Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 06 Jul 2012, at 19:31, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote

 This is a rephrasing which does not suppress in any way the fact  
that in Helsinki I am uncertain about the experience I will feel next.


But that is ALWAYS true regardless of whether identity splitting or  
duplicating chambers enter the picture; it's true because of the  
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and the unpredictable nature of  
your external environment, and even without that fact and even if  
the world was as deterministic as Newton thought it was it would  
remain true that you don't know what the results of a calculation  
will be until you finish the calculation.



The new result is that

A - Indeterminism

And you tell me that it is not interesting because

B - Indeterminism

and that

C - indeterminism.

That is hardly a critic. It would be if I was using B and C, but the  
whole point is in the fact tha I do not assume B nor C (in that  
derivation).


Bruno






 If you have a better theory, you might mention it.

Life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you're gonna  
get.


  John K Clark




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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-06 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 05 Jul 2012, at 21:53, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/5/2012 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 05 Jul 2012, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/5/2012 12:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 04 Jul 2012, at 18:29, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  if you duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent one  
Bruno Marchal to Washington1 and the other Bruno Marchal to  
Washington2 then there would only be one Bruno Marchal having a  
Washington experience.


 No problem with that.

I'm glad to hear you say that but then it's even more mysterious  
that you can't extrapolate that fact to its logical conclusion.  
When the start button is pushed on that duplicating machine your  
brain and body may have been instantly duplicated but you, the  
first person perspective, has not been and will not be until  
there is something in the environment in Washington that makes a  
change to one of your sense organs that is missing in the  
environment of Moscow; only then, when there is a difference  
between the two, is your first person perspective split and it's  
meaningless to ask which one is really you.



There is no sense to ask who is really me, but this has never  
been asked. On the contrary what is asked is the probability of  
the specific events seeing Washington , or seeing Moscow.


Both are 'seen'.  The question is by whom.


Well, you can say that I provide the answer in AUDA, and that the  
answer is the inner god, alias the knower, alias Bp  p, alias  
S4Grz. It has no name and is already NOT arithmetical. Unlike the  
machine, or the third person self which is arithmetical.





It is only related to 1-p indeterminancy by assuming there is one  
person who does the seeing.


But there is indeed one person who does the seeing, indeed they are  
two of them. There is one person in Moscow, and one person in  
Washington, and those are the one we interview. We just continue to  
use the you and me, if they are used in the first person  
indexical sense, in the usual way.





It would no puzzle at all if Moscow were seen by Putin and  
Washington was seen by Obama.


And there is no puzzle if we duplicate Brent either. Comp implies  
both Brent will see one city, that they could not have predicted to  
live that one in particular. For each of them subjectively the  
experience is the same as having one in either city by throwing a  
coin. You can replace Brent by machine having enough ability to  
be able to distinguish Moscow from Washington, and you can prove  
easily that such machine has no technic to predict which location  
she (in the usual sense) will observe in his immediate future.






I know in advance that it will be only one of them from my future  
first person perspective. This is confirmed in all experience, as  
your own  1) and 2) prediction illustrates.


But then there is not probability interpretation.


? John agreed that 1) and 2) are 1-pov incompatible, so here the  
and is an 1-pov or. It is the same as head or tail.







You write, The theory is P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. the confirmation and  
refutation of this is isomorphic to any prediction in a Bernouilli  
experience (throwing of a coin), both in the iterated and non  
iterated cases.


But P(W)=P(M)=1/2 is shorthand and it hides the implicit  
assumption that there is some X such that X is in Washington or  
X is in Moscow.


That is assumed in the protocol, at steps 1-7.
And that is guarantied by only a tiny part of arithmetic by step 8.  
(assuming comp)





If W=X1 is in Washington and M=X2 is in Moscow, then there is  
no probability interpretation of where X0 is.


Then no probability makes any sense, because if I throw a dice, I  
cannot know if the guy who looks at the result is still me.


You can if there is only one Bruno Marchal and only one die.  But if  
there are six Bruno's seeing six dice with spots 1 thru 6...


Not from their first points of view. The Bruno who see 2 is  
unique. Same for each outcome here.





But with comp we agree that P(W) = 1 for a simple (no duplication)  
teleportation. So we accept some local comp type of identity, and  
that it can be duplicated. So although you will be in Washington  
and Moscow, for a third person observer view, both of you, and any  
of you, will feel as having been randomly selected (as the  
iteration makes clearer) among Washington and Moscow.


Indeed, you can't predict in advance any city you will feel to be,  
as that would contradict the survival of the other. If you predict  
Moscow, you make the Brent in Washington into a zombie, or a non- 
Brent. Comp says both are Brent.


Right.  So when asked what is the probability Brent sees Washington  
the answer is 1.


No because the question bears on the 1-pov and they are mutually  
exclusive.




And the probability Brent sees Moscow is 1.  The probability 1/2  
only comes by equivocating on you.


No, it comes from the fact that all Brent feels to be unique, 

Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-06 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 05 Jul 2012, at 22:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/5/2012 11:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. But this happens because my computational state in Helsinki has  
been duplicated, and the changes you talk about is the experience  
of self-localization. This is a rephrasing which does not suppress  
in any way the fact that in Helsinki I am uncertain about the  
experience I will feel next.


But that uncertainty could exist without the duplication - just the  
uncertainty of which city you would be teleported to.   But in the  
duplication case, when you say, I am uncertain about the experience  
I will feel next. the second I, the I of the future, has an  
ambiguous reference.  The uncertainty is in the ambiguity of this  
reference.


No problem with this. AUDA explains indeed why the 1-I is equivocating/ 
ambiguous. Comp makes this into an indeterminacy of outcome. So, this  
does not change the fact that if comp is true, then physics is reduce  
to arithmetic.

Exactly the same ambiguousness is applied in Everett.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-06 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 05 Jul 2012, at 20:40, David Nyman wrote:


On 5 July 2012 18:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

But we can already justify the relative indeterminacy of the  
relative first person perspective, from what is an entirely  
deterministic background.


Hoyle wan't necessarily assuming comp (and nor do I when talking in  
this way).  But the point which I have consistently tried to put to  
you is more basic.  This is that the relative indeterminacy of the  
relative first person perspective already, by that very  
formulation, assumes without justification (albeit rather  
inexplicitly) some specific relative localisation within what is,  
more properly considered, an indifferent ensemble (e.g. UD* or  
alternatively some cosmological SWE).


This is ambiguous. There is a know localization, as I feel to be here  
and now, but that feeling is distributed on the whole of the UD*, and  
is a priori something no local. So the localization is given by the  
first person view, like the fact that the one reconstituted in M knows  
that he is that one. The 3-localization does not need to be assumed as  
it follows from arithmetic.






Hoyle's way of thinking makes the indeterminate localisation of  
experience explicit and absolute at the outset:


But this is exactly what I can hardly interpret in comp. It looks like  
ASSA, which I have explained when I enter in this list as being non  
sensical when we assume comp. Even without comp, I am not sure it can  
make sense. What do you mean by localization exactly. With comp,  
physical localization is an emerging pattern, and computational  
localization in the UD, is defined by arithmetical relations.




he just imagines, in effect, what would it be like if the ensemble  
of all possible occasions of sentience were unrolled  
stochastically in a sort of eternal recurrence. This gives,  
effectively, a relative-frequency interpretation of the probability  
of any particular occasion being presently given.


In which structure is that relative-frequency defined, and to whom  
does it apply? How can we verify it?






But then such stochastic process will interfere with the outcomes of  
duplication, and transportation, at least to make sense. But then it  
might be in conflict with computationalism.


I don't see why you think so.  The experiences associated with each  
duplication or transportation outcome are assumed to be present in  
the deterministic substrate in due measure, and hence to occur in  
the associated stream of consciousness in due course.  That there is  
always some given occasion of experience is consequent on an  
absolute first-personal indeteminism;


I fail to see why this would be needed, or even what it could mean, to  
be honest.





relativisation to an episode of a particular personal history is  
then dependent on whatever deterministic substrate is associated  
with the given occasion.  Relative amnesia (or selective memory)  
effectively compartmentalises first-personal histories from each  
other and is consequently transparent to reconstitution delay.


The above considerations seem so basic to our disagreement that  
rather than comment further on your other points, I will await your  
response to this.  It is of course perfectly possible (not to say  
likely) that I am missing something basic here, so I am trying to be  
as explicit as possible.


I don't think you are enough explicit.




Let me know what, if anything, is still unclear.


I don't see how to define the absolute first person indeterminacy in  
the comp context. I am also suspicious in front of any assumed  
indeterminacy. That is my major critics of the collapse of the wave  
packet, and Everett confirmed, for me at least, that we don't need it.
But even for probability in general: it is always relative to the  
context where we do a random experiment, and I fail to make sense of  
it in some absolute context, for context is a relative notion. Unless  
you agree that it is the first person indeterminacy of the universal  
machine, but here two, the machine can become any of us, but not in  
one step, in many steps, so that it is not just the comp- 
indeterminacy, but more its transitive closure on the histories/ 
computations.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-06 Thread David Nyman
On 6 July 2012 10:27, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

*In which structure is that relative-frequency defined, and to whom does it
apply? How can we verify it?*
*
*

The structure, if you like, is the total state of knowledge of the knower
(as you have characterised it in a post to Brent) which ex hypothesi must
embrace all possible occasions of sentience.  Each such occasion is here
conceived as a set of spatio-temporal relations in the context of a
particular personal history.  Taken as a whole the structure is of course
timeless and eternal.  Hoyle's heuristic is then simply a way of thinking
about this structure such that occasions are given (i.e. from the pov of
the knower) in proportion to their measure, in mutually exclusive
succession.  Hence the intrinsic spatio-temporal relations of the substrate
are conceived as unfolding experientially in the form of the myriad
personal histories.  It's a way of rationalising the experiential dynamic,
if you like, from the pov of a universal knower, which as you yourself
point out, cannot be an arithmetical, or indeed a physical, notion.

You ask me how this could be tested; since it is a way of thinking, rather
than a theory, the only relevant test is whatever power it may possess to
reduce confusion and enhance conceptual clarity.  I became particularly
aware of this when reading some of the posts about jumping and
backtracking, etc.  When we reason about some divergence of my future
moments in copying scenarios it is perfectly natural of course to
relativise these to my personal history as given, without consideration
that the relevant reference class might be any broader.  Furthermore, since
our reasoning here seems naturally to follow the spatio-temporal
evolution of some underlying real system (as Bitbol calls it), it does
not seem relevant to distinguish the logico-physical relations of next or
prior from the bare notion of succession itself.

Real problems of coherency in this way of thinking emerge, however, when we
begin to consider future moments of low intrinsic measure, such as in
quantum suicide scenarios, or extreme threats to conscious survival.  At
this point, we seek to avoid cul-de-sacs or occasions of extreme
improbability by resorting to notions of jumping or backtracking referred
to a particular personal identity, or even in extreme cases the idea of
merging with the infant consciousness of a different identity entirely. But
here we are no longer following - or at the very least least are forced to
undertake highly non-standard excursions within - the real system.  This
reaches perhaps its reductio ad absurdum in Saibal Mitra's treatment of
memory erasure scenarios.  He is forced by this mode of reasoning to
speculate, for example, that the you that escapes disaster by memory
erasure has swapped histories with another you that would otherwise
have avoided it!  It is interesting to speculate how one would test, or
even recognise, *this* eventuality!

It should, I hope, be obvious that all of the above incoherencies can be
resolved quite simply by adopting the heuristic under discussion.  The
structure under consideration, as I have said, is the total state of
knowledge of the knower; all possible occasions of sentience, duly
distributed amongst distinguishable personal histories in due measure,
exist within it.  All that is required, conceptually, is to make explicit
the experiential notion of the mutually-exclusive succession of occasions
of sentience; all relativisation of personal identity and past-future
relations are referred to those aspects of the substrate associated with a
given occasion.  There is no suggestion of prior or next in the bare notion
of experiential succession; no extrinsic ordering whatsoever is implied.
 The logical consequence is that *all* notions of personal history are
referred to a singular point-of-view: that of the knower. I am
fundamentally that knower, and the knowledge successively recoverable from
occasions of sentience is what informs me of who, where, when, and relative
to what, I am on any given occasion.

David

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-06 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 06 Jul 2012, at 15:07, David Nyman wrote:


On 6 July 2012 10:27, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

In which structure is that relative-frequency defined, and to whom  
does it apply? How can we verify it?


The structure, if you like, is the total state of knowledge of the  
knower (as you have characterised it in a post to Brent) which ex  
hypothesi must embrace all possible occasions of sentience.



This might lead to perhaps interesting question. The knower I  
described to Brent, was the knower that we might associate to the  
universal machine. Usually (before salvia!) I would not have been open  
to that idea, because, well, first the math is lacking, and might not  
exist or be trivial. I would have said that the knower begin with the  
Löbian entity. But that might be a detail in our setting: the Löbian  
machine is basically the same as the universal machine, but having the  
belief in some induction axioms. This gives the reflexive loop giving  
them the rich and stable cognitive abilities of the Löbian machine  
(with the 8 hypostases). Those hypostases will never get change on all  
computational histories where the machine remains correct (that is  
enough for the derivation of the physical laws, but is quite too much  
simple for real life psychology.
Now, such machine (the virgin universal or the Löbian which is  
slightly less virgin) have basically no knowledge at all, and live in  
a disconnected conscious state.


I am not sure it makes sense to ask for such a machine if there is a  
probability that they become suddenly me. I would say that may be  
the first person indeterminacy of such a machine might have a  
indeterminacy domain limited to slightly more complex universal state,  
perhaps becoming a bacteria, before becoming a mammal, say. The idea,  
is that you always survived in the most normal (Gaussian) neighborhood  
available to you, and that normal state is given by the relative  
proportion of computations going into that state. So in all situations  
the indterminacy is relative to the actual state of the machine, as  
brought by the universal dovetailer (or its arithmetical equivalent).


It is not impossible that a rich conscious state, like the one by a  
Löbian mammals, necessitates a very long computation, so that the  
probability to become such a Löbian mammals, directly from the  
universal knower, would be a very rare event (possible, but  
stochastically impossible).






Each such occasion is here conceived as a set of spatio-temporal  
relations in the context of a particular personal history.  Taken as  
a whole the structure is of course timeless and eternal.  Hoyle's  
heuristic is then simply a way of thinking about this structure such  
that occasions are given (i.e. from the pov of the knower) in  
proportion to their measure, in mutually exclusive succession.   
Hence the intrinsic spatio-temporal relations of the substrate are  
conceived as unfolding experientially in the form of the myriad  
personal histories.  It's a way of rationalising the experiential  
dynamic, if you like, from the pov of a universal knower, which as  
you yourself point out, cannot be an arithmetical, or indeed a  
physical, notion.


Indeed. But it is still describable in arithmetical terms, like  
arithmetical truth, which is not arithmetical, but concerns only  
arithmetical sentences.
I think that here you have a good intuition that the spatiol temporal  
unfold experentially from the knower, and this is confirmed, as the  
knower logic, with comp, is given by S4Grz (and the X logics) and this  
defined indeed a sort of dynamic. In my (old) opinion: this confirmed  
Brouwer theory of consciousness, which relates intrinsically  
consciousness and time (and S4Grz has indeed been used as a logic of  
time by some philosopher).
Now, the salvia experience has refuted this for me, as it generates an  
hallucination which put some doubt on that perspective, and which is  
why I am willing to attribute a consciousness to the non Löbian  
universal machine. Indeed, it seems conceivable that we can be  
conscious in a completely non spatio-temporal way. I thought comp  
would prevent such possibility, even through an hallucination.
Here your thought might be helpful. But I am not sure it needs to  
postulate an absolute indeterminacy. I am not sure it might make sense  
to ask: being a virgin UM, what is the probability of being David in  
the next instant?.


But the plant salvia, I have to say, provides evidence for your idea  
that it might make sense, for we can apparently get the virgin state  
(or be close to it), and yet *it seems* that we survive. It remains  
possible that actually, I am correct, and that the probability to  
become a bacteria when smoking salvia is close to 1, from the 1-pov.  
Of course the third person view will not confirm this. Brrr...




You ask me how this could be tested; since it is a way of thinking,  
rather than a theory, the 

Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-06 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote

 This is a rephrasing which does not suppress in any way the fact that in
 Helsinki I am uncertain about the experience I will feel next.


But that is ALWAYS true regardless of whether identity splitting or
duplicating chambers enter the picture; it's true because of the Heisenberg
Uncertainty Principle and the unpredictable nature of your external
environment, and even without that fact and even if the world was as
deterministic as Newton thought it was it would remain true that you don't
know what the results of a calculation will be until you finish the
calculation.

 If you have a better theory, you might mention it.


Life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you're gonna get.

  John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-06 Thread David Nyman
On 6 July 2012 18:01, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

*I am sure your analysis might help to better apprehend consciousness, and
 can perhaps better handle the amnesia situation. But you have not (yet)
 convinced me that it has to be termed into a new form of *assumed at the
 outset* indeterminacy. The probability of being me is a sort of Dirac
 distribution: it is one, for me, and zero for the others. The probability
 of becoming me, is perhaps close to one on the transitive closure of the
 computations, and is complex to compute for particular brain instantiation.
 *


Thanks for your detailed critique up to this point, Bruno.  I understand of
course that you are particularly concerned to assess its consistency with
comp.  By contrast, as I have said, my own motivation has been more
generally to find a heuristic for navigating some of the thornier
conceptual puzzles presented by consciousness.  I understand that the kind
of global probability distribution entailed by this notion is poorly
defined in a strict mathematical sense.  The global distribution is simply
assumed ex hypothesi by the stipulation of a class of all sentient moments,
and the relative probability of any sub-class of moments is then assumed
to derive from a kind of global frequency-interpretation as a consequence
of the unique stochastic succession of moments.  This is essentially what
Hoyle had in mind with his pigeon hole metaphor, and it stands or falls in
terms of its utility as a mode of thought for certain purposes; no more, no
less.

Consequently the **assumed at the outset* indeterminacy *just follows
automatically from* *the specification of the heuristic; as moments succeed
each other without extrinsic ordering, the personalised spatio-temporal
characteristics associated with each successive moment have in this sense
no prior determination.  The notion of succession here simply grounds the
bare notion of experiential transition, and the consequence of each such
transition is to localise the knower in terms of an underlying real
system. This system, in turn, can readily be assumed to be as complex as
necessary to account for the unfolding relative scenarios thus recovered.

A feature of this view is that all subsequent notions of indeterminacy are
inherited from a single primitive notion, which is assumed to mediate
*all*questions of who, where, when and relative to what.  For example,
it
grounds the relative probabilities of the future outcomes of individual
persons as well as more general anthropic or observer self-selection
issues.  One could see this as a useful conceptual simplification or a step
too far, I guess.  The probability of being me, seems to be, as you say,
all or nothing; but in terms of the heuristic it is weird but inevitable
that this must always seem to be the case in the context of a given
occasion of experience.  The probability of becoming me (or that there
will be a me to be) depends, as I think you imply, on the entire web of
relations encoded in the real system.

Thank you again for the critique.  I hadn't really thought to convince
you, but you have helped me to test the usefulness of the view under
stress, as it were.  I continue to find it helpful, but I will of course
always be on the look-out for cases where it might seriously mislead.  We
cannot hope for full illumination in such matters, but a small guiding
light can often help us negotiate a conceptual obstacle in the path.

David

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-06 Thread Stephen P. King

On 7/6/2012 5:18 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 6 July 2012 18:01, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


/I am sure your analysis might help to better apprehend
consciousness, and can perhaps better handle the amnesia
situation. But you have not (yet) convinced me that it has to
be termed into a new form of *assumed at the outset*
indeterminacy. The probability of being me is a sort of
Dirac distribution: it is one, for me, and zero for the
others. The probability of becoming me, is perhaps close to
one on the transitive closure of the computations, and is
complex to compute for particular brain instantiation./


Thanks for your detailed critique up to this point, Bruno.  I 
understand of course that you are particularly concerned to assess its 
consistency with comp.  By contrast, as I have said, my own motivation 
has been more generally to find a heuristic for navigating some of the 
thornier conceptual puzzles presented by consciousness.  I understand 
that the kind of global probability distribution entailed by this 
notion is poorly defined in a strict mathematical sense.  The global 
distribution is simply assumed ex hypothesi by the stipulation of a 
class of all sentient moments, and the relative probability of any 
sub-class of moments is then assumed to derive from a kind of global 
frequency-interpretation as a consequence of the unique stochastic 
succession of moments.  This is essentially what Hoyle had in mind 
with his pigeon hole metaphor, and it stands or falls in terms of its 
utility as a mode of thought for certain purposes; no more, no less.


Consequently the /*assumed at the outset* indeterminacy /just 
follows automatically from//the specification of the heuristic; as 
moments succeed each other without extrinsic ordering, the 
personalised spatio-temporal characteristics associated with each 
successive moment have in this sense no prior determination.  The 
notion of succession here simply grounds the bare notion of 
experiential transition, and the consequence of each such transition 
is to localise the knower in terms of an underlying real system. 
This system, in turn, can readily be assumed to be as complex as 
necessary to account for the unfolding relative scenarios thus recovered.


A feature of this view is that all subsequent notions of indeterminacy 
are inherited from a single primitive notion, which is assumed to 
mediate _all_ questions of who, where, when and relative to what.  For 
example, it grounds the relative probabilities of the future 
outcomes of individual persons as well as more general anthropic or 
observer self-selection issues.  One could see this as a useful 
conceptual simplification or a step too far, I guess.  The 
probability of being me, seems to be, as you say, all or nothing; but 
in terms of the heuristic it is weird but inevitable that this must 
always seem to be the case in the context of a given occasion of 
experience.  The probability of becoming me (or that there will be a 
me to be) depends, as I think you imply, on the entire web of 
relations encoded in the real system.


Thank you again for the critique.  I hadn't really thought to 
convince you, but you have helped me to test the usefulness of the 
view under stress, as it were.  I continue to find it helpful, but I 
will of course always be on the look-out for cases where it might 
seriously mislead.  We cannot hope for full illumination in such 
matters, but a small guiding light can often help us negotiate a 
conceptual obstacle in the path.


David
--

Dear David and Bruno,

I am very informed by your discussion so far. I really appreciate 
the patience and depth of the discussion! I would only add that the idea 
of a single primitive notion, which is assumed to mediate all questions 
of who, where, when and relative to what is a form of Pre-Established 
Harmony ala what Leibniz had in mind to explain the synchronization of 
the Monads. I see this idea as problematic because it assumes something 
that is completely unphysical and even impossible! It is my claim that 
any such PEH is equivalent to a solution to an optimization or 
satisfaction problem and such require computations to be actually 
performed to be said to have solutions.
One can claim that a solution exists and even privite a proof of 
this existence, but this is no substitute for actually having the 
solution in hand so as to use it. The real world requires that we 
physically instantiate our computations; we have to do work to gain 
knowledge of solutions to problems. The idea that there exists a 
Mediator of all questions is not sufficient if we do not have the means 
to acquire the exact nature of the who, where, when and relative to what.
We have to be very careful about this assumed from the onset 
stuff! Yes, it is necessary to assume things even for the sake of 
discussion of ideas, but to assume 

Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-06 Thread David Nyman
On 6 July 2012 22:55, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:

We have to be very careful about this assumed from the onset stuff! Yes,
 it is necessary to assume things even for the sake of discussion of ideas,
 but to assume that they are de facto primitive and/or a priori is often a
 fatal mistake.


Let me assure you, Stephen, that I make no assumptions or assertions as to
primitivity or a priori truth for these notions.  As I have said, I find
them useful and illuminating (as presumably did Hoyle) in connection with
certain conceptual problems of consciousness, particularly those relating
to personal identity and history.  It is also the case that, in discussing
these particular ideas with others, I've found that their particular
explicitness with respect to factors that are often tacit or even entirely
unrecognised has often been helpful in drawing out veiled aspects of
competing viewpoints.

I tend to agree that a comparison can be drawn with Leibnizian PEH, which I
suppose is rather unavoidable given the way the notion is formulated.  With
respect to the substrate or real system with which Hoyle's pigeon holes
are assumed to be associated *h**ypotheses non fingo; *the heuristic is
more or less neutral on this issue, which can be construed both as a
weakness or a strength, depending on one's purposes.

David

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-06 Thread Stephen P. King

On 7/6/2012 7:26 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 6 July 2012 22:55, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net 
mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote:


We have to be very careful about this assumed from the onset
stuff! Yes, it is necessary to assume things even for the sake of
discussion of ideas, but to assume that they are de facto
primitive and/or a priori is often a fatal mistake.


Let me assure you, Stephen, that I make no assumptions or assertions 
as to primitivity or a priori truth for these notions.


 Hi David,

I did not mean to claim that you where making assumptions or 
assertions. I was speaking in generalities, thus the use of the word we.


 As I have said, I find them useful and illuminating (as presumably 
did Hoyle) in connection with certain conceptual problems of 
consciousness, particularly those relating to personal identity and 
history.


I agree. Hoyle was on to an important idea, IMHO. I really 
appreciate that you have pointed this out.


 It is also the case that, in discussing these particular ideas with 
others, I've found that their particular explicitness with respect to 
factors that are often tacit or even entirely unrecognised has often 
been helpful in drawing out veiled aspects of competing viewpoints.


Yes. I recall vividly how much David Bohm discussed tacit 
assumptions in his writings. It is more often the case than not that it 
is what we jsut assume to be true without question that is the problem 
that prevents progress in our thinking.




I tend to agree that a comparison can be drawn with Leibnizian PEH, 
which I suppose is rather unavoidable given the way the notion is 
formulated.  With respect to the substrate or real system with which 
Hoyle's pigeon holes are assumed to be associated /h//ypotheses non 
fingo; /the heuristic is more or less neutral on this issue, which 
can be construed both as a weakness or a strength, depending on one's 
purposes.


Would it be too bold to claim that we now have enough evidence to 
propose a hypothesis?


--
Onward!

Stephen

Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
~ Francis Bacon

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 04 Jul 2012, at 18:29, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  if you duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent one  
Bruno Marchal to Washington1 and the other Bruno Marchal to  
Washington2 then there would only be one Bruno Marchal having a  
Washington experience.


 No problem with that.

I'm glad to hear you say that but then it's even more mysterious  
that you can't extrapolate that fact to its logical conclusion. When  
the start button is pushed on that duplicating machine your brain  
and body may have been instantly duplicated but you, the first  
person perspective, has not been and will not be until there is  
something in the environment in Washington that makes a change to  
one of your sense organs that is missing in the environment of  
Moscow; only then, when there is a difference between the two, is  
your first person perspective split and it's meaningless to ask  
which one is really you.



There is no sense to ask who is really me, but this has never been  
asked. On the contrary what is asked is the probability of the  
specific events seeing Washington , or seeing Moscow. I know in  
advance that it will be only one of them from my future first person  
perspective. This is confirmed in all experience, as your own  1)  
and 2) prediction illustrates.





So first person indeterminacy is entirely the result of the fact  
that Washington and Moscow happen to be not identical, if they were  
there would be no differentiation of perspective regardless of how  
many brains and bodies there were.


Indeed. That is why W and M are used to make clear the presence of the  
differentiation.




So first person indeterminacy is functionally equivalent to the  
environment is changeable and unpredictable and the idea can bring  
no enlightenment into the nature of personal identity or  
consciousness.


The environment are not changeable, and have been chosen for their  
stability. The indeterminacy comes from the differentiation only  
between the identical first person (before going out of the boxes)  
when the copies discover where they are. In the two room case, with a  
one and a zero in some envelop in each room, the two rooms and the  
envelop does not evolve at at all. Your argument that it is the  
environment which evolve does not work, because it does not. That  
would be testable by a third person, when the first person  
indeterminacy is only something livable by the candidate themselves:  
there is no 3-indeterminacy in this setting at all.






 I can duplicate you in two closed little rooms. In step 6 you are  
duplicated on a chip. The unpredictable nature of the place where  
the reconstitution are done is irrelevant


If the two closed rooms are identical then its irrelevant where the  
rooms are, but if the rooms are identical then the first person  
perspective that you're so concerned about (me too) has NOT been  
duplicated.


Of course the two rooms contains a difference.



 With comp you know in advance that in the duplication experience,  
your 1-pov will remain unique


Forget comp, from simple logic you know that your first person  
point of view will remain unique.


I am glad you agree with this. that has not been always clear.



If 2 things have the same first person point of view then there is  
only one first person point of view


We agree on this since the start.




and so it remains unique;  and if 2 things have a different first  
person point of view then each one remains unique because it's  
different from anything else.  OK I admit that's not very profound,  
but unlike most theories in philosophies tautologies do have the  
virtue of being true.


And ... ?





 No matter what diary entry I come up with you keep saying it  
would not disprove your theory because of blah blah point of view  
blah blah, so I want you to tell me exactly what diary entry WOULD  
disprove your theory?


 I will feel to be in W.  Confirmed by the guy in W, but disproved  
by the guy in M.


I want to be certain I understand, you seem to be saying that if  
before the experiment the subject had written in his diary I will  
feel like I'm in Washington and only Washington and had written  
nothing else, and then after the experiment you had interviewed the  
subject in Moscow and he said I feel like I'm in Moscow and only  
Moscow then you would concede that your theory of first person  
indeterminacy is incorrect.


This is utterly ridiculous. First person indeterminacy indiscates that  
the guy who understand the point will never
write I will feel to be in W and in only in W, as he knows that this  
will be disqualified by the guy in Moscow. The correct guy will  
predict W or M, never W only, nor M only.
The fact that some idiotic predict that he will win the lottery does  
not lake false the probability that the he will win, which is very  
small.




I could be wrong but I have a feeling if that had happened 

Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-05 Thread David Nyman
On 5 July 2012 08:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

The proof if by absurdo. Suppose there is an algorithm, or even just a God
 capable of predicting the specific outcome among 1) and 2).  Suppose it
 is 1), then the guy in Moscow refutes it, and comp invites us to listen
 to him. If it is 2), then the guy in washington refutes it, and comp
 invites us to listen to him.
 Indeterminacy has not been assumed: it results from the trivial fact that
 I am copied in the same state in two different place so that I can't
 predict which differentation will occur from my first person perspective.


This is where it may be more explicit - and hence clearer - to express the
logic in terms of Hoyle's heuristic, in my view. To remind you, a unique
first person locus is first assumed, all experiential content then being
the consequence of a unique stochastic multiplexing of the entire class of
sentient moments, from this singular perspective.  The objective
substrate, on which sentience may be supposed to supervene, is assumed to
be deterministic, as is the experiential multiplex, whose role is to make
explicit a means of conceiving an entire class as a serialisation.  But
this latter conceptualisation allows us to bring an *explicit
indeterminism*into the picture, against what appears as an otherwise
entirely
deterministic background.  An explicit stochastic multiplexing of moments
mandates that all occasions of sentience must take their place in due
course and in due measure, relativised to whatever personal histories may
be recoverable from the internal logic of the deterministic substrate.

There are several useful aspects of this way of thinking, I believe.
 Firstly, it takes seriously the singularity of first-personal location.
Secondly, it makes explicit a generalised first-personal indeterminacy as a
fundamental characteristic of experience.  Thirdly, and importantly, it
prises apart two distinct aspects of temporal experience: replaces and
logically prior or next.  Stochastic multiplexing of moments mediates the
former aspect: this moment - the moment as given - replaces all others in
experience.  It is only in the context of the moment as given that
logico-temporal ordering becomes relativised to a particular personal
history, as mediated by the deterministic substrate..  Thus Bruno's, John's
or David's occasions of experience become relativised to their particular
reference (or relevance) class through, in effect, the selective memory of
a more generalised stochastic process.  In this way, each of us can speak
meaningfully of my next expected moment, or my prior history by
exclusive reference to the memory state defined within a given
spatio-temporal location.

It is curious at first to apply this heuristic to the UDA and similar
scenarios, though ultimately simplifying, in my view.  Firstly we must put
aside any fundamental notion of past and future except as a logical
implication from the perspective of a momentary localisation within a
stochastic experiential multiplex.  We must however continue to take
personal history seriously - and not only our own - because any other
attitude would be bad faith. From this perspective we see that John's
description of the objective situation after copying is perfectly
reasonable and true of the deterministic substrate, and indeed the class of
all sentient moments considered as a whole.  It ceases, however, to make
any sense at all in the context of the present heuristic, in which
first-personal experience is explicitly recovered from a unique perspective
by the mutual replacement of singular givens.  This heuristic provides a
view of the first-person as a singular stream of consciousness in which all
personal episodes emerge in due course, in due measure and in due relation.

David

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-05 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  There is no sense to ask who is really me


I'm glad to hear you say that.


  what is asked is the probability of the specific events seeing
 Washington , or seeing Moscow.


That depends entirely on something outside of you, namely Washington and
Moscow, it depends on the probability of Washington producing a sense
signal that Moscow does not produce, until then your environment is the
same and so are you and so there is no differentiation (assuming quantum
randomness can be ignored) and so there is only one Bruno Marchal. When the
cities start to display their differences then things will change,
especially you.

   So first person indeterminacy is functionally equivalent to the
 environment is changeable and unpredictable and the idea can bring no
 enlightenment into the nature of personal identity or consciousness.

 The environment are not changeable, and have been chosen for their
 stability.


If nothing can change then photons can not change their positions, so they
can not enter your eye, so it would be equivalent to Bruno1 and Brono2
starring into two identical Black Holes, so there would be no difference
between the two Bruno brains, so there would be no splitting of viewpoints,
so  there would be only one Bruno Marchal until something changed.

 In the two room case, with a one and a zero in some envelop in each room,
 the two rooms and the envelop does not evolve at at all.


By definition It's not a environmental factor until it encounters you, as
long as that zero or one stays in that envelope it's irrelevant, only when
its opened does it become an environmental factor.

  If 2 things have the same first person point of view then there is only
 one first person point of view

  We agree on this since the start.


Good.

  and so it remains unique;  and if 2 things have a different first person
 point of view then each one remains unique because it's different from
 anything else.  OK I admit that's not very profound, but unlike most
 theories in philosophies tautologies do have the virtue of being true.

  And ... ?


And so there is nothing insightful about first person indeterminacy and
it can not help us understand how the world works.

 I want to be certain I understand, you seem to be saying that if before
 the experiment the subject had written in his diary I will feel like I'm
 in Washington and only Washington and had written nothing else, and then
 after the experiment you had interviewed the subject in Moscow and he said
 I feel like I'm in Moscow and only Moscow then you would concede that
 your theory of first person indeterminacy is incorrect.


 This is utterly ridiculous. First person indeterminacy indiscates that
 the guy who understand the point will never write I will feel to be in W
 and in only in W, as he knows that this will be disqualified by the guy in
 Moscow. The correct guy will predict W or M, never W only, nor M
 only.The fact that some idiotic predict that he will win the lottery does
 not lake false the probability that the he will win, which is very small.


OK, you say that diary entry would not disprove your theory,  so I repeat
my request now for the third time, WHAT DIARY ENTRY WOULD DISPROVE YOUR
THEORY? I remind you that you introduced the idea of diaries not me and if
you can not answer my question because your theory predicts everything then
it predicts nothing and it is not science, and the world already has enough
metaphysical mush.

 John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 05 Jul 2012, at 15:47, David Nyman wrote:


On 5 July 2012 08:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

The proof if by absurdo. Suppose there is an algorithm, or even just  
a God capable of predicting the specific outcome among 1) and  
2).  Suppose it is 1), then the guy in Moscow refutes it, and  
comp invites us to listen to him. If it is 2), then the guy in  
washington refutes it, and comp invites us to listen to him.
Indeterminacy has not been assumed: it results from the trivial fact  
that I am copied in the same state in two different place so that I  
can't predict which differentation will occur from my first person  
perspective.


This is where it may be more explicit - and hence clearer - to  
express the logic in terms of Hoyle's heuristic, in my view. To  
remind you, a unique first person locus is first assumed,


Is that different from the unique first person that we have to attach  
to any universal machine?






all experiential content then being the consequence of a unique  
stochastic multiplexing of the entire class of sentient moments,  
from this singular perspective.


This seems like adding an ASSA on top of all RSSA. I fail to see the  
simplification, but if it helps you why not. Do you think we can make  
an experimental test showing a role to such an ASSA?




 The objective substrate, on which sentience may be supposed to  
supervene, is assumed to be deterministic, as is the experiential  
multiplex, whose role is to make explicit a means of conceiving an  
entire class as a serialisation.  But this latter conceptualisation  
allows us to bring an explicit indeterminism into the picture,  
against what appears as an otherwise entirely deterministic  
background.


But we can already justify the relative indeterminacy of the relative  
first person perspective, from what is an entirely deterministic  
background.





An explicit stochastic multiplexing of moments mandates that all  
occasions of sentience must take their place in due course and in  
due measure, relativised to whatever personal histories may be  
recoverable from the internal logic of the deterministic substrate.


But then such stochastic process will interfere with the outcomes of  
duplication, and transportation, at least to make sense. But then it  
might be in conflict with computationalism.






There are several useful aspects of this way of thinking, I  
believe.  Firstly, it takes seriously the singularity of first- 
personal location.


I try to assume the less, and it seems to me that for UDA this is  
explained by the fact that machine have singular self-referential  
memories. Then AUDA confirms this singular aspect with the use of the  
classical theory of knowledge.



Secondly, it makes explicit a generalised first-personal  
indeterminacy as a fundamental characteristic of experience.


I fail to see how this is needed, nor even if it makes thing simpler.  
It is already hard for most to understand an indeterminacy whose  
existence follows from deduction, so another one imposed on the top of  
it might seem making the picture even more complex.



Thirdly, and importantly, it prises apart two distinct aspects of  
temporal experience: replaces and logically prior or next.   
Stochastic multiplexing of moments mediates the former aspect: this  
moment - the moment as given - replaces all others in experience.   
It is only in the context of the moment as given that logico- 
temporal ordering becomes relativised to a particular personal  
history, as mediated by the deterministic substrate..  Thus Bruno's,  
John's or David's occasions of experience become relativised to  
their particular reference (or relevance) class through, in effect,  
the selective memory of a more generalised stochastic process.


You might have a correct intuition, and I can intuit something, but  
all what I do, is to derive the consequence of surviving with  
probability one in case of technically successful brain transplant.  
What is the relation between the new stochastic process and the global  
(on arithmetic) comp one.


Perhaps the stochastic process you describe is the same as the comp  
one, applied to the virgin universal machine, more exactly to its  
first person pov.  Total ammesy would lead any one to that state.  
But we don't have to assume it. Universal numbers exists, and their  
domain of indeterminacy contains all possible experiences, except that  
the probability of going amnesic and getting my personal memory back  
might be a statistically rare event (I dunno, some experience reports  
can be amazing on this point).





In this way, each of us can speak meaningfully of my next expected  
moment, or my prior history by exclusive reference to the memory  
state defined within a given spatio-temporal location.


But machines/numbers can talk of their next expected moment without  
invoking any stochastic process. Stochasticness appears because their  
relative consciousness is 

Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-05 Thread meekerdb

On 7/5/2012 12:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Jul 2012, at 18:29, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  if you duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent one Bruno 
Marchal
to Washington1 and the other Bruno Marchal to Washington2 then there 
would only
be one Bruno Marchal having a Washington experience.


 No problem with that.


I'm glad to hear you say that but then it's even more mysterious that you can't 
extrapolate that fact to its logical conclusion. When the start button is pushed on 
that duplicating machine your brain and body may have been instantly duplicated but 
you, the first person perspective, has not been and will not be until there is 
something in the environment in Washington that makes a change to one of your sense 
organs that is missing in the environment of Moscow; only then, when there is a 
difference between the two, is your first person perspective split and it's meaningless 
to ask which one is really you.



There is no sense to ask who is really me, but this has never been asked. On the 
contrary what is asked is the probability of the specific events seeing Washington , 
or seeing Moscow.


Both are 'seen'.  The question is by whom.  It is only related to 1-p indeterminancy by 
assuming there is one person who does the seeing.  It would no puzzle at all if Moscow 
were seen by Putin and Washington was seen by Obama.


I know in advance that it will be only one of them from my future first person 
perspective. This is confirmed in all experience, as your own  1) and 2) prediction 
illustrates.


But then there is not probability interpretation.


You write, The theory is P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. the confirmation and refutation of this is 
isomorphic to any prediction in a Bernouilli experience (throwing of a coin), both in the 
iterated and non iterated cases.


But P(W)=P(M)=1/2 is shorthand and it hides the implicit assumption that there is some X 
such that X is in Washington or X is in Moscow.  If W=X1 is in Washington and M=X2 
is in Moscow, then there is no probability interpretation of where X0 is.


This is exactly the same problem raised by Everett's interpretation of QM.  If everything 
happens then what does it mean to say an event has a certain probability?


Brent


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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 05 Jul 2012, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/5/2012 12:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 04 Jul 2012, at 18:29, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  if you duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent one  
Bruno Marchal to Washington1 and the other Bruno Marchal to  
Washington2 then there would only be one Bruno Marchal having a  
Washington experience.


 No problem with that.

I'm glad to hear you say that but then it's even more mysterious  
that you can't extrapolate that fact to its logical conclusion.  
When the start button is pushed on that duplicating machine your  
brain and body may have been instantly duplicated but you, the  
first person perspective, has not been and will not be until there  
is something in the environment in Washington that makes a change  
to one of your sense organs that is missing in the environment of  
Moscow; only then, when there is a difference between the two, is  
your first person perspective split and it's meaningless to ask  
which one is really you.



There is no sense to ask who is really me, but this has never  
been asked. On the contrary what is asked is the probability of the  
specific events seeing Washington , or seeing Moscow.


Both are 'seen'.  The question is by whom.


Well, you can say that I provide the answer in AUDA, and that the  
answer is the inner god, alias the knower, alias Bp  p, alias  
S4Grz. It has no name and is already NOT arithmetical. Unlike the  
machine, or the third person self which is arithmetical.





It is only related to 1-p indeterminancy by assuming there is one  
person who does the seeing.


But there is indeed one person who does the seeing, indeed they are  
two of them. There is one person in Moscow, and one person in  
Washington, and those are the one we interview. We just continue to  
use the you and me, if they are used in the first person indexical  
sense, in the usual way.





It would no puzzle at all if Moscow were seen by Putin and  
Washington was seen by Obama.


And there is no puzzle if we duplicate Brent either. Comp implies both  
Brent will see one city, that they could not have predicted to live  
that one in particular. For each of them subjectively the experience  
is the same as having one in either city by throwing a coin. You can  
replace Brent by machine having enough ability to be able to  
distinguish Moscow from Washington, and you can prove easily that such  
machine has no technic to predict which location she (in the usual  
sense) will observe in his immediate future.






I know in advance that it will be only one of them from my future  
first person perspective. This is confirmed in all experience, as  
your own  1) and 2) prediction illustrates.


But then there is not probability interpretation.


? John agreed that 1) and 2) are 1-pov incompatible, so here the and  
is an 1-pov or. It is the same as head or tail.







You write, The theory is P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. the confirmation and  
refutation of this is isomorphic to any prediction in a Bernouilli  
experience (throwing of a coin), both in the iterated and non  
iterated cases.


But P(W)=P(M)=1/2 is shorthand and it hides the implicit assumption  
that there is some X such that X is in Washington or X is in  
Moscow.


That is assumed in the protocol, at steps 1-7.
And that is guarantied by only a tiny part of arithmetic by step 8.  
(assuming comp)





If W=X1 is in Washington and M=X2 is in Moscow, then there is no  
probability interpretation of where X0 is.


Then no probability makes any sense, because if I throw a dice, I  
cannot know if the guy who looks at the result is still me. But with  
comp we agree that P(W) = 1 for a simple (no duplication)  
teleportation. So we accept some local comp type of identity, and that  
it can be duplicated. So although you will be in Washington and  
Moscow, for a third person observer view, both of you, and any of you,  
will feel as having been randomly selected (as the iteration makes  
clearer) among Washington and Moscow.


Indeed, you can't predict in advance any city you will feel to be, as  
that would contradict the survival of the other. If you predict  
Moscow, you make the Brent in Washington into a zombie, or a non- 
Brent. Comp says both are Brent.



you = the owner of the identity cart. Just don't forget to take it  
with you,  before accepting a duplication experience.





This is exactly the same problem raised by Everett's interpretation  
of QM.  If everything happens then what does it mean to say an event  
has a certain probability?



But once you make the machine-observer relativization the theory  
explains why events have relative probabilities. For the same reason  
not all arithmetical propositions are true, not all physical  
propositions are true, and most factual truth are relative to context  
and self-reference.


Everything does not happen, neither with comp, nor with Everett.  

Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 05 Jul 2012, at 18:15, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 There is no sense to ask who is really me

I'm glad to hear you say that.

 what is asked is the probability of the specific events seeing  
Washington , or seeing Moscow.


That depends entirely on something outside of you, namely Washington  
and Moscow, it depends on the probability of Washington producing a  
sense signal that Moscow does not produce, until then your  
environment is the same and so are you and so there is no  
differentiation (assuming quantum randomness can be ignored) and so  
there is only one Bruno Marchal. When the cities start to display  
their differences then things will change, especially you.


In that sense OK. But so the first person indeterminacy remains on  
what I will feel if I do the experience in practice.




  So first person indeterminacy is functionally equivalent to  
the environment is changeable and unpredictable and the idea can  
bring no enlightenment into the nature of personal identity or  
consciousness.


The environment are not changeable, and have been chosen for their  
stability.


If nothing can change then photons can not change their positions,  
so they can not enter your eye, so it would be equivalent to Bruno1  
and Brono2 starring into two identical Black Holes, so there would  
be no difference between the two Bruno brains, so there would be no  
splitting of viewpoints, so  there would be only one Bruno Marchal  
until something changed.


OK. But this happens because my computational state in Helsinki has  
been duplicated, and the changes you talk about is the experience of  
self-localization. This is a rephrasing which does not suppress in any  
way the fact that in Helsinki I am uncertain about the experience I  
will feel next.
There is no uncertainty in W and M which interfere with this  
uncertainty.








 In the two room case, with a one and a zero in some envelop in  
each room, the two rooms and the envelop does not evolve at at all.


By definition It's not a environmental factor until it encounters  
you, as long as that zero or one stays in that envelope it's  
irrelevant, only when its opened does it become an environmental  
factor.
 If 2 things have the same first person point of view then there  
is only one first person point of view


 We agree on this since the start.

Good.
 and so it remains unique;  and if 2 things have a different first  
person point of view then each one remains unique because it's  
different from anything else.  OK I admit that's not very profound,  
but unlike most theories in philosophies tautologies do have the  
virtue of being true.


 And ... ?

And so there is nothing insightful about first person  
indeterminacy and it can not help us understand how the world works.


That is a quick jump. Also I am not saying that the comp indeterminacy  
explains the world, at this stage three it makes things more complex.  
It is a consequence of comp that we can just not put under the rug. I  
am not solving a problem, I am formulating it.






 I want to be certain I understand, you seem to be saying that if  
before the experiment the subject had written in his diary I will  
feel like I'm in Washington and only Washington and had written  
nothing else, and then after the experiment you had interviewed the  
subject in Moscow and he said I feel like I'm in Moscow and only  
Moscow then you would concede that your theory of first person  
indeterminacy is incorrect.


This is utterly ridiculous. First person indeterminacy indiscates  
that the guy who understand the point will never write I will feel  
to be in W and in only in W, as he knows that this will be  
disqualified by the guy in Moscow. The correct guy will predict W  
or M, never W only, nor M only.The fact that some idiotic  
predict that he will win the lottery does not lake false the  
probability that the he will win, which is very small.


OK, you say that diary entry would not disprove your theory,  so I  
repeat my request now for the third time, WHAT DIARY ENTRY WOULD  
DISPROVE YOUR THEORY?


The point is mathematical. Such diary entries would be trivial, like  
both diaries containing  I am in Washington.
Given it consists of statistics, it is clearer in repeating the  
experience, the theory would be disproved in the majority of the  
copies find an algorithm to predict their outcomes, or if the P(having  
be k times in W) does not fit with the Pascal triangle. Of course it  
is non sensical.




I remind you that you introduced the idea of diaries not me and if  
you can not answer my question because your theory predicts everything


The theory predicts that we don't have a predicting algorithm, just  
probabilities. It predicts P = 1/2. It would be refuted if the  
statistics of the first person experience violated the Pascal  
triangle, or the Gauss distribution. But it does not, for obvious  
mathematical 

Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-05 Thread David Nyman
On 5 July 2012 18:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

*But we can already justify the relative indeterminacy of the relative
 first person perspective, from what is an entirely deterministic background.
 *


Hoyle wan't necessarily assuming comp (and nor do I when talking in this
way).  But the point which I have consistently tried to put to you is more
basic.  This is that the relative indeterminacy of the relative first
person perspective already, by that very formulation, assumes without
justification (albeit rather inexplicitly) some specific relative
localisation within what is, more properly considered, an indifferent
ensemble (e.g. UD* or alternatively some cosmological SWE).  Hoyle's way of
thinking makes the indeterminate localisation of experience explicit and *
absolute* at the outset: he just imagines, in effect, what would it be
like if the ensemble of all possible occasions of sentience were
unrolled stochastically in a sort of eternal recurrence. This gives,
effectively, a relative-frequency interpretation of the probability of any
particular occasion being presently given.

*But then such stochastic process will interfere with the outcomes of
duplication, and transportation, at least to make sense. But then it might
be in conflict with computationalism.*


I don't see why you think so.  The experiences associated with each
duplication or transportation outcome are assumed to be present in the
deterministic substrate in due measure, and hence to occur in the
associated stream of consciousness in due course.  That there is always
some given occasion of experience is consequent on an absolute
first-personal indeteminism; relativisation to an episode of a particular
personal history is then dependent on whatever deterministic substrate is
associated with the given occasion.  Relative amnesia (or selective
memory) effectively compartmentalises first-personal histories from each
other and is consequently transparent to reconstitution delay.

The above considerations seem so basic to our disagreement that rather than
comment further on your other points, I will await your response to this.
 It is of course perfectly possible (not to say likely) that I am missing
something basic here, so I am trying to be as explicit as possible.  Let me
know what, if anything, is still unclear.

David

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-05 Thread meekerdb

On 7/5/2012 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 05 Jul 2012, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/5/2012 12:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 04 Jul 2012, at 18:29, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  if you duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent one Bruno
Marchal to Washington1 and the other Bruno Marchal to Washington2 then 
there
would only be one Bruno Marchal having a Washington experience.


 No problem with that.


I'm glad to hear you say that but then it's even more mysterious that you can't 
extrapolate that fact to its logical conclusion. When the start button is pushed on 
that duplicating machine your brain and body may have been instantly duplicated but 
you, the first person perspective, has not been and will not be until there is 
something in the environment in Washington that makes a change to one of your sense 
organs that is missing in the environment of Moscow; only then, when there is a 
difference between the two, is your first person perspective split and it's 
meaningless to ask which one is really you.



There is no sense to ask who is really me, but this has never been asked. On the 
contrary what is asked is the probability of the specific events seeing Washington , 
or seeing Moscow.


Both are 'seen'.  The question is by whom.


Well, you can say that I provide the answer in AUDA, and that the answer is the inner 
god, alias the knower, alias Bp  p, alias S4Grz. It has no name and is already NOT 
arithmetical. Unlike the machine, or the third person self which is arithmetical.





It is only related to 1-p indeterminancy by assuming there is one person who does the 
seeing.


But there is indeed one person who does the seeing, indeed they are two of them. There 
is one person in Moscow, and one person in Washington, and those are the one we 
interview. We just continue to use the you and me, if they are used in the first 
person indexical sense, in the usual way.






It would no puzzle at all if Moscow were seen by Putin and Washington was seen 
by Obama.


And there is no puzzle if we duplicate Brent either. Comp implies both Brent will see 
one city, that they could not have predicted to live that one in particular. For each of 
them subjectively the experience is the same as having one in either city by throwing a 
coin. You can replace Brent by machine having enough ability to be able to distinguish 
Moscow from Washington, and you can prove easily that such machine has no technic to 
predict which location she (in the usual sense) will observe in his immediate future.






I know in advance that it will be only one of them from my future first person 
perspective. This is confirmed in all experience, as your own  1) and 2) 
prediction illustrates.


But then there is not probability interpretation.


? John agreed that 1) and 2) are 1-pov incompatible, so here the and is an 1-pov or. 
It is the same as head or tail.







You write, The theory is P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. the confirmation and refutation of this is 
isomorphic to any prediction in a Bernouilli experience (throwing of a coin), both in 
the iterated and non iterated cases.


But P(W)=P(M)=1/2 is shorthand and it hides the implicit assumption that there is some 
X such that X is in Washington or X is in Moscow.


That is assumed in the protocol, at steps 1-7.
And that is guarantied by only a tiny part of arithmetic by step 8. (assuming 
comp)




If W=X1 is in Washington and M=X2 is in Moscow, then there is no probability 
interpretation of where X0 is.


Then no probability makes any sense, because if I throw a dice, I cannot know if the guy 
who looks at the result is still me.


You can if there is only one Bruno Marchal and only one die.  But if there are six Bruno's 
seeing six dice with spots 1 thru 6...


But with comp we agree that P(W) = 1 for a simple (no duplication) teleportation. So we 
accept some local comp type of identity, and that it can be duplicated. So although you 
will be in Washington and Moscow, for a third person observer view, both of you, and any 
of you, will feel as having been randomly selected (as the iteration makes clearer) 
among Washington and Moscow.


Indeed, you can't predict in advance any city you will feel to be, as that would 
contradict the survival of the other. If you predict Moscow, you make the Brent in 
Washington into a zombie, or a non-Brent. Comp says both are Brent.


Right.  So when asked what is the probability Brent sees Washington the answer is 1.  And 
the probability Brent sees Moscow is 1.  The probability 1/2 only comes by equivocating on 
you.





you = the owner of the identity cart. Just don't forget to take it with you,  before 
accepting a duplication experience.





This is exactly the same problem raised by Everett's interpretation of QM.  If 
everything happens then what does it mean to say an event has a certain probability?



But 

Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-05 Thread meekerdb

On 7/5/2012 11:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. But this happens because my computational state in Helsinki has been duplicated, and 
the changes you talk about is the experience of self-localization. This is a rephrasing 
which does not suppress in any way the fact that in Helsinki I am uncertain about the 
experience I will feel next.


But that uncertainty could exist without the duplication - just the uncertainty of which 
city you would be teleported to.   But in the duplication case, when you say, I am 
uncertain about the experience I will feel next. the second I, the I of the future, 
has an ambiguous reference.  The uncertainty is in the ambiguity of this reference.


Brent

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-04 Thread John Clark
On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


   if you duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent one Bruno
 Marchal to Washington1 and the other Bruno Marchal to Washington2 then
 there would only be one Bruno Marchal having a Washington experience.


  No problem with that.


I'm glad to hear you say that but then it's even more mysterious that you
can't extrapolate that fact to its logical conclusion. When the start
button is pushed on that duplicating machine your brain and body may have
been instantly duplicated but you, the first person perspective, has not
been and will not be until there is something in the environment in
Washington that makes a change to one of your sense organs that is missing
in the environment of Moscow; only then, when there is a difference between
the two, is your first person perspective split and it's meaningless to ask
which one is really you. So first person indeterminacy is entirely the
result of the fact that Washington and Moscow happen to be not identical,
if they were there would be no differentiation of perspective regardless of
how many brains and bodies there were. So first person indeterminacy is
functionally equivalent to the environment is changeable and
unpredictable and the idea can bring no enlightenment into the nature of
personal identity or consciousness.

 I can duplicate you in two closed little rooms. In step 6 you are
 duplicated on a chip. The unpredictable nature of the place where the
 reconstitution are done is irrelevant


If the two closed rooms are identical then its irrelevant where the rooms
are, but if the rooms are identical then the first person perspective that
you're so concerned about (me too) has NOT been duplicated.

 With comp you know in advance that in the duplication experience, your
 1-pov will remain unique


Forget comp, from simple logic you know that your first person point of
view will remain unique. If 2 things have the same first person point of
view then there is only one first person point of view and so it remains
unique;  and if 2 things have a different first person point of view then
each one remains unique because it's different from anything else.  OK I
admit that's not very profound, but unlike most theories in philosophies
tautologies do have the virtue of being true.

 No matter what diary entry I come up with you keep saying it would not
 disprove your theory because of blah blah point of view blah blah, so I
 want you to tell me exactly what diary entry WOULD disprove your theory?


  I will feel to be in W.  Confirmed by the guy in W, but disproved by the
 guy in M.


I want to be certain I understand, you seem to be saying that if before the
experiment the subject had written in his diary I will feel like I'm in
Washington and only Washington and had written nothing else, and then
after the experiment you had interviewed the subject in Moscow and he said
I feel like I'm in Moscow and only Moscow then you would concede that
your theory of first person indeterminacy is incorrect. I could be wrong
but I have a feeling if that had happened you would not make such a
concession, if so then please state precisely what diary entry WOULD
disprove your theory. If there is no hypothetical experimental result that
can disprove your theory then it predicts nothing because it predicts
everything and is not science.


  The 1-indeterminacy is not a theory, it is a theorem in the theory comp.


A theorem is a statement that has been proven from OTHER statements, but in
one important step in your proof of  1-indeterminacy you assume
1-indeterminacy.

  John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 at 3:21 AM, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
 On 2 July 2012 17:50, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 And one nanosecond after the copying when one receives sensory impulses that
 originated in Moscow and the other   receives sensory impulses that
 originated in Washington neither would be in precisely the first-person
 position they were in before.

 What does that have to do with anything?  Is it credible that after all this
 verbiage you have failed to grasp the difference between the first-person
 position of each copy and a third-person description of both copies
 together?  Congratulations, John - you really have succeeded in elevating
 the straw man argument to a level hitherto unsuspected.

I'm pretty sure John understands the argument but he prefers to give
primacy to the objective/third-person viewpoint. The first-person
viewpoint involves an assumption that I am a single person travelling
through time in the forward direction, which when looked at
objectively is an illusion. Some people are offended by illusions.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-03 Thread David Nyman
On 3 July 2012 08:09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:

I'm pretty sure John understands the argument but he prefers to give
 primacy to the objective/third-person viewpoint. The first-person
 viewpoint involves an assumption that I am a single person travelling
 through time in the forward direction, which when looked at
 objectively is an illusion. Some people are offended by illusions.


If that is indeed the case, Stathis, it would spare us all a great deal of
pointless argument if he simply made this preference as explicit as you
have just done.  If that is what we are talking about, then I agree that
the subjective experience of moving forwards in time is essentially
illusory, in the sense that each individuated first-person perspective
obscures a deeper, more general level of explanation.  But the
indeterminacy being discussed here precisely concerns appearances from the
individuated perspective; the illusion itself, if you like.  This is the
whole point of the argument. Hence attempting to evade it by dint of
substituting an objective description is an absolutely classic example of
a straw man.

David

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-03 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 02 Jul 2012, at 22:17, John Clark wrote:


On Mon, Jul 2, 2012  PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 The profound thing is that in Helsinki he does not know which one  
he will feel to be, so he is confronted with an indeterminacy


Suppose I send the same identical Email to both you and to Craig at  
the same identical time, you look at your copy and think  when John  
hit the send button on his computer he could not have predicted that  
I would get this copy of the Email and not the one Craig got,


? It is the same. Leading to same experience, except one is  
(predictably) lived by me, and the other one 'experience, not mail) is  
lived by Craig. I don't see any indeterminacy here.




so it's a example of indeterminacy and all sorts of profound  
conclusions can be drawn from that fact. What makes this ridiculous  
is that the 2 Emails are identical and thus completely  
interchangeable. In the same way the man sent to Washington and the  
man sent to Moscow are also identical and thus completely  
interchangeable,


Before their differentiate, and the question is ask about the result  
of the differentiation.




and they will remain that way until the environments of Washington  
and Moscow, being different, change the two so they are different  
and no longer interchangeable. So first person indeterminacy is  
just the result of the unpredictable nature of what goes on in  
Washington and Moscow.


Nothing in W and M, relevant in the duplication experience, is  
unpredictable in W and M.





 Learning that the other is there will not make you suddenly being  
that one.


Why would I need to suddenly become that other fellow for a logical  
man to conclude that the predictions written in that diary was 100%  
correct??


You did not write any prediction (on the 1-pox, as asked) in the  
diary. You wrote the two outcomes, which is hardly a prediction.







  you have restricted your prediction on the third person view on  
the 1-views.


I am in Washington and feel like I'm in Washington and only in  
Washington and that is just what I predicted would happen.


Read yourself. You did not write W, nor M, but both W and M.  
That can be seen as a correct prediction on the 3-view (including the  
possible 1-view) but not on the 1-views themselves, as asked.




If that's not a 1-view what is?


No. It was two 1-views.





 But that is just not answering the question asked.

The answer is 42


sigh



but I can't figure out what the question is or why what was written  
in that diary is not a successful prediction.


To predict head and tail is not a prediction of what you will see when  
throwing a coin.







 In physics we say there is indeterminacy and the meaning of that  
is clear


 This meaning is terribly debated since its inception.

That is entirely incorrect. The meaning of physical indeterminacy  
has always been crystal clear, it's the truth or falsehood of it  
that has been debated; but when you say first person indeterminacy  
I don't even know what you're talking about.


You said it yourself. The one in W is only in Washington. How can he  
be satisfied with having written 1) and 2) in the diary?


You persist in ignoring that the question concerns the 1-views.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-03 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 03 Jul 2012, at 12:05, David Nyman wrote:


On 3 July 2012 08:09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:

I'm pretty sure John understands the argument but he prefers to give
primacy to the objective/third-person viewpoint. The first-person
viewpoint involves an assumption that I am a single person travelling
through time in the forward direction, which when looked at
objectively is an illusion. Some people are offended by illusions.

If that is indeed the case, Stathis, it would spare us all a great  
deal of pointless argument if he simply made this preference as  
explicit as you have just done.


It seems so to me too. He would, like some people, just dismiss the 1- 
pov. But John understands well the 1-pov, as illustrated by the fact  
that he does agree that both copies will feel unique, in one place. So  
he remains just illogical in his last step when he just systematically  
forget that the question was bearing on the 1pov. Putting the emphasis  
somewhere else, in this case, is nothing less than simply avoiding the  
question.




 If that is what we are talking about, then I agree that the  
subjective experience of moving forwards in time is essentially  
illusory, in the sense that each individuated first-person  
perspective obscures a deeper, more general level of explanation.   
But the indeterminacy being discussed here precisely concerns  
appearances from the individuated perspective; the illusion  
itself, if you like.


Yes. And that illusion is more real than any third person object we  
might invent to explain that illusion.




 This is the whole point of the argument. Hence attempting to evade  
it by dint of substituting an objective description is an  
absolutely classic example of a straw man.


It seems to me too, indeed.

Of course, if Stathis think John Clark is offended by illusion, we can  
understand why John want to be stuck in a reasoning whose conclusion  
will make the primitive physical reality two times more illusory,  
given that we don't even experience it.


That's the reason why I would avoid the term illusion for any  
conscious experience. The raw experience cannot be an illusion, as  
consciousness cannot be an illusion. You can't wake up and say I  
dreamed that I was conscious, but that was an illusion, nor can you  
say I dreamed that I dream, but that was an illusion.


Personal identity, time, space, things like that can be illusion,  
but only for those who attach a primitive reality to it. It is not  
more an illusion that the net or a cyber form of life. The experiences  
remains real, in all situations, and as scientists we can try to  
relate it to objective existing patterns, like computations and  
relative self-observing numbers.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-03 Thread John Clark
On Tue, Jul 3, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  Suppose I send the same identical Email to both you and to Craig at the
 same identical time, you look at your copy and think  when John hit the
 send button on his computer he could not have predicted that I would get
 this copy of the Email and not the one Craig got,


  It is the same. Leading to same experience, except one is (predictably)
 lived by me, and the other one 'experience, not mail) is lived by Craig.


I'm saying your experience would be EXACTLY the same if you had received
Craig's Email and he had received yours because they are identical and
interchangeable. I'm also saying that if you duplicated the entire city of
Washington and sent one Bruno Marchal to Washington1 and the other Bruno
Marchal to Washington2 then there would only be one Bruno Marchal having a
Washington experience.

 I don't see any indeterminacy here.


It's precisely the same situation with your duplicating thought experiment,
they don't differentiate until there is a difference between them, just as
the word suggests; so if there is any indeterminacy it is entirely a
function of the unpredictable nature of large cities and tells us nothing
about the nature of personal identity.

  so it's a example of indeterminacy and all sorts of profound
 conclusions can be drawn from that fact. What makes this ridiculous is
 that the 2 Emails are identical and thus completely interchangeable. In the
 same way the man sent to Washington and the man sent to Moscow are also
 identical and thus completely interchangeable,

  Before their differentiate, and the question is ask about the result of
 the differentiation.


The result of the differentiation is that you might see the White House
tomorrow and you might see the Kremlin, and if Everett is right you WILL
see the White House tomorrow and you WILL see the Kremlin. I can't be more
specific about that, not because of something to do with you but because of
the indeterminacy inherent in the entire physical universe that makes it
impossible to make perfect predictions. Nature might throw the White House
at you next and it might throw the Kremlin. And all this is not exactly
breaking news, its not some new discovery of yours, we've known about it
for nearly 90 years.

  and they will remain that way until the environments of Washington and
 Moscow, being different, change the two so they are different and no longer
 interchangeable. So first person indeterminacy is just the result of the
 unpredictable nature of what goes on in Washington and Moscow.

  Nothing in W and M, relevant in the duplication experience, is
 unpredictable in W and M.


I don't know what that means. You seem to be saying that the activities in
Washington and Moscow are predictable but that can't be right.


  You did not write any prediction (on the 1-pox, as asked) in the diary.
 You wrote the two outcomes,


Two different things happened, you interacted with Washington and you
interacted with Moscow so of course I wrote about 2 outcomes, if I had not
done so you would complain that my prediction was incomplete and you would
have been right.

  I am in Washington and feel like I'm in Washington and only in
 Washington and that is just what I predicted would happen. If that's not a
 1-view what is?


   No. It was two 1-views.


I have no idea what a two 1-views is (are?) but regardless of what it is
apparently a feeling of being in Washington and only in Washington is just
not good enough to be a 1-view. So I repeat my original question, what is?

 I can predict the winning lotery ticket. It is enough to write
 1) ticket 00
 2) ticket 01
 3) ticket 02
 ...
 100) ticket 99.
 Wow. You are quite clairvoyant!



I don't know about clairvoyant but if every one of those lottery tickets
turned out to be correct then my prediction was a good one.

  Try to use the diaries with respect to the question asked


My difficulty is not finding an answer but figuring out what the question
is. No matter what diary entry I come up with you keep saying it would not
disprove your theory because of blah blah point of view blah blah, so I
want you to tell me exactly what diary entry WOULD disprove your theory? If
you can't do that then it's not a theory and it's not a proof, its just
blather.

 You said it yourself. The one in W is only in Washington.


Yes.

 How can he be satisfied with having written 1) and 2) in the diary?


Because there are now 2 John K Clarks and because 1+1= 2 from any point of
view.

  John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-03 Thread John Clark
On 3 July 2012  Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:

 I'm pretty sure John understands the argument but he prefers to give
 primacy to the objective/third-person viewpoint.


On the contrary, the first person subjective viewpoint is the most
important thing in the universe, or at least it is in my opinion.  And
that's why I insist on thinking as clearly as I can about it.

Some people are offended by illusions.


Maybe some people are offended, but not me. As I said before illusions are
a perfectly real subjective phenomena as legitimate as any other.

 John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-03 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 03 Jul 2012, at 18:02, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Jul 3, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 Suppose I send the same identical Email to both you and to Craig  
at the same identical time, you look at your copy and think  when  
John hit the send button on his computer he could not have  
predicted that I would get this copy of the Email and not the one  
Craig got,


 It is the same. Leading to same experience, except one is  
(predictably) lived by me, and the other one 'experience, not mail)  
is lived by Craig.


I'm saying your experience would be EXACTLY the same if you had  
received Craig's Email and he had received yours because they are  
identical and interchangeable. I'm also saying that if you  
duplicated the entire city of Washington and sent one Bruno Marchal  
to Washington1 and the other Bruno Marchal to Washington2 then there  
would only be one Bruno Marchal having a Washington experience.


No problem with that.




 I don't see any indeterminacy here.

It's precisely the same situation with your duplicating thought  
experiment, they don't differentiate until there is a difference  
between them, just as the word suggests; so if there is any  
indeterminacy it is entirely a function of the unpredictable nature  
of large cities and tells us nothing about the nature of personal  
identity.


I can duplicate you in two closed little rooms. In step 6 you are  
duplicated on a chip. The unpredictable nature of the place where the  
reconstitution are done is irrelevant, except to be stable again, but  
this is in the default hypothesis, yes we suppose there is no tsuanami  
or asteroids demolishing W or M in the experience.







  so it's a example of indeterminacy and all sorts of profound  
conclusions can be drawn from that fact. What makes this ridiculous  
is that the 2 Emails are identical and thus completely  
interchangeable. In the same way the man sent to Washington and the  
man sent to Moscow are also identical and thus completely  
interchangeable,


 Before their differentiate, and the question is ask about the  
result of the differentiation.


The result of the differentiation is that you might see the White  
House tomorrow and you might see the Kremlin, and if Everett is right


Better not to introduce physics, for the reasoning proposed does not  
assume any physical theory. It assumes only a physical reality being  
at least capable of supporting a Turing machine, but it does not  
identify it with such a machine.







you WILL see the White House tomorrow and you WILL see the Kremlin.



With some probabilities, depending in great part of what I decide to  
do. But Everett is not relevant at this stage of the reasoning.





I can't be more specific about that, not because of something to do  
with you but because of the indeterminacy inherent in the entire  
physical universe that makes it impossible to make perfect  
predictions. Nature might throw the White House at you next and it  
might throw the Kremlin. And all this is not exactly breaking news,  
its not some new discovery of yours, we've known about it for nearly  
90 years.



?

The question is do you agree with it or not. If you agree then what  
about step 4?





 and they will remain that way until the environments of  
Washington and Moscow, being different, change the two so they are  
different and no longer interchangeable. So first person  
indeterminacy is just the result of the unpredictable nature of  
what goes on in Washington and Moscow.


 Nothing in W and M, relevant in the duplication experience, is  
unpredictable in W and M.


I don't know what that means. You seem to be saying that the  
activities in Washington and Moscow are predictable but that can't  
be right.


Enough to take coffee and write the result of the experience in the  
diary.


You wrote 1) and 2), and the copies agrees that this what trivial  
and non precise, because they know that they each got only 1) or  
only 2), and now they understand that the question was bearing on  
exactly that, so they get the step 3, and move to step 4.





 You did not write any prediction (on the 1-pox, as asked) in the  
diary. You wrote the two outcomes,


Two different things happened,


In the 3-view. Not from the 1-view, as you can know by interviewing  
the resulting people.




you interacted with Washington and you interacted with Moscow so of  
course I wrote about 2 outcomes, if I had not done so you would  
complain that my prediction was incomplete and you would have been  
right.


You did not made a prediction. You made a list of the outcome, without  
much other precision.
After the experience, for the two people, only one outcome has been  
realized. The question was bearing on that outcome. Not on a 3-view on  
the situation.


You don't implicate yourself enough in the thought experience. You  
seem unable to put yourself at the place of one of the copies.







  I am in Washington and feel like 

Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-03 Thread meekerdb

On 7/3/2012 10:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No matter what diary entry I come up with you keep saying it would not disprove your 
theory because of blah blah point of view blah blah, so I want you to tell me exactly 
what diary entry WOULD disprove your theory?


I will feel to be in W.  Confirmed by the guy in W, but disproved by the guy in M. Not 
good enough!


I will feel to be in Vienna. Disproved by both.

I will feel to be in W and M. Disproved by both.

I will feel to be in W and I will feel to be in M. Disproved by both.

I will die. Disproved by both.

I will feel to be in W or I will feel to be in M. Confirmed by both.

I will feel to be in W with a probability 1/2. Confirmed by most in the iteration 
experiences.


The 1-indeterminacy is not a theory, it is a theorem in the theory comp. No program nor 
machine can predict its future in the protocol of self-duplication. It is about a 
triviality, but then it has consequences.





Maybe John would feel more engaged with the question if you changed it to Washington and 
Damascus.  Suppose there were going to be ten duplicate John Clarks.  Would John feel the 
same if nine were in Washington and one in Damascus as compared to the other way around?


Brent

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Jul 2012, at 19:26, John Clark wrote:


On Sun, Jul 1, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 There are incompatible from the 1-pov ONLY if you assume there  
can be only one Bruno Marchal


 1-pov means 1-pov from the 1-pov view.

 That's real nice, but the predictions written down in advance were:

1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in  
Washington and only Washington.
2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in  
Moscow and only Moscow.


Without making silly assumptions like there can be only one Bruno  
Marchal


That is not a silly assumptions. It is a consequence of  
computationalism. After the duplication and differentiation, there is  
only one Bruno Marchal from the points of view of all Bruno Marchal.

This shows that you don't really make the thought experiment.



show me how these predictions were wrong from ANY perspective you  
care to name.


You don't give a prediction. You gave two predictions. You 1) + 2)  
only describe the domain of the 1-indeterminacy.









 There is only one.

Even if there is only one I they third party outside observer  
agree with you, the 1-pov from the 1-pov view about your diary  
entry and it's accuracy.


 Even if I am duplicated into 10^100, all of them will have a  
unique pov.


If there were 10^100 cities then before the experiment you would  
write down 10^100  predictions in your diary and after the  
experiment all 10^100 Brunos would read what they had written in  
their diary and say I was right.

So where is this first person indeterminacy you keep talking about?



If 1) + 2) means 1) AND 2): both will know the prediction was wrong.
If 1) + 2) means 1) OR 2):  both will agree it was correct, but  
that OR was necessarily non constructive, and this confirms the 1- 
indeterminacy. Same with 1) + 2) + ... + 10^100).




  just look and see what was written in the diary before the  
experiment started, it's right there clear as a bell in black and  
white. So where is this spectral first person indeterminacy you  
keep talking about?


 The incompatible experience I feel to be in M and I feel to be  
in W. After the experience we can interview the two copies, and  
they will confirm it.


Yes, they will confirm that they feel exactly as they predicted they  
would feel, and there was nothing incompatible in the prediction.


Only if + is interpreted as an OR, confirming the indeterminacy.




 It helps to understand that from the 1-pov, the experience was not  
predictible.


You, Bruno Marchal,  are now in Washington and you write in your  
diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Washington and only Washington.


Yes. And I know I am not the one in Moscow. From my first person  
perspective, I live a selection, and I have no mean to have predicted  
it.



Then you, Bruno Washington, receive a fax from Bruno Moscow and see  
that he wrote in his diary  I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow and  
only Moscow. Please show me what was in error in the predictions  
from ANY point of view.


Let us write more completely your 1) and 2) predictions:

1) I find myself in Washington, and realize that I could not have  
predicted that particular outcome, and I guess now that the question  
was bearing on that, so I got eventually the 1-indeterminacy point.
2) I find myself in Moscow, and realize that I could not have  
predicted that particular outcome, and I guess now that the question  
was bearing on that, so I got eventually the 1-indeterminacy point.


So they both eventually understand that their first person povs was  
indeterminate on 1) and 2), and that the + was an OR, as it was  
clear at the start for those who take into account the difference  
between 1-pov and 3-pov.
I have really no clues why you keep NOT taking that difference into  
account. In fact you do, as with the 1)+2), but you keep describing  
the 3-view on the 1-views, instead of listening to each reconstituted  
person, for whom the + can only be interpreted as an OR.

I don't think anyone else but you miss that distinction.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-02 Thread John Clark
On Sun, Jul 1, 2012 at 1:17 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 You are, by definition asked to predict which one.


If the person asking the question demands one and only one prediction then
he has made the very silly logical assumption that there can only be one
Bruno Marchal.

 Your two predictions:

 1)I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in
 Washington and only Washington.
 2)I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow
 and only Moscow.

 cannot work for this, because 1) and 2) are simply incompatible


Yes they are incompatible, but only if you make a very silly assumption,
but I have not done so.

 Each bruno marchal will see that only one of the two has been realized,


Yes, from his point of view he will only have proof that half of the
prediction is true and it will remain that way until he receives a fax from
the other Bruno Marchal definitively proving in black and white that the
entire prediction was 100% correct.

 When the W-John Clark and the M-John Clark will look at their diaries and
 see the two predictions,


Yes.

They will understand that only one of the two prediction has been
 verified, from their first person point of view,


No. I've read my diary and I've read the fax from the other John and from
my first person point of view I know that all the predictions made have
been verified, and the other John agrees, and so does any third party.

 If they redo the experience, they know that the prediction bears on the
 future unique first person experience. Which one cannot be predicted in
 advance for obvious logical reason.


In physics we say there is indeterminacy and the meaning of that is clear,
in this universe we can't know the position and momentum of something with
unlimited accuracy, perhaps in another universe you can but not in this
one. I can imagine a experiment that would prove physical indeterminacy is
untrue, that's why it's meaningful, but when you talk about first person
indeterminacy I don't understand what would satisfy you that it is untrue.
It seems to me you are trying to find something profound from the fact that
the Washington man will not see Moscow because if he did then he would not
be the Washington man, he'd be the Moscow man.

Even if it's not possible I can imagine what the desire to have a magic way
to know the exact momentum and position of something would mean, but I
don't know what  overcoming first person indeterminacy would look like in
this universe or any other. I don't know what you think is missing in the
prediction.

 Just after the experience is done, they will each know for sure which one
 among 1) and 2) has been realized,


They can't very well do it before the experience because before then
neither the Washington man nor the Moscow man exists and only the
experience of living in those cities creates them. I don't understand what
exactly the prediction is lacking that illustrates this first person
indeterminacy that you think is so very deep.

 In case you have not yet grasp the question,


And I most certainly have not grasped the question! I don't understand what
more you expect a successful prediction to do. If the evidence in the
diaries is not good enough exactly what would convince you that  first
person indeterminacy has been overcome. I can tell you exactly what would
convince me that physical indeterminacy has been overcome, just the exact
measurement of the momentum and position of something; all I ask is that
without getting all metaphysical  give me a concrete experiment that could
actually be performed that would convince you that first person
indeterminacy has been overcome. If you can't do that it's not science.

 I insist that the question bears only on that future first person
experience.

Like the first person experience of writing and reading a diary, a
experience which fortunately can be shared with a third party outside
observer; I say fortunately because otherwise we'd be talking about
mystical metaphysics not science.

 Not on a third person description of bodies nor on a third person
description of first person experiences, only on the first person
experience.

The only first person experience I know directly is my own, and science is
not good at making grand universal conclusions from only one example.

 Or give me the algorithm which will choose among 1) and 2)

OK, but First give me a algorithm that produces one unique answer to the
question Is 3 greater than 2 OR is 4 greater than 2?. If you can not
produce a single answer then the question is indeterminate, and it's also
silly.

  John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-02 Thread David Nyman
On 2 July 2012 15:06, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 Not on a third person description of bodies nor on a third person
 description of first person experiences, only on the first person
 experience.

 The only first person experience I know directly is my own


For heaven's sake re-read your own statement above and then carefully
re-consider the question you are being asked, and that question only.
 After Bruno has been copied each copy must be in precisely the
first-person position you describe.  It follows, as a precise consequence
of your own statement above, that the first-person position of each is now
indeterminate relative to any prior prediction.  Resist being distracted by
the jointly-describable third-person situation of both copies considered
together.  This joint situation corresponds to *the first-person experience
of neither copy*.  Consequently you are not being asked about that; it is
beside the point.  The point is simply that The only first person
experience I know directly is my own.  Got it now?

David

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 02 Jul 2012, at 16:06, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Jul 1, 2012 at 1:17 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 You are, by definition asked to predict which one.

If the person asking the question demands one and only one  
prediction then he has made the very silly logical assumption that  
there can only be one Bruno Marchal.


Not at all. It uses only the fact that from the point of view of the  
subject he will feel only one unique experience.






 Your two predictions:

1)I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in  
Washington and only Washington.
2)I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in  
Moscow and only Moscow.


cannot work for this, because 1) and 2) are simply incompatible

Yes they are incompatible, but only if you make a very silly  
assumption, but I have not done so.


No? They are justifiably (if not evidently) incompatible from the  
point of view of the subject or subjects. Both will only *live* only  
one of the two possibilities.






 Each bruno marchal will see that only one of the two has been  
realized,


Yes, from his point of view he will only have proof that half of the  
prediction is true and it will remain that way until he receives a  
fax from the other Bruno Marchal definitively proving in black and  
white that the entire prediction was 100% correct.


Yes. The half. The question was bearing on the experience only. Yes,  
he learn later intellectually that the other has been successfully  
reconstituted, but that fact will not change the P=1/2.
Likewise, in the 1/2^n iterated self-duplication, the fact that you  
hear about the John Clark who saw the Monty Python movie, will change  
anything in the way the vast majority of John Clarks will predict the  
next outcomes if repeated.






 When the W-John Clark and the M-John Clark will look at their  
diaries and see the two predictions,


Yes.

They will understand that only one of the two prediction has been  
verified, from their first person point of view,


No. I've read my diary and I've read the fax



OK. By the very definition I gave, the diary relate the first person  
experience, and the fax make available a third person datum only.
Learning that the other is there will not make you suddenly being that  
one. In dependence with your psychology you can treat the other as a  
stranger, or as a brother, but not as you in the first person sense,  
that here-and-now. Unless you bring non Turing emulable telepathy,  
but then we go out of our working hypothesis.





from the other John and from my first person point of view I know  
that all the predictions made have been verified, and the other John  
agrees, and so does any third party.


Because you have restricted your prediction on the third person view  
on the 1-views. But that is just not answering the question asked.






 If they redo the experience, they know that the prediction bears  
on the future unique first person experience. Which one cannot be  
predicted in advance for obvious logical reason.


In physics we say there is indeterminacy and the meaning of that is  
clear,


This meaning is terribly debated since its inception. You contradict  
the whole literature. The collapse of the wave is still in the  
curriculum. Everett is still not really read. And I just put Everett  
logics one (logical) step further.






in this universe we can't know the position and momentum of  
something with unlimited accuracy, perhaps in another universe you  
can but not in this one. I can imagine a experiment that would prove  
physical indeterminacy is untrue, that's why it's meaningful, but  
when you talk about first person indeterminacy I don't understand  
what would satisfy you that it is untrue.


Even a zombie can fake to not understand the difference between the 1- 
view and the 3-view. If you want to see that all this leads to  
verifiable statement, read more cautiously the definition and go to  
step 4, etc.





It seems to me you are trying to find something profound from the  
fact that the Washington man will not see Moscow because if he did  
then he would not be the Washington man, he'd be the Moscow man.


The profound thing is that in Helsinki he does not know which one he  
will feel to be, so he is confronted with an indeterminacy, and he can  
try to quantify it, by using computer science, for example. See the  
other steps for more and more interesting protocols.






Even if it's not possible I can imagine what the desire to have a  
magic way to know the exact momentum and position of something would  
mean, but I don't know what  overcoming first person indeterminacy  
would look like in this universe or any other. I don't know what you  
think is missing in the prediction.


You did not predict the relative first person experience that you can  
live. You described the correct 3-view of the experiences, including  
charitably the 1-views, but still not listening to them.

Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-02 Thread John Clark
On Mon, Jul 2, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote

  silly assumptions like there can be only one Bruno Marchal


  That is not a silly assumptions. It is a consequence of
 computationalism.


So you've proved that if  computationalism is true then there can be only
one Bruno Marchal, but for the proof to work you've got to start with the
assumption that there can be only one Bruno Marchal. Seems like a lot of
wasted effort to me.

 After the duplication and differentiation, there is only one Bruno
 Marchal from the points of view of all Bruno Marchal.


And assuming they are logical all the Bruno Marchals would agree with each
other on that point, and I the third party observer agree too.

 You don't give a prediction. You gave two predictions.


And that's twice as good if both predictions turn out to be true, and they
do.

 If 1) + 2) means 1) AND 2): both will know the prediction was wrong.


How on earth will they know it was wrong when every word that was predicted
to be written in those diaries was in fact written? It's interesting,
you're the one who introduced the idea of the people in the experiment
using diaries so it could be a real scientific experiment, but now you
don't like that idea.

 You, Bruno Marchal,  are now in Washington and you write in your diary
 I Bruno Marchal am now in Washington and only Washington.


  Yes. And I know I am not the one in Moscow.


For God's sake, you know you're not the one in Moscow because you're not
the one in Moscow!  X is not Y because if it were Y would be X; Where is
the cosmic significance in that?

 1) I find myself in Washington, and realize that I could not have
 predicted that particular outcome,


And yet by looking in the diary that you had written you find rock solid
proof that you DID predict that outcome. Maybe you made other predictions
too, one about some fellow in Moscow, and maybe you made a prediction about
the rain probability in Duluth Minnesota too,  but all that's irrelevant,
it doesn't effect you because you're in Washington.


  2) I find myself in Moscow, and realize that I could not have predicted
 that particular outcome,


And yet by looking in the diary that you had written you find rock solid
proof that you DID predict that outcome. Maybe you made other predictions
too, one about some fellow in Washington, and maybe you made a prediction
about the rain probability in Duluth Minnesota too,  but all that's
irrelevant, it doesn't effect you because you're in Moscow.

 you keep describing the 3-view on the 1-views, instead of listening to
 each reconstituted person


I am listening to them, and introducing the diaries into this was your idea
not mine.

  John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-02 Thread John Clark
On Mon, Jul 2, 2012  David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:

  After Bruno has been copied each copy must be in precisely the
 first-person position you describe.


And one nanosecond after the copying when one receives sensory impulses
that originated in Moscow and the other   receives sensory impulses that
originated in Washington neither would be in precisely the first-person
position they were in before.

Got it now?


Nope.

  John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-02 Thread David Nyman
On 2 July 2012 17:50, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

*And one nanosecond after the copying when one receives sensory impulses
that originated in Moscow and the other   receives sensory impulses that
originated in Washington neither would be in precisely the first-person
position they were in before.*

What does that have to do with anything?  Is it credible that after all
this verbiage you have failed to grasp the difference between the
first-person position of each copy and a third-person description of both
copies together?  Congratulations, John - you really have succeeded in
elevating the straw man argument to a level hitherto unsuspected.

David

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 02 Jul 2012, at 18:41, John Clark wrote:


On Mon, Jul 2, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote

  silly assumptions like there can be only one Bruno Marchal

 That is not a silly assumptions. It is a consequence of  
computationalism.


So you've proved that if  computationalism is true then there can  
be only one Bruno Marchal,


I will ask you not to use bruno marchal for that can be confusing.

You only forget that the question bears on the first person point of  
view, which, by the given definition and protocols is obviously  
unique, from their own pov, as your own description 1) and 2)  
already recognizes.




but for the proof to work you've got to start with the assumption  
that there can be only one Bruno Marchal. Seems like a lot of wasted  
effort to me.


 After the duplication and differentiation, there is only one Bruno  
Marchal from the points of view of all Bruno Marchal.


And assuming they are logical all the Bruno Marchals would agree  
with each other on that point, and I the third party observer agree  
too.


So they will all agree having different views, and that the question  
was thus meaningful. They all agree that they could not have predicted  
the particular experience they are living. Such an a prediction  
algorithm is simply nonsensical.





 You don't give a prediction. You gave two predictions.

And that's twice as good if both predictions turn out to be true,  
and they do.


Of course not. The one in M and the one in W have different  
incompatible experience. In one diary we see Well I am in Moscow  
now, and in the other diary well I am in Washington now, and the  
question was bearing on that. Not on where the copies are, but where  
the copies feel to be individually.







 If 1) + 2) means 1) AND 2): both will know the prediction was  
wrong.


How on earth will they know it was wrong when every word that was  
predicted to be written in those diaries was in fact written? It's  
interesting, you're the one who introduced the idea of the people in  
the experiment using diaries so it could be a real scientific  
experiment, but now you don't like that idea.


If you predicted 1)and 2), you are wrong at the start, because the  
question was on the 1-pov, and 1)-and-2) is not a possible 1-pov.
Or it means that you predicted the 3-view on the 1-view. In that case  
your prediction is correct but does not address the question asked.


Now you are only in W (resp. M), and your prediction fails to predict  
that special happening, which is obvious for you can't experience, in  
the usual cognitive sense of experience, both happening at once.







 You, Bruno Marchal,  are now in Washington and you write in your  
diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Washington and only Washington.


 Yes. And I know I am not the one in Moscow.

For God's sake, you know you're not the one in Moscow because you're  
not the one in Moscow!
X is not Y because if it were Y would be X; Where is the cosmic  
significance in that?


The question is asked in Helsinki. Here you seem to be be deliberately  
rhetorically oversimplifying a sentence taken out of the context.






 1) I find myself in Washington, and realize that I could not have  
predicted that particular outcome,


And yet by looking in the diary that you had written you find rock  
solid proof that you DID predict that outcome.


Then I can predict the winning lotery ticket. It is enough to write
1) ticket 00
2) ticket 01
3) ticket 02
...
100) ticket 99.

Wow. You are quite clairvoyant!



Maybe you made other predictions too, one about some fellow in  
Moscow, and maybe you made a prediction about the rain probability  
in Duluth Minnesota too,  but all that's irrelevant, it doesn't  
effect you because you're in Washington.


 2) I find myself in Moscow, and realize that I could not have  
predicted that particular outcome,


And yet by looking in the diary that you had written you find rock  
solid proof that you DID predict that outcome.


Not if I find both 1) and 2), given that here I am living only 2)  
and not 1). So if this means that your prediction is successful, it  
means that you believe you have a mean to predict the winning lottery  
ticket.




Maybe you made other predictions too, one about some fellow in  
Washington, and maybe you made a prediction about the rain  
probability in Duluth Minnesota too,  but all that's irrelevant, it  
doesn't effect you because you're in Moscow.


 you keep describing the 3-view on the 1-views, instead of  
listening to each reconstituted person


I am listening to them, and introducing the diaries into this was  
your idea not mine.


To give two outcomes when you see only one is not what is called  
prediction.


There is one outcome, not because there is only one John Clark, but  
because for all possible John Clarks, there is only one 1-pov, from  
their 1-pov view, and that the question was bearing on which one you  
can predict to be 

Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-02 Thread Craig Weinberg
Stephen,

Right, this is all about wholeness. I suggest that 

1. Wholeness can never be 100% independent of context. 

2. Since consciousness is materially related in any definition of wholeness, I 
reason that...

3. There is not necessarily any possible method of extracting, teleporting, 
simulating, or duplicating conscious entities since...

4. Consciousness may always be the top-most 'cream' of any given system. This 
makes sense to me from a statistical mechanics perspective. Awareness can be 
defined as the perpetually least likely possibility in all universes. It is the 
'floating superlative'; like the highest mountain peak in any geographic frame, 
consciousness is the 'peakness' itself - defining the form of the mountain by 
doing nothing more than just not being underneath any other part of itself.

You correctly understood what I was getting at. Brent correctly picked out a 
flaw in my use of teleportation rather than duplication but didn't care that 
it's really irrelevant.

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-02 Thread John Clark
On Mon, Jul 2, 2012  PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 The profound thing is that in Helsinki he does not know which one he will
 feel to be, so he is confronted with an indeterminacy


Suppose I send the same identical Email to both you and to Craig at the
same identical time, you look at your copy and think  when John hit the
send button on his computer he could not have predicted that I would get
this copy of the Email and not the one Craig got, so it's a example of
indeterminacy and all sorts of profound conclusions can be drawn from that
fact. What makes this ridiculous is that the 2 Emails are identical and
thus completely interchangeable. In the same way the man sent to Washington
and the man sent to Moscow are also identical and thus completely
interchangeable, and they will remain that way until the environments of
Washington and Moscow, being different, change the two so they are
different and no longer interchangeable. So first person indeterminacy is
just the result of the unpredictable nature of what goes on in Washington
and Moscow.

 Learning that the other is there will not make you suddenly being that
 one.


Why would I need to suddenly become that other fellow for a logical man to
conclude that the predictions written in that diary was 100% correct??

  you have restricted your prediction on the third person view on the
 1-views.


I am in Washington and feel like I'm in Washington and only in Washington
and that is just what I predicted would happen. If that's not a 1-view
what is?

 But that is just not answering the question asked.


The answer is 42 but I can't figure out what the question is or why what
was written in that diary is not a successful prediction.

 In physics we say there is indeterminacy and the meaning of that is clear


  This meaning is terribly debated since its inception.


That is entirely incorrect. The meaning of physical indeterminacy has
always been crystal clear, it's the truth or falsehood of it that has been
debated; but when you say first person indeterminacy I don't even know
what you're talking about.

  John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 30 Jun 2012, at 19:28, John Clark wrote:



On Sat, Jun 30, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 As I said before if you really had complete information then you  
could make 2 predictions:
1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in  
Washington and only Washington.
2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in  
Moscow and only Moscow.


Afterwards both diaries can be shown to anyone who is interested  
proving that there was no indeterminacy and the prediction is  
confirmed to be completely correct.


 But from the 1-pov, we know in advance that those two prediction  
are incompatible.


There are incompatible from the 1-pov ONLY if you assume there can  
be only one Bruno Marchal


1-pov means 1-pov from the 1-pov view. There is only one. Even if  
I am duplicated into 10^100, all of them will have a unique pov. The  
probability question bears on those unique pov (from their unique pov  
view).





and there is no logical reason for making that assumption, therefore  
I at this 1-pov will not do so.


 Things become paradoxical only if you make the assumption that  
there can only be one Bruno Marchal, therefore the assumption must  
be untrue.


  you confuse 1 pov and 3 pov,

You keep repeating that over and over like a mantra, but there is a  
possibility  it is you that is confused.


 Things become paradoxical only if you make the assumption that  
there can only be one Bruno Marchal, therefore the assumption must  
be untrue.


 all those Bruno Marchal, whoever they are will still each feel to  
be only one of them.


Yes, and there is rock solid proof that is exactly precisely what  
was predicted to happen,


Correct, but the question is on the content of the 1-pov. And the  
theory predict that those content will be exlcuive and non compatible,  
as you write correctly above.




if you doubt this just look and see what was written in the diary  
before the experiment started, it's right there clear as a bell in  
black and white. So where is this spectral first person  
indeterminacy you keep talking about?


The incompatible experience I feel to be in M and I feel to be in  
W. After the experience we can interview the two copies, and they  
will confirm it.






 we agree that there are both bruno marchal

Exactly.

 and so the prediction was wrong.

WHAT??  He could have also written in his diary the Bruno Marchal  
who calls himself I and sees Washington will not be the Bruno  
Marchal who calls himself I who does NOT see Washington. He could  
have added that to his official prediction, but I think writing  
something so thunderously obvious would be a waste of ink.


No. It helps to understand that from the 1-pov, the experience was not  
predictible. Your move consists in looking all the time from the 3-pov  
on the 1-pov, but the question bears on the 1-pov from the 1-pov.
It is simoilar as what happens when you look at up+down in an {up,  
down} analyser. QM predicts you will be in the superposition state,  
but comp explain you will feel only one branch.


Bruno




  John K Clark



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 30 Jun 2012, at 21:57, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/30/2012 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 29 Jun 2012, at 21:20, John Clark wrote:


On Fri, Jun 29, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 You said yourself that the first person cannot be defined. How  
could we verify that prediction? Except by feeling to be one of  
the W and M reconstituted person. And from their points of viex,  
the prediction of being in both place is simply refuted.


Refuted?? As I said before if you really had complete information  
then you could make 2 predictions:


1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now  
in Washington and only Washington.


2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now  
in Moscow and only Moscow.


Afterwards both diaries can be shown to anyone who is interested  
proving that there was no indeterminacy and the prediction is  
confirmed to be completely correct.


But from the 1-pov, we know in advance that those two prediction  
are incompatible. So you can make one more which is 1) OR 2).


I think it's 1) AND 2).


We asked on what will be the future 1-pov. As 1-pov, 1) and 2) are  
incompatible, unless you suppose some telepathy between the two copies  
(but with comp this would mean the level was not right, or that comp  
is inconsistent).
John gave two predictions, which is not a prediction. To predict that  
the market will crash + to predict that the market will not crash is  
not a prediction. If I ask what is the chance that it will rain, I  
will not be happy with an answer like it 1) it will rain + 2) it will  
not rain. Still less with it will rain and it will not rain.











Things become paradoxical only if you make the assumption that  
there can only be one Bruno Marchal, therefore the assumption must  
be untrue.


Things become contradictory when you confuse 1 pov and 3 pov,  
leading to 1) and 2) which is non sense.
The assumption is not that there is only one Bruno Marchal, but  
that all those Bruno Marchal, whoever they are will still each feel  
to be only one of them. Oh I am the one in Moscow, and not the one  
in Washington, and I was unable to predict that fact, unless using  
a or.


Suppose you predict I will be in Washinton.  Then the Bruno in  
Washington will be right and the Bruno is Moscow will say, Oh, I  
was wrong.


Exactly, and with comp we have to listen to both. If not, in the MWI,  
I can predict that the up+down electron, that I will measure in the  
{up, down} base, is always up.


Bruno





 You have a machine with some button, and you are asked to make a  
prediction on the immediate personal outcome of a simple experiment.


Right, and the prediction is easy to make and it is perfect.


1) or 2). But that leads to the indeterminacy.




  you sill confuse 1 and 3 views.

You keep repeating that over and over like a mantra, but there is  
a possibility  it is you that is confused.


It is up to you to show this, but, here again, you deny that after  
the duplication, whoever you will be, will recognize that he was  
not able top have predicted with certainty the particular outcome.  
This can only be I will be in such city, and this will be refuted  
by the one in the other city. With comp, we agree that there are  
both bruno marchal, and so the prediction was wrong. It was a  
selection in disguise.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 30 Jun 2012, at 23:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:

It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot  
necessarily be different from a any sufficiently complex functional  
interaction. Something like a war, for instance involves lots of  
dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc.


My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the  
Moon?


Yes. In principle. Assuming comp. Just find the right state of all  
americans at the beginning of the war, and a pretty precise  
description of America, and implement all this on a very powerful  
computer on the moon.


There is provably (assuming comp) infinitely many implementation of  
the American civil war in arithmetic. And that is very easy to prove.  
Again the hard part is to get the relative measure right.
Of course in arithmetic, UDA shows that the measure exists, or has to  
exist, because if it does not exist, then comp has to be wrong. I  
don't pretend that this is obvious.





Can you move Gettysburg to Moscow?


If comp is correct, you can emulate Gettysburg where you want.





Do you see what I am getting at? Human identity is not made of only  
matter.


Well, if human identity is made of matter (what would that mean?),  
then comp is wrong (whatever ùade of matter means).



It is made partly of unique interactions of unique events. Even  
without first person fragmentation (which brain conjoined twins  
suggest is not a problem - I can be spread out beyond an  
individual body), there is nothing to suggest that the event  
specific entanglement-momentum of any system can be reproduced  
independently of context. If you duplicate Bruno's body, you get a  
newborn baby in an adult body.


This will depend on the level of duplication.



If you duplicate Gettysburg you get a bunch of confused amnesiac  
babies in uniforms. Each neuron has to discover its own connections  
for the first time, recapitulating the experience of the individuals  
or historic events as a whole as they struggle to cohere like a mass  
of fibrillating cardiac cells unable to synch.


In your materialist non-comp theory, that is conceivable. But is such  
primitive matter conceivable? I have no clue what that could mean. But  
I know it means nothing if comp is assumed to be correct.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-01 Thread John Clark
On Sat, Jun 30, 2012 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 Suppose you predict I will be in Washinton.


But if he was smart and knowledgeable of the situation (and the thought
experiment would be useless if he was not) that would NOT be his
prediction, instead he would make 2 predictions:

1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in
Washington and only Washington.
2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow
and only Moscow.

 Then the Bruno in Washington will be right and the Bruno is Moscow will
 say, Oh, I was wrong.


No, after the copying Bruno Washington and Bruno Moscow will both look at
their identical diary entries and both will conclude I was right. And
you, the third party outside observer, will look at the behavior of both
Bruno Washington and Bruno Moscow and you will agree with the first person
perspective of both of them that the accuracy of their predictions was
indeed perfect. There will be no indeterminacy and no confusion between
1-pov and 3-pov and everybody will agree on what has occurred, unless
of course somebody makes the illogical assumption that there can be only
one Bruno Marchal

 John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Jul 2012, at 18:15, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Jun 30, 2012 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:


 Suppose you predict I will be in Washinton.

But if he was smart and knowledgeable of the situation (and the  
thought experiment would be useless if he was not) that would NOT be  
his prediction, instead he would make 2 predictions:


1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in  
Washington and only Washington.
2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in  
Moscow and only Moscow.


 Then the Bruno in Washington will be right and the Bruno is Moscow  
will say, Oh, I was wrong.


No, after the copying Bruno Washington and Bruno Moscow will both  
look at their identical diary entries and both will conclude I was  
right. And you, the third party outside observer, will look at the  
behavior of both Bruno Washington and Bruno Moscow and you will  
agree with the first person perspective of both of them that the  
accuracy of their predictions was indeed perfect. There will be no  
indeterminacy and no confusion between 1-pov and 3-pov and  
everybody will agree on what has occurred, unless of course somebody  
makes the illogical assumption that there can be only one Bruno  
Marchal



But for all persons, not just the John Clarks and Bruno Marchals, I  
mean, for all persons, they feel only to be one among all those persons.


You just don't do the thought experiment. You keep your view fixed in  
the third person view. But comp can predict the future first person  
view easily, and comp predicts that you, from your first person point  
of view, will live a unique first person experience, among


I was in Sidney and now I am in Washington

and

I was in Sidney and now I am in Moscow.

You are, by definition asked to predict which one.

Your two predictions:


1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in  
Washington and only Washington.
2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in  
Moscow and only Moscow.



cannot work for this, because 1) and 2) are simply incompatible  
from all the resulting possible future first person points of view of  
both bruno marchal (your terming). Each bruno marchal will see  
that only one of the two has been realized, and which one was the  
object of the question.


When the W-John Clark and the M-John Clark will look at their diaries  
and see the two predictions, They will  understand that only one of  
the two prediction has been verified, from their first person point of  
view, and both knows which one, now. If they redo the experience, they  
know that the prediction bears on the future unique first person  
experience. Which one cannot be predicted in advance for obvious  
logical reason.


Just after the experience is done, they will each know for sure which  
one among 1) and 2) has been realized, for each of them, and they will  
know the existence of their doppelganger only intellectually a bit  
later.


In case you have not yet grasp the question, I insist that the  
question bears only on that future first person experience. Not on a  
third person description of bodies nor on a third person description  
of first person experiences, only on the first person experience. Comp  
makes this indeterminate in case of (self) multiplication.


Or give me the algorithm which will choose among 1) and 2), given that  
comp predicts that all first person experience will indeed experience  
such a selection.


And the iterated self-duplication protocols leads to white noise for  
almost all 2^n (n big) resulting first person points of view,  
justifying, in such protocol the P = 1/2.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-01 Thread John Clark
On Sun, Jul 1, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 There are incompatible from the 1-pov ONLY if you assume there can be
 only one Bruno Marchal


  1-pov means 1-pov from the 1-pov view.


 That's real nice, but the predictions written down in advance were:

1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in
Washington and only Washington.
2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow
and only Moscow.

Without making silly assumptions like there can be only one Bruno Marchal
show me how these predictions were wrong from ANY perspective you care to
name.

 There is only one.


Even if there is only one I they third party outside observer agree with
you, the 1-pov from the 1-pov view about your diary entry and it's
accuracy.

 Even if I am duplicated into 10^100, all of them will have a unique pov.


If there were 10^100 cities then before the experiment you would write down
10^100  predictions in your diary and after the experiment all 10^100
Brunos would read what they had written in their diary and say I was
right. So where is this first person indeterminacy you keep talking
about?

   just look and see what was written in the diary before the experiment
 started, it's right there clear as a bell in black and white. So where is
 this spectral first person indeterminacy you keep talking about?

  The incompatible experience I feel to be in M and I feel to be in W.
 After the experience we can interview the two copies, and they will confirm
 it.


Yes, they will confirm that they feel exactly as they predicted they would
feel, and there was nothing incompatible in the prediction.


  It helps to understand that from the 1-pov, the experience was not
 predictible.


You, Bruno Marchal,  are now in Washington and you write in your diary I
Bruno Marchal am now in Washington and only Washington. Then you, Bruno
Washington, receive a fax from Bruno Moscow and see that he wrote in his
diary  I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow and only Moscow. Please show me
what was in error in the predictions from ANY point of view.

  John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-01 Thread meekerdb

On 7/1/2012 9:15 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Jun 30, 2012 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


 Suppose you predict I will be in Washinton.


But if he was smart and knowledgeable of the situation (and the thought experiment would 
be useless if he was not) that would NOT be his prediction, instead he would make 2 
predictions:


1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Washington and only 
Washington.
2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow and only 
Moscow.


 Then the Bruno in Washington will be right and the Bruno is Moscow will say, 
Oh,
I was wrong.


No, after the copying Bruno Washington and Bruno Moscow will both look at their 
identical diary entries and both will conclude I was right. And you, the third party 
outside observer, will look at the behavior of both Bruno Washington and Bruno Moscow 
and you will agree with the first person perspective of both of them that the accuracy 
of their predictions was indeed perfect. There will be no indeterminacy and no confusion 
between 1-pov and 3-pov and everybody will agree on what has occurred, unless of 
course somebody makes the illogical assumption that there can be only one Bruno Marchal


You mistake my point, which was that one being right and one being wrong doesn't imply 
there is something probabilistic happening.  It's certain that one is right and one is wrong.


Brent

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-01 Thread meekerdb

On 7/1/2012 10:26 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Jul 1, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 There are incompatible from the 1-pov ONLY if you assume there can 
be only
one Bruno Marchal


 1-pov means 1-pov from the 1-pov view.


 That's real nice, but the predictions written down in advance were:

1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Washington and only 
Washington.
2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow and only 
Moscow.


Without making silly assumptions like there can be only one Bruno Marchal show me how 
these predictions were wrong from ANY perspective you care to name.


The difficulty seems to be that we tend to think of ourselves as unique and so this 
produces contradictions with the idea we can be duplicated.  Suppose we take a coin and on 
the heads side we right This side will come up.  Then we flip the coin and half the time 
the writing is correct and half the time it's wrong.  Now a man comes along and says let 
me explain this.  He duplicates the coin; and now when you flip one of the coins he 
catches it and puts it down one way and the other one beside it the opposite way (but you 
can't tell which is which).  And he says, see this is what is really happening and why the 
probability is 1/2 - from the viewpoint of the original coin.


It might be objected that brains are different because they have a first-person 
viewpoint.  But why do they have it?  Suppose that before the duplication of the man in 
Helsinki, his brains is provided with a transceiver that can broadcast and receive signals 
from his brain.  Now when he is duplicated this brain in Washington is still connected to 
his brain in Moscow, and he is in two places at once in terms of his perceptions.  Does he 
still have unity of consciousness?  I think that he would if the connections were 
sufficiently comprehensive.  He might have one focus of conscious attention that could 
shift between what he perceived in Moscow and what he perceived in Washington.  Could he 
have two?  Can you notice what your toes are feeling at the same time you notice what your 
fingers are feeling?  I can't.  So the 'unity of consciousness' seems to an inability to 
process multiple sources of input at the same time and fit them into your inner 
narrative.  Your inner narrative assumes a single 'you'.  In the connected brain example 
it might be possible to learn a bi-local point of view.  Certainly in terms of artificial 
intelligence there would be no need to assume a single localized 'self'.  Already military 
defensive systems integrate many sensors from many locations.


Brent

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-07-01 Thread Stathis Papaioannou




On 02/07/2012, at 2:15 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 No, after the copying Bruno Washington and Bruno Moscow will both look at 
 their identical diary entries and both will conclude I was right. And you, 
 the third party outside observer, will look at the behavior of both Bruno 
 Washington and Bruno Moscow and you will agree with the first person 
 perspective of both of them that the accuracy of their predictions was indeed 
 perfect. There will be no indeterminacy and no confusion between 1-pov and 
 3-pov and everybody will agree on what has occurred, unless of course 
 somebody makes the illogical assumption that there can be only one Bruno 
 Marchal.

It may be illogical but it's the way we think. The 3-pov is the way things 
actually are, from a god's eye perspective, and the 1-pov is the way things 
seem to an observer embedded in the experiment. That the observer knows the 
objective truth does not change the way he feels about it.

-- Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-30 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 29 Jun 2012, at 21:20, John Clark wrote:


On Fri, Jun 29, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 You said yourself that the first person cannot be defined. How  
could we verify that prediction? Except by feeling to be one of the  
W and M reconstituted person. And from their points of viex, the  
prediction of being in both place is simply refuted.


Refuted?? As I said before if you really had complete information  
then you could make 2 predictions:


1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in  
Washington and only Washington.


2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in  
Moscow and only Moscow.


Afterwards both diaries can be shown to anyone who is interested  
proving that there was no indeterminacy and the prediction is  
confirmed to be completely correct.


But from the 1-pov, we know in advance that those two prediction are  
incompatible. So you can make one more which is 1) OR 2).




Things become paradoxical only if you make the assumption that there  
can only be one Bruno Marchal, therefore the assumption must be  
untrue.


Things become contradictory when you confuse 1 pov and 3 pov, leading  
to 1) and 2) which is non sense.
The assumption is not that there is only one Bruno Marchal, but that  
all those Bruno Marchal, whoever they are will still each feel to be  
only one of them. Oh I am the one in Moscow, and not the one in  
Washington, and I was unable to predict that fact, unless using a or.







 You have a machine with some button, and you are asked to make a  
prediction on the immediate personal outcome of a simple experiment.


Right, and the prediction is easy to make and it is perfect.


1) or 2). But that leads to the indeterminacy.




  you sill confuse 1 and 3 views.

You keep repeating that over and over like a mantra, but there is a  
possibility  it is you that is confused.


It is up to you to show this, but, here again, you deny that after the  
duplication, whoever you will be, will recognize that he was not able  
top have predicted with certainty the particular outcome. This can  
only be I will be in such city, and this will be refuted by the one  
in the other city. With comp, we agree that there are both bruno  
marchal, and so the prediction was wrong. It was a selection in  
disguise.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-30 Thread John Clark
On Sat, Jun 30, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 As I said before if you really had complete information then you could
 make 2 predictions:
 1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in
 Washington and only Washington.
 2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in
 Moscow and only Moscow.

 Afterwards both diaries can be shown to anyone who is interested proving
 that there was no indeterminacy and the prediction is confirmed to be
 completely correct.


  But from the 1-pov, we know in advance that those two prediction are
 incompatible.


There are incompatible from the 1-pov ONLY if you assume there can be
only one Bruno Marchal and there is no logical reason for making that
assumption, therefore I at this 1-pov will not do so.

 Things become paradoxical only if you make the assumption that there can
 only be one Bruno Marchal, therefore the assumption must be untrue.


   you confuse 1 pov and 3 pov,


You keep repeating that over and over like a mantra, but there is a
possibility  it is you that is confused.

 Things become paradoxical only if you make the assumption that there can
 only be one Bruno Marchal, therefore the assumption must be untrue.


  all those Bruno Marchal, whoever they are will still each feel to be
 only one of them.


Yes, and there is rock solid proof that is exactly precisely what was
predicted to happen, if you doubt this just look and see what was written
in the diary before the experiment started, it's right there clear as a
bell in black and white. So where is this spectral first person
indeterminacy you keep talking about?

 we agree that there are both bruno marchal


Exactly.

 and so the prediction was wrong.


WHAT??  He could have also written in his diary the Bruno Marchal who
calls himself I and sees Washington will not be the Bruno Marchal who
calls himself I who does NOT see Washington. He could have added that to
his official prediction, but I think writing something so thunderously
obvious would be a waste of ink.

  John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-30 Thread meekerdb

On 6/30/2012 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 29 Jun 2012, at 21:20, John Clark wrote:


On Fri, Jun 29, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 You said yourself that the first person cannot be defined. How could we 
verify
that prediction? Except by feeling to be one of the W and M reconstituted 
person.
And from their points of viex, the prediction of being in both place is 
simply refuted.


Refuted?? As I said before if you really had complete information then you could make 2 
predictions:


1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Washington and 
only Washington.


2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow and only 
Moscow.


Afterwards both diaries can be shown to anyone who is interested proving that there was 
no indeterminacy and the prediction is confirmed to be completely correct.


But from the 1-pov, we know in advance that those two prediction are incompatible. So 
you can make one more which is 1) OR 2).


I think it's 1) AND 2).





Things become paradoxical only if you make the assumption that there can only be one 
Bruno Marchal, therefore the assumption must be untrue.


Things become contradictory when you confuse 1 pov and 3 pov, leading to 1) and 2) 
which is non sense.
The assumption is not that there is only one Bruno Marchal, but that all those Bruno 
Marchal, whoever they are will still each feel to be only one of them. Oh I am the one 
in Moscow, and not the one in Washington, and I was unable to predict that fact, unless 
using a or.


Suppose you predict I will be in Washinton.  Then the Bruno in Washington will be right 
and the Bruno is Moscow will say, Oh, I was wrong.


Brent









 You have a machine with some button, and you are asked to make a 
prediction on
the immediate personal outcome of a simple experiment.


Right, and the prediction is easy to make and it is perfect.


1) or 2). But that leads to the indeterminacy.




 you sill confuse 1 and 3 views.


You keep repeating that over and over like a mantra, but there is a possibility  it is 
you that is confused.


It is up to you to show this, but, here again, you deny that after the duplication, 
whoever you will be, will recognize that he was not able top have predicted with 
certainty the particular outcome. This can only be I will be in such city, and this 
will be refuted by the one in the other city. With comp, we agree that there are both 
bruno marchal, and so the prediction was wrong. It was a selection in disguise.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-30 Thread Craig Weinberg
It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be 
different from a any sufficiently complex functional interaction. Something 
like a war, for instance involves lots of dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc.

My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the Moon? Can 
you move Gettysburg to Moscow?

Do you see what I am getting at? Human identity is not made of only matter. It 
is made partly of unique interactions of unique events. Even without first 
person fragmentation (which brain conjoined twins suggest is not a problem - 
I can be spread out beyond an individual body), there is nothing to suggest 
that the event specific entanglement-momentum of any system can be reproduced 
independently of context. If you duplicate Bruno's body, you get a newborn baby 
in an adult body. If you duplicate Gettysburg you get a bunch of confused 
amnesiac babies in uniforms. Each neuron has to discover its own connections 
for the first time, recapitulating the experience of the individuals or 
historic events as a whole as they struggle to cohere like a mass of 
fibrillating cardiac cells unable to synch.

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-30 Thread meekerdb

On 6/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be 
different from a any sufficiently complex functional interaction. Something 
like a war, for instance involves lots of dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc.

My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the Moon? Can 
you move Gettysburg to Moscow?


We could send Craig there.

Brent

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-30 Thread Stephen P. King

On 6/30/2012 7:35 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot 
necessarily be different from a any sufficiently complex functional 
interaction. Something like a war, for instance involves lots of 
dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc.


My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the 
Moon? Can you move Gettysburg to Moscow?


We could send Craig there.

Brent


Hi Brent,

The copy and paste idea of teleportation tacitly requires an entire 
entity and not a system that is just the interactions of many entities. 
We can copy wholes, not parts, and preserve invariant their identities.


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Stephen

Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
~ Francis Bacon


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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-30 Thread meekerdb

On 6/30/2012 5:38 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 6/30/2012 7:35 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot necessarily be 
different from a any sufficiently complex functional interaction. Something like a 
war, for instance involves lots of dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc.


My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the Moon? Can you move 
Gettysburg to Moscow?


We could send Craig there.

Brent


Hi Brent,

The copy and paste idea of teleportation tacitly requires an entire entity and not a 
system that is just the interactions of many entities. We can copy wholes, not parts, 
and preserve invariant their identities.




Craig wasn't even talking about duplication; so we can 'teleport' him there by commercial 
airliner.


Brent

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-30 Thread Stephen P. King

On 6/30/2012 9:56 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/30/2012 5:38 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 6/30/2012 7:35 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/30/2012 2:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
It seems to me that with functionalism a human identity cannot 
necessarily be different from a any sufficiently complex functional 
interaction. Something like a war, for instance involves lots of 
dynamic i/o, 'processing', etc.


My question then is: Can you teleport the American Civil War to the 
Moon? Can you move Gettysburg to Moscow?


We could send Craig there.

Brent


Hi Brent,

The copy and paste idea of teleportation tacitly requires an 
entire entity and not a system that is just the interactions of many 
entities. We can copy wholes, not parts, and preserve invariant their 
identities.




Craig wasn't even talking about duplication; so we can 'teleport' him 
there by commercial airliner.


Brent
-


Brent,

You are not even trying to understand what Craig is talking/writing 
about. Please don't pretend otherwise.


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Stephen

Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
~ Francis Bacon

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-29 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 28 Jun 2012, at 18:16, John Clark wrote:


On Wed, Jun 27, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 comp allows self-duplication. That is the key point.

OK.

 If you really had complete information then you could make 2  
predictions: 1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno  
Marchal am now in Washington and only Washington .2) I Bruno  
Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow and  
only Moscow.


 That's better. But still ignore the first/third person distinction.

I don't know what you're talking about. John K Clark, a third party  
outside observer who also has complete information about the  
proceedings, makes the exact same predictions that Bruno Marchal,  
the first person, does about what he will write in his diary. And  
events will prove that both are correct.


 Both predictions will turn out to be 100% correct;

 Not from the first person point of view,

I don't know what you're talking about. The first person or second  
person or third person or the 99'th person can all be shown the  
entries from both diaries proving that the predictions made by Bruno  
Marchal and John K Clark were indeed 100% correct about what Bruno  
Marchal will write.


You said yourself that the first person cannot be defined. How could  
we verify that prediction? Except by feeling to be one of the W and M  
reconstituted person. And from their points of viex, the prediction of  
being in both place is simply refuted.





 the question was bearing on I, not BrunoMarchal, which refers to  
a third person description. [...] You don't need to define it [I] to  
get the point that the proba on the localisation on the future sense  
of self is 1/2.


So you can't define I or even give a example of I that remains  
true for more than a second,


Actually I can define enough good approximation of it, and have done  
that in two ways (with the personal diary/memory  content in UDA, and  
with Theaetetus' trick in AUDA).





and you believe as I do that you are free to add subtract multiply  
and divide I by any arbitrary integer; and yet you still think  
assigning a probability to such a vague constantly shifting  
uncountable specter means something so concrete you can give it a  
probability that means something. I don't.


But if you use comp you can predict that about all 2^n resulting  
persons in an iterated self-duplication will agree with me.






You say the probability of something to do with the non-defined  
ephemeral thing called I is 1/2,


There is nothing less ephemeral than I. You ignore an important data  
in the discussion: our continuous experience of identity. The  
duplication experience does not change it, and that is a simple  
consequence of comp. Like in Everett, the observer does not feel the  
split.




but to me the meaning would be just as great (or as little) if you  
had assigned a negative probability to it of -1/2, or a imaginary  
probability of 1/2i; I have no idea what to do with any of these  
probability figures including yours of 1/2, I don't see how I could  
make use of any of them in any way.


Just look at the step 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and then AUDA, and you can  
understand that the indeterminacy is absolutely fundamental. It  
explains the existence of the realm where the physical laws comes from.






 You ignore again the 1-3 distinction that I made precise.

I don't know what you're talking about. You admit you can't define  
I and so although both the Washington and Moscow man use the word  
I without hesitation when referring to themselves you can't know  
if one or both or neither really deserves to have that title,


They deserve that title because we have already agree that I survive  
in a successful teleportation. I just cannot be sure where I will feel  
if there is a duplication.




and yet you still assign a probability of 1/2 to something that is  
supposed to have something to do with I, although it's unclear  
exactly what.


If you are willing to believe that the two copies have survived, we  
don't need a definition of I, other than what we attribute to others  
when we say he is conscious. In fact I is conceptually hard to  
define, but very easy to grasp. It has this in common with  
consciousness.





That sure does not sound very precise to me!


You invoke an unecessary, for the reasoning, notion of I. The point  
is simply that you cannot predict in advance where you will feel to be  
after the duplication experience. The duplication thought experience  
has been invented for bypassing the personal identity problem. You  
have a machine with some button, and you are asked to make a  
prediction on the immediate personal outcome of a simple experiment.  
In step seven, you are just throwing a pen, and ask to predict what  
you will be be observing, in case a UD is run in the universe. I have  
no clue of what you don't understand, except that you sill confuse 1  
and 3 views.


Bruno


Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-29 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 2:18 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 I explains why people think, I could have done otherwise.


Regardless of what they think the irrefutable fact remains that they did
NOT do otherwise, and they did not do otherwise for a reason or they did
not.

 They could, due to random events in their brain/environment, but causal
 efficacy of those random events (e.g. choosing Everest vs Matterhorn) is
 narrowly constrained by who they are.


That's basically what I said, you are what you are for a reason, your
genes; in this particular case the risk taking gene. So wanting to climb a
mountain was deterministic, but picking one mountain over another was
random.  The free will noise does not enter the picture.

  So even though their choice is 'random' it still may satisfy the
 social/legal concept of their responsibility.


I think people are ALWAYS responsible for their actions unless they can
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the the circumstances of the crime were so
unusual that he's very unlikely to repeat it or serve as a deterrent for
others. As for the law, it says some people are responsible and some are
not with no rhyme or reason for putting some people in one group and some
in another, after going through a astronomically complex process the end
result is that the law chooses at random who to punish.

  John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-29 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Jun 29, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 You said yourself that the first person cannot be defined. How could we
 verify that prediction? Except by feeling to be one of the W and M
 reconstituted person. And from their points of viex, the prediction of
 being in both place is simply refuted.


Refuted?? As I said before if you really had complete information then you
could make 2 predictions:

1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in
Washington and only Washington.

2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow
and only Moscow.

Afterwards both diaries can be shown to anyone who is interested proving
that there was no indeterminacy and the prediction is confirmed to be
completely correct. Things become paradoxical only if you make the
assumption that there can only be one Bruno Marchal, therefore the
assumption must be untrue.

 You have a machine with some button, and you are asked to make a
 prediction on the immediate personal outcome of a simple experiment.


Right, and the prediction is easy to make and it is perfect.

  you sill confuse 1 and 3 views.


You keep repeating that over and over like a mantra, but there is a
possibility  it is you that is confused.

  John K Clark










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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-28 Thread John Clark
On Wed, Jun 27, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 comp allows self-duplication. That is the key point.


OK.

 If you really had complete information then you could make 2
 predictions: 1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am
 now in Washington and only Washington .2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my
 diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow and only Moscow.


  That's better. But still ignore the first/third person distinction.


I don't know what you're talking about. John K Clark, a third party outside
observer who also has complete information about the proceedings, makes the
exact same predictions that Bruno Marchal, the first person, does about
what he will write in his diary. And events will prove that both are
correct.

 Both predictions will turn out to be 100% correct;


  Not from the first person point of view,


I don't know what you're talking about. The first person or second person
or third person or the 99'th person can all be shown the entries from both
diaries proving that the predictions made by Bruno Marchal and John K Clark
were indeed 100% correct about what Bruno Marchal will write.

 the question was bearing on I, not BrunoMarchal, which refers to a
 third person description. [...] You don't need to define it [I] to get the
 point that the proba on the localisation on the future sense of self is 1/2.


So you can't define I or even give a example of I that remains true for
more than a second, and you believe as I do that you are free to add
subtract multiply and divide I by any arbitrary integer; and yet you
still think assigning a probability to such a vague constantly shifting
uncountable specter means something so concrete you can give it a
probability that means something. I don't.

You say the probability of something to do with the non-defined ephemeral
thing called I is 1/2, but to me the meaning would be just as great (or
as little) if you had assigned a negative probability to it of -1/2, or a
imaginary probability of 1/2i; I have no idea what to do with any of these
probability figures including yours of 1/2, I don't see how I could make
use of any of them in any way.

 You ignore again the 1-3 distinction that I made precise.


I don't know what you're talking about. You admit you can't define I and
so although both the Washington and Moscow man use the word I without
hesitation when referring to themselves you can't know if one or both or
neither really deserves to have that title, and yet you still assign a
probability of 1/2 to something that is supposed to have something to do
with I, although it's unclear exactly what. That sure does not sound very
precise to me!

John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-28 Thread John Clark
On Wed, Jun 27, 2012  meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 I think the claim that, It's either determined or random. is
 misleading. Thoughts and actions may be determined in the sense of
 constrained to a fairly narrow probability distribution, and yet random.


it is a deterministic certainty that a coin flip will never turn into an
ostrich and will always produce a heads or a tails, but if it came up tails
it did so for a reason or it did not do so for a reason. And you may have
inherited the risk taking gene so it is determined that you like to take
dangerous adventurous vacations; there is a reason you have that
personality trait, but you may have picked climbing Mt. Everest rather than
the Matterhorn for no reason at all, it was random. But what does the free
will noise have to do with any of this?

  John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-28 Thread meekerdb

On 6/28/2012 9:31 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Jun 27, 2012  meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 I think the claim that, It's either determined or random. is misleading.
Thoughts and actions may be determined in the sense of constrained to a 
fairly
narrow probability distribution, and yet random.


it is a deterministic certainty that a coin flip will never turn into an ostrich and 
will always produce a heads or a tails, but if it came up tails it did so for a reason 
or it did not do so for a reason. And you may have inherited the risk taking gene so it 
is determined that you like to take dangerous adventurous vacations; there is a reason 
you have that personality trait, but you may have picked climbing Mt. Everest rather 
than the Matterhorn for no reason at all, it was random. But what does the free will 
noise have to do with any of this?


I explains why people think, I could have done otherwise.  They could, due to random 
events in their brain/environment, but causal efficacy of those random events (e.g. 
choosing Everest vs Matterhorn) is narrowly constrained by who they are.  So even though 
their choice is 'random' it still may satisfy the social/legal concept of their 
responsibility.


Brent

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-27 Thread John Clark
On Tue, Jun 26, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Step 2 is that the diary of the one teleported does not mention the
 delays of reconstitution in absence of third person clue.


Obviously true.

 Step 3, is that no machine can predict the content of its personal future
 diaries content in self-multiplication experience.


Not counting quantum randomness the only reason the many diaries will be
different is that the many authors of those many diaries, you, end up in
different environments. So step 3 is just a convoluted way of saying that
you can't always predict how environmental factors will change nor how
those factors will effect you, which is just a convoluted way of saying
that you never know what new things the universe will throw at you, which
is just a convoluted way of saying that predicting is hard, especially the
future.

 By the comp assumption, they can be copied and put in two different
 environments, so that they will differentiate,


Yes.

 and that is why they cannot predict their experience, even in a prior
 state of complete information of the issuing protocol.


If you really had complete information then you could make 2 predictions:

1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in
Washington and only Washington.

2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow
and only Moscow.

Both predictions will turn out to be 100% correct; a very odd situation
certainly but it is paradoxical only if you make the totally unwarranted
assumption that there can only be one Bruno Marchal, and without that
assumption assigning probabilities to the question what city will I end up
in? is pointless because I is not defined.

Mot plausibly two minds because complex self-reference is chaotic and mind
 state diverge from very little difference.


Maybe, but I doubt if it's like the butterfly effect, I doubt if its quite
as sensitive as that, otherwise we would not be observing personality
traits in people that persist, largely unchanged, for many decades.

John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 27 Jun 2012, at 17:51, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Jun 26, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Step 2 is that the diary of the one teleported does not mention  
the delays of reconstitution in absence of third person clue.


Obviously true.

 Step 3, is that no machine can predict the content of its personal  
future diaries content in self-multiplication experience.


Not counting quantum randomness the only reason the many diaries  
will be different is that the many authors of those many diaries,  
you, end up in different environments.


Specifically due to the fact that comp allows self-duplication. That  
is the key point.





So step 3 is just a convoluted way of saying that you can't always  
predict how environmental factors will change nor how those factors  
will effect you, which is just a convoluted way of saying that you  
never know what new things the universe will throw at you, which is  
just a convoluted way of saying that predicting is hard, especially  
the future.


It has nothing to do with evolution of environment. The indeterminacy  
is definite, and brought by the possibility of self-duplication.





 By the comp assumption, they can be copied and put in two  
different environments, so that they will differentiate,


Yes.

 and that is why they cannot predict their experience, even in a  
prior state of complete information of the issuing protocol.


If you really had complete information then you could make 2  
predictions:


1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in  
Washington and only Washington.


2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in  
Moscow and only Moscow.


That's better. But still ignore the first/third person distinction.





Both predictions will turn out to be 100% correct;


Not from the first person point of view, when they relate to such  
view. The one in washington can still say something like BM is in  
Moscow, but not I am in Moscow. And the question was bearing on I,  
not BrunoMarchal, which refers to a third person description.





a very odd situation certainly but it is paradoxical only if you  
make the totally unwarranted assumption that there can only be one  
Bruno Marchal,


This is implied by comp, trivially for the first person pov.



and without that assumption assigning probabilities to the question  
what city will I end up in? is pointless because I is not defined.


You don't need to define it to get the point that the proba on the  
localisation on the future sense of self is 1/2.


You ignore again the 1-3 distinction that I made precise.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-27 Thread meekerdb

On 6/27/2012 8:51 AM, John Clark wrote:


Mot plausibly two minds because complex self-reference is chaotic and mind 
state
diverge from very little difference.


Maybe, but I doubt if it's like the butterfly effect, I doubt if its quite as sensitive 
as that, otherwise we would not be observing personality traits in people that persist, 
largely unchanged, for many decades.


But personality can remain stable while thoughts (and diaries) diverge.  It may be like a 
butterfly effect with personality as a chaotic attractor.  Randomness, e.g. potassium 40 
decays in the bloodstream, may deflect the trajectory of thought, but only into nearby 
channels consistent with personality.  That's why I think the claim that, It's either 
determined or random. is misleading.  Thoughts and actions may be determined in the sense 
of constrained to a fairly narrow probability distribution, and yet random.


Brent

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-27 Thread meekerdb

On 6/27/2012 9:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Not counting quantum randomness the only reason the many diaries will be different is 
that the many authors of those many diaries, you, end up in different environments.


Specifically due to the fact that comp allows self-duplication. That is the key 
point.




So step 3 is just a convoluted way of saying that you can't always predict how 
environmental factors will change nor how those factors will effect you, which is just 
a convoluted way of saying that you never know what new things the universe will throw 
at you, which is just a convoluted way of saying that predicting is hard, especially 
the future.


It has nothing to do with evolution of environment. The indeterminacy is definite, and 
brought by the possibility of self-duplication.


I don't understand what you are saying?  Why is 'self-duplication' different from 
'duplication'?  And it's not clear where the boundary is between 'you' and 'the 
environment'.  If 'you' is just the algorithm your brain is executing, then the thermal 
molecular motion in your brain is 'environment' and divergent of thought is due to 'the 
environment'.  But if 'you' is your physical body/brain then the divergence is inherent in 
the physics.


Brent

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 27 Jun 2012, at 19:57, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/27/2012 9:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Not counting quantum randomness the only reason the many diaries  
will be different is that the many authors of those many diaries,  
you, end up in different environments.


Specifically due to the fact that comp allows self-duplication.  
That is the key point.





So step 3 is just a convoluted way of saying that you can't  
always predict how environmental factors will change nor how those  
factors will effect you, which is just a convoluted way of saying  
that you never know what new things the universe will throw at  
you, which is just a convoluted way of saying that predicting is  
hard, especially the future.


It has nothing to do with evolution of environment. The  
indeterminacy is definite, and brought by the possibility of self- 
duplication.


I don't understand what you are saying?  Why is 'self-duplication'  
different from 'duplication'?


In this reasoning, it isn't.  (It would be if you are alone, or if you  
don't trust the others and build your own teleportation device, but  
that is not relevant for the reasoning).




And it's not clear where the boundary is between 'you' and 'the  
environment'.


We can only hope that the doctor, or the teleportation boxes  
engineers have choose the right comp substitution level. But the  
reasoning assumes, non constructively, that they did so.




If 'you' is just the algorithm your brain is executing, then the  
thermal molecular motion in your brain is 'environment' and  
divergent of thought is due to 'the environment'.  But if 'you' is  
your physical body/brain then the divergence is inherent in the  
physics.


Does this change the P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 for first person prediction on  
its future first person experience in step 3?


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Thu, Jun 28, 2012 at 1:51 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 If you really had complete information then you could make 2 predictions:

 1) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in
 Washington and only Washington.

 2) I Bruno Marchal will write in my diary I Bruno Marchal am now in Moscow
 and only Moscow.

 Both predictions will turn out to be 100% correct; a very odd situation
 certainly but it is paradoxical only if you make the totally unwarranted
 assumption that there can only be one Bruno Marchal, and without that
 assumption assigning probabilities to the question what city will I end up
 in? is pointless because I is not defined.

You dismiss human psychology, which includes the belief that I am a
single person who persists through time. If strange things such as
duplication happen to me they will be interpreted in the light of this
belief. It may be delusional, but it's an important delusion.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-26 Thread John Clark
On Mon, Jun 25, 2012  Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

   It's not that we don't know what we are going to do, but we don't know
 what we are going to experience


A distinction without a difference, experiencing something is doing
something.

 it is impossible to have complete information about one's environment
 because [...]


The because is irrelevant, in fact the entire environment is irrelevant .
Even if you were in no environment at all, that is to say even if you
received zero input from your sense organs, you still could not always
predict what mental state you would be in, you still would not know what
you would be experiencing in the future.

  John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 25 Jun 2012, at 21:01, John Clark wrote:


On Mon, Jun 25, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 The question is do you agree with it, or not. So that we can move  
to step 4.


I've lost track, is step 3 the trivial observation that sometimes we  
don't know what we're going to do, or was that step 2?



Step 2 is that the diary of the one teleported does not mention the  
delays of reconstitution in absence of third person clue.


Step 3, is that no machine can predict the content of its personal  
future diaries content in self-multiplication experience.


Step 4 is a mix of step 2 and 3, and makes the observation that if  
P(W) P(M) = 1/2, say, in the WM-duplication experience, then P(W) =  
P(M) = 1/2 in the same experience except that an asymmetrical delay of  
reconstitution has been introduced.






 You ignore that we can test inequalities, even without  
probability. I do produce the description of the devices so that we  
can test the hypotheses.


Then tell me of an experiment  that a scientist can perform in a lab  
where if XY then your theory is wrong but if Y X then your theory  
is probably right, where X and Y are objectively measurable  
quantities of some sort; just tell me what X and Y are.


Look at what is observable close enough. Comp predicts that the logic  
of those observable will appear as being non boolean. Read the whole  
sane04 to see why, and how that is made precise, for the non- 
booleanity is quantum, but not yet proved equivalent with the QM  
quantum logic.






 but this does not mean that we cannot attach one mind to two  
different machines,


Yes provided the machines were identical, or at least functionally  
identical.


We agree on this since the start.





 or to two identical (similar at the subst. level) machine put in  
different environment,


If they were in different environments then the machines would not  
be identical or even functionally identical and their associated  
minds would be different because they would have different memories.


By the comp assumption, they can be copied and put in two different  
environments, so that they will differentiate, and that is why they  
cannot predict their experience, even in a prior state of complete  
information of the issuing protocol.


Or you have to put the substitution level in the infinitely down so as  
to make us non duplicable, but then we are no more working in the comp  
theory.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 25 Jun 2012, at 21:19, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/25/2012 12:01 PM, John Clark wrote:


 or to two identical (similar at the subst. level) machine put in  
different environment,


If they were in different environments then the machines would not  
be identical or even functionally identical and their associated  
minds would be different because they would have different memories.


They would become different as they interacted with the different  
environments.  But the environments might be so nearly identical  
that the difference is not perceptible.  Would there then be two  
minds, or only one?


Good question. Mot plausibly two minds because complex self-reference  
is chaotic and mind state diverge from very little difference. But  
this might not concern the relative probabilities.




Or is it a moot question because brains (and computers and  
environments) have a lot of random variation below the level of  
perception and so the minds/brains would diverge unless the whole  
system, brain+environment, were cloned and isolated at the quantum  
level (which we can't do).  This why I suspect that Bruno's idea  
requires that physics and consciousness are inseparable,


Yes, that's the point.




even if they can be derived from number and computation theory.


They have to, if we take seriously the idea that consciousness is  
related to (even physical, or not) computations, which is an  
arithmetical notion.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-26 Thread meekerdb

On 6/26/2012 10:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 25 Jun 2012, at 21:01, John Clark wrote:


On Mon, Jun 25, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 The question is do you agree with it, or not. So that we can move to step 
4.


I've lost track, is step 3 the trivial observation that sometimes we don't know what 
we're going to do, or was that step 2?



Step 2 is that the diary of the one teleported does not mention the delays of 
reconstitution in absence of third person clue.


Step 3, is that no machine can predict the content of its personal future diaries 
content in self-multiplication experience.


Step 4 is a mix of step 2 and 3, and makes the observation that if P(W) P(M) = 1/2, say, 
in the WM-duplication experience, then P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 in the same experience except 
that an asymmetrical delay of reconstitution has been introduced.






 You ignore that we can test inequalities, even without probability. I do 
produce
the description of the devices so that we can test the hypotheses.


Then tell me of an experiment  that a scientist can perform in a lab where if XY then 
your theory is wrong but if Y X then your theory is probably right, where X and Y are 
objectively measurable quantities of some sort; just tell me what X and Y are.


Look at what is observable close enough. Comp predicts that the logic of those 
observable will appear as being non boolean. Read the whole sane04 to see why, and how 
that is made precise, for the non-booleanity is quantum, but not yet proved equivalent 
with the QM quantum logic.






 but this does not mean that we cannot attach one mind to two different 
machines,


Yes provided the machines were identical, or at least functionally identical.


We agree on this since the start.





 or to two identical (similar at the subst. level) machine put in different
environment,


If they were in different environments then the machines would not be identical or even 
functionally identical and their associated minds would be different because they would 
have different memories.


By the comp assumption, they can be copied and put in two different environments, so 
that they will differentiate, and that is why they cannot predict their experience, even 
in a prior state of complete information of the issuing protocol.


But that is true if you simply fell asleep and were whisked to Moscow or Washington.  The 
interesting claim is not the unpredictability, but the uncertainty of identity.  If 
something is faithfully copied, it no longer makes sense to refer to it as singular.


Brent



Or you have to put the substitution level in the infinitely down so as to make us non 
duplicable, but then we are no more working in the comp theory.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-25 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 24 Jun 2012, at 22:29, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/24/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


And then if I luckily succeed in computing the electron mass  
9.10938291×10-31kg,  Brent will tell me that we already knew  
that, and ask for something else.


Well if you do it by luck...  But of course I'd be very impressed if  
you could calculate it just from comp+arithmetic.  But I'd be less  
impressed if you just showed that it must be one of all possible  
numbers.


Sure. We might try to define physics, and with comp, physics is  
independent of the ontological theory, which is just any UD, or,  
axiomatical description of a universal system. Physics is independent  
of the choice of the base phi_i. But is the mass of the electron  
really a physical law, or a contingent fact? I am not sure all actual  
theories answer this in the same way. I think it is an open problem,  
necessitating the correct unification of gravitation and quantum  
mechanics. It is of course an open problem in the comp physics.






More realistically, shouldn't comp+arithmetic be able to make some  
basic predictions like: QM must be based on complex Hilbert spaces  
(not real, quateronic or octonic).  Or the level at which spacetime  
is discrete (if it is).


It is too early to address such question, and it all depends  
technically of the possible semantics for the material hypostases  
(like S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*). But there are technical reason to believe  
that it should not be impossible to derive the presence of the  
necessity of a quantum computing nature of reality, in which case  
quantum mechanics would be shown to be a necessity. The arithmetical  
quantization does seem to be able to already implement some quantum  
gates, except that it looks like some infinities are introduced, and  
that a full treatment of the measure (not just the measure one) is  
needed to make it working.


Even for QM, and for QM+GR, or for QED, some people do defend the use  
of quaternions, or even the octonions.
Also, you can derive the quantum digital rule from 5 Stern-Gerlach  
experiments (like Schwinger did). You get the QM matrices rule from  
the four first one, and the 5th one imposes the complex numbers. The  
material hypostases already give the comp quantum logics, and it is  
just a problem of optimizing the theorem prover to see if the comp  
physics makes the same prediction, so it might be relatively easy to  
justify the use of the complex numbers, like the use of real number is  
already justify in the comp physics intuitively.


But again, I insist, that the comp physics is a necessity with comp.  
My technical point is that we have no choice in this matter, even if  
it was just impractical (like the use of string theory is impractical  
in the kitchen).


And, then the comp physics is the first theory which unifies quanta  
and qualia, where the empirical physics still ignores the problem by  
using an ad hoc supervenience thesis which is just incompatible with  
the comp hypothesis.


Remember that comp is a theory in the mind studies, not a priori  
matter. It shows that the laws of physics have a reason deeper than an  
inference from what we can see (which is nice for the applications,  
but explains virtually nothing).


Bruno






Brent

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-25 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 25 Jun 2012, at 01:08, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 01:29:31PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/24/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

And then if I luckily succeed in computing the electron mass
9.10938291×10^-31 kg,  Brent will tell me that we already knew
that, and ask for something else.


Well if you do it by luck...  But of course I'd be very impressed if
you could calculate it just from comp+arithmetic.  But I'd be less
impressed if you just showed that it must be one of all possible
numbers.

More realistically, shouldn't comp+arithmetic be able to make some
basic predictions like: QM must be based on complex Hilbert spaces
(not real, quateronic or octonic).


I do think this is a very interesting question. I do have a good
reason for supposing it is must be complex, not real, but then it
fails to say why it shouldn't be quarternionic in preference to  
complex.


The trouble is it is so difficult to work out what a quarternionic QM
would really mean.


Or the level at which spacetime
is discrete (if it is).


Spacetime must emerge from relationships between events. The set of
events must be countable, but the relationships between them is a  
power

set of this, which is uncountable.

This would imply continuity of spacetime, I think.

This is a flipside of Bruno's argument that COMP entails physics (ie
phenomenal physics) is not computable.


Comp already explains a lot of what physicists accepts, but find very  
weird, like appearances of a pure strong form indeterminacy/parallel  
realities, non locality, non cloning. It predicts the existence of  
continuous observable, and of non computable sequences of definite  
observations.


Unfortunately it does not seems to be able to derive easily the  
empirically simpler aspect of physics, like the existence and  
structure of space-time, or the existence of computable hamiltonian/ 
energy.


But comp is not a proposal for doing physics differently. Comp is just  
the most simple and reasonable hypothesis in the cognitive science,  
and then it transforms the mind-body problem into the necessity of  
deriving physics from arithmetic or any universal system. In that  
sense it already explains why there is a physical quantum-like  
reality. Comp discovers the realm in which the physical laws appeared  
and logically evolved, and this in a way which saves the persons  
from metaphysical elimination. The reversal is more theological than  
physical. it introduces rigor in the human or spiritual sciences.


It is up to the materialists, if they want to stay materialist, to  
provide their non-comp theory of mind. But with the exception of  
Penrose, ... and Craig, no one seems to be aware of that necessity.  
UDA is supposed to make that clear, though.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-25 Thread John Clark
On Sun, Jun 24, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 The first person indeterminacy is a fact, with respect to comp.


First person indeterminacy is a fact with respect to ANYTHING, sometimes
you don't know what you're going to do till you do it. I find your
theoretical prediction of this less than impressive.

 And then if I luckily succeed in computing the electron mass
 9.10938291×10-31kg, Brent will tell me that we already knew that, and ask
 for something else.


Don't be ridiculous! If you can produce the value of 9.10938291×10^-31kg
from nothing but pure numbers you would be universally hailed as the
greatest logician or mathematician or physicist (there would no longer be
any difference between the three professions) who ever lived. Philosophical
theories are a dime a dozen but theories that can produce numbers are not,
and theories where the numbers match the numbers obtained from experiment
are even less common. If you want your ideas to go mainstream there is just
no alternative, you've got to find a way for those ideas to churn out
numbers, numbers that can be tested.

 You need also to be interested in consciousness, and capable of
 distinguishing first and third person points of view


I'm interested in consciousness but I am not capable of always making the
distinction between the first and third person points of view, but you have
admitted you can't do it either.  On March 27 2012 I said:

 Give me a example of 2 conscious beings that are identical by what you
call 3-view but NOT identical by what you call 1-view, show they
deserve different names, do that and I might get a idea what you're talking
about; but don't give me that diaries business, if the diaries are
different a third party can see that just as well as the individuals who
wrote them. Just one clear non mystical example where objectively 2 things
are identical but subjectively they are not, that's all I ask and I don't
think it's a unreasonable request as your proof depends on there being such
a difference.

You responded to my request with:

You ask me something impossible

I agree it is impossible. I can conceive of 2 conscious minds being
identical from the 1- view but not from the 3-view, for example a mind
generated from a biological brain and a uploaded mind generated from a
computer, in which case there really wouldn't be two minds but only one.
However 2 minds identical from the 3- view but not from the 1-view makes no
sense.

  John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-25 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 25 Jun 2012, at 18:24, John Clark wrote:


On Sun, Jun 24, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 The first person indeterminacy is a fact, with respect to comp.

First person indeterminacy is a fact with respect to ANYTHING,  
sometimes you don't know what you're going to do till you do it. I  
find your theoretical prediction of this less than impressive.


The question is do you agree with it, or not. So that we can move to  
step 4.






 And then if I luckily succeed in computing the electron mass  
9.10938291×10-31kg, Brent will tell me that we already knew that,  
and ask for something else.


Don't be ridiculous! If you can produce the value of 9.10938291×10^ 
-31kg from nothing but pure numbers you would be universally hailed  
as the greatest logician or mathematician or physicist (there would  
no longer be any difference between the three professions) who ever  
lived. Philosophical theories are a dime a dozen but theories that  
can produce numbers are not, and theories where the numbers match  
the numbers obtained from experiment are even less common. If you  
want your ideas to go mainstream there is just no alternative,  
you've got to find a way for those ideas to churn out numbers,  
numbers that can be tested.


You ignore that we can test inequalities, even without probability. I  
do produce the description of the devices so that we can test the  
hypotheses. All you have to do is proceed in the argument, even if you  
need this to understand that it is more modest than you extrapolate.


Please do the reasoning, before extrapolating on assertions I do not  
provide.







 You need also to be interested in consciousness, and capable of  
distinguishing first and third person points of view


I'm interested in consciousness but I am not capable of always  
making the distinction between the first and third person points of  
view, but you have admitted you can't do it either.  On March 27  
2012 I said:


 Give me a example of 2 conscious beings that are identical by what  
you call 3-view but NOT identical by what you call 1-view, show  
they deserve different names, do that and I might get a idea what  
you're talking about; but don't give me that diaries business, if  
the diaries are different a third party can see that just as well as  
the individuals who wrote them. Just one clear non mystical example  
where objectively 2 things are identical but subjectively they are  
not, that's all I ask and I don't think it's a unreasonable request  
as your proof depends on there being such a difference.


You responded to my request with:

You ask me something impossible

I agree it is impossible. I can conceive of 2 conscious minds being  
identical from the 1- view but not from the 3-view, for example a  
mind generated from a biological brain and a uploaded mind generated  
from a computer, in which case there really wouldn't be two minds  
but only one. However 2 minds identical from the 3- view but not  
from the 1-view makes no sense.


We agree on that indeed. And ?

For the reasoning, we don't have to attribute two first person povs to  
one 3-viewed machine, but to attribute one first person povs to two  
different 3-viewed machine, and eventually number relations.


It looks like you want me to believe that the relation of mind and  
machine is one-one, by telling me to give an example of 2 different  
minds for one machine, which we agree is impossible, but this does not  
mean that we cannot attach one mind to two different machines, or to  
two identical (similar at the subst. level) machine put in different  
environment, like Sidney and Beijing, for example.


It is crucially important, because machine cannot know in which  
computations there are among the infinities which exists in the  
solution of a universal diophantine equation, and in a sense, she  
belongs to all those computations that she cannot distinguishes. That  
makes a big infinity.


I am not solving a problem, I am reducing a philosophical problem to  
a mathematical problem, assuming comp.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-25 Thread meekerdb

On 6/25/2012 10:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
For the reasoning, we don't have to attribute two first person povs to one 3-viewed 
machine, but to attribute one first person povs to two different 3-viewed machine, and 
eventually number relations.


It looks like you want me to believe that the relation of mind and machine is one-one, 
by telling me to give an example of 2 different minds for one machine, which we agree is 
impossible,


But of course we can have two minds attributed to the same brain - just not at the same 
(3p) time.  A computer can be used to run two different AI programs, and even mutlitask 
them.  And some people exhibit mutliple-presonality disorder.  If thoughts are discrete 
things, do they come with markers.  If you had multiple-personalities would you always 
know which personality you were at a given moment?



but this does not mean that we cannot attach one mind to two different machines, or to 
two identical (similar at the subst. level) machine put in different environment, like 
Sidney and Beijing, for example.


It is crucially important, because machine cannot know in which computations there are 
among the infinities which exists in the solution of a universal diophantine equation, 
and in a sense, she belongs to all those computations that she cannot distinguishes. 
That makes a big infinity.


An infinite-personality disorder.

Brent

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-25 Thread John Clark
On Mon, Jun 25, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 The question is do you agree with it, or not. So that we can move to step
 4.


I've lost track, is step 3 the trivial observation that sometimes we don't
know what we're going to do, or was that step 2?

 You ignore that we can test inequalities, even without probability. I do
 produce the description of the devices so that we can test the hypotheses.


Then tell me of an experiment  that a scientist can perform in a lab where
if XY then your theory is wrong but if Y X then your theory is probably
right, where X and Y are objectively measurable quantities of some sort;
just tell me what X and Y are.

 but this does not mean that we cannot attach one mind to two different
 machines,


Yes provided the machines were identical, or at least functionally
identical.

 or to two identical (similar at the subst. level) machine put in
 different environment,


If they were in different environments then the machines would not be
identical or even functionally identical and their associated minds would
be different because they would have different memories.

  John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-25 Thread meekerdb

On 6/25/2012 12:01 PM, John Clark wrote:


 or to two identical (similar at the subst. level) machine put in different
environment,


If they were in different environments then the machines would not be identical or even 
functionally identical and their associated minds would be different because they would 
have different memories.


They would become different as they interacted with the different environments.  But the 
environments might be so nearly identical that the difference is not perceptible.  Would 
there then be two minds, or only one?  Or is it a moot question because brains (and 
computers and environments) have a lot of random variation below the level of perception 
and so the minds/brains would diverge unless the whole system, brain+environment, were 
cloned and isolated at the quantum level (which we can't do).  This why I suspect that 
Bruno's idea requires that physics and consciousness are inseparable, even if they can be 
derived from number and computation theory.


Brent

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-25 Thread Jason Resch
On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 2:01 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Mon, Jun 25, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  The question is do you agree with it, or not. So that we can move to
 step 4.


 I've lost track, is step 3 the trivial observation that sometimes we don't
 know what we're going to do, or was that step 2?



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm

It's not that we don't know what we are going to do, but we don't know what
we are going to experience (even if we could have complete information
about our mind).  It is impossible to have complete information about one's
environment because we exist within an infinite number of them.
 Acquiring information from our environment is a process that occurs over
time.  This information can differentiate some of the infinite environments
from others, but there will never be certainty regarding the stability or
continuity of the environment because some fraction of our infinite
environments will take highly divergent paths.  In the next second you
could find yourself a trillion light-years from your current location if
someone there happened to recreated you in your current form.

Jason

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-25 Thread meekerdb

On 6/25/2012 3:54 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 2:01 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com 
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:


On Mon, Jun 25, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:

 The question is do you agree with it, or not. So that we can move to 
step 4.


I've lost track, is step 3 the trivial observation that sometimes we don't 
know what
we're going to do, or was that step 2?


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm 
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm


It's not that we don't know what we are going to do, but we don't know what we are going 
to experience (even if we could have complete information about our mind).  It is 
impossible to have complete information about one's environment because we exist within 
an infinite number of them.  Acquiring information from our environment is a process 
that occurs over time.  This information can differentiate some of the infinite 
environments from others, but there will never be certainty regarding the stability or 
continuity of the environment because some fraction of our infinite environments will 
take highly divergent paths.  In the next second you could find yourself a trillion 
light-years from your current location if someone there happened to recreated you in 
your current form.




Or find 'yourself' a Boltzmann brain.

Brent

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-24 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 23 Jun 2012, at 18:02, John Clark wrote:


On Fri, Jun 22, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 Something is not primitive if you can derive it from something  
simpler.


You don't think the electron is primitive, so show me how to derive  
its mass, spin, and electrical charge from something simpler.


We must first derive its existence/appearance. But the beginning is  
given by AUDA. You have to be sure to grasp the first person  
indeterminacy, because it is the building brick of the derivation of  
physics, which I recall, is given by a statistics on computations as  
seen by internal points of view, captured informally by the logics of  
self-reference and its modal variants imposed by incompleteness.


Most plausibly electrons and particles arise from universal group  
symmetries, and formally braiding operators should appears in the  
semantics of some of those hypostases.


It is also possible that some properties of the electron are  
geographical, so that comp would make existing consistent physical  
realities with electron having different properties, which would no  
more be physical, but contingent. Open problem.


But you can already understand, if you do the work, why we have to do  
this when assuming comp, which is the technical point.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-24 Thread John Clark
On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 You don't think the electron is primitive, so show me how to derive its
 mass, spin, and electrical charge from something simpler.


  We must first derive its existence/appearance.


But that was exactly what I asked you to do! If you tell me what the mass,
spin and electrical charge of electrons are you've told me just about all
there is to say about the existence/appearance of electrons. So if you
don't think electrons are primitive you must be able to derive them from
something simpler. What is that derivation?

 Most plausibly electrons and particles arise from universal group
 symmetries, and formally braiding operators should appears in the semantics
 of some of those hypostases.


Well that all sounds real nice, real scholarly, but the trouble is there is
no reason for me to think you're right until your theory can actually
produce some numbers. We know that the mass of the electron is 9.10938291×10
-31 kg, we know this from experiment, so show me how to derive this number
from something simpler and I will concede that there is something to your
theory after all.

You have to be sure to grasp the first person indeterminacy


Show me how to calculate  the number 9.10938291×10-31 from first person
indeterminacy and I will be sure that first person indeterminacy is
something that is worth grasping.

 John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-24 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 24 Jun 2012, at 17:16, John Clark wrote:




On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 You don't think the electron is primitive, so show me how to  
derive its mass, spin, and electrical charge from something simpler.


 We must first derive its existence/appearance.

But that was exactly what I asked you to do! If you tell me what the  
mass, spin and electrical charge of electrons are you've told me  
just about all there is to say about the existence/appearance of  
electrons. So if you don't think electrons are primitive you must be  
able to derive them from something simpler. What is that derivation?


What I try to explain is NOT a derivation of physics from arithmetic.  
But a proof of its existence and necessity in all theories consistent  
with the computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science.


You confuse somehow   ( === for derivation)

COMP === PHYSICS

and

COMP - necessary(COMP === PHYSICS).

Yet, the reasoning is enough constructive to show how to do the  
derivation, and in particular, accepting the most common analytical  
definition of belief and knowledge, to derive the logic of the  
observable, which can already be compared to the logic inferred from  
observation.  Up to now it fits.


How to do the derivation is what I have begun to describe on FOAR  
(starting from zero).






 Most plausibly electrons and particles arise from universal group  
symmetries, and formally braiding operators should appears in the  
semantics of some of those hypostases.


Well that all sounds real nice, real scholarly, but the trouble is  
there is no reason for me to think you're right until your theory  
can actually produce some numbers.


The theory already produces some geometries, and modalities that we  
can much more easily compared to nature than using the particular  
numbers, which might as well be geographical.


But that theory is not mine, it *is* the theory of all self- 
referentially correct universal machine looking inward. And the main  
part has been isolated through well known work, like Gödel, Löb,  
Solovay, Matiyasevich.


The theory explains the distinction of qualia and quanta, and prevents  
the universal machine from reductionist conception of the person. It  
does not put consciousness under the rug, it starts from its  
association with relative computational states.




We know that the mass of the electron is 9.10938291×10-31 kg, we  
know this from experiment, so show me how to derive this number from  
something simpler and I will concede that there is something to your  
theory after all.


I have explained the necessity (the main result, UDA) in FOAR. here I  
have made an attempt, but you remained stuck on step 3.






You have to be sure to grasp the first person indeterminacy

Show me how to calculate  the number 9.10938291×10-31 from first  
person indeterminacy and I will be sure that first person  
indeterminacy is something that is worth grasping.


You might just not be interested in comp and its consequence.

The first person indeterminacy is a fact, with respect to comp. It is  
a logical consequence of comp (and of much of its many possible  
weakening up to the simple assumption of self-duplicability).


In a sense, it is the most simple impossibility theorem in computer  
science: there are no programs capable to predict what they will write  
about self-localization after a backup will be splitted.
If *you* can write such a program, then I will believe first person  
indeterminacy doesn't exist.


And then if I luckily succeed in computing the electron mass  
9.10938291×10-31kg,  Brent will tell me that we already knew that,  
and ask for something else.


I am a logician. I just show that:  if we can survive a digital  
transplant, then the physical reality emerges from a peculiar  
arithmetical process involving *many* computations, self-reference and  
inductive inference, and this in a sufficiently precise way so that we  
can already make some comparisons.


UDA is

COMP - necessary(COMP === PHYSICS).

And AUDA is a piece of

COMP === PHYSICS

You just need to understand step 3, then 4, up to 8. (although 7 is  
already quite well). For AUDA you need mathematical logic and  
theoretical computer science.


You need also to be interested in consciousness, and capable of  
distinguishing first and third person points of view (and later  
logical indexical modalities).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-24 Thread meekerdb

On 6/24/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And then if I luckily succeed in computing the electron mass 9.10938291×10^-31 kg, 
 Brent will tell me that we already knew that, and ask for something else.


Well if you do it by luck...  But of course I'd be very impressed if you could calculate 
it just from comp+arithmetic.  But I'd be less impressed if you just showed that it must 
be one of all possible numbers.


More realistically, shouldn't comp+arithmetic be able to make some basic predictions like: 
QM must be based on complex Hilbert spaces (not real, quateronic or octonic).  Or the 
level at which spacetime is discrete (if it is).


Brent

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-24 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 01:29:31PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
 On 6/24/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 And then if I luckily succeed in computing the electron mass
 9.10938291×10^-31 kg,  Brent will tell me that we already knew
 that, and ask for something else.
 
 Well if you do it by luck...  But of course I'd be very impressed if
 you could calculate it just from comp+arithmetic.  But I'd be less
 impressed if you just showed that it must be one of all possible
 numbers.
 
 More realistically, shouldn't comp+arithmetic be able to make some
 basic predictions like: QM must be based on complex Hilbert spaces
 (not real, quateronic or octonic).  

I do think this is a very interesting question. I do have a good
reason for supposing it is must be complex, not real, but then it
fails to say why it shouldn't be quarternionic in preference to complex.

The trouble is it is so difficult to work out what a quarternionic QM
would really mean.

 Or the level at which spacetime
 is discrete (if it is).

Spacetime must emerge from relationships between events. The set of
events must be countable, but the relationships between them is a power
set of this, which is uncountable.

This would imply continuity of spacetime, I think.

This is a flipside of Bruno's argument that COMP entails physics (ie
phenomenal physics) is not computable.

 
 Brent
 
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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-23 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 22 Jun 2012, at 20:24, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/22/2012 12:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


2) The fact that there is no algorithm to decide if a program  
compute some function does not ential that we cannot recognize what  
do some program.


You mean there is no algorithm that, given any program, the  
algorithm can always answer yes or no to the question Does this  
program compute the factorial function.  Right?


Right.


It doesn't mean that an algorithm cannot answer the question for  
some programs.


Yes. That's the point.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-23 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Jun 22, 2012  Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:


  This quantization of time is easily seen as problematic when we consider
 that SR tells us that any granulation of time is equivalent to a grnulation
 of space which has observable effect.


All physicists agree that neither Special Relativity nor General Relativity
can be the last word on the subject because neither theory takes Quantum
Mechanics into account, and even the laws of mathematics agree that
Relativity theories can not be valid at the singularity at the center of a
Black Hole because at that point you'd have infinite density and infinite
curvature of spacetime yielding nonsensical results for any calculations
made there. By the way, before 1900 calculations about the way hot objects
give off light yielded the same sort of nonsensical results, Planck solved
the problem by introducing the idea that energy was not continuous but
existed as a series of small jumps, perhaps calculations about the
singularity can make sense if another quantity is quantized, like time or
space or both.

Relativity works well for things that are very large and very massive and
Quantum Mechanics works well for things that are very small and very light,
but to understand what happens when things are very small and very massive,
like a Black Hole singularity, we need a quantum theory of gravity and we
don't have one.

 Basically it predicts violations of Lorentz invariance by ultra high
 energy photons. So far observations have not shown any violations, even in
 very high gamma rays from GRBs. see: : http://arxiv.org/abs/0909.4927


I know, that's why I didn't say there was no experimental evidence, I said
there is little or no experimental evidence; that report is almost 3
years old (a eon for science) and since then there has been little or no
confirmation or follow through.

 Ordered collections alone do not have transitions.


They have discontinuous jumps, but they would look just like smooth
transitions to you if they were small enough and stuff at the Planck level
is very very small indeed. But maybe time is continuous after all, but then
again maybe not.

  John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-23 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Jun 22, 2012  Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  Something is not primitive if you can derive it from something simpler.


You don't think the electron is primitive, so show me how to derive its
mass, spin, and electrical charge from something simpler.

 John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-22 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 20 Jun 2012, at 19:37, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Jun 20, 2012 at 3:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 It's true that if you knew the numerical value of Chaitin's  
Constant then you would know that if a 100 bit program had not  
stopped after a Turing Machine had run n number of finite operations  
then it never will; but the trouble is you don't know Chaitin's  
Constant and never can, so you can never know how big n is. So even  
though they have been running for a googoplex to the googoplex power  
years one of those programs could stop 5 seconds from now.


 Not if I waited, by chance or whatever, a time bigger than BB(100).

Then it will never stop but you don't know it will never stop, so  
you'll still be looking to see if it stops in the next 5 seconds or  
the next 10 seconds or the next  googoplex to the googoplex power  
years.


Correct.



Godel was a Platonist, he thought things were true or they were not  
he just said sometimes we can't know which, and Turing certainly  
believed all programs will come to a stop or they will not,


Yes. That is part of Arithmetical Realism.



but he was investigating if we can always obtain that one bit of  
information for any program and he proved we can not.


Indeed.



Neither the Busy Beaver nor Chaitin's work on the Omega Constant  
changes that fact and is just more confirmation that Turing was  
right, not that more confirmation was needed, the proof is ironclad.


Sure.




 If a decimal change after that, then we got a computable function  
growing more quickly than BB.


As I've said if a program of a given size has not stopped by a  
certain finite number of operations it never will, but that fact  
does you no good at all because to know what that finite number is  
you'd have to know Chaitin's Constant and you don't know that and  
never will.


Yes. But nowhere I said that we would knowingly get the decimals  
correct, only that we would get the decimal correct after a finite  
(even if unknown) time.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-22 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 20 Jun 2012, at 20:23, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 6/20/2012 3:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Jun 2012, at 19:41, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Jun 19, 2012 at 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:
 Unlike the proton and neutron nobody has found any  
experimental evidence that the electron has a inner structure,  
that it is made of parts.


 The primitive matter I talk about is the idea of primary matter  
in the Aristotle sense


Aristotle was a great logician but a dreadful physicist.

 If I say that electron is not primitive, I don't mean it is made  
of part, almost the contrary, that it is a mathematical reality,  
or that it is reducible to a non physical mathematical or  
theological reality, an invariant in our sharable computations.


I don't know what that means. What experiment would I need to  
perform, what would a electron need to do to prove it was  
primitive.


The electron cannot do that, but my pet amoeba cannot prove they  
are unicellular, despite they are.
It is just that if matter is primitive (not explainable from non  
material relation) then we have to make it infinite  to  
singularize consciousness.


Dear Bruno,

I am parsing your comments here as I want to fully and clearly  
understand them.


Do you stand by that implication, that matter is primitive =   
not explainable from non material relation?  This implies that:  
matter is not primitive  = explainable from non material  
relation. No? I would like to better understand how the notion of  
ontological primitives is defined in your dictionary.



Something is not primitive if you can derive it from something  
simpler. Put in other word, something is not primitive if its  
existence or its appearance can be proved in a theory which does not  
postulate it in the basic assumption. It is emergent, in some large  
sense.


Exemple: if comp is true then matter is not primitive (by UDA). Like  
life is no more considered as primitive by most biologist, as it is  
consider as being a chemically emergent reality for them.







With comp, we just abandon the idea of singularize consciousness in  
bodies, and then the bodies have to be explained in term of number  
relation.


Why would we have to singularize consciousness in bodies at  
all? What premise or postulate is it that consciousness is  
singularized in a body? I am assuming that singularize means to  
make singular in the sense of either a singularity or a singleton.  
I am not sure which of the latter you are assuming.


It is the way we experience our consciousness. We feel to be unique in  
only one body, and universe. Of course we know better, once we assume  
comp or even just QM (without collapse).






It is more easy to understand that reversal at the epistemological  
level. Physical concepts are not primitive means that we can reduce  
them to non physical concepts, like those coming from theoretical  
(mathematical) computer science. It means that physics is not the  
fundamental science. Exactly like we can reduce biology to physics,  
we can reduce physics to the study of machine dreams.




At the epistemological level we are assuming that there already  
exist conscious entities, therefore a reversal cannot be run in a  
consistent manner if the reversal implies the non-existence of  
conscious entities.


OK.


You are now equating reducible to explainable. Is an explanation  
a constructive process in your thinking?


Not necessarily, and usually necessarily not.









 To calculate the first 100 digits of Chaitin's constant you'd  
need to feed all programs that can be expressed in 100 bits or  
less into a Turing Machine and see how many of them stop and how  
many of then do not. Some of them will never stop but the only way  
to know how many is to wait a infinite number of years and then  
see how many programs are still running. So you'd need to be  
infinitely patient, in other words you'd need to be dead.


 Only to be sure of the decimals obtained.

Well yeah, it's easy to calculate Chaitin's constant  if you don't  
mind getting it wrong.


After BB(100) computation steps, the decimals will be correct. I  
will not know it, but they are correct.


Is this correctness that occurs after the BB(100) steps capable  
of being forced to hold for the infinite case, as discussed in  
this paper http://arxiv.org/abs/math/0509616? I would like to better  
understand how you leap the gap between the finite case and the  
infinite case.


? (The infinite case is no more a case of computation).











 If I relax that constraints, then I need only to be *very  
patient*. The non computable, but well defined Buzzy Beaver  
function (BB) bounds the time needed to wait. Of course it grows  
*very* fast. But I don't need an *infinite* time to get the 100  
first digits correct. Any time bigger than BB(100) will do.


If we wait a googoplex to the googoplex power years some 100 bit  
programs will 

Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-22 Thread meekerdb

On 6/22/2012 12:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
2) The fact that there is no algorithm to decide if a program compute some function does 
not ential that we cannot recognize what do some program.


You mean there is no algorithm that, given any program, the algorithm can always answer 
yes or no to the question Does this program compute the factorial function.  Right?  
It doesn't mean that an algorithm cannot answer the question for some programs.


Brent

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-22 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Jun 21, 2012  Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:

I think that we agree that [time] transitions are occurring!


Maybe time changes as a smooth transition, maybe it's a series of discrete
jumps, it would look the same to us either way, and even if our best
instruments were a billion trillion trillion times as sensitive as they are
they still could not detect the granularity in time if it was as small as
the Plank Time level.

 we cannot think of time as just a ordered collection of entities.


I don't see why not.

 Just because we can get a from a concatenation of physical constants
 does not make it a physical constant.


True, but it's also true that a simple formula produces units of time
[Gh/c^5]^1/2 = 5.38 * 10-44 second. so it's not hard to imagine that there
is something special about 5.38 * 10^-44 seconds, and there is no logical
reason to think that time must be continuous, and there is little or no
experimental evidence that it is, and our best theories suddenly start
producing nonsense at times less than that; so until we have reason to
think otherwise using Occam's Razor I think our default position should be
that just like matter and energy and momentum and spin, time is not
continuous but quantized

  The word Free means that it is not forced or coerced.


Sometimes I can not do exactly what my will wants me to do, in fact usually
that is the case. Sometimes I can't do what I want because other people
prevent me and sometimes I can't do what I want (move faster than the speed
of light, walk through a brick wall, jump over a mountain) because the laws
of physics prevent me.  I see no fundamental reason why one class of
restrictions is coercion but the other class is not, thus free will
means you can't always get what you want and nobody has free will, even God
does not have free will because according to theologians God wants us to
obey him and be happy but His creations keep malfunctioning and so even He
can't always get what he wants.  He can't get no satisfaction either.

  John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-22 Thread Stephen P. King

On 6/22/2012 4:11 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Jun 21, 2012  Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net 
mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote:


I think that we agree that [time] transitions are occurring!


Maybe time changes as a smooth transition, maybe it's a series of 
discrete jumps, it would look the same to us either way, and even if 
our best instruments were a billion trillion trillion times as 
sensitive as they are they still could not detect the granularity in 
time if it was as small as the Plank Time level.


Hi John,

This quantization of time is easily seen as problematic when we 
consider that SR tells us that any granulation of time is equivalent to 
a grnulation of space which has observable effect. Basically it predicts 
violations of Lorentz invariance by ultra high energy photons. So far 
observations have not shown any violations, even in very high gamma rays 
from GRBs. see: http://arxiv.org/abs/0909.4927




 we cannot think of time as just a ordered collection of entities.


I don't see why not.


Ordered collections alone do not have transitions. This is part of 
my argument against Bruno's idea of abstract implementation.




 Just because we can get a from a concatenation of physical
constants does not make it a physical constant.


True, but it's also true that a simple formula produces units of time 
[Gh/c^5]^1/2 = 5.38 * 10-44 second. so it's not hard to imagine that 
there is something special about 5.38 * 10^-44 seconds, and there is 
no logical reason to think that time must be continuous, and there is 
little or no experimental evidence that it is, and our best theories 
suddenly start producing nonsense at times less than that; so until we 
have reason to think otherwise using Occam's Razor I think our default 
position should be that just like matter and energy and momentum and 
spin, time is not continuous but quantized


Your reasoning here is good but it ignores the implied violation of 
Lorentz invariance.




The word Free means that it is not forced or coerced.


Sometimes I can not do exactly what my will wants me to do, in fact 
usually that is the case. Sometimes I can't do what I want because 
other people prevent me and sometimes I can't do what I want (move 
faster than the speed of light, walk through a brick wall, jump over a 
mountain) because the laws of physics prevent me.  I see no 
fundamental reason why one class of restrictions is coercion but the 
other class is not, thus free will means you can't always get what 
you want and nobody has free will, even God does not have free will 
because according to theologians God wants us to obey him and be happy 
but His creations keep malfunctioning and so even He can't always get 
what he wants.  He can't get no satisfaction either.


  John K Clark


That's a good thing, otherwise we would be completely incorrigible. :-P

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Onward!

Stephen

Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
~ Francis Bacon

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-21 Thread Stephen P. King

On 6/21/2012 11:41 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Jun 20, 2012  Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net 
mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote:


 Do you [Bruno] stand by that implication, that matter is
primitive = not explainable from non material relation?  This
implies that: matter is not primitive  = explainable from non
material relation.


That implies nothing of the sort, in fact it implies the exact opposite.


Hi John,

Nice to talk with you again! ;-) It is quite possible that I got it 
exactly backward, that would be a symptom of my dyslexia. ;-)



If it's really primitive then it's the end of a long line of what is 
that made of? or why did that happen? questions. If it's truly 
primitive then it's not explainable PERIOD, otherwise the explanation 
would be the thing that was primitive, unless of course the 
explanation itself had a explanation. Maybe nothing is primitive and 
it's like a onion with a infinite number of layers, or maybe not, 
nobody knows.


Each and every one of these possibilities are included in the wide 
variety of mereologies http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/ 
that I have tried to ask Bruno about. I would really like to get an 
exact definition what Bruno defines as primitive. I have a preference 
for the nothing is truly primitive idea as this is what is considered 
in the non-well founded sets and related logics that Jon Barwise et al 
have written about and is assumed in Vaughan Pratt's rehabilitation of 
Dualism. I realize that this is a hard thing to get people to think 
about, but given the fact that the current assumptions and theories are 
not solving the problems, why not consider reasonable alternatives?





 time is not just the number of steps, it is also the
transitional flow from one step to another.


You don't know that to be true and without instrumentation if time 
jumped just a hundred times a second or so you couldn't tell the 
difference between that and continuous flow, that's why TV and movies 
work.


I am talking/writing about the transition itself, not the fineness 
of it. Whether is is smooth or discrete, I think that we agree that 
transitions are occurring! So my point remains conta Bruno, we cannot 
think of time as just a ordered collection of entities.



And there are theoretical reasons to suspect that there is no time 
shorter than the Plank Time, 10^-44 seconds, a number that can be 
calculated using only the gravitational constant, the speed of light, 
and Plank's constant, which makes me think they may be the most 
important physical constants around and although the laws of physics 
may be different in different parts of the multiverse those three 
numbers may stay the same. Or maybe not, nobody knows.


I would really like to understand the reasoning that lead to that 
misconception. Just because we can get a from a concatenation of 
physical constants does not make it a physical constant. I have 
reasons to suspect that the gravitational constant is not actually a 
constant but that is not my story to tell. Time, as we are considering 
here, is a measure of duration of interaction. If there is not a means 
to define the standard of that measure then it follows that time does 
not exist in that sense. On the other hand, the existence of the 
transitioning itself is not dependent on the existence of a measure.





  I would really like to understand why it is that John Clark
insists on this elimination attitude toward the referent of that
sequence of ASCII characters. It seems that he does not
understand the ramifications of such a postulate! IMHO, it makes
anything that claims to be produced by his mind to be a
meaningless sequence of ASCII characters as it clearly cannot be
the result of an act of his will. He can have no will


I have said, more than once, that the meaning of will is clear and I 
have absolutely no problem with it; but I don't have the slightest 
idea what free will is supposed to mean and neither do you and 
neither does anybody else. I know this because whenever anybody tries 
to give a definition or a example or even a informal explanation of 
free will it only takes them about 2 seconds to tie themselves into 
idiotic self contradictions, circularity, and other ridiculous logical 
knots.


  John K Clark

The word Free means that it is not forced or coerced. It is a 
legal type term, IMHO. I will agree with your point that the concept has 
been pushed into situations and realms where it simply does not apply. I 
hope that you see my humorous point of the absurdity that flows from 
thinking of free will (or its denial) applies as a universal.


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Onward!

Stephen

Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
~ Francis Bacon

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 19 Jun 2012, at 19:41, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Jun 19, 2012 at 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:
 Unlike the proton and neutron nobody has found any experimental  
evidence that the electron has a inner structure, that it is made  
of parts.


 The primitive matter I talk about is the idea of primary matter in  
the Aristotle sense


Aristotle was a great logician but a dreadful physicist.

 If I say that electron is not primitive, I don't mean it is made  
of part, almost the contrary, that it is a mathematical reality, or  
that it is reducible to a non physical mathematical or theological  
reality, an invariant in our sharable computations.


I don't know what that means. What experiment would I need to  
perform, what would a electron need to do to prove it was primitive.


The electron cannot do that, but my pet amoeba cannot prove they are  
unicellular, despite they are.
It is just that if matter is primitive (not explainable from non  
material relation) then we have to make it infinite to singularize  
consciousness. With comp, we just abandon the idea of singularize  
consciousness in bodies, and then the bodies have to be explained in  
term of number relation.


It is more easy to understand that reversal at the epistemological  
level. Physical concepts are not primitive means that we can reduce  
them to non physical concepts, like those coming from theoretical  
(mathematical) computer science. It means that physics is not the  
fundamental science. Exactly like we can reduce biology to physics, we  
can reduce physics to the study of machine dreams.







 To calculate the first 100 digits of Chaitin's constant you'd  
need to feed all programs that can be expressed in 100 bits or less  
into a Turing Machine and see how many of them stop and how many of  
then do not. Some of them will never stop but the only way to know  
how many is to wait a infinite number of years and then see how many  
programs are still running. So you'd need to be infinitely patient,  
in other words you'd need to be dead.


 Only to be sure of the decimals obtained.

Well yeah, it's easy to calculate Chaitin's constant  if you don't  
mind getting it wrong.


After BB(100) computation steps, the decimals will be correct. I will  
not know it, but they are correct.






 If I relax that constraints, then I need only to be *very  
patient*. The non computable, but well defined Buzzy Beaver function  
(BB) bounds the time needed to wait. Of course it grows *very* fast.  
But I don't need an *infinite* time to get the 100 first digits  
correct. Any time bigger than BB(100) will do.


If we wait a googoplex to the googoplex power years some 100 bit  
programs will still be running, some of them could be Busy Beaver  
programs but others could just be very long finite programs. And in  
the same 1962 paper where Rado introduced the idea of the beaver he  
proved that a general algorithm to tell if a program is a Busy  
Beaver or not does not exist.


That is true for all programs. There is no algorithmic way to see if a  
program compute the factorial function. Again, this does not change  
anything in the argument.




It's true that if you knew the numerical value of Chaitin's Constant  
then you would know that if a 100 bit program had not stopped after  
a Turing Machine had run n number of finite operations then it never  
will; but the trouble is you don't know Chaitin's Constant and never  
can, so you can never know how big n is. So even though they have  
been running for a googoplex to the googoplex power years one of  
those programs could stop 5 seconds from now.


Not if I waited, by chance or whatever, a time bigger than BB(100). If  
a decimal change after that, then we got a computable function growing  
more quickly than BB.





And a Busy Beaver program grows faster than any computable function  
but to my knowledge it has not been proven that all non-computable  
functions grow as fast as the Busy Beaver.


That would be false. There are many non computable predicate, with non  
growing values.






 Lawrence Krauss in his book A Universe From Nothing says that  
someday something close to that might actually be possible.


 You mean? Deriving addition and multiplication from physics?

No, Krauss talks about deriving physics from addition and  
multiplication, or at least from logic; he talks about proving that  
in the multiverse only certain fundamental laws of physics are  
logically self consistent.  He even talks about the distant dream of  
showing that something is consistent but nothing is not.


OK. Nice.





 That is impossible.

I think both Krauss and I would give the same response to that, maybe.

 Why do you use gibberish to condemn free will, and not to  
condemn event without cause?


Because the meaning of a event without a cause is clear and no  
circularity is involved.


Cause is a fuzzy notion, and so non causal is even more fuzzy.




Even the 

Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-20 Thread John Clark
On Wed, Jun 20, 2012 at 3:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 It's true that if you knew the numerical value of Chaitin's Constant
 then you would know that if a 100 bit program had not stopped after a
 Turing Machine had run n number of finite operations then it never will;
 but the trouble is you don't know Chaitin's Constant and never can, so you
 can never know how big n is. So even though they have been running for a
 googoplex to the googoplex power years one of those programs could stop 5
 seconds from now.


  Not if I waited, by chance or whatever, a time bigger than BB(100).


Then it will never stop but you don't know it will never stop, so you'll
still be looking to see if it stops in the next 5 seconds or the next 10
seconds or the next  googoplex to the googoplex power years. Godel was a
Platonist, he thought things were true or they were not he just said
sometimes we can't know which, and Turing certainly believed all programs
will come to a stop or they will not, but he was investigating if we can
always obtain that one bit of information for any program and he proved we
can not. Neither the Busy Beaver nor Chaitin's work on the Omega Constant
changes that fact and is just more confirmation that Turing was right, not
that more confirmation was needed, the proof is ironclad.

 If a decimal change after that, then we got a computable function growing
 more quickly than BB.


As I've said if a program of a given size has not stopped by a certain
finite number of operations it never will, but that fact does you no good
at all because to know what that finite number is you'd have to know
Chaitin's Constant and you don't know that and never will.

  John K Clark

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Re: Autonomy? A proposal

2012-06-19 Thread Stephen P. King

On 6/18/2012 5:13 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Brent, Stephen,


On 18 Jun 2012, at 18:55, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 6/18/2012 11:51 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/18/2012 1:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



Because consciousness, to be relatively manifestable, introduced a 
separation between me and not me, and the not me below my 
substitution level get stable and persistent by the statistical 
interference between the infinitely many computations leading to my 
first person actual state.


How does on computation interfere with another? and how does that 
define a conscious stream of thought that is subjective agreement 
with other streams of thought?


Brent




They interfere statistically by the first person indeterminacy on UD* 
(or arithmetic).


Hi Bruno,

You seem to have an exact metric for this measure of the first 
person indeterminacy on UD* (or arithmetic). What I need to understand 
is the reasoning behind your choice of set theory and arithmetic axioms; 
after all there are many mutually-exclusive and yet self-consistent 
choices that can be made. Do you see a 1p feature that would allow you 
to known that preference is not biased?



And it remains to be seen if that defines a conscious stream of 
thought that is subjective agreement with other streams of thought.


If it does not have subjective argeement with other mutually 
exclusive then there would be a big problem. No?










Do you realize that you are asking Bruno the same question here 
that I have been asking him for a long time now? Exactly how do 
computations have any form of causal efficacy upon each other within 
an immaterialist scheme?


By the embedding of a large part of the constructive computer science 
in arithmetic.


What part is not embedded?




There is a universal diophantine polynomial (I will say more on this 
on the FOAR list soon). Once you have a universal system, you get them 
all (with CT). I might identify a notion of cause with the notion of 
universal (or not) machine. Some existing number relation implements 
all the possible relations between all possible universal machine.


Universality (of computations) requires the existence of an 
equivalence class (modulo diffeomorphisms) of physical systems over 
which that computation is functionally equivalent. No? If not, how is 
universality defined? Over a purely abstract set? What defines the 
axioms for that set?





You have to study the detail of Gödel's proof, or study Kleene's 
predicate, which translate computer science in arithmetic. For the non 
materialist, the problem is not to get interactions, the problem is 
not having too much of them.


Correct! You get an infinite regress of interactions! Way too 
many! In fact, I bet that you get at least a aleph_1 cardinal infinity. 
But what about the continuum hypothesis? Do you take it as true or false 
in your sets? If you take it as false then you obtain a very interesting 
thing in the number theory; it looks like all arithmetics are 
non-standard in some infinite limit! You have to have a means to 
necessitate a limit to finite sets. The requirement of Boolean 
satisfyability 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boolean_satisfiability_problemexactly 
gives us this rule.




Keep in mind I submit a problem, for the computationalist. Not a 
solution., but precise problems. You can use the arithmetical 
quantization to test test the quantum tautologies.


We will see if there is or not some winning topological quantum 
computer on the border of numberland, as seen from inside all 
computations.


What physical experiment will measure this effect? If there is no 
physical effect correlated with the difference, then this idea is 
literally a figment of someone's imagination and nothing more. The 
physical implementation of a quantum computer is a physical event. I 
thought that your idea that computations are independent of all 
physicality was completely and causally independent from such. =-O


My argument is that a computational simulation is nothing more than 
vaporware (a figment of someone's imagination) until and unless there 
exists a plenum of physical systems that all can implement the best 
possible version of that simulation. When we recall that Wolfram 
defines the real thing as the best possible simulation, we reach a 
conclusion. This plenum is the trace or action (???I am not sure???)  
of (on?) an equivalence class of spaces that are diffeomorphic to each 
*other under some ordering*. I am not certain of the wording of the 
first part of this, but I am absolutely certain of the latter part, an 
equivalence class of spaces that are diffeomorphic to each *other under 
some ordering* I am unassailably certain of.




--
Onward!

Stephen

Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
~ Francis Bacon

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Re: Autonomy?

2012-06-19 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 19 Jun 2012, at 00:08, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/18/2012 2:13 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Brent, Stephen,


On 18 Jun 2012, at 18:55, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 6/18/2012 11:51 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/18/2012 1:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



Because consciousness, to be relatively manifestable, introduced  
a separation between me and not me, and the not me below my  
substitution level get stable and persistent by the statistical  
interference between the infinitely many computations leading to  
my first person actual state.


How does on computation interfere with another? and how does that  
define a conscious stream of thought that is subjective agreement  
with other streams of thought?


Brent




They interfere statistically by the first person indeterminacy on  
UD* (or arithmetic).


That still seems very vague.  I can suppose that many computations  
go thru the same or similar sequences which later branch and so have  
indeterminant futures.  But is that 'interference'?


Sure. Of course a priori it is not wave like, for the probabilities  
add only, untilm you take the self-reference constraint into account,  
which leads to the arithmetical quantization, which imposes a quantum  
logic on the consistent extensions.





And why should it produce any me, not me boundary?


It does not. personal identity is an illusion due to disconnected  
memories, and correct self-reference. The me/not me is just explained  
by the diagonalisation: if Dx gives xx, DD gives DD.







And it remains to be seen if that defines a conscious stream of  
thought that is subjective agreement with other streams of thought.








Do you realize that you are asking Bruno the same question  
here that I have been asking him for a long time now? Exactly how  
do computations have any form of causal efficacy upon each other  
within an immaterialist scheme?


By the embedding of a large part of the constructive computer  
science in arithmetic.


There is a universal diophantine polynomial (I will say more on  
this on the FOAR list soon). Once you have a universal system, you  
get them all (with CT). I might identify a notion of cause with the  
notion of universal (or not) machine. Some existing number relation  
implements all the possible relations between all possible  
universal machine.


You have to study the detail of Gödel's proof, or study Kleene's  
predicate, which translate computer science in arithmetic. For the  
non materialist, the problem is not to get interactions, the  
problem is not having too much of them.


Exactly.  It's the problem of having proved too much.  To say all  
computations can exist and if consciousness is computation then all  
conscious thoughts will exist is true but meaningless - like  
tautologies are.


It is not tautological because we can test if there are too much  
computations and if they obey quantum logic or not, so it is certainly  
not tautological. You forget that the laws of physics are given by the  
statistics on those computations.


Bruno




Brent



Keep in mind I submit a problem, for the computationalist. Not a  
solution., but precise problems. You can use the arithmetical  
quantization to test test the quantum tautologies.


We will see if there is or not some winning topological quantum  
computer on the border of numberland, as seen from inside all  
computations.



Bruno



Might it be that 'subjective agreement between streams of thought  
is just another form of what computer science denotes as  
bisimulation (except that it is not a timeless platonic version of  
it)?--

Onward!

Stephen




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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