Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Hi John:
Thanks for the message.
Perhaps one could call the incompleteness of the Nothing a vacuum
energy because it always has and always will drive the dynamic of my system.

Hal
At 06:56 PM 5/6/2004, you wrote:
Hal,
before the time when we met on another list I tackled 'similar'
concerns. Very briefly:
I picked nothingness rather than nothing. The first reaction was: If I
consider nothingness at all, it already became somethingness. This was
how I started to build up the world
at that time (~1990).
Later I learned about the (alleged) energy content of vacuum,
(calculkated some ^120 of the material content of our universe...) which has
fit perfectly in my own nonsense-speculation.
Just a reminiscense
Cheers
John Mikes

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```I am currently in the middle of rewriting my cell re Alastair's Agreed
Fundamentals project along the lines of my recent posts.  I attach a draft
below because to an extent I believe it is similar to some of what Bruno is
saying.  Arithmetic truth is a component of all potential to divide
[see below].  However, I see no observer or role for one [or more].

Hal

Draft of HRM01V09
[1def] cf-Information: The potential to divide as with a boundary.  An
Example: The information in a Formal Axiomatic System [FAS] divides true
statements from not true statements relevant to that FAS.

[2def] cf-All information: A packet of all potentials to divide [the
Everything].

[3def] cf-Definition: A Definition is a potential to divide the cf-all
information packet into two [a pair of] sub packets.  [One sub packet
contains the information in the entity of interest and the other sub packet
contains the left over information.]

One such sub packet pair results from the definition of a Nothing that
contains no information leaving behind the Everything.  Defining an
Everything as in [2def] results in the same pair.

The Nothing is incomplete because it can not resolve questions re its own
stability.

The Nothing tries to resolve this incompleteness by gaining information
but this is not possible since the Everything requires a Nothing.

This causes the boundary between the Nothing and the Everything to have
a random dynamic.

Universes are interpretations of this boundary [the Plenitude?]

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```

Hi Stephen
Sorry I was tired when I replied to you. Let me be expend on the last
post and be a little more explicit.
THIS IS A REPOST OF THE LAST POST TO YOU.
George

Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear George,

Interleaving.

-
Original Message -
From:
George
Levy
To:
Stephen
Paul King
Sent:
Wednesday, May 12, 2004 3:00 PM
Subject:
Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

Stephen,

Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear George,

How does indeterminacy and
multiple-world-occupation follow from an inability to deduce that one
is not in a simulation?

The total ignorance (not his inability) of an observer of whether his
world is or is not in a simulation effectively places his whole
universe in a state of superposition. Equivalently, this observer
occupies several worlds some of them in simulators and others not in
simulators. This multiplicity of world forms an ensemble of worlds that
he occupies. The elements of the ensemble belong to different levels
in a simulation hierarchy. His act of performing a measurement on his
world to extract the information he seeks about his world being in a
simulator, results in different a outcome in each world in the
ensemble. In order for the observer to remain consisten with the world
he observes, his states must change accordingly. As a result the states
of the observer diverge or "split." Each world in the ensemble now
contains a diffeent observer. Equivalently, each of these observers
occupies a much reduce ensemble. Equivalently, each of these observers
do not occupy a world in superposition.

[GL]
It seems to me that if two worlds are indistinguishable from
the point of view of an observer, then the two worlds could be switched
on the observer - or conversely that the observer could be teleported
from one world to the other - without him knowing it.

[SPK]

The 3rd person abilty to
interchangeidentical worlds does notnecessitate the a priori
existence of a multitute of identical worlds from a 1st person point of
view, because, as you wrote they could be switched without him (the 1st
person) knowing it. So why entertain their existence in the first
place?

The existence of multiple worlds is a consequence of the principle of
sufficient reason as I have explained before. If a world is in a
particular state, and there is no reason for it to be in this state,
then it must also be in all possible states. By the way this principle
has an echo in elementary particle physics. The 3rd person is almost
not in my vocabulary except when I talk about first persons who share
identical or almost identical frames of references. Therefore I do not
quite understand your reference to a 3rd person ability to interchange
identical worlds. It just does not make sense to me.

Let us also take into
account that the kind of teleportation that you bring up here is not
physically possible. I do not understand how it continues to be used as
apedagological device.

Such teleportation would be trivial for creatures living in a
simulation or even in the real world when you have a distributed
computing capability like the Internet.. Applets are being teleported
on the Internet every day. In the future, robots may get to have their
software teleported from one machine in Paris to another one in
Washington. It just so happen that carbon based creatures using wetware
AI cannot be easily teleported.

[GL]
The existence of many such worlds give rise to Quantum
indeterminacy.

[SPK]

I beg to differ. IIRC,
David Deutsch and others have repeatedly pointed out that it is the
superposition principle of Quantum Mechanics that implies the existence
of "many worlds" not the prior existence of multiple identical worlds.

It all depends what your starting axioms are. As I said my starting
axiom is the conscious "I" capable of logic and applying the principle
of sufficient reason. BOTH superposition AND the existence of
"many-worlds are consequences of this principle.

Unless you believe in the "I" and that you believe that you are capable
of logical thinking, there is absolutely no sane reasoning that you can
do. This applies to "David Deutsch and others." Their reasoning is not
wrong, it just starts with one of my theorems.

[GL]
Measurement only restricts the size of the ensemble.

[SPK]

Are you assuming the
"collapse of the wave-function" or some classical or "ignorance based"
interpretation of probabilities here?

Neither. As I have explained above, when an observer exists in two
worlds, (or equivalently in a single
world in two states of superposition), and this observer makes a
measurement, then obviously the measurement will come out differently
in each world. The observer'```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```

Hi Stephen

Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear George,

Interleaving.

-
Original Message -
From:
George
Levy
To:
Stephen
Paul King
Sent:
Wednesday, May 12, 2004 3:00 PM
Subject:
Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

Stephen,

Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear George,

How does indeterminacy and
multiple-world-occupation follow from an inability to deduce that one
is not in a simulation?

Multiple world + comp = indeterminacy

[GL]
It seems to me that if two worlds are indistinguishable from
the point of view of an observer, then the two worlds could be switched
on the observer - or conversely that the observer could be teleported
from one world to the other - without him knowing it.

[SPK]

The 3rd person abilty to
interchangeidentical worlds does notnecessitate the a priori
existence of a multitute of identical worlds from a 1st person point of
view, because, as you wrote they could be switched without him (the 1st
person) knowing it. So why entertain their existence in the first
place?

The existence of multiple worlds is a consequence of the principle of
sufficient reason as I have explained before. If a world is in a
particular state, and there is no reason for it to be in this state,
then it must also be in all possible states.

Let us also take into
account that the kind of teleportation that you bring up here is not
physically possible. I do not understand how it continues to be used as
apedagological device.

Such teleportation would be trivial for creatures living in a
simulation or even in the real world when you have a distributed
computing capability like the Internet.. Applets are being teleported
on the Internet every day. In the future, robots may get to have their
software teleported from one machine in Paris to another one in
Washington.

[GL]
The existence of many such worlds give rise to Quantum
indeterminacy.

[SPK]

I beg to differ. IIRC,
David Deutsch and others have repeatedly pointed out that it is the
superposition principle of Quantum Mechanics that implies the existence
of "many worlds" not the prior existence of multiple identical worlds.

As I mentioned above, multiple worlds + comp = indeterminacy

[GL]
Measurement only restricts the size of the ensemble.

[SPK]

Are you assuming the
"collapse of the wave-function" or some classical or "ignorance based"
interpretation of probabilities here?

No. When an observer exists in two worlds, (or equivalently in a single
world in two states of superposition), and this observer makes a
measurement, then obviously the measurement will come out differently
in each world. The observer's states which must remain consistent with
the world that he observes, must then diverge.) The world he now
occupies is a single world (or equivalently there is no more
superposition).

[GL]
A creature nominally living in a simulation as observed (3rd
person) by an experimenter, lives from the first person point of view
in multiple simulations located at multiple levels.

[SPK]

It seems to me that you are
assuming what I define as the "voyeur's framing" when considering the
notion of a simulation. That is ok, IHMO, so long as you acknowledge
that such a simulation will involve less computational power that one
that dissallows for the voyeur's framing. It is like observing the game
When you make this
assumption it follows that many -even an infinity - of simulated worlds
could simultaneously exits, but I am arguing that the support for the
multitute of identical worlds vanishes when we consider the caseof the
simulation that requires more computational power than that available
to *ANY* observer that you, from within the simulation, could
communicate with. To follow the EverQuest analogy, consider yourself as
a NPC (non-player character) within the EverQuest "world". The maximal
computational power that you would have available would be the
computational power needed to generate the unfolding of events you
could observe from a 1st person point of view.
I argue that we have
a similar situation in our "real" world. Stephen Wolfram wrote:

http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/articles/physics/85-undecidability/2/text.html

"The behavior of a physical system may always be
calculated by simulating explicitly each step in its evolution. Much of
theoretical physics has, however, been concerned with devising shorter
methods of calculation that reproduce the outcome without tracing each
step. Such shortcuts can be made if the computations used in the
calculation are more sophisticated than those that the physical system
can i```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Hi George,

I mainly agree with your remarks. Some ambiguity remains but I would
like to take some time to succeed making them clear. A priori
our approaches differs methodologically.
Concerning your UDA question, could tell me if you were referring
to the UDA presentation in 11 steps, or to the one in 15 steps
(that is to the conversation with Joel
or to the older presentation in one post I made for Russell)?
Ah you mention step 12, so it is the old one OK. But what do you mean by
a reduced universe?
Also, could you explain what you mean by frame of reference and this
without physicalist assumptions. Remember I try to deduce the whole of physics
(including geometry but not geography) from the numbers' dreams.
I am rather busy until tuesday.

See You,

Bruno

At 21:42 12/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
Hi Bruno

Bruno Marchal wrote:

when you say that the first person is all there is I am not sure it
fits nicely with
the methodology I am following. I am not sure I understand why you don't
need the UD,
given that the UD is just a nice third person description of the comp
plenitude.
[That such a thing could exist is a highly non trivial consequence of the
closure of
the set of programmable functions for the diagonalization: the existence
of a universal
machine. (The Post Turing discovery)]. Cf the diagonalization posts.
These are difficult issues... First it seems that the UD does not have to
be a basic assumption from which the plenitude can be derived. I think you
agree with that.

Another issue is that if we begin with the basic assumption of first
person perspective (from which the third person can be derived when first
persons share the same frame of reference) then the plenitude should
necessarily be regarded from the first person perspective.

Is it correct to say that the plenitude is invariant when seen from the
first person? In other words, are all the future potentialities present in
the same amount as seen by any observer (no matter how little or how much
his life is compromised by his circumstances)? This may be a basic
invariance law in the MWI similar to the invariance of c in relativity.

If this invariance is true, then your statement that the UD is a nice
third person description for the plenitude is OK however it would only be
a derivation from the plenitude invariance principle The UD would also be
invariant to describe or generate the plenitude, for any observer.

science/philosophy
of mind, if you mind.
This is a hard question to answer, but I'll give it a try. I am very
committed to the first person relativistic or relative perspective. I
believe that science has been gradually moving toward it from the days of
Galileo and Copernicus. Einstein made the I relative in space and time.
Everett made it relative in the quantum realm. I want to push that to its
ultimate conclusion: that the I should be the basic axiom from which
everything else derives. In I, I include consciousness and its logical
process.

I reviewed your Universal Dovetailer Argument. at your internet site and I
agree very much with it. However, I have some questions. Step 1-11 forces
the reader to consider the first person perspective. Step 12  may have
been taken too hastily. It presumes that the observer in steps 1-11 exists
in a plenitude (for example a closed set of the set of programmable
functions). This is not clear. In fact step 1-11 could have been taken in
a reduced universe.

George
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Hi Bruno

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hi George,

I mainly agree with your remarks. Some ambiguity remains but I would
like to take some time to succeed making them clear. A priori
our approaches differs methodologically.
Concerning your UDA question, could tell me if you were referring
to the UDA presentation in 11 steps, or to the one in 15 steps
(that is to the conversation with Joel
or to the older presentation in one post I made for Russell)?
Ah you mention step 12, so it is the old one OK. But what do you mean by
a reduced universe?
I got the argument at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1726.html

Step 12 is the step when you introduce the UDA.

By reduced universe, I mean a many-world universe where the number of
worlds is less than that of the plenitude or even finite. Your example
of teleportation between Washington and Moscow describes a reduced
universe: The number of options is limited to only two places. Note that
even though the example mentions only one world where this experiment
occurs, this description is by the 3rd person. The first person
experiences two worlds.

Also, could you explain what you mean by frame of reference and this
without physicalist assumptions. Remember I try to deduce the whole of
physics
(including geometry but not geography) from the numbers' dreams.

Frame of reference is difficult to define. I have used the analogy with
relativity because it is a convenient model for what I want to express.
However, I do not restrict frame of reference to spatio-temporal
characteristics. At a first level I include quantum measurements: if two
experimenters observes the apparent collapse of the wave functon in
the same way then they occupy the same world in the plenitude.  At a
higher level I also include logical processes governing consciousness.
Two observer sharing the same logical system experiences the same
consciousness. Unfortunately I do not know enough about logic to
express logic in a relativistic fashion.  I have gone as far  as
recognizing that conditional probabilities can be viewed as a
relativization of information.

I found it convenient to view relativity as a road map. One of  the
first things Einstein did was to recognize the principle of invariance
of c (for special relativity) and the equivalence of acceleration with
gravity (for general relativity). Other things he did was to express the
concept of simultaneity and to derive a spatio-temporal metric.

We could define the invariance of the plenitude as seen by any observer
as a starting point. This principle led me to argue in the past on this
list that conditional suicide or even more simply death does not alter
measure.

The analogy to simultaneity can be expresses by the conditional suicide
experiments that we have discussed on this list a few years ago in which
different observers see different outcomes depending on how many
contingencies they share in their survival.

The analogy with the metric can be expressed by thought experiment that
I have presented on this list a few years ago in which the probability
of achieving a goal such as winning at a  lottery can be calculated
using conditional probabilities which are contingent on the survival of
the player. This topic I believe was of interest to Wei but I don't
think I got him interested in my point of view.

I would also like to include logical systems but as I have mentioned
above, I do not know enough about logic to relativitize it. I also would
like to set up a thought experiment involving relativistic logical
systems but I don't know how to proceed.

All this is just scratching the surface. There is a need for
establishing strong links with physics and mathematics and to make this
theory falsifiable. There is also the need for unifying all these
relativities - make them into one single coherent whole: Einstein's
Relativity, Everett's Relative Many-World interpretation, and
(Relative?) Logic.

Have a good weekend. I will also be busy till Tuesday.

George

I am rather busy until tuesday.

See You,

Bruno

At 21:42 12/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:

Hi Bruno

Bruno Marchal wrote:

when you say that the first person is all there is I am not sure it
fits nicely with
the methodology I am following. I am not sure I understand why you
don't need the UD,
given that the UD is just a nice third person description of the
comp plenitude.
[That such a thing could exist is a highly non trivial consequence
of the closure of
the set of programmable functions for the diagonalization: the
existence of a universal
machine. (The Post Turing discovery)]. Cf the diagonalization posts.

These are difficult issues... First it seems that the UD does not
have to be a basic assumption from which the plenitude can be
derived. I think you agree with that.

Another issue is that if we begin with the basic assumption of first
person perspective (from which the third person can be derived when
first persons share the ```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```

Dear George,

How does indeterminacy and
multiple-world-occupation follow from an inability to deduce that one is not in
a simulation?

Also, how is multiple-world-occupation
knowable 1st person unless by the means I discusses previously? Does this not
violate the anthropic principle?

I am missing something. :_(

Stephen

- Original Message -
From:
George Levy

To: Everything List
Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2004 1:12
AM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some
massive computer?
Hi StephenStephen Paul King wrote:

Dear George,

My take of Russell's post
is:

Unless the creature had some experience
that was not dismissible as a hallucination (1st person) and/or was witness
by others (a proxy of 3rd person?) that lead him to the conclusion that it
existed within a virtual reality then it would have no ability to make such
a deduction.True. But from its own point of view its
world would then be indeterminate. The creature would occupy several worlds as
long as this indeterminacy
exists.George

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

``` IMHO, this latter situation seem to be what D. Deutsch proposes as a test
for his MWI. If we can create a physical implementation of a quantum
computation that has greater computational power than that allowed by the
classical (as per the Copenhagen Interpretation or other interpretations)
case, then it would verify .MWI. A failure of such would be a
falsification.

Perhaps Stephen, but I offer that it would ultimately only lend support to
the view that the classical model is incomplete. This reasoning reminds me
of the anecdote about the eminent astronomer who, when his student commented
on how naive it was that for so long people believed the earth to be the
center of the universe , replied on the contrary, given a belief that one
is stationary relative to the celestial panoply and given no
additional hard evidence other than the sun, for instance, appearing in the
east -arcing across the sky - then sinking out of sight in the west, it
would be foolish to think otherwise. It was at the time the simplest
explanation, lacking any solid additional detailed observation. And it was
simply wrong.

On the subject of consciousness, I wonder how fruitful it is to conduct
thought experiments that infer the observer's consciousness. The reason I
wonder this is (because I am? no, that's another story..) that I'm reading
more and more of late about the zombie within concept where it seems that
while we operate under the illusion of self control, in fact some entity
that is the product of one's integrated anatomical and physiological
pattern is actually acting and reacting measurably before I am aware; even
when I believe I thought of and initiated the action. Whether or not one
is hallucinating, we may in fact all be in the end delusional.

My question is: if real, how does the above situation effect assumptions
that are founded on the assumption of a single conscious observer/actor's
first person experience? Perhaps all we can safely refer to is the
observerand make no additional claims as to their, or even my own,
conscious experience *lacking additional supportive empirical data*.

Cheers
CMR

-- insert gratuitous quotation that implies my profundity here --

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```At 15:59 11/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:

snip

I remember discussing this topic but I do not remember you calling me
silly. Oh sorry you were only thinking it. Thank you :-)

You are welcome. You know on these matters we can never be sure :-)

Now when you say that the first person is all there is I am not sure it
fits nicely with
the methodology I am following. I am not sure I understand why you don't
need the UD,
given that the UD is just a nice third person description of the comp
plenitude.
[That such a thing could exist is a highly non trivial consequence of the
closure of
the set of programmable functions for the diagonalization: the existence of
a universal
machine. (The Post Turing discovery)]. Cf the diagonalization posts.

You could as well just say you don't need comp. (But I use comp to just
benefits from
computer science and mathematical logic taking into account Post Turing
Church ...Solovay).
The first person essentially will be an intuitionist/constructivist
machine, a self-extending
entity which goes through locally anti-symmetric sequences of knowledge states.
Physics seems to appears in the first person plural (where vast
collection of interacting
machines are multiplied), but the last discovery ---(that a quantum
logic [even an infinity*] appears in the pure singular first person pov)---
surely makes
me more open to the importance of the pure (intuitionist) first person.
science/philosophy
of mind, if you mind.
I use comp if only because my more primary goal is to show that some hypothesis
could make some theological question empirically testable.

Bruno

* That infinity of QL (Quantum Logic) converging toward CL (Classical logics)
could be a form of *arithmetical decoherence* as experimented by all sound
Universal Machine with respect to their  normal neighborhoods/consistent
extensions.
You should study logic just to see the beauty. (Or the error! This material
is new,
and has not been verified by someone else. Caution.)

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```

Dear
CMR,

- Original
Message -
From: "CMR"
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: "Everything
List" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, May
12, 2004 10:22 AM
Subject: Re: Are we
simulated by some massive computer?

[SPK]
IMHO, this
latter situation seem to be what D. Deutsch proposes as a test  for
his MWI. If we can create a physical implementation of a quantum
computation that has greater computational power than that allowed by
the  classical (as per the Copenhagen Interpretation or other
interpretations)  case, then it would verify .MWI. A failure of such
would be a  falsification.
[CMR]
Perhaps Stephen, but I offer that it would ultimately only lend support
to the view that the classical model is incomplete. This reasoning
reminds me of the anecdote about the eminent astronomer who, when his
student commented on how naive it was that for so long people believed
the earth to be the center of the universe, replied "on the contrary,
given a belief that one is stationary relative to the celestial panoply
and given no additional hard evidence other than the sun, for instance,
appearing in the east -arcing across the sky - then sinking out of sight
in the west, it would be foolish to think otherwise". It was at the time
the simplest explanation, lacking any solid additional detailed
observation. And it was simply wrong.

[SPK]

This situation would seem to argue against Occam's Razor without further
contemplations. People that I correspond with often ask me: "What is the
"problem" for which your solution is offered? I respond by pointing to this
notion of incompleteness that you mention as a start.

As to the story of the eminent astronomer, let us recall howtend
toassume as "truth"our beliefs even though they are often justified
by no more than a consensus of opinion.

[CMR]
On the subject of consciousness, I wonder how fruitful it is to conduct
thought experiments that infer the observer's consciousness. The reason
I wonder this is (because I am? no, that's another story..) that I'm
reading more and more of late about the "zombie within" concept where it
seems that while we operate under the illusion of "self" control, in
fact some entity that is the product of one's integrated anatomical and
physiological pattern is actually acting and reacting measurably before
"I" am aware; even when I believe I thought of and "initiated" the
action. Whether or not one is hallucinating, we may in fact all be in
the end delusional.
[SPK]

Indeed, there is some empirical evidence (discussed in Roger Penroses
wonderful books) that what we consider as our 1st person experience of the world
is nothing more than a construct formed fractions of a second prior to our
awareness of it. What is amazing is how the generation of this construct
(simulation!) is edited continuously and edited such that what is taken to be
subjectively as the exact present moment is actually up to ½ of a second in the
past.

Could you tell us the names of some of the books and papers that you are reading

[CMR]
My question is: if "real", how does the above situation
effect assumptions that are founded on the assumption of a single
conscious observer/actor's "first person" experience? Perhaps all we can
safely refer to is the observer and make no additional claims as to
their, or even my own, conscious experience *lacking additional
supportive empirical data*.
[SPK]

This is exactly the kind of question that has pushed me to question the
entire idea of realism as it is used in physics and mathematics. Could what we
take as reality be nothing more than a collective delusion or "Maya"? I mean
this in all seriousness.

The question then becomes: Given that we each have a 1st person
experience of a world, what is necessary and sufficient to explain how it is
generated? I believe that we already have a wide variety of mathematical and
conceptual tools to go through this question and to form coherent
conclusions.

I do not see how a mere postulation of a Platonic Plenitude, wherein my
own 1st person experience is an infinitesimal fraction, is sufficient to bridge
the gap to the probability 1 that I have of actually experiencing the writing of
these words. We need an explanation of how the appearance of chance is
necessitated.

Kindest
regards,

Stephen

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```

Dear George,

Interleaving.

- Original Message -
From:
George Levy

To: Stephen Paul King
Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2004 3:00
PM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some
massive computer?
Stephen, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear George,

How does indeterminacy and
multiple-world-occupation follow from an inability to deduce that one is not
in a simulation?

[CMR]
It seems to me that if two worlds are indistinguishable from the point of
view of an observer, then the two worlds could be switched on the observer -
or conversely that the observer could be teleported from one world to the
other - without him knowing it.

[SPK]

The 3rd person abilty to
interchangeidentical worlds does notnecessitate the a priori
existence of a multitute of identical worlds from a 1st person point of view,
because, as you wrote they could be switched without him (the 1st person)
knowing it. So why entertain their existence in the first place? If the
existence of such is merely to construct a statistical ensemble, then fine,
but bear in mine that such is merely a construct with its own set of
assumptions and embelishments.
Let us also take into
account that the kind of teleportation that you bring up here is not
physically possible. I do not understand how it continues to be used as
apedagological device.

[CMR]
The existence of many such worlds give rise to Quantum indeterminacy.

[SPK]

I beg to differ. IIRC,
David Deutsch and others have repeatedly pointed out that it is the
superposition principle of Quantum Mechanics that implies the existence of
"many worlds" not the prior existence of multiple identical
worlds.

[CMR]
Measurement only restricts the size of the ensemble.

[SPK]

Are you assuming the
"collapse of the wave-function" or some classical or "ignorance based"
interpretation of probabilities here?

[CMR]
A creature nominally living in a simulation as observed (3rd person) by
an experimenter, lives from the first person point of view in multiple
simulations located at multiple levels.

[SPK]

It seems to me that you are
assuming what I define as the "voyeur's framing" when considering the notion
of a simulation. That is ok, IHMO, so long as you acknowledge that such a
simulation will involve less computational power that one that dissallows for
the voyeur's framing. It is like observing the game "EverQuest" on your
computer monitor.
When you make this
assumption it follows that many -even an infinity - of simulated worlds could
simultaneously exits, but I am arguing that the support for the multitute of
identical worlds vanishes when we consider the caseof the simulation
that requires more computational power than that available to *ANY* observer
that you, from within the simulation, could communicate with. To follow the
EverQuest analogy, consider yourself as a NPC (non-player character) within
the EverQuest "world". The maximal computational power that you would have
available would be the computational power needed to generate the unfolding of
events you could observe from a 1st person point of view.
I argue that we have
a similar situation in our "real" world. Stephen Wolfram
wrote:

http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/articles/physics/85-undecidability/2/text.html

"The behavior of a physical system may always be calculated by
simulating explicitly each step in its evolution. Much of theoretical physics
has, however, been concerned with devising shorter methods of calculation that
reproduce the outcome without tracing each step. Such shortcuts can be made if
the computations used in the calculation are more sophisticated than those
that the physical system can itself perform. Any computations must, however,
be carried out on a computer. But the computer is itself an example of a
physical system. And it can determine the outcome of its own evolution only by
explicitly following it through: No shortcut is possible. Such computational
irreducibility occurs whenever a physical system can act as a computer. The
behavior of the system can be found only by direct simulation or observation:
No general predictive procedure is possible."

I take this reasoning and
invert to to argue that what we experience as "reality" is indistinguishable
from a simulation of the world using the most computational power available,
the latter being the world as a physical system, acting as a computer,
computing its own evolution. What we take as a 1st person "reality" is nothing
more than the best possible simulation. My rubric is: if we cannot 1st person
distiguish between a "real" object and a simulate```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```

I'd love to take credit for George's arguments (he
probablyknows morethan me, after all) but that wouldn't be ethical
(andI don't think we want to revisit THAT thread!)

cheers!

Dear George,

Interleaving.

[CMR]
It seems to me that if two worlds are indistinguishable from the point
of view of an observer, then the two worlds could be switched on the
observer - or conversely that the observer could be teleported from one
world to the other - without him knowing it.

[SPK]

The 3rd person abilty to
interchangeidentical worlds does notnecessitate the a priori
existence of a multitute of identical worlds from a 1st person point of
view, because, as you wrote they could be switched without him (the 1st
person) knowing it. So why entertain their existence in the first place? If
the existence of such is merely to construct a statistical ensemble, then
fine, but bear in mine that such is merely a construct with its own set of
assumptions and embelishments.
Let us also take into
account that the kind of teleportation that you bring up here is not
physically possible. I do not understand how it continues to be used as
apedagological device.

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```

Dear George and CMR,

Whops! My apologies. But does this
cancel out what I wrote?

Stephen

- Original Message -
From:
CMR

To: Stephen Paul King
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2004 6:02
PM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some
massive computer?

I'd love to take credit for George's arguments (he
probablyknows morethan me, after all) but that wouldn't be ethical
(andI don't think we want to revisit THAT thread!)

cheers!

Dear George,

Interleaving.

[CMR]
It seems to me that if two worlds are indistinguishable from the
point of view of an observer, then the two worlds could be switched on the
observer - or conversely that the observer could be teleported from one
world to the other - without him knowing it.

[SPK]

The 3rd person abilty
to interchangeidentical worlds does notnecessitate the a
priori existence of a multitute of identical worlds from a 1st person
point of view, because, as you wrote they could be switched without him
(the 1st person) knowing it. So why entertain their existence in the first
place? If the existence of such is merely to construct a statistical
ensemble, then fine, but bear in mine that such is merely a construct with
its own set of assumptions and embelishments.
Let us also take into
account that the kind of teleportation that you bring up here is not
physically possible. I do not understand how it continues to be used as
apedagological device.

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Hi Bruno

Bruno Marchal wrote:

when you say that the first person is all there is I am not sure it
fits nicely with
the methodology I am following. I am not sure I understand why you
don't need the UD,
given that the UD is just a nice third person description of the comp
plenitude.
[That such a thing could exist is a highly non trivial consequence of
the closure of
the set of programmable functions for the diagonalization: the
existence of a universal
machine. (The Post Turing discovery)]. Cf the diagonalization posts.
These are difficult issues... First it seems that the UD does not have
to be a basic assumption from which the plenitude can be derived. I
think you agree with that.

Another issue is that if we begin with the basic assumption of first
person perspective (from which the third person can be derived when
first persons share the same frame of reference) then the plenitude
should necessarily be regarded from the first person perspective.

Is it correct to say that the plenitude is invariant when seen from the
first person? In other words, are all the future potentialities present
in the same amount as seen by any observer (no matter how little or how
much his life is compromised by his circumstances)? This may be a basic
invariance law in the MWI similar to the invariance of c in relativity.

If this invariance is true, then your statement that the UD is a nice
third person description for the plenitude is OK however it would only
be a derivation from the plenitude invariance principle The UD would
also be invariant to describe or generate the plenitude, for any observer.

science/philosophy
of mind, if you mind.
This is a hard question to answer, but I'll give it a try. I am very
committed to the first person relativistic or relative perspective.
I believe that science has been gradually moving toward it from the days
of Galileo and Copernicus. Einstein made the I relative in space and
time. Everett made it relative in the quantum realm. I want to push that
to its ultimate conclusion: that the I should be the basic axiom from
which everything else derives. In I, I include consciousness and its
logical process.

I agree very much with it. However, I have some questions. Step 1-11
forces the reader to consider the first person perspective. Step 12  may
have been taken too hastily. It presumes that the observer in steps 1-11
exists in a plenitude (for example a closed set of the set of
programmable functions). This is not clear. In fact step 1-11 could have
been taken in a reduced universe.

George

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```

Bruno and George,

amazing how accurately you describe in math
words what I
wrote in 1998 and put on the WEB in 1999, based
on the 1997 paper (Pre-Geometric origins) of Rainer Zimmermann - the NARRATIVE
(no math) of the (no Plato-based)Plenitude - Bigbangs unlimited, including ours.
No comp, no simulation, just a plain logical 'story' how bigbangs have got to
emerge.
I work on comp-leting (!) it ever since. In
plain langauge - give it some more 2-300 years.

My purpose was to "keep the Big bang-like
beginning" for the convenience (after I fought against the cosmologists'
follies) and describe a logical necessity for it to occur with a subsequent
history it underwent in our universe (amongst
innumerable others) to re-dissipate into the Plenitude.

They are not any similar to ours, I can't put
Tegmar's ideas
into them.All occur and dissipate
aspatialy-atemporally.

Related stuff: on the Karl Jaspers Forum
(networks 2003):
http://www.douglas.qc.ca/fdg/kjf/62-TAMIK.htm- while on
the (apache) "Index of
jamikes" - my website - the entries
following:http//pages.prodigy.net/jamikes/...
...Plenitude00.html,
..bigbang.html,
...evolJuly00.html
show my approach in its forming (not even by far any similar to yours).

Just FYI - I claim no part in the UD-related
thoughts.G
Cheers

John Mikes

- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 9:59 AM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive
computer?

At 15:51 10/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:   BM: But
you agree there is no plenitude without an UD. GL: No I don't agree.
I don't agree that the UD is the origin of all things.
But to say that there is no plenitude without an UD does not mean that the
UD is the origin of all things.
This is typical classical thinking.   But I
am a classical (boolean) thinker. (and actually it was a typical
confusion between A-B and B-A, don't worry it happens all the
time).   To paraphrase  "In
the beginning there was the UD (eg. x=x+1).
(Technical details: the UD is a little more than x = x+1, but OK)
And the UD generated the Plenitude (eg. 0, 1, 2,
3, ...)   Be careful. I thought we agreed that the
Plenitude is a first person notion. the O, 1, 2, 3,  could not even
be used to describe a notion of  3-plenitude. The 3-plenitude is
best described by the whole arithmetical truth, which  has been
proved to be not describable by any finite theory. It is not completely
unifiable. . Out of the
plenitude came out different worlds.  But you *do* have
understand the UDA argument (I have links!), and now you  begin to
talk like Schmidhuber. With the comp hyp only one physical world exists,
and it  is an emerging (from the 1-point of view) appearance. It
emerges from all the comp histories. For exemple, although newtonian
worlds are generated by the UD, no  consciousness can ever
stabilize on it because it is (or should be) of measure zero.
Out of some of these worlds conscious creatures emerged.
We are some of  these creatures."
And so this sentence has just no meaning with (classical) comp.
This is 3rd person thinking. It leads to the
mind-body problem.  I resolve the mind-body problem at
the outset by using the observer as a  starting point. The "I"
is both an observable fact and an axiom. "I" can  observe that "I"
am capable of logical thinking and that my thoughts are  consistent.
( I will leave to you the detail regarding what kind of logic
applies) My logical ability leads me to the principle of sufficient reason
One way to phrase this principle is "If there is no reason for
something  not to be then it must be. Since I am in a particular
state and there is  no reason for me not to be in any other state,
then I must also be in  those states. This leads me to think that
there are other observers beside  myself, in fact, all possible
observers.  I can also apply this same principle to the
world that I observe. If the  world is in a particular state, and
there are no reasons for this world to  be in this particular state,
then in must be in all possible states. This  leads me to the
plenitude. Thus the plenitude includes all possible worlds.
The indistinguishability of which observer I am and (conjugately?) which
world I occupy leads to first person indeterminacy.
I agree with all this. my point is that this is indeed the
correct (with comp) discourse of the first person. I can't say more
without technics.
If not recall me what you mean by the plenitude.
Remember also that from a machine's point of view (1 or
3 whatever) the plenitude is given by the the UD, or more
exactly its complete execution (UD*). I suppose "I"
am the UD. Or maybe "I*" am the UD??? I don't know if this  makes
sense.   I don't think so.
It may be possible that the need t```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```

Bruno Marchal wrote:

At 15:51 10/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:

BM: But you agree there is no plenitude without an UD.

GL: No I don't agree. I don't agree that the UD is the origin of all
things.
But to say that there is no plenitude without an UD does not mean that
the UD
is the origin of all things.

I am being the devil's advocate. I actually agree with you, except that
I don't understand the need for a UD.

To paraphrase

In the beginning there was the UD (eg. x=x+1).
(Technical details: the UD is a little more than x = x+1, but OK)

And the UD generated the Plenitude (eg. 0, 1, 2, 3, ...)
Be careful. I thought we agreed that the Plenitude is a first person
notion.
the O, 1, 2, 3,  could not even be used to describe a notion of
3-plenitude.
The 3-plenitude is best described by the whole arithmetical truth,
which has been
proved to be not describable by any finite theory. It is not
completely unifiable.

. Out of the plenitude came out different worlds.
But you *do* have understand the UDA argument (I have links!), and now
you begin to talk
like Schmidhuber.

Sorry that I wasn't clearer. I was just playing the devil's advocate. I
do not agree with Schmidhuber, I agree mostly with you except that I
don't see the need of a UD.

With the comp hyp only one physical world exists, and it is an emerging
(from the 1-point of view) appearance. It emerges from all the comp
histories.
For exemple, although newtonian worlds are generated by the UD, no
consciousness
can ever stabilize on it because it is (or should be) of measure zero.

Out of some of these worlds conscious creatures emerged. We are some
of these creatures.

And so this sentence has just no meaning with (classical) comp.

I agree with you.

This is 3rd person thinking. It leads to the mind-body problem.

I resolve the mind-body problem at the outset by using the observer
as a starting point.  The I is both an observable fact and an
axiom. I can observe that I am capable of logical thinking and
that my thoughts are consistent. ( I will leave to you the detail
regarding what kind of logic applies) My logical ability leads me to
the principle of sufficient reason One way to phrase this principle
is If there is no reason for something not to be then it must be.
Since I am in a particular state and there is no reason for me not to
be in any other state, then I must also be in those states. This
leads me to think that there are other observers beside myself, in
fact, all possible observers.

I can also apply this same principle to the world that I observe. If
the world is in a particular state, and there are no reasons for this
world to be in this particular state, then in must be in all possible
states. This leads me to the plenitude. Thus the plenitude includes
all possible worlds.

The indistinguishability of which observer I am and (conjugately?)
which world I occupy leads to first person indeterminacy.

I agree with all this. my point is that this is indeed the correct
(with comp)
discourse of the first person. I can't say more without technics.

As I said I think the UD is a remnant of 3rd person thinking.

I don' t understand why you dislike so much 3-person thinking (although I
appreciate very much your respect for the 1-person).
It is not that I dislike the 3rd person. I believe that the 1st person
is all there is. The 3rd person is only an approximation that 1st
persons can use to communicate when they share the same approximate
frame of reference. The first person can be useful, just like Newtonian
mechanics can be useful. However, in certain situations the third person
point of view just breaks down.

3-person thinking is called usually science. It is communicable
falsifiable (mainly) propositions and proofs. Like a proof that 17 is a
prime number.
I agree. But only for observers sharing the same frame of reference.

It is simpler to assume the plenitude as an axiom than an arbitrary
UD. At least there is nothing arbitrary about the plenitude.
But the UD is just a machine-independent (and thus non arbitrary)
description of the
comp plenitude as it can be talked about in a 3-person way by
(consistent) machines.
I keep insisting that the UD is not given as an possible explanation,
but it is
a *necessary problem* (once we postulate comp).

I don't see why the UD is necessary. Maybe I am missing something.

I did prove that that necessary problem
is equivalent to the extraction of the physical laws from number
theory/arithmetic.

Why don't you use the observer himself to do this.

It may be that using the observer as starting points will force White
Rabbits to be filtered out of the observable world

And again I totally agree. It *is* what is proved in my thesis. I have
done two things:

the other (related to an error in my thesis I talked
about in some previous post) is the apparition of a new quantum
logic (I did
not command it!) and even (I must verify) an infinity of quantum
```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```

Russell

OK. You are suffering from 3rd person thinking which leads you to these
conclusions:
1) As a scientist experimenting with this simulated creature, you
have absolutely no evidence that this creature is conscious.
2) You believe that the creature (conscious or unconscious) is
3) You believe that your simulator is the world of the creature.

First person thinking leads to other conclusions:
1) You perceives this creature as a different instantation of your
own "I." Therefore you believe that the creature has some form of
consciousness, maybe not identical to your own, but nevertheless,
consciousness.
2) The world this creature exists in is to some extent
indeterminate. It may be your own simulator that you purchased with
some government grant, or it could be another almost identical
simulator that *[EMAIL PROTECTED] run on Alpha Centauri 1,000,000 years ago. Or
it could be yet another one. Only the creature itself can perform
experiments to refine its perception of its world. Should you pull the
plug on your simulator, the creature would continue to exist somewhere
or somewhen else in the plenitude.
3) The indeterminacy and the experiment that the creature can
conduct are limited by its own perception of itself, of its mind, of
its body and of its world. Its own mind will shape its own world.

George

Russell Standish wrote:

Sorry, but I fail to see it as self evident. Imagine being a creature
immersed in a virtual reality setup its entire life, a virtual reality
that does not include a representation (ie a body) of the creature itself.

Would that creature deduce that it is in a virtual reality, and that
it has a body in another (unobservable to it) reality?

Or would it even be conscious?

Cheers

On Tue, May 11, 2004 at 04:10:15PM -0700, George Levy wrote:

Russell wrote

However, the mind-body problem doesn't completely disappear - rather
it is transformed into "Why the Anthropic Principle?".

Once you have accepted that "I" exist and that "I" am capable of logical
thinking and capable of following a logical chain, then the Anthropic
principle becomes trivial. What "I" am and what "I" observe becomes the
initial boundary condition for a logical chain leading to the proof of
the existence of the world: "I am therefore the world is." This is the
Anthropic Principle.

George

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```

Russell

Remember the creature must be consistent with the world it observes and
vice versa. An unchanging one bit world does not seem to be able to
support the existence of a consistent conscious entity - at
least not with our kind of consciousness.

Let's move the creature up to a richer world that it can observe. Let
us also assume that the creature has no body. What does this means?
That it can "observe" but cannot "control" objects in this world? Like
a ghost? All I can say is that the consciousness of the creature will
be shaped by the world it inhabits and vice versa. It consciousness
will certainly be different from ours. It can certainly use the
Anthropic Principle by asserting consistency of itself with its
world by saying "I am what I am therefore my world is what it is."

George

Since the
creature has no information whatsoever about any body it might have,
what is to stop it's world being the simplest of all possible worlds?
How about a one bit universe?

Day 1.

Q.  What can I see today?
A.  A bit.

Q. What is the value of the bit?
A. 1

Day 2.

Q.  What can I see today?
A.  A bit.

Q. What is the value of the bit?
A. 1

...

Of course there is no conundrum at all if the creature is unconscious.

George

Russell Standish wrote:

Sorry, but I fail to see it as self evident. Imagine being a creature
immersed in a virtual reality setup its entire life, a virtual reality
that does not include a representation (ie a body) of the creature itself.

Would that creature deduce that it is in a virtual reality, and that
it has a body in another (unobservable to it) reality?

Or would it even be conscious?

Cheers

On Tue, May 11, 2004 at 04:10:15PM -0700, George Levy wrote:

Russell wrote

However, the mind-body problem doesn't completely disappear - rather
it is transformed into "Why the Anthropic Principle?".

Once you have accepted that "I" exist and that "I" am capable of logical
thinking and capable of following a logical chain, then the Anthropic
principle becomes trivial. What "I" am and what "I" observe becomes the
initial boundary condition for a logical chain leading to the proof of
the existence of the world: "I am therefore the world is." This is the
Anthropic Principle.

George

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```

Dear George,

My take of Russell's post is:

Unless the creature had some experience
that was not dismissible as a hallucination (1st person) and/or was witness by
others (a proxy of 3rd person?) that lead him to the conclusion that it existed
within a virtual reality then it would have no ability to make such a
deduction.

Another possibility is to consider the
upper bound on the computational recourses required to generate the totality of
theexperience of such a creature and ask if that creature could have a 1st
person experience an event that required more than that upper
bound.

IMHO, this latter situation seem to be what
D. Deutsch proposes as a test for his MWI. If we can create a physical
implementation of a quantum computation that has greater computational power
than that allowed by the classical (as per the Copenhagen Interpretation or
other interpretations) case, then it would verify MWI. A failure of such would
be a falsification.

Kindest regards,

Stephen

- Original Message -
From:
George Levy

To: Everything List
Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 7:57 PM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some
massive computer?
RussellOK. You are suffering from 3rd person thinking
which leads you to these conclusions: 1) As a scientist
experimenting with this simulated creature, you have absolutely no evidence
that this creature is conscious. 2) You believe
that the creature (conscious or unconscious) is stuck in your simulation.
3) You believe that your simulator is the world of the
creature.First person thinking leads to other
conclusions: 1) You perceives this creature as a
different instantation of your own "I." Therefore you believe that the
creature has some form of consciousness, maybe not identical to your own, but
nevertheless, consciousness. 2) The world this
creature exists in is to some extent indeterminate. It may be your own
simulator that you purchased with some government grant, or it could be
another almost identical simulator that *[EMAIL PROTECTED] run on Alpha Centauri
1,000,000 years ago. Or it could be yet another one. Only the creature itself
can perform experiments to refine its perception of its world. Should you pull
the plug on your simulator, the creature would continue to exist somewhere or
somewhen else in the plenitude. 3) The indeterminacy and
the experiment that the creature can conduct are limited by its own perception
of itself, of its mind, of its body and of its world. Its own mind will shape
its own world.George Russell Standish wrote:
Sorry, but I fail to see it as self evident. Imagine being a creature
immersed in a virtual reality setup its entire life, a virtual reality
that does not include a representation (ie a body) of the creature itself.

Would that creature deduce that it is in a virtual reality, and that
it has a body in another (unobservable to it) reality?

Or would it even be conscious?

Cheers

On Tue, May 11, 2004 at 04:10:15PM -0700, George Levy wrote:

Russell wrote

However, the mind-body problem doesn't completely disappear - rather
it is transformed into "Why the Anthropic Principle?".

Once you have accepted that "I" exist and that "I" am capable of logical
thinking and capable of following a logical chain, then the Anthropic
principle becomes trivial. What "I" am and what "I" observe becomes the
initial boundary condition for a logical chain leading to the proof of
the existence of the world: "I am therefore the world is." This is the
Anthropic Principle.

George

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```

Hi Stephen

Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear George,

My take of Russell's post is:

Unless the creature had some experience that
was not dismissible as a hallucination (1st person) and/or was witness
by others (a proxy of 3rd person?) that lead him to the conclusion that
it existed within a virtual reality then it would have no ability to
make such a deduction.

True. But from its own point of view its world would then be
indeterminate. The creature would occupy several worlds as long as this
indeterminacy exists.

George

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```I saw the documentary movie Tibet: Cry of the Snow Lion the other day.

In one scene, a group of monks is sitting around  in a circle, and the
Dalai Llama is
overseeing.

The monks are industriously and methodically placing individual tiny
coloured
beads (there are maybe 4 or 5 colours)
around the perimeter of an enormous circular mandala pattern (made of 10s of
1000s of beads). The pattern has grown to almost two metres in diameter,
and it
features an extrordinarily elaborate kaleidoscopic pattern with perfect
and large complex  patterns built on tiny patterns.

If someone places a single bead out of its proper place in the pattern,
the pattern
will be distorted and it will not be possible to maintain the growing
recursive pattern.
But if every bead is placed correctly, the perimiter can grow by one
the order of the pattern, and the process can repeat, growing larger and
larger.

OBSERVABLE REALITY IS LIKE THE MANDALA. EVERYTHING MUST BE
JUST SO, TO MAINTAIN THE OBSERVABLE ORDER OVER A LARGE
PROGRAM NEXT STEPS, LEADS TO CHAOS RAPIDLY. A SELECT FEW PATHS
CAN MAINTAIN THE ORDER.
p.s. Later in the movie, they return to this scene, with the monks
around an enormous,
wondrously complex circular pattern. A monk takes a wooden yardstick,
and with
a few brief sweeps, obliterates the pattern, leaving chaos. The chaos;
is cleared to one side, and a monk places a single bead in the centre of
the circle

That last part is the real lesson of the mandala.

Eric

George Levy wrote:

Bruno,

Bruno Marchal wrote:

And a priori the
UD is a big problem because it contains too
many histories/realities (the white rabbits),
and a priori it does not contain obvious mean
to force those aberrant histories into
a destructive interference process (unlike
Feynman histories).

It may be that using the observer as starting points will force White
Rabbits to be filtered out of the observable world

George

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```At 15:51 10/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:

BM: But you agree there is no plenitude without an UD.
GL: No I don't agree. I don't agree that the UD is the origin of all things.

But to say that there is no plenitude without an UD does not mean that the UD
is the origin of all things.

This is typical classical thinking.

But I am a classical (boolean) thinker. (and actually it was a
typical confusion between A-B and B-A, don't worry it happens
all the time).

To paraphrase

In the beginning there was the UD (eg. x=x+1).

(Technical details: the UD is a little more than x = x+1, but OK)

And the UD generated the Plenitude (eg. 0, 1, 2, 3, ...)

Be careful. I thought we agreed that the Plenitude is a first person notion.
the O, 1, 2, 3,  could not even be used to describe a notion of
3-plenitude.
The 3-plenitude is best described by the whole arithmetical truth, which
has been
proved to be not describable by any finite theory. It is not completely
unifiable.

. Out of the plenitude came out different worlds.
But you *do* have understand the UDA argument (I have links!), and now you
begin to talk
like Schmidhuber. With the comp hyp only one physical world exists, and it
is an emerging
(from the 1-point of view) appearance. It emerges from all the comp histories.
For exemple, although newtonian worlds are generated by the UD, no
consciousness
can ever stabilize on it because it is (or should be) of measure zero.

Out of some of these worlds conscious creatures emerged. We are some of
these creatures.

And so this sentence has just no meaning with (classical) comp.

This is 3rd person thinking. It leads to the mind-body problem.

I resolve the mind-body problem at the outset by using the observer as a
starting point.  The I is both an observable fact and an axiom. I can
observe that I am capable of logical thinking and that my thoughts are
consistent. ( I will leave to you the detail regarding what kind of logic
applies) My logical ability leads me to the principle of sufficient reason
One way to phrase this principle is If there is no reason for something
not to be then it must be. Since I am in a particular state and there is
no reason for me not to be in any other state, then I must also be in
those states. This leads me to think that there are other observers beside
myself, in fact, all possible observers.

I can also apply this same principle to the world that I observe. If the
world is in a particular state, and there are no reasons for this world to
be in this particular state, then in must be in all possible states. This
leads me to the plenitude. Thus the plenitude includes all possible worlds.

The indistinguishability of which observer I am and (conjugately?) which
world I occupy leads to first person indeterminacy.

I agree with all this. my point is that this is indeed the correct (with comp)
discourse of the first person. I can't say more without technics.

If not recall me what you mean by
the plenitude.
Remember also that from a machine's point
of view (1 or 3 whatever) the plenitude
is given by the the UD, or more exactly its
complete execution (UD*).
I suppose I am the UD. Or maybe I* am the UD??? I don't know if this
makes sense.

I don't think so.

It may be possible that the need to invoke a UD originates from
classical 3rd person (objective or absolute) thinking in which several
separate physical worlds are simulated.

I would be prudent before linking objective with absolute. I could
argue that
only the subjective is absolute (for example it is hard to relativize
actual pain ...).
Also,  I insist (I know you did got that probably subtle point), but with comp
the adjective physical cannot be applied to anything capable of being
emulated (because the physical is a sum on all possible emulations at once,
and that cannot be emulated).

As I said I think the UD is a remnant of 3rd person thinking.

I don' t understand why you dislike so much 3-person thinking (although I
appreciate very much your respect for the 1-person).
3-person thinking is called usually science. It is communicable
falsifiable (mainly) propositions and proofs. Like a proof that 17 is a
prime number.

The comp hypothesis may be better off without a UD simply because it is
possible to derive the plenitude without a UD. And should you refuse to
accept the observer as a starting point,  you could assume the plenitude
as a starting pont axiom. It is simpler to assume the plenitude as an
axiom than an arbitrary UD. At least there is nothing arbitrary about the
plenitude.

But the UD is just a machine-independent (and thus non arbitrary)
description of the
comp plenitude as it can be talked about in a 3-person way by (consistent)
machines.
I keep insisting that the UD is not given as an possible explanation, but it is
a *necessary problem* (once we postulate comp). I did prove that that
necessary problem
is equivalent to the extraction of the physical laws ```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```At 16:13 07/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
Bruno,

Bruno Marchal wrote:

My view is that the observer-experience simply consists in the
(virtual) transitions from one observer-moment to another where the
transition is filtered by having to be consistent with the
observer-state. Note how the observer bootstraps himself into
consciousness out of the plenitude. So maybe my UD is the nul UD : it
is the maximally dumb UD.
A maximally dumb UD?  I am not sure I understand.
This may be the crux of our misunderstanding. I think that an observer can
emerge out of the penitude without a UD.  The maximally dumb UD is the
Null-UD.

But you agree there is no plenitude without an UD.
If not recall me what you mean by
the plenitude.
Remember also that from a machine's point
of view (1 or 3 whatever) the plenitude
is given by the the UD, or more exactly its
complete execution (UD*).

First person (relative or relativistic) experience is the only one that
matters.  The world(s) he perceives is the portion of the plenitude
consistent with himself. (The body must be consistent with the mind)

I agree.

It may be possible that the need to invoke a UD originates from classical
3rd person (objective or absolute) thinking in which several separate
physical worlds are simulated.

I disagree, or I don't understand. I don't think there
is a *need* to *invoke* a UD. It is just
that the UD is there, and we cannot make it
disappears by simple wish (without
abandoning the comp hyp). And a priori the
UD is a big problem because it contains too
many histories/realities (the white rabbits),
and a priori it does not contain obvious mean
to force those aberrant histories into
a destructive interference process (unlike
Feynman histories).
And so apparently comp is false, and then
my work points on the fact that we cannot yet
conclude to the falsity of comp because, by
interviewing self-referentially correct machines
on the 1-possible histories, the machine does
propose a highly non trivial  quantum geometry
so that destructive interference of too complex
histories remains possible (without a priori priors).
Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Bruno,

Bruno Marchal wrote:

At 16:13 07/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:

Bruno,

Bruno Marchal wrote:

My view is that the observer-experience simply consists in the
(virtual) transitions from one observer-moment to another where
the transition is filtered by having to be consistent with the
observer-state. Note how the observer bootstraps himself into
consciousness out of the plenitude. So maybe my UD is the nul UD
: it is the maximally dumb UD.

A maximally dumb UD?  I am not sure I understand.

This may be the crux of our misunderstanding. I think that an
observer can emerge out of the penitude without a UD.  The maximally
dumb UD is the Null-UD.

But you agree there is no plenitude without an UD.
No I don't agree. I don't agree that the UD is the origin of all things.
This is typical classical thinking. To paraphrase:

In the beginning there was the UD (eg. x=x+1). And the UD generated the
Plenitude (eg. 0, 1, 2, 3, ...). Out of the plenitude came out different
worlds. Out of some of these worlds conscious creatures emerged. We are
some of these creatures.

This is 3rd person thinking. It leads to the mind-body problem.

I resolve the mind-body problem at the outset by using the observer as a
starting point.  The I is both an observable fact and an axiom. I
can observe that I am capable of logical thinking and that my thoughts
are consistent. ( I will leave to you the detail regarding what kind of
logic applies) My logical ability leads me to the principle of
sufficient reason One way to phrase this principle is If there is no
reason for something not to be then it must be. Since I am in a
particular state and there is no reason for me not to be in any other
state, then I must also be in those states. This leads me to think that
there are other observers beside myself, in fact, all possible observers.

I can also apply this same principle to the world that I observe. If the
world is in a particular state, and there are no reasons for this world
to be in this particular state, then in must be in all possible states.
This leads me to the plenitude. Thus the plenitude includes all possible
worlds.

The indistinguishability of which observer I am and (conjugately?) which
world I occupy leads to first person indeterminacy.

If not recall me what you mean by
the plenitude.
Remember also that from a machine's point
of view (1 or 3 whatever) the plenitude
is given by the the UD, or more exactly its
complete execution (UD*).
I suppose I am the UD. Or maybe I* am the UD??? I don't know if this
makes sense.

First person (relative or relativistic) experience is the only one
that matters.  The world(s) he perceives is the portion of the
plenitude consistent with himself. (The body must be consistent with
the mind)

I agree.

It may be possible that the need to invoke a UD originates from
classical 3rd person (objective or absolute) thinking in which
several separate physical worlds are simulated.

I disagree, or I don't understand. I don't think there
is a *need* to *invoke* a UD. It is just
that the UD is there, and we cannot make it
disappears by simple wish (without
abandoning the comp hyp).
As I said I think the UD is a remnant of 3rd person thinking. The comp
hypothesis may be better off without a UD simply because it is possible
to derive the plenitude without a UD. And should you refuse to accept
the observer as a starting point,  you could assume the plenitude as a
starting pont axiom. It is simpler to assume the plenitude as an axiom
than an arbitrary UD. At least there is nothing arbitrary about the
plenitude.

And a priori the
UD is a big problem because it contains too
many histories/realities (the white rabbits),
and a priori it does not contain obvious mean
to force those aberrant histories into
a destructive interference process (unlike
Feynman histories).
It may be that using the observer as starting points will force White
Rabbits to be filtered out of the observable world

George

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```On Mon, May 10, 2004 at 03:51:34PM -0700, George Levy wrote:
But you agree there is no plenitude without an UD.

No I don't agree. I don't agree that the UD is the origin of all things.
This is typical classical thinking. To paraphrase:

In the beginning there was the UD (eg. x=x+1). And the UD generated the
Plenitude (eg. 0, 1, 2, 3, ...). Out of the plenitude came out different
worlds. Out of some of these worlds conscious creatures emerged. We are
some of these creatures.

This is 3rd person thinking. It leads to the mind-body problem.

I resolve the mind-body problem at the outset by using the observer as a
starting point.  The I is both an observable fact and an axiom. I
can observe that I am capable of logical thinking and that my thoughts
are consistent. ( I will leave to you the detail regarding what kind of
logic applies) My logical ability leads me to the principle of
sufficient reason One way to phrase this principle is If there is no
reason for something not to be then it must be. Since I am in a
particular state and there is no reason for me not to be in any other
state, then I must also be in those states. This leads me to think that
there are other observers beside myself, in fact, all possible observers.

...

It may be that using the observer as starting points will force White
Rabbits to be filtered out of the observable world

George

I think this email is quite profound. I find myself in agreement with
George's statement, and I basically say the same thing (in a more
clumsy way) in Why Occam's Razor.

However, the mind-body problem doesn't completely disappear - rather
it is transformed into Why the Anthropic Principle?. See Bruno's
critique of my paper, circa early 2000. The AP demands that our
observed universe contains an instantiation of our consciousness. This
is needed, as otherwise we will only see trivial worlds, contrary to
observation.

My guess is that the AP is a reflection of some deep principle of
consciousness that we haven't unravelled - something necessarily
self-reflexive.

Cheers

A/Prof Russell Standish  Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile)
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax   9385 6965, 0425 253119 ()
Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02

pgp0.pgp
Description: PGP signature

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```

Bruno Marchal wrote:

I agree with George, but note that I arrive at an equivalent
assertion without using that lower levels have lower complexity
and therefore higher measure.  That is possible, but
the problem is that it is a priori hard to estimate the dumbness
of the universal dovetailer which is quite capable to entangle high
complexity programs with low complexity programs, so that
the multiplication related to low-complexity can be inherited to
high-complexity (due to dovetailing). But you may be right, I have not
proved that a UD could be that dumb!
Gosh, Bruno, I don't understand what you are saying. Maybe I am too
naive! Or maybe our background conceptions are too different so even if
the language is the same it does not make sense. For one I don't see how
a first person experience needs to depend on a UD. My view is that the
observer-experience simply consists in the (virtual) transitions from
one observer-moment to another where the transition is filtered by
having to be consistent with the observer-state. Note how the observer
bootstraps himself into consciousness out of the plenitude. So maybe my
UD is the nul UD : it is the maximally dumb UD.

George

From a suggestion of Jacques
Bailhache (an old everythinger) I have try to build an explicit
UD which makes the measure on computations arbitrary, but I have
not succeed, in the limit (on which bears the first points of view),
the right measure seems to self-correct by itself. It is that
self-measure I study with provability logic.
Another problem with the idea of low level, or of simple program
is that even a program with 2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^64
as minimal bit-length is quite little in comparison of almost all number
in Plato Heaven.
Bruno

At 15:56 05/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:

This has been an interesting thread. Unfortunately I was too busy to
contribute much. However, here is a thought regarding simulation
versus first and third person points of view.

It does make sense to talk about a 3rd person point of view about
simulation of a conscious entity on a computer. However, I don't
think it applies to a first person point of view.

In the plenitude we'll have an infinite number of levels of
simulation as well as an infinite number of simulations per level
(2^aleph_0 as suggested by Bruno in a previous post, or higher)

From a first person point of view any observer moment in any
simulation and at any level can transit to another observer moment in
a different simulation at a different level provided the transition
is consistent with the observer. Therefore from the first person
point of view there is no such a thing as living in a simulator. As
first persons we live in all simulators and at all levels.

In addition, since lower levels have lower complexity and therefore
higher measure, the number of simulations is higher at lower levels.

Therefore we are more likely to occupy ensembles of simulations
located at the lower levels. Is there a lowest level in the level
hierarchy, that is a level below which there is no simulation, just
the plenitude? Possibly. If so, we are most likely to exist most of
the time at that base level, but we cannot exclude that some of the
time we may be in a higher level.

h. This argument points to the fact that most of the time we do
not live in a simulator!

George

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```At 23:02 06/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

I agree with George, but note that I arrive at an equivalent
assertion without using that lower levels have lower complexity
and therefore higher measure.  That is possible, but
the problem is that it is a priori hard to estimate the dumbness
of the universal dovetailer which is quite capable to entangle high
complexity programs with low complexity programs, so that
the multiplication related to low-complexity can be inherited to
high-complexity (due to dovetailing). But you may be right, I have not
proved that a UD could be that dumb!
Gosh, Bruno, I don't understand what you are saying. Maybe I am too naive!
Or maybe our background conceptions are too different so even if the
language is the same it does not make sense. For one I don't see how a
first person experience needs to depend on a UD. My view is that the
observer-experience simply consists in the (virtual) transitions from
one observer-moment to another where the transition is filtered by
having to be consistent with the observer-state. Note how the observer
bootstraps himself into consciousness out of the plenitude. So maybe my UD
is the nul UD : it is the maximally dumb UD.

But then why are you sure that lower complexity have higher measure?
I understand intuitively but how would you prove that without introducing a
special UD?
A maximally dumb UD?  I am not sure I understand.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```I agree with George, but note that I arrive at an equivalent
assertion without using that lower levels have lower complexity
and therefore higher measure.  That is possible, but
the problem is that it is a priori hard to estimate the dumbness
of the universal dovetailer which is quite capable to entangle high
complexity programs with low complexity programs, so that
the multiplication related to low-complexity can be inherited to
high-complexity (due to dovetailing). But you may be right, I have not
proved that a UD could be that dumb! From a suggestion of Jacques
Bailhache (an old everythinger) I have try to build an explicit
UD which makes the measure on computations arbitrary, but I have
not succeed, in the limit (on which bears the first points of view),
the right measure seems to self-correct by itself. It is that
self-measure I study with provability logic.
Another problem with the idea of low level, or of simple program
is that even a program with 2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^64
as minimal bit-length is quite little in comparison of almost all number
in Plato Heaven.
Bruno
At 15:56 05/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
This has been an interesting thread. Unfortunately I was too busy to
contribute much. However, here is a thought regarding simulation versus
first and third person points of view.

It does make sense to talk about a 3rd person point of view about
simulation of a conscious entity on a computer. However, I don't think it
applies to a first person point of view.

In the plenitude we'll have an infinite number of levels of simulation as
well as an infinite number of simulations per level (2^aleph_0 as
suggested by Bruno in a previous post, or higher)

From a first person point of view any observer moment in any simulation
and at any level can transit to another observer moment in a different
simulation at a different level provided the transition is consistent
with the observer. Therefore from the first person point of view there is
no such a thing as living in a simulator. As first persons we live in all
simulators and at all levels.

In addition, since lower levels have lower complexity and therefore higher
measure, the number of simulations is higher at lower levels.

Therefore we are more likely to occupy ensembles of simulations located at
the lower levels. Is there a lowest level in the level hierarchy, that is
a level below which there is no simulation, just the plenitude? Possibly.
If so, we are most likely to exist most of the time at that base level,
but we cannot exclude that some of the time we may be in a higher level.

h. This argument points to the fact that most of the time we do not
live in a simulator!

George
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```The following is a combination of several of my previous ideas which forces
me to raise a question re measure in this thread.

1) The first step is to examine the act of definition. In this case the
definition of a Nothing.  Any definition process simultaneously defines
two entities.  The definition is a boundary between an entity of interest
and the leftover building blocks.  In the special case of a Nothing the
left over is an Everything.  Thus the two are dependent partners.  Since
the Everything contains all information the definition pair must itself
specify all information and can be represented by a normal real.

2)  A Nothing has an interesting logical problem: It can not answer any
meaningful question about itself.  Assuming there is a relevant meaningful
question a Nothing would be incomplete.  An inescapable meaningful
question is its own stability.  This is not only meaningful it is

3) To attempt to answer this question a Nothing randomly and
spontaneously decays towards an Everything to resolve its
incompleteness.  But this is not sustainable since an Everything is not
independent of a Nothing.  Therefore a Nothing rebounds from the decay.

4) Thus the definition pair or boundary between the Nothing and
Everything partners is randomly dynamic - equivalent to a random sequence
of normal reals.

5)  A universal dovetailer computer [the computer plus its collective
dynamic input and output] is a good way to model a selector of a random
sequence of normal reals.

6) Notice that the Everything also has a logical problem.  Looking at the
same meaningful question of its own stability it contains all possible
answers.  Just one would constitute a selection i.e. net internal
information which is not an aspect of the Everything.   Thus the
Everything is inconsistent.

7) Thus the entire system while being - apparently - the only game in town
is also both incomplete and inconsistent.

8) Universes are interpretations of sections of the normal real string.
9) Now a question is how many of these interpretations have internal rules
that allow input from an external random oracle?  If  we are to maintain a
zero information system then the answer must be a randomly changing
percentage.  So all interpretations must be able change character i.e. be
subject to an external random oracle the internal rules of the particular
interpretation notwithstanding.

10) What this means is that there remains some information in the system -
the computer itself is incorrectly defined - to get rid of this problem the
computer has to function like any computer I ever used - it must make
random errors.

I do not see how one can extract from this any measure re anything which
to me seems reasonable since there should be no information in there anyway.

Hal

Hal

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Hal,
before the time when we met on another list I tackled 'similar'
concerns. Very briefly:
I picked nothingness rather than nothing. The first reaction was: If I
consider nothingness at all, it already became somethingness. This was
how I started to build up the world
at that time (~1990).
Later I learned about the (alleged) energy content of vacuum,
(calculkated some ^120 of the material content of our universe...) which has
fit perfectly in my own nonsense-speculation.
Just a reminiscense
Cheers
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, May 06, 2004 6:43 PM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

The following is a combination of several of my previous ideas which
forces
me to raise a question re measure in this thread.

1) The first step is to examine the act of definition. In this case the
definition of a Nothing.  Any definition process simultaneously defines
two entities.  The definition is a boundary between an entity of interest
and the leftover building blocks.  In the special case of a Nothing the
left over is an Everything.  Thus the two are dependent partners.  Since
the Everything contains all information the definition pair must itself
specify all information and can be represented by a normal real.

2)  A Nothing has an interesting logical problem: It can not answer any
meaningful question about itself.  Assuming there is a relevant meaningful
question a Nothing would be incomplete.  An inescapable meaningful
question is its own stability.  This is not only meaningful it is

3) To attempt to answer this question a Nothing randomly and
spontaneously decays towards an Everything to resolve its
incompleteness.  But this is not sustainable since an Everything is not
independent of a Nothing.  Therefore a Nothing rebounds from the
decay.

4) Thus the definition pair or boundary between the Nothing and
Everything partners is randomly dynamic - equivalent to a random
sequence
of normal reals.

5)  A universal dovetailer computer [the computer plus its collective
dynamic input and output] is a good way to model a selector of a random
sequence of normal reals.

6) Notice that the Everything also has a logical problem.  Looking at
the
same meaningful question of its own stability it contains all possible
answers.  Just one would constitute a selection i.e. net internal
information which is not an aspect of the Everything.   Thus the
Everything is inconsistent.

7) Thus the entire system while being - apparently - the only game in town
is also both incomplete and inconsistent.

8) Universes are interpretations of sections of the normal real string.

9) Now a question is how many of these interpretations have internal rules
that allow input from an external random oracle?  If  we are to maintain a
zero information system then the answer must be a randomly changing
percentage.  So all interpretations must be able change character i.e. be
subject to an external random oracle the internal rules of the particular
interpretation notwithstanding.

10) What this means is that there remains some information in the system -
the computer itself is incorrectly defined - to get rid of this problem
the
computer has to function like any computer I ever used - it must make
random errors.

I do not see how one can extract from this any measure re anything which
to me seems reasonable since there should be no information in there
anyway.

Hal

Hal

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Hi Kory,

Are you still there? I got funny responses from the webposter, it looks
Hoping to hear about you soon,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```At 16:14 30/04/04 -0400, John M wrote:

How about:  self? is it a good enoug 1st person soul?

Here you put your finger on something quite
important but rather hard to explain without saying more
on the incompleteness phenomenon. We will certainly
come back on this more than once.
The idea is that there are many notion of selves for the
sound machine. (I recall I am always talking about
a machine which proves theorem of arithmetic, and by
definition a machine is sound if she proves true theorems).
Then the third person self is defined by a correct
functional description of the machine at the right level
(which exist for us by comp, and which can be made explicit
for simple machine like Peano-Arithmetic, ...).
It is a third person self, a little like when you say I have
a mouth ...
I remember now that I did use the term soul for this notion
of *third* person (or self) in the provocative view of comp:
comp means you can save your soul on a disket.
Stathis made me think that the word soul is perhaps
better used for the first person self.
In a nutshell, the third person self is the one which
will be described by the Godelian beweisbar provability
predicate Bew(x), (and then by the modal logical systems
G and G* (for those who remember, I will re-explain later)).
The first person self will be defined by applying the
Theaetetus trick on the third person self, that is on bew.
So the first person will be defined by a new predicate saying
Bew(x) and True(x).
But the predicate Truth(x), by Tarski theorem, cannot be defined
in the language of the machine. Still, by using G (and G*) we
can defined such a box (but detail will be given at time).
Now the machine is sound, which means the machine
proves only true proposition of arithmetic.
So, obviously the first and third person are equivalent.
But the incompleteness theorems will entail that neither
the 3-machine self,  nor 1-machine self can *prove* that
equivalence. Such subtle nuances will be made cristal
transparent by the explicit use of G and G*.
I recall that G is a formal theory complete for the provable
discours,by the machine, on the propositional provability
logic of itself (the machine itself). G* is a formal theory
complete for the true discours,by the machine, on the
propositional provability logic of itself (the machine itself).
That is: G* contains the true but unprovable sentences
on and by the machine. What appears here, with the
box [0] for the 3-person and  [1] for the 1-person:
G* proves [0] = [1], but G does not prove it.

Well I guess this was difficult for those who doesn't know
enough logic and my intend was to explain more before.
So don't worry if you don't understand.
Remember that the popular book by Smullyan
Forever Undecided has been reedited, and is a not too
bad introduction to the modal logic G. It could help.
Old (in this list) definition of G and G* can be found
here http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1417.html
and in the neighborhood.
Bruno

John M
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED];
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, April 30, 2004 9:37 AM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
Ok Stathis, thanks for the precision.
Anyway you give me the temptation to identify the soul by the first
person.
We will be able to prove (with the comp hyp) that not only the soul exists
but (I forget to say) also that from the *correct* soul point of view, the
soul
is NOT a machine.
But perhaps the word soul is to charged with emotion, and perhaps
we should stick on the expression first person.
'course, it is just a matter of vocabulary. (But then humans are able
to fight themselves during centuries for matter of vocabulary ... :(

Bruno

At 22:23 30/04/04 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 29 April 2004 Bruno Marchal wrote:

At 23:16 28/04/04 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

There is a single idea underlying much of the confusion in discussions
of personal identity: the belief in a soul.

Indeed.

I use this term for a quality or substance which resides in a person
throughout his life and is somehow responsible for his identity, and
which (here is the problem) is not captured by a complete description
of
the person's physical and psychological state. Often, it is a hidden
assumption.

That's a nice definition of the soul, quite similar to the provable
properties
of the first person, once we will define it precisely (in the
Thaetetus
way). And comp will
entails, *as a theorem*, the existence of the soul, then!

Actually, I didn't mean to use soul as a synonym for consciousness or
subjective experience, which is why I said it was something not captured
by a complete description of a person's physical *or psychological*
state.
Subjective experience differs from other empirical data in that it can
only be fully understood in a first person context, but I do not see why
this should disqaulify it from being a fit```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```At 09:25 29/04/04 -0400, John M wrote:
Bruno,
I am sorry if my poorly chosen words irritated you, that was
the farthest from my intentions. I can see, they did.

Yes but that's ok. Thanks for caring.  You give me the opportunity
to take a new look to the Bochenski book. I did search that book
for a long time and a friend who was working at Los Alamos
brought me back a withdrawn exemplary from the Los Alamos library!
It confirms my feeling that fundamental questions are multi-cultural
in essence. We should come back on this but I prefer to try to explain
a little bit the technical part of my work before. Please don't hesitate to
intervene with question, remarks, or any skeptical critics.
Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```On 29 April 2004 Bruno Marchal wrote:

At 23:16 28/04/04 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

There is a single idea underlying much of the confusion in discussions of
personal identity: the belief in a soul.
Indeed.

I use this term for a quality or substance which resides in a person
throughout his life and is somehow responsible for his identity, and which
(here is the problem) is not captured by a complete description of the
person's physical and psychological state. Often, it is a hidden
assumption.

That's a nice definition of the soul, quite similar to the provable
properties
of the first person, once we will define it precisely (in the Thaetetus
way). And comp will
entails, *as a theorem*, the existence of the soul, then!
Actually, I didn't mean to use soul as a synonym for consciousness or
subjective experience, which is why I said it was something not captured by
a complete description of a person's physical *or psychological* state.
Subjective experience differs from other empirical data in that it can only
be fully understood in a first person context, but I do not see why this
should disqaulify it from being a fit subject for scientific study.
Cognitive psychologists write rigorous scientific papers of which they are
very proud, and they seem to have replaced the behaviourists (who thought
consciousness was at best unimportant and at worst non-existent) in most

What I meant by soul was something beyond reason or empirical fact,
whether of the first or the third person variety; something magical or
supernatural, in other words.

Stathis Papaioannou

_
http://ninemsn.match.com?referrer=hotmailtagline

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Dear Stephen,

At 13:44 29/04/04 -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:

But there is no such thing as a delay in Platonia, but that is not my
point.

It is good it is not your point because there are delay in Platonia,
at least in the sense I was using the word. A delay relative to a
computational state is the minimal number of step for the UD
to come back on that state or its continuations (roughly speaking).
By the compiler theorem this make sense, and it is just a (computable)
number. It has nothing to to with the subjective time we will
be able to axiomatize once we define the first person, and it has
nothing to do with the physical time which we will or will not
recover from the quantum logics (given by interviewing
the sound universal machine).

I am trying to see how you deal with the problem of intractible
computations - as implementable given infinite resources - and how it may be
possible for measures to be defined using them. I had not considered this
application but it is intriguing. You touch on this below.
If complexity
play a role it must be derived along with the measure on the comp
histories.
[SPK]

Yes, but is this derivation on that can be taken to exist independent of
the first person aspect of comp histories?
This may be one of my key difficulties. On one hand, I do not have a
problem with the idea of Platonic existence, re AR, of mathematical objects
but I do have a problem with the seeming lack of a clear explanation of how
the flow of temporality  arises in the first person aspect.

But we have not yet arrive at this point. Wait for S4Grz. You *will*
be delighted :)(We will see ...).

It seems to me that what ever our theory of Everything is, it must
explain how it is not just possible to have a flow of temporality  a
priori; it must have a non-measure zero sampling in the class of all
possible relationships between numbers - or whatever notion of Ur-object
that one uses.
I personaly eschew the notion of fundamental objects and use the
Heraclitian notion of Process and fundamental, thus I see mathematical
objects - numbers, etc. - as derivative of this notion of Process. I see
Hintikka's idea of proofs as game theoretical constructs as strongly hinting
at this idea...

It is really a matter of convenience, to take numbers, sets, or games.
But in general game theories, or set theories are richer and less simple than
elementary arithmetic. I don't think those dictinction are quite relevant.
You will tell me ... after I make enough precise the result I got and the
propositions I conjecture.
Do you know Conway game theory?  Where games are jkust a slight
generalisation of his concept of number?

In Conscience  Mecanisme I do make a case that Bennett notion of
depth could play a role in order to derive the cosmological aspect of
physics. Even prior a-la-Schmidhuber could play a role. But the
methodology I advocate although it could justify the prior if needed,
cannot
rely on it at the start.
[SPK]

I agree. We have to have the methodology itself as an a priori existent.
It is co-present in Platonia in your thinking, it seems to me. ;-)

This is a little bit too vague for me I'm afraid.

I do not see how the mere a priori existence of solutions (Integers)
and
the relationships between them (also Integers), as a priori existing
numbers
is sufficient.

We will discuss that after I succeed in explaining how the whole things
work. All Right?
[SPK]

Sure! ;-)

BM:
The comp reason why the soul or the first person is never captured by
any
complete third person description is akin to the reason truth and
knowledge are
not arithmetizable (as opposed to provable and consistent).
Godel's theorem  Co. makes universal machine a highly non trivial
type of
being.

[SPK]

Does not this statement, that  truth and knowledge are not
arithmetizable, imply that the postulation of AR is insufficient?
[BM]
No. And giving that Godel's incompleteness is true for much more
general things than machine, we can say not only that arithmetical
truth is not arithmetizable, but mathematical truth is not
mathematicalizable, physical truth is not physicalizable, and more
generally [whatever]-truth is not [whatver]izable.
So strictly speaking AR could be sufficient (the Pythagorean version
of my thesis). For reason of simplicity I do not use it.
[SPK]

Wait a minute! It is one thing to say that [whatever]-truth is not
[whatver]izable and it is another to say that [whatever]-truth is finitely
constructible or approximatable. The former deals with its existential
aspects and the latter deals with its meaningfulness and expressiveness. We
do not require absoluteness (truth, decidability or otherwise) in our
interactions to be able to have meaningfulness.
But this is not problematic to me; I am interested in how physicality
MUST obtain, even if only in the first person sense. In fact, in my work I
anly assume first person ```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Ok Stathis, thanks for the precision.
Anyway you give me the temptation to identify the soul by the first person.
We will be able to prove (with the comp hyp) that not only the soul exists
but (I forget to say) also that from the *correct* soul point of view, the soul
is NOT a machine.
But perhaps the word soul is to charged with emotion, and perhaps
we should stick on the expression first person.
'course, it is just a matter of vocabulary. (But then humans are able
to fight themselves during centuries for matter of vocabulary ... :(
Bruno

At 22:23 30/04/04 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 29 April 2004 Bruno Marchal wrote:

At 23:16 28/04/04 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

There is a single idea underlying much of the confusion in discussions
of personal identity: the belief in a soul.
Indeed.

I use this term for a quality or substance which resides in a person
throughout his life and is somehow responsible for his identity, and
which (here is the problem) is not captured by a complete description of
the person's physical and psychological state. Often, it is a hidden
assumption.

That's a nice definition of the soul, quite similar to the provable
properties
of the first person, once we will define it precisely (in the Thaetetus
way). And comp will
entails, *as a theorem*, the existence of the soul, then!
Actually, I didn't mean to use soul as a synonym for consciousness or
subjective experience, which is why I said it was something not captured
by a complete description of a person's physical *or psychological* state.
Subjective experience differs from other empirical data in that it can
only be fully understood in a first person context, but I do not see why
this should disqaulify it from being a fit subject for scientific study.
Cognitive psychologists write rigorous scientific papers of which they are
very proud, and they seem to have replaced the behaviourists (who thought
consciousness was at best unimportant and at worst non-existent) in most

What I meant by soul was something beyond reason or empirical fact,
whether of the first or the third person variety; something magical or
supernatural, in other words.

Stathis Papaioannou

_
http://ninemsn.match.com?referrer=hotmailtagline
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```How about:  self? is it a good enoug 1st person soul?
John M
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED];
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, April 30, 2004 9:37 AM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

Ok Stathis, thanks for the precision.
Anyway you give me the temptation to identify the soul by the first
person.
We will be able to prove (with the comp hyp) that not only the soul exists
but (I forget to say) also that from the *correct* soul point of view, the
soul
is NOT a machine.
But perhaps the word soul is to charged with emotion, and perhaps
we should stick on the expression first person.
'course, it is just a matter of vocabulary. (But then humans are able
to fight themselves during centuries for matter of vocabulary ... :(

Bruno

At 22:23 30/04/04 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 29 April 2004 Bruno Marchal wrote:

At 23:16 28/04/04 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

There is a single idea underlying much of the confusion in discussions
of personal identity: the belief in a soul.

Indeed.

I use this term for a quality or substance which resides in a person
throughout his life and is somehow responsible for his identity, and
which (here is the problem) is not captured by a complete description
of
the person's physical and psychological state. Often, it is a hidden
assumption.

That's a nice definition of the soul, quite similar to the provable
properties
of the first person, once we will define it precisely (in the
Thaetetus
way). And comp will
entails, *as a theorem*, the existence of the soul, then!

Actually, I didn't mean to use soul as a synonym for consciousness or
subjective experience, which is why I said it was something not captured
by a complete description of a person's physical *or psychological*
state.
Subjective experience differs from other empirical data in that it can
only be fully understood in a first person context, but I do not see why
this should disqaulify it from being a fit subject for scientific study.
Cognitive psychologists write rigorous scientific papers of which they
are
very proud, and they seem to have replaced the behaviourists (who thought
consciousness was at best unimportant and at worst non-existent) in most

What I meant by soul was something beyond reason or empirical fact,
whether of the first or the third person variety; something magical or
supernatural, in other words.

Stathis Papaioannou

_
http://ninemsn.match.com?referrer=hotmailtagline

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Dear Bruno,

I would like to focus on one thing, but will interleave comments on the
rest..

- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, April 30, 2004 10:05 AM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

Dear Stephen,

At 13:44 29/04/04 -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:

But there is no such thing as a delay in Platonia, but that is not
my
point.

It is good it is not your point because there are delay in Platonia,
at least in the sense I was using the word. A delay relative to a
computational state is the minimal number of step for the UD
to come back on that state or its continuations (roughly speaking).
By the compiler theorem this make sense, and it is just a (computable)
number. It has nothing to to with the subjective time we will
be able to axiomatize once we define the first person, and it has
nothing to do with the physical time which we will or will not
recover from the quantum logics (given by interviewing
the sound universal machine).

[SPK]

Now this statement has me very puzzled! Platonia must include all
possible computational steps and even if we only consider computations as N
to N maps we will find that there exist minimal recursions (like Poincare
recursions where the computation returns to its initial state) that will be
infinitely long. These are the type of computations that I am troubled by,
computations that are attempts to solve NP-Complete problems.

What kind of a delay is it when we have infinitely many steps? You seem
to have ignored what I wrote below.

I am distinguishing subjective time from this delay! But I wonder if
you are not forgetting that Platonia is, by definition, timeless. Platonia
is given, to abuse words, all at once. It is eternal and without beginning
or end to its existence. Given this, it must be Complete and all inclusive.
Do you not agree?

[SPK]
**I am trying to see how you deal with the problem of intractible
computations - as implementable given infinite resources - and how it may
be
possible for measures to be defined using them. I had not considered this
application but it is intriguing. ***

snip

[SPK]

Yes, but is this derivation on that can be taken to exist
independent of
the first person aspect of comp histories?

This may be one of my key difficulties. On one hand, I do not have a
problem with the idea of Platonic existence, re AR, of mathematical
objects
but I do have a problem with the seeming lack of a clear explanation of
how
the flow of temporality  arises in the first person aspect.

[BM]
But we have not yet arrive at this point. Wait for S4Grz. You *will*
be delighted :)(We will see ...).

[SPK]

I am very interested in studying S4Grz!

[SPK]
It seems to me that what ever our theory of Everything is, it must
explain how it is not just possible to have a flow of temporality  a
priori; it must have a non-measure zero sampling in the class of all
possible relationships between numbers - or whatever notion of Ur-object
that one uses.

I personaly eschew the notion of fundamental objects and use the
Heraclitian notion of Process and fundamental, thus I see mathematical
objects - numbers, etc. - as derivative of this notion of Process. I see
Hintikka's idea of proofs as game theoretical constructs as strongly
hinting
at this idea...

[BM]
It is really a matter of convenience, to take numbers, sets, or games.
But in general game theories, or set theories are richer and less simple
than
elementary arithmetic. I don't think those dictinction are quite relevant.
You will tell me ... after I make enough precise the result I got and the
propositions I conjecture.
Do you know Conway game theory?  Where games are just a slight
generalisation of his concept of number?

[SPK]

Yes, but it has been some time ago that I studied Conway's idea. I do
recall that it intrigued me a great deal. What is your take on it?

snip

[SPK]

I have been following your discussion with Kory (and all others)
closely.

In an attempt to put all my cards on the table I will state that
my
idea is a kind of process based mind-body dualism (based on Vaughan
Pratt's
work http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/pratt95rational.html), but one that
becomes
very similar to Russell's neutral monism in the limit of the Totality
of
Existence, which I believe is the same as your Platonia, e.g. an
asymptotically vanishing dualism. I do not see Platonia as being
mental
or mind, ala a new form of Berkeliean Idealism.

[BM]
We can guess similarities indeed.  But (I told you this before) Pratt's
paper are hard, and the relation with mind and bodies is implicit, nowhere
does him really tackle the m/b problem.

Pratt explains his idea in great detail in the above referenced paper
and in several other places on his website. But it seems that his idea```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```The following is a combination of two of my previous ideas which together
simplify my attempt to prove that a computer is a good model of the
substrate of a multi universe venue for our apparent sequence of states.

1) The first step is to examine the act of definition. In this case the
definition of a Nothing.  Any definition process simultaneously defines
two entities.  The definition is a boundary between an entity of interest
and the leftover building blocks.  In the special case of a Nothing the
left over is an Everything.  Thus the two are dependent partners.  Since
the Everything contains all information the definition pair must itself
specify all information and can be represented by a normal real.

2)  A Nothing has an interesting logical problem: It can not answer any
meaningful question about itself.  Assuming there is a relevant meaningful
question a Nothing would be incomplete.  An inescapable meaningful
question is its own stability.  This is not only meaningful it is

3) To attempt to answer this question a Nothing randomly and
spontaneously decays towards an Everything to resolve its
incompleteness.  But this is not sustainable since an Everything is not
independent of a Nothing.  Therefore a Nothing rebounds from the decay.

4) Thus the definition or boundary between the Nothing and Everything
pair is randomly dynamic equivalent to a random sequence of normal reals.

5)  A universal computer is a good way to model a selector of a random
sequence of normal reals.

Hal

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```wow..

2)  A Nothing has an interesting logical problem: It can not answer any
meaningful question about itself.  Assuming there is a relevant meaningful
question a Nothing would be incomplete.  An inescapable meaningful
question is its own stability.  This is not only meaningful it is

3) To attempt to answer this question a Nothing randomly and
spontaneously decays towards an Everything to resolve its
incompleteness.  But this is not sustainable since an Everything is not
independent of a Nothing.  Therefore a Nothing rebounds from the
decay.

4) Thus the definition or boundary between the Nothing and Everything
pair is randomly dynamic equivalent to a random sequence of normal reals.

5)  A universal computer is a good way to model a selector of a random
sequence of normal reals.

Hal

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Hi Stephen,

At 12:15 28/04/04 -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:

I struggle to find the right words to express the difficulty that I see.
My problem is that your work ignores the computational complexity
(NP-Completeness) of grading (defining measures) the relationships.
This is due to the fact that from a first person point of view any delay
will not been perceived. I do not pretend that complexity should always
been ignored, but to introduce it at the start would be ad hoc. If complexity
play a role it must be derived along with the measure on the comp histories.
In Conscience  Mecanisme I do make a case that Bennett notion of
depth could play a role in order to derive the cosmological aspect of
physics. Even prior a-la-Schmidhuber could play a role. But the
methodology I advocate although it could justify the prior if needed, cannot
rely on it at the start.

I do not see how the mere a priori existence of solutions (Integers) and
the relationships between them (also Integers), as a priori existing numbers
is sufficient.
We will discuss that after I succeed in explaining how the whole things
work. All Right?

BM:
The comp reason why the soul or the first person is never captured by any
complete third person description is akin to the reason truth and
knowledge are
not arithmetizable (as opposed to provable and consistent).
Godel's theorem  Co. makes universal machine a highly non trivial type of
being.
[SPK]

Does not this statement, that  truth and knowledge are not
arithmetizable, imply that the postulation of AR is insufficient?
No. And giving that Godel's incompleteness is true for much more
general things than machine, we can say not only that arithmetical
truth is not arithmetizable, but mathematical truth is not
mathematicalizable, physical truth is not physicalizable, and more
generally [whatever]-truth is not [whatver]izable.
So strictly speaking AR could be sufficient (the Pythagorean version
of my thesis). For reason of simplicity I do not use it.

Let me
state this in a different way. How does Digital Substitution ( yes,
Doctor ) get coded into numbers without involving physical implementation?

But that's the point of the whole work. Now, if you have follow
a little bit the literature on the mind body problem you surely know
that nobody has succeed in explaining how a private mind can be attached
to anything third-person describable, be it physical or mathematical.
All what I say is that if we survive the digital brain substitution, then any
fundamental explanation of what matter *cannot* rely on anything
like Aristotelian substances or even to anything *primitively* physical.
With comp the mind-body problem is just two times more difficult in the
sense that we must explain not only the mind but also the matter, and
this from the mind. The UDA (alias the 1-8 reasoning) just show that:
comp *must* explain matter by a mind theory. Wait perhaps I say
more to Kory so that you can be made your objection more specific.
Best regards,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Bruno,
I am sorry if my poorly chosen words irritated you, that was
the farthest from my intentions. I can see, they did.

In arguments (other lists) with religious zealots an idea popped
up in my mind about that (what you objected to) 'physicalistic'
*translation* of heaven, hell, eternity and judgement etc., all
in the phraseology of this list (which is far from being understood
i.e. automatic in my different foundational knowledge-base ) -
about not the underlying sciences, rather the mindset of - yes - the
advanced physicists, who are 'beyond' the classical(?), our conventionally
developed memes, yet may still be within the age-old ways of human thinking
which lurk in the back of the minds.
You mean classical logic? I don't think so.
No, I don't mean 'logic'. I meant evolutionary thinking within the western
culture. (You may argue that it belongs into it, I have no
counter-argument).
After your interesting survey of the pertinent cultural history
(thank you) you concluded - and I fully agree:
You raise interesting question but I thing it would be premature to
really tackle that now.

Of course one cannot draw strict borders between coexisting cultures, there
is more crossfertilization than is obvious, the common anthropological
origins/ways of human (mental as well) evolution are undeniable.

My post was the idea (and questioning) of the infiltration of the
'historically evolved' memes into a different worldview (which I called
incorrectly(?) 'physicalistic') and its (odd) ways of expression, i.e.
language, -  not as you asked:
Is it a western or eastern type of *behavior* ?  ;-)

What are you asking for? -
I am not asking FOR, I am asking a question, seeking opinions.

I got yours, thank you

John M

- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, April 28, 2004 11:06 AM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

At 11:03 27/04/04 -0400, John M wrote:
Bruno:
I really TRY to catch up with the discussions -

Thanks for telling.

however I can't help feeling
that what's going on is a physicalistic (?)

I guess you are trying to provoke me here, isn't it?
(I mean you are aware that I pretend (at least) that physics
could be reducible to machine's sychology/theology/biology/
number theory, etc. This is hardly physicalistic).

*translation*
of Judeo-Christian theology: whe we die, we (soul?) transfer  to the
Dear Good Lord's Heaven/Paradise (= called a 1000
different planets) - sometimes expressed as quantum
imortality...(of the soul?)
Then again, just like in the Christian myth, in heaven
everybody (including God) speaks the one human language  we know (or
not).

You mean classical logic? I don't think so. You could read the  nice book
by I. M. Bochenski (translated in english in 1961,  University of Notre
Dame Press): A History of Formal Logic.  It contains a large chapter on the
logics, epistemology and
metaphysics of India,before and after Chr. It could change
your mind on this point. Also quite astonishing in that regard  is the
book by Th. Stcherbatsky: Buddhist Logic. Comp itself
(arguably) has appeared in the east a very long time before
Plato, as most analysis of the heaven and hell concepts.
(Reference in Conscience  Mecanisme).
Remember also Giordiano Bruno who has been burned by the Church for his
questions and imaginations; (he was an explicit
many worlder in the form of other planet with life form).
You raise interesting question but I thing it would be premature to
really tackle that now.

Everything
is in the pattern of our terrestrial physical taste and comp .
imagination.
Maybe we get to hell: the mathematically illiterate planet?

At least I put the carts on the table: Church Turing Post Markov ...
thesis, + a minimal amount of arithmetical realism, + that special act on f
aith in front of a medical operation.
And the game is just to see where all that could lead with respect to
some unsolved fundamental question.

Can't we do better?

... and then I point on the fact, about which I have probably
underestimated the startlingness, that, thanks to some  works done by ...
Godel, ..., Solovay, we can quasi-literally ask the opinion of *the* sound
classical universal machines on that question. In some sense I eliminate
the act of faith by just interviewing the machine. What are you asking for?

Look, I promise to Kory a hopefully readable account of what I see as an
obvious (but necessarily a little bit technical) mathematical/physical
confirmation of comp. It is a modest confirmation in the sense that it
leads quickly to many open mathematical problems, a sequence of
conjectures but also a real path from bit to qubit, should comp be true.

I finish by a question.
Because we are about to interview the UM on a possible measure
existing on its (closer) consistent extensions, it is natural
to ask her if she *do* have a consistent extension.

Now```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Hi Kory,

So we met two important theories or machines:
Classical Logic CL and Peano Arithmetic PA.
As collection of theorems, the first is a subset of
the second:
PA
|
|
|
CL
Now I have chosen PA to set the things. Any theory or
machine rich enough to prove elementary theorems about
numbers will do.
What will be important is that anybody (including possible
machines) should be able to verify mechanically if a given
proof is a proof, at least in principle (in case a given proof
is 2^64 steps long).
We will interview PA about its possible (consistent) extensions.

It is Godel who showed how to make such an interview,
by showing how to translate the meta-predicate of provability
into an arithmetical sentence.
Let me be a little more specific. Don't hesitate to tell me you know
all this, but it could help some others, and it could help
in front of futur misunderstandings.
PA has a language. Here it is:

L_PA  =   {v, , -, not, t, f, A, E, =, +, *,
SUC, 0, (, ), x,y,z,x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, ...}
We could code those symbol by the odd integer above 1. So
the Godel number of v is 3, and this I abbreviate by ng(v)=3.
So ng()=5, ng(-)=7, ng(not)=9, ng(t)=11, ..., ng(x)=33, ng(y)=35, etc.
So exactly in the sense that you can define the divisability predicate
Div(x,y)  (which is true when x divide y) only with the available symbol
as in
Div(x,y) =  Ez(x*z = y)  (there exist a number z such that
x multiplied by z gives y)
you can define the meta-predicate IS-A-VARIABLE(x), which is
true when x is a number representing a variable, as Godel number.
Actually, with the code we have chosen:
IS-A-VARIABLE(x)  = ODD(x)  BIGGER-OR-EQUAL(x,3)

= Ey(x=2y+1)  Ez(x = z+33)

Now we want to talk about formula also with PA. I recall
that there are precise formula formation rule like
if A is a formula then (not A) is a formula
if A and B are formula then (A  B) is a formula,
etc.
To code a formula by a number, a traditional way relies
on the well known fundamental theorem of arithmetic
saying that all number have a unique decomposition
in product of prime numbers.
So the formula Ez(x*z = y) will be coded by the number

2^(ng(E))*3^(ng(z))*5^(ng(())*7^ng(x)*11^(ng(*))*13^(ng(z))* ...
(I let you continue)
(I have also avoid the quotation mark for not wasting ink,
but ng('(') is more readable than ng((), mmhh..
Now, a proof in, or by, PA  [in if you think as PA
being a theory; by if you think as PA as a machine
(a theorem prover)]  is just a sequence of formula
such that they are either axioms or has been obtained
from the axioms by a finite number of application of
the inference rule.
So, although it could be hard to *find* a proof (as
unpedagogical exercice try to prove the formula (A - A)
in the systeme send yesterday), it is easy to verify
a proof once the proof is given.
The point is that we can translate a proof into a number
by relying a second time on the fundamental theorem
of arithmetic. A proof is just a finite sequence of
formula F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 ... FN  (actually it will be proof
of FN if F1, F2, ... are axioms or comes from axioms
and preeceeding formula by application of the inference
rule). Its (Godel) number will be
2^ng(F1)*3^ng(F2)*5^ng(F3)

Now, like we have define in PA language IS-A-VARIABLE(x)
we can translate meta-predicates like IS-AN-AXIOME(x),
HAS-BEEN-DERIVED-FROM-MODUS-PONENS(x,y,z), meaning
z is derivable from x and y by modus ponens.
Etc. Etc.   So that we can defined in PA arithmetical language

IS-A-PROOF-OF(x,y)  saying that y is a translation (a godel
number of) of a proof of formula (with Godel number) x.
This was the B(x,y) of yesterday.

And then the Godel formula BEW(x), that is PROVABLE(x),
is just EyB(x,y) i.e. it exist a number y such that y is a proof
of x, to make it short.
Now, a machine will be said to be consistent,if the machine
does not prove f.f is a symbol with the intended meaning of
an absurdity, or a contradiction. in arithmetic f could be defined
by the formula  (1 = 0), well actually (SUC(0) = 0).
So the consistency of the machine, or of the theory, or
of PA (here) can be defined by the formula (not BEW(f)).
Godel second incompleteness theorem is that
if a machine is consistent then the machine cannot prove
she is consistent. Now I will explain in which sense we can
say that to be consistent is the same has having a consistent
extension, so you see that Godel second incompleteness
explain why, as I said to John, when we ask the machine
if she *do* have at least one consistent extension, she
remains silent.
Well that is a little bit discouraging isn' it? How could we
hope the machine to be able to give us the geometry
of its consistent extensions when she remain silent on
the very question of having consistent extensions at all?
But if you are patient enough with PA, she will justify
her silence by proving ```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Dear Bruno,

We are getting more coherent and on point in our understanding of each
other. ;-) Interleaving.

- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 9:09 AM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

Hi Stephen,

At 12:15 28/04/04 -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:

I struggle to find the right words to express the difficulty that I
see.
My problem is that your work ignores the computational complexity
(NP-Completeness) of grading (defining measures) the relationships.

This is due to the fact that from a first person point of view any delay
will not been perceived. I do not pretend that complexity should always
been ignored, but to introduce it at the start would be ad hoc.

[SPK]

But there is no such thing as a delay in Platonia, but that is not my
point. I am trying to see how you deal with the problem of intractible
computations - as implementable given infinite resources - and how it may be
possible for measures to be defined using them. I had not considered this
application but it is intriguing. You touch on this below.

If complexity
play a role it must be derived along with the measure on the comp
histories.

[SPK]

Yes, but is this derivation on that can be taken to exist independent of
the first person aspect of comp histories?

This may be one of my key difficulties. On one hand, I do not have a
problem with the idea of Platonic existence, re AR, of mathematical objects
but I do have a problem with the seeming lack of a clear explanation of how
the flow of temporality  arises in the first person aspect.

It seems to me that what ever our theory of Everything is, it must
explain how it is not just possible to have a flow of temporality  a
priori; it must have a non-measure zero sampling in the class of all
possible relationships between numbers - or whatever notion of Ur-object
that one uses.

I personaly eschew the notion of fundamental objects and use the
Heraclitian notion of Process and fundamental, thus I see mathematical
objects - numbers, etc. - as derivative of this notion of Process. I see
Hintikka's idea of proofs as game theoretical constructs as strongly hinting
at this idea...

In Conscience  Mecanisme I do make a case that Bennett notion of
depth could play a role in order to derive the cosmological aspect of
physics. Even prior a-la-Schmidhuber could play a role. But the
methodology I advocate although it could justify the prior if needed,
cannot
rely on it at the start.

[SPK]

I agree. We have to have the methodology itself as an a priori existent.
It is co-present in Platonia in your thinking, it seems to me. ;-)

I do not see how the mere a priori existence of solutions (Integers)
and
the relationships between them (also Integers), as a priori existing
numbers
is sufficient.

We will discuss that after I succeed in explaining how the whole things
work. All Right?

[SPK]

Sure! ;-)

BM:
The comp reason why the soul or the first person is never captured by
any
complete third person description is akin to the reason truth and
knowledge are
not arithmetizable (as opposed to provable and consistent).
Godel's theorem  Co. makes universal machine a highly non trivial
type of
being.

[SPK]

Does not this statement, that  truth and knowledge are not
arithmetizable, imply that the postulation of AR is insufficient?
[BM]
No. And giving that Godel's incompleteness is true for much more
general things than machine, we can say not only that arithmetical
truth is not arithmetizable, but mathematical truth is not
mathematicalizable, physical truth is not physicalizable, and more
generally [whatever]-truth is not [whatver]izable.
So strictly speaking AR could be sufficient (the Pythagorean version
of my thesis). For reason of simplicity I do not use it.

[SPK]

Wait a minute! It is one thing to say that [whatever]-truth is not
[whatver]izable and it is another to say that [whatever]-truth is finitely
constructible or approximatable. The former deals with its existential
aspects and the latter deals with its meaningfulness and expressiveness. We
do not require absoluteness (truth, decidability or otherwise) in our
interactions to be able to have meaningfulness.

But this is not problematic to me; I am interested in how physicality
MUST obtain, even if only in the first person sense. In fact, in my work I
anly assume first person physicality - there is no such thing as third
person or objective physicality. This is where our idea overlap
strongly.;-)

Let me
state this in a different way. How does Digital Substitution ( yes,
Doctor ) get coded into numbers without involving physical
implementation?

[BM]
But that's the point of the whole work. Now, if you have follow
a little bit the literature on the mind body problem you surely know
that nobody has```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```On 27 April 2004 Bruno Marchal wrote:

But you will be dead in the same sense that you will
be dead in the next instant, at least with what I understand
when you quote Parfit. In THAT case you shouldn't care at
all in the presence of any possible threats, no?

Yes, you could say that we die every moment and are replaced by near-exact
replicas. You could imagine a situation where this is made more explicit:
alien scientists stop the world every second, make copies of everyone, kill
all the originals, put the copies in their place, and repeat the procedure
in another second. They could have been doing this for years, without anyone
suspecting anything unusual was going on. If you are suddenly given this
information, and you know that the aliens are going to continue doing this
indefinitely (and there is nothing anyone can do to stop them or escape),
would you suddenly stop caring about anything that happens in the future,
because you'll be dead in one second anyway, and so will everyone you have
ever known?

There is a single idea underlying much of the confusion in discussions of
personal identity: the belief in a soul. I use this term for a quality or
substance which resides in a person throughout his life and is somehow
responsible for his identity, and which (here is the problem) is not
captured by a complete description of the person's physical and
psychological state. Often, it is a hidden assumption.

--Stathis Papaioannou

_
Watch LIVE baseball games on your computer with MLB.TV, included with MSN
http://join.msn.com/?page=features/mlbpgmarket=en-us/go/onm00200439ave/direct/01/

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```At 11:03 27/04/04 -0400, John M wrote:

Bruno:
I really TRY to catch up with the discussions -

Thanks for telling.

however I can't help feeling
that what's going on is a physicalistic (?)

I guess you are trying to provoke me here, isn't it?
(I mean you are aware that I pretend (at least) that physics
could be reducible to machine's psychology/theology/biology/
number theory, etc. This is hardly physicalistic).

*translation*
of Judeo-Christian theology: whe we die, we (soul?) transfer to the Dear
Good Lord's Heaven/Paradise (= called1000 different planets) - sometimes
expressed as quantum imortality...(of the soul?)
Then again, just like in the Christian myth, in heaven everybody
(including God) speaks the one human language we know (or not).

You mean classical logic? I don't think so. You could read the nice
book by I. M. Bochenski (translated in english in 1961, University of
Notre Dame Press): A History of Formal Logic. It contains a large
chapter on the logics, epistemology and metaphysics of India,before
and after Chr. It could change your mind on this point. Also quite
astonishing in that regard is the book by Th. Stcherbatsky: Buddhist
Logic. Comp itself (arguably) has appeared in the east a very long time before
Plato, as most analysis of the heaven and hell concepts.
(Reference in Conscience  Mecanisme).
Remember also Giordiano Bruno who has been burned by the Church
for his questions and imaginations; (he was an explicit
many worlder in the form of other planet with life form).
You raise interesting question but I thing it would be premature to
really tackle that now.

Everything
is in the pattern of our terrestrial physical taste and comp imagination.
Maybe we get to hell: the mathematically illiterate planet?

At least I put the carts on the table: Church Turing Post Markov ... thesis,
+ a minimal amount of arithmetical realism, + that special act on faith
in front of a medical operation.
And the game is just to see where all that could lead with respect
to some unsolved fundamental question.

Can't we do better?
... and then I point on the fact, about which I have probably underestimated
the startlingness, that, thanks to some  works done by ... Godel,
..., Solovay, we can quasi-literally ask the opinion of *the* sound classical
universal machines on that question. In some sense I eliminate the
act of faith by just interviewing the machine. What are you asking for?
Look, I promise to Kory a hopefully readable account of what I see as an
obvious (but necessarily a little bit technical) mathematical/physical
confirmation of comp. It is a modest confirmation in the sense that it
leads quickly to many open mathematical problems, a sequence of
conjectures but also a real path from bit to qubit, should comp be true.
I finish by a question.
Because we are about to interview the UM on a possible measure
existing on its (closer) consistent extensions, it is natural
to ask her if she *do* have a consistent extension.
Now on *that* question, the UM remains silent, always.

Is it a western or eastern type of behavior ?  ;-)
Is is not a little bit like the thundering silence of Vimalakirti?
;-)

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```At 23:16 28/04/04 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

There is a single idea underlying much of the confusion in discussions of
personal identity: the belief in a soul.
Indeed.

I use this term for a quality or substance which resides in a person
throughout his life and is somehow responsible for his identity, and which
(here is the problem) is not captured by a complete description of the
person's physical and psychological state. Often, it is a hidden assumption.

That's a nice definition of the soul, quite similar to the provable properties
of the first person, once we will define it precisely (in the Thaetetus
way). And comp will
entails, *as a theorem*, the existence of the soul, then!

The comp reason why the soul or the first person is never captured by any
complete third person description is akin to the reason truth and knowledge are
not arithmetizable (as opposed to provable and consistent).
Godel's theorem  Co. makes universal machine a highly non trivial type of
being.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```
Hi Kori,
At 10:55 27/04/04 -0400, Kory Heath wrote:
At 10:17 AM 4/27/04, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
Don't worry, I will try NOT to give
a 120h course in
mathematical logic which is just impossible without chalk
black board. But I will try to give some insights. I must think
how to do it. It will help me, btw, to prepare my talk in Paris
and Amsterdam so that any critics is welcome.
Ok! I'm very interested to hear it, and I'll let you know where I'm
confused, and where I'm bored. :)

Yes but I must go now. Mmmh... I should definitely connect myself at
home.
I will do asap.
Here is a beginning.
1)we will interview a simple machine which has very basic beliefs in
number theory.
The most well know Escherichia Coli-machine of that
sort is know as PEANO ARITHMETIC PA.
It is an extension of classical logic CL. Originally Godel worked
with
the PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA machine instead, but the proof will work
for a *very vast* class of machines (and even more).
2) Godel showed how to translate metaproposition (talk on proposition)
into
the language of arithmetic used by PA (talk on numbers), and this
by
coding the alphabet by numbers, formula by suitable sequence of
numbers,
proof by sequences of sequences of numbers.
He got an arithmetical formula B(x,y) such that PA proves B(n,m) if
and
only if m is a code of a proof of a formula coded by n.
And so he got easily from that a formula Bew(x) (for beweisbar =
provable
in German), which means intuitively that x represents a provable
formula.
Obviously (?) Bew(x) can be defined by EyB(y,x). OK?
Note that B(x,y) is decidable. Do you understand that any one
patient
enough can verify if B(n, m) is the case or not, in finite time.
Do you intuit this is no more obvious for Bew(n)?
I surely should say a little more about what is a proof in or by PA,
and
more about what is PA for those who never did heard about her
before.
Here is an attemp of a cut and paste from chapter 2 of Conscience
et
Mecanisme (+ minor translation in english...)
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume1CC/4z1_2sansp.pdf
giving you an explicit presentation of PA.
Axioms
1) A-(B-A) (a posteriori principle)
2) (A-B)-((A-(B-C))-(A-C))
3) A-(B-AB)
4) (A-C)-((B-C)-(AvB-C))
5) A-AvB
6) B-AvB
7) AB-A
8) AB-B
9) (A-B)-((A- B)- A)
10) Av A (exclude middle principe)
Inference Rules:
MP) A, A-B = B (I will say more about
that)
Quantifiers rules:
QE1)
A(t)-.xA(x)
QE2) A(x)-B =
.xA(x)-B
QU1)
.xA(x)-A(t)
QU2) B-A(x) =
B-.xA(x)
PA non logical axiom:
1) (0 = SUC(x))
2) (SUC(x) = SUC(y)) - x = y
3) x+0 = x
4) x+SUC(y) = SUC(x+y) ; recursive definition of
5) xx0 = 0
6) xxSUC(y) =
(xxy) +
x  ; recursive definition of
multiplication
And the the following infinite set of induction formula (one
for each formula A you can express in PA language).
A(0)
.x{A(x)
- A(SUC(x))} -
.xA(x)

Comments? Questions? I surely need to explain
what is an inference rule for the non logician.
-Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Dear Bruno,

This touches on a main portion of my difficulty with the notion that a
Platonia based theory can be sufficient.

- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, April 28, 2004 11:12 AM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

At 23:16 28/04/04 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

There is a single idea underlying much of the confusion in discussions of
personal identity: the belief in a soul.

Indeed.

[SPK]

This seems to be related to the homunculus problem:

The homunculus problem is basically Do we need a homunculus for
understanding imagery? A homunculus is the idea of a little man in our
heads which sees the images (and words) we see and understands these
words and images for us.

This, of course, implies an infinite regress of homunculi...

But it seems that the same problem obtains if we replace the
anthropomorphic homunculus with a machine and ignore the limits placed by
quantum gravity (QC) on physical size.

I use this term for a quality or substance which resides in a person
throughout his life and is somehow responsible for his identity, and
which
(here is the problem) is not captured by a complete description of the
person's physical and psychological state. Often, it is a hidden
assumption.

That's a nice definition of the soul, quite similar to the provable
properties
of the first person, once we will define it precisely (in the Thaetetus
way). And comp will
entails, *as a theorem*, the existence of the soul, then!

[SPK]

Your idea, Bruno, is VERY interesting to me as it would completely
sidestep this problem (and other problems of QC such as the problem of time
and space) by making all notions of 1st person phenomena, which includes
everything related to physicality,  QC included) reducible to modal logical
aspects of eternally existing relationships among eternally existing
Numbers.

I struggle to find the right words to express the difficulty that I see.
My problem is that your work ignores the computational complexity
(NP-Completeness) of grading (defining measures) the relationships. Your
thesis seems to have the same problem as Julian Barbour's thesis.

He assumes that  we can ignore the requirement that a computation takes
at least a polynomial number of steps to perform a computation by appealing
to the priori existence of solution of the computation in Platonia.

I do not see how the mere a priori existence of solutions (Integers) and
the relationships between them (also Integers), as a priori existing numbers
is sufficient.

The comp reason why the soul or the first person is never captured by any
complete third person description is akin to the reason truth and
knowledge are
not arithmetizable (as opposed to provable and consistent).
Godel's theorem  Co. makes universal machine a highly non trivial type of
being.

[SPK]

Does not this statement, that  truth and knowledge are not
arithmetizable, imply that the postulation of AR is insufficient? Let me
state this in a different way. How does Digital Substitution ( yes,
Doctor ) get coded into numbers without involving physical implementation?

Kindest regards,

Stephen

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```At 13:55 27/04/04 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Ok, one last stab. You are going to be copied and teleported to 1000
different planets. Only your body and your brain will be copied. On 999
of these planets, everyone speaks Spanish, and on one planet, everyone
speaks French. You don't know either language, and you are only allowed
to learn one of them before your departure. From my perspective, learning
Spanish is the correct choice. From your perspective, there's no reason
to chose one over the other. Is there?

-- Kory
I would learn Spanish before teleportation, in order to give my
descendants the best chance of success; but going on what I said above, I
shouldn't care at all, because I'll be dead and someone else (or 1000
others) will take my place!

But you will be dead in the same sense that you will
be dead in the next instant, at least with what I understand
when you quote Parfit. In THAT case you shouldn't care at
all in the presence of any possible threats, no?
(BTW, concerning Parfit, he still believe (in his book Reasons
and Persons) that we are token. I have already
argued that with the comp hyp we can only be type.
That means we cannot been made singular. The only argument
Parfit gives for our token self-identity is that we
would be immortal if we were type. That's not so easy,
but even if it were I don't think it is a convincing
argument.)
I don't think we need a sophisticate theory of
personal identity for understanding the consequence of
comp. We need just not to confuse the first person, which
are not duplicable, from their body (third person describable)
seems rather unclear to me. What do you mean by I'll be dead
giving that the comp hyp makes you dead in that sense (annihilated
and then reconstituted) at each conceivable instant?
Actually you do the 1/3 distinction when you say
someone else (or 1000 others) will take my place.
it is someone else from the 1-view, and 1000 others from
the 3 view. Now we must derive physics from the 1-view
of 3-splitted-differentiating machines in platonia. OK?
Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Hi Bruno,

At 06:46 AM 4/26/04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The important point is that once we keep up comp
through the eight points, we see that the laws of
physics, whatever they are, must be given
by the invariant in the comp-accessible worlds.
I'm pretty sure I now understand points 1-8, but let me confirm something:
the conclusion of points 1-8 is *not* that comp is true. The conclusion
is that *if* comp is true, then the invariant predicted by that model will
ultimately match the laws of physics that we have discovered empirically.
One could accept points 1-8, but still remain agnostic about whether or not
the invariant actually does match the empirical laws of physics - that is,
agnostic about whether or not comp is actually true. Correct?

The task of point 9 is to start showing mathematically what the invariant
actually looks like. You make the tantalizing claim that the invariant
actually looks like quantum physics, but for the moment I have to remain
agnostic, because I don't know enough about the mathematics of provability,
results strong enough to make you suspect that comp is true?

That would make
a great part of quantum physics into physical
laws in the sense of comp.
It would be a pleasure to explain this with
more details. Are you willing to hear a little
bit about Godel's theorem and some of its
generalisation by Lob and Solovay?
I am certainly willing to hear about it - I know more about Godel's Theorem
and the theory of computation than I do about quantum physics - but I doubt
I know enough to make much sense of your explanations, so it might be a
waste of your time. Perhaps all I can pick up right now is the flavor of
of quantum physics is deeply connected to the weirdness of provability
theory?

-- Kory

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```At 06:08 AM 4/27/04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
(BTW, concerning Parfit, he still believe (in his book Reasons
and Persons) that we are token. I have already
argued that with the comp hyp we can only be type.
That means we cannot been made singular. The only argument
Parfit gives for our token self-identity is that we
would be immortal if we were type. That's not so easy,
but even if it were I don't think it is a convincing
argument.)
I agree that it's not a convincing argument, but it does seem like an easy
statement. If comp is true, aren't we immortal? If not, why not?

-- Kory

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```At 08:23 27/04/04 -0400, Kory Heath wrote:
Hi Bruno,

At 06:46 AM 4/26/04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The important point is that once we keep up comp
through the eight points, we see that the laws of
physics, whatever they are, must be given
by the invariant in the comp-accessible worlds.
I'm pretty sure I now understand points 1-8, but let me confirm something:
the conclusion of points 1-8 is *not* that comp is true. The conclusion
is that *if* comp is true, then the invariant predicted by that model will
ultimately match the laws of physics that we have discovered
empirically. One could accept points 1-8, but still remain agnostic about
whether or not the invariant actually does match the empirical laws of
physics - that is, agnostic about whether or not comp is actually true.
Correct?

Correct.

The task of point 9 is to start showing mathematically what the invariant
actually looks like. You make the tantalizing claim that the invariant
actually looks like quantum physics, but for the moment I have to remain
agnostic, because I don't know enough about the mathematics of
perspective, are your results strong enough to make you suspect that comp
is true?

It makes me suspect indeed that comp is plausible, at least.
Actually that plausibility comes both for the 1-8 reasoning which forces
us to believe in some many world, so the fact that some physicists
begin to think seriously about the possibility of many-things is by itself
a sort of confirmation. Interviewing the machines should give more
quantitative information about the interference between the possibilities.
Here too I want to say I got a confirmation, but, as I will try to explain,
I got something weaker than quantum logic, and I am afraid only the future
will decide. The problem is that 1) physicists propose not *one* quantum logic,
but a labyrinth of QL (to quote van Fraassen), and my interview gives rise
also to different sorts of QL. But forget all that, I will really try to
give (new)
flavors of the mathematical confirmation of comp.

That would make
a great part of quantum physics into physical
laws in the sense of comp.
It would be a pleasure to explain this with
more details. Are you willing to hear a little
bit about Godel's theorem and some of its
generalisation by Lob and Solovay?
I am certainly willing to hear about it - I know more about Godel's
Theorem and the theory of computation than I do about quantum physics -
but I doubt I know enough to make much sense of your explanations, so it
might be a waste of your time.

We will see. Don't hesitate to tell me you don't
understand, or that you are bored. Strictly speaking the
math are much more simple
than people imagine, at least for a passive understanding.
But you should be frustated at the end, because
we will arrive at my incompetence point, that is, a set
of open questions.

Perhaps all I can pick up right now is the flavor of your results. For
instance, does your position entail that the weirdness of quantum
physics is deeply connected to the weirdness of provability theory?

Yes. The flavor is that eventually physics is equal to
a sort of integral on machine's self-ignorance, that is on
machine's incompleteness. But today I still don't have,
for example, a proof of something as simple as
the violation of Bell's inequality, although
I can argue it would be a miracle if they are not violated
(in the comp physics I mean) due to the high non booleanity
of the Arithmetical QL we obtain.
Don't worry, I will try NOT to give a 120h course in
mathematical logic which is just impossible without chalk
black board. But I will try to give some insights. I must think
how to do it. It will help me, btw, to prepare my talk in Paris
and Amsterdam so that any critics is welcome.
Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```At 08:34 27/04/04 -0400, Kory Heath wrote:
At 06:08 AM 4/27/04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
(BTW, concerning Parfit, he still believe (in his book Reasons
and Persons) that we are token. I have already
argued that with the comp hyp we can only be type.
That means we cannot been made singular. The only argument
Parfit gives for our token self-identity is that we
would be immortal if we were type. That's not so easy,
but even if it were I don't think it is a convincing
argument.)
I agree that it's not a convincing argument, but it does seem like an easy
statement. If comp is true, aren't we immortal? If not, why not?

I do thing that comp (and/or Everett QM) leads to a form,
perhaps more than one form actually, of immortality.
But the very meaning of such statement will remain very
ambiguous without digging deeper in the personal
identity issue (which, despite Stathis Papaioannou's remark, is
not necessary for getting the physics/psycho reversal).
It is perhaps less misleading  to say that what comp shows
is that mortality is no more obvious. It is less misleading
because comp will appear to have a necessary interrogative
status: no sound machine can ever entirely be convinced
of the truth of comp; a comp-practitioner should infer it
again and again. (I think the brain does just that in the form
of an instinctive dialog between the cerebral stem and the cortex).
Look perhaps at some of James Higgo immortality posts for
previous discussions on that not so obvious thread.
Jacques Mallah gave interesting rebuttal ...
Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```At 10:17 AM 4/27/04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Don't worry, I will try NOT to give a 120h course in
mathematical logic which is just impossible without chalk
black board. But I will try to give some insights. I must think
how to do it. It will help me, btw, to prepare my talk in Paris
and Amsterdam so that any critics is welcome.
Ok! I'm very interested to hear it, and I'll let you know where I'm
confused, and where I'm bored. :)

-- Kory

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Bruno:
I really TRY to catch up with the discussions - however I can't help feeling
that what's going on is a physicalistic (?) *translation*
of Judeo-Christian theology: whe we die, we (soul?) transfer to the Dear
Good Lord's Heaven/Paradise (= called1000 different planets) - sometimes
expressed as quantum imortality...(of the soul?)
Then again, just like in the Christian myth, in heaven everybody
(including God) speaks the one human language we know (or not). Everything
is in the pattern of our terrestrial physical taste and comp imagination.
Maybe we get to hell: the mathematically illiterate planet?

Can't we do better?

John Mikes

- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED];
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2004 6:08 AM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

At 13:55 27/04/04 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Ok, one last stab. You are going to be copied and teleported to 1000
different planets. Only your body and your brain will be copied. On 999
of these planets, everyone speaks Spanish, and on one planet, everyone
speaks French. You don't know either language, and you are only allowed
to learn one of them before your departure. From my perspective,
learning
Spanish is the correct choice. From your perspective, there's no reason
to chose one over the other. Is there?

-- Kory

I would learn Spanish before teleportation, in order to give my
descendants the best chance of success; but going on what I said above, I
shouldn't care at all, because I'll be dead and someone else (or 1000
others) will take my place!

But you will be dead in the same sense that you will
be dead in the next instant, at least with what I understand
when you quote Parfit. In THAT case you shouldn't care at
all in the presence of any possible threats, no?

(BTW, concerning Parfit, he still believe (in his book Reasons
and Persons) that we are token. I have already
argued that with the comp hyp we can only be type.
That means we cannot been made singular. The only argument
Parfit gives for our token self-identity is that we
would be immortal if we were type. That's not so easy,
but even if it were I don't think it is a convincing
argument.)

I don't think we need a sophisticate theory of
personal identity for understanding the consequence of
comp. We need just not to confuse the first person, which
are not duplicable, from their body (third person describable)
seems rather unclear to me. What do you mean by I'll be dead
giving that the comp hyp makes you dead in that sense (annihilated
and then reconstituted) at each conceivable instant?

Actually you do the 1/3 distinction when you say
someone else (or 1000 others) will take my place.
it is someone else from the 1-view, and 1000 others from
the 3 view. Now we must derive physics from the 1-view
of 3-splitted-differentiating machines in platonia. OK?

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

RE: Fwd: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Lets go over this again. There is a 100% chance that some copy of Kory
Heath will find himself in the non-bizarre world, even though there will be
one billion copies which find themselves in the bizarre worlds. If that
single, lucky copy is not *you*, then who is he? Or rather, I should ask,
if you are not *you*, then who are you? Force of habit makes us think that
only one copy can be the real you, which is what you are assuming when
you say that the chances are very low - one in a billion - that *I* will
be that copy. If all these copies exist, then each is equally entitled to
claim to be the real you, and each will probably stamp his foot and
insist that he (and he alone) *is* the real you. This is what I tried to
show with my teleportation vacation thought experiment. The stay-home copy
believes he has been cheated because he (the real he, in his opinion)
missed out on seeing the planets, whereas in fact two thousand copies with
equal claim to being the real person did find themselves off Earth.

I suppose our minds really are not designed to deal with the concept of
multiple copies of ourselves. We insist that there can only be one copy
extant at a time, and reason as if this is the case. It becomes less
problematic if we talk only about third person probabilities.
consciousness--namely, that all truths about reality can be described in
third-person terms, that there are no first-person truths (like truths about
'qualia', such as Nagel's question 'what is it like to be a bat' -- see
http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/Nagel_Bat.html ) which are not just ways
of restating third-person facts. From a third-person point of view, it's
certainly true that it would be meaningless for me to wonder which of two
copies I am about to experience becoming, but for those who see
consciousness as something more than just a certain type of behavior, the
question could be meaningful, and a mathematical theory of consciousness
(perhaps along the lines of David Chalmers' 'psychophysical laws') might
tell you the probabilities that your next experience would be that of one
copy vs. another.

Jesse

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```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Hi Kory,

(Recall: the 1-9 points we mention can be find by clicking on
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m5384.html   )
At 00:04 24/04/04 -0400, Kory Heath wrote:

Thanks very much for your clarifications. I clearly misunderstood the
intent of your point 8. I thought you were arguing that, if we analyze the
structure of all possible 1st-person histories of all possible
self-aware-subsystems in Platonia, we would find that histories that
exhibit the basic elements of what we commonly think of as our laws of
physics - say, light, gravity, etc. - have a greater measure than those
histories that contain (say) srats and gilixas, and that therefore our
local laws are the most common ones in Platonia. I find this position
highly dubious, but I no longer think that's what you were saying.

Nice.

My new interpretation of what you're saying (and correct me if I'm wrong
again) is that if you were to examine the entire ensemble of
next-possible-states of *me* (Kory Heath) at this moment, you would find
that (as a mathematical fact, part of the basic structure of Platonia)
most of them contain galaxies and stars, etc. Therefore, the regularities
I see around me are simply the emergent effect of my first person
indeterminacy domain.

Yes.

K: If we imagine some other computational state that represents a SAS with
a personality, memories of growing up in a world that contains srats and
gilixas, etc., most of that SAS's next-possible-states would contain
srats and gilixas, so a very different set of stable local laws would
emerge from that SAS's first person indeterminacy domain.

Well, we should expect that what makes stable
those different geographical data
(galaxies and gilixas) are semblable. The physical
laws should be what makes both
galaxies and gilixas stable.
The laws of physics will be the same, but they
can be implemented in highly different geographical
manners.

(We can imagine that the resulting regularities resemble a 4+1D cellular
automata, which contains nothing like our gravity, light, etc.).

Actually (but this is a premature technical point) 4+1D
classical cellular automata will not work.
Let us come back to this point later. (You can remember me).
It *is* a probable non trivial consequence of 9.

I'm still confused by some parts of your post. I don't see why the
assumption that most of my next-possible-states do in fact contain stars
and galaxies necessarily follows from points 1-7.

Well, it follows from comp and the data stars
and galaxies, and the belief that stars
and galaxies are not complete illusion. It is clear
that at some point it will be necessary to be
a little more specific about the distinction
geography/physics.
Grosso modo laws should be necessary,
unlike geographical data which are contingent but
should be consistent with the physical laws.
Up to this point (the whole 1-8) it is natural to expect
that physical laws could be trivial (equivalent to the
classical tautologies for example): in that case,
comp would entails that there is no physical laws
(at least in the strong sense I use implicitly until
now). Everything would be geographical! But
I will give below reason to believe that comp does
not make physics so trivial. The basic reason
comes from Godel's theorem.

Here's a very rough sketch of what I think points 1-7 *do* imply:

Platonia contains every possible computational state that represents a
self-aware structure, and for each such state there are X number of
next-possible-states, which also exist in Platonia. The chances of one
self-aware state jumping (I know my terminology is dangerously loose
here) to any particular next state is 1 / X, where X is the total number
of next-possible-states for the state in question. Any regularities which
emerge out of this indeterminate traversal from state to state will be
perceived as local laws of physics.

I mainly agree. The differences are those I usually
make. Indeed a machine can have only a finite
number of possible states, but the DU (comp platonia)
will go through those states infinitely often and the
probability will be defined on the set of complete
histories (those distinguishable in principle).
A priori there are 2^aleph_0 histories.
Your  last sentence is a little bit ambiguous (probably
because we have not yet decide a criteria for the
geography/physics distinction). It is really the invariant
we observe out of this indeterminate traversal from
state to state which will play the role of laws
of physics, and those will be global. Now those laws will
be among those things which make galaxies stable, but
I would not put the existence of galaxies in the local
physical laws,  only what makes those galaxies stable.
So that laws will be global (by mere definition).
I have mention that up to this point the laws could be
trivial, but of course they could also be non trivial; so much
that the existence of galaxies would be a law. I doubt it
but the whole point of 1-8 is to show that ```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```I remember discussing this with you a few months ago. I am still not
convinced though :-)

- Oorspronkelijk bericht -
Van: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Aan: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Verzonden: Sunday, April 25, 2004 06:19 PM
Onderwerp: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

Saibal Mitra wrote:

This is the ''white rabbit'' problem which was discussed on
this list a few
years ago. This can be solved by assuming that there exists
a measure over
the set of al universes, favoring simpler ones.

Also, note that there is no such thing as ''next possible''
states. Once you
consider the whole of Platonia all you have is a
probability distribution
over the set of all possible states you can be in (because
you can't define
time in a normal way anymore). There is no conditional
probability for your
next experience given what you have experienced now. A
valid question is:
What is the probability that you will be in a state P that
contains the
memory that you have been in a state P'.

It's not necessarily true that the all-universe idea rules out conditional
probabilities for experiences. If you had a mathematical theory of
consciousness, it might very well define a notion of subjective time and
give you something like transition probabilities between
observer-moments--the probability that my next experience will be B, given
that my current experience is A.

Jesse

_
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```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```
- Oorspronkelijk bericht -
Van: Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Aan: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Verzonden: Monday, April 26, 2004 03:00 AM
Onderwerp: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

At 10:48 AM 4/25/04, Saibal Mitra wrote:
This is the ''white rabbit'' problem which was discussed on this list a
few
years ago. This can be solved by assuming that there exists a measure
over
the set of al universes, favoring simpler ones.

I don't believe there are any grounds for assuming that, so the problem
isn't solved for me.

This can be motivated in a number of ways. I think Hall Finney made this
argument some time ago, and it is my favorite argument. Suppose you identify
a universe with the program specifying it. The probability that you find
yourself in a universe X will be proportional to the priori probability of X
multiplied by the number of times you will be computed in X. It is possible
to define universes Y_{n} that are defined by executing X n times. The
probability that you find yourself in Y_{n} is thus proportional to the
prior probability of Y_{n} times n. To have a well normalizable probability
distribution Y_{n} has to go to zero faster than 1/n. Now, the size of
program Y_{n} depends linearly on Log(n) (because you have to specify the
number n in the program). So, asuming that the prior probability only
depends on program size, it must decay (at least) exponentially as a
function of program size.

Once you
consider the whole of Platonia all you have is a probability distribution
over the set of all possible states you can be in (because you can't
define
time in a normal way anymore).

I don't agree with this. I can imagine an infinite 2D lattice of cells,
seeded with the binary digits of pi, and ask the following question: if
the
rules of Conway's Life were applied to this lattice, what would it look
like after a million ticks of the clock? There's an objective answer to
this question, and that answer exists in Platonia. I believe that this
implies that the universe I just described (and all other possible CA
universes, and much more) exists in Platonia. I define time as the
ticking of the clock in such computational worlds, so I believe time
exists in Platonia. (Of course, in another sense, Platonia exists in a
timeless all at once. This is similar to the way that time exists in the
block universe of relativity theory.)

I agree. I was refering to the whole of Platonia which is timeless.

There is no conditional probability for your
next experience given what you have experienced now. A valid question is:
What is the probability that you will be in a state P that contains the
memory that you have been in a state P'.

I find this way of looking at things very confusing. What do you mean by
you in this formulation? Is you a thing that jumps from state to
state?
If so, then we have some form of time. If not, what is this you?
Obviously it is something that can be said to be in a state P
(otherwise,
you wouldn't consider your above question valid). But what does it mean
for
you to be in a state P? If it's true that you are in a state P, are
you
just timelessly in state P, or what? How can you even talk about something

It's confusing, but it has a big advantage over the more intuitive point of
view. This is how I see it (I know that others on thius list disagee with
me):

Clearly there exists a program that represents me. If you know exactly how
my brain works, you can run me on a computer. I thus have to identify myself
with that program. Note that if you run this program it will change itself
(I would have a notion of time even if simulated without any external
environment). So, by program I mean the program plus the exact computational
state it is in.

Then, I like to get rid of the concept of personal identity. The idea that
Saibal yesterday is the same as Saibal today cannot be made precise. You can
try to identify programs p and p' by saying that they represent the same
person if by running p you eventually obtain p'. But what about external
influences changing a person? There are other reasons too (see my input in
the the quantum suicide debate).

To see how it works (in principle) consider Saibal doing an experiment. Let
S1 denote the program specifying me just before I start the experiment and
S2 the program after I observe the result (taking seriously what I wrote
above, I couldn't write the sentence like this...).  Suppose that there are
many possible outcomes, and I want to know the probability that I will
observe a particular outcome. According to the intuitive view there exists a
conditional probability that you are in state S2 given that you were in
state S1, and that is what you should try to compute using some theory.
However, since S2 and S1 are strictly speaking different persons this is
difficult, as I wrote above. Instead, one should compute quantities that
refer to single persons (programs) only```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```On 26 April 2004 Kory Heath wrote:

I am definitely not claiming that only one of the copies is the real me.
Every copy is the real me from its own perspective. But to each one of
those copies, all the other copies are *different people*. This is true
from any perspective, including the third-person one.
I didn't mean to suggest that you actually believe only one of the copies
can be the real you, but rather that the way we use language forces us
into this way of thinking, as you aknowledge.

You know, I have a horrible feeling that this subject has been argued to
death 1000 times already on various newsgroups - with 1000 people taking
your position, and 1000 people taking mine.
addressing the problem of personal identity. But since you brought it up
(and Saibal Mitra in another recent post also addresses this question), I
think that the only position which does not lead to confusion and paradox is
to say that there is no such thing as personal identity in the way we
normally use the term, i.e., as a special quality different to mere
similarity between two putatively identical individuals. This is an
extension of neo-Lockean theory expounded, for example, by Derek Parfit in
his 1984 book Reasons and Persons. It is equivalent to saying that we
effectively die every moment, to be replaced by near-replicas who share our
memories, and usually (but not necessarily) our bodies. We entertain the
fiction of continuity of identity because that is how our minds have
evolved: an organism would not get very far if it had no concern for what
was going to happen to it in the next millisecond because that would be
someone else's problem. The fact that it IS a fiction would be immediately
evident if we could meet our past and future selves, and if mind/body
duplication with or without teleportion were a common event. With this
position, it would be obvious that questions about whether the copy really
is you are meaningless. The copy has most of your memories and thinks he is
you; what else can you say beyond this?

Ok, one last stab. You are going to be copied and teleported to 1000
different planets. Only your body and your brain will be copied. On 999 of
these planets, everyone speaks Spanish, and on one planet, everyone speaks
French. You don't know either language, and you are only allowed to learn
one of them before your departure. From my perspective, learning Spanish is
the correct choice. From your perspective, there's no reason to chose one
over the other. Is there?

-- Kory

I would learn Spanish before teleportation, in order to give my descendants
the best chance of success; but going on what I said above, I shouldn't care
at all, because I'll be dead and someone else (or 1000 others) will take my
place!

--Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```At 10:36 AM 4/24/04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Does the fact that we never find ourselves in one of the bizarre,
inconsistent worlds that are postulated to exist in Platonia cast doubt on
the reality of these worlds and the validity of the underlying theory?
Not yet. We know that the bizarre, inconsistent worlds must exist if the
Platonia idea is correct, but we (or at least I) don't currently know how
likely they are. In Platonia, there are X number of possible-next-states
from my current state. (For simplicity's sake, lets even say that X is a
very very large finite number.) If a vast majority of these states show me
sitting in my chair typing, with my computer not turning into a kangaroo,
etc., then no, the fact that my world so far has not been bizarre and
inconsistent does *not* cast doubt on the validity of the Platonia theory.
In fact, if we can show logically, mathematically, or computationally (for
me these are all ultimately the same thing) that a vast majority of my
next-possible-states do in fact show me sitting in my chair typing, with
very few computers turning into kangaroos, this would be an extremely
strong reason to believe that the Platonia theory is correct, because it's
survived a rather stringent falsification test.

Note that the tests we need to perform - tests like how many of my next
possible states show me still sitting in my chair? How many of my next
possible states show my computer turning into a kangaroo? - are logical /
mathematical / computational ones, not empirical ones. We already have the
empirical data, which we call the laws of physics. We need to know what
the Platonia theory actually predicts, and compare it to the empirical
data. For my part, I don't actually know what the Platonia theory predicts,
because I have no idea how to go about addressing the question
mathematically. Bruno Marchal says we need to create a better model of what
counts as a platonistic observer, and interview it about its relative
consistent extensions (what I've been calling next-possible-states), and
find out what regularities it would see. To me, that's just another
statement of the problem. I don't have a very good model of what counts as
a platonistic observer, and I don't know how to determine the structure of
its next-possible-states, etc.

If we make progress on this issue, and we come to the mathematical
conclusion that the probabilities we're looking for *don't* exist in
Platonia - that is, if we determine that (say) my next-possible-states in
which my computer turns into a kangaroo are just as common as those in
which it remains a computer - then I think that that does cast doubt on the
validity of the Platonia theory.

For your vacation, you buy a ticket that allows you to be destructively
scanned and teleported to one thousand fabulous destinations around the
solar system. The machine also sends a copy of you to a receiving station
next door, on Earth (it's the rules). You enter the sending station, press
the red button, and a second later find yourself in slightly altered
surroundings. When you get out of the machine, you realise that you are
still on Earth. Disappointed, you buy another ticket on the spot and go
through the same procedure again, hoping for a better result. Again,
however, you walk out and see that you are still on Earth. This time, you
are angry. The probability that you finish up the stay-home copy twice is
less than one in one million! You suspect on this basis that the company
running the teleporter has cheated you, and did not send copies to the
holiday destinations at all.
falsifiability. If I buy two tickets in a row, and I reappear on Earth both
times, I'm tempted to suspect that I've been cheated. On the other hand, I
know that the chances were 100% that this was going to happen to *some*
copy. So maybe I'm just that unlucky copy? Unfortunately, if you continue
to think in this way, you give up the idea of falsifiability completely. No
matter how many times you buy a ticket and reappear on Earth, you can
always argue that the chances were 100% that this would happen to some
copy. No amount of empirical data can ever convince you that the company is
cheating you. This is fine if you have some independent reason for trusting
the company with 100% confidence, but without such an independent reason,
you should suspect foul-play.

-- Kory

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```On 25 April 2004 Kory Heath wrote:

QUOTE-
Not yet. We know that the bizarre, inconsistent worlds must exist if the
Platonia idea is correct, but we (or at least I) don't currently know how
likely they are. In Platonia, there are X number of possible-next-states
from my current state. (For simplicity's sake, lets even say that X is a
very very large finite number.) If a vast majority of these states show me
sitting in my chair typing, with my computer not turning into a kangaroo,
etc., then no, the fact that my world so far has not been bizarre and
inconsistent does *not* cast doubt on the validity of the Platonia theory.
In fact, if we can show logically, mathematically, or computationally (for
me these are all ultimately the same thing) that a vast majority of my
next-possible-states do in fact show me sitting in my chair typing, with
very few computers turning into kangaroos, this would be an extremely strong
reason to believe that the Platonia theory is correct, because it's survived
a rather stringent falsification test.
-ENDQUOTE

This analysis is sound only in the common sense single world situation. You
get into trouble if you try to use conventional probabilities if multiple
histories/worlds/copies are allowed, as I tried to show with the
teleportation example.

Suppose that the overwhelming majority of your next-possible-states are
totally bizarre, according to the theory we are testing. If only one copy of
you can exist at any one time, then the theory predicts that there is a
billion to one probability that in the next second you will find yourself in
a bizarre universe. As a matter of fact, as you read these words, you do not
find that the world around you suddenly becomes bizarre. Therefore, the
theory is most likely wrong.

Consider now a similar theory, but multiple copies of you are allowed. The
theory predicts that there will be one billion branchings of the world in
the next second, with each branch containing a person who shares all your
memories up to that point. The theory also predicts, as above, that all but
one of these worlds will be obviously bizarre. As a matter of fact, as you
read these words, you do not experience the world around you suddenly
becoming bizarre. But unlike the previous example, this is entirely
consistent with the theory, which predicted that one version of you would
continue in the world as per usual.

--Stathis Papaioannou

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```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```This is the ''white rabbit'' problem which was discussed on
this list a few
years ago. This can be solved by assuming that there exists
a measure over
the set of al universes, favoring simpler ones.

Also, note that there is no such thing as ''next possible''
states. Once you
consider the whole of Platonia all you have is a
probability distribution
over the set of all possible states you can be in (because
you can't define
time in a normal way anymore). There is no conditional
probability for your
next experience given what you have experienced now. A
valid question is:
What is the probability that you will be in a state P that
contains the
memory that you have been in a state P'.

Quoting Stathis Papaioannou
[EMAIL PROTECTED]:

On 25 April 2004 Kory Heath wrote:

QUOTE-
Not yet. We know that the bizarre, inconsistent worlds
must exist if the
Platonia idea is correct, but we (or at least I) don't
currently know how
likely they are. In Platonia, there are X number of
possible-next-states
from my current state. (For simplicity's sake, lets even
say that X is a
very very large finite number.) If a vast majority of
these states show me

sitting in my chair typing, with my computer not turning
into a kangaroo,
etc., then no, the fact that my world so far has not been
bizarre and
inconsistent does *not* cast doubt on the validity of the
Platonia theory.

In fact, if we can show logically, mathematically, or
computationally (for

me these are all ultimately the same thing) that a vast
majority of my
next-possible-states do in fact show me sitting in my
chair typing, with
very few computers turning into kangaroos, this would be
an extremely
strong
reason to believe that the Platonia theory is correct,
because it's
survived
a rather stringent falsification test.
-ENDQUOTE

This analysis is sound only in the common sense single
world situation. You

get into trouble if you try to use conventional
probabilities if multiple
histories/worlds/copies are allowed, as I tried to show
with the
teleportation example.

Suppose that the overwhelming majority of your next-
possible-states are
totally bizarre, according to the theory we are testing.
If only one copy
of
you can exist at any one time, then the theory predicts
that there is a
billion to one probability that in the next second you
will find yourself
in
a bizarre universe. As a matter of fact, as you read
these words, you do
not
find that the world around you suddenly becomes bizarre.
Therefore, the
theory is most likely wrong.

Consider now a similar theory, but multiple copies of you
are allowed. The

theory predicts that there will be one billion branchings
of the world in
the next second, with each branch containing a person who
memories up to that point. The theory also predicts, as
above, that all but

one of these worlds will be obviously bizarre. As a
matter of fact, as you

read these words, you do not experience the world around
you suddenly
becoming bizarre. But unlike the previous example, this
is entirely
consistent with the theory, which predicted that one
version of you would
continue in the world as per usual.

--Stathis Papaioannou

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modem. Bestel snel op zonnet.nl.

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Saibal Mitra wrote:
This is the ''white rabbit'' problem which was discussed on
this list a few
years ago. This can be solved by assuming that there exists
a measure over
the set of al universes, favoring simpler ones.
Also, note that there is no such thing as ''next possible''
states. Once you
consider the whole of Platonia all you have is a
probability distribution
over the set of all possible states you can be in (because
you can't define
time in a normal way anymore). There is no conditional
probability for your
next experience given what you have experienced now. A
valid question is:
What is the probability that you will be in a state P that
contains the
memory that you have been in a state P'.
It's not necessarily true that the all-universe idea rules out conditional
probabilities for experiences. If you had a mathematical theory of
consciousness, it might very well define a notion of subjective time and
give you something like transition probabilities between
observer-moments--the probability that my next experience will be B, given
that my current experience is A.

Jesse

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```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```What Jesse and Saibal write is the key, I think. While all successor
states are possible,
only very few are experiencable and memorable by a coherent brain
(computer) and mind
(software decision path in your brain).

I think that the only factor that makes these anything can happen/is
happening theories plausible
at all is that all but a vanishingly small number or successor states
are OVERWHELMINGLY
incoherent.

The argument runs like this. To make everything come out so that
everything seems consistent,
and mutually consistent, for one or, in our case, a large group of,
observers, the states and behaviours
of an inconceivably vast number of different particles/waves has to be
just so, or the whole
shebang just falls apart. There are close to zero such large-scale
coherent states (or state-succession
paths, if you will.) There may nearly be just one such coherent
state-succession path.

Another way of putting this is that the number and type of
future-outcome-factors that don't matter
to the ability of the whole pattern to remain coherent is relatively
very, very small. Perhaps the different
ways in which a quantum state of some photon can come out into a
classical state when observed
are amongst the factors that don't matter to the ability of our
universe to continue coherent (i.e. observable)
but the probabilities of those different outcomes for the photon DO
matter to the coherence of our
universe, and the very fact that the photon's quantum state does
collapse into one classical state for us when
we observe it is a result of us being able to observe only a single path
that is consistent with our and our universe's
continued overall coherence. A property of the coherent, observable path
through the plenitude is that
quantum states MUST choose a single state, for observers inside that
coherent observable state-evolution-path.

Or something.

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```
- Original Message -
From: Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To:
Sent: Sunday, April 25, 2004 2:45 AM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

At 10:36 AM 4/24/04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Does the fact that we never find ourselves in one of the bizarre,
inconsistent worlds that are postulated to exist in Platonia cast doubt
on
the reality of these worlds and the validity of the underlying theory?

Not yet. We know that the bizarre, inconsistent worlds must exist if the
Platonia idea is correct, but we (or at least I) don't currently know how
likely they are. In Platonia, there are X number of possible-next-states
from my current state. (For simplicity's sake, lets even say that X is a
very very large finite number.) If a vast majority of these states show me
sitting in my chair typing, with my computer not turning into a kangaroo,
etc., then no, the fact that my world so far has not been bizarre and
inconsistent does *not* cast doubt on the validity of the Platonia theory.
In fact, if we can show logically, mathematically, or computationally (for
me these are all ultimately the same thing) that a vast majority of my
next-possible-states do in fact show me sitting in my chair typing, with
very few computers turning into kangaroos, this would be an extremely
strong reason to believe that the Platonia theory is correct, because it's
survived a rather stringent falsification test.

I submit that this neither supports or refutes the validity of platonia.
It ultimately only suggests that the past and current states of our
world have been consistent with the laws (theories) of physics and
aristotilean logic, so a far as we can accurately determine same, and
suggests somewhat less convincingly that the future states will continue
to be so.

Cheers,
CMR

-- insert gratuitous quotation that implies my profundity here --

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```A little earlier I posted what I called a left wing proof that an ongoing
computer output of a random succession of normal reals is a reasonable
model for the dynamic boundary between the definitional pair Nothing and
Everything.  [I got left wing proof from an article by Keith Devlin on
page 36 of the January 2004 Discover Magazine.]

No particular kind of computer is involved, just an infinite number of
randomly configured computers [including universal dovetailers] randomly
distributed along the string, using it as input [or not] and doing their
thing and the output of each becomes a replacement section of the string.

Universes are interpretations of sections of the string.

Now a question is how many of these interpretations have internal rules
that allow input from an external random oracle?  If  we are to maintain a
zero information system then the answer must be a randomly changing
percentage.  So all interpretations must be able change character i.e. be
subject to an external random oracle the rules of the particular
interpretation notwithstanding.

Hal

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```At 10:16 AM 4/25/04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Consider now a similar theory, but multiple copies of you are allowed. The
theory predicts that there will be one billion branchings of the world in
the next second, with each branch containing a person who shares all your
memories up to that point. The theory also predicts, as above, that all
but one of these worlds will be obviously bizarre. As a matter of fact, as
you read these words, you do not experience the world around you suddenly
becoming bizarre. But unlike the previous example, this is entirely
consistent with the theory, which predicted that one version of you would
continue in the world as per usual.
Yes, your theory states that the chances are 100% that some copy will find
itself in the non-bizarre world. But the theory also states that the
chances are very low - one in a billion - that *I* will be that copy. Why
isn't this second probability important? It seems to me that you only care
about the first probability, and disregard the second as irrelevant.

I'm assuming that the hypothetical person in these thought experiments is
not certain that the copying theory is actually correct, and is trying to
figure out whether or not to believe it. In such a case, the
one-in-a-billion probability is relevant. If the theory states that a
billion copies of me are going to be made, and only one of those copies
will find itself in a non-bizarre world, and then I find myself in the
non-bizarre world, this should change my assessment of the likelihood of
the copying theory - it should make me a billion times more suspicious!
Whether or not this causes me to reject the copying theory depends on how
much credence I gave that theory before the alleged copying took place. If
I thought that the copying theory was almost definitely true - say, a
trillion times more likely to be true than false - then I should continue
to believe it after finding myself in the (very unlikely) non-bizarre
world. If I thought that the theory was only a thousand times more likely
of being true than false before the alleged copying, then I should strongly
doubt the theory after I find myself in the non-bizarre world.

If we accept your logic, the Platonia idea is unfalsifiable. One could, I
suppose, still believe it on strictly a priori logical grounds. Is that

-- Kory

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```At 10:48 AM 4/25/04, Saibal Mitra wrote:
This is the ''white rabbit'' problem which was discussed on this list a few
years ago. This can be solved by assuming that there exists a measure over
the set of al universes, favoring simpler ones.
I don't believe there are any grounds for assuming that, so the problem
isn't solved for me.

Once you
consider the whole of Platonia all you have is a probability distribution
over the set of all possible states you can be in (because you can't define
time in a normal way anymore).
I don't agree with this. I can imagine an infinite 2D lattice of cells,
seeded with the binary digits of pi, and ask the following question: if the
rules of Conway's Life were applied to this lattice, what would it look
like after a million ticks of the clock? There's an objective answer to
this question, and that answer exists in Platonia. I believe that this
implies that the universe I just described (and all other possible CA
universes, and much more) exists in Platonia. I define time as the
ticking of the clock in such computational worlds, so I believe time
exists in Platonia. (Of course, in another sense, Platonia exists in a
timeless all at once. This is similar to the way that time exists in the
block universe of relativity theory.)

There is no conditional probability for your
next experience given what you have experienced now. A valid question is:
What is the probability that you will be in a state P that contains the
memory that you have been in a state P'.
I find this way of looking at things very confusing. What do you mean by
you in this formulation? Is you a thing that jumps from state to state?
If so, then we have some form of time. If not, what is this you?
Obviously it is something that can be said to be in a state P (otherwise,
you wouldn't consider your above question valid). But what does it mean for
you to be in a state P? If it's true that you are in a state P, are you
just timelessly in state P, or what? How can you even talk about something

-- Kory

```

Fwd: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Forwarded at the request of the author:

From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]

On 25 April 2004 Kory Heath wrote:

QUOTE-
Yes, your theory states that the chances are 100% that some copy will find
itself in the non-bizarre world. But the theory also states that the
chances are very low - one in a billion - that *I* will be that copy. Why
isn't this second probability important? It seems to me that you only care
about the first probability, and disregard the second as irrelevant.
-ENDQUOTE

Lets go over this again. There is a 100% chance that some copy of Kory
Heath will find himself in the non-bizarre world, even though there will
be one billion copies which find themselves in the bizarre worlds. If that
single, lucky copy is not *you*, then who is he? Or rather, I should ask,
if you are not *you*, then who are you? Force of habit makes us think that
only one copy can be the real you, which is what you are assuming when
you say that the chances are very low - one in a billion - that *I* will
be that copy. If all these copies exist, then each is equally entitled to
claim to be the real you, and each will probably stamp his foot and
insist that he (and he alone) *is* the real you. This is what I tried to
show with my teleportation vacation thought experiment. The stay-home copy
believes he has been cheated because he (the real he, in his opinion)
missed out on seeing the planets, whereas in fact two thousand copies with
equal claim to being the real person did find themselves off Earth.

I suppose our minds really are not designed to deal with the concept of
multiple copies of ourselves. We insist that there can only be one copy
extant at a time, and reason as if this is the case. It becomes less
problematic if we talk only about third person probabilities.

Incidentally, this point applies to any many worlds theory, not just the
Platonia idea.

--Stathis Papaioannou

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```On 24 April 2004 Kory Heath wrote (in response to Bruno Marchal's post of 13
April 2004):

QUOTE-
Platonia contains every possible computational state that represents a
self-aware structure, and for each such state there are X number of
next-possible-states, which also exist in Platonia. The chances of one
self-aware state jumping (I know my terminology is dangerously loose here)
to any particular next state is 1 / X, where X is the total number of
next-possible-states for the state in question. Any regularities which
emerge out of this indeterminate traversal from state to state will be
perceived as local laws of physics...The real question is, what reason do
we have to believe that any regularities actually emerge? In other words,
how do we *know* that most of my next-possible-states do in fact contain
stars and galaxies?
-ENDQUOTE

Does the fact that we never find ourselves in one of the bizarre,
inconsistent worlds that are postulated to exist in Platonia cast doubt on
the reality of these worlds and the validity of the underlying theory?
Consider this thought experiment:

You are living in a time when humanity has colonised other planets in the
solar system and teleportation is commonplace. For your vacation, you buy a
ticket that allows you to be destructively scanned and teleported to one
thousand fabulous destinations around the solar system. The machine also
sends a copy of you to a receiving station next door, on Earth (it's the
rules). You enter the sending station, press the red button, and a second
later find yourself in slightly altered surroundings. When you get out of
the machine, you realise that you are still on Earth. Disappointed, you buy
another ticket on the spot and go through the same procedure again, hoping
for a better result. Again, however, you walk out and see that you are still
on Earth. This time, you are angry. The probability that you finish up the
stay-home copy twice is less than one in one million! You suspect on this
basis that the company running the teleporter has cheated you, and did not
send copies to the holiday destinations at all. You demand a refund.

The confusion here arises from using the pronoun you in the traditional
way: as if there can only be one you in existence at any one time.
Stay-home-you imagines he has missed out on seeing Jupiter from its moons,
because, obviously, he is here and not there. This is valid reasoning when a
person cannot be in two places at once, but in this case we are starting
with the premise that a person can be in at least 1001 places at once!

In a similar vein, if the existence of multiple versions of me branching out
from the present moment in Platonia/Multiverse is allowed, the fact that
I-typing do not experience, say, my laptop computer turning into a
kangaroo and hopping away does not mean that it doesn't happen.

(The above discussion brings up the old arguments about personal identity,
but I will refrain from starting a thread on that topic unless others are
interested.)

Stathis Papaioannou.

_
http://ninemsn.match.com?referrer=hotmailtagline

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Bruno -

Thanks very much for your clarifications. I clearly misunderstood the
intent of your point 8. I thought you were arguing that, if we analyze the
structure of all possible 1st-person histories of all possible
self-aware-subsystems in Platonia, we would find that histories that
exhibit the basic elements of what we commonly think of as our laws of
physics - say, light, gravity, etc. - have a greater measure than those
histories that contain (say) srats and gilixas, and that therefore our
local laws are the most common ones in Platonia. I find this position
highly dubious, but I no longer think that's what you were saying.

My new interpretation of what you're saying (and correct me if I'm wrong
again) is that if you were to examine the entire ensemble of
next-possible-states of *me* (Kory Heath) at this moment, you would find
that (as a mathematical fact, part of the basic structure of Platonia) most
of them contain galaxies and stars, etc. Therefore, the regularities I see
around me are simply the emergent effect of my first person indeterminacy
domain. If we imagine some other computational state that represents a SAS
with a personality, memories of growing up in a world that contains srats
and gilixas, etc., most of that SAS's next-possible-states would contain
srats and gilixas, so a very different set of stable local laws would
emerge from that SAS's first person indeterminacy domain. (We can imagine
that the resulting regularities resemble a 4+1D cellular automata, which
contains nothing like our gravity, light, etc.).

I'm still confused by some parts of your post. I don't see why the
assumption that most of my next-possible-states do in fact contain stars
and galaxies necessarily follows from points 1-7. Here's a very rough
sketch of what I think points 1-7 *do* imply:

Platonia contains every possible computational state that represents a
self-aware structure, and for each such state there are X number of
next-possible-states, which also exist in Platonia. The chances of one
self-aware state jumping (I know my terminology is dangerously loose
here) to any particular next state is 1 / X, where X is the total number of
next-possible-states for the state in question. Any regularities which
emerge out of this indeterminate traversal from state to state will be
perceived as local laws of physics.

Now, you say: Let us (re)define the laws of physics as the laws we can
always predict and verify consistently (if any!). Now, having accepted the
1-7 points, the occurrence of such laws must have a measure 1, so the laws
of physics must be derivable from what has measure 1 relatively to the
measure on the computational histories. I agree with this, but to me it
seems like a simple tautology - another statement of my above paragraph. It
sounds to me like you're saying that the (local) laws of physics are
whatever regularities emerge when we examine the entire ensemble of
next-possible-states from my current state (and the ensemble of all the
next-possible-states from each of those possible-states, and so on). This
is tautologically true - whatever emerges, emerges. The real question is,
what reason do we have to believe that any regularities actually emerge? In
other words, how do we *know* that most of my next-possible-states do in
fact contain stars and galaxies? This idea doesn't necessarily follow from
anything in points 1-7.

Perhaps you're arguing the following: we do in fact perceive a world filled
with regularities, which we have codified into our local laws of physics.
Therefore, *if* points 1-7 are true - that is, if comp is true - then it
must be the case that most of my next-possible-states do in fact contain
stars and galaxies and gravity and light. If I were (somehow) able to
completely mathematically analyze one of my computational states and all of
its next-possible-states, and if I then determined that the probabilities
in this ensemble of next-possible-states *didn't* match the regularities I
actually perceive, then I should conclude that comp is false. If this is
Point 7.5 - which states that we do in fact perceive regularities that we
codify into (local) laws of physics. Then your argument can run: if points
1-7.5 are all true, then it must be true that most of my
next-possible-states contain stars and galaxies.

This argument implies a constraint on comp - which is good, because it
means that comp is falsifiable - but it doesn't give me any clue how to
show mathematically that most of Kory Heath's next-possible-states actually
do contain stars and galaxies - i.e. that most of Kory Heath's
next-possible-states match the laws of physics, or at least exhibit some
kind of probabilistic bias that would result in perceived regularities. I
suppose that this is what you mean when you say that we need to modelize
or better identify a platonistic ```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```At 05:27 21/04/04 -0400, Kory Heath wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote a 10-point argument about determining whether or not
we are simulated by some massive computer. Here is point 9 from that post:

9) Now, from computer science and logic, startlingly enough perhaps,
we can isolate a measure on the 1-person comp histories, and this
give us the laws of physics (this is too technical to be put here, and
actually I have derived only the logical structure of the probability
one, but I got something non trivial and very close to a quantum logic
(which can be seen as the logic of the quantum probability one, as
von Neumann has shown).
Bruno, I agree with everything in points 1-7 of the post I'm referring to.

Cool.
(Kory is referring  to my post
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m5384.html  )

I think I understand the main thrust of points 8 and 10, but they both
depend on the truth of the quoted point 9.

Not at all.  The point 8 follows only from the points 1-7. Actually the points
1 to 8 sum up the main result of my thesis, that is the reversal
physics/machine's psychology (once we assume comp).
This made the point 9 just a mathematical confirmation.
I will try to explain, but actually it is me who does not understand why
you don't see that the point 8 follows from the point 1-7.
The proof really stop at 8.
9 is a mathematical confirmation with
observer modelized (or even identify) with equivalence class of
states of sound universal Turing machines.

I find this point [9] highly dubious, and I'm interested to hear more
about why you believe it (or whether I'm actually interpreting it correctly).

OK. I promise I will try to make it clear, but that will be possible
only if you realize that 8 follows from 1-7. Keeping we assume comp all
through.
I will first continue to comment your post, as a sort of preparation.

Is it your contention that if we start only with the idea of Platonia
(which contains all possible computational structures and events), and
we analyze the structure of all possible 1st-person histories weaving
their way through this Platonia, we would see that a majority of them find
themselves in universes like the one we currently inhabit, with stars,
galaxies, relativity, quantum physics, etc.?

No. Such a contention is not mine. What you say here
does not follow from neither 1-8, nor 9.
Only the laws of physics follows, but the existence of the moon
or of galaxies are not necessarily laws of physics, but are
quite possibly geographical laws (like being in Moscow
instead of Washington). Now the stability of
the appearance of matter is related to the laws of physics,
and so, if (to talk like you) we analyze the structure of all
possible 1st-person histories going trough your actual
Kory-Heath state (including your memory of stars and
galaxies) then the measure of your computational
continuations in Platonia without stars and galaxies
will (or should) be negligible. The disappearance of galaxies
could be seen as a talking white rabbit event.
So, only worlds with entities very similar to Kory Heath
should contains galaxies. If this was false (in Platonia)
then comp would be false (and refutable).

I find that extremely hard to believe; there are an infinite number of
multi-dimensional cellular-automata worlds that contain nothing like
stars, galaxies, or the familiar physics we know,

But then they don't contain entities sufficiently
close to Kory Heath, (they don't go through Kory-Heath comp
states) and those world/stories don't belong to your
actual first person indeterminacy domain.

and I don't see any reason to believe that all the 1st-person histories
weaving their way through these computational structures (which surely
exist in Platonia) have less measure than those that weave through the
structures more resembling our own universe.

You are right. No doubt there are worlds without stars
and galaxies, but having srats and gilixas instead, and
some Burno arguing to some Kyro about the geographical
nature of those objects. Nothing in 1-8 prevents this.

I find it much easier to believe - in fact, it seems almost necessarily
true - that, when we analyze the structure of all the 1st-person histories
weaving their way through Platonia, we see that virtually all observers
observe indeterminacy. This in itself seems like a non-trivial finding. It
would be even more non-trivial if one could analyze the structure of the
indeterminacy that virtually all 1st-person observers must observe, and
find that it is very much like quantum logic. This seems to be one of
your claims, and it certainly seems possible (though I don't know enough
yet to judge the issue for myself). However, it's a much further leap to
conclude that we can go on to derive the laws of physics from the
analysis of 1st-person histories weaving their way through Platonia. In
the quote above, you acknowledge that you haven't actually done this -
actually I have derived only the logical structure of ```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Bruno Marchal wrote a 10-point argument about determining whether or not we
are simulated by some massive computer. Here is point 9 from that post:

9) Now, from computer science and logic, startlingly enough perhaps,
we can isolate a measure on the 1-person comp histories, and this
give us the laws of physics (this is too technical to be put here, and
actually I have derived only the logical structure of the probability
one, but I got something non trivial and very close to a quantum logic
(which can be seen as the logic of the quantum probability one, as
von Neumann has shown).
Bruno, I agree with everything in points 1-7 of the post I'm referring to.
I think I understand the main thrust of points 8 and 10, but they both
depend on the truth of the quoted point 9. I find this point highly
dubious, and I'm interested to hear more about why you believe it (or
whether I'm actually interpreting it correctly).

Is it your contention that if we start only with the idea of Platonia
(which contains all possible computational structures and events), and we
analyze the structure of all possible 1st-person histories weaving their
way through this Platonia, we would see that a majority of them find
themselves in universes like the one we currently inhabit, with stars,
galaxies, relativity, quantum physics, etc.? I find that extremely hard to
believe; there are an infinite number of multi-dimensional
cellular-automata worlds that contain nothing like stars, galaxies, or the
familiar physics we know, and I don't see any reason to believe that all
the 1st-person histories weaving their way through these computational
structures (which surely exist in Platonia) have less measure than those
that weave through the structures more resembling our own universe.

I find it much easier to believe - in fact, it seems almost necessarily
true - that, when we analyze the structure of all the 1st-person histories
weaving their way through Platonia, we see that virtually all observers
observe indeterminacy. This in itself seems like a non-trivial finding. It
would be even more non-trivial if one could analyze the structure of the
indeterminacy that virtually all 1st-person observers must observe, and
find that it is very much like quantum logic. This seems to be one of
your claims, and it certainly seems possible (though I don't know enough
yet to judge the issue for myself). However, it's a much further leap to
conclude that we can go on to derive the laws of physics from the
analysis of 1st-person histories weaving their way through Platonia. In the
quote above, you acknowledge that you haven't actually done this -
actually I have derived only the logical structure of the probability one,
but I got something non trivial and very close to a quantum logic - but
you seem to believe that it can be done. Why?

-- Kory

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```At 13:08 13/04/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:

Put in another way, *either* the massive computer simulates the exact
laws of physics (exact with comp = the laws extractible from the
measure on all 1-computations) in which case we belong to it but
in that case we belong also to all its copy in Platonia, and our
prediction or physics relies on all those copies (so that to say
we belong to the massive computer has no real meaning: if it stops,
nothing can happen to us for example); *or* the massive
computer simulates only an approximation of those laws (like a
brain during the night), and then we can in principle make the
comparison, and find the discrepancies, and conclude we inhabit
a fake reality ... OK?
Bruno

This is a very interesting method of testing what I thought was
untestable. However, I see some problems. The number of simulations within
Platonia is likely to be infinite. In addition, you may be simulated at
more than one level, possibly at an infinite number of levels, including
at the base level in Platonia if there is such a thing.

OK.  Although I am not sure by what you mean by base in Platonia.

While the  number of instances of you in the computer may be limited,
the number of computers in Platonia may be infinite. In addition, the
number of real you in Platonia is also likely to be infinite.
Yes. Plausibly 2^aleph_0 (the power of the continuum).

Your existence at the base level in Platonia is much more likely than the
existence of a simulation computer (because the computer is presumably
much more complex than you) and therefore, your measure in Platonia will
swamp out your measure in the computers.

OK.

Your proposed test idea is interesting but it should be designed to cancel
out these infinities.

If that is possible. The translation of the reasoning in arithmetic leads
me to think that these
infinities are not cancellable. Comp would predict that the toe cannot be
renormalizable.
It is too early to make definite conclusion however.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

RE: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```At 09:58 13/04/04 -0400, Ben Goertzel wrote:

6) This shows that if we are in a massive computer running in
a universe,  then (supposing we know it or believe it) to
predict the future of any experiment we decide to carry one
(for example testing A or B) we need to take into account all
reconstitutions at any time of the computer (in the relevant
state) in that universe, and actually also in any other
universes (from our first person perspective we could not be
aware of the difference of universes from inside the computer).
Yes, but this is just a fancy version of the good old-fashioned Humean
problem of induction, isn't it?
That would be the case if there were no measure on the computations.

Indeed, predicting the future on a sound a priori basis is not
possible.  One must make arbitrary assumptions in order to guide
predictions.
This is a limitation, not of the comp hypothesis specifically, but of
the notion of prediction itself.
You cannot solve the problem of induction with or without comp, so I
don't think you should use problem-of-induction related difficulties as
an argument against comp.

I was not arguing against comp! (nor for).

In fact, comp comes with a kind of workaround to the problem of
induction, which is: To justify induction, make an arbitrary assumption
of a certain universal computer, use this to gauge simplicity, and then
judge predictions based on their simplicity (to use a verbal shorthand
for a lot of math a la Solomonoff, Levin, Hutter, etc.).  This is not a
solution to the problem of induction (which is that one must make
arbitrary assumptions to do induction), just an elegant way of
introducing the arbitrary assumptions.
This can help for explaining what intelligence is, but cannot help
for the mind body problem where *all* computations must be taken into
account.

So, in my view, we are faced with a couple different ways of introducing
the arbitrary assumptions needed to justify induction:
1) make an arbitrary assumption that the apparently real physical
universe is real
2) make an arbitrary assumption that simpler hypotheses are better,
where simplicity is judged by some fixed universal computing system
There is no scientific (i.e. inductive or deductive) way to choose
between these.  From a human perspective, the choice lies outside the
domain of science and math; it's a metaphysical or even ethical choice.

I am not convinced. I don't really understand 1), and the interest of 2)
relies, I think, in the fact that simplicity should not (and does not, I'm sure
Schmidhuber would agree) on the choice of the universal computing
system.
Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

```

RE: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```
6) This shows that if we are in a massive computer running in
a universe,  then (supposing we know it or believe it) to
predict the future of any experiment we decide to carry one
(for example testing A or B) we need to take into account all
reconstitutions at any time of the computer (in the relevant
state) in that universe, and actually also in any other
universes (from our first person perspective we could not be
aware of the difference of universes from inside the computer).

Yes, but this is just a fancy version of the good old-fashioned Humean
problem of induction, isn't it?

Indeed, predicting the future on a sound a priori basis is not
possible.  One must make arbitrary assumptions in order to guide
predictions.

This is a limitation, not of the comp hypothesis specifically, but of
the notion of prediction itself.

You cannot solve the problem of induction with or without comp, so I
don't think you should use problem-of-induction related difficulties as
an argument against comp.

In fact, comp comes with a kind of workaround to the problem of
induction, which is: To justify induction, make an arbitrary assumption
of a certain universal computer, use this to gauge simplicity, and then
judge predictions based on their simplicity (to use a verbal shorthand
for a lot of math a la Solomonoff, Levin, Hutter, etc.).  This is not a
solution to the problem of induction (which is that one must make
arbitrary assumptions to do induction), just an elegant way of
introducing the arbitrary assumptions.

So, in my view, we are faced with a couple different ways of introducing
the arbitrary assumptions needed to justify induction:

1) make an arbitrary assumption that the apparently real physical
universe is real

2) make an arbitrary assumption that simpler hypotheses are better,
where simplicity is judged by some fixed universal computing system

There is no scientific (i.e. inductive or deductive) way to choose
between these.  From a human perspective, the choice lies outside the
domain of science and math; it's a metaphysical or even ethical choice.

-- Ben Goertzel

```

RE: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```Ben Goertzel writes:
So, in my view, we are faced with a couple different ways of introducing
the arbitrary assumptions needed to justify induction:

1) make an arbitrary assumption that the apparently real physical
universe is real

2) make an arbitrary assumption that simpler hypotheses are better,
where simplicity is judged by some fixed universal computing system

There is no scientific (i.e. inductive or deductive) way to choose
between these.  From a human perspective, the choice lies outside the
domain of science and math; it's a metaphysical or even ethical choice.

But is there a way to test these?  Could we make different predictions
on the basis of these assumptions, and then reject one or the other
based on our observations?

Hal Finney

```

Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

```

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Put in another way, *either* the massive computer simulates the exact
laws of physics (exact with comp = the laws extractible from the
measure on all 1-computations) in which case we belong to it but
in that case we belong also to all its copy in Platonia, and our
prediction or physics relies on all those copies (so that to say
we belong to the massive computer has no real meaning: if it stops,
nothing can happen to us for example); *or* the massive
computer simulates only an approximation of those laws (like a
brain during the night), and then we can in principle make the
comparison, and find the discrepancies, and conclude we inhabit
a fake reality ... OK?

Bruno

This is a very interesting method of testing what I thought was
untestable. However, I see some problems. The number of simulations
within Platonia is likely to be infinite. In addition, you may be
simulated at more than one level, possibly at an infinite number of
levels, including at the base level in Platonia if there is such a thing.

While the  number of instances of you in the computer may be limited,
the number of computers in Platonia may be infinite. In addition, the
number of real you in Platonia is also likely to be infinite.

Your existence at the base level in Platonia is much more likely than
the existence of a simulation computer (because the computer is
presumably much more complex than you) and therefore, your measure in
Platonia will swamp out your measure in the computers.

Your proposed test idea is interesting but it should be designed to
cancel out these infinities.

George

```