Re: Belief Statements

2005-02-07 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi John:
Sorry this took awhile - I have been very busy.
At 07:49 AM 1/31/2005, you wrote:
Hi, Hal,
I stepped out from this discussion a while ago, because it grew above my
head (or attentional endurance), but I keep reading. Now is a remark of
yours I want to ask about:
I defined information as the potential to establish a boundary.
A kernel is the potential to establish a particular boundary.
I don't work with the rigor and discipline you display, -  I am no designing
engineer, nor administrator of people doing such precision - I let my
intuition tease me. So more than a decade ago I identified (my?)
information
as acknowledged difference whereby the difference was the criterion for
the existence. (Your ALL  Nothing don't exist in this sense, I am sorry
for the kill.)
Acknowledged, of course by anything. Now I think a difference involves a
boundary. Without such 'implied', no diference could be establihed. I feel a
clsoeness here.
Do you?
A bit.  I do not know how to do a one for one on acknowledged.
Then the 2nd part: which invokes my more recent domain: wholeness (akin to
Robert Rosen's complexity concept, the 'natural' one) where I consider
models as the basis for our ways of thinking, since we cannot encompass
the tota;lity in our little mind. Topical and other models, maps,
territories, the sciences, ideas, etc. They are in intereffect, all of them,
in diverse depth
as Kampis identifies it (that part is what I am concerned about lately) and
it gives some(!) natural basis for the topical/scientific model-selection.
The models are surrounded by their boundaries and our reductionistic
observation stops right there. Neglecting the 'beyond', which leads to
paradoxes, poorly understood concepts, and all the misunderstanding we can
explore in discussions like this one.
I feel such chosen/selected models are akin to your kernels if they are not
offended by it. Within boundaries that can occasionally be trasncended if
one must.
The difference is that I think (my) boundaries are selected.
I am not sure how to work with this.  My All contains all potential 
boundaries [kernels] including itself, the Nothing and the boundary between 
them [the Everything].  This I reconciled in the An All/Nothing multiverse 
model thread.  At this level there can be no selection.  However, the 
dynamic internal to the All selects kernels to which it gives physical 
reality for awhile.

(Time is another open questionmark for me, I don't feel ready to address
it).
Time is tough.  I am struggling with it re my posted effort to understand 
how choice in my (2) model can function and whether or not a SAS can be 
explained by that functioning.  I do not think an ideal clock which is - as 
usually conceived - just a repeated loop of relative mechanical position 
has anything to do with time which seems more some measure of non 
repeated change.  This is why I think that my oil canning boundaries within 
a kernel having physical reality are outside time.

Did I miss some important aspect of yours?
I do not know.  I am working on a post to bring all my recent posts 
together.
Hal Ruhl 




Re: Belief Statements

2005-02-04 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi All:
As I indicated in my last post I now see choice as an essential part of my 
(2).  But what do I mean by choice and how does choice operate on the 
dynamic?

Speculation:
What is my idea of choice?  In my (2) choice is the ability of a kernel 
currently having physical reality to select in part which kernel(s) next 
have physical reality and this selection is not a constant while a kernel 
has physical reality.  This is not necessarily the same as free will.

I think the first thing to notice is that by my definition of kernel the 
boundary establishing potential of a given kernel need not be associated 
with a fully fixed boundary.  A boundary could for example have something 
like oil canning dents in it.  The issue re the kernel is whether it is a 
particular boundary not a question of whether or not it is completely 
static.   Such flexing or partially indeterminate features of a boundary 
partially determine the next kernel given physical reality.  That is the 
current condition of the current kernel when the external dynamic moves 
physical reality partially determines which kernel(s) receive it.

Thus the external dynamic would be inconsistent with its history which is a 
requirement of (2).

Is this free will?  Free will seems to require that one oil canning 
dent influence the state sequence of another oil canning dent in the same 
kernel while that kernel has physical reality.  This seems an unnecessary 
step up in complexity for the total dynamic but it is not forbidden by the 
model since within a kernel the actual oil canning of a dent and its causes 
are not necessarily fixed.  Surely this applies to large regions of the 
boundary containing many oil canning dents.

What is a SAS in this venue?  Taken over a large enough region of the 
boundary the mechanism described above could account for self aware in 
what is actually an overall timeless moment.

I will try to put this all in a post to the An All/Nothing multiverse 
model thread.

Hal Ruhl




RE: Belief Statements

2005-02-02 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 10:19 01/02/05 -0800, Hal Finney wrote:
Bruno writes:
 I am not sure that I understand what you do with that measure on programs.
 I prefer to look at infinite coin generations (that is infinitely
 reiterated self-duplications)
 and put measure on infinite sets of alternatives. Those infinite sets of
 relative alternative *are* themselves generated by simple programs (like
 the UD).
Here is how I approach it, based on Schmidhuber.

OK. But remember that Schmidhuber completely dismisses
the distinction between first and third points of view, and so his
approach cannot be used to explain both the laws of mind, the
laws of matter and the relation between them.
I have explained this before.

Suppose we pick a model
of computation based on a particular Universal Turing Machine (UTM).

All right. And with Church's thesis Schmidhuber is right to invoke the
compiler theorem when he justifies such a choice is arbitrary.

Imagine this model being given all possible input tapes.

At once? I cannot imagine that, except under the form of a UD. This
follows from the two diagonalization posts to this list referred to in my url.
It is really the closure of the set of partial recursive function which makes
the comp whole comp definable. I will come back on the diagonalisations.
It's the pillar of all the construction I try to describe (but also of a very
large part of theoretical computer science, including Li and Vitanyi).

There are an
uncountably infinite number of such tapes, but on any given tape only
a finite length will actually be used (i.e. the probability of using
an infinite number of bits of the tape is zero).

To *define* (only) the program. But during arbitrary runs of even very
short programs all the tape will be used. In the sense that the needed
part of the tape will grow in an unboundable way, getting at deep
(in Bennett sense) large strings. Those are both absolutely (or
Kolmogorov-chaitin improbable but are highly probable relatively to
each other sligth variant (like the work of Shakespeare which is
both coin-improbable and then reflect determined universal
lobian anxieties (to be short). The only measure I can make sense
of is the relative (to a state) measure of the histories
(= computations from some 1 or 3 point of views) going through that states.

  This means that any
program which runs is only a finite size, yet occurs on an infinite
number of tapes.
This is ambiguous for me. Where on the tapes ? In company of other
programs ? Finite or recursive or recursively enumerable sets of programs?

 The fraction of the tapes which holds a given program
is proportional to 1 over 2^(program length), if they are binary tapes.

Yes but you postulate an infinite random structure at the start. What is that?
Taking the inside view into account gives cheaply strong form of randomness
the first person comp indeterminacy).

This is considered the measure of the given program.
An equivalent way to think of it is to imagine the UTM being fed with
a tape created by coin flips.  Now the probability that it will run a
given program is its measure, and again it will be proportional to 1
over 2^(program length).  I don't know whether this is what you mean
by infinite coin generations but it sounds similar.

By some aspect: I just show how comp gives sense to infinite coin
generation by iterating self-duplications. In *that* situation (which is 
only partial
relatively to the UD) we have a random noise.
And if we duplicate the populations of observers we get a locally
third person (in appearance) observable random noise, like Quantum
Physicist *seems* to observe (but Many-Worlders know better).


I believe you can get the same concept of measure by using the Universal
Dovetailer (UD) but I don't see it as necessary or particularly helpful
to invoke this step.  To me it seems simpler just to imagine all possible
programs being run, without having to also imagine the operating system
which runs them all on a time-sharing computer, which is what the UD
amounts to.

The UD is just a program among others but it can be shown that it
*is* the simplest program generating the most complex histories (actually all).
But the complexity is judged from inside, by those self-aware programs
generated in the many computations generated by the UD, and distributed
in the whole execution of it (UD*).

 Now we cannot know in which computational history we belong,
 or more exactly we belong to an infinity of computational histories
 (undistinguishable up to now). (It could be all the repetition of your
 simple program)
And by repetition of your simple program I think you mean the fact
that there are an infinite number of tapes which have the same prefix
(the same starting bits) and which all therefore run the same program,
if it fits in that prefix.  This is the basic reason why shorter programs
have greater measure than longer ones, because there are a larger fraction
of the tapes which have a given short prefix than a long one.

That 

RE: Belief Statements

2005-02-02 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 1 Feb 2005 Hal Finney wrote:
Here is how I approach it, based on Schmidhuber.  Suppose we pick a model
of computation based on a particular Universal Turing Machine (UTM).
Imagine this model being given all possible input tapes.  There are an
uncountably infinite number of such tapes, but on any given tape only
a finite length will actually be used (i.e. the probability of using
an infinite number of bits of the tape is zero).  This means that any
program which runs is only a finite size, yet occurs on an infinite
number of tapes.  The fraction of the tapes which holds a given program
is proportional to 1 over 2^(program length), if they are binary tapes.
This is considered the measure of the given program.
An equivalent way to think of it is to imagine the UTM being fed with
a tape created by coin flips.  Now the probability that it will run a
given program is its measure, and again it will be proportional to 1
over 2^(program length).
It sounds like this program-to-generate-all-programs includes a mechanism 
whereby there is a Pr=0.5 that it will halt (and go on to the next program) 
as it generates each bit. This will do the job, and it will favour shorter 
programs, but why rely on this particular program? And if you consider not a 
program-to-generate-all-programs, but simply the set of all possible 
programs, how do you arrive at this 1/2^n measure?

--Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Belief Statements

2005-02-01 Thread Hal Ruhl
I would like to offer a resolution to my issue with my (2) by indicating 
that choice is the essential variable that allows the dynamic of an 
evolving Something over kernels within the All to be inconsistent with its 
history.

This allows both the appearance of time and the appearance of choice to be 
not appearances at all.

Hal



RE: Belief Statements

2005-02-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 12:51 29/01/05 -0800, Hal Finney wrote:
 On 28 Jan 2005 Hal Finney wrote:
 I suggest that the answer is that accidental instantiations only
 contribute an infinitesimal amount, compared to the contributions of
 universes like ours.
Stathis Papaioannou replied:
 I don't understand this conclusion. A lengthy piece of code (whether it
 represents a moment of consciousness or anything else) is certainly less
 likely to be accidentally implemented on some random computer than on the
 computer running the original software. But surely the opposite is the 
case
 if you allow that all possible computer programs run simply by virtue of
 their existence as mathematical objects. For every program running on a
 biological or electronic computer, there must be infinitely many exact
 analogues and every minor and major variation thereof running out there in
 Platonia.

I'm afraid I don't understand your argument here.  I am using the
Schmidhuber concept that the measure of a program is related to its size
and/or information complexity: that shorter (and simpler) programs have
greater measure than longer ones.  Do you agree with that, or are you
challenging that view?
My point was then that we can imagine a short program that can naturally
evolve consciousness, whereas to create consciousness artificially
or arbitrarily, without a course of natural evolution, requires a huge
number of bits to specify the conscious entity in its entirety.
You mention infinity; are you saying that there is no meaningful
difference between the measure of programs, because each one has an
infinite number of analogs?  Could you explain that concept in more
detail?

I am not sure that I understand what you do with that measure on programs.
I prefer to look at infinite coin generations (that is infinitely 
reiterated self-duplications)
and put measure on infinite sets of alternatives. Those infinite sets of
relative alternative *are* themselves generated by simple programs (like
the UD). Now we cannot know in which computational history we belong,
or more exactly we belong to an infinity of computational histories
(undistinguishable up to now). (It could be all the repetition of your 
simple program)
But to make an infinitely correct prediction we should average on all
computational histories going through our states.
Your measure could explain why simple and short subroutine persists
everywhere but what we must do is to extract the actual measure, the one
apparently given by QM, from an internal measure on all relatively
consistent continuation of our (unknown!) probable computationnal state.
This is independent of the fact that some short programs could play the role of
some initiator of something persisting. Perhaps a quantum dovetailer ? But to
proceed by taking comp seriously this too should be justify from within.
Searching a measure on the computational histories instead of the
programs can not only be justified by thought experiments, but can
be defined neatly mathematically. Also a modern way of talking on the
Many Worlds is in term of relative consistent histories.
But the histories emerge from within. This too must be taken into account.
It can change the logic. (And actually changes it according to the lobian
machine).

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



RE: Belief Statements

2005-02-01 Thread Hal Finney
Bruno writes:
 I am not sure that I understand what you do with that measure on programs.
 I prefer to look at infinite coin generations (that is infinitely 
 reiterated self-duplications)
 and put measure on infinite sets of alternatives. Those infinite sets of
 relative alternative *are* themselves generated by simple programs (like
 the UD).

Here is how I approach it, based on Schmidhuber.  Suppose we pick a model
of computation based on a particular Universal Turing Machine (UTM).
Imagine this model being given all possible input tapes.  There are an
uncountably infinite number of such tapes, but on any given tape only
a finite length will actually be used (i.e. the probability of using
an infinite number of bits of the tape is zero).  This means that any
program which runs is only a finite size, yet occurs on an infinite
number of tapes.  The fraction of the tapes which holds a given program
is proportional to 1 over 2^(program length), if they are binary tapes.
This is considered the measure of the given program.

An equivalent way to think of it is to imagine the UTM being fed with
a tape created by coin flips.  Now the probability that it will run a
given program is its measure, and again it will be proportional to 1
over 2^(program length).  I don't know whether this is what you mean
by infinite coin generations but it sounds similar.

I believe you can get the same concept of measure by using the Universal
Dovetailer (UD) but I don't see it as necessary or particularly helpful
to invoke this step.  To me it seems simpler just to imagine all possible
programs being run, without having to also imagine the operating system
which runs them all on a time-sharing computer, which is what the UD
amounts to.

 Now we cannot know in which computational history we belong,
 or more exactly we belong to an infinity of computational histories
 (undistinguishable up to now). (It could be all the repetition of your 
 simple program)

And by repetition of your simple program I think you mean the fact
that there are an infinite number of tapes which have the same prefix
(the same starting bits) and which all therefore run the same program,
if it fits in that prefix.  This is the basic reason why shorter programs
have greater measure than longer ones, because there are a larger fraction
of the tapes which have a given short prefix than a long one.

It's also possible, as you imply, that your consciousness is instantiated
in multiple completely different programs.  For example, we live in a
program which pretty straightforwardly implements the universe we see;
but we also live in a program which implements a very different universe,
in which aliens exist who run artificial life experiments, and we are
one of those experiments.  We also live in programs which just happen to
simulate moments of our consciousness, purely through random chance.

However, my guess is that the great majority of our measure will lie
in just one program.  I suspect that that program will be quite simple,
and that all the other programs (such as the one with the aliens running
alife experiments) will be considerably more complex.  The simplest case
is just what we see, and that is where most of our measure comes from.

 But to make an infinitely correct prediction we should average on all
 computational histories going through our states.

Yes, I agree, although as I say my guess is that we will be close enough
just by taking things as we see them, and in fact it may well be that
the corrections from considering bizarre computational histories will
be so tiny as to be unmeasurable in practice.

 Your measure could explain why simple and short subroutine persists
 everywhere but what we must do is to extract the actual measure, the one
 apparently given by QM, from an internal measure on all relatively
 consistent continuation of our (unknown!) probable computationnal state.
 This is independent of the fact that some short programs could play the role 
 of
 some initiator of something persisting. Perhaps a quantum dovetailer ? But to
 proceed by taking comp seriously this too should be justify from within.
 Searching a measure on the computational histories instead of the
 programs can not only be justified by thought experiments, but can
 be defined neatly mathematically. Also a modern way of talking on the
 Many Worlds is in term of relative consistent histories.
 But the histories emerge from within. This too must be taken into account.
 It can change the logic. (And actually changes it according to the lobian
 machine).

I'm losing you here.

Hal Finney



Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-31 Thread John M
Hi, Hal,
I stepped out from this discussion a while ago, because it grew above my
head (or attentional endurance), but I keep reading. Now is a remark of
yours I want to ask about:

I defined information as the potential to establish a boundary.
A kernel is the potential to establish a particular boundary.

I don't work with the rigor and discipline you display, -  I am no designing
engineer, nor administrator of people doing such precision - I let my
intuition tease me. So more than a decade ago I identified (my?)
information
as acknowledged difference whereby the difference was the criterion for
the existence. (Your ALL  Nothing don't exist in this sense, I am sorry
for the kill.)
Acknowledged, of course by anything. Now I think a difference involves a
boundary. Without such 'implied', no diference could be establihed. I feel a
clsoeness here.
Do you?

Then the 2nd part: which invokes my more recent domain: wholeness (akin to
Robert Rosen's complexity concept, the 'natural' one) where I consider
models as the basis for our ways of thinking, since we cannot encompass
the tota;lity in our little mind. Topical and other models, maps,
territories, the sciences, ideas, etc. They are in intereffect, all of them,
in diverse depth
as Kampis identifies it (that part is what I am concerned about lately) and
it gives some(!) natural basis for the topical/scientific model-selection.
The models are surrounded by their boundaries and our reductionistic
observation stops right there. Neglecting the 'beyond', which leads to
paradoxes, poorly understood concepts, and all the misunderstanding we can
explore in discussions like this one.
I feel such chosen/selected models are akin to your kernels if they are not
offended by it. Within boundaries that can occasionally be trasncended if
one must.
The difference is that I think (my) boundaries are selected.
(Time is another open questionmark for me, I don't feel ready to address
it).

Did I miss some important aspect of yours?

John Mikes


- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, January 30, 2005 12:33 PM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements


 Hi Stephen:

 At 11:08 AM 1/30/2005, you wrote:
 Dear Hal,
 
 How do your kernels fundamentally differ from Julian Barbor's time
  capsules?

 I defined information as the potential to establish a boundary.
 A kernel is the potential to establish a particular boundary.
SNIP

 Hal Ruhl







Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-30 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Stephen:
At 11:08 AM 1/30/2005, you wrote:
Dear Hal,
   How do your kernels fundamentally differ from Julian Barbor's time 
capsules?
I defined information as the potential to establish a boundary.
A kernel is the potential to establish a particular boundary.
When I said time in a previous post:
In my opinion choice demands a non quantified time - that is a continuous 
flow in a = and there must be steps in a =.

I was talking about a progression in the sequence not necessarily an 
ordered progression so perhaps time was the wrong word to use - it 
confused the issue.

I am not familiar with Julian Barbor's time capsules.  Do you have a URL 
where I could explore them?

   There seems to be a constant attempt by many to rework the idea of an 
a priori ordering, such that the universe - taken as a 3rd person 
representadum, or the conscious experience - the 1st person 
representadum, exist a priori and any notion of transitivity and change 
are merely some kind of illusion.
I would actually prefer to work with my theory (1) but my issue here is how 
do I justify this given that the All and the Nothing are an [is,is not] 
definitional pair.  Why would one member of such a pair have an existence 
that excludes the other.  This forces me to theory (2) which seems free of 
choice not only in this aspect but in the aspect that the All already 
contains the entire ensemble of kernels.

Given this I would be forced to believe (1) and that some unknown reason 
produces the initial existence asymmetry or invoke simplicity or some 
other mantra.

 This is, IMHO, an attempt to derive Becoming from Being.
   Why not try something different? Like deriving Being from Becoming?
Well this may be close to describing a (the main resulting?) difference 
between (1) and (2) but again how do I justify using (1) which is more like 
Being from Becoming over (2) which is more like Becoming from Being since 
(2) seems more complete as a theory?

Hal Ruhl 




Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-30 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Stephen:
I took a look at Julian Barbour's time capsules and his Nows may be like 
my kernels but in my (2) the sequence of kernels is inconsistent with its 
past due to the = dynamic as I have indicated.

A sequence of kernels may for a number of steps look like one could derive 
something fundamental for the sequence but this itself is an illusion.  The 
inconsistent dynamic is the fundamental and contains no fundamental rules 
in its inconsistency let alone any that could be deduced from within the 
sequence.

Hal Ruhl 




Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-30 Thread Jesse Mazer
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Hi Stephen:
I took a look at Julian Barbour's time capsules and his Nows may be like 
my kernels but in my (2) the sequence of kernels is inconsistent with its 
past due to the = dynamic as I have indicated.
Barbour's idea is that there is no sequence to the time capsules at all, 
they all exist independently in a timeless manner. Some time capsules may 
contain records that appear more or less consistent with other time 
capsules, and the number of other capsules which have records consistent 
with a given capsule may have something to do with determining the 
probability of that time capsule, but there is no objective truth about the 
future or past of a given time capsule. Here's a good discussion of his 
theory, I don't know if you already read this one or not:

http://www.edge.org/documents/archive/edge60.html
He also wrote a book explaining his idea at greater length, called The End 
of Time:

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0195145925/103-7046420-2415059
Jesse



Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-30 Thread Stephen Paul King
Dear Jesse,
   Your description of Barbour's Time Capsules sounds about right. My 
problem with his idea, and may others like it, is that they seem to require 
some kind of ab initio preconstruction of the capsules, kernels, etc. and 
also some pre-existing harmony that connects them together. Becoming and 
derivative notions such as motion and the 1st person experience of a flow 
of time are all explained in terms of some illusion. The first problem I 
see with this is that no reason is given, other than some version of an 
anthropic principle, for the a priori necessity of the Illusion.

   Why not start of with the idea that Becoming is fundamental and use 
notions like Non-Well Founded streams to elaborate a hypothesis. The 
illusion then is explained simply as the 1st person representation of the 
computational aspect of the streams, ala Bruno Marchal's theory. To put it 
in metaphorical terms, we could say that 1st person conscious experience is 
how the Totality of Existence manifests/represents some finite aspect of 
itself to Itself.

Stephen
PS, this idea of mine is strongly influenced by the ideas discussed in Greg 
Egan's book Distress.

- Original Message - 
From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, January 30, 2005 6:38 PM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements


Hal Ruhl wrote:
Hi Stephen:
I took a look at Julian Barbour's time capsules and his Nows may be like 
my kernels but in my (2) the sequence of kernels is inconsistent with its 
past due to the = dynamic as I have indicated.
Barbour's idea is that there is no sequence to the time capsules at all, 
they all exist independently in a timeless manner. Some time capsules may 
contain records that appear more or less consistent with other time 
capsules, and the number of other capsules which have records consistent 
with a given capsule may have something to do with determining the 
probability of that time capsule, but there is no objective truth about 
the future or past of a given time capsule. Here's a good discussion of 
his theory, I don't know if you already read this one or not:

http://www.edge.org/documents/archive/edge60.html
He also wrote a book explaining his idea at greater length, called The 
End of Time:

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0195145925/103-7046420-2415059
Jesse




RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-29 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 28 Jan 2005 Hal Finney wrote:

Here's how I look at the question of whether a bit string, if accidentally
implemented as part of another program, would be conscious.
.
.
.
I would approach this from the Schmidhuber perspective that all programs
exist and run, in a Platonic sense, and this creates all computable
universes.  Some programs create universes like ours, which have
conscious entities.  Other programs create random universes, which may,
through sheer outlandish luck, instantiate patterns which match those
of conscious entities.
All consciousnesses exist in this model, and as Bruno emphasizes, from
the inside there is no way to know which program instantiated you.
In fact this may not even be a meaningful question.  But what are
meaningful to ask, in the Schmidhuber sense, are two things.  First,
what is the measure of your consciousness: how likely are you to exist?
And second, among all of the instantiations of your consciousness in all
the universes, how much of your measure does each one contribute?
All well so far.
I suggest that the answer is that accidental instantiations only
contribute an infinitesimal amount, compared to the contributions of
universes like ours.  Our universe appears to have extremely simple
physical laws and initial conditions.  Yet it formed complex matter and
chemistry which allowed life to evolve and consciousness to develop.
Maybe we got some lucky breaks; the universe doesn't seem particularly
fecund as far as we can tell, but conscious life did happen.  The odds
against it were not, as in the case of accidental instantiation, an
exponential of an astronomical number.  This means that the contribution
to a consciousness from a lawful universe like the one we observe
is almost infinitely greater than the contribution from accidental
instantiations.
I don't understand this conclusion. A lengthy piece of code (whether it 
represents a moment of consciousness or anything else) is certainly less 
likely to be accidentally implemented on some random computer than on the 
computer running the original software. But surely the opposite is the case 
if you allow that all possible computer programs run simply by virtue of 
their existence as mathematical objects. For every program running on a 
biological or electronic computer, there must be infinitely many exact 
analogues and every minor and major variation thereof running out there in 
Platonia.

--Stathis Papaioannou
_
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RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-29 Thread Hal Ruhl
I recently posted that I seemed to have two theories re how my multiverse 
might work.  These are:

1) Nothing - Something = to completion.
2) {Nothing#(n) + All[(n-1) = evolving Somethings]} -
 {Nothing#(n+1) + All[n = evolving 
Somethings]} : repeat...

Here:
- is a spontaneous decay of a Nothing into a Something because of the 
inherent logical
   incompleteness of the Nothing.

= is a random path.
= is a path where each new step is inconsistent with prior steps.
In (1) choice within the Something is a necessary component of the =.
In (2) choice is precluded to avoid accumulation of net information.
My issue is that it seems one would like to base an explanation of how 
worlds evolve on the presence of choice.  However, since the [Nothing,All] 
is a definitional pair, how does one justify selecting (1) over (2)?

In my opinion choice demands a non quantified time - that is a continuous 
flow in a = and there must be steps in a =.

Hal Ruhl





RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-29 Thread Hal Finney
 On 28 Jan 2005 Hal Finney wrote:
 I suggest that the answer is that accidental instantiations only
 contribute an infinitesimal amount, compared to the contributions of
 universes like ours.

Stathis Papaioannou replied:
 I don't understand this conclusion. A lengthy piece of code (whether it 
 represents a moment of consciousness or anything else) is certainly less 
 likely to be accidentally implemented on some random computer than on the 
 computer running the original software. But surely the opposite is the case 
 if you allow that all possible computer programs run simply by virtue of 
 their existence as mathematical objects. For every program running on a 
 biological or electronic computer, there must be infinitely many exact 
 analogues and every minor and major variation thereof running out there in 
 Platonia.

I'm afraid I don't understand your argument here.  I am using the
Schmidhuber concept that the measure of a program is related to its size
and/or information complexity: that shorter (and simpler) programs have
greater measure than longer ones.  Do you agree with that, or are you
challenging that view?

My point was then that we can imagine a short program that can naturally
evolve consciousness, whereas to create consciousness artificially
or arbitrarily, without a course of natural evolution, requires a huge
number of bits to specify the conscious entity in its entirety.

You mention infinity; are you saying that there is no meaningful
difference between the measure of programs, because each one has an
infinite number of analogs?  Could you explain that concept in more
detail?

Hal Finney



RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-29 Thread Hal Ruhl
I meant to define the symbol = as:
= is a path over kernels where each new step is inconsistent with prior 
steps.

Hal Ruhl





Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-29 Thread Stephen Paul King
Dear Hal,
   What your defining seems to me to be a NOT map or else it is a mere 
random map. There is no consistent definition of an inconsistent map 
otherwise, IMHO. Please explain how I am wrong. ;-)

   Why not a map that is a path where the information associated with each 
step is consistent to some degree /delta with the information available 
about the prior steps?

Stephen
- Original Message - 
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, January 29, 2005 3:43 PM
Subject: RE: Belief Statements


I meant to define the symbol = as:
= is a path over kernels where each new step is inconsistent with 
prior steps.

Hal Ruhl




Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-29 Thread Hal Ruhl
At 06:29 PM 1/29/2005, you wrote:
Dear Hal,
   What your defining seems to me to be a NOT map or else it is a mere 
random map. There is no consistent definition of an inconsistent map 
otherwise, IMHO. Please explain how I am wrong. ;-)
I wanted to have a sequence that does not accumulate net information or 
have an rule that is itself net information.  A random sequence has to 
check to see if its pattern fits some test for randomness.  A path wherein 
each step is inconsistent with the past sequence seems to meet the 
requirements I desired.

   Why not a map that is a path where the information associated with 
each step is consistent to some degree /delta with the information 
available about the prior steps?
In my opinion any such rule is net information.
Hal Ruhl 




Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-29 Thread Stephen Paul King
Dear Hal,
   What do you propose as a means to explain the memory and processing 
required to be sure of inconsistency as opposed to consistency? Both 
options, it seems to me, require checking of some kind! All that is left is 
randomness, there is no such a thing as a true test for randomness that is 
finitely implementable! If we accept that option then we have to explain the 
apparent continuity that occurs in the 1st person aspect of the path.

Stephen
- Original Message - 
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, January 29, 2005 7:17 PM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements


At 06:29 PM 1/29/2005, you wrote:
Dear Hal,
   What your defining seems to me to be a NOT map or else it is a mere 
random map. There is no consistent definition of an inconsistent map 
otherwise, IMHO. Please explain how I am wrong. ;-)
I wanted to have a sequence that does not accumulate net information or 
have an rule that is itself net information.  A random sequence has to 
check to see if its pattern fits some test for randomness.  A path wherein 
each step is inconsistent with the past sequence seems to meet the 
requirements I desired.

   Why not a map that is a path where the information associated with 
each step is consistent to some degree /delta with the information 
available about the prior steps?
In my opinion any such rule is net information.
Hal Ruhl



Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-29 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Stephen:
At 10:49 PM 1/29/2005, you wrote:
Dear Hal,
   What do you propose as a means to explain the memory and processing 
required to be sure of inconsistency as opposed to consistency?
It is not a logical inconsistency.  What I am trying to convey is that each 
step in the sequence pays no attention to the prior sequence.  That is a 
maximal inconsistency of progression to the sequence.  Random and 
independent to me convey a testable behavior and I want to point to an 
untestable progression.

Both options, it seems to me, require checking of some kind! All that is 
left is randomness, there is no such a thing as a true test for 
randomness that is finitely implementable!

The embedding system component - the All - is already infinite, so an 
infinite test is containable therein.

If we accept that option then we have to explain the apparent continuity 
that occurs in the 1st person aspect of the path.

Such a path will link arbitrarily long strings of kernels that give the 
appearance of 1st person continuity,  and this appearance can hold even if 
many other kinds of kernels intervene - the 1st person could not detect this.

Hal Ruhl 




RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-28 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 09:41 27/01/05 +, Brent Meeker wrote:

-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2005 2:32 PM
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Belief Statements


With comp the
mind-body relation is one-one
in the body - mind  direction, and one-many in the mind-body direction. It
is counter-intuitive but no less than QM without collapse (Everett, Deutch).

Bruno
This seems doubtful to me.  A mind (all minds we know of) think of themselves
as associated with a body and they are so associated.  As I understand your
comp hypothesis it is that a mind-body can fork into two or more mind-body
pairs - but it's no longer the same mind; so the relation is still one-to-one.
Brent Meeker
Only after the forking. Before it is, from a measure point of view, as if 
you were
simultaneously in two equivalent computations (without this no 
interference-like
phenomena would ever be possible). Remember the Y = II law. A forking leads
two a multiplication of the computational history.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-28 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 09:29 28/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 28 Jan 2005 Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 22:19 27/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
For example, if I am running an AI program on my computer and a 
particular bitstring is associated with the simulated being noting, I 
think, therefore I am, then should not the same bitstring arising by 
chance in the course of, say, a spreadsheet calculation give rise to the 
same moment of consciousness - regardless of whether the spreadsheet 
user or anyone other than the simulated being himself is or can be aware 
of this?

But from the point of view of the simulated being himself he cannot have 
the slightest clue about
which executions he is supported by. He is dispersed in 2^aleph0 
computational histories and
he can only bet on its most probable consistent extensions. You always 
talk like if the mind body relation was one-one, when with comp although 
you still can attach a mind to a [piece of relative
object appearing in your most probable histories] the mind of the piece 
of relative object cannot
attach an object to itself, only an infinity of such objects. With comp 
the mind-body relation is one-one
in the body - mind  direction, and one-many in the mind-body direction. 
It is counter-intuitive but no less than QM without collapse (Everett, Deutch).
Bruno, I don't see where you think I disagree with you. I agree that a 
particular simulated mind may have multiple physical implementations, and 
that it is in general impossible for the mind to know which implementation 
it is supported by. I make the further point that it is not necessary, in 
general, for any conscious being at the level of the physical 
implementation to be aware that the implementation is being run, in order 
for the simulated being to be conscious.

OK. So we can perhaps drop out the very idea that there is a physical 
run. I agree with
Hal Finney view of the accidental running. Consciousness is attached to 
states together
with their relative histories. Consciousness will then be related to the 
measure one
continuations ... if the laws of physics can be derived from that. If not: 
comp is false.

And this makes comp (in principle) testable (experimentally refutable).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 08:38 26/01/05 -0500, Tianran Chen wrote:
Hal Finney wrote:
I had a problem with the demonstration in Permutation City.  They claimed
to chop up a simulated consciousness timewise, and then to run the pieces
backwards: first the 10th second, then the 9th second, then the 8th,
and so on.  And of course the consciousness being simulated was not
aware of the chopping.
The problem is that you can't calculate the 10th second without
calculating the 9th second first.  That's a fundamental property of our
laws of physics and I suspect of consciousness as we know it.  This means
that what they actually did was to initially calculate seconds 1, 2,
3... in order, then to re-run them in the order 10, 9, 8  And of
course the consciousness wasn't aware of the re-runs.  But it's not clear
that from this you can draw Egan's strong conclusions about dust.
It's possible that the initial, sequential run was necessary for the
consciousness to exist.
I doubt this is the case.

But the sequential run, actually the infinity of sequential runs, exist(s) 
like any runs
of any partial recursive functions exists in any of those representations 
allowed by
the arithmetical relations. From inside an observer cannot distinguish 
real, virtual
or just arithmetical realities (it is a theorem with the comp hyp and 
reasonable definition
of observation).


First of all, I don't think you should call it law at all, since such 
property is indeed derived purely from the interpretation we had made so 
far about our world. Although these interpretations (QM, Relativity, super 
string and etc.) are in favor now, they are logically no more valid than 
Newton's physics at his time (or even now). If we all this time dependency 
a defect, then we (still) do not know whether it is a defect of theories 
we favored, or a defect of the world we are in now, or a defect of our 
reasoning ability, or even a resultant defect induced from some other 
defect of our world. Infinite (or at least very large) number of theory 
can be developed based on finite number of observed facts, just like 
infinite numer of curves can pass through finite number of common points. 
However, we have principles like Occam's Razor to choose between them. How 
do we know that some other theory may not suffer from this defect?

Sure. That is why it is better to build a TOE from introspection than from 
observation.
Then you can make it communicable in case you show it is the output of a 
machine
belonging to a class of natural introspector. After that you can still 
compare with the facts.
A case is made with the natural introspector played by Lobian machine (cf 
url below).



Second, even with the physics we use nowadays, there are still simple 
problems that can be calculate NOT IN ORDER. For instance, the displace of 
a single pendular at any time can be calculate regardless of its history. 
Put into more formal way, there exist some turing machine that can 
calculate in constant (regard to the time) steps. More generally, dynamic 
systems and complex systems are the only thing that has history. 
However, many dynamic system can be translated (however messly) into 
simple system of equations that can be solved in constant time with some 
turing machine. Take gas for example, the position of each molecule is no 
doubt a hard problem that only expressed with dynamic system. However, if 
we are to talk about gas in a higher level in terms of volume, pressure, 
and temperature, then most problem can be expressed in simple systems that 
can be calculated in constant time.

Finally, our physics world may be one of the limit that some problem 
cannot be solved in constant time. This had been talked about quite 
thoroughly in the discussion about super-turing computation. I don't have 
much to add on to that.

Actually the comp hyp, once you distinguish first and third person point of 
views makes part of reality not turing-emulable at all, at least a priori 
(it is the consequence of the universal dovetailer argument).
The apparent computability of physical laws must be explained and this 
without invoking any magical selector of substancial reality (universe).


Conclusion: A world can be simulated IN or OUT OF ORDER, depending on the 
physics to be simulated, the world the simulator is in, and the design of 
the simulator (which is related to the level of intellegence of the 
designer in this particular case).
It is not relevant. The ORDER of such simulation is defined from inside by 
the simulated people.
From outside you need less than the block-arithmetical reality.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 22:19 27/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
For example, if I am running an AI program on my computer and a particular 
bitstring is associated with the simulated being noting, I think, 
therefore I am, then should not the same bitstring arising by chance in 
the course of, say, a spreadsheet calculation give rise to the same moment 
of consciousness - regardless of whether the spreadsheet user or anyone 
other than the simulated being himself is or can be aware of this?

But from the point of view of the simulated being himself he cannot have 
the slightest clue about
which executions he is supported by. He is dispersed in 2^aleph0 
computational histories and
he can only bet on its most probable consistent extensions. You always talk 
like if the mind body relation was one-one, when with comp although you 
still can attach a mind to a [piece of relative
object appearing in your most probable histories] the mind of the piece 
of relative object cannot
attach an object to itself, only an infinity of such objects. With comp the 
mind-body relation is one-one
in the body - mind  direction, and one-many in the mind-body direction. It 
is counter-intuitive but no less than QM without collapse (Everett, Deutch).

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-27 Thread Hal Finney
It is true that there are some physical systems for which we can
predict the future state without calculating all intermediate states.
Periodic systems will fall into this category if we can figure out
analytically what the period is.  But there are other systems where
this is thought to be impossible; for example, chaotic systems.

Chaotic systems are ones whose future behavior is sensitively dependent
on the current state.  Making even an infinitisimal change to the current
state will cause massive changes in the future.  I don't think it would be
possible with any computational model to predict the state of a chaotic
system far in the future without computing intermediate states.

My guess is that consciousness as we know it is inherently chaotic.
It seems like small changes to our beliefs and knowledge can lead to
large changes in behavior.  So often we experience being torn between
alternate courses of action, where the tiniest change could tip us from
one choice to the other.

Neural behavior is inherently chaotic as well.  Neurons are believed to
sum the recent activity levels on their synapses and when this exceeds a
threshold, the neuron suddenly and catastrophically fires a nerve impulse.
It then goes through a refractory period (about 1 millisecond) in which it
is unable to fire again until it has rested and regathered its strength,
at which point it goes back to summing its inputs.  If we plotted the net
input strength to the neuron, it would be an irregular line with lots of
little jags and bumps, and whenever it manages to exceed a certain level,
there is a sudden firing.  Probably we would often see the stimulation
level approach that threshold line and fall back, not quite meeting the
threshold, until we just reach it and another nerve impulse is fired.
This kind of sensitive dependence on initial conditions is a recipe for
mathematical chaos.

Of course, this is not a rigorous proof, and it is conceivable that
consciousness is not in fact chaotic even though it subjectively
seems so, and even though its subtrate (the brain's neural net) is.
Nevertheless it would be almost unbelievably bizarre to imagine that
you could calculate the mental state of an 80 year old man, with all
the memories of a lifetime, without actually calculating the experiences
that led to those memories.

In Egan's story, the computer is supposed to calculate his conscious
experience of the 10th second first, then the 9th second, and so on.
Suppose in the first (subjective) second he stutters on saying the number
one, out of nervousness.  Then the memory of that stutter will be
present as he recites all the other numbers.  Perhaps he will enunciate
them more carefully in order to compensate.  So when the system calculates
that 10th second, it has to know what happened during the first second.
Those events will be latent in his memories during the 10th second, and
may influence his behavior.  His conscious reactions to earlier events
are in his memory at later times.  So I don't see how it could possibly
work to calculate the 10th second first.

Two other minor points: in Egan's story, this experiment was not being
done on dust.  It was done on an ordinary computer.  It was the result
of this experiment, which is of course that there was no subjective
awareness of the time scrambling, which was supposed to lend credence
to the dust hypothesis.

Second, quantum computers cannot efficiently solve NP complete problems,
or at least they are not known to be able to.  It's possible that ordinary
computers can solve NP complete problems; no one has ever proven that
they can't (this is the famous P = NP problem of computer science).
And if it turns out that ordinary computers can handle them efficiently,
then of course quantum computers will be able to as well, since they
are a superset of ordinary computers.  But if it turns out that P !=
NP and ordinary computers can't solve NP problems efficiently, there is
no evidence that the situation will be different for quantum computers.

Hal Finney



Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 28 Jan 2005 Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 22:19 27/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
For example, if I am running an AI program on my computer and a particular 
bitstring is associated with the simulated being noting, I think, 
therefore I am, then should not the same bitstring arising by chance in 
the course of, say, a spreadsheet calculation give rise to the same moment 
of consciousness - regardless of whether the spreadsheet user or anyone 
other than the simulated being himself is or can be aware of this?

But from the point of view of the simulated being himself he cannot have 
the slightest clue about
which executions he is supported by. He is dispersed in 2^aleph0 
computational histories and
he can only bet on its most probable consistent extensions. You always talk 
like if the mind body relation was one-one, when with comp although you 
still can attach a mind to a [piece of relative
object appearing in your most probable histories] the mind of the piece 
of relative object cannot
attach an object to itself, only an infinity of such objects. With comp the 
mind-body relation is one-one
in the body - mind  direction, and one-many in the mind-body direction. It 
is counter-intuitive but no less than QM without collapse (Everett, 
Deutch).

Bruno, I don't see where you think I disagree with you. I agree that a 
particular simulated mind may have multiple physical implementations, and 
that it is in general impossible for the mind to know which implementation 
it is supported by. I make the further point that it is not necessary, in 
general, for any conscious being at the level of the physical implementation 
to be aware that the implementation is being run, in order for the simulated 
being to be conscious.

--Stathis Papaioannou
_
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RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker wrote:
For example, if I am running an AI program on my computer and a 
particular
bitstring is associated with the simulated being noting, I think, 
therefore
I am, then should not the same bitstring arising by chance in the course
of, say, a spreadsheet calculation give rise to the same moment of
consciousness - regardless of whether the spreadsheet user or anyone 
other
than the simulated being himself is or can be aware of this?

I think not.  Consciousness is a narrative the brain constructs to form
memories.  It has a context.  It is consciousness *of* something.  A 
bitstring
in a spreadsheet has a different context (unless the spreadsheet is 
simulation
of some world) and isn't fulfilling the function of consciousness.

So, how long a bitstring do you need to create a context? You could change 
the argument a little and consider the entire simulation of a world complete 
with conscious inhabitants; it would still only amount to a very long 
sequence of 1's and 0's running on a digital computer. If you believe in the 
computational hypothesis of mind, you believe two things about this computer 
program:

(1) This sequence of binary digits has a special organisation, which can be 
understood as conforming to certain rules and relationships in a particular 
programming language;

(2) Implementing the binary sequence on a digital computer results in a 
simulated world with inhabitants who are self-aware.

You can stipulate that (1) must be true for (2) to be true, but it does not 
thereby follow that any conscious being in the physical world must be able 
to understand the details of (1) in order for (2) to be true. For example, 
suppose the computer language were devised by a long extinct civilization, 
and no-one alive now is able to understand it: should that make any 
difference to the simulation from inside? Similarly, if the entire 
computation occurs by chance in the course of another computation - a 
spreadsheet, a cryptography cracking program on the planet Zork, distributed 
throughout a computer network in tiny pieces as in the Egan story - how can 
the conscious beings inside possibly know this?

--Stathis Papaioannou
_
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Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-27 Thread Jesse Mazer
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
For example, if I am running an AI program on my computer and a particular 
bitstring is associated with the simulated being noting, I think, 
therefore I am, then should not the same bitstring arising by chance in 
the course of, say, a spreadsheet calculation give rise to the same moment 
of consciousness - regardless of whether the spreadsheet user or anyone 
other than the simulated being himself is or can be aware of this?
Only if you believe it's the bitstring itself which is mapped to a 
particular conscious experience, rather than the causal pattern enacted by 
the AI program's computation that led it to produce that bitstring. So if 
you believe in psychophysical laws (to use a term I have seen some 
philosophers use), it depends on how these laws map facts about the physical 
world to facts about first-person experience.

Jesse



Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Hal Finney)
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2005 12:16:24 -0800 (PST)
It is true that there are some physical systems for which we can
predict the future state without calculating all intermediate states.
Periodic systems will fall into this category if we can figure out
analytically what the period is.  But there are other systems where
this is thought to be impossible; for example, chaotic systems.
Chaotic systems are ones whose future behavior is sensitively dependent
on the current state.  Making even an infinitisimal change to the current
state will cause massive changes in the future.  I don't think it would be
possible with any computational model to predict the state of a chaotic
system far in the future without computing intermediate states.
My guess is that consciousness as we know it is inherently chaotic.
It seems like small changes to our beliefs and knowledge can lead to
large changes in behavior.  So often we experience being torn between
alternate courses of action, where the tiniest change could tip us from
one choice to the other.
Neural behavior is inherently chaotic as well.  Neurons are believed to
sum the recent activity levels on their synapses and when this exceeds a
threshold, the neuron suddenly and catastrophically fires a nerve impulse.
It then goes through a refractory period (about 1 millisecond) in which it
is unable to fire again until it has rested and regathered its strength,
at which point it goes back to summing its inputs.  If we plotted the net
input strength to the neuron, it would be an irregular line with lots of
little jags and bumps, and whenever it manages to exceed a certain level,
there is a sudden firing.  Probably we would often see the stimulation
level approach that threshold line and fall back, not quite meeting the
threshold, until we just reach it and another nerve impulse is fired.
This kind of sensitive dependence on initial conditions is a recipe for
mathematical chaos.
Of course, this is not a rigorous proof, and it is conceivable that
consciousness is not in fact chaotic even though it subjectively
seems so, and even though its subtrate (the brain's neural net) is.
Nevertheless it would be almost unbelievably bizarre to imagine that
you could calculate the mental state of an 80 year old man, with all
the memories of a lifetime, without actually calculating the experiences
that led to those memories.
In Egan's story, the computer is supposed to calculate his conscious
experience of the 10th second first, then the 9th second, and so on.
Suppose in the first (subjective) second he stutters on saying the number
one, out of nervousness.  Then the memory of that stutter will be
present as he recites all the other numbers.  Perhaps he will enunciate
them more carefully in order to compensate.  So when the system calculates
that 10th second, it has to know what happened during the first second.
Those events will be latent in his memories during the 10th second, and
may influence his behavior.  His conscious reactions to earlier events
are in his memory at later times.  So I don't see how it could possibly
work to calculate the 10th second first.
Two other minor points: in Egan's story, this experiment was not being
done on dust.  It was done on an ordinary computer.  It was the result
of this experiment, which is of course that there was no subjective
awareness of the time scrambling, which was supposed to lend credence
to the dust hypothesis.
Second, quantum computers cannot efficiently solve NP complete problems,
or at least they are not known to be able to.  It's possible that ordinary
computers can solve NP complete problems; no one has ever proven that
they can't (this is the famous P = NP problem of computer science).
And if it turns out that ordinary computers can handle them efficiently,
then of course quantum computers will be able to as well, since they
are a superset of ordinary computers.  But if it turns out that P !=
NP and ordinary computers can't solve NP problems efficiently, there is
no evidence that the situation will be different for quantum computers.
Hal Finney
_
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RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 28 Jan 2005 Brent Meeker wrote:

I'm not sure I understand the computational hyposthesis - and I certainly 
don't
*believe* it.
So you don't believe that even in principle a digital computer can be 
conscious? I think the challenge to this is going to come not from 
theoretical considerations, but from practical developments in AI in the 
coming decades. There will come a point where to insist that a computer is 
not conscious will be no more plausible than insisting you alone are 
conscious.

(1) This sequence of binary digits has a special organisation, which can 
be
understood as conforming to certain rules and relationships in a 
particular
programming language;

(2) Implementing the binary sequence on a digital computer results in a
simulated world with inhabitants who are self-aware.

You can stipulate that (1) must be true for (2) to be true, but it does 
not
thereby follow that any conscious being in the physical world must be 
able
to understand the details of (1) in order for (2) to be true.

Sure.
For example,
suppose the computer language were devised by a long extinct 
civilization,
and no-one alive now is able to understand it: should that make any
difference to the simulation from inside?

A good question.  Another is, given any bitstring and a certain world, is 
there
a language in which that bitstring simulates that world?
Yes. This is the basic idea I am getting at. I don't see any way around it.
Similarly, if the entire
computation occurs by chance in the course of another computation - a
spreadsheet, a cryptography cracking program on the planet Zork, 
distributed
throughout a computer network in tiny pieces as in the Egan story - how 
can
the conscious beings inside possibly know this?

This would seem to be contrary to (1) supra - the tiny pieces not longer 
have
a special organisation.
No: they always have a special organisation, given the appropriate language, 
as per your point above.

--Stathis Papaioannou
_
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RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-27 Thread Hal Finney
Here's how I look at the question of whether a bit string, if accidentally
implemented as part of another program, would be conscious.

First, it's a little confusing what we mean by a bit string.  Is this
the program of the computer?  A snapshot of its state?  Can a program
or a snapshot be conscious?  Suppose that instead of talking about a
bit string, we consider instead the actual sequence of states that the
computer goes through.  Then we could ask, if this sequence of states
matched the sequence of states that was part of a conscious program, but
in this case they happened accidentally as part of some other program,
would they nevertheless create a consciousness?

Second, even with this definition, it's an unreasonable question.
That is, given what we know about the complexity of consciousness, it
doesn't make sense that a computer could accidentally run a program that
matched the run of a conscious simulation, for a long enough period that
it would correspond to a perceptible moment of consciousness.  The brain
has something like 10^12 neurons and 10^15 synapses, and they'd probably
have to be simulated at microsecond resolution (if not a million times
smaller) to get a simulation that was at all accurate.  This means that
there would probably be something like 10^23 bits of information in a
simulation of a tenth of a second of a human brain, if you capture all
of the connectivity and timing information.

There's no way that you could accidentally match a 10^23 bit pattern
in this universe.  Even if every sub-atomic particle in the observable
universe were a computer, you'd be hard pressed to match even a 300 bit
pattern by accident.  The additional difficulty for the accidental match
of a brain pattern is so much greater that our minds can't even conceive
of how impossible it is.

Third, even though it will never happen in our universe, if we believe
in the multiverse then we have to admit that it will happen by accident,
somewhere.  So we might still want to answer the question of whether
this accidental instantiation of the computation is conscious.

I would approach this from the Schmidhuber perspective that all programs
exist and run, in a Platonic sense, and this creates all computable
universes.  Some programs create universes like ours, which have
conscious entities.  Other programs create random universes, which may,
through sheer outlandish luck, instantiate patterns which match those
of conscious entities.

All consciousnesses exist in this model, and as Bruno emphasizes, from
the inside there is no way to know which program instantiated you.
In fact this may not even be a meaningful question.  But what are
meaningful to ask, in the Schmidhuber sense, are two things.  First,
what is the measure of your consciousness: how likely are you to exist?
And second, among all of the instantiations of your consciousness in all
the universes, how much of your measure does each one contribute?

This, then, is how I would approach the question.  Not, is this accidental
instantiation conscious; but rather, how much measure do such accidental
instantiations contribute, compared to non-accidental ones like those
we see in the universe around us?

I suggest that the answer is that accidental instantiations only
contribute an infinitesimal amount, compared to the contributions of
universes like ours.  Our universe appears to have extremely simple
physical laws and initial conditions.  Yet it formed complex matter and
chemistry which allowed life to evolve and consciousness to develop.
Maybe we got some lucky breaks; the universe doesn't seem particularly
fecund as far as we can tell, but conscious life did happen.  The odds
against it were not, as in the case of accidental instantiation, an
exponential of an astronomical number.  This means that the contribution
to a consciousness from a lawful universe like the one we observe
is almost infinitely greater than the contribution from accidental
instantiations.

Therefore, I would suggest that the answer to the question of whether an
accidental instantiation is conscious is simply this: it doesn't matter.
Even if it is conscious, its contribution to the measure of that conscious
experience is so small as to be completely negligible.

Hal Finney



Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-26 Thread Stephen Paul King
Dear Hal and Tianran,
   Assuming there is some aspect of consciousness that requires QM ( I side 
with Penrose on this) these out of order computations are impossible. This 
boils down to the fact that for systems that have time-like relationship 
with each other will have observable that are not commutative.
   We could ignore Penrose and make the same argument by pointing out that 
is the simulated consciousnesses, for example those of Alice and Bob of the 
EPR experiment, are to involve any hint of QM phenomena then the 
non-commutativity will rear its ugly head and nip off the idea in the bud. I 
am surprised that Greg Egan didn't notice this...

Stephen
- Original Message - 
From: Tianran Chen [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2005 8:38 AM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements


Hal Finney wrote:
I had a problem with the demonstration in Permutation City.  They claimed
to chop up a simulated consciousness timewise, and then to run the pieces
backwards: first the 10th second, then the 9th second, then the 8th,
and so on.  And of course the consciousness being simulated was not
aware of the chopping.
The problem is that you can't calculate the 10th second without
calculating the 9th second first.  That's a fundamental property of our
laws of physics and I suspect of consciousness as we know it.  This means
that what they actually did was to initially calculate seconds 1, 2,
3... in order, then to re-run them in the order 10, 9, 8  And of
course the consciousness wasn't aware of the re-runs.  But it's not clear
that from this you can draw Egan's strong conclusions about dust.
It's possible that the initial, sequential run was necessary for the
consciousness to exist.
I doubt this is the case.
First of all, I don't think you should call it law at all, since such 
property is indeed derived purely from the interpretation we had made so 
far about our world. Although these interpretations (QM, Relativity, super 
string and etc.) are in favor now, they are logically no more valid than 
Newton's physics at his time (or even now). If we all this time dependency 
a defect, then we (still) do not know whether it is a defect of theories 
we favored, or a defect of the world we are in now, or a defect of our 
reasoning ability, or even a resultant defect induced from some other 
defect of our world. Infinite (or at least very large) number of theory 
can be developed based on finite number of observed facts, just like 
infinite numer of curves can pass through finite number of common points. 
However, we have principles like Occam's Razor to choose between them. How 
do we know that some other theory may not suffer from this defect?

Second, even with the physics we use nowadays, there are still simple 
problems that can be calculate NOT IN ORDER. For instance, the displace of 
a single pendular at any time can be calculate regardless of its history. 
Put into more formal way, there exist some turing machine that can 
calculate in constant (regard to the time) steps. More generally, dynamic 
systems and complex systems are the only thing that has history. 
However, many dynamic system can be translated (however messly) into 
simple system of equations that can be solved in constant time with some 
turing machine. Take gas for example, the position of each molecule is no 
doubt a hard problem that only expressed with dynamic system. However, if 
we are to talk about gas in a higher level in terms of volume, pressure, 
and temperature, then most problem can be expressed in simple systems that 
can be calculated in constant time.

Finally, our physics world may be one of the limit that some problem 
cannot be solved in constant time. This had been talked about quite 
thoroughly in the discussion about super-turing computation. I don't have 
much to add on to that.

Conclusion: A world can be simulated IN or OUT OF ORDER, depending on the 
physics to be simulated, the world the simulator is in, and the design of 
the simulator (which is related to the level of intellegence of the 
designer in this particular case).





Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-26 Thread Tianran Chen
Dear Stephen
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Hal and Tianran,
   Assuming there is some aspect of consciousness that requires QM ( I 
side with Penrose on this) these out of order computations are 
impossible. This boils down to the fact that for systems that have 
time-like relationship with each other will have observable that are not 
commutative.
   We could ignore Penrose and make the same argument by pointing out 
that is the simulated consciousnesses, for example those of Alice and 
Bob of the EPR experiment, are to involve any hint of QM phenomena then 
the non-commutativity will rear its ugly head and nip off the idea in 
the bud. I am surprised that Greg Egan didn't notice this...

Stephen
Logically speaking, QM (not its interpretations) is simply a branch of 
applied mathematics (use the definition given by Foundation of 
Mathematics) that happen to agree with some observed facts. In 
another word, QM is a set of equations we used to describe phenomenon. 
If there is time dependency, then it is in the structure of those 
equations, not in the phenomenon. It is totally possible that later 
on, some totally different theories will be proposed that can describe 
the same set of observations and yet do not suffer from such time 
dependency problem. Isn't it?

Let us suppose, later on, the super-string theory become favored by 
most serious physicsts, and let us pretend that there are some 
equation in the super-string theory that can support consciousness, 
and can be solved in constant steps with some turing machine. However 
unlikely, such possible shall not be ruled out.

Also from another direction, isn't it possible that later some type of 
computation model (say quantum computer) can actually solve hard 
problems (say multi-body gravity problem) in constant time, then it 
can also simulate consciousness-supporting world out of order.

I only had chance read a few sections novel, so sorry if I 
misunderstood some important details here. But the novel did not 
explicitly say which theory of physics the simulator was using, right?



Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-26 Thread Stephen Paul King
Dear Tianran,
   QM is far more than a set of equations! It is a very predictive and 
falsifiable collection of principles and relationships. The most cunning of 
experimenters have been trying for almost 90 years to find a falsification, 
none yet has even been hinted. When a quantum gravity theory is found that 
unifies QM and General Relativity theory's realms of prediction, it will not 
contradict them, but will extend them. We see the same situation when we 
compare QM and GR to Newton's theory.
   It is one thing for a quantum computation to solve NP-Complete problems 
in polynomial time. It is something else to compute simulations of behaviors 
faster than Nature itself can complete them. The non-commutativity issue 
is a very important aspect of any theory that hopes to explain phenomena, it 
follows from the small but non-zero value of the Plank constant. From what I 
have studied of superstring theory (or its M-theory incarnation), the 
non-commutativity of canonically conjugate observables (such as position and 
momentum) is something that we should not expect to vanish.
   This is Not a time dependency, it is a concurrency problem. It 
involves the order of operations that naturally can not be avoided when more 
that one event is considered. In order to do simulations of consciousnesses 
that involve shuffling the ordering, it is necessary for each conscious 
event is computationally simulable independent of all others and this would 
include any possible experience including experiences of events that involes 
order sensitive measurements. If we could assume that all possible 
experienciable events exists, like a pile of shapshots, then we claim have 
to prove that for any given first person experience of living in a world 
with time there exists some sequence of snapshots that exist a priori in the 
pile, but this is not enough, we must be able to show the necessity of first 
person experiences.
   Why is it that I have a first experson experience of a world in which 
there is an asymmetry between past and future if the entire content of this 
experience exists priori to me? Why bother with an illusion of time?
   BTW, the N-boby problem is completely intractible in a world that takes 
Plank's constant to be zero because the number of solutions becomes infinite 
if the energy differences can be infinitely small. The problem is 
non-integrable.
   QM solves this problem partially by only allowing energy (involved in 
emmision and absorbtion events, which encompasses any and all interactions) 
to be integer multiples of the plank constant. All of this can be learned 
from a good QM for laymen book such as Roger Penrose's The Emperor's New 
Mind or John Gribbin's Schroedinger's Kittens.

Stephen
- Original Message - 
From: Tianran Chen [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED]; 
everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wednesday, January 26, 2005 9:48 PM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements


Dear Stephen
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Hal and Tianran,
   Assuming there is some aspect of consciousness that requires QM ( I 
side with Penrose on this) these out of order computations are 
impossible. This boils down to the fact that for systems that have 
time-like relationship with each other will have observable that are not 
commutative.
   We could ignore Penrose and make the same argument by pointing out 
that is the simulated consciousnesses, for example those of Alice and Bob 
of the EPR experiment, are to involve any hint of QM phenomena then the 
non-commutativity will rear its ugly head and nip off the idea in the 
bud. I am surprised that Greg Egan didn't notice this...

Stephen
Logically speaking, QM (not its interpretations) is simply a branch of 
applied mathematics (use the definition given by Foundation of 
Mathematics) that happen to agree with some observed facts. In another 
word, QM is a set of equations we used to describe phenomenon. If there is 
time dependency, then it is in the structure of those equations, not in 
the phenomenon. It is totally possible that later on, some totally 
different theories will be proposed that can describe the same set of 
observations and yet do not suffer from such time dependency problem. 
Isn't it?

Let us suppose, later on, the super-string theory become favored by most 
serious physicsts, and let us pretend that there are some equation in the 
super-string theory that can support consciousness, and can be solved in 
constant steps with some turing machine. However unlikely, such possible 
shall not be ruled out.

Also from another direction, isn't it possible that later some type of 
computation model (say quantum computer) can actually solve hard problems 
(say multi-body gravity problem) in constant time, then it can also 
simulate consciousness-supporting world out of order.

I only had chance read a few sections novel, so sorry if I misunderstood 
some important details here. But the novel did not explicitly say which 
theory

RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-19 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Hal,
At 22:30 17/01/05 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:

I reject Schmidhuber Comp because a sequence of world states [world 
kernels] which may indeed be Turing machine [or some extension there of] 
emulable is nevertheless managed by the system's dynamic which is external 
to the machine.

Any sub component of a world kernel [such as myself] is subject to the 
same result thus my rejection of Personal Comp.

I understand the sentences but I am completely lost to see relations with 
previous sentences of you. Have you try to sum up your theory (your 
theories) in a web page (like you did some years ago) ?

I really think we should focus on a well established theory or language to 
make progress. As you
know my results are based on classical first order arithmetic. But recently 
I came back to an old craving of me: lambda calculus and combinatory logic. 
I have discovered that combinators make it possible to simplify 
considerably my work (and this at many different levels). I will hardly 
resist to say more on this  in a near future. The advantage of combinatory 
logic is that it is more quickly funny (as opposed to first order logic 
which beginning is tedious and hard (and I usually refer to textbook or to 
Podnieks pages).
Informal Combinatory logic can be presented as an everything theory. It 
has a static and a dynamic:

STATIC:  K is a molecule
  S is a molecule
  if x and y are molecules then (x y) is a molecule. From this 
you  can easily enumerate all
  possible molecules: K, S, (K K), (K S), (S K), (S S), ((K K) 
K), ((K S) K) ...

DYNAMIC: For all molecules x and y, the molecules ((K x) y) produce x
 For all molecules x, y z, the molecules (((S x) y) z) 
produce y

Exercices: what gives ((K K) K) ? what gives (K (K K)) ?
 Is there a molecule M such that (M x) gives x?
That theory has been discovered by Shoenfinkel in 1920 and rediscovered by 
Curry and Church (the same as in Church thesis) in the 1930, and has had 
since many applications in practical and theoretical computer science. It 
is very fine grained and useful to compare many theories. I am sure that if 
you were willing to study it a little , it would inspire you for finding 
more understandable presentation of your ideas. Note that it does not 
subsumes comp, but, given that this theory is Turing complete, it is 
perhaps one of the better road toward computer science and its 
philosophies. It could interest everyone in this list and I am pretty sure 
many know it or have heard about it. I am currently translating my thesis 
in combinators language if only because I have discovered it provides huge 
helps to make concrete some otherwise too much abstract notion for good 
willing students and philosophers.
I am leaving Brussels for Paris (First European Congress in Philo of 
Sciences) and I will be back in a few days.

Regards,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-18 Thread Hal Ruhl
What I am really talking about is availability of choice.
My All/Nothing model appears to preclude choice.  In this it seems a member 
of a class that assume all information already exists.

Awhile ago I posted on another model in which there is a Nothing.  This 
Nothing suffers the same incompleteness issue as the one in the All/Nothing 
model.  In this case to resolve this issue the Nothing spontaneously decays 
into a Something which then sets off on a trip to completion.  This model 
seems to insist on the presence of choice.

Hal




Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-18 Thread Danny Mayes
I remember your previous posts on nothing, and how it decays.  
However, this concept requires an intelligence to be present with 
nothing to cause nothingness to decay, does it not?  It is 
intelligence and consciousness which defines things and makes relative 
comparisons. 

Danny Mayes   

Hal Ruhl wrote:
What I am really talking about is availability of choice.
My All/Nothing model appears to preclude choice.  In this it seems a 
member of a class that assume all information already exists.

Awhile ago I posted on another model in which there is a Nothing.  
This Nothing suffers the same incompleteness issue as the one in the 
All/Nothing model.  In this case to resolve this issue the Nothing 
spontaneously decays into a Something which then sets off on a trip to 
completion.  This model seems to insist on the presence of choice.

Hal



--
Danny Mayes
Law Office of W. Daniel Mayes
130 Waterloo St., SW
P.O. Drawer 2650
Aiken, SC 29802
(803) 648-6642
(803) 648-4049 fax
877-528-5598 toll free
[EMAIL PROTECTED]



Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-18 Thread Hal Ruhl
At 02:37 PM 1/18/2005, you wrote:
I remember your previous posts on nothing, and how it decays.
However, this concept requires an intelligence to be present with 
nothing to cause nothingness to decay, does it not?  It is intelligence 
and consciousness which defines things and makes relative comparisons.
Danny Mayes

Actually no.  The meaningful question that the Nothing must resolve is its 
own stability - persistence.  This is the case in both models. It is a 
freshman physics question.  The Nothing must resolve it but can not.  This 
causes the decay into a Something if you will in both models.  In the model 
free of an All once this happens it continues to complete itself by some 
path.  This is a creation of information scenario.  Choice is the way to do 
this.

Hal 




Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-18 Thread Danny Mayes
It may be a freshman philosophy question, but it can't be a physics 
question because you are dealing with issues occurring before our known 
physics were established.

Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 02:37 PM 1/18/2005, you wrote:
I remember your previous posts on nothing, and how it decays.
However, this concept requires an intelligence to be present with 
nothing to cause nothingness to decay, does it not?  It is 
intelligence and consciousness which defines things and makes 
relative comparisons.
Danny Mayes

Actually no.  The meaningful question that the Nothing must resolve is 
its own stability - persistence.  This is the case in both models. It 
is a freshman physics question.  The Nothing must resolve it but can 
not.  This causes the decay into a Something if you will in both 
models.  In the model free of an All once this happens it continues 
to complete itself by some path.  This is a creation of information 
scenario.  Choice is the way to do this.

Hal

--
Danny Mayes
Law Office of W. Daniel Mayes
130 Waterloo St., SW
P.O. Drawer 2650
Aiken, SC 29802
(803) 648-6642
(803) 648-4049 fax
877-528-5598 toll free
[EMAIL PROTECTED]



Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-18 Thread Hal Ruhl
At 04:41 PM 1/18/2005, you wrote:
It may be a freshman philosophy question, but it can't be a physics 
question because you are dealing with issues occurring before our known 
physics were established.
You really miss the point.  It is a question of logic and finding an 
unavoidable meaningful question for the Nothing.  The question - various 
stabilities of a construct is first covered in freshman physics.

Hal



RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-17 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 01:32 16/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 15/1/05 Bruno Marchal wrote:
Obviously!  But it is so only because you dismiss the failure induction 
problem. Also: third person identity is arguably an illusion. But I 
hardy doubt first person identity can ever be an illusion or that it 
could even be useful to consider like it. What is painful in pain for the 
suffering first person is mainly that the pain can last, and this 
independently of any precise idea the first person could have about who she is.
This type of argument is often used to support the more common sense 
position on personal identity, but it is flawed. If I believe (as I do) 
that my future will consist of a series of people who live only for a 
moment, who believe they are me and share most of my memories, but aside 
from this similarity are no more me than any stranger is, then I 
shouldn't worry about my future suffering any more than I should worry 
about the suffering of a stranger. As a matter of fact, I would worry more 
if I expected to be tortured tomorrow than if I expected someone else 
would be tortured tomorrow. Therefore, the idea that continuity of 
personal identity is an illusion must be wrong, or at least my claim to 
believe this idea must be disingenuous.

In fact, all this argument shows is that humans, and for that matter other 
animals, have evolved to behave as if the conventional view of personal 
identity is true. It is so primitive and deep-seated that belief is 
probably not the best word for it; it is more a feeling or instinct. And 
it is certainly not something I can overcome with mere reason!

Nor is it interesting to do so. I don't think any notion of prediction keep 
sense. I am probably a little more oriented toward Popper-refutable 
theories where predictions are senseful.


There wouln't be much point in arguing about all this if it were not for 
the theoretical possibility of teleportation, multiple universes, time 
travel and so on. Efforts to save the conventional view of personal 
identity in discussing these matters result in a complicated mess. If we 
allow that all that exists is individual moments of first person 
experience which can be grouped according to their similarity, as a stamp 
collector groups stamps, giving the impression of continuous streams of 
consciousness, all the apparent paradoxes and other difficulties disappear.
But I am interested in the probabilities of those impressions of 
continuous streams. And I think those probabilities are relative (like in 
Everett relative state theory).  Also if WE are machine then the physical 
laws are emergent on relations between numbers, and this in a sufficiently 
precise way to be tested; making the comp assumption (theory) Popper 
refutable itself.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-17 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hello Hal,
In my particular All/Nothing approach my world kernels are packets of 
information necessary and sufficient to describe a particular state of a 
universe.  The dynamic of the approach provides physical reality to world 
kernels in sequences [worlds] in a manner that is inconsistent with the 
dynamic's past [to avoid the net information necessary to describe a 
structured dynamic - even a random one].

This will produce sequences of world kernels [worlds] given physical 
reality that permit the continuation of large kernel sub components from 
kernel to kernel.  Some of these sequences could be such that the entire 
kernels and the sequence of such could be properly emulated by a Turing 
machine.  This however is not the same as the Turing machine emulating the 
entire evolution of that world since the dynamic that establishes the 
emulable sequence can terminate its emulability [or even just switch 
machines] without regard to the state of the emulating Turing machine.

For this reason I must currently reject Schmidhuber Comp:   The universe 
is computable/Turing emulable.

Now if one envisions the physical reality evolution of sub components of 
the world kernels in such a sequence the result would be the same.

?

So I find I must also reject ... Comp:   I (you) am (are) 
computable/Turing emulable.
I have no problem with that; but your phrasing is too fuzzy for me to 
follow the reason why you reject both Schmidhuber and the personal-comp. 
Do you really mean that your theory would made you say no to a doctor 
presenting you an artificial brain (even with a very low substitution level 
description of yourself) ?
Remember that my point is just that is we are machine then physics is 100% 
derivable from computer science. (But even if we succeed to derive 100% of 
physics from comp this would not be a proof that comp is true).

Regards,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-17 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Bruno:
At 09:51 AM 1/17/2005, you wrote:
Hello Hal,
snip mine

Now if one envisions the physical reality evolution of sub components of 
the world kernels in such a sequence the result would be the same.

?

So I find I must also reject ... Comp:   I (you) am (are) 
computable/Turing emulable.
I have no problem with that; but your phrasing is too fuzzy for me to 
follow the reason why you reject both Schmidhuber and the personal-comp.

I reject Schmidhuber Comp because a sequence of world states [world 
kernels] which may indeed be Turing machine [or some extension there of] 
emulable is nevertheless managed by the system's dynamic which is external 
to the machine.

Any sub component of a world kernel [such as myself] is subject to the same 
result thus my rejection of Personal Comp.


Do you really mean that your theory would made you say no to a doctor 
presenting you an artificial brain (even with a very low substitution 
level description of yourself) ?
First assume that choice is available to sub components of a world state.
I would not accept because even if the dynamic is such that my world state 
sequence suffers only minor shifts such as jumping to slightly different 
machines I do not believe there is a current description of me low enough 
that the artificial brain would not lead to a divergence of my future 
history from what it would have been with my current biological 
brain.  [The dynamic can eventually change my description on the fly in any 
event.]  I would be selecting one future history vs another.  Just having 
the procedure or not is such a selection [choice] [my current brain would 
suffer some alternate future history as well]  and demonstrates that the 
two courses are not the same.

Having no way to select between these future histories I would stay the 
course with what I had.

Is choice available?
There is no change taking place during the physical reality of a world 
kernel.  Any sub component of a world kernel can not influence the next 
kernel selected for the sequence since influence is a change.  Only the 
external dynamic selects the succeeding world kernel and this selection is 
inconsistent with any past selection.  There is no choice.


Remember that my point is just that is we are machine then physics is 100% 
derivable from computer science.

I suspect that this may be correct for sequences that suffer only small 
shifts in the machine that can emulate them given that all the machines are 
after all computers by assumption.  Allowing the ability to Turing emulate 
a sub component of a kernel in a portion of a sequence is the same as 
allowing the ability to Turing emulate the entire kernel containing the sub 
component in the same portion of the sequence since one can not establish 
an isolating cut between a sub component and the kernel it is a part of.

(But even if we succeed to derive 100% of physics from comp this would not 
be a proof that comp is true).
Exactly.
Hal 




RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-16 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Bruno:
In my particular All/Nothing approach my world kernels are packets of 
information necessary and sufficient to describe a particular state of a 
universe.  The dynamic of the approach provides physical reality to world 
kernels in sequences [worlds] in a manner that is inconsistent with the 
dynamic's past [to avoid the net information necessary to describe a 
structured dynamic - even a random one].

This will produce sequences of world kernels [worlds] given physical 
reality that permit the continuation of large kernel sub components from 
kernel to kernel.  Some of these sequences could be such that the entire 
kernels and the sequence of such could be properly emulated by a Turing 
machine.  This however is not the same as the Turing machine emulating the 
entire evolution of that world since the dynamic that establishes the 
emulable sequence can terminate its emulability [or even just switch 
machines] without regard to the state of the emulating Turing machine.

For this reason I must currently reject Schmidhuber Comp:   The universe 
is computable/Turing emulable.

Now if one envisions the physical reality evolution of sub components of 
the world kernels in such a sequence the result would be the same.

So I find I must also reject ... Comp:   I (you) am (are) 
computable/Turing emulable.

Yours
Hal Ruhl





Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-15 Thread Stephen Paul King
I agree, if there is a continuity of memory, no mater how long some 3-person 
duration of unconsiousness might occur,, the different person aspect 
vanishes. I am what I remember myslef to be...

Stephen
- Original Message - 
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, January 15, 2005 10:30 PM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements


On 15/1/05 Danny Mayes wrote:
To have any sense perception there has to be the passage of an 
inordinately large amount of time as compared to the smallest units of 
time available.  If each frame of time, the smallest divisible unit if you 
assume that time is discreet, is a different identity, there would be no 
perception.  So you must expand the time frame out to at least a moment, 
which I'll define as the time for a passing thought.  However, all of this 
seems nonsense to me. Where is the cuttoff point that you become a 
different person?
It's easy to get confused over the meaning of terms like different 
person here. The basic idea I am trying to get across is that if a person 
or other conscious entity is destroyed and after a certain time period is 
(to an arbitrary level of fidelity) reconstructed, perhaps fom a different 
source of matter, then in general there is no way for that person to know 
that he hasn't just had a period of unconsciousness whilst still remaining 
the same person.

Many would be shocked at the prospect of going through the above process, 
fearing that it would actually amount to being killed and then replaced by 
a deluded imposter. Literally, I suppose this is true. We could also argue 
about whether we should say that the original person has survived the 
process, or whether the pre- and post-reconstruction versions are 
identical. This is just semantics. The important point is that the 
normal flow of conscious experience is indistinguishable from / equivalent 
to dying and being replaced by a deluded imposter every moment.

--Stathis Papaioannou
_
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RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 15/1/05 Brent Meeker wrote:
(quoting my post)
It's easy to get confused over the meaning of terms like different person
here. The basic idea I am trying to get across is that if a person or other
conscious entity is destroyed and after a certain time period is (to an
arbitrary level of fidelity) reconstructed, perhaps fom a different source
of matter, then in general there is no way for that person to know that he
hasn't just had a period of unconsciousness whilst still remaining the
same person.
Many would be shocked at the prospect of going through the above process,
fearing that it would actually amount to being killed and then replaced by 
a
deluded imposter. Literally, I suppose this is true. We could also argue
about whether we should say that the original person has survived the
process, or whether the pre- and post-reconstruction versions are
identical. This is just semantics. The important point is that the normal
flow of conscious experience is indistinguishable from / equivalent to 
dying
and being replaced by a deluded imposter every moment.

--Stathis Papaioannou

I see some problems with the above view.  First, the idea that the same
person can have different physical realizations is based on the 
naturalistic
view of thought and consciousness.  Thought is some physical process.  But
then it seems this physical basis is ignored and a person is idealized as
just the information processing.  But there is no information without
representation.  Just because it is possible to realize a person in
different physical media doesn't mean that the physical medium can be
dispensed with.
We can restrict ourselves to the one thing we know for certain about thought 
and consciousness (leaving aside the Problem of Other Minds), which is that 
it is associated with complex electrochemical processes in human brains. It 
doesn't change my argument.

Second, there seems to be an assumption that a person is only a sequence of
conscious thoughts.  All conscious thought is associated with brains - and
also with a lot of unconscious 'thought' or information processing.  It is
not at all clear that one could recreate the conscious stream of thought
without the unconscious part.
Again, let's agree that only the wet squishy thing inside our skulls is 
capable of thought. We certainly don't have any direct evidence to the 
contrary.

Third, related to the second above, thought is a process that is 
distributed
in both space, throughout the brain, as well as time.  Hence relativity
implies that there is no unique sequence of events corresponding to a 
single
state of consciousness.
Can you explain this third point?
I've never understood why critics of computationalism think the brain is so 
fundamentally different from electronic computers. Whatever mysterious, as 
yet undiscovered of processes may be behind conscious thought, it all has to 
be done with at most a couple of dozen different elements taking part in 
chemical reactions. What else beyond this could there possibly be?

--Stathis Papaioannou
_
Are you right for each other? Find out with our Love Calculator:  
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Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-14 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 15:01 13/01/05 -0500, John Mikes wrote:
Your Honored Divinity! (Name: God Bruno M):
Semantics is a great thing. I agree.
Since IMO we all (meaning as you said not only humans, or livings)
interfere in all changes of the world (here restricted to our universe)
multilaterally, your 'god' definition holds and so theology can be called
part of the 'natural sciences' we try to handle.
I don't like to much the expression natural. (So I like your 'quoteq')
I think it is an indexical expression, like here, now, etc. The separation
between natural/artificial is artificial (and thus natural!). But, above all, a
lot of people takes Nature as granted, and implicitly assume physicalism
(which you know is incompatible with mechanism).
As for being god I really mean the sense of Alan Watts. The other unique
one, has no name (like the first person btw), and like any Whole once you 
accept
mathematical realism.


(But as a fellow-god, please. don't deny the s from my last name.)
Oops. Please accept my modest loebian apologies.

Divinely yours
You are welcome,
Bruno

- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Danny Mayes [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED];
[EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, January 13, 2005 10:49 AM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
 At 09:16 13/01/05 -0500, Danny Mayes wrote:

 Could you explain this  last line?
 
 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
 As for the failure of induction if all possible worlds exist, I
prefer
 to simply bypass the problem.
 
 
 
 Mmm... I think you make the same mistake as David Lewis (In the
plurality
 of worlds, but in
 counterfactuals it partially fix the mistake ...).
 You bypass the most interesting problem which actually makes refutable
 classes of mathematical theologies.


 I will try. I will also try to be short and you can consult
 my URL for more explanations including posts to this list.
 The starting point is the assumption that I (we, you) are turing emulable.
 Now computations are mathematical objects, and with some amount
 of arithmetical realism or platonism all computations exists in the
 same sense that all constructive reals exists. But some thought
 experiment show that if we are turing emulable then we cannot know
 which computations support us. Both Stathis and David Lewis are aware
 that with a many-worlds postulate, or even just with many
 computations postulates, there is a failure of induction
 problem. Indeed, a priori, if you make induction from all the
computationnal
 histories going through your states you get many white rabbit stories if
 not just
 white noise, unless you discover that computations and observer relative
 to them are highly non trivial mathematical object so that the induction
 problem could perhaps be solved technically (and indeed progress has
 been made and sometimes I make attempt to convey a little bit of it).
 Solving the induction problem means in this context that we are able to
 justify why the average observer can predict some normal (reversible,
linear)
 computation at the bottom and below.
 'The term theology could be justified because it reminds us that once
you
 accept the idea that your immediate most probable future consistent
 extension is determined by a mean on all your 2^Aleph0 maximal
 consistent extensions, and that you survive always on the most
normal/near
 comp history, then the dyingnotion seems to belong to the category
 of wishful thinking (making us more ignorant). But theology, in this
context
 can also just be defined by the study of what machines can correctly (or
just
 consistently) prove and infer about themselves and their most probable
 computations, and here deep results in mathematical logic and in
theoretical
 computer science give huge lightning (but necessitate of course some
 math work). (Now I am not sanguine about any words but I recall the term
 theology had been used by Plato to mean the study of the Gods, and then
 if you are willing to believe (with Alan Watts) that we are all Gods ...

 And, (this I add to John Mikes, if you permit Danny,) when I say we are
 Gods, John, I don't see any reason to limit the understanding of we to
 the humans. You know I talk on something far larger yet non trivial.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-14 Thread John M

 Stathis Papaioannou writes:
  Here is another irrational belief I hold, while I'm confessing. I am
  absolutely convinced that continuity of personal identity is a kind of
  illusion. If I were to be painlessly killed every second and immediately
  replaced by an exact copy, with all my memories, beliefs about being me,
  etc., I would have no way of knowing that this was happening, and indeed
I
  believe that in a sense this IS happening, every moment of my life. Now,
  suppose I am offered the following deal. In exchange for $1 million
  deposited in my bank account, tonight I will be killed with a sharp axe
in
  my sleep, and in the morning a stranger will wake up in my bed who has
been
  brainwashed and implanted with all my memories at my last conscious
moment.
  This stranger will also have had plastic surgery so that he looks like
me,
  and he will then live life as me, among other things spending the $1
million
  which is now in my bank account.

Stathis:
Would YOU stay alive to observe? or would your self- (ego) also merge into
that 'stranger'  in which case IT IS YOU, not a stranger?

(Such exchanges (much less perfect) occurs when someone is steeling your
Social Security # and/or internet passwords (ha ha).
Your thought experiment is neither so thought, nor so strange.)

EPR was a better one.

John Mikes















RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Hal Finney writes:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:

 As for the failure of induction if all possible worlds exist, I prefer 
to
 simply bypass the problem. I predict that in the next few moments the 
world
 will most likely continue to behave as it always has in the past... Here 
I
 am a few moments later, and I am completely, horribly wrong. A zillion
 versions of me in other worlds are dying or losing consciousness as they
 watch fire-breathing dragons materialise out of nothing. So what? Those
 versions are not continuing to type to the end of this paragraph, while 
this
 one-in-a-zillion version manifestly is, and will continue to live life
 holding the delusional belief that the laws of physics will remain 
constant.

This works OK to reject worlds where you die, but presumably there are
also more worlds where you survive but see surprising failures of natural
law than worlds where natural law exists.  If you truly believe this,
it should affect your actions, and you should not proceed under the
assumption that everything will be normal.  Most universes where you
survive would probably be so lawless that you would just barely survive,
so perhaps this would point to abandoning moral behavior and striving
for brute survival at all costs.  I.e. go out and steal from people,
rob banks, commit murder without thought of the consequences, because
it's far more likely that the street will turn to molten metal than that
you'll be apprehended and sent to jail.

Actually, no, I don't think most people (with past experience of an orderly 
world, as we have) WOULD behave in this way, even if it were proved beyond 
reasonable doubt that the lawless, disorganised universes always have and 
always will predominate. Having thought about this, I doubt that I would 
change my life much if this proof were provided, even if I didn't have to 
rely on death removing me from unspeakably horrible futures.  I think the 
important bit psychologically is the understanding that the horrible and 
disorganised universes which will predominate in the future have also 
predominated in the past - which would of course mean that we have been 
incredibly lucky to have survived thus far. It shouldn't make any difference 
to what we should expect from here on, logically, but psychologically, I 
think it would.

Suppose you are credibly informed by some very wicked and very powerful 
aliens that, starting tonight, you will be whisked from your bed, cloned a 
thousand times, one clone will be returned to bed unharmed, while the rest 
will be tortured horribly for the rest of their lives. This will then be 
repeated with the clone that goes unharmed the next night, and so on every 
night until that clone dies before the next cloning time is due. Given this 
bleak future, many people, perhaps most people, would understandably choose 
suicide now as the only way out.

Now consider the same aliens credibly inform you of all the above, but with 
the additional information that, without your knowledge, the cloning/torture 
cycles have actually been going on since you were born. While the news would 
no doubt still be shocking, I suspect many people would say, So what? I've 
lived like this for years, and as far as this thread of consciousness which 
I identify as myself is concerned, I've done OK. As long as I can be sure 
that at least one thread of consciousness will continue as before, I would 
be stupid to kill myself now.

You might say the attitude  in the last paragraph is irrational, but I would 
be surprised if at least a substantial minority of subscribers to this list 
(who, I think it would be fair to say, as a group hold reason in higher 
esteem than the population as a whole does) would decide against suicide.

Probably it would make a difference if we could witness the clones' torture 
rather than just knowing that it occcurs, but returning to the original 
question, what better way is there to isolate ourselves from unpleasantness 
than sequestering it, forever unreachable even in theory, in a parallel 
universe?

--Stathis Papaioannou
_
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RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-13 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
1. Every possible world can be simulated by a computer program.

With the most usual (Aristotelian) sense of the term world, this
assumption would entail the falsity of comp,
which is that I can be simulated by a computer program.
(I, or any of the class of observers I belong(s) to).
But then, as you were indeed driving at, we
cannot know in computations are supporting us,
and there are actually 2^Aleph0 infinite histories
going through your current state, and any notion of worlds
is a subjective notion emerging from probabilistic
interference among those computations. Actually
those which support you + all those below (your substitution
level).
In the spirit of your thought experiment, let me ask
you a personal question. Assume you have big motivation
for going to Mars. You can now choose between a 100$ and a
1$ teletransporter machine (TTM). Let us assume you are not so rich
that this difference count (or adjust the number relatively to your situation).
The 100$ TTM has no security and it is known that billion of copies of yourself
will be sold elsewhere, for example to the kind of hell you were pointing to.
The 1$ TTM has quantum coded protection, so that the probability
is very near one that no pirate will be able to copy you.
Are you telling us that you will take the insecure low cost TTM ?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-13 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
As for the failure of induction if all possible worlds exist, I prefer 
to simply bypass the problem.

Mmm... I think you make the same mistake as David Lewis (In the plurality 
of worlds, but in
counterfactuals it partially fix the mistake ...).
You bypass the most interesting problem which actually makes refutable 
classes of mathematical theologies.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-13 Thread Danny Mayes
Could you explain this  last line?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
As for the failure of induction if all possible worlds exist, I 
prefer to simply bypass the problem.

Mmm... I think you make the same mistake as David Lewis (In the 
plurality of worlds, but in
counterfactuals it partially fix the mistake ...).
You bypass the most interesting problem which actually makes refutable 
classes of mathematical theologies.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-13 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 09:16 13/01/05 -0500, Danny Mayes wrote:
Could you explain this  last line?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
As for the failure of induction if all possible worlds exist, I prefer 
to simply bypass the problem.

Mmm... I think you make the same mistake as David Lewis (In the plurality 
of worlds, but in
counterfactuals it partially fix the mistake ...).
You bypass the most interesting problem which actually makes refutable 
classes of mathematical theologies.

I will try. I will also try to be short and you can consult
my URL for more explanations including posts to this list.
The starting point is the assumption that I (we, you) are turing emulable.
Now computations are mathematical objects, and with some amount
of arithmetical realism or platonism all computations exists in the
same sense that all constructive reals exists. But some thought
experiment show that if we are turing emulable then we cannot know
which computations support us. Both Stathis and David Lewis are aware
that with a many-worlds postulate, or even just with many
computations postulates, there is a failure of induction
problem. Indeed, a priori, if you make induction from all the computationnal
histories going through your states you get many white rabbit stories if 
not just
white noise, unless you discover that computations and observer relative
to them are highly non trivial mathematical object so that the induction
problem could perhaps be solved technically (and indeed progress has
been made and sometimes I make attempt to convey a little bit of it).
Solving the induction problem means in this context that we are able to
justify why the average observer can predict some normal (reversible, linear)
computation at the bottom and below.
'The term theology could be justified because it reminds us that once you
accept the idea that your immediate most probable future consistent
extension is determined by a mean on all your 2^Aleph0 maximal
consistent extensions, and that you survive always on the most normal/near
comp history, then the dyingnotion seems to belong to the category
of wishful thinking (making us more ignorant). But theology, in this context
can also just be defined by the study of what machines can correctly (or just
consistently) prove and infer about themselves and their most probable
computations, and here deep results in mathematical logic and in theoretical
computer science give huge lightning (but necessitate of course some
math work). (Now I am not sanguine about any words but I recall the term
theology had been used by Plato to mean the study of the Gods, and then
if you are willing to believe (with Alan Watts) that we are all Gods ...

And, (this I add to John Mike, if you permit Danny,) when I say we are
Gods, John, I don't see any reason to limit the understanding of we to
the humans. You know I talk on something far larger yet non trivial.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-13 Thread John M
Your Honored Divinity! (Name: God Bruno M):
Semantics is a great thing. I agree.
Since IMO we all (meaning as you said not only humans, or livings)
interfere in all changes of the world (here restricted to our universe)
multilaterally, your 'god' definition holds and so theology can be called
part of the 'natural sciences' we try to handle.
(But as a fellow-god, please. don't deny the s from my last name.)
Divinely yours
John Mikes

- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Danny Mayes [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED];
[EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, January 13, 2005 10:49 AM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements


 At 09:16 13/01/05 -0500, Danny Mayes wrote:

 Could you explain this  last line?
 
 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
 As for the failure of induction if all possible worlds exist, I
prefer
 to simply bypass the problem.
 
 
 
 Mmm... I think you make the same mistake as David Lewis (In the
plurality
 of worlds, but in
 counterfactuals it partially fix the mistake ...).
 You bypass the most interesting problem which actually makes refutable
 classes of mathematical theologies.


 I will try. I will also try to be short and you can consult
 my URL for more explanations including posts to this list.
 The starting point is the assumption that I (we, you) are turing emulable.
 Now computations are mathematical objects, and with some amount
 of arithmetical realism or platonism all computations exists in the
 same sense that all constructive reals exists. But some thought
 experiment show that if we are turing emulable then we cannot know
 which computations support us. Both Stathis and David Lewis are aware
 that with a many-worlds postulate, or even just with many
 computations postulates, there is a failure of induction
 problem. Indeed, a priori, if you make induction from all the
computationnal
 histories going through your states you get many white rabbit stories if
 not just
 white noise, unless you discover that computations and observer relative
 to them are highly non trivial mathematical object so that the induction
 problem could perhaps be solved technically (and indeed progress has
 been made and sometimes I make attempt to convey a little bit of it).
 Solving the induction problem means in this context that we are able to
 justify why the average observer can predict some normal (reversible,
linear)
 computation at the bottom and below.
 'The term theology could be justified because it reminds us that once
you
 accept the idea that your immediate most probable future consistent
 extension is determined by a mean on all your 2^Aleph0 maximal
 consistent extensions, and that you survive always on the most
normal/near
 comp history, then the dyingnotion seems to belong to the category
 of wishful thinking (making us more ignorant). But theology, in this
context
 can also just be defined by the study of what machines can correctly (or
just
 consistently) prove and infer about themselves and their most probable
 computations, and here deep results in mathematical logic and in
theoretical
 computer science give huge lightning (but necessitate of course some
 math work). (Now I am not sanguine about any words but I recall the term
 theology had been used by Plato to mean the study of the Gods, and then
 if you are willing to believe (with Alan Watts) that we are all Gods ...

 And, (this I add to John Mike, if you permit Danny,) when I say we are
 Gods, John, I don't see any reason to limit the understanding of we to
 the humans. You know I talk on something far larger yet non trivial.

 Bruno

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 10:24 13/01/05 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
1. Every possible world can be simulated by a computer program.

With the most usual (Aristotelian) sense of the term world, this
assumption would entail the falsity of comp,
which is that I can be simulated by a computer program.
(I, or any of the class of observers I belong(s) to).
Huh? I thought I was saying the opposite. I certainly believe in comp.
In the spirit of your thought experiment, let me ask
you a personal question. Assume you have big motivation
for going to Mars. You can now choose between a 100$ and a
1$ teletransporter machine (TTM). Let us assume you are not so rich
that this difference count (or adjust the number relatively to your 
situation).
The 100$ TTM has no security and it is known that billion of copies of 
yourself
will be sold elsewhere, for example to the kind of hell you were pointing 
to.
The 1$ TTM has quantum coded protection, so that the probability
is very near one that no pirate will be able to copy you.
Are you telling us that you will take the insecure low cost TTM ?
It's a good question, and this is where the rational comes up against the 
emotional. If it were my first trip, I think I'd be very nervous about the 
cheap alternative, and I would pay the extra or avoid going if I couldn't 
afford it. However, if I had used the $100 service many times in the past 
(through choice or necessity), I don't think I would worry about using it 
again.

Here is another irrational belief I hold, while I'm confessing. I am 
absolutely convinced that continuity of personal identity is a kind of 
illusion. If I were to be painlessly killed every second and immediately 
replaced by an exact copy, with all my memories, beliefs about being me, 
etc., I would have no way of knowing that this was happening, and indeed I 
believe that in a sense this IS happening, every moment of my life. Now, 
suppose I am offered the following deal. In exchange for $1 million 
deposited in my bank account, tonight I will be killed with a sharp axe in 
my sleep, and in the morning a stranger will wake up in my bed who has been 
brainwashed and implanted with all my memories at my last conscious moment. 
This stranger will also have had plastic surgery so that he looks like me, 
and he will then live life as me, among other things spending the $1 million 
which is now in my bank account.

If I were rational, I should probably accept the above deal, on the grounds 
that my apparent continuity of personal identity will be the same as it 
always has been. If such a proposal were put to me, however, I would be 
horrified; and I am sure my friends and family would be too, even if they 
shared my philosophical beliefs about personal identity. I would also be 
horrified if offered the role of the stranger who takes someone else's 
place. I can't decide which would be worse.

On the other hand, if I had been forced to go through the above 
transformation several times, I might get used to the idea and not be so 
worried. Rationally, it shouldn't make any difference.

--Stathis Papaioannou
_
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RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-13 Thread Hal Finney
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
 Here is another irrational belief I hold, while I'm confessing. I am 
 absolutely convinced that continuity of personal identity is a kind of 
 illusion. If I were to be painlessly killed every second and immediately 
 replaced by an exact copy, with all my memories, beliefs about being me, 
 etc., I would have no way of knowing that this was happening, and indeed I 
 believe that in a sense this IS happening, every moment of my life. Now, 
 suppose I am offered the following deal. In exchange for $1 million 
 deposited in my bank account, tonight I will be killed with a sharp axe in 
 my sleep, and in the morning a stranger will wake up in my bed who has been 
 brainwashed and implanted with all my memories at my last conscious moment. 
 This stranger will also have had plastic surgery so that he looks like me, 
 and he will then live life as me, among other things spending the $1 million 
 which is now in my bank account.

That's an interesting thought experiment.  I think the problem is that
given human psychology, any such brainwashing is almost certain to be
superficial and not to duplicate the deep mental structures which are
part of our identity.  The guy who wakes up in bed is still going to be
a stranger, who merely resembles you in some ways.

If we imagine instead that we are living voluntarily as members of a
computer simulation (uploads), then it would be possible to actually
have the stranger's mind be an exact copy of your own.  However, in
that case the copy would be so exact that there really isn't any sense
in which you have been replaced by a stranger.  The stranger would
really be you, if he had the exact same mind and body as represented
in the computer simulation.

You could arbitrarily induce various levels of change in the copied
mind, so that you would have a continuum from an exact copy, to one with
some exceedingly small changes, to one which would be about as good as
a brainwashed human being, to some that would be entirely different.
Then I'm not sure what the sensible approach is as far as how much money
to demand in exchange for such an alteration.

After all, the money doesn't spring into existence, it is transferred
from one person to another.  From the larger perspective, why should
you care about helping one human being over another?  Once you start to
think of the person waking up in bed as an arbitrary human being, who
might or might not happen to resemble you, it becomes harder to adopt
the identity-centric viewpoint where you only root for the one guy who is
you.

If you think of identity as an illusion, as many of these thought
experiments seem to suggest, all we can fall back on is a universal
altruism, where our goal is to maximize the total happiness of conscious
entities.  Such a goal is largely immune to these paradoxes, although
it does have some problems of its own.

Hal Finney



Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-12 Thread Alastair Malcolm
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Alastair Malcolm [EMAIL PROTECTED];
everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: 11 January 2005 14:47
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
 I certainly agree. Now the problem is that there are many logics, and so
 there are many notion or logical possibility.

It sounds like we may be using 'logics' for two different purposes. For me,
basic logic is intended here (that of syllogisms and 'if it is true
that p, then it cannot be the case that p is false'); any ambiguities
between logics in directly describing a (physical-type) world would tend to
be due to their particular application areas (for example temporal logic
would not be geared to worlds with certain alternatives to time); others
tend not to have this use at all (for example modal logic is more about
consistency/proveability/necessity, or worlds in general). Again, in the
same vein as my reply to Hal F, if a logic / formal system cannot
describe an entity, it is either due to an inherent restriction (compared to
other logics / formal systems), or else the entity is totally beyond our
comprehension (in a formal sense).

 The choice of the logic (or logicS) will depend on some basic assumptions.
.
.
.
If you read the papers I am referring too, don't hesitate to ask questions.

Is it still the case that the best english version of the relevant ideas are
from your earlier posts to this list, as identified in your URL? I shall try
to look at them at some stage.

Alastair




Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-12 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 09:45 12/01/05 +, Alastair Malcolm wrote:
It sounds like we may be using 'logics' for two different purposes. For me,
basic logic is intended here (that of syllogisms and 'if it is true
that p, then it cannot be the case that p is false');
This is a little ambiguous. But I will take it as your acceptation
of (at least) intuitionist basic logical system.

any ambiguities
between logics in directly describing a (physical-type) world would tend to
be due to their particular application areas (for example temporal logic
would not be geared to worlds with certain alternatives to time);
And this will depend on some non-logical axiom you will postulate
togeteher with the background logic.

 others
tend not to have this use at all (for example modal logic is more about
consistency/proveability/necessity, or worlds in general). Again, in the
same vein as my reply to Hal F, if a logic / formal system cannot
describe an entity, it is either due to an inherent restriction (compared to
other logics / formal systems), or else the entity is totally beyond our
comprehension (in a formal sense).
OK.

Is it still the case that the best english version of the relevant ideas are
from your earlier posts to this list, as identified in your URL? I shall try
to look at them at some stage.

Perhaps better is my SANE paper, you can download it from
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
I show that IF we are Turing-emulable THEN physics is, in a testable way,
 the geometry of the border of our ignorance. Where by our I refer to 
us the
Loebian Machine.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-12 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 18:12 11/01/05 -0500, John M quotes Russell Standish writing:
(if I am correct in the quotes).
4) For those who believe in Computationalism, the Turing model of
   computation implicitly requires this Time postulate.

Here I disagree a lot. Actually most models of computation does no
require any Time Postulate. They need only Peano axioms of arithmetic.
Time-steps of computations are build from the successor function : n - n+1
Reasoning on computations needs no more than the induction axioms (See
Podnieks page for the first order arithmetic axioms).
Even quantum computation does not (really) need time, but that is
a less obvious statement about which we can discuss later.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-12 Thread John M
Dear Russell, you wrote:
This sounds like a terminological difference. To me, data refers to
mere differences. Information has meaning. Observation attaches
meaning to data, creating informations from that data.
WHAT do you observe if you have to create the meaning? I find it a reverse
route, to learn the quantities (data) and then enrich them with meaning to
make it 'information'. Don't forget that there is ample information
(meanings galore) - unquantizable, where the 'bits' don't even come into the
picture. All those are its (in my nomenclature).
I wonder if I am alone with this terminology?
Far we are not: in my terminology to 'absorb' (acknowledge, imbibe) a
difference implies the meaning part as well, so the datum gets it when it
becomes information. Of course data can be non-quantitative.
*
Then you wrote:
 Again this is terminology. By timelike I was referring to the
 process of bringing two entities together for comparison. Nothing
 more, not less. Perhaps pre-timelike is a more accurate term, but I
 like to egg the pudding!

You probably missed my example anticipating such reply:
... observation can compare e.g. overlapping pictures,
 atemporarily, in one 
when WE do not bring together comparables one after the other.
I don't deny the time factor, just want to leave open the possibility of an
atemporal worldview (which is still a big problem for me, too).
*
Then again I have a reply to your:
 Not sure how remark to point 4 relates to this one. Does it mean you
 don't believe in QM? Or that QM is not universal within the plenitude?
(I'd agree with you there) Or that QM is an accidental feature of our
world? (I'm inclined to disagree with you here)

First I find it an 'out-of-bounds' argumentative twist to change my term
human representational way of OUR world model into your
accidental feature of our world.
The linear THEORY of QM about the - originally- (nonlinear?) world of
microscopic physics is not a 'feature' of the world. I answered this
differentiation after #4 (cf: Comp-Turing), that's why I referred to it
after #5 (QM) as similarly a limited model based anthropologism. Sorry if a
critical remark on QM hit mores sensitive chords.
*
Small potato: (on the religious discussion-example)
 No ideas can be proven. Surely you know that from Popper. 
Right you are, let's change it to 'justified'/'explained'. That can be
logical, even if Sir Karl did not exclude it from existence. What I meant
is: first the believers should explain what their belief is based on, then I
can argue against it. Not in reverse (time!).
I don't start to argue against something the existence of which I don't see
justified or explained, just because the other side would like to put me
into a more vulnerable position in the argumentation.
*
To your final par:
 Comp  QM aren't part of the belief system here. They are interesting
 afterthoughts. The belief system relates to ideas about what
 information means - I don't really see you disputing this, although I
 do see some misunderstandings; the existence of a plenitude of
 data (which I don't see you disputing either); and the Anthropic
 Principle, which you may well dispute, as its a decidedly dodgy
proposition.

Information I coined more than 10 years ago (maybe a review is actual, one
reason why I entered this discussion: to get new input ideas) was:
Absorbed (acknowledged) difference. By any contraption capable of doing so
('meaning' implied). Any difference, from an electrical charge to an
economical controversy in S-W Asia. Now I see 'observation' as very close to
this. And: to 'experience' as well.
My plenitude is a feature in my NARRATIVE (not even a hypo-thesis)
needed for a story of Big Bangs (unlimited) to start the multiverse in a way
acceptable for human logic (- without the controversies in the physical
cosmological BB fable.) It lacks data, serves ONE purpose, I refuse to
discuss details of it, it is unobservable and unexplained.
Sorry, I did not read your paper on the AP, maybe you made some sense to it.
So far I see in it only us, god's real children as the most important
feature in the world.
Merry Xmas! (oops: it is past).

John Mikes

- Original Message -
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tuesday, January 11, 2005 8:19 PM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements


 On Tue, Jan 11, 2005 at 06:12:28PM -0500, John M wrote:
SNIP, Quotes for reply see above in the text.




RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 9 January 2005 Alastair Malcolm wrote:

This is a fascinating discussion list, full of stimulating ideas and
theories, but I would be interested to know what people *actually* believe
on the subject of many/all worlds - what one would bet one's house or life
on, given that one were forced to choose some such bet.
I believe it is logically necessary that all possible worlds exist, based on 
a number of ideas that have been discussed many times on this list:

1. Every possible world can be simulated by a computer program.
2. It is not, in general, possible to distinguish between a simulated world 
and a real world.

2a. If there is no empirical or logical way to distinguish with certainty 
between a real and a simulated world, one may as well say there is no 
essential difference between them [interesting, but not really necessary for 
the rest of this argument].

3. Consider a computer running a simulation complete with conscious beings. 
This particular computer was designed by a now extinct civilization, and 
although the hardware still appears to be working, the compiler, instruction 
manual and computer language documentation have all been lost.

3a. The result of (3) is that the simulated world continues to run on the 
computer, even though there can be no communication between it and us in the 
real world where the computer exists physically. (Idea for a story: maybe 
that's why the gods used to talk to us in ancient times but no longer do!)

4. A computer need not be a box that runs Windows or Linux. Conceivably, a 
computer could consist of the idle passage of time, or the set of natural 
numbers, operated on by some hugely complex look-up table. In Greg Egan's 
1994 novel Permutation City, it is pointed out that a simulated being's 
experiences are the same if the computation is run backwards, forwards, 
chopped up into individual pieces and randomly dispersed throughout the 
world-wide network; the computation somehow assembles itself out of dust - 
out of omnipresent, apparently randomly distributed ones and zeroes.

4a. In other words, no hardware, whether physical or simulated (if these are 
different things) is necessary for the implementation of a computation. 
Every possible computation is implemented out there in the realm of pure 
mathematics, so every possible world necessarily exists.

Now, the above argument is sometimes taken as being self-evidently absurd. 
Hilary Putnam and John Searle have actually used it in this way to attack 
strong A.I. theories. The objection is that the effort and information 
needed to construct the look-up table in (4) is at least as great as that 
which would be needed to construct and program a computer in the 
conventional way. An analogy can be made with a block of marble: in a sense, 
it does contain every possible statue, but this is not any help to the 
sculptor. But all this means is that we cannot, in this world, communicate 
with or make any use of the type of computer described in (3) or (4). The 
other worlds may exist, but we can never know this directly.

As for the failure of induction if all possible worlds exist, I prefer to 
simply bypass the problem. I predict that in the next few moments the world 
will most likely continue to behave as it always has in the past... Here I 
am a few moments later, and I am completely, horribly wrong. A zillion 
versions of me in other worlds are dying or losing consciousness as they 
watch fire-breathing dragons materialise out of nothing. So what? Those 
versions are not continuing to type to the end of this paragraph, while this 
one-in-a-zillion version manifestly is, and will continue to live life 
holding the delusional belief that the laws of physics will remain constant.

--Stathis Papaiaonnou
_
Searching for that dream home? Try   http://ninemsn.realestate.com.au  for 
all your property needs.



RE: Belief Statements

2005-01-12 Thread Hal Finney
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
 1. Every possible world can be simulated by a computer program.

I'm not sure that this is the best definition of a possible world.
I'm concerned that we are hiding a lot of assumptions in this word.
It relates to my earlier comment about ambiguity in which constitutes
the multiverse.

 4. A computer need not be a box that runs Windows or Linux. Conceivably, a 
 computer could consist of the idle passage of time, or the set of natural 
 numbers, operated on by some hugely complex look-up table. In Greg Egan's 
 1994 novel Permutation City, it is pointed out that a simulated being's 
 experiences are the same if the computation is run backwards, forwards, 
 chopped up into individual pieces and randomly dispersed throughout the 
 world-wide network; the computation somehow assembles itself out of dust - 
 out of omnipresent, apparently randomly distributed ones and zeroes.

I had a problem with the demonstration in Permutation City.  They claimed
to chop up a simulated consciousness timewise, and then to run the pieces
backwards: first the 10th second, then the 9th second, then the 8th,
and so on.  And of course the consciousness being simulated was not
aware of the chopping.

The problem is that you can't calculate the 10th second without
calculating the 9th second first.  That's a fundamental property of our
laws of physics and I suspect of consciousness as we know it.  This means
that what they actually did was to initially calculate seconds 1, 2,
3... in order, then to re-run them in the order 10, 9, 8  And of
course the consciousness wasn't aware of the re-runs.  But it's not clear
that from this you can draw Egan's strong conclusions about dust.
It's possible that the initial, sequential run was necessary for the
consciousness to exist.

 As for the failure of induction if all possible worlds exist, I prefer to 
 simply bypass the problem. I predict that in the next few moments the world 
 will most likely continue to behave as it always has in the past... Here I 
 am a few moments later, and I am completely, horribly wrong. A zillion 
 versions of me in other worlds are dying or losing consciousness as they 
 watch fire-breathing dragons materialise out of nothing. So what? Those 
 versions are not continuing to type to the end of this paragraph, while this 
 one-in-a-zillion version manifestly is, and will continue to live life 
 holding the delusional belief that the laws of physics will remain constant.

This works OK to reject worlds where you die, but presumably there are
also more worlds where you survive but see surprising failures of natural
law than worlds where natural law exists.  If you truly believe this,
it should affect your actions, and you should not proceed under the
assumption that everything will be normal.  Most universes where you
survive would probably be so lawless that you would just barely survive,
so perhaps this would point to abandoning moral behavior and striving
for brute survival at all costs.  I.e. go out and steal from people,
rob banks, commit murder without thought of the consequences, because
it's far more likely that the street will turn to molten metal than that
you'll be apprehended and sent to jail.

Hal Finney



Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal
At 10:32 09/01/05 +, Alastair Malcolm wrote:
For my own part, I give strong credibility (50%) to the existence of many
worlds in some guise or other, and in particular to the existence of all
logically possible(*) worlds (alpw).

I certainly agree. Now the problem is that there are many logics, and so
there are many notion or logical possibility.
The choice of the logic (or logicS) will depend on some basic assumptions.
In particular with the computationalist hypothesis (comp) there is a necessity
to distinguish precisely notions like first and third person point of view 
and this leads
to different notion of logical possibilities. The Modal logics can help here.
You can read my papers referred in my URL below. A good book introducing
the main logics I am using is the book by Smullyan Forever Undecided.

Actually I'm working currently with still another type of logic: the 
Shoenfinkel
Curry Combinatory Logics.  This will help for linking my work with the
mainstream logical work of today's logicians (linear logic, for example).
Here too Smullyan wrote a very nice introductory book To Mock a
Mockingbird. I strongly recommend it. A classical treatise is the 
North-Holland
book on the Lambda Calculus by Henk Barendregt.
Combinatory logics (and its sister the lambda calculus) has failed concerning
its initial goal to provide a logical foundation of the whole of mathematics.
But Combinatory Logics has been, and still is, very useful in the foundation
of computer science (which itself is indispensable through the comp hyp).
Not really the time to say much more now, but my point is that logical 
possibility
is a notion which we should'nt take for granted. Logic is a field full of 
surprise
and unexpected results.

Concerning your question of believing in the many worlds, I can only give
you a rough summary of the conclusion of the work I have done in the comp
frame. With the Church thesis (see the diagonalization posts to this list and
referred in my url) there is a universal notion of computation (unlike 
provability,
proofs, etc.), and all computations exist (the comp form of everything).
Giving the discrepancy between first and third person notion (see my papers
or see my posts to the list) no observer-machine can ever know which
computations support them, and physical reality (whatever it is) must emerge
from the interference (in an a priori larger sense than the quantum sense)
of all the computations which are rich enough to support your processing.
This can be computed and compare to actual physics. Until now the
comparison tend to confirm both the quantum hyp. and the comp hyp.
Note that physics is made secondary with respect to computer science, or
logic, or arithmetics. The combinatory logics make possible, in principle,
to distinguish the apparition (in the eyes of the Lobian machine) of
classical physics and quantum physics (and this is new, I mean it is
not explicitly in my thesis).
The common point between my work, Smullyan's Forever undecided, and
Smullyan To mock a Mockingbird is, of course, the study of self-reference,
which is the main tool to define formally the first and third person views.
If you read the papers I am referring too, don't hesitate to ask questions.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-11 Thread John M



(Sorry for the convoluted editing: it comes from 
Russell's format as 
attachment only, without strraight readability 
as an e-mail)

- Original Message - 
From: "Russell Standish" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: "John M" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: "Hal Ruhl" [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, January 10, 2005 6:50 
PM
Subject: Re: Belief 
Statements
Dear Russell,
since you e-mail without words 
(only an attachment) I copy your text here to give my reply to it - interspaced, 
if you don't mind :
--
On Mon, Jan 10, 2005 at 04:08:15PM -0500, 
John M wrote:  At 07:40 PM 1/9/2005, you wrote: 

(Russell Standish):
  A compromise on these two views 
occurs through my assumption of "Time" being a necessary property of 
bserverhood. Sure atemporal worldsexist, but there's nobody in them to 
observe them. Similarly, Hal Ruhl's dynamic process is simply the process of 
observation.  
 
Cheers (R.St.)  Russell seems to 
restrict 'observerhood' to timed worlds (maybe: humans?) ("there's nobody 
in them to observe them"). 
I leave 'observation' open to ANY 
absorption of information, in 'our' sense or otherwise. I don't 'deny' 
existence to formats we have no idea about. We just don't know. (JM 
) 
*
 ( R St now ) 
:
It is an assumption (or perhaps postulate: the 
Time postulate). It isamenable to debate, just as Euclid's axioms are. I 
offer the following points in its favour:

1) Observation is the process of creating 
information, by distinguishing differences between things (aka 
bits).

JM: IMO observation does 
NOT CREATE information, it collects it. Information is the acknowledged 
difference and I agree with point 2: there must be at least 1 mutual dimension 
for a comparison (to have an acknowledgeabledifference) aka 
information. 
Two dimensionally unconnected 'facts' do not constitute a difference, nor 
provide information on the two together. Desultory knowledge is irrelevant in 
this case. 
(Bits: I may not 
understand it right, but IMO a 'bit' does not disclose a meaning - it is 
applicable in any context applied. 
So I would reverse 
Wheeler's 'it from bit' into 'bit from it'. We do not 'create' the world 
according to the computer bits - but in the contrary, the bits represent (stand 
for) the "its".) 

2) To have a difference, obviously requires at 
least one dimension.

3) To compare two different entities requires 
that the properties of the two entities be brought together 
(inside the observer's "mind"). Thus the one required dimension 
must be "timelike",   
withthe observer passing from point to point.

JM: I don't see the 
conclusion about "timelike":observation can compare e.g. overlapping 
pictures atemporarily, in one. 
But this, again, is the 
reflection of human habits (logic and capabilities). 
If we consider 
'information'as I propose in generalization:
acknowledged 
difference, not restricted how and by what acknowledged, "our" time 
concept does not enter the picture. 

4) For those who believe in Computationalism, 
the Turing model of computation implicitly requires this Time 
postulate.

JM: I don't. It is a human 
representational way of OUR world model. Even if we try to 'apply' it to "other" 
worlds.

5) It appears to be a necessary ingredient to 
obtain Quantum Mechanics from first principles (see my "Why Occams Razor" 
paper)

JM: ditto, see my remark 
to #4

None of this is a proof. However, it is very 
persuasive andgeneral. For someone to claim that this postulate is invalid, 
theywould probably need to show a model of observation that invalidates it, 
just as Gauss showed Euclid's 5th axiom was not necessary by showing a 
consistent geometry in which he axiom was invalid. And that would be a very 
interesting development.

JM: Nobody has 
toshow an unproven idea as invalid. The idea must be verified first for 
argumentation. Furthermore: it is nice to show an alternative, however an 
unlikely idea can be deemed unlikely without providing an alternative. 

Ideas are 'persuasive' 
within the belief system they fit into. Comp and QM are "general" chapters 
within the (limited) model we have in contemporary science about THIS world. Not 
valid in an openminded multiverse of no restrictions.

Cheers

Russell 
Standish 


 Re-Cheers

John 
Mikes







Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-10 Thread Alastair Malcolm
- Original Message -
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: 09 January 2005 16:21
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
 Alastair Malcolm writes:
  For my own part, I give strong credibility (50%) to the existence of
many
  worlds in some guise or other, and in particular to the existence of all
  logically possible(*) worlds (alpw). For me the existence of one world
  (ours) so conveniently life-suited - sufficiently spatio-temporally
extended
  and quiescent but with particular properties enabling wide diversity in
  chemistry etc - demands a specific explanation, and the only other
candidate
  final explanation - a Creator (say a God, or a 'higher' civilisation) -
  suffers (at least) the problem of requiring an explanation for *it*.

 That's a great question.  I agree that assuming that this is the only
 world is quite problematic.  On the other hand it does not necessarily
 follow that all possible or conceivable worlds exist.  From hearing
 some physicists speak, I get the impression that they are being dragged
 kicking and screaming towards many worlds and anthropic ideas, but are
 resisting.  They still hope to come up with some kind of mathematical or
 philosophical reason to at least restrict the number of possible worlds.

I would be interested to know if anyone could think of any possible
mathematical or philosophical restriction that that could be, other than
deductive logic itself.

 At a minimum they are looking for dependencies among many superficially
 independent aspects of the observable universe.  In fact, you could
 describe that as the fundamental goal of physics.  They might accept
 that certain physical constants have a certain accidental or contingent
 aspect, that there is no fundamental reason why they have those values;
 but they want to minimize the number of constants for which this is
 true, and find ways to show that other constants and properties depend
 on these few arbitrary ones.

Unfortunately all the basic physical principles that frame any minimisation
of the number of arbitrary constants are themselves based solely on what
happens to occur in our particular universe.

 I also think that AUH (all universe hypothesis) admits too many
 alternative formulations which may not all be consistent.  That would seem
 to force the metaverse to choose between, say, Schmidhuber and Tegmark.
 Yet how can that be?  It doesn't seem to make sense that there are two
 inconsisent ways that all universes can exist.

One must be careful that the mode-of-representation tail doesn't wag the
physical dog: the neutrality of not giving preference to any particular
complete entity itself (both in terms of number, or just existence) implies
that it is what the representation *refers to* that is crucial, so any
inconsistencies in, say, measure between modes of representation merely
reflect the fact that different codes within a mode (bit strings,
mathematical forms etc) can in certain circumstances refer to the same
entity. (This is not to devalue their potential role, when used carefully,
as a guide in overall relative measure estimates.)

Alastair




Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-10 Thread Alastair Malcolm
- Original Message -
From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: 09 January 2005 19:28
Subject: Re: Belief Statements
 I can't conceive of space-time being anything other than infinite.  The
 existence of all logically possible worlds seems necessary in infinite
 space-time, where . . . anything that can happen must happen, not only
once
 but an infinite number of times.

By 'worlds' I didn't mean planets - I effectively meant universes. Apologies
for any confusion here.

Please also be aware of the difference between logical possibility (defined
in my earlier post) and physical possibility (conformity to the physical
laws).

Alastair




Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-10 Thread John M
Comments below, please.
John M
- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, January 09, 2005 8:16 PM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements


 Hi Russell:

 My dynamic in part produces worlds that appear to have time as a property
 but also produces all kinds of worlds that have no time in the sense of
 there being any ordered sequence.  There are also worlds that are just a
 single kernel that is given physical reality in a manner commensurate with
 the features of the dynamic.

 Hal


 At 07:40 PM 1/9/2005, you wrote: (Russell  Standish)
 A compromise on these two views occurs through my assumption of Time
   being a necessary property of observerhood. Sure atemporal worlds
   exist, but there's nobody in them to observe them. Similarly, Hal
   Ruhl's dynamic process is simply the process of observation.
 
Cheers  (R.St.)

 

Russell seems to restrict 'observerhood' to timed worlds (maybe: humans?)
(there's nobody in them to observe them). I leave 'observation' open to
ANY absorption of information, in 'our' sense or otherwise. I don't 'deny'
existence to formats we have no idea about. We just don't know.

Hal (above) mentions dynamic, in our usual sense, a sequence in time, as a
property of the world (the one (kind?) we live in). Reference to ORDERED
sequence, ordered as we have it (in time).

I mentioned several times (!) tha one problem I struggle with is how to
fashion
'change' in an atemporal system? where the 'from' and 'to' are not fixed?
This
seems to be beyond our imagination - however I don't deny its existence (see
above).

Our 'model' of the 'world' disallows these variations, but - that's where
the
reductionistic models fail to represent the wholeness (totality). Sciences
are
reductionistic, so I accept the reply that my idea is not scientific (in
today's
definitions of the sciences).

JM













Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-10 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Russell:
At 06:50 PM 1/10/2005, you wrote:
It is an assumption (or perhaps postulate: the Time postulate). It is
amenable to debate, just as Euclid's axioms are. I offer the following
points in its favour:
1) Observation is the process of creating information, by
   distinguishing differences between things (aka bits).
I can not agree with this given my model.  Physical Reality is brought to 
world kernels in some sequence by the dynamic.  As I stated before each 
step of the dynamic is inconsistent with its past [see the All/Nothing 
multiverse model thread].  As such there is no dimensionality to it or 
perhaps one could call it infinitely dimensioned.  All world kernels 
preexist within the All.  Information is not created or 
destroyed.  Switched on and off in terms of physical reality is a better 
view.  However, world kernels are of different informational content [size] 
so a world can look like information is created if the sequence of kernels 
consists of kernels of increasing size.

2) To have a difference, obviously requires at least one dimension.
Worlds can of course have non zero finite dimensionality.  However, 
differences are not distinguishable by some other difference [a difference 
is what I take to be that which is pointed to by the term observer].


3) To compare two different entities requires that the properties of
   the two entities be brought together (inside the observer's
   mind). Thus the one required dimension must be timelike, with
   the observer passing from point to point.
As stated above a difference can not compare [distinguish] other 
differences.  However, a difference can change as the dynamic moves to 
different kernels and this can look like an act such as distinction and 
appear [memory - false or not] as if directed by the difference that changes.

4) For those who believe in Computationalism, the Turing model of
   computation implicitly requires this Time postulate.
Some kernel sequences could appear to be the successive outputs of a 
computer but this is just appearance.

5) It appears to be a necessary ingredient to obtain Quantum Mechanics
   from first principles (see my Why Occams Razor paper)
Quantum Mechanics and Relativity appear to be just consequences of some 
world kernels having a non zero, finite difference in size and the dynamic 
providing a physical reality to a sequence of such world kernels - a non 
zero, discrete step evolution of the applicable world.

Hal



Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-09 Thread Hal Finney
Alastair Malcolm writes:
 For my own part, I give strong credibility (50%) to the existence of many
 worlds in some guise or other, and in particular to the existence of all
 logically possible(*) worlds (alpw). For me the existence of one world
 (ours) so conveniently life-suited - sufficiently spatio-temporally extended
 and quiescent but with particular properties enabling wide diversity in
 chemistry etc - demands a specific explanation, and the only other candidate
 final explanation - a Creator (say a God, or a 'higher' civilisation) -
 suffers (at least) the problem of requiring an explanation for *it*.

That's a great question.  I agree that assuming that this is the only
world is quite problematic.  On the other hand it does not necessarily
follow that all possible or conceivable worlds exist.  From hearing
some physicists speak, I get the impression that they are being dragged
kicking and screaming towards many worlds and anthropic ideas, but are
resisting.  They still hope to come up with some kind of mathematical or
philosophical reason to at least restrict the number of possible worlds.

At a minimum they are looking for dependencies among many superficially
independent aspects of the observable universe.  In fact, you could
describe that as the fundamental goal of physics.  They might accept
that certain physical constants have a certain accidental or contingent
aspect, that there is no fundamental reason why they have those values;
but they want to minimize the number of constants for which this is
true, and find ways to show that other constants and properties depend
on these few arbitrary ones.

I also think that AUH (all universe hypothesis) admits too many
alternative formulations which may not all be consistent.  That would seem
to force the metaverse to choose between, say, Schmidhuber and Tegmark.
Yet how can that be?  It doesn't seem to make sense that there are two
inconsisent ways that all universes can exist.  To me that suggests a
weakness in our understanding which further study will improve upon.
But it means that we can't claim to understand the AUH or to really know
what it would mean for all universes to exist.

As far as the MWI of QM, my understanding is that advanced theoretical
physicists believe QM will be shown to be false(!).  It is expected to
be merely an approximation to some deeper theory which will also explain
general relativity.  If all we had was QM, I think the MWI would very
likely be true.  However, given that QM will be replaced by string theory
or loop quantum gravity or some other model, I don't know enough about
those to say whether the MWI will still be the simplest explanation.

All in all I'd say that I see too much confusion and uncertainty to hold
to any position regarding the existence of multiple universes.

Hal Finney



Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-09 Thread Norman Samish
I can't conceive of space-time being anything other than infinite.  The 
existence of all logically possible worlds seems necessary in infinite 
space-time, where . . . anything that can happen must happen, not only once 
but an infinite number of times.

The difficulty, as Hal Finney points out, is that we so far do not know what 
can happen.

Why does infinite space-time exist?  Perhaps because it must - what 
alternative could there be?

Norman Samish
.
- Original Message - 
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, January 09, 2005 8:21 AM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements


Alastair Malcolm writes:
 For my own part, I give strong credibility (50%) to the existence of many
 worlds in some guise or other, and in particular to the existence of all
 logically possible(*) worlds (alpw). For me the existence of one world
 (ours) so conveniently life-suited - sufficiently spatio-temporally 
 extended
 and quiescent but with particular properties enabling wide diversity in
 chemistry etc - demands a specific explanation, and the only other 
 candidate
 final explanation - a Creator (say a God, or a 'higher' civilisation) -
 suffers (at least) the problem of requiring an explanation for *it*.

That's a great question.  I agree that assuming that this is the only
world is quite problematic.  On the other hand it does not necessarily
follow that all possible or conceivable worlds exist.  From hearing
some physicists speak, I get the impression that they are being dragged
kicking and screaming towards many worlds and anthropic ideas, but are
resisting.  They still hope to come up with some kind of mathematical or
philosophical reason to at least restrict the number of possible worlds. 
snip
All in all I'd say that I see too much confusion and uncertainty to hold
to any position regarding the existence of multiple universes.

Hal Finney





Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-09 Thread Hal Ruhl
My views on the subject of a multiverse are:
1) The base level embedding system should have no net information.
2) The base level embedding system should have a dynamic.
The above seem to have consequences:
i) There can be no down select [limitation] on the number of worlds.
ii)  There can be no down select on the properties of worlds.
Comments so far:
What is a world?  In my view a world is just some sequence of temporary 
physical reality given to individual members of an infinite ensemble of 
preexisting packets of information I call kernels.  Such members of the 
ensemble would be world kernels.  A world kernel encodes a single state.  A 
portion of some such kernels could be considered to be a memory [perhaps a 
false one] of past states.  The dynamic of (2) gives a brief physical 
reality to world kernels in some sequence thereby producing a world.

iii) Each step of the dynamic must be inconsistent with its past.
Comments:
Eventually the dynamic gives physical reality to world kernels in a 
sequence that has an evolution with respect to sub components [non isolated 
of course] within these kernels that seems to them consistent with some set 
of rules.  There can be no down select on the types of rules.

I have posted my proposal for such a base level embedding system in the An 
All/Nothing multiverse model thread.

Hal


 




Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-09 Thread John M
Dear Hal,
in my multiverse it is a characteristic of this 'our' world to have
developed (into?) a space and time system. I would not assign
time to all others just becauseso we can understand it better.
(The story of the driver who looks for his (in the darkenss) dropped carkeys
around the corner under the streetlamp, because there he can see better).
I don't understand (or know) how to handle atemporal worlds, but - Hey! - do
we understand everything? (only on this list).

Have a good 2005

John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, January 09, 2005 4:01 PM
Subject: Re: Belief Statements


 My views on the subject of a multiverse are:

 1) The base level embedding system should have no net information.

 2) The base level embedding system should have a dynamic.

 The above seem to have consequences:

 i) There can be no down select [limitation] on the number of worlds.

 ii)  There can be no down select on the properties of worlds.

 Comments so far:

 What is a world?  In my view a world is just some sequence of temporary
 physical reality given to individual members of an infinite ensemble of
 preexisting packets of information I call kernels.  Such members of the
 ensemble would be world kernels.  A world kernel encodes a single state.
A
 portion of some such kernels could be considered to be a memory [perhaps a
 false one] of past states.  The dynamic of (2) gives a brief physical
 reality to world kernels in some sequence thereby producing a world.

 iii) Each step of the dynamic must be inconsistent with its past.

 Comments:

 Eventually the dynamic gives physical reality to world kernels in a
 sequence that has an evolution with respect to sub components [non
isolated
 of course] within these kernels that seems to them consistent with some
set
 of rules.  There can be no down select on the types of rules.

 I have posted my proposal for such a base level embedding system in the
An
 All/Nothing multiverse model thread.

 Hal











Re: Belief Statements

2005-01-09 Thread Hal Ruhl
Hi Russell:
My dynamic in part produces worlds that appear to have time as a property 
but also produces all kinds of worlds that have no time in the sense of 
there being any ordered sequence.  There are also worlds that are just a 
single kernel that is given physical reality in a manner commensurate with 
the features of the dynamic.

Hal
At 07:40 PM 1/9/2005, you wrote:
A compromise on these two views occurs through my assumption of Time
 being a necessary property of observerhood. Sure atemporal worlds
 exist, but there's nobody in them to observe them. Similarly, Hal
 Ruhl's dynamic process is simply the process of observation.
  Cheers