miss my point.  As I said in earlier posts the information is static, 
the process of uncovering it is not.
So why couldn't the static ideas expressed by the laws of logic be 
timelessly true, even if we can only see the relationships between these 
truths in a sequential way?
You still miss what I am saying.  The laws of logic are designed to 
discover preexisting information.  The preexisting information is static.  
Discovery is a time dependent process.  It assumes time exists.  Why that?  
How is it justified?
The laws of logic need not be thought of as rules of discovery, they can 
be thought of purely as expressing static relationships between static 
truths, relationships that would exist regardless of whether anyone 
contemplated or discovered them. For example, in every world where X and Y 
are simultaneously true, it is also true that X is true, even if no one 
notices this.

 If you don't think the laws of logic can be taken for granted, you 
could just solve the information problem by saying it is 
simultaneously true that there is something rather than nothing and 
also nothing rather than something, even though these facts are 
contradictory.
There would still be the information contained in the existence of the 
contradiction which divides it from systems that are not contradictory.
No it wouldn't, because if you abandon the laws of logic you can say 
that it is also true that this system is not contradictory--in other 
words, although it's true that both these contradictory statements are 
true (so the 'system' containing both is contradictory), it's also true 
that one is true and one is false (so the system containing both is not 
contradictory). Of course, you can now say the meta-system containing 
both the statements I just made is contradictory, but I can apply the 
exact same anti-logic to show this meta-system is not contradictory. And 
you can also use anti-logic to show that every statement I have made in 
this paragraph about the implications of anti-logic is false, including 
this one. Once you abandon the principle that if a statement is true, 
its negation must be false and vice-versa, then anything goes.
And why is anything goes a problem?  Anything goes 

Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-12 Thread Jesse Mazer
Hal Ruhl wrote:

OK, since I don't really understand your system I should have said 
something more general, like you're justifying the idea that the All is 
inconsistent in terms of your own theoretical framework, not in terms of 
inconsistent axiomatic systems.
Do you grant that the All which contains all information contains a 
completed axiomatized arithmetic?
No, because Godel proved that no axiomatic system can generate the set of 
all statements that would be true of our model of arithmetic (at least not 
without also generating false statements).

 So, again, you don't have any way of showing to a person who doesn't 
share your theoretical framework in the first place that everything, 
i.e. the All, need be inconsistent.
I expect that this is a common problem for anyone's ideas.
Not really, usually when people try to convince others of new ideas they 
appeal to some common framework of beliefs or common understanding they 
already share--that's why people are capable of changing each other's mind 
through reasoned arguments, rather than everyone just making arguments like 
if you grant that the Bible is the word of God, I can use passages from the 
Bible to show that it is indeed the word of God.

I do not believe in TOE's that start with the natural numbers - where did 
that info come from?
I don't consider that to be information because it seems logically 
impossible that a statement such as one plus one equals two could be 
false.
Why? Is there no universe [state] wherein the transitory meaning assigned 
to these symbols makes the sentence false?
I intentionally wrote the statement out in english words to convey the 
notion that I was making a meaningful statement about our model of 
arithmetic, rather than quoting a string of arbitrary symbols which can be 
mapped to the model in a certain way but don't have to be. There is no 
logically possible universe where the *idea* I am expressing in english when 
I say one plus one equals two is false, although of course we can imagine 
a universe where a non-english-speaker might use that particular string of 
letters to mean something different, like my thorax is on fire (as we 
would translate the meaning of his statement in english).


You might as well ask, where do the laws of logic come from? Do you 
consider the laws of logic to be information?
The Laws of Logic [at least as we have assembled them in our little 
corner of our multiverse] establish a process designed to discover the 
information compressed into a system.  A process takes place in a dimension 
we call time.  Thus time is a hidden assumption in the Laws of Logic.
I disagree. X AND Y - X does not imply that first you have X AND Y and 
then it somehow transforms into X at a later date, it just means if it is 
true that statements X and Y are both true, then statement X must be true.

 If you don't think the laws of logic can be taken for granted, you could 
just solve the information problem by saying it is simultaneously true 
that there is something rather than nothing and also nothing rather 
than something, even though these facts are contradictory.
There would still be the information contained in the existence of the 
contradiction which divides it from systems that are not contradictory.
No it wouldn't, because if you abandon the laws of logic you can say that it 
is also true that this system is not contradictory--in other words, although 
it's true that both these contradictory statements are true (so the 'system' 
containing both is contradictory), it's also true that one is true and one 
is false (so the system containing both is not contradictory). Of course, 
you can now say the meta-system containing both the statements I just made 
is contradictory, but I can apply the exact same anti-logic to show this 
meta-system is not contradictory. And you can also use anti-logic to show 
that every statement I have made in this paragraph about the implications of 
anti-logic is false, including this one. Once you abandon the principle that 
if a statement is true, its negation must be false and vice-versa, then 
anything goes.

Jesse


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-12 Thread Jesse Mazer
Hal Ruhl:
Hi Jesse:
At 04:46 PM 12/12/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:

OK, since I don't really understand your system I should have said 
something more general, like you're justifying the idea that the All is 
inconsistent in terms of your own theoretical framework, not in terms of 
inconsistent axiomatic systems.
Do you grant that the All which contains all information contains a 
completed axiomatized arithmetic?
No, because Godel proved that no axiomatic system can generate the set of 
all statements that would be true of our model of arithmetic (at least not 
without also generating false statements).
Except an infinite one.
Godel's theorem would also apply to infinite axiomatic systems whose axioms 
are recursively enumerable (computable). But sure, if you allow 
non-computable axiomatic systems, you could have one that was both complete 
and consistent.


 So, again, you don't have any way of showing to a person who doesn't 
share your theoretical framework in the first place that everything, 
i.e. the All, need be inconsistent.
I expect that this is a common problem for anyone's ideas.
Not really, usually when people try to convince others of new ideas they 
appeal to some common framework of beliefs or common understanding they 
already share--that's why people are capable of changing each other's mind 
through reasoned arguments, rather than everyone just making arguments 
like if you grant that the Bible is the word of God, I can use passages 
from the Bible to show that it is indeed the word of God.
Well ideas of this nature then where the framework shifts.
Since I don't understand your ideas I can't really comment. But I can't 
think of any historical examples of new 
mathematical/scientific/philosophical ideas that require you to already 
believe their premises in order to justify these premises.


You might as well ask, where do the laws of logic come from? Do you 
consider the laws of logic to be information?
The Laws of Logic [at least as we have assembled them in our little 
corner of our multiverse] establish a process designed to discover the 
information compressed into a system.  A process takes place in a 
dimension we call time.  Thus time is a hidden assumption in the 
Laws of Logic.
I disagree. X AND Y - X does not imply that first you have X AND Y 
and then it somehow transforms into X at a later date, it just means if 
it is true that statements X and Y are both true, then statement X must be 
true.
You miss my point.  As I said in earlier posts the information is static, 
the process of uncovering it is not.
So why couldn't the static ideas expressed by the laws of logic be 
timelessly true, even if we can only see the relationships between these 
truths in a sequential way?

Try to stop thinking and reach a decision or uncover a truth.  But what 
keeps thinking and deciding from being local illusions.
I don't know, the justification of beliefs is a part of the field of 
epistemology, and I don't have any good theory of epistemology. But I 
generally trust my thought-processes nevertheless.


 If you don't think the laws of logic can be taken for granted, you 
could just solve the information problem by saying it is simultaneously 
true that there is something rather than nothing and also nothing 
rather than something, even though these facts are contradictory.
There would still be the information contained in the existence of the 
contradiction which divides it from systems that are not contradictory.
No it wouldn't, because if you abandon the laws of logic you can say that 
it is also true that this system is not contradictory--in other words, 
although it's true that both these contradictory statements are true (so 
the 'system' containing both is contradictory), it's also true that one is 
true and one is false (so the system containing both is not 
contradictory). Of course, you can now say the meta-system containing both 
the statements I just made is contradictory, but I can apply the exact 
same anti-logic to show this meta-system is not contradictory. And you can 
also use anti-logic to show that every statement I have made in this 
paragraph about the implications of anti-logic is false, including this 
one. Once you abandon the principle that if a statement is true, its 
negation must be false and vice-versa, then anything goes.
And why is anything goes a problem?  Anything goes includes universes 
such as ours.
The contradictory truths aren't truths about different domains, like 
different universes--then they really wouldn't be contradictory, since 
there's no contradiction involved in saying X is true in universe #1 but 
false in universe #2. I am talking about contradictory truths in a single 
domain, like it being simultaneously true that *our* universe contains stars 
and true that our universe does not contain stars.

Anyway, are you now agreeing that if you abandon the laws of logic, you can 
solve the information problem by saying it is both true that 

Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-11 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Jesse
You wrote:
Well, what I get from your answer is that you're justifying the idea 
that the All is inconsistent in terms of your own concept of evolving 
Somethings, not in terms of inconsistent axiomatic systems.
Just the reverse.  The evolving Somethings inevitably encompass the 
inconsistencies within the All [all those inconsistent systems [self or 
pairwise] each with their full spectrum of unselected meaning.  That is 
why the Somethings evolve randomly and inconsistently.

But in this case, someone who doesn't believe (or understand) your own 
theory in the first place need not agree that there's any reason to 
think a theory of everything would involve everything being inconsistent.
I do not believe in TOE's that assume structures such as just an Everything 
thus yielding a theory with that assumption as irreducible 
information.  After all where did that come from?

I do not believe in TOE's that assume a dynamic such as computers 
simulating universes without a justification for a dynamic.

I do not believe in TOE's that start with the natural numbers - where did 
that info come from?

If you select a particular meaning out of its spectrum of possible meanings 
and assign it to a system is that not even more information in any such TOE?

My approach solves these issues for me and has only few small prices to pay:
Computer simulations or other dynamics will suffer random input.  But so 
what?  For example a CA that tends to an attractor can be stabilized in a 
reasonably self similar behavior off the attractor with the right amount of 
random input.  Such an input to a universe is a decent explanation for an 
accelerating expansion of that universe given a max info storage and a 
fixed or increasing susceptibility to such input per unit volume.

One could not do a statistical extract of information [there is none] say 
re why we find ourselves in this particular kind of universe.  But again so 
what?  Why would that be a believable expectation of a TOE in the first 
place?  All universes over and over is in my belief system more satisfying 
and may be able to put some handle on ideas such as self aware and free 
will etc. at least for me.

As to the individual beliefs, understandings, or needs of others I can not 
speak.

Hal




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-11 Thread Norman Samish
Hal,
With reference to your inconsistent TOE model (which I do not claim to 
understand), you state My approach solves these issues for ME . . .   You 
also state All universes over and over is in my belief system more 
satisfying and may be able to put some handle on ideas such as self aware 
and free will etc. at least for ME.  As to the individual beliefs, 
understandings, or needs of others I can not speak.  (My capitalizations.)
Are you implying that your model is NOT universal?  Are you saying 
that reality is subjective?
Norman

- Original Message - 
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Saturday, December 11, 2004 11:56 AM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model


Hi Jesse

You wrote:

Well, what I get from your answer is that you're justifying the idea
that the All is inconsistent in terms of your own concept of evolving
Somethings, not in terms of inconsistent axiomatic systems.

Just the reverse.  The evolving Somethings inevitably encompass the
inconsistencies within the All [all those inconsistent systems [self or
pairwise] each with their full spectrum of unselected meaning.  That is
why the Somethings evolve randomly and inconsistently.

But in this case, someone who doesn't believe (or understand) your own
theory in the first place need not agree that there's any reason to
think a theory of everything would involve everything being 
inconsistent.

I do not believe in TOE's that assume structures such as just an Everything
thus yielding a theory with that assumption as irreducible
information.  After all where did that come from?

I do not believe in TOE's that assume a dynamic such as computers
simulating universes without a justification for a dynamic.

I do not believe in TOE's that start with the natural numbers - where did
that info come from?

If you select a particular meaning out of its spectrum of possible meanings
and assign it to a system is that not even more information in any such TOE?

My approach solves these issues for me and has only few small prices to pay:

Computer simulations or other dynamics will suffer random input.  But so
what?  For example a CA that tends to an attractor can be stabilized in a
reasonably self similar behavior off the attractor with the right amount of
random input.  Such an input to a universe is a decent explanation for an
accelerating expansion of that universe given a max info storage and a
fixed or increasing susceptibility to such input per unit volume.

One could not do a statistical extract of information [there is none] say
re why we find ourselves in this particular kind of universe.  But again so
what?  Why would that be a believable expectation of a TOE in the first
place?  All universes over and over is in my belief system more satisfying
and may be able to put some handle on ideas such as self aware and free
will etc. at least for me.

As to the individual beliefs, understandings, or needs of others I can not
speak.

Hal








Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-11 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Norman:
I suppose a person would hope that a theory they propose is in some way 
global but I was talking about the idea that belief is a factor in 
mathematical as well as other discourse.

Bruno said in an earlier post in this thread:
A proposition P is logically possible, relatively to
1) a consistent set of beliefs A
2) the choice of a deduction system D (and then consistent
means does not derive 0=1).
Most mathematical proofs are too complex to be judged by other than the 
belief of the majority of mathematicians.

Hal
At 03:44 PM 12/11/2004, you wrote:
Hal,
With reference to your inconsistent TOE model (which I do not claim to
understand), you state My approach solves these issues for ME . . .   You
also state All universes over and over is in my belief system more
satisfying and may be able to put some handle on ideas such as self aware
and free will etc. at least for ME.  As to the individual beliefs,
understandings, or needs of others I can not speak.  (My capitalizations.)
Are you implying that your model is NOT universal?  Are you saying
that reality is subjective?
Norman
- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Saturday, December 11, 2004 11:56 AM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
Hi Jesse
You wrote:
Well, what I get from your answer is that you're justifying the idea
that the All is inconsistent in terms of your own concept of evolving
Somethings, not in terms of inconsistent axiomatic systems.
Just the reverse.  The evolving Somethings inevitably encompass the
inconsistencies within the All [all those inconsistent systems [self or
pairwise] each with their full spectrum of unselected meaning.  That is
why the Somethings evolve randomly and inconsistently.
But in this case, someone who doesn't believe (or understand) your own
theory in the first place need not agree that there's any reason to
think a theory of everything would involve everything being
inconsistent.
I do not believe in TOE's that assume structures such as just an Everything
thus yielding a theory with that assumption as irreducible
information.  After all where did that come from?
I do not believe in TOE's that assume a dynamic such as computers
simulating universes without a justification for a dynamic.
I do not believe in TOE's that start with the natural numbers - where did
that info come from?
If you select a particular meaning out of its spectrum of possible meanings
and assign it to a system is that not even more information in any such TOE?
My approach solves these issues for me and has only few small prices to pay:
Computer simulations or other dynamics will suffer random input.  But so
what?  For example a CA that tends to an attractor can be stabilized in a
reasonably self similar behavior off the attractor with the right amount of
random input.  Such an input to a universe is a decent explanation for an
accelerating expansion of that universe given a max info storage and a
fixed or increasing susceptibility to such input per unit volume.
One could not do a statistical extract of information [there is none] say
re why we find ourselves in this particular kind of universe.  But again so
what?  Why would that be a believable expectation of a TOE in the first
place?  All universes over and over is in my belief system more satisfying
and may be able to put some handle on ideas such as self aware and free
will etc. at least for me.
As to the individual beliefs, understandings, or needs of others I can not
speak.
Hal



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-11 Thread Jesse Mazer
Hal Ruhl wrote:
You wrote:
Well, what I get from your answer is that you're justifying the idea 
that the All is inconsistent in terms of your own concept of evolving 
Somethings, not in terms of inconsistent axiomatic systems.
Just the reverse.  The evolving Somethings inevitably encompass the 
inconsistencies within the All [all those inconsistent systems [self or 
pairwise] each with their full spectrum of unselected meaning.  That is 
why the Somethings evolve randomly and inconsistently.
OK, since I don't really understand your system I should have said something 
more general, like you're justifying the idea that the All is inconsistent 
in terms of your own theoretical framework, not in terms of inconsistent 
axiomatic systems. So, again, you don't have any way of showing to a person 
who doesn't share your theoretical framework in the first place that 
everything, i.e. the All, need be inconsistent.

I do not believe in TOE's that start with the natural numbers - where did 
that info come from?
I don't consider that to be information because it seems logically 
impossible that a statement such as one plus one equals two could be 
false. You might as well ask, where do the laws of logic come from? Do you 
consider the laws of logic to be information? If you don't think the laws 
of logic can be taken for granted, you could just solve the information 
problem by saying it is simultaneously true that there is something rather 
than nothing and also nothing rather than something, even though these 
facts are contradictory.

If you grant that the laws of logic and mathematics contain no information 
because there is no possible world in which they could be otherwise, then 
you could always adopt a theory like Tegmark's which just says that the 
everything consists of all possible mathematical structures, although you 
might still have a problem with picking a measure on these structures if you 
want a notion of probability (to solve things like the 'white rabbit 
problem'), and if there is any element of choice in picking the measure that 
would be form of arbitrariness or information (see my post at 
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2606.html ).

Jesse



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-10 Thread Hal Ruhl
To continue:
As I said attach no significance to the little thought pictures I am using 
to illustrate various aspects of my system.  They illustrate little chunks 
and then break down.

The system has no net information.
The Nothing has no internal information.
The Everything is the boundary of both erected by the unavoidable 
definition and has no further ability to divide so it has no information.
Thus the All must have no net internal information.
Neither the All nor the Nothing can stand alone because they are a 
definitional pair and their simultaneity allows the boundary [the 
definition also called the Everything] to have no net information other 
wise it would only contain one of the pair and thus have a residual 
potential to divide.

A kernel of information is the that information constituting a particular 
potential to divide.

The All contains all such kernels.
The All is internally inconsistent because it contains for example a 
complete axiomatized arithmetic  as well as an infinity of other such 
kernels of information.

Further the system can not have a fixed structure because that is a 
possible selection [a potential to divide] and that is not allowed in the 
system so at this point drop most of the original All as sphere 
picture.  It was meant to illustrate just a few aspects of the system.

Now pick things up with the original post with the Nothing bring incomplete 
re having to resolve the meaningful question of its own persistence.

Hal
 




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-10 Thread Jesse Mazer
Hal Ruhl wrote:
A kernel of information is the that information constituting a particular 
potential to divide.

The All contains all such kernels.
The All is internally inconsistent because it contains for example a 
complete axiomatized arithmetic  as well as an infinity of other such 
kernels of information.
So a set of all statements generated by an axiomatic system would qualify as 
a kernel of information? Even if you allow inconsistent axiomatic systems 
(as opposed to just consistent but incomplete ones), I still don't see why 
this makes the All inconsistent. After all, an axiomatic system is just a 
rule for generating strings of symbols which have no inherent meaning, such 
as TBc3\. It is only when we make a mapping between the symbols and a 
*model* in our head (like 'in terms of my model of arithmetic, let T 
represent the number two, B represent addition, c represent the number 
three, 3 represent equality, and \ represent the number five') that we can 
judge whether any pair of symbol-strings is inconsistent. Without such a 
mapping between symbols and models there can be no notion of 
inconsistency, because two meaningless strings of symbols cannot possibly 
be inconsistent. And if we do assign symbol-strings a meaning in terms of a 
model, then if we find that two strings *are* inconsistent, that doesn't 
mean the symbols represent an inconsistent model, it just means that one of 
the statements must be *false* when applied to the model (for example, the 
symbol-string 7+1=9 is false when applied to our model of arithmetic). The 
model itself is always consistent. So unless you believe that inconsistent 
axiomatic systems represent true facts about inconsistent models, I don't 
think you can say the All must be inconsistent based on the fact that it 
contains rules which generate false statements about models as well as true 
ones.

Jesse



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-10 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Jesse:
Meaning can not be assigned as an inherent component of the All.  That 
would be a selection.  Meaning can only be assigned if at all within the 
wave of physical reality associated with an evolving Something.  Evolving 
Somethings will eventually encompass pairs of counterfactual and self 
counterfactual kernels of information thus making their future evolution 
which is an individual journey to completeness inconsistent with their past 
evolution.  Thus the All is filled with inconsistent and non selected 
[random] activity.  Its internal  dynamic is random and inconsistent.  Are 
these both not required for a global non selected activity?   Random could 
still be consistent which would be a selection.

Hal
At 09:10 PM 12/10/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
A kernel of information is the that information constituting a particular 
potential to divide.

The All contains all such kernels.
The All is internally inconsistent because it contains for example a 
complete axiomatized arithmetic  as well as an infinity of other such 
kernels of information.
So a set of all statements generated by an axiomatic system would qualify 
as a kernel of information? Even if you allow inconsistent axiomatic 
systems (as opposed to just consistent but incomplete ones), I still don't 
see why this makes the All inconsistent. After all, an axiomatic system is 
just a rule for generating strings of symbols which have no inherent 
meaning, such as TBc3\. It is only when we make a mapping between the 
symbols and a *model* in our head (like 'in terms of my model of 
arithmetic, let T represent the number two, B represent addition, c 
represent the number three, 3 represent equality, and \ represent the 
number five') that we can judge whether any pair of symbol-strings is 
inconsistent. Without such a mapping between symbols and models there 
can be no notion of inconsistency, because two meaningless strings of 
symbols cannot possibly be inconsistent. And if we do assign 
symbol-strings a meaning in terms of a model, then if we find that two 
strings *are* inconsistent, that doesn't mean the symbols represent an 
inconsistent model, it just means that one of the statements must be 
*false* when applied to the model (for example, the symbol-string 7+1=9 is 
false when applied to our model of arithmetic). The model itself is always 
consistent. So unless you believe that inconsistent axiomatic systems 
represent true facts about inconsistent models, I don't think you can say 
the All must be inconsistent based on the fact that it contains rules 
which generate false statements about models as well as true ones.

Jesse



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-10 Thread Jesse Mazer
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Meaning can not be assigned as an inherent component of the All.  That 
would be a selection.  Meaning can only be assigned if at all within the 
wave of physical reality associated with an evolving Something.  Evolving 
Somethings will eventually encompass pairs of counterfactual and self 
counterfactual kernels of information thus making their future evolution 
which is an individual journey to completeness inconsistent with their past 
evolution.  Thus the All is filled with inconsistent and non selected 
[random] activity.  Its internal  dynamic is random and inconsistent.  Are 
these both not required for a global non selected activity?   Random could 
still be consistent which would be a selection.
Well, what I get from your answer is that you're justifying the idea that 
the All is inconsistent in terms of your own concept of evolving 
Somethings, not in terms of inconsistent axiomatic systems. But in this 
case, someone who doesn't believe (or understand) your own theory in the 
first place need not agree that there's any reason to think a theory of 
everything would involve everything being inconsistent.

Jesse


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-09 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi everyone:
I am a little short on time for a few days so I will start with this:
This is just a thought picture and not meant to have other significance:
Think of a sphere and call it the All.
Think of the space outside the sphere and call it the Nothing.
Think of the surface separating them and call that the Everything.
Information is the potential to divide as with a boundary [such as the 
Everything]

The All contains all information
The Nothing contains none
The Everything contains both the All and the Nothing
The All and the Nothing are an [is,is not] definitional pair.
The total system contains no net information since there is no potential to 
further divide.

Hal




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-08 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 20:08 07/12/04 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
I believe we discussed this and you agreed that a complete arithmetic 
would be inconsistent.  I have not found the applicable posts.

If by arithmetic you mean an axiomatizable theory, then indeed, by 
incompleteness it follows that such an arithmetic, if complete, must be 
inconsistent.
If by arithmetic you mean a (not necessarily axiomatizable, and actually: 
necessarily not axiomatizable) model, then incompleteness does not apply. A 
model (identified with some set of sentences) can be both complete and 
consistent.
Sometimes people use arithmetic (with a little a) for an axiomatizable 
presentation of arithmetic, and Arithmetic for the set of sentence true in 
the standard model  of arithmetic.


We have reached too many levels of nesting.  I have been of on my own 
excavations.  Is not all true arithmetical sentences a part of comp?

Comp just asks for the truth of those sentences not depending of me or you.
My problem is that I have not a clear idea of what you mean by nothing, 
dynamic, boundary, all.
About the inconsistency of the ALL I could imagine a resemblance with my 
critics of Tegmark, which is that if you take a too bigger mathematical 
ontology you take the risk of being inconsistent (i.e. that your theory is 
inconsistent).
It is like giving a name to the unnameable.
Before axiomatic set theories like Zermelo-Fraenkel, ... Cantor called the 
collection of all sets the Inconsistent. But this does make sense for 
me. Only a theory, or a machine, or a person can be inconsistent, not a 
set, or a realm, or a model.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-08 Thread Bruno Marchal

At 16:29 08/12/04 +0100, I wrote:
Before axiomatic set theories like
Zermelo-Fraenkel, ... Cantor called the collection of all
sets the Inconsistent. But this does make sense for
me. Only a theory, or a machine, or a person can be inconsistent, not
a set, or a realm, or a model.
Read instead: But this does NOT make sense for me. (sorry)
Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-07 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Hal,
In my questions about truth etc I was not really looking for a response 
but was rather trying to demonstrate the need for additional information 
in your theory.

I don't have a theory. Just an argument showing that if we are machine then 
eventually physics is derivable from machine psychology/computer science.


Your responses made my point I think.  It is this issue I struggle 
with.  I seek a TOE that has no net information.  Though its components 
individually may have any amount of information the sum of all the 
information in all the components is no information.

Why the down select re descriptions vs the All.
I don't understand.
My theory almost [However see below] includes yours as a sub 
component.  My only spin is that my theory necessarily has all dynamics in 
it subject to external random input.  Why down select to just your theory 
and as a result add all that extra required info?

How is the set of such sentences known to be consistent?
It is never known to be consistent. We can just hope it is.
That is what I thought.
(Smullyan makes a different case for arithmetical truth, but this would 
be in contradiction
with the comp hyp).
Please give me a URL or reference for his work.

I deduce this from many readings of Smullyan. But I think Smullyan is just 
afraid that people takes Godel's second incompleteness theorem as an 
argument showing that Peano Arithmetic cannot been known to be consistent. 
And I agree with Smullyan on that point. But with comp I cannot know my own 
consistency and I can only show (to myself) that IF I am consistent then 
Peano Arithmetic is consistent. Look at the Forever Undecided book (on 
the net or in the list archive).



To answer these questions it seems necessary to inject information into 
your theory beyond what may already be there - the sentences - ...

Right. This indeed follows from Goedel's incompleteness.
Here you appear to me to be saying that your theory is indeed subject to 
random external input.

Not the theory, but the possible observers described by theory. This is 
just a consequence of comp: we belongs' to an uncountable infinity of 
(infinite) computations. Cf our talk on the white rabbits. We don't need to 
inject randomness: a priori we have too much (first person) randomness. 
With comp it is the *lack* of randomness which is in need to be explained.


Random because we do not know if the set of sentences is consistent in 
its current state and if incomplete it can be added to.  How can it be 
added to in a manner that is consistent with the existing state?

This is not relevant. See Jesse's post.

So it would seem that your theory is indeed a sub component of my theory 
so as I said why down select and be burdened with all that net info?

But which theory? COMP ?  COMP is mainly the hope that it is possible to 
survive some treatment in a hospital.


...and where did all that info come from and why allow any in a base 
level system for worlds?

Concerning just natural numbers this is a mystery. With comp it is 
necessarily mysterious.
Perhaps it is mysterious because it is unnecessary.

But then you should explain why we believe in natural numbers. (You did 
give plenty evidence that you believe in natural numbers).

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-07 Thread Jesse Mazer
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2004 10:46:04 -0500
Hi Jesse:
To clarify - the All contains all information simultaneously [see the 
definition in the original post] - including ALL Truing machines with ALL 
possible output tapes - so it contains simultaneously both output tapes re 
your comment below.
But if there is a fact which is true in one world being simulated by a 
given Turing machine, but false in a different Turing machine simulation, 
that doesn't mean that the All is contradictory. After all, the statement 
this planet contains life is true of Earth but not true of Pluto, but that 
doesn't mean the solar system is contradictory, it just means that different 
facts are true of different planets. Similarly, if the All contains all 
possible worlds in some sense (all possible Turing machine programs, for 
example), then different facts could be true of different worlds, without 
this meaning the All itself is inconsistent. If Turing machine program #2334 
simulates a 3-dimensional universe while Turing machine program #716482 
simulates a 2-dimensional universe, that doesn't mean the inconsistent 
statements the universe is 3-dimensional and the universe is 
2-dimensional are simultaneously true in the All--rather, it just means the 
statements the universe described by program #2334 is 3-dimensional and 
the universe described by program #716482 is 2-dimensional are 
simultaneously true in the All, and there is no contradiction between these 
statements. As long as you always describe the *context* of any statement, I 
don't see any reason why we should describe the All as inconsistent. So if 
you think the All is inconsistent somehow, you need to explain in more 
detail why you think this is.

Also, you didn't answer my earlier question about whether your idea of the 
All only includes worlds that could be simulated on a Turing machine, or if 
it also includes worlds that could be simulated by a hypercomputer which 
is capable of performing uncomputable operations (like instantly deciding if 
a given Turing machine program will halt or not).

Jesse



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-07 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Bruno:
At 06:40 AM 12/7/2004, you wrote:
Hi Hal,
In my questions about truth etc I was not really looking for a response 
but was rather trying to demonstrate the need for additional information 
in your theory.

I don't have a theory. Just an argument showing that if we are machine 
then eventually physics is derivable from machine psychology/computer science.

I have almost no current opposition to this.  It sounds to me that it is in 
the All with my adder of a random input to the machine.


Your responses made my point I think.  It is this issue I struggle 
with.  I seek a TOE that has no net information.  Though its components 
individually may have any amount of information the sum of all the 
information in all the components is no information.

Why the down select re descriptions vs the All.
I don't understand.
My theory almost [However see below] includes yours as a sub 
component.  My only spin is that my theory necessarily has all dynamics 
in it subject to external random input.  Why down select to just your 
theory and as a result add all that extra required info?

How is the set of such sentences known to be consistent?
It is never known to be consistent. We can just hope it is.
That is what I thought.
(Smullyan makes a different case for arithmetical truth, but this would 
be in contradiction
with the comp hyp).
Please give me a URL or reference for his work.

I deduce this from many readings of Smullyan. But I think Smullyan is just 
afraid that people takes Godel's second incompleteness theorem as an 
argument showing that Peano Arithmetic cannot been known to be consistent. 
And I agree with Smullyan on that point.
I believe we discussed this and you agreed that a complete arithmetic would 
be inconsistent.  I have not found the applicable posts.

But with comp I cannot know my own consistency and I can only show (to 
myself) that IF I am consistent then Peano Arithmetic is consistent. Look 
at the Forever Undecided book (on the net or in the list archive).

There seems to be many ways to establish the necessary and sufficient 
properties of my All and the above seems to be one of them.



To answer these questions it seems necessary to inject information into 
your theory beyond what may already be there - the sentences - ...

Right. This indeed follows from Goedel's incompleteness.
Here you appear to me to be saying that your theory is indeed subject to 
random external input.

Not the theory, but the possible observers described by theory. This is 
just a consequence of comp: we belongs' to an uncountable infinity of 
(infinite) computations. Cf our talk on the white rabbits. We don't need 
to inject randomness: a priori we have too much (first person) randomness. 
With comp it is the *lack* of randomness which is in need to be explained.

The randomness injected at each event can be quite small.  Also it is 
injected into each Something which itself is a multiverse so it is spread 
over all the universes in that multiverse.  Seldom would it parse so as to 
inject large deltas into individual universes.


Random because we do not know if the set of sentences is consistent in 
its current state and if incomplete it can be added to.  How can it be 
added to in a manner that is consistent with the existing state?

This is not relevant. See Jesse's post.
But not wrong? See my previous post which is a clearer statement of what I 
mean.  The above is a contribuitor to the random evolution dynamic of the 
Somethings.  Two identical Somethings may not take the same next step.


So it would seem that your theory is indeed a sub component of my theory 
so as I said why down select and be burdened with all that net info?

But which theory? COMP ?  COMP is mainly the hope that it is possible to 
survive some treatment in a hospital.

We have reached too many levels of nesting.  I have been of on my own 
excavations.  Is not all true arithmetical sentences a part of comp?


...and where did all that info come from and why allow any in a base 
level system for worlds?

Concerning just natural numbers this is a mystery. With comp it is 
necessarily mysterious.
Perhaps it is mysterious because it is unnecessary.

But then you should explain why we believe in natural numbers. (You did 
give plenty evidence that you believe in natural numbers).
They would be in the All.
Hal



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-07 Thread Hal Ruhl
At 06:37 PM 12/7/2004, you wrote:
To clarify - the All contains all information simultaneously [see the 
definition in the original post] - including ALL Truing machines with ALL 
possible output tapes - so it contains simultaneously both output tapes 
re your comment below.
But if there is a fact which is true in one world being simulated by a 
given Turing machine, but false in a different Turing machine simulation, 
that doesn't mean that the All is contradictory. After all, the 
statement this planet contains life is true of Earth but not true of 
Pluto, but that doesn't mean the solar system is contradictory, it just 
means that different facts are true of different planets.
This really misses my meaning.  That is not how Somethings evolve in the 
All.  The Somethings incorporate preexisting information such as states of 
universes in a random dynamic.

Similarly, if the All contains all possible worlds in some sense (all 
possible Turing machine programs, for example), then different facts could 
be true of different worlds, without this meaning the All itself is 
inconsistent. If Turing machine program #2334 simulates a 3-dimensional 
universe while Turing machine program #716482 simulates a 2-dimensional 
universe, that doesn't mean the inconsistent statements the universe is 
3-dimensional and the universe is 2-dimensional are simultaneously true 
in the All--rather, it just means the statements the universe described 
by program #2334 is 3-dimensional and the universe described by program 
#716482 is 2-dimensional are simultaneously true in the All, and there is 
no contradiction between these statements.
See above.

As long as you always describe the *context* of any statement, I don't see 
any reason why we should describe the All as inconsistent. So if you think 
the All is inconsistent somehow, you need to explain in more detail why 
you think this is.
I already have.  Would you agree that Turing's result says that some subset 
of FAS are inconsistent?

Also, you didn't answer my earlier question about whether your idea of the 
All only includes worlds that could be simulated on a Turing machine, or 
if it also includes worlds that could be simulated by a hypercomputer 
which is capable of performing uncomputable operations (like instantly 
deciding if a given Turing machine program will halt or not).
The All is all information without restriction.  All the information is in 
there all the time.  The boundaries of the Somethings wash across the 
inherent counterfactuals counterfactually.

Hal



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-07 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Jesse:
At 09:23 PM 12/7/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:

To clarify - the All contains all information simultaneously [see the 
definition in the original post] - including ALL Truing machines with 
ALL possible output tapes - so it contains simultaneously both output 
tapes re your comment below.
But if there is a fact which is true in one world being simulated by a 
given Turing machine, but false in a different Turing machine 
simulation, that doesn't mean that the All is contradictory. After 
all, the statement this planet contains life is true of Earth but not 
true of Pluto, but that doesn't mean the solar system is contradictory, 
it just means that different facts are true of different planets.
This really misses my meaning.  That is not how Somethings evolve in the 
All.  The Somethings incorporate preexisting information such as states 
of universes in a random dynamic.
I am not asking about how Somethings evolve in your theory, I'm asking 
what's your justification for claiming that the All is inconsistent.
You are giving examples of machines simulating worlds.  That is not how my 
approach works.  Thus my response.  For the other see below.


As long as you always describe the *context* of any statement, I don't 
see any reason why we should describe the All as inconsistent. So if you 
think the All is inconsistent somehow, you need to explain in more 
detail why you think this is.
I already have.  Would you agree that Turing's result says that some 
subset of FAS are inconsistent?
You don't need Turing's results to show that,
Its one of many ways of showing that the All contains kernels of 
information that are inconsistent with each other.  The kernels are always 
there.  No computers are running in my All it only may look that way here 
and there from time to time.

it is quite trivial to construct an axiomatic system with two 
contradictory axioms, or with different subsets of axioms that can be used 
to prove inconsistent theorems.


However, there is a distinction between saying an axiomatic system is 
inconsistent, and saying there is something inconsistent in the behavior 
of the Turing machine simulating that system. There will always be a 
single definite truth about what symbol the Turing machine prints out at 
what time--it is only when you try to interpret the *meaning* of different 
strings of symbols that it prints out that you will see an inconsistency. 
As an analogy, suppose I am running a complex simulation of a human being 
sitting at a writing desk, and he writes two sentences on a simulated 
piece of paper: I have a beard and I do not have a beard. If we 
interpret these sentences in terms of their english meaning, obviously 
they represent inconsistent statements, but that doesn't mean the 
simulation itself is somehow inconsistent, does it? One of the 
statements will be true and one will be false, so there's no problem.
Get rid of the machine.

Your argument would only show the All to be inconsistent if you believe 
that for every axiomatic system a Turing machine can simulate, there must 
be a corresponding world within the All where all the axioms and 
theorems represent simultaneously true statements about that world. But if 
you believe that, then you are saying the All must contain not only all 
possible worlds, but logically impossible worlds as well. Is that what 
you're saying?
All states of all worlds are logically within the venue and visited with 
physical reality over and over.


Also, you didn't answer my earlier question about whether your idea of 
the All only includes worlds that could be simulated on a Turing 
machine, or if it also includes worlds that could be simulated by a 
hypercomputer which is capable of performing uncomputable operations 
(like instantly deciding if a given Turing machine program will halt or not).
The All is all information without restriction.  All the information is 
in there all the time.  The boundaries of the Somethings wash across the 
inherent counterfactuals counterfactually.
I don't understand what these words are supposed to mean, or how they 
address my question above. Can you just answer yes or no?
Again get rid of the machine.  The dynamic is not a simulation generating 
states in any way.

Hal



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-07 Thread Hal Ruhl
Maybe this will help:
The All contains all possible output states of all Turing machines [among 
all manner of other info such as  states of really messy universes] 
simultaneously.  These states are given Physical reality by evolving 
Somethings in random order over and over.  Some such sequences can 
arbitrarily closely approach or even exactly match those that would be 
output by a Turing machine for long runs of states [but not infinite runs 
of states due to the random input factor - no selection allowed].  All 
other sequences of all kinds of states also take place.

Hal



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-07 Thread Jesse Mazer
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2004 22:19:02 -0500
Hi Jesse:
At 09:23 PM 12/7/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:

To clarify - the All contains all information simultaneously [see the 
definition in the original post] - including ALL Truing machines with 
ALL possible output tapes - so it contains simultaneously both output 
tapes re your comment below.
But if there is a fact which is true in one world being simulated by a 
given Turing machine, but false in a different Turing machine 
simulation, that doesn't mean that the All is contradictory. After 
all, the statement this planet contains life is true of Earth but not 
true of Pluto, but that doesn't mean the solar system is contradictory, 
it just means that different facts are true of different planets.
This really misses my meaning.  That is not how Somethings evolve in the 
All.  The Somethings incorporate preexisting information such as states 
of universes in a random dynamic.
I am not asking about how Somethings evolve in your theory, I'm asking 
what's your justification for claiming that the All is inconsistent.
You are giving examples of machines simulating worlds.  That is not how my 
approach works.  Thus my response.  For the other see below.


As long as you always describe the *context* of any statement, I don't 
see any reason why we should describe the All as inconsistent. So if you 
think the All is inconsistent somehow, you need to explain in more 
detail why you think this is.
I already have.  Would you agree that Turing's result says that some 
subset of FAS are inconsistent?
You don't need Turing's results to show that,
Its one of many ways of showing that the All contains kernels of 
information that are inconsistent with each other.  The kernels are always 
there.  No computers are running in my All it only may look that way here 
and there from time to time.
What is a kernel of information? Can you give a concrete example of two 
kernels of information within the All that are inconsistent with each other?

However, there is a distinction between saying an axiomatic system is 
inconsistent, and saying there is something inconsistent in the behavior 
of the Turing machine simulating that system. There will always be a 
single definite truth about what symbol the Turing machine prints out at 
what time--it is only when you try to interpret the *meaning* of different 
strings of symbols that it prints out that you will see an inconsistency. 
As an analogy, suppose I am running a complex simulation of a human being 
sitting at a writing desk, and he writes two sentences on a simulated 
piece of paper: I have a beard and I do not have a beard. If we 
interpret these sentences in terms of their english meaning, obviously 
they represent inconsistent statements, but that doesn't mean the 
simulation itself is somehow inconsistent, does it? One of the 
statements will be true and one will be false, so there's no problem.
Get rid of the machine.
OK, instead of talking about a simulated person running on a machine, let's 
just talk about a real person like you or me, whatever you think real 
people are. If I write the words I have a beard and then write the words 
I do not have a beard, does this show the All is inconsistent? If not, 
then why does the fact that we can write down (or conceive of) inconsistent 
axiomatic systems show that the All is inconsistent?

Your argument would only show the All to be inconsistent if you believe 
that for every axiomatic system a Turing machine can simulate, there must 
be a corresponding world within the All where all the axioms and 
theorems represent simultaneously true statements about that world. But if 
you believe that, then you are saying the All must contain not only all 
possible worlds, but logically impossible worlds as well. Is that what 
you're saying?
All states of all worlds are logically within the venue and visited with 
physical reality over and over.
What is the venue? Can you give an example of what you mean by a state 
of a world? Can you explain why the fact that there are inconsistent 
axiomatic systems shows that All is inconsistent?


Also, you didn't answer my earlier question about whether your idea of 
the All only includes worlds that could be simulated on a Turing 
machine, or if it also includes worlds that could be simulated by a 
hypercomputer which is capable of performing uncomputable operations 
(like instantly deciding if a given Turing machine program will halt or 
not).
The All is all information without restriction.  All the information is 
in there all the time.  The boundaries of the Somethings wash across the 
inherent counterfactuals counterfactually.
I don't understand what these words are supposed to mean, or how they 
address my question above. Can you just answer yes or no?
Again get rid of the machine.  The dynamic is not a simulation generating 
states

Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-07 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Jesse:
The All contains inconsistent FAS [we have no issue here as far as I can 
tell] and thus all of the theorems of such FAS as some of the kernels of 
information simultaneously.  [Do we have an issue here?]  This content 
makes the All inconsistent. [OK?]  The All does not output anything - it is 
internally inconsistent.  [OK?].  A Something [see the original post] can 
not evolve [its boundary moving through the All in an attempt to complete 
itself ] consistent with its prior evolution because each new kernel 
encompassed by its boundary changes the Something and further some such 
kernels may be inconsistent with those kernels already 
encompassed.  [OK?]  Further the consistent evolution of a Something would 
be a selection [evolution according to some plan] which is not allowed [see 
original post]  [OK?] This in no way prevents any kind of string of states 
from being encompassed. [OK?]

Hal



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-07 Thread Jesse Mazer
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2004 22:41:45 -0500
Maybe this will help:
The All contains all possible output states of all Turing machines [among 
all manner of other info such as  states of really messy universes] 
simultaneously.  These states are given Physical reality by evolving 
Somethings in random order over and over.  Some such sequences can 
arbitrarily closely approach or even exactly match those that would be 
output by a Turing machine for long runs of states [but not infinite runs 
of states due to the random input factor - no selection allowed].  All 
other sequences of all kinds of states also take place.

Hal
OK, that is helpful in making your ideas a little more concrete. But in this 
case, what would it mean for two possible states to be inconsistent with 
one another? Can you give an example of two Turing machine states that are 
inconsistent?

Also, when you talk about Turing machine states, are you talking about 
different possible strings of numbers on the tape that will be seen *after* 
a given Turing machine's computation has halted, or are you talking about 
the state of a Turing machine during a single step in its computation, like 
the tape reads 100011010, the Turing machine's read/write head is on the 
second zero, and the machine is in internal state #14?

Jesse



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 17:15 03/12/04 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
Hi Bruno:
I assume your theory is intended to give the range of descriptions of worlds.
The All in my model contains - well - ALL so it includes systems to which 
Godel's theorem applies.

Your theory has problems for me.
What is truth?
Truth is a queen who wins all the wars without any army.
You can guess it by reading a newspaper. But you can better guess it
by reading two independent newspaper, and still better by reading three 
independent
newspapers, etc.


What is a sentence?
An informal sentence is a ordered set of words having hopefully some meaning.
A formal sentence is the same but with a decidable grammar, and sometimes a
mathematical notion of meaning in the form of a mathematical structure 
satisfying
the sentence. This can be find in any textbook in logic.


What is arithmetical?
A sentence is arithmetical, roughly, if it bears on (natural) numbers.

As Stephen Paul King asked: How is truth resolved for a given sentence?
It is resolved partially by proof.

Why the down select re descriptions vs the All.

I don't understand.

How is the set of such sentences known to be consistent?
It is never known to be consistent. We can just hope it is.
(Smullyan makes a different case for arithmetical truth, but this would be 
in contradiction
with the comp hyp).


To answer these questions it seems necessary to inject information into 
your theory beyond what may already be there - the sentences - ...

Right. This indeed follows from Goedel's incompleteness.

...and where did all that info come from and why allow any in a base level 
system for worlds?

Concerning just natural numbers this is a mystery. With comp it is 
necessarily mysterious.

Best regards,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-06 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Bruno:
In my questions about truth etc I was not really looking for a response but 
was rather trying to demonstrate the need for additional information in 
your theory.  Your responses made my point I think.  It is this issue I 
struggle with.  I seek a TOE that has no net information.  Though its 
components individually may have any amount of information the sum of all 
the information in all the components is no information.

At 08:13 AM 12/6/2004, you wrote:
At 17:15 03/12/04 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
Hi Bruno:
I assume your theory is intended to give the range of descriptions of worlds.
The All in my model contains - well - ALL so it includes systems to which 
Godel's theorem applies.

Your theory has problems for me.
What is truth?
Truth is a queen who wins all the wars without any army.
You can guess it by reading a newspaper. But you can better guess it
by reading two independent newspaper, and still better by reading three 
independent
newspapers, etc.


What is a sentence?
An informal sentence is a ordered set of words having hopefully some meaning.
A formal sentence is the same but with a decidable grammar, and sometimes a
mathematical notion of meaning in the form of a mathematical structure 
satisfying
the sentence. This can be find in any textbook in logic.


What is arithmetical?
A sentence is arithmetical, roughly, if it bears on (natural) numbers.

As Stephen Paul King asked: How is truth resolved for a given sentence?
It is resolved partially by proof.

Why the down select re descriptions vs the All.
I don't understand.
My theory almost [However see below] includes yours as a sub 
component.  My only spin is that my theory necessarily has all dynamics in 
it subject to external random input.  Why down select to just your theory 
and as a result add all that extra required info?

How is the set of such sentences known to be consistent?
It is never known to be consistent. We can just hope it is.
That is what I thought.
(Smullyan makes a different case for arithmetical truth, but this would be 
in contradiction
with the comp hyp).

Please give me a URL or reference for his work.

To answer these questions it seems necessary to inject information into 
your theory beyond what may already be there - the sentences - ...

Right. This indeed follows from Goedel's incompleteness.
Here you appear to me to be saying that your theory is indeed subject to 
random external input.

Random because we do not know if the set of sentences is consistent in 
its current state and if incomplete it can be added to.  How can it be 
added to in a manner that is consistent with the existing state?  .

So it would seem that your theory is indeed a sub component of my theory so 
as I said why down select and be burdened with all that net info?


...and where did all that info come from and why allow any in a base 
level system for worlds?

Concerning just natural numbers this is a mystery. With comp it is 
necessarily mysterious.
Perhaps it is mysterious because it is unnecessary.
Hal




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-06 Thread Jesse Mazer
Hal Ruhl wrote:
To answer these questions it seems necessary to inject information into 
your theory beyond what may already be there - the sentences - ...

Right. This indeed follows from Goedel's incompleteness.
Here you appear to me to be saying that your theory is indeed subject to 
random external input.

Random because we do not know if the set of sentences is consistent in 
its current state and if incomplete it can be added to.  How can it be 
added to in a manner that is consistent with the existing state?  .
We can choose whether a Godel statement should be judged true or false by 
consulting our model of arithmetic. See this post of mine on the use of 
models in mathematics from the thread Something for Platonists (you can 
see the other posts in the thread by clicking 'View This Thread' at the 
top):

http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4584.html
Jesse



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-06 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Jesse:
My originating post appeals only to the result of Turing to the effect that 
there is in general no decision procedure.

As a result FAS in general can not be both complete and consistent.
Since my All contains all FAS including the complete ones then the All is 
inconsistent.  That is the simplicity of it.

As to any confusion over the concept of model I can call just as well 
call it a theory.

Hal
At 02:40 PM 12/6/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
To answer these questions it seems necessary to inject information into 
your theory beyond what may already be there - the sentences - ...

Right. This indeed follows from Goedel's incompleteness.
Here you appear to me to be saying that your theory is indeed subject to 
random external input.

Random because we do not know if the set of sentences is consistent in 
its current state and if incomplete it can be added to.  How can it be 
added to in a manner that is consistent with the existing state?  .
We can choose whether a Godel statement should be judged true or false by 
consulting our model of arithmetic. See this post of mine on the use of 
models in mathematics from the thread Something for Platonists (you 
can see the other posts in the thread by clicking 'View This Thread' at 
the top):

http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4584.html
Jesse




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-06 Thread Jesse Mazer
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Hi Jesse:
My originating post appeals only to the result of Turing to the effect that 
there is in general no decision procedure.
There's no single decision procedure for a Turing machine, but if you 
consider more general kinds of machines, like a hypercomputer that can 
check an infinite number of cases in a finite time, then there may be a 
single decision procedure for such a machine to decide if any possible 
statement about arithmetic is true or false. If your everything includes 
only computable universes, then such hypercomputers wouldn't exist in any 
universe, but if you believe in an everything more like Tegmark's 
collection of all conceivable mathematical structures, then there should be 
universes where it would be possible to construct such a hypercomputer, even 
if they can't be constructed in ours.

By the way, do you understand that Godel's proof is based on the idea that, 
if we have an axiomatic system A, we can always find a statement G that we 
can understand to mean axiomatic system A will not prove statement G to be 
true? Surely it is not simply a matter of random choice whether G is true 
or false--we can see that as long as axiomatic system A is consistent, it 
cannot prove G to be false (because that would mean axiomatic system A 
[i]will[/i] prove G to be true), nor can it prove it is true (because that 
would mean it was proving true the statement that it would never prove it 
true). But this means that A will never prove G true, which means we know G 
*is* true, provided A is consistent. I would say that we can *know* that the 
Peano axioms are consistent by consulting our model of arithmetic, in the 
same way we can *know* the axiomatic system discussed in my post at 
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4584.html is consistent, by realizing 
those axioms describe the edges and vertices of a triangle. Do you disagree 
that these model-based proofs of consistency are valid?

Jesse



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-06 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Jesse:
I think you miss my point.  The All contains ALL including Turing machines 
that model complete FAS and other inconsistent systems.   The All is 
inconsistent - that is all that is required.

Godel's theorem is a corollary of Turing's.
As you say a key element of Godel's approach to incompleteness is to assume 
consistency of the system in question.

The only way I see to falsify my theory at this location is to show that 
all contents of the All are consistent.

Hal
At 11:46 PM 12/6/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Hi Jesse:
My originating post appeals only to the result of Turing to the effect 
that there is in general no decision procedure.
There's no single decision procedure for a Turing machine, but if you 
consider more general kinds of machines, like a hypercomputer that can 
check an infinite number of cases in a finite time, then there may be a 
single decision procedure for such a machine to decide if any possible 
statement about arithmetic is true or false. If your everything includes 
only computable universes, then such hypercomputers wouldn't exist in any 
universe, but if you believe in an everything more like Tegmark's 
collection of all conceivable mathematical structures, then there should 
be universes where it would be possible to construct such a hypercomputer, 
even if they can't be constructed in ours.

By the way, do you understand that Godel's proof is based on the idea 
that, if we have an axiomatic system A, we can always find a statement G 
that we can understand to mean axiomatic system A will not prove 
statement G to be true? Surely it is not simply a matter of random choice 
whether G is true or false--we can see that as long as axiomatic system A 
is consistent, it cannot prove G to be false (because that would mean 
axiomatic system A [i]will[/i] prove G to be true), nor can it prove it is 
true (because that would mean it was proving true the statement that it 
would never prove it true). But this means that A will never prove G true, 
which means we know G *is* true, provided A is consistent. I would say 
that we can *know* that the Peano axioms are consistent by consulting our 
model of arithmetic, in the same way we can *know* the axiomatic system 
discussed in my post at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4584.html 
is consistent, by realizing those axioms describe the edges and vertices 
of a triangle. Do you disagree that these model-based proofs of 
consistency are valid?

Jesse




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-06 Thread Jesse Mazer
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Hi Jesse:
I think you miss my point.  The All contains ALL including Turing machines 
that model complete FAS and other inconsistent systems.   The All is 
inconsistent - that is all that is required.
You mean because the All contains Turing machines which model axiomatic 
systems that are provably inconsistent (like a system that contains the 
axiom all A have property B as well as the axiom there exists an A that 
does not have property B), that proves the All itself is inconsistent? If 
that's your argument, I don't think it makes sense--the Turing machine 
itself won't behave in a contradictory way as it prints out symbols, there 
will always be a single definite truth about which single it prints at a 
given time, it's only when we interpret the *meaning* of those symbols that 
we may see the machine has printed out two symbol-strings with opposite 
meaning. But we are free to simply believe that the machine has printed out 
a false statement, there is no need to believe that every axiomatic system 
describes an actual world within the All, even a logically impossible 
world where two contradictory statements are simultaneously true.

Godel's theorem is a corollary of Turing's.
As you say a key element of Godel's approach to incompleteness is to assume 
consistency of the system in question.
But do you agree it is possible for us to *prove* the consistency of a 
system like the Peano arithmetic or the axiomatic system describing the 
edges and points of a triangle, by finding a model for the axioms?

The only way I see to falsify my theory at this location is to show that 
all contents of the All are consistent.

Hal
I think you need to give a more clear definition of what is encompassed by 
the All before we can decide if it is consistent or inconsistent. For 
example, does the All represent the set of all logically possible worlds, 
or do you demand that it contains logically impossible worlds too? Does the 
All contain sets of truths that cannot be printed out by a single Turing 
machine, but which could be printed out by a program written for some type 
of hypercomputer, like the set of all true statements about arithmetic (a 
set which is both complete and consistent)?

Jesse



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-04 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi John:
At 02:29 PM 12/3/2004, you wrote:
Dear Hal,
here are some stupid remarks (I call them stupid, because - they really
are - I cannot follow the theoretical logic of your discussion with Bruno,
and base my remarks on feeling while reading your text - which is not the
most scientific way of dicussion. Nevertheless I submit them FYI: I quote
and reply below.- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, December 01, 2004 3:49 PM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
 (Hal: BrunoJM: blank lines)
 Hi Bruno:


 In the following call an individual [Ai,Dj] pair logic system Ln where
i,
 j, and n can go from 1 to an uncountable infinity and all possible
 [Ai,D,j] pairings are considered.
What if i or j are '0'? do you take it out from 'all possible,' if the
pair is
a single logic item?
i and j are just used as an index.  You can start at 0 if you want, 
you still run over all A and D.

(That would be no valid description of Worlds? restrictions on 'valid'?)
In Nothing both are '0', (I suppose). Is this an exception from your model?
BTW All and Nothing cannot have a model in the usual sense. (Common sense,
that is). I call a 'model' an informational (topical, etc.) restricted view.
Such possibility would violate the impossibility of 0 = 1 (- in the
consistency).
 

 I see no reason to exclude the Ln which have such an Ai from being a valid
 description of a World.  It is just an explicit expression of
 incompleteness rather than an implicit one.   Thus there could be two
 subsets of Ai in W.
I deny the argument I see no reason to exclude... (Nescio non est
argumentum).
Such as: this is the only way it can be... is appealing to ignorance of
the other ways.
My statement was not an argument that no such reason exists just an 
indication that I personally have not been able to think of one.  Absence 
of evidence is not evidence of absence.   However I do give an argument in 
favor of not excluding such Ln:

It is just an explicit expression of incompleteness rather than an 
implicit one.

 Thus induction would fail for all worlds in W because the logical
 foundation for all worlds would be constantly shifting from one Ln to
 another.

 Concerning many theories, to say that a proposition
 (or a set of propositions) A is logically possible
 is the same as saying that A is consistent (i.e you
 cannot derive 0 = 1 from it),

No matter what, the unlimited Multiverse cannot be based on a possibility
WITHIN  A N Y 
of the logical systems derivable in our mind. Our descriptive talent can
have limits but not the
W. Even the 0=1 impossibility postulate is human logic,  see above my Latin
phrase.
Exactly my point.  One can not - I believe - build a valid theory of 
descriptions of worlds based on a down selection from the All.


 When talking of descriptions of worlds - in such a venue consistency would
 only be applicable to individual states [if at all] and not to successions
 of states.  The question then is can the All [which contains W] contain
 self inconsistent states such as one with a correctly and completely
 assembled two wheeled tricycle or a cat that is both alive and dead or the
 same thing having two valid sets of coordinates?  Now the All is complete
 so it is internally inconsistent so I see no way to argue against the
 presence of such states founded on inconsistent Ai.
That sounds better, (including the i=0 above case as well?)
If you meant 1 = 0, Yes.  This could be a rather odd world, but degree of 
oddity is not relevant.  I advise reflection on the opinion of the dung 
beetle when considering what constitutes and suitable world.


   or saying that A has a
 model (a reality, a mathematical structure) satisfying it.
Human logic again. Is A modeled with the unmodelable ALL or Nothing?

 It seems that the idea that mathematical structures are actually
consistent
 is nice but lacks any basis.

!
Was that a sign of agreement?

 To help place my model in context with the above:

 A core idea is the definitional pair relationship.  The [All,Nothing] pair
 is unique in being inherently unavoidable but still summing to no
 information.  Thus it has no initiation and no end.
Amen

 Another core idea is: Is there a meaningful question the Nothing must
 resolve?   The answer to this is: Yes there is:  The Nothing either
 continues [persists], or it does not.   The answer must be inherent in the
 information within the Nothing but there is none in there by
 definition.  Therefore the Nothing is incomplete - it can not resolve any
 meaningful question.  But in this case it must do so.  The only reservoir
 of information is the All.   Therefore it must breach the barrier between
 itself and the All.  In doing so it losses contact with what it was [an Ln
 shift] and becomes an evolving [including successive Ln shifts] - a
 multiverse - within the All.

And so on...The 'partners of yours (All  Nothing) get a task, MUST DO

Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-03 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Bruno:
I assume your theory is intended to give the range of descriptions of worlds.
The All in my model contains - well - ALL so it includes systems to which 
Godel's theorem applies.

Your theory has problems for me.
What is truth?
What is a sentence?
What is arithmetical?
As Stephen Paul King asked: How is truth resolved for a given sentence?
Why the down select re descriptions vs the All.
How is the set of such sentences known to be consistent?
To answer these questions it seems necessary to inject information into 
your theory beyond what may already be there - the sentences - and where 
did all that info come from and why allow any in a base level system for 
worlds?

Yours
Hal
At 08:03 AM 12/3/2004, you wrote:
At 15:49 01/12/04 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
the All is internally inconsistent since it is complete.
I have a counter-example: take the following theory: All
true arithmetical sentences. This is complete and yet consistent.
Gödel's theorem applies only on axiomatizable (or mechanically
generable) theory.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-12-01 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Bruno:
At 09:38 AM 11/30/2004, you wrote:
At 13:40 26/11/04 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
What does logically possible mean?
In the above I meant in the context of the larger phrase of: logically 
possible worlds.

In the following call an individual [Ai,Dj] pair logic system Ln where i, 
j, and n can go from 1 to an uncountable infinity and all possible 
[Ai,D,j] pairings are considered.

A proposition P is logically possible, relatively to
1) a consistent set of beliefs A
2) the choice of a deduction system D (and then consistent
means does not derive 0=1).
if the negation of P is not deductible (in D) from A.
So in the larger phrase rather than dealing with a proposition P in 
relation to Ln I am exploring the range of [Ai,Dj] pairs that would be 
valid descriptions of worlds.  Call this sort after ensemble W.

The further issue is induction and whether or not it fails for a particular Ln.
Now suppose that belief set Ai includes the belief that Ai, and Dj for 
j over some range are both subject to random input from outside the system.

I see no reason to exclude the Ln which have such an Ai from being a valid 
description of a World.  It is just an explicit expression of 
incompleteness rather than an implicit one.   Thus there could be two 
subsets of Ai in W.

Is there any reason why the ensemble W can not for reasons of its own 
structure include Ai from both subsets and also insist that the 
incompletenesses both implicit and explicit be progressively resolved?  I 
know of none and to avoid a selection within the W it would seem that 
this arrangement is unavoidable.

Thus induction would fail for all worlds in W because the logical 
foundation for all worlds would be constantly shifting from one Ln to 
another.

Concerning many theories, to say that a proposition
(or a set of propositions) A is logically possible
is the same as saying that A is consistent (i.e you
cannot derive 0 = 1 from it),
When talking of descriptions of worlds - in such a venue consistency would 
only be applicable to individual states [if at all] and not to successions 
of states.  The question then is can the All [which contains W] contain 
self inconsistent states such as one with a correctly and completely 
assembled two wheeled tricycle or a cat that is both alive and dead or the 
same thing having two valid sets of coordinates?  Now the All is complete 
so it is internally inconsistent so I see no way to argue against the 
presence of such states founded on inconsistent Ai.

 or saying that A has a
model (a reality, a mathematical structure) satisfying
it.
It seems that the idea that mathematical structures are actually consistent 
is nice but lacks any basis.

To help place my model in context with the above:
A core idea is the definitional pair relationship.  The [All,Nothing] pair 
is unique in being inherently unavoidable but still summing to no 
information.  Thus it has no initiation and no end.

Another core idea is: Is there a meaningful question the Nothing must 
resolve?   The answer to this is: Yes there is:  The Nothing either 
continues [persists], or it does not.   The answer must be inherent in the 
information within the Nothing but there is none in there by 
definition.  Therefore the Nothing is incomplete - it can not resolve any 
meaningful question.  But in this case it must do so.  The only reservoir 
of information is the All.   Therefore it must breach the barrier between 
itself and the All.  In doing so it losses contact with what it was [an Ln 
shift] and becomes an evolving [including successive Ln shifts] - a 
multiverse - within the All.  Since the [All,Nothing] is as above an 
unavoidable definitional pair a new Nothing simultaneously replaces the 
old one.  The cycle repeats. The cycle always was and always will be and 
the All contains an infinite number of these Somethings all evolving 
towards completeness.  This produces waves of physical reality passing 
through a random sequence of states [including Ln shifts as per 
above].   The Somethings evolve because of their own incompleteness and the 
need for no selection no net information within the All.  The evolution 
must be random because of no selection and the All is internally 
inconsistent since it is complete.

Hal



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-22 Thread John M
Hi, Hal,

I feel we have a semantic dichotomy: using model in diverse meanings. As I
guess yours is a 'metaphoric compendium some simulation of a 'total' into
usable terms from other sources,
while I use the word as a cut-off from totality, focussing on the
characteristics (content?) relevant to the study (observation, discussion),
omitting the 'not involved' connotations.
'Yours' is more comprehensive, 'mine' is incomplete, reductionistic.

John Mikes

- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Sunday, November 21, 2004 4:36 PM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model


 Hi John:

 I am trying to make the model independent of what might be the detail
 structure of individual universes within it.

 Hal

 At 10:41 AM 11/21/2004, you wrote:
 Hal:
 how about this:
 
 a 'concept' is THE part of ALL cut (limited?) by topical boundaries into
a
 (topical) model disregarding other connections and e/affects.
 Our reductionist science  uses such restrictions because of our
incapability
 to encompass a wider domain of ALL into our mental function. (I am not
the
 best in formulating).
 
 John Mikes
 - Original Message -
 From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Saturday, November 20, 2004 11:32 PM
 Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
 
   I was asked about concepts.
   I would define concept as any division of the All into two sub
   components, each of the sub components is a concept.
   Usefullness of a concept as judged by a SAS [if they exist] is not an
issue.
  
   Hal




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-21 Thread John M
Hal:
how about this:

a 'concept' is THE part of ALL cut (limited?) by topical boundaries into a
(topical) model disregarding other connections and e/affects.
Our reductionist science  uses such restrictions because of our incapability
to encompass a wider domain of ALL into our mental function. (I am not the
best in formulating).

John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Saturday, November 20, 2004 11:32 PM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model


 I was asked about concepts.

 I would define concept as any division of the All into two sub
 components, each of the sub components is a concept.

 Usefullness of a concept as judged by a SAS [if they exist] is not an
issue.

 Hal






Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-21 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi John:
I am trying to make the model independent of what might be the detail 
structure of individual universes within it.

Hal
At 10:41 AM 11/21/2004, you wrote:
Hal:
how about this:
a 'concept' is THE part of ALL cut (limited?) by topical boundaries into a
(topical) model disregarding other connections and e/affects.
Our reductionist science  uses such restrictions because of our incapability
to encompass a wider domain of ALL into our mental function. (I am not the
best in formulating).
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Saturday, November 20, 2004 11:32 PM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
 I was asked about concepts.

 I would define concept as any division of the All into two sub
 components, each of the sub components is a concept.

 Usefullness of a concept as judged by a SAS [if they exist] is not an
issue.

 Hal





Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-20 Thread Hal Ruhl
I was asked about concepts.
I would define concept as any division of the All into two sub 
components, each of the sub components is a concept.

Usefullness of a concept as judged by a SAS [if they exist] is not an issue.
Hal




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-18 Thread John M
Hal:
makes sense to me - with one question:
I take: ALL stands for the totality (wholeness as I say) and your --  is
is confined to whatever we do, or are capable (theoretically) to know -
whether already discovered or not.
In that case the 'definitional pair' wouold be anthropocentric?
(It would not make sense, if you consider it as the 'infinite computer'
rather than us).
*
That would really equate ALL and NOTHING, because in the nothing the is
not component includes all. Not a pair?

John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, November 17, 2004 7:29 PM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model


 In my [is, is not] definitional pair the is not component is the All
 minus the is component.

 Thus the is not member is not simply unwinged horses or the like.  In
 most of these pairs I suspect the is not component has no apparent
 usefulness [to most SAS [if they exist]].  Be that as it may both members
 of the [All, Nothing] pair seem to have usefulness.

 Hal








Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-18 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi John:
At 11:27 AM 11/18/2004, you wrote:
Hal:
makes sense to me - with one question:
I take: ALL stands for the totality (wholeness as I say) and your --  is
is confined to whatever we do, or are capable (theoretically) to know -
whether already discovered or not.
It is more than that.  The All is all information.
In that case the 'definitional pair' wouold be anthropocentric?
I try to make it as generalized as I can but there is the limits of an 
unavoidable inside perspective.

(It would not make sense, if you consider it as the 'infinite computer'
rather than us).
*
That would really equate ALL and NOTHING, because in the nothing the is
not component includes all. Not a pair?
The All and the Nothing are nearly identical in that they both contain no 
information since all information is equivalent to having no information.

The only left over issue is the defining information for each and this is 
the same [they are a definitional pair] and so it too sums to no 
information.  The result is a zero information system that allows computer 
simulations [noisy ones] of some multiverses and a rationale for a dynamic 
i.e. the computers run.

Hal



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-18 Thread Hal Ruhl
I forgot to point out that the definitional information for the 
[All,Nothing] pair cancels because the inverse definition i.e. the 
[Nothing, All] pair is the same system.

Hal



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-17 Thread Georges Quenot
Hal Ruhl wrote:

Hi George:
Hi Hal,
At 09:13 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
My use of these words is convenience only but my point is why should 
existence be so anemic as to prohibit the simultaneous presence of an 
All and a Nothing.
The prohibition does not come from an anemia of existence
(as you suggest) but rather from the strength of nothing(ness),
at least in my view of things.
I am not sure I understand where we disagree (and even if we
really disagree) on this question of the {something, nothing,
concept, existence} question.
Even if we consider that defining something automatically
defines (a complementary) something else, this happens at the
concept level. It might well be that both defined concepts
simultaneously exists (say at least in the mind/brain of a
few humans beings) but this says noting about whether either
one or the other actually gets at something that would exist.
Even if the *concepts of* something (or all) and nothing do
need to exist simultaneously for any of them to exist, it
(obviously ?) does not follows that something (or all) and
nothing also needs to exist simultaneously (or even simply
makes sense in any absolute way).
Last but not least, what is the complementary concept of a
given concept is not that obvious. Let's consider the concept
of a winged horse. Regardless of whether it actually gets
at something or not, it can be considered to be opposed to
non winged horses or to winged things that are not horses
rather that to anything that is not a winged horses. In
set theory, a complementary of a set is always considered
only within a given larger set and never in any fully open
way (and there are well known and very good reasons for that
whatever common sense may say). Similarly, defining an all
or something in a fully open way is likely to be inconsistent.
The situation is different here from the case of the winged
horse and probably from all other cases and there is no reason
that common sense be still relevant (like in the set of all
sets paradox). This might be a case (possibly the only one)
in which defining/considering something does not automatically
make appear a complementary something (even simply at the
concept level).
This would be an arbitrary truncation without reasonable justification.
Just as the opposite.
I provided a justification - a simple basis for evolving universes - 
which does not yet seem to have toppled.
It might be not so simple. I went through it and I still can't
figure what evolving universes might get at. Up to this point,
I did not find something that would sound to me as a (more)
reasonable justification. This may well comme from me.
What appears reasonable or not or what appears as an actual
justification or not is certainly very relative. Currently, I am
still in the process of trying to find some sense (in my view of
things) in what you are talking about (and/or of trying to
figure out what your view of things might be). *Not* to say it
necessarily hasn't.
Georges.


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-17 Thread John Collins
There do exist consistent approaches to set theory where you do have a
universal set and can therefore consider taking complements to be a
sinle-argument operation. to bypass the obvious paradox (that any set can be
used to make a necessarily larger powerset) you need to concoct a map from
the universal set onto its own powerset. The easiest way to do this is to
have lots of 'urelements' or' indivisible but somehow different sets, which
can then be mapped to larger sets in the powerset. If you find urelements
philosophically objectionable (which most computationally-minded people do)
then there exist other more difficult approaches: Try a google search for
Alonzo Church, Willard Quine or Thomas Forster to see some people who
have tried...

--Chris Collins

- Original Message - 
From: Georges Quenot [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, November 17, 2004 10:36 AM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model


 Hal Ruhl wrote:
  
  Hi George:

 Hi Hal,

  At 09:13 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
 
  Hal Ruhl wrote:
 
  My use of these words is convenience only but my point is why should
  existence be so anemic as to prohibit the simultaneous presence of an
  All and a Nothing.
 
  The prohibition does not come from an anemia of existence
  (as you suggest) but rather from the strength of nothing(ness),
  at least in my view of things.

 I am not sure I understand where we disagree (and even if we
 really disagree) on this question of the {something, nothing,
 concept, existence} question.

 Even if we consider that defining something automatically
 defines (a complementary) something else, this happens at the
 concept level. It might well be that both defined concepts
 simultaneously exists (say at least in the mind/brain of a
 few humans beings) but this says noting about whether either
 one or the other actually gets at something that would exist.

 Even if the *concepts of* something (or all) and nothing do
 need to exist simultaneously for any of them to exist, it
 (obviously ?) does not follows that something (or all) and
 nothing also needs to exist simultaneously (or even simply
 makes sense in any absolute way).

 Last but not least, what is the complementary concept of a
 given concept is not that obvious. Let's consider the concept
 of a winged horse. Regardless of whether it actually gets
 at something or not, it can be considered to be opposed to
 non winged horses or to winged things that are not horses
 rather that to anything that is not a winged horses. In
 set theory, a complementary of a set is always considered
 only within a given larger set and never in any fully open
 way (and there are well known and very good reasons for that
 whatever common sense may say). Similarly, defining an all
 or something in a fully open way is likely to be inconsistent.
 The situation is different here from the case of the winged
 horse and probably from all other cases and there is no reason
 that common sense be still relevant (like in the set of all
 sets paradox). This might be a case (possibly the only one)
 in which defining/considering something does not automatically
 make appear a complementary something (even simply at the
 concept level).

  This would be an arbitrary truncation without reasonable
justification.
 
  Just as the opposite.
 
  I provided a justification - a simple basis for evolving universes -
  which does not yet seem to have toppled.

 It might be not so simple. I went through it and I still can't
 figure what evolving universes might get at. Up to this point,
 I did not find something that would sound to me as a (more)
 reasonable justification. This may well comme from me.
 What appears reasonable or not or what appears as an actual
 justification or not is certainly very relative. Currently, I am
 still in the process of trying to find some sense (in my view of
 things) in what you are talking about (and/or of trying to
 figure out what your view of things might be). *Not* to say it
 necessarily hasn't.

 Georges.





Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-17 Thread Georges Quenot
rmiller wrote:

This is starting to sound like discussion Hume must have had with himself.
Might be. And was Hume finally able to conclude something ?
Georges.


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-17 Thread Georges Quenot
John Collins wrote:

There do exist consistent approaches to set theory where you do have a
universal set and can therefore consider taking complements to be a
sinle-argument operation. to bypass the obvious paradox (that any set can be
used to make a necessarily larger powerset) you need to concoct a map from
the universal set onto its own powerset.
I was not thinking of that one but rather to the inconsistency
that appears when one wants to consider things like the set of
all sets that do not containe themselves.
The easiest way to do this is to
have lots of 'urelements' or' indivisible but somehow different sets, which
can then be mapped to larger sets in the powerset. If you find urelements
philosophically objectionable (which most computationally-minded people do)
This is the first time I heard of such things as 'urelements'
and I haven't that faintest idea of what that might be but,
for sure, I must be severely computationally-minded.
then there exist other more difficult approaches: Try a google search for
Alonzo Church, Willard Quine or Thomas Forster to see some people who
have tried...
I have heard of the first two but not on that topic.
Georges.


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-17 Thread Hal Ruhl
In my [is, is not] definitional pair the is not component is the All 
minus the is component.

Thus the is not member is not simply unwinged horses or the like.  In 
most of these pairs I suspect the is not component has no apparent 
usefulness [to most SAS [if they exist]].  Be that as it may both members 
of the [All, Nothing] pair seem to have usefulness.

Hal
  




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-16 Thread Georges Quenot
Hal Ruhl wrote:

 [...]
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self 
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident 
[once you notice it].
The problem with evidence is that on one side there is no other
known basis to build certainties and on the other it appears to
be very relative [once you notice it]. :-)
Also, (self) evidence that seems so sounds like a pleonasm to me.
Georges.


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-16 Thread Georges Quenot
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Boundaries:  I have as I said in one post of this thread and as I recall 
in some earlier related threads defined information as a potential to 
erect a boundary.  So the All is chuck full of this potential.  Actual 
boundaries are the Everything and any evolving Something.
This is unclear to me. To take a practical and simple example,
from which wavelength a monochromatic radiation ceases to be red ?
 The All and the Nothing are not mutually exclusive.
I understand that one can have a view differing from mine
on this question. In any sound sense of these concepts for
me, they are exclusive however.
  Perhaps the
 exclusive idea is based on a hidden assumption of some sort of space
 that can only be filled with or somehow contain one or the other but not
 both.
This is intersting. I have exactly the opposite feeling.
In my view, there cannot be anything like space or time (and
therefore no other time/place for any something to hide or
coexist) if there is(*) nothing.
(*) is must be considered here in an intemporel mode and
not in the present one. Somehow like equals in 2 and 2
equals 4 
Georges.


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-16 Thread Eric Cavalcanti
On Wed, 2004-11-17 at 08:39, Georges Quenot wrote:
 Hal Ruhl wrote:
  
   [...]
  The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self 
  evident [once you notice it].
  At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident 
  [once you notice it].
 
 The problem with evidence is that on one side there is no other
 known basis to build certainties and on the other it appears to
 be very relative [once you notice it]. :-)

But that's inevitable, or isn't it?
Can we have any certainty other than those logically
derived from assumed principles? 

And in this case, isn't it desirable that at least the
assumed principles are self-evident? Could we have 
something better?

 Also, (self) evidence that seems so sounds like a pleonasm to me.

Yes, I think I agree with you, but that's the common usage.
A'self-evident' means evident without proof. But can
something be 'evident' only after proof? It seems to me
that an 'evident' proposition doesn't need proof either.

Eric.



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-16 Thread Hal Ruhl
At 05:39 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
 [...]
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self 
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident [once 
you notice it].
The problem with evidence is that on one side there is no other
known basis to build certainties and on the other it appears to
be very relative [once you notice it]. :-)
Here I was not trying to support the idea that Self-evident is 
necessarily a positive characteristic of an idea but rather that Monday 
morning quarterbacking can make it appear so.  This was in response to the 
comment I received.  I suppose that many ideas originally considered to be 
self evident after near term reflection were ultimately rejected.


Also, (self) evidence that seems so sounds like a pleonasm to me.
To me self evident is a belief.  The validity assigned to most 
mathematical proofs appears - as has been said by others - to be dependent 
on the belief of the majority who examine the proof.  In most cases this 
belief is all that is available so it is not redundant but it is no more 
than majority opinion.

Hal



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-16 Thread Georges Quenot
Eric Cavalcanti wrote:

 On Wed, 2004-11-17 at 08:39, Georges Quenot wrote:

Hal Ruhl wrote:
 [...]
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self 
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident 
[once you notice it].
The problem with evidence is that on one side there is no other
known basis to build certainties and on the other it appears to
be very relative [once you notice it]. :-)
But that's inevitable, or isn't it?
Can we have any certainty other than those logically
derived from assumed principles? 
That's part of the problem, yes.
And in this case, isn't it desirable that at least the
assumed principles are self-evident?
Oh, lots of things appear desirable. That does not make them
true (unfortunately in many cases). And when desirableness
comes in as a cause (if not a reason) things turns even more
relative.
 Could we have something better?
That's another part of the problem.
Also, (self) evidence that seems so sounds like a pleonasm to me.
Yes, I think I agree with you, but that's the common usage.
Yes and no. I don't feel it is neutral, even if frequent.
A'self-evident' means evident without proof. But can
something be 'evident' only after proof? It seems to me
that an 'evident' proposition doesn't need proof either.
I meant: did anyone ever encounter such a thing as an evidence
that did not seem to be so ? How can one discriminate between an
evidence and something that would just seem to be an evidence ?
Georges.


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-16 Thread Hal Ruhl
At 05:58 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Boundaries:  I have as I said in one post of this thread and as I recall 
in some earlier related threads defined information as a potential to 
erect a boundary.  So the All is chuck full of this potential.  Actual 
boundaries are the Everything and any evolving Something.
This is unclear to me. To take a practical and simple example,
from which wavelength a monochromatic radiation ceases to be red ?
Color is a complex and local system reaction to the collision between a 
small system - a photon to temporarily stay with a particle view  - and a 
larger system - a photo receptor etc.  The information in the photon [its 
energy] and the information in the chemistry of the photo receptor 
determine the initial path of this response in a given large system and 
create a boundary between this initiation and the initiation that would 
have been if the information differed.  [By the way I do not support this 
description of such systems but that is another discussion.]

 The All and the Nothing are not mutually exclusive.
I understand that one can have a view differing from mine
on this question. In any sound sense of these concepts for
me, they are exclusive however.
  Perhaps the
 exclusive idea is based on a hidden assumption of some sort of space
 that can only be filled with or somehow contain one or the other but not
 both.
This is intersting. I have exactly the opposite feeling.
In my view, there cannot be anything like space or time (and
therefore no other time/place for any something to hide or
coexist) if there is(*) nothing.
As I said my approach to physics differs from the standard one re space 
and time etc.  My use of these  words is convenience only but my point is 
why should existence be so anemic as to prohibit the simultaneous presence 
of an All and a Nothing.  This would be an arbitrary truncation without 
reasonable justification.

(*) is must be considered here in an intemporel mode and
not in the present one. Somehow like equals in 2 and 2
equals 4 
See above.
Hal 




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-16 Thread Georges Quenot
Hal Ruhl wrote:

 At 05:39 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:

Hal Ruhl wrote:
 [...]
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self 
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident 
[once you notice it].
The problem with evidence is that on one side there is no other
known basis to build certainties and on the other it appears to
be very relative [once you notice it]. :-)
Here I was not trying to support the idea that Self-evident is 
necessarily a positive characteristic of an idea but rather that Monday 
morning quarterbacking can make it appear so. 
Do you mean that for the particular idea that defining a thing
actually defines two things ?
 This was in response to
the comment I received.  I suppose that many ideas originally considered 
to be self evident after near term reflection were ultimately rejected.
Do you consider that this could be the case for this particular
idea ?
Also, (self) evidence that seems so sounds like a pleonasm to me.
To me self evident is a belief.
OK. Fine.
 The validity assigned to most
mathematical proofs appears - as has been said by others - to be 
dependent on the belief of the majority who examine the proof.  In most 
cases this belief is all that is available so it is not redundant but it 
is no more than majority opinion.
I agree here. And sometimes, even unanimity fails (there is
a famous example: Cauchy produced a false theorem about the
continuity of a series of continuous functions, he taught it
and it was in class books for years whithout anyone finding
any problem until some day someone noticed that it fails for
the Fourier series of f(x) = x; of course, he saved the theorem
by adding an additional premise but the false theorem had been
recognized/believed as true in the mean time).
Georges.


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-16 Thread Georges Quenot
Hal Ruhl wrote:

At 05:58 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Boundaries:  I have as I said in one post of this thread and as I 
recall in some earlier related threads defined information as a 
potential to erect a boundary.  So the All is chuck full of this 
potential.  Actual boundaries are the Everything and any evolving 
Something.
This is unclear to me. To take a practical and simple example,
from which wavelength a monochromatic radiation ceases to be red ?
Color is a complex and local system reaction to the collision between a 
small system - a photon to temporarily stay with a particle view  - 
and a larger system - a photo receptor etc.  The information in the 
photon [its energy] and the information in the chemistry of the photo 
receptor determine the initial path of this response in a given large 
system and create a boundary between this initiation and the initiation 
that would have been if the information differed.  [By the way I do not 
support this description of such systems but that is another discussion.]
Do you mean that it is a nonsense to say that a monochromatic
radiation of 700 nm is red if it does not actually hit and
activate some photoreceptors of the appropriate type ?
 The All and the Nothing are not mutually exclusive.
I understand that one can have a view differing from mine
on this question. In any sound sense of these concepts for
me, they are exclusive however.
  Perhaps the
 exclusive idea is based on a hidden assumption of some sort of space
 that can only be filled with or somehow contain one or the other but not
 both.
This is interesting. I have exactly the opposite feeling.
In my view, there cannot be anything like space or time (and
therefore no other time/place for any something to hide or
coexist) if there is(*) nothing.

As I said my approach to physics differs from the standard one re 
space and time etc.
I meant here something similar to the standard space and time
as considered in physics and common sense. I could consider
other possible senses but I currently can't figure any.
My use of these  words is convenience only but my 
point is why should existence be so anemic as to prohibit the 
simultaneous presence of an All and a Nothing.
The prohibition does not come from an anemia of existence
(as you suggest) but rather from the strength of nothing(ness),
at least in my view of things.
This would be an 
arbitrary truncation without reasonable justification.
Just as the opposite.
Georges.


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-16 Thread Hal Ruhl
At 08:48 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
 At 05:39 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:

Hal Ruhl wrote:
 [...]
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self 
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident 
[once you notice it].
The problem with evidence is that on one side there is no other
known basis to build certainties and on the other it appears to
be very relative [once you notice it]. :-)
Here I was not trying to support the idea that Self-evident is 
necessarily a positive characteristic of an idea but rather that Monday 
morning quarterbacking can make it appear so.
Do you mean that for the particular idea that defining a thing
actually defines two things ?
I mean it in a universal way - it is always the situation.
 This was in response to
the comment I received.  I suppose that many ideas originally considered 
to be self evident after near term reflection were ultimately rejected.
Do you consider that this could be the case for this particular
idea ?
Darwin seems to have felt this way about Origins [Stephen Gould's The 
Structure of Evolutionary Theory, page 2] so why should my ideas be special?

Also, (self) evidence that seems so sounds like a pleonasm to me.
To me self evident is a belief.
OK. Fine.
 The validity assigned to most
mathematical proofs appears - as has been said by others - to be 
dependent on the belief of the majority who examine the proof.  In most 
cases this belief is all that is available so it is not redundant but it 
is no more than majority opinion.
I agree here. And sometimes, even unanimity fails (there is
a famous example: Cauchy produced a false theorem about the
continuity of a series of continuous functions, he taught it
and it was in class books for years whithout anyone finding
any problem until some day someone noticed that it fails for
the Fourier series of f(x) = x; of course, he saved the theorem
by adding an additional premise but the false theorem had been
recognized/believed as true in the mean time).
Georges.
Hal 




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-16 Thread Georges Quenot
Hal Ruhl wrote:

At 08:48 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Darwin seems to have felt this way about Origins [Stephen Gould's The 
Structure of Evolutionary Theory, page 2] so why should my ideas be 
special?
We agree here. Interesting reference.
Georges.


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-16 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi George:
At 09:13 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:

At 05:58 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Boundaries:  I have as I said in one post of this thread and as I 
recall in some earlier related threads defined information as a 
potential to erect a boundary.  So the All is chuck full of this 
potential.  Actual boundaries are the Everything and any evolving Something.
This is unclear to me. To take a practical and simple example,
from which wavelength a monochromatic radiation ceases to be red ?
Color is a complex and local system reaction to the collision between a 
small system - a photon to temporarily stay with a particle view  - and 
a larger system - a photo receptor etc.  The information in the photon 
[its energy] and the information in the chemistry of the photo receptor 
determine the initial path of this response in a given large system and 
create a boundary between this initiation and the initiation that would 
have been if the information differed.  [By the way I do not support this 
description of such systems but that is another discussion.]
Do you mean that it is a nonsense to say that a monochromatic
radiation of 700 nm is red if it does not actually hit and
activate some photoreceptors of the appropriate type ?
Such a photon has only part of the information required for the parsing of 
red from other color responses of a particular large system.  Further you 
and I may both indicate red when colliding with such a photon but this is a 
learned designation for who knows what different sensations [change] we our 
respective large systems have.  Not that I believe in observers or in the 
isolation of systems.

 The All and the Nothing are not mutually exclusive.
I understand that one can have a view differing from mine
on this question. In any sound sense of these concepts for
me, they are exclusive however.
  Perhaps the
 exclusive idea is based on a hidden assumption of some sort of space
 that can only be filled with or somehow contain one or the other but not
 both.
This is interesting. I have exactly the opposite feeling.
In my view, there cannot be anything like space or time (and
therefore no other time/place for any something to hide or
coexist) if there is(*) nothing.
As I said my approach to physics differs from the standard one re space 
and time etc.
I meant here something similar to the standard space and time
as considered in physics and common sense. I could consider
other possible senses but I currently can't figure any.
My use of these  words is convenience only but my point is why should 
existence be so anemic as to prohibit the simultaneous presence of an All 
and a Nothing.
The prohibition does not come from an anemia of existence
(as you suggest) but rather from the strength of nothing(ness),
at least in my view of things.
This would be an arbitrary truncation without reasonable justification.
Just as the opposite.
I provided a justification - a simple basis for evolving universes - which 
does not yet seem to have toppled.

Hal 




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-16 Thread rmiller
This is starting to sound like discussion Hume must have had with himself.
RM



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-15 Thread Georges Quenot
Hal Ruhl wrote:

 At 08:16 AM 11/14/2004, you wrote:
 
  Hal Ruhl wrote:
  
   4) A Something: A division of the All into two subparts.
 
  That too, sounds bad to me. It might well be that the only something that
  deserve the title of Something would be the All itself. Everything else
  might appear so only in our minds (and/or in other types of minds).
 I believe my use of the term Something in the text of the justification
 is consistent with my definition.   One must allow for the case that the
 All could have internal boundaries of some sort.
Hi Hal,
I would say that this is a matter of faith. Indeed, It *could*. But no
one has the ability to prove either It has or It hasn't any such boundary
(in an absolute sense, of course). From this point of view, I am at best
agnostic and I seriously doubt It actually has. That's why I would also
like to say : One must allow for the case that the All could have no (true)
internal boundaries of any sort.
Georges.


Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-15 Thread Hal Ruhl
I received the following comments from Eric Cavalcanti but did not see them 
post on the Everything list.

 It is the same idea as Godel's approach to showing the incompleteness of
 arithmetic.  The structure of arithmetic was asked a question [the 
truth or
 falseness of a grammatically valid statement] it could not answer
 [resolve].  The Nothing can not escape being asked if it is stable or not
 and has no ability to resolve the question.

But it's not as wave-handing as you make it sound.
Godel's theorem has a precise meaning and proof
given the axioms of Mathematics. It works within those
axioms, and has no meaning outside that scope.

If you want to use a similar argument, you need to
carefully define what you mean by It's the same idea
as Godel's approach.
Godel's theorem was about arithmetic but the idea behind the theorem was to 
ask a system a question meaningful to that system which it could not in its 
present state resolve.  That is what is happening in my model.  My Nothing 
can not avoid determining its stability [i.e. its persistence] but can not 
make this determination without changing.

It may sound pedantic, but the problem is that you are
trying to create a theory that describes everything, and
therefore it's desirable that its constructs are
self-evident and certainly required that they are
self-consistent.
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self 
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident [once 
you notice it].

The All is not internally consistent because it is complete.  What do you 
mean by self-consistent in this case.  In my view there is no need for 
universes to be consistent.  See #10 and #11 of the original post.


What sense does it make to say that the Nothing must
answer a question if no question is actually asked?
As Pete Carlton said, I believe that you are using a
metaphor for something else, but then you need to
carefully explain what it is, without the metaphor.
See above for the unavoidable meaningful question.

 I also don't understand why the Nothing should be the kind of thing that
 penetrates boundaries, attempts to complete itself, etc.  It seems that
 your Nothing gets up to quite a lot of action considering that it's
 Nothing.  Are these actions metaphors for something else, and if so, what?
 The Nothing can not escape answering the stability question so it must try
 to add structure [information] to itself until it has an answer.  The
 only source of this structure is the ALL .   Thus the Everything boundary
 must be breached.
What is the stability question? Why is it that the
Nothing cannot escape answering it?
See above
 What does it mean
for the Nothing to penetrate the boundary,
There are three components in the system:
The All
The Nothing
Boundaries
The only component that may be capable of answering the question is the 
All.  Thus the Nothing must breach the boundary between them [the 
Everything].  It can not avoid this because it persists or it does 
not.  When this happens an evolving multiverse [a Something] and a renewed 
Nothing are formed and the cycle starts again.

and in what
sense does the Nothing complete itself in this process?
It adds information that resides in the All.
What is information?
I have else where defined information as:
The potential to divide as with a boundary.  An Example: The information in 
a Formal Axiomatic System [FAS] divides true statements from not true 
statements [relevant to that FAS].

How does Nothing know when it has
found an answer?
A Something pays no active attention to what it was.  In fact it can not 
because each new added bit of information creates a new system.  This 
continues until it is a one for one with the All.

How can a Nothing become something else?
It must do so by filling itself with information. - see above -
What does it
become if it does? A different Nothing?
It becomes a Something i.e. an evolving multiverse as outlined in the 
original post.

How can you
distinguish between the former and the latter?
It will no longer meet the definition of Nothing.
Hal 




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-15 Thread Norman Samish
Hal,
I'm way out of my depth, but if I'm correctly interpreting what you are 
saying, it looks to me that your multiverse model cannot be valid.

This is because it answers the question Why does anything exist?  with the 
answer Because it's not possible to conceive of Nothing, since the concept 
of Nothing is Something.

However, this answer requires Something that conceptualizes.  Suppose that 
Something is not there?  If there were Nothing, there could be no Something.

Norman




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-15 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Norman:
My model has both a Nothing, the All, and a set of Somethings simultaneously.
Hal
At 06:10 PM 11/15/2004, you wrote:
Hal,
I'm way out of my depth, but if I'm correctly interpreting what you are
saying, it looks to me that your multiverse model cannot be valid.
This is because it answers the question Why does anything exist?  with the
answer Because it's not possible to conceive of Nothing, since the concept
of Nothing is Something.
However, this answer requires Something that conceptualizes.  Suppose that
Something is not there?  If there were Nothing, there could be no Something.
Norman



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-15 Thread Benjamin Udell
Norman's answer sounds pretty good to me. I also checked 
http://www.nothing.com/  found maybe or maybe not nothing there.  Something's 
also at http://www.something.com - Ben Udell.

- Original Message - 
From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, November 15, 2004 6:10 PM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model


Hal,
I'm way out of my depth, but if I'm correctly interpreting what you are saying, 
it looks to me that your multiverse model cannot be valid.

This is because it answers the question Why does anything exist?  with the 
answer Because it's not possible to conceive of Nothing, since the concept of 
Nothing is Something.

However, this answer requires Something that conceptualizes.  Suppose that 
Something is not there?  If there were Nothing, there could be no Something.

Norman




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-15 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Benjamin:
Norman's comments as I indicated in a response completely miss the essence 
of my model.

Hal
At 06:25 PM 11/15/2004, you wrote:
Norman's answer sounds pretty good to me. I also checked 
http://www.nothing.com/  found maybe or maybe not nothing 
there.  Something's also at http://www.something.com - Ben Udell.

- Original Message -
From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, November 15, 2004 6:10 PM
Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model
Hal,
I'm way out of my depth, but if I'm correctly interpreting what you are 
saying, it looks to me that your multiverse model cannot be valid.

This is because it answers the question Why does anything exist?  with 
the answer Because it's not possible to conceive of Nothing, since the 
concept of Nothing is Something.

However, this answer requires Something that conceptualizes.  Suppose that 
Something is not there?  If there were Nothing, there could be no Something.

Norman



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-15 Thread Hal Ruhl
To answer a few other comments/questions:
Boundaries:  I have as I said in one post of this thread and as I recall in 
some earlier related threads defined information as a potential to erect a 
boundary.  So the All is chuck full of this potential.  Actual boundaries 
are the Everything and any evolving Something.

Something(s):  In my model these are evolving universes and not anti 
Nothings.  The All is the anti Nothing.

Definitions:  The only definitions for which I identify both members of the 
[is, is not] pair are the [All,Nothing] pair and the complementary 
Somethings pairs.  [Is, is not] pairs are not alternates or true/false 
comparisons but are rather information/content complements.  The Everything 
is a boundary and its complement is all other boundaries.  True noise is a 
concept re information flow and its complement is all other concepts.

The All and the Nothing are not mutually exclusive.  Perhaps the 
exclusive idea is based on a hidden assumption of some sort of space that 
can only be filled with or somehow contain one or the other but not both.

Hal

 




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-15 Thread Hal Ruhl
To respond to comments on consistency.
I see no reason why components of the system need to be internally 
consistent.  And I have indicated that the All is not internally 
consistent.   Generally speaking evolving Somethings are also not 
consistent.  Actually evolving Somethings are a sequence of Somethings in 
that each new quantum of information incorporated into a Something makes 
it a new system.

Arithmetic and any system that incorporates it can not prove its [their] 
own consistency.

Hal 




Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-15 Thread Eric Cavalcanti
On Tue, 2004-11-16 at 10:13, Hal Ruhl wrote:
 To respond to comments on consistency.
 
 I see no reason why components of the system need to be internally 
 consistent.  And I have indicated that the All is not internally 
 consistent.   Generally speaking evolving Somethings are also not 
 consistent.  Actually evolving Somethings are a sequence of Somethings in 
 that each new quantum of information incorporated into a Something makes 
 it a new system.
 
 Arithmetic and any system that incorporates it can not prove its [their] 
 own consistency.

Not to be able to prove its consistency doesn't mean
it's inconsistent, does it? 

I'm thinking about an inconsistent system as one that
can prove both a statement and its negation.

What exactly do you mean by your All? All systems of
representations, or All that 'exists'? If the latter,
what does it mean 'to exist'? If the former, do these
systems necessarily have a one-to-one correspondence
to something that 'exists', and in what sense? 

I just can't grasp what you could possibly mean by an
inconsistent All. And therefore I can't see what use
this model could possibly have, and how can it possibly
represent Anything. :)

Eric.



Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model

2004-11-15 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Eric:
At 09:46 PM 11/15/2004, you wrote:
On Tue, 2004-11-16 at 10:13, Hal Ruhl wrote:
 To respond to comments on consistency.

 I see no reason why components of the system need to be internally
 consistent.  And I have indicated that the All is not internally
 consistent.   Generally speaking evolving Somethings are also not
 consistent.  Actually evolving Somethings are a sequence of Somethings in
 that each new quantum of information incorporated into a Something makes
 it a new system.

 Arithmetic and any system that incorporates it can not prove its [their]
 own consistency.
Not to be able to prove its consistency doesn't mean
it's inconsistent, does it?
Going a little further Turing showed that there is in general no decision 
procedure.  Godel's proof is a corollary of this.   So if arithmetic ever 
became complete it would have to be inconsistent.   The All contains all 
arithmetics including the complete and inconsistent one.  So the All is 
internally inconsistent.

Also if you did add an axiom to arithmetic how could this be done so it was 
known to be consistent with the previous axioms?


I'm thinking about an inconsistent system as one that
can prove both a statement and its negation.
That is right
What exactly do you mean by your All? All systems of
representations, or All that 'exists'? If the latter,
what does it mean 'to exist'? If the former, do these
systems necessarily have a one-to-one correspondence
to something that 'exists', and in what sense?
As I said in an earlier post the information within the All may have a 
separate physical existence.
I left open for now what that might be.  I do believe this to be in any way 
essential as part of the description of worlds.  The All since it 
contains all information sums to no net information. Concepts would be 
packets of associated information.  All this points to the first of the 
above which is a position I have preferred for awhile.


I just can't grasp what you could possibly mean by an
inconsistent All. And therefore I can't see what use
this model could possibly have, and how can it possibly
represent Anything. :)
See above.  If our world is indeed subject to true noise as I state in my 
model it would be a sequence of new systems - how does prove which is a 
step by step process within a given system have any relevance?

Hal



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