Re: Belief Statements

2005-02-07 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi John: Sorry this took awhile - I have been very busy. At 07:49 AM 1/31/2005, you wrote: Hi, Hal, I stepped out from this discussion a while ago, because it grew above my head (or attentional endurance), but I keep reading. Now is a remark of yours I want to ask about: I defined information as

Re: Belief Statements

2005-02-04 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi All: As I indicated in my last post I now see choice as an essential part of my (2). But what do I mean by choice and how does choice operate on the dynamic? Speculation: What is my idea of choice? In my (2) choice is the ability of a kernel currently having physical reality to select in

RE: Belief Statements

2005-02-02 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 10:19 01/02/05 -0800, Hal Finney wrote: Bruno writes: I am not sure that I understand what you do with that measure on programs. I prefer to look at infinite coin generations (that is infinitely reiterated self-duplications) and put measure on infinite sets of alternatives. Those infinite

RE: Belief Statements

2005-02-02 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 1 Feb 2005 Hal Finney wrote: Here is how I approach it, based on Schmidhuber. Suppose we pick a model of computation based on a particular Universal Turing Machine (UTM). Imagine this model being given all possible input tapes. There are an uncountably infinite number of such tapes, but on

Re: Belief Statements

2005-02-01 Thread Hal Ruhl
I would like to offer a resolution to my issue with my (2) by indicating that choice is the essential variable that allows the dynamic of an evolving Something over kernels within the All to be inconsistent with its history. This allows both the appearance of time and the appearance of choice

RE: Belief Statements

2005-02-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 12:51 29/01/05 -0800, Hal Finney wrote: On 28 Jan 2005 Hal Finney wrote: I suggest that the answer is that accidental instantiations only contribute an infinitesimal amount, compared to the contributions of universes like ours. Stathis Papaioannou replied: I don't understand this

RE: Belief Statements

2005-02-01 Thread Hal Finney
Bruno writes: I am not sure that I understand what you do with that measure on programs. I prefer to look at infinite coin generations (that is infinitely reiterated self-duplications) and put measure on infinite sets of alternatives. Those infinite sets of relative alternative *are*

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-31 Thread John M
Sent: Sunday, January 30, 2005 12:33 PM Subject: Re: Belief Statements Hi Stephen: At 11:08 AM 1/30/2005, you wrote: Dear Hal, How do your kernels fundamentally differ from Julian Barbor's time capsules? I defined information as the potential to establish a boundary. A kernel

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-30 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Stephen: At 11:08 AM 1/30/2005, you wrote: Dear Hal, How do your kernels fundamentally differ from Julian Barbor's time capsules? I defined information as the potential to establish a boundary. A kernel is the potential to establish a particular boundary. When I said time in a previous

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-30 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Stephen: I took a look at Julian Barbour's time capsules and his Nows may be like my kernels but in my (2) the sequence of kernels is inconsistent with its past due to the = dynamic as I have indicated. A sequence of kernels may for a number of steps look like one could derive something

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-30 Thread Jesse Mazer
Hal Ruhl wrote: Hi Stephen: I took a look at Julian Barbour's time capsules and his Nows may be like my kernels but in my (2) the sequence of kernels is inconsistent with its past due to the = dynamic as I have indicated. Barbour's idea is that there is no sequence to the time capsules at all,

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-30 Thread Stephen Paul King
- From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Sunday, January 30, 2005 6:38 PM Subject: Re: Belief Statements Hal Ruhl wrote: Hi Stephen: I took a look at Julian Barbour's time capsules and his Nows may be like my kernels but in my (2) the sequence of kernels

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-29 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 28 Jan 2005 Hal Finney wrote: Here's how I look at the question of whether a bit string, if accidentally implemented as part of another program, would be conscious. . . . I would approach this from the Schmidhuber perspective that all programs exist and run, in a Platonic sense, and this

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-29 Thread Hal Ruhl
I recently posted that I seemed to have two theories re how my multiverse might work. These are: 1) Nothing - Something = to completion. 2) {Nothing#(n) + All[(n-1) = evolving Somethings]} - {Nothing#(n+1) + All[n = evolving Somethings]} : repeat... Here: - is a

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-29 Thread Hal Finney
On 28 Jan 2005 Hal Finney wrote: I suggest that the answer is that accidental instantiations only contribute an infinitesimal amount, compared to the contributions of universes like ours. Stathis Papaioannou replied: I don't understand this conclusion. A lengthy piece of code (whether it

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-29 Thread Hal Ruhl
I meant to define the symbol = as: = is a path over kernels where each new step is inconsistent with prior steps. Hal Ruhl

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-29 Thread Stephen Paul King
is consistent to some degree /delta with the information available about the prior steps? Stephen - Original Message - From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Saturday, January 29, 2005 3:43 PM Subject: RE: Belief Statements I meant to define the symbol

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-29 Thread Hal Ruhl
At 06:29 PM 1/29/2005, you wrote: Dear Hal, What your defining seems to me to be a NOT map or else it is a mere random map. There is no consistent definition of an inconsistent map otherwise, IMHO. Please explain how I am wrong. ;-) I wanted to have a sequence that does not accumulate net

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-29 Thread Stephen Paul King
Subject: Re: Belief Statements At 06:29 PM 1/29/2005, you wrote: Dear Hal, What your defining seems to me to be a NOT map or else it is a mere random map. There is no consistent definition of an inconsistent map otherwise, IMHO. Please explain how I am wrong. ;-) I wanted to have a sequence

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-29 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Stephen: At 10:49 PM 1/29/2005, you wrote: Dear Hal, What do you propose as a means to explain the memory and processing required to be sure of inconsistency as opposed to consistency? It is not a logical inconsistency. What I am trying to convey is that each step in the sequence pays no

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-28 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 09:41 27/01/05 +, Brent Meeker wrote: -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2005 2:32 PM To: everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Belief Statements With comp the mind-body relation is one-one in the body - mind direction

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-28 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 09:29 28/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 28 Jan 2005 Bruno Marchal wrote: At 22:19 27/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: For example, if I am running an AI program on my computer and a particular bitstring is associated with the simulated being noting, I think, therefore I am,

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 08:38 26/01/05 -0500, Tianran Chen wrote: Hal Finney wrote: I had a problem with the demonstration in Permutation City. They claimed to chop up a simulated consciousness timewise, and then to run the pieces backwards: first the 10th second, then the 9th second, then the 8th, and so on. And of

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 22:19 27/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: For example, if I am running an AI program on my computer and a particular bitstring is associated with the simulated being noting, I think, therefore I am, then should not the same bitstring arising by chance in the course of, say, a

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-27 Thread Hal Finney
It is true that there are some physical systems for which we can predict the future state without calculating all intermediate states. Periodic systems will fall into this category if we can figure out analytically what the period is. But there are other systems where this is thought to be

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 28 Jan 2005 Bruno Marchal wrote: At 22:19 27/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: For example, if I am running an AI program on my computer and a particular bitstring is associated with the simulated being noting, I think, therefore I am, then should not the same bitstring arising by

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker wrote: For example, if I am running an AI program on my computer and a particular bitstring is associated with the simulated being noting, I think, therefore I am, then should not the same bitstring arising by chance in the course of, say, a spreadsheet calculation give rise to the

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-27 Thread Jesse Mazer
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: For example, if I am running an AI program on my computer and a particular bitstring is associated with the simulated being noting, I think, therefore I am, then should not the same bitstring arising by chance in the course of, say, a spreadsheet calculation give rise

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Hal Finney) To: everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Belief Statements Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2005 12:16:24 -0800 (PST) It is true that there are some physical systems for which we can predict the future state without calculating all intermediate states. Periodic systems

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 28 Jan 2005 Brent Meeker wrote: I'm not sure I understand the computational hyposthesis - and I certainly don't *believe* it. So you don't believe that even in principle a digital computer can be conscious? I think the challenge to this is going to come not from theoretical considerations,

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-27 Thread Hal Finney
Here's how I look at the question of whether a bit string, if accidentally implemented as part of another program, would be conscious. First, it's a little confusing what we mean by a bit string. Is this the program of the computer? A snapshot of its state? Can a program or a snapshot be

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-26 Thread Stephen Paul King
in the bud. I am surprised that Greg Egan didn't notice this... Stephen - Original Message - From: Tianran Chen [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2005 8:38 AM Subject: Re: Belief Statements Hal Finney wrote: I had

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-26 Thread Tianran Chen
Dear Stephen Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Hal and Tianran, Assuming there is some aspect of consciousness that requires QM ( I side with Penrose on this) these out of order computations are impossible. This boils down to the fact that for systems that have time-like relationship with each

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-26 Thread Stephen Paul King
Mind or John Gribbin's Schroedinger's Kittens. Stephen - Original Message - From: Tianran Chen [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2005 9:48 PM Subject: Re: Belief Statements Dear Stephen Stephen Paul King

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-19 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Hal, At 22:30 17/01/05 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote: I reject Schmidhuber Comp because a sequence of world states [world kernels] which may indeed be Turing machine [or some extension there of] emulable is nevertheless managed by the system's dynamic which is external to the machine. Any sub

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-18 Thread Hal Ruhl
What I am really talking about is availability of choice. My All/Nothing model appears to preclude choice. In this it seems a member of a class that assume all information already exists. Awhile ago I posted on another model in which there is a Nothing. This Nothing suffers the same

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-18 Thread Danny Mayes
I remember your previous posts on nothing, and how it decays. However, this concept requires an intelligence to be present with nothing to cause nothingness to decay, does it not? It is intelligence and consciousness which defines things and makes relative comparisons. Danny Mayes Hal

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-18 Thread Hal Ruhl
At 02:37 PM 1/18/2005, you wrote: I remember your previous posts on nothing, and how it decays. However, this concept requires an intelligence to be present with nothing to cause nothingness to decay, does it not? It is intelligence and consciousness which defines things and makes relative

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-18 Thread Danny Mayes
It may be a freshman philosophy question, but it can't be a physics question because you are dealing with issues occurring before our known physics were established. Hal Ruhl wrote: At 02:37 PM 1/18/2005, you wrote: I remember your previous posts on nothing, and how it decays. However, this

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-18 Thread Hal Ruhl
At 04:41 PM 1/18/2005, you wrote: It may be a freshman philosophy question, but it can't be a physics question because you are dealing with issues occurring before our known physics were established. You really miss the point. It is a question of logic and finding an unavoidable meaningful

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-17 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 01:32 16/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 15/1/05 Bruno Marchal wrote: Obviously! But it is so only because you dismiss the failure induction problem. Also: third person identity is arguably an illusion. But I hardy doubt first person identity can ever be an illusion or that it

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-17 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hello Hal, In my particular All/Nothing approach my world kernels are packets of information necessary and sufficient to describe a particular state of a universe. The dynamic of the approach provides physical reality to world kernels in sequences [worlds] in a manner that is inconsistent with

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-17 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Bruno: At 09:51 AM 1/17/2005, you wrote: Hello Hal, snip mine Now if one envisions the physical reality evolution of sub components of the world kernels in such a sequence the result would be the same. ? So I find I must also reject ... Comp: I (you) am (are) computable/Turing emulable.

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-16 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Bruno: In my particular All/Nothing approach my world kernels are packets of information necessary and sufficient to describe a particular state of a universe. The dynamic of the approach provides physical reality to world kernels in sequences [worlds] in a manner that is inconsistent with

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-15 Thread Stephen Paul King
]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Saturday, January 15, 2005 10:30 PM Subject: Re: Belief Statements On 15/1/05 Danny Mayes wrote: To have any sense perception there has to be the passage of an inordinately large amount of time as compared to the smallest units of time available. If each

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 15/1/05 Brent Meeker wrote: (quoting my post) It's easy to get confused over the meaning of terms like different person here. The basic idea I am trying to get across is that if a person or other conscious entity is destroyed and after a certain time period is (to an arbitrary level of

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-14 Thread Bruno Marchal
[EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Thursday, January 13, 2005 10:49 AM Subject: Re: Belief Statements At 09:16 13/01/05 -0500, Danny Mayes wrote: Could you explain this last line? Bruno Marchal wrote: At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-14 Thread John M
Stathis Papaioannou writes: Here is another irrational belief I hold, while I'm confessing. I am absolutely convinced that continuity of personal identity is a kind of illusion. If I were to be painlessly killed every second and immediately replaced by an exact copy, with all my

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Hal Finney writes: Stathis Papaioannou writes: As for the failure of induction if all possible worlds exist, I prefer to simply bypass the problem. I predict that in the next few moments the world will most likely continue to behave as it always has in the past... Here I am a few moments

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-13 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 1. Every possible world can be simulated by a computer program. With the most usual (Aristotelian) sense of the term world, this assumption would entail the falsity of comp, which is that I can be simulated by a computer program. (I, or any of

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-13 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: As for the failure of induction if all possible worlds exist, I prefer to simply bypass the problem. Mmm... I think you make the same mistake as David Lewis (In the plurality of worlds, but in counterfactuals it partially fix the mistake ...).

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-13 Thread Danny Mayes
Could you explain this last line? Bruno Marchal wrote: At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: As for the failure of induction if all possible worlds exist, I prefer to simply bypass the problem. Mmm... I think you make the same mistake as David Lewis (In the plurality of worlds,

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-13 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 09:16 13/01/05 -0500, Danny Mayes wrote: Could you explain this last line? Bruno Marchal wrote: At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: As for the failure of induction if all possible worlds exist, I prefer to simply bypass the problem. Mmm... I think you make the same mistake as

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-13 Thread John M
]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Thursday, January 13, 2005 10:49 AM Subject: Re: Belief Statements At 09:16 13/01/05 -0500, Danny Mayes wrote: Could you explain this last line? Bruno Marchal wrote: At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: As for the failure of induction

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Bruno Marchal wrote: At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 1. Every possible world can be simulated by a computer program. With the most usual (Aristotelian) sense of the term world, this assumption would entail the falsity of comp, which is that I can be simulated by a computer

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-13 Thread Hal Finney
Stathis Papaioannou writes: Here is another irrational belief I hold, while I'm confessing. I am absolutely convinced that continuity of personal identity is a kind of illusion. If I were to be painlessly killed every second and immediately replaced by an exact copy, with all my memories,

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-12 Thread Alastair Malcolm
- Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Alastair Malcolm [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: 11 January 2005 14:47 Subject: Re: Belief Statements I certainly agree. Now the problem is that there are many logics, and so there are many notion

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-12 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 09:45 12/01/05 +, Alastair Malcolm wrote: It sounds like we may be using 'logics' for two different purposes. For me, basic logic is intended here (that of syllogisms and 'if it is true that p, then it cannot be the case that p is false'); This is a little ambiguous. But I will take it as

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-12 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 18:12 11/01/05 -0500, John M quotes Russell Standish writing: (if I am correct in the quotes). 4) For those who believe in Computationalism, the Turing model of computation implicitly requires this Time postulate. Here I disagree a lot. Actually most models of computation does no require

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-12 Thread John M
- From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tuesday, January 11, 2005 8:19 PM Subject: Re: Belief Statements On Tue, Jan 11, 2005 at 06:12:28PM -0500, John M wrote: SNIP, Quotes for reply see above in the text.

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 9 January 2005 Alastair Malcolm wrote: This is a fascinating discussion list, full of stimulating ideas and theories, but I would be interested to know what people *actually* believe on the subject of many/all worlds - what one would bet one's house or life on, given that one were forced to

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-12 Thread Hal Finney
Stathis Papaioannou writes: 1. Every possible world can be simulated by a computer program. I'm not sure that this is the best definition of a possible world. I'm concerned that we are hiding a lot of assumptions in this word. It relates to my earlier comment about ambiguity in which constitutes

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 10:32 09/01/05 +, Alastair Malcolm wrote: For my own part, I give strong credibility (50%) to the existence of many worlds in some guise or other, and in particular to the existence of all logically possible(*) worlds (alpw). I certainly agree. Now the problem is that there are many

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-11 Thread John M
IL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Monday, January 10, 2005 6:50 PM Subject: Re: Belief Statements Dear Russell, since you e-mail without words (only an attachment) I copy your text here to give my reply to it - interspaced, if you don't mind : -- On M

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-10 Thread Alastair Malcolm
- Original Message - From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: 09 January 2005 16:21 Subject: Re: Belief Statements Alastair Malcolm writes: For my own part, I give strong credibility (50%) to the existence of many worlds in some guise or other

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-10 Thread Alastair Malcolm
- Original Message - From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: 09 January 2005 19:28 Subject: Re: Belief Statements I can't conceive of space-time being anything other than infinite. The existence of all logically possible worlds seems necessary

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-10 Thread John M
Comments below, please. John M - Original Message - From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Sunday, January 09, 2005 8:16 PM Subject: Re: Belief Statements Hi Russell: My dynamic in part produces worlds that appear to have time as a property but also

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-10 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Russell: At 06:50 PM 1/10/2005, you wrote: It is an assumption (or perhaps postulate: the Time postulate). It is amenable to debate, just as Euclid's axioms are. I offer the following points in its favour: 1) Observation is the process of creating information, by distinguishing differences

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-09 Thread Hal Finney
Alastair Malcolm writes: For my own part, I give strong credibility (50%) to the existence of many worlds in some guise or other, and in particular to the existence of all logically possible(*) worlds (alpw). For me the existence of one world (ours) so conveniently life-suited - sufficiently

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-09 Thread Norman Samish
Subject: Re: Belief Statements Alastair Malcolm writes: For my own part, I give strong credibility (50%) to the existence of many worlds in some guise or other, and in particular to the existence of all logically possible(*) worlds (alpw). For me the existence of one world (ours) so conveniently

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-09 Thread Hal Ruhl
My views on the subject of a multiverse are: 1) The base level embedding system should have no net information. 2) The base level embedding system should have a dynamic. The above seem to have consequences: i) There can be no down select [limitation] on the number of worlds. ii) There can be no

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-09 Thread John M
@eskimo.com Sent: Sunday, January 09, 2005 4:01 PM Subject: Re: Belief Statements My views on the subject of a multiverse are: 1) The base level embedding system should have no net information. 2) The base level embedding system should have a dynamic. The above seem to have consequences: i

Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-09 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Russell: My dynamic in part produces worlds that appear to have time as a property but also produces all kinds of worlds that have no time in the sense of there being any ordered sequence. There are also worlds that are just a single kernel that is given physical reality in a manner