Re: Are conscious beings always fallible?

2004-01-20 Thread Eric Hawthorne
How would they ever know that I wonder?
Well let's see. I'm conscious and I'm not fallible. Therefore ;-)
David Barrett-Lennard wrote:

I'm wondering whether the following demonstrates that a computer that can
only generate thoughts which are sentences derivable from some 
underlying
axioms (and therefore can only generate true thoughts) is unable to 
think.

This is based on the fact that a formal system can't understand sentences
written down within that formal system (forgive me if I've worded this
badly).
Somehow we would need to support free parameters within quoted 
expressions.
Eg to specify the rule

It is a good idea to simplify x+0 to x

It is not clear that language reflection can be supported in a completely
general way.  If it can, does this eliminate the need for a 
meta-language?
How does this relate to the claim above?

- David
 

I  don't see the problem with representing logical meta-language, and 
meta-metalanguage... etc if necessary
in a computer. It's a bit tricky to get the semantics to work out 
correctly, I think, but there's nothing
extra-computational about doing higher-order theorem proving.

http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/Research/HVG/HOL/

This is an example of an interactive (i.e. partly human-steered) 
higher-order thereom prover.
I think with enough work someone could get one of these kind of systems 
doing some useful higher-order
logic reasoning on its own, for certain kinds of problem domains anyway.

Eric



Re: Are conscious beings always fallible?

2004-01-20 Thread Bruno Marchal
I agree with you. Actually you can use the second recursion theorem
of Kleene to collapse all the orders. This is easier in an untyped
programming language like (pure) LISP than in a typed language,
although some typed language have a primitive for handling untyped
self-reference, like the primitive SELF in Smalltalk ...
Bruno



At 23:29 19/01/04 -0800, Eric Hawthorne wrote:
How would they ever know that I wonder?
Well let's see. I'm conscious and I'm not fallible. Therefore ;-)
David Barrett-Lennard wrote:

I'm wondering whether the following demonstrates that a computer that can
only generate thoughts which are sentences derivable from some underlying
axioms (and therefore can only generate true thoughts) is unable to think.
This is based on the fact that a formal system can't understand sentences
written down within that formal system (forgive me if I've worded this
badly).
Somehow we would need to support free parameters within quoted expressions.
Eg to specify the rule
It is a good idea to simplify x+0 to x

It is not clear that language reflection can be supported in a completely
general way.  If it can, does this eliminate the need for a meta-language?
How does this relate to the claim above?
- David

I  don't see the problem with representing logical meta-language, and 
meta-metalanguage... etc if necessary
in a computer. It's a bit tricky to get the semantics to work out 
correctly, I think, but there's nothing
extra-computational about doing higher-order theorem proving.

http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/Research/HVG/HOL/

This is an example of an interactive (i.e. partly human-steered) 
higher-order thereom prover.
I think with enough work someone could get one of these kind of systems 
doing some useful higher-order
logic reasoning on its own, for certain kinds of problem domains anyway.

Eric



RE: Are conscious beings always fallible?

2004-01-20 Thread David Barrett-Lennard
Even if we utilize a language with reflection capability, do we still
have an underlying problem with different levels of mathematical truth
as indicated by the question of whether 3+4 equals 7?

When an expression contains a sub-expression, don't we expect to be able
to replace that sub-expression by an equivalent one?  But deciding
whether two expressions are equivalent depends on a particular
perspective of mathematical truth.

Btw I thought Smalltalk was weakly typed (can throw a message at any
object regardless of type)

- David


 -Original Message-
 From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Tuesday, 20 January 2004 6:44 PM
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: Re: Are conscious beings always fallible?
 
 I agree with you. Actually you can use the second recursion theorem
 of Kleene to collapse all the orders. This is easier in an untyped
 programming language like (pure) LISP than in a typed language,
 although some typed language have a primitive for handling untyped
 self-reference, like the primitive SELF in Smalltalk ...
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 At 23:29 19/01/04 -0800, Eric Hawthorne wrote:
 How would they ever know that I wonder?
 Well let's see. I'm conscious and I'm not fallible. Therefore
;-)
 
 David Barrett-Lennard wrote:
 
 I'm wondering whether the following demonstrates that a computer
that
 can
 only generate thoughts which are sentences derivable from some
 underlying
 axioms (and therefore can only generate true thoughts) is unable
to
 think.
 
 This is based on the fact that a formal system can't understand
 sentences
 written down within that formal system (forgive me if I've worded
this
 badly).
 
 Somehow we would need to support free parameters within quoted
 expressions.
 Eg to specify the rule
 
  It is a good idea to simplify x+0 to x
 
 It is not clear that language reflection can be supported in a
 completely
 general way.  If it can, does this eliminate the need for a meta-
 language?
 How does this relate to the claim above?
 
 - David
 
 I  don't see the problem with representing logical meta-language, and
 meta-metalanguage... etc if necessary
 in a computer. It's a bit tricky to get the semantics to work out
 correctly, I think, but there's nothing
 extra-computational about doing higher-order theorem proving.
 
 http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/Research/HVG/HOL/
 
 This is an example of an interactive (i.e. partly human-steered)
 higher-order thereom prover.
 I think with enough work someone could get one of these kind of
systems
 doing some useful higher-order
 logic reasoning on its own, for certain kinds of problem domains
anyway.
 
 Eric