Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 1:49 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: The spark plugs don't fire in response to the will of the driver, the brain does. This isn't magic, this is the ordinary process by which we participate in the world in every waking moment of our lives. It is not the same. Building a car that you can drive with your mind is one thing, building a car that can predict where you want to drive to next month is completely different. But the atoms in the food I ate for dinner that will be incorporated into my brain don't know what I'm going to do next month. All they have to do is behave like every other carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen etc. atom in the universe. Whatever my brain does, it does it with those interchangeable components. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On Saturday, September 29, 2012 2:14:34 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 1:49 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: The spark plugs don't fire in response to the will of the driver, the brain does. This isn't magic, this is the ordinary process by which we participate in the world in every waking moment of our lives. It is not the same. Building a car that you can drive with your mind is one thing, building a car that can predict where you want to drive to next month is completely different. But the atoms in the food I ate for dinner that will be incorporated into my brain don't know what I'm going to do next month. All they have to do is behave like every other carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen etc. atom in the universe. Whatever my brain does, it does it with those interchangeable components. At the level in which there are interchangeable components, there is no brain. At the level at which we can describe a brain, the context is a whole living organism. Your view conflates what I call the micro-impersonal level with higher impersonal levels and the perceptual frame of impersonal representations with the perceptual frame of personal presentations. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/0yzrPhaAMFwJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On 28 Sep 2012, at 11:56, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal and all, from Leibniz's point of view: 1) Free will is possible with L's determinism if defined in the following way: if the monad sees the appetite, then the action is free will. If not, not. I would have said that this is freedom, not free will. To be franc, I still don't know how to interpret monad. 2) Consciousness does not emerge from matter, That's coherent with computationalism. it is a fulgeration of the All (the monad of monads), to use L's term. I think that means emanation, not sure. Matter is never in complete control, nor are the monads, nor in fact is the All. OK. L's causation is cooperative. The monad of monads appears to cause changes, but it can only do so according to the monads' perceptions, according to their individual desires, because monads are unaffected by other monads. All changes in monads are actually caused by their previous states. Looks like monad might be interpreted in the comp theory by a computational state, or a relative number (relative to a universal system or number). Since this must occur according to the preestablished harmony, to me that all boils down to mean that the preestablished harmony is a script for monadic change. It looks like a script describing (a part of) arithmetical truth. Like the prices of stock market stocks, it contains all you need or can know to predict the future states of all monads, those being individually given by their previous states. Since the previous states have been constantly reset so that each monad knows everything in the univefrse uniqueloy from its own point of view. That's not quite clear for me, sorry. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/28/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-27, 12:52:30 Subject: Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant) On 27 Sep 2012, at 15:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You can approximate consciousness by belief in self-consistency. This has already a causal efficacy, notably a relative self-speeding ability (by G?el length of proof theorem). But belief in self-consistency is pure 3p, and is not consciousness, you get consciousness because the machine will confuse the belief in self-consistency with the truth of its self-consistency, and this will introduce a quale. The machine can be aware of it, and (with enough cognitive ability) the machine will be aware of its non communicability, making it into a personal quale. I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real, and consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago you did understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of brain and matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives another role for consciousness: the bringing of physical realities through number relations being selected (non causally, here). Consciousness is what makes notions of causal efficacy meaningful to start with. I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws. But this cannot be entirely correct. Consciousness will make your brain, at the level below the substitution level, having some well defined state, with an electron, for example, described with some precise position. Without consciousness there is no material brain at all. Of course, you will argue that this is what physics already describes, with QM. In that sense I am OK, but consciousness is still playing a role, even if it is not necessarily the seemingly magical role invoked by Craig. Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is possible but it is contrary to all science. I agree with you on this. As an argument against mechanism, your point is valid. My point is that the way you talk might been misleading as it looks like it is bearing on some notion of primitively causal matter, but it does not. That plays some role when comparing the comp matter and the QM matter. This applies even if the whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is at the level of the simulation. Not if we observe ourselves or our neighborhood below our substitution level. In that case we can see only the trace of all infinitely many possible simulations, or computations, leading to our actual current computational states. Again we can say that QM confirms this a posteriori. In that case an observation will determine a brain state, in the same way a self-localization after duplication determines a self-localized state (like I am in this well defined city). Bruno I think it is the same error as using determinacy to refute free- will. This would be correct if we were living at the determinist base level, but we
Re: Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
Hi Bruno Marchal and all, from Leibniz's point of view: 1) Free will is possible with L's determinism if defined in the following way: if the monad sees the appetite, then the action is free will. If not, not. 2) Consciousness does not emerge from matter, it is a fulgeration of the All (the monad of monads), to use L's term. I think that means emanation, not sure. Matter is never in complete control, nor are the monads, nor in fact is the All. L's causation is cooperative. The monad of monads appears to cause changes, but it can only do so according to the monads' perceptions, according to their individual desires, because monads are unaffected by other monads. All changes in monads are actually caused by their previous states. Since this must occur according to the preestablished harmony, to me that all boils down to mean that the preestablished harmony is a script for monadic change. Like the prices of stock market stocks, it contains all you need or can know to predict the future states of all monads, those being individually given by their previous states. Since the previous states have been constantly reset so that each monad knows everything in the univefrse uniqueloy from its own point of view. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/28/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-27, 12:52:30 Subject: Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant) On 27 Sep 2012, at 15:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You can approximate consciousness by belief in self-consistency. This has already a causal efficacy, notably a relative self-speeding ability (by G?el length of proof theorem). But belief in self-consistency is pure 3p, and is not consciousness, you get consciousness because the machine will confuse the belief in self-consistency with the truth of its self-consistency, and this will introduce a quale. The machine can be aware of it, and (with enough cognitive ability) the machine will be aware of its non communicability, making it into a personal quale. I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real, and consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago you did understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of brain and matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives another role for consciousness: the bringing of physical realities through number relations being selected (non causally, here). Consciousness is what makes notions of causal efficacy meaningful to start with. I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws. But this cannot be entirely correct. Consciousness will make your brain, at the level below the substitution level, having some well defined state, with an electron, for example, described with some precise position. Without consciousness there is no material brain at all. Of course, you will argue that this is what physics already describes, with QM. In that sense I am OK, but consciousness is still playing a role, even if it is not necessarily the seemingly magical role invoked by Craig. Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is possible but it is contrary to all science. I agree with you on this. As an argument against mechanism, your point is valid. My point is that the way you talk might been misleading as it looks like it is bearing on some notion of primitively causal matter, but it does not. That plays some role when comparing the comp matter and the QM matter. This applies even if the whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is at the level of the simulation. Not if we observe ourselves or our neighborhood below our substitution level. In that case we can see only the trace of all infinitely many possible simulations, or computations, leading to our actual current computational states. Again we can say that QM confirms this a posteriori. In that case an observation will determine a brain state, in the same way a self-localization after duplication determines a self-localized state (like I am in this well defined city). Bruno I think it is the same error as using determinacy to refute free- will. This would be correct if we were living at the determinist base level, but we are not. Consciousness and free-will are real at the level where we live, and unreal, in the big 3p picture, but this concerns only the outer god, not the inner one which can *know* a part of its local self- consistency, and cannot know its local future. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On 26 Sep 2012, at 19:37, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, September 26, 2012 3:45:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Sep 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch jason...@gmail.com wrote: Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someone is able to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon. The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying qualia. With comp a physical events is explained in term of measure and machine/number relative consciousness selection (à la WM-duplication way). Physics is phenomenal. It is an internal consciousness selection made on coherent computations (arithmetical relations). We can't explain physics without a theory of quanta, which, in comp, is a sub-theory of a theory of consciousness/qualia. Consciousness is not epiphenomenal: it is the extractor of the physical realities in arithmetic. We could say that consciousness is the universal self-accelerating property of the universal number which makes possible the differentiation of the experience, and then the physical reality is a projection. I could consider consciousness as the main force in the universe, even if it is also a phenomenal reality (the ontology being only arithmetic, or finite combinatorial relations). We are on the same page here then. My only question is, if consciousness is the main force in the universe, doesn't it make more sense to see arithmetic as the condenser of experiences into physical realism? It makes sense once we assume comp, as we attach consciousness to computations, whose existence is guarantied by arithmetic. Are you saying that arithmetic guarantees consciousness because it obviously supervenes on awareness, or do you say that consciousness is specifically inevitable from arithmetic truth. Consciousness is specifically inevitable from arithmetic truth, seen from inside. If the latter, then it sounds like you are saying that some arithmetic functions can only be expressed as pain or blue... No. You confuse Turing emulable, and first person indeterminacy recoverable. Pain and blue have no arithmetical representations. in which case, how are they really arithmetic. They are not. Arithmetical truth is already not arithmetical. Arithmetic seen from inside is *vastly* bigger than arithmetic. This needs a bit of model theory to be explained formally. Besides, we have never seen a computation turn blue or create blueness. It would not lake sense to see that. Brain and electromagnetic fields or any 3p notion cannot turn blue. Blue is a singular informative global experienced by first person. I can easily see why experience would need semiotic compressions to organize itself, but I can see no reason that arithmetic or physical realities would possibly need to be 'extracted', or even what that would mean. This is what the Universal Dovetailer Argument explains. If it does, then I don't understand it. If you can explain it with a common sense example as a metaphor, then I might be able to get more of it. Did you understand the first person indeterminacy? Tell me if you understand the seven first steps of the UDA, in http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Why execute a program if all possible outcomes are already computable? To be computable is not enough, if the computations are not done, relatively to the situation you are in. Your question is like why should I pay this beer if I can show that I can pay it?. Yes, why should I pay for the beer if it's arithmetically inevitable that I have paid for the beer in the future? It is not arithmetically inevitable. In some stories you don't pay. Comp, like QM, leads to a continuum of futures, and your decisions and acts here-and-now determine the general features of your normal (majority) futures. That is why life and discussion forums have some sense. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On 27 Sep 2012, at 04:24, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the pain they are experiencing? Is it all coincidental? There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the painful stimulus to the subject saying that hurts, and this completely explains the observable behaviour. We can't observe the experience itself. If the experience had separate causal powers we would be able to observe its effects: we would see that neurons were miraculously firing contrary to physical law, and explain this as the immaterial soul affecting the physical world. I find the entire concept of epiphenominalism to be self-defeating: if it were true, there is no reason to expect anyone to ever have proposed it. If consciousness were truly an epiphenomenon then the experience of it and the resulting wonder about it would necessarily be private and non- shareable. In other words, whoever is experiencing the consciousness with all its intrigue can in no way effect changes in the physical world. So then who is it that proposes the theory of epiphenominalism to explain the mystery of conscious experience? It can't be the causally inefficacious experiencer. The only consistent answer epiphenominalism can offer is that the theory of epiphenominalism comes from a causally efficacious entity which in no way is effected by experiences. It might as well be a considered a non-experiencer, for it would behave the same regardless of whether it experienced something or if it were a zombie. The experiencer would behave the same if he were a zombie, since that is the definition of a zombie. I know I'm not a zombie and I believe that other people aren't zombies either, but I can't be sure. Epiphenominalism is forced to defend the absurd notion that epiphenominalism (and all other theories of consciousness) are proposed by things that have never experienced consciousness. Perhaps instead, its core assumption is wrong. The reason for all these books and discussion threads about consciousness is that experiences and consciousness are causally efficacious. If they weren't then why is anyone talking about them? The people talking about them could be zombies. There is nothing in any observation of peoples' behaviour that *proves* they are conscious, because consciousness is not causally efficacious. You can approximate consciousness by belief in self-consistency. This has already a causal efficacy, notably a relative self-speeding ability (by Gödel length of proof theorem). But belief in self- consistency is pure 3p, and is not consciousness, you get consciousness because the machine will confuse the belief in self- consistency with the truth of its self-consistency, and this will introduce a quale. The machine can be aware of it, and (with enough cognitive ability) the machine will be aware of its non communicability, making it into a personal quale. I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real, and consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago you did understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of brain and matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives another role for consciousness: the bringing of physical realities through number relations being selected (non causally, here). Consciousness is what makes notions of causal efficacy meaningful to start with. I think it is the same error as using determinacy to refute free-will. This would be correct if we were living at the determinist base level, but we are not. Consciousness and free-will are real at the level where we live, and unreal, in the big 3p picture, but this concerns only the outer god, not the inner one which can *know* a part of its local self-consistency, and cannot know its local future. Bruno It is emergent, at a higher level of description, supervenient or epiphenomenal - but not separately causally efficacious, or the problem of other minds and zombies would not exist. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 1:29 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical events or not? There are multiple levels involved here and you may be missing the forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms. Saying the consciousness is irrelevant in the processes of the brain may be like saying human psychology is irrelevant in the price moves of the stock market. Of course, you might explain the price moves in terms of atomic interactions, but you are missing the effects of higher-level phenomenon, which are real and do make a difference. The higher level description is not an entity with *separate* causal power. Was the stock market movement caused by physics, chemistry, biochemistry or psychology? In a manner of speaking, it's correct to say any of them; but we know that all the chemical, biochemical and psychological properties are ultimately traceable to the physics, even if it isn't practically useful to attempt stock market prediction by analysing brain physics. What I object to is the idea of strong emergence, that higher level properties are not merely surprising but fundamentally unable to be deduced from lower level properties. We can't observe the experience itself. I'm not convinced of this. While today, we have difficulty in even defining the term, in the future, with better tools and understanding of minds and consciousness, we may indeed be able to tell if a certain process implements the right combination of processes to have what we would call a mind. By tracing the flows of information in its mind, we might even know what it is and isn't aware of. Albeit at a low resolution, scientists have already extracted from brain scans what people are seeing: http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mindreading-software-could-record-your-dreams.html We still can't observe the experience. Advanced aliens may be able to read our thoughts very accurately in this way but still have no idea what we actually experience or whether we are conscious at all. The people talking about them could be zombies. There is nothing in any observation of peoples' behaviour that *proves* they are conscious, Consciousness is defined on dictionary.com as awareness of sensations, thoughts, surrounds, etc. Awareness is defined as having knowledge. So we can say consciousness is merely having knowledge of sensations, thoughts, surroundings, etc. The merely makes it an epiphenomenon. I think this is Daniel Dennett's potion. Dennett argues that zombies are logically impossible as consciousness is nothing but the sort of information processing that goes on in brains. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You can approximate consciousness by belief in self-consistency. This has already a causal efficacy, notably a relative self-speeding ability (by Gödel length of proof theorem). But belief in self-consistency is pure 3p, and is not consciousness, you get consciousness because the machine will confuse the belief in self-consistency with the truth of its self-consistency, and this will introduce a quale. The machine can be aware of it, and (with enough cognitive ability) the machine will be aware of its non communicability, making it into a personal quale. I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real, and consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago you did understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of brain and matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives another role for consciousness: the bringing of physical realities through number relations being selected (non causally, here). Consciousness is what makes notions of causal efficacy meaningful to start with. I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws. Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is possible but it is contrary to all science. This applies even if the whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is at the level of the simulation. I think it is the same error as using determinacy to refute free-will. This would be correct if we were living at the determinist base level, but we are not. Consciousness and free-will are real at the level where we live, and unreal, in the big 3p picture, but this concerns only the outer god, not the inner one which can *know* a part of its local self-consistency, and cannot know its local future. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On Thursday, September 27, 2012 1:01:12 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 11:09 PM, Stephen P. King step...@charter.netjavascript: wrote: On 9/26/2012 11:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stat...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch jason...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the pain they are experiencing? Is it all coincidental? There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the painful stimulus to the subject saying that hurts, and this completely explains the observable behaviour. But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical events or not? There are multiple levels involved here and you may be missing the forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms. Saying the consciousness is irrelevant in the processes of the brain may be like saying human psychology is irrelevant in the price moves of the stock market. Of course, you might explain the price moves in terms of atomic interactions, but you are missing the effects of higher-level phenomenon, which are real and do make a difference. Exactly Jason. The moment we conflate physical events with painful stimulus we have lost the war. If we assume that physical events can possibly be defined as full of 'pain', or that they stimulate (i.e. are received and responded to as a signifying experience - which is causally efficacious in changing observed behavior), then we are already begging the question of the explanatory gap. To assume that there can be a such thing as a purely physical event which nonetheless is full of pain and power to influence behavior takes the entirety of sense and awareness for granted but then fails to acknowledge that it was necessary in the first place. Once you have the affect of pain and the effect of behavioral stimulation, you don't need a brain as far as explaining consciousness - you already have consciousness on the sub-personal level. We can't observe the experience itself. I'm not convinced of this. While today, we have difficulty in even defining the term, in the future, with better tools and understanding of minds and consciousness, we may indeed be able to tell if a certain process implements the right combination of processes to have what we would call a mind. By tracing the flows of information in its mind, we might even know what it is and isn't aware of. Albeit at a low resolution, scientists have already extracted from brain scans what people are seeing: http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mindreading-software-could-record-your-dreams.html This may not be what we are seeing at all, but rather what we are looking at. There was a recent study on the visual cortex which showed the same activity whether the subject actually saw something or not. There may be no activity in the brain at all which directly translates into any conscious experience that we have, only the event horizon where we interface with our body and the body's world. We aren't in there...we're in here. We are not extended across public spaces, we are intended within private times. They are orthogonal sense modalities of the same essential process on multiple levels, each of which are cross-juxtaposed with ever other. (This means One group of cells in my body can get my full attention, or that I can think abstractly without consciously considering any cells or bodies or conditions in the world). If the experience had separate causal powers we would be able to observe its effects: we would see that neurons were miraculously firing contrary to physical law, and explain this as the immaterial soul affecting the physical world. It sounds like you are saying either epiphenomenalism is true or interactionism is true ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)#Dualist_views_of_mental_causation ). Both of these are forms of dualism, and I think both are false. Yes, I agree they are both because they both fail to recognize the symmetry of extended public space and intended private time. It's understandable because we are inherently biased as being completely steeped in our privacy to the point that it seems largely transparent to us. Our ability to make sense of public space phenomena is so powerful and clear that we are, at least in the West, seduced into believing that the interior too surely must be nothing but a clever arrangement of exteriors. It isn't. The symmetry is the thing. Levels and symmetry are the answer, not linear functions. There is no magic required at all, unless you deny your own private experience from the start, which of course 'saws off the branch that you are sitting on' and logically disqualifies 'you' from having any opinion about anything. Because they assume
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On Thursday, September 27, 2012 9:09:12 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.bejavascript: wrote: You can approximate consciousness by belief in self-consistency. This has already a causal efficacy, notably a relative self-speeding ability (by Gödel length of proof theorem). But belief in self-consistency is pure 3p, and is not consciousness, you get consciousness because the machine will confuse the belief in self-consistency with the truth of its self-consistency, and this will introduce a quale. The machine can be aware of it, and (with enough cognitive ability) the machine will be aware of its non communicability, making it into a personal quale. I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real, and consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago you did understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of brain and matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives another role for consciousness: the bringing of physical realities through number relations being selected (non causally, here). Consciousness is what makes notions of causal efficacy meaningful to start with. I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws. Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is possible but it is contrary to all science. This applies even if the whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is at the level of the simulation. That is not what I believe at all. I have corrected you and others on this many times but you won't hear it. Nothing unusual needs to happen in the brain for ordinary consciousness to take place, it's just that physics has nothing to say about whether billions of synapses will suddenly begin firing in complex synchronized patterns or not. Physics doesn't care. Can neurons fire when conditions are right? Yes. Can our thoughts and intentions directly control conditions in the brain? YES. Of course. Obviously. Otherwise we wouldn't care any more about the human brain than we would a wasps nest. It's not that physics needs to be amended, it is that experience is part of physics, and physics is part of experience. Craig I think it is the same error as using determinacy to refute free-will. This would be correct if we were living at the determinist base level, but we are not. Consciousness and free-will are real at the level where we live, and unreal, in the big 3p picture, but this concerns only the outer god, not the inner one which can *know* a part of its local self-consistency, and cannot know its local future. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/w6fXJrx0AsEJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 7:49 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote: On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 1:29 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical events or not? There are multiple levels involved here and you may be missing the forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms. Saying the consciousness is irrelevant in the processes of the brain may be like saying human psychology is irrelevant in the price moves of the stock market. Of course, you might explain the price moves in terms of atomic interactions, but you are missing the effects of higher-level phenomenon, which are real and do make a difference. The higher level description is not an entity with *separate* causal power. Was the stock market movement caused by physics, chemistry, biochemistry or psychology? In a manner of speaking, it's correct to say any of them; but we know that all the chemical, biochemical and psychological properties are ultimately traceable to the physics, even if it isn't practically useful to attempt stock market prediction by analysing brain physics. What I object to is the idea of strong emergence, that higher level properties are not merely surprising but fundamentally unable to be deduced from lower level properties. I agree with your distaste for strong emergence, but I think that you can no more take the consciousness out of the brain, then you could take out the chemical reactions. Each is a fundamental part of what it is and does. We can't observe the experience itself. I'm not convinced of this. While today, we have difficulty in even defining the term, in the future, with better tools and understanding of minds and consciousness, we may indeed be able to tell if a certain process implements the right combination of processes to have what we would call a mind. By tracing the flows of information in its mind, we might even know what it is and isn't aware of. Albeit at a low resolution, scientists have already extracted from brain scans what people are seeing: http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mindreading-software-could-record-your-dreams.html We still can't observe the experience. Advanced aliens may be able to read our thoughts very accurately in this way but still have no idea what we actually experience or whether we are conscious at all. Maybe they could know what we experience. If they moved their minds to alternate substrates they might have much greater neural plasticity and this could allow them to alter their own minds and know what we experience. Perhaps with enough practice doing this with different creatures from all over the galaxy they could develop some pretty accurate theories about what processing patterns of information lead to what first person experiences. The people talking about them could be zombies. There is nothing in any observation of peoples' behaviour that *proves* they are conscious, Consciousness is defined on dictionary.com as awareness of sensations, thoughts, surrounds, etc. Awareness is defined as having knowledge. So we can say consciousness is merely having knowledge of sensations, thoughts, surroundings, etc. The merely makes it an epiphenomenon. I think this is Daniel Dennett's potion. Dennett argues that zombies are logically impossible as consciousness is nothing but the sort of information processing that goes on in brains. Zombies are logically impossible precisely because consciousness is not an epiphenomenon. Dennett explains his position on epiphenomenalism here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gxqXdzMv7Iofeature=BFalist=PL9D673C673BC85C3Et=7m10s He is flabbergasted that anyone takes this view seriously Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On 9/27/2012 10:22 AM, Jason Resch wrote: This is to equate reasoning to automatically following an algorithm. This implies perfect predictability at some level and thus the absence of any 1p only aspects. Additionally, the recipe is some thng that needs explanation. How was it found...? This kind of zombie reasoning is an oxymoron as it assumes the possibility of evaluations and yet disallows the very possibility. Zombies have no qualia and thus cannot represent anything to itself. It has no self and thus lacks the capacity to impress anything upon that non-existent self. Here, I disagree. If a you ask a zombie to solve a riddle, and it ponders it for several minutes and then gives you the correct answer, how can you say it was not reasoning? It is like saying a computer is not multiplying when you ask it what 4*4 is and it gives you 16. Note that I think we agree (some forms of reasoning probably require consciousness), which only provides another reason to doubt the consistency of the definition of zombies. I don't think reasoning is normally assumed to require consciousness, which is why someone who defines zombies as non-conscious may still hold that they have a reasoning ability. Hi Jason, OK, but isn't that the point I made? Automaton behavior is per-scripted. It is not the result from an internal self-model. Is there some point where the two are identical in the 3p sense. Certainly! But only in that special case does your claim follow, but it does not follow generally as we need to take into account novel behavior. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On 9/27/2012 10:22 AM, Jason Resch wrote: I think the only difference in what you are saying and what I am saying, is I say look the zombies can do these things (by their definition), so they must be conscious and there is the inconsistency, whereas you say zombies cannot do these things since they are not conscious (by their definition), so then zombie behavior cannot be indistinguishable to a third party. It works out to the same conclusion, either zombies are conscious, or zombies can't behave indistinguishably, and hence the definition of a zombie that is non-conscious but has identical behavior is flawed. Hi Jason, I am fine with identity of the two if and only if there is no distinguishable difference in behavior, as this gives us a 3p definition, but to only see that case as the whole of the gamut of possibilities is a mistake. My claim is that the zombie idea can cause as much confusion as it's proponents intended to solve. Ideas are two edged things Otherwise they are just meaningless noise. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On 27 Sep 2012, at 15:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You can approximate consciousness by belief in self-consistency. This has already a causal efficacy, notably a relative self-speeding ability (by Gödel length of proof theorem). But belief in self-consistency is pure 3p, and is not consciousness, you get consciousness because the machine will confuse the belief in self-consistency with the truth of its self-consistency, and this will introduce a quale. The machine can be aware of it, and (with enough cognitive ability) the machine will be aware of its non communicability, making it into a personal quale. I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real, and consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago you did understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of brain and matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives another role for consciousness: the bringing of physical realities through number relations being selected (non causally, here). Consciousness is what makes notions of causal efficacy meaningful to start with. I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws. But this cannot be entirely correct. Consciousness will make your brain, at the level below the substitution level, having some well defined state, with an electron, for example, described with some precise position. Without consciousness there is no material brain at all. Of course, you will argue that this is what physics already describes, with QM. In that sense I am OK, but consciousness is still playing a role, even if it is not necessarily the seemingly magical role invoked by Craig. Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is possible but it is contrary to all science. I agree with you on this. As an argument against mechanism, your point is valid. My point is that the way you talk might been misleading as it looks like it is bearing on some notion of primitively causal matter, but it does not. That plays some role when comparing the comp matter and the QM matter. This applies even if the whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is at the level of the simulation. Not if we observe ourselves or our neighborhood below our substitution level. In that case we can see only the trace of all infinitely many possible simulations, or computations, leading to our actual current computational states. Again we can say that QM confirms this a posteriori. In that case an observation will determine a brain state, in the same way a self-localization after duplication determines a self-localized state (like I am in this well defined city). Bruno I think it is the same error as using determinacy to refute free- will. This would be correct if we were living at the determinist base level, but we are not. Consciousness and free-will are real at the level where we live, and unreal, in the big 3p picture, but this concerns only the outer god, not the inner one which can *know* a part of its local self- consistency, and cannot know its local future. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 11:30 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws. Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is possible but it is contrary to all science. This applies even if the whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is at the level of the simulation. That is not what I believe at all. I have corrected you and others on this many times but you won't hear it. Nothing unusual needs to happen in the brain for ordinary consciousness to take place, it's just that physics has nothing to say about whether billions of synapses will suddenly begin firing in complex synchronized patterns or not. Physics doesn't care. Can neurons fire when conditions are right? Yes. Can our thoughts and intentions directly control conditions in the brain? YES. Of course. Obviously. Otherwise we wouldn't care any more about the human brain than we would a wasps nest. It's not that physics needs to be amended, it is that experience is part of physics, and physics is part of experience. If physics cannot predict even in theory when the neurons will fire then *by definition* the neurons behave contrary to physics. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On Thursday, September 27, 2012 7:45:07 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 11:30 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws. Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is possible but it is contrary to all science. This applies even if the whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is at the level of the simulation. That is not what I believe at all. I have corrected you and others on this many times but you won't hear it. Nothing unusual needs to happen in the brain for ordinary consciousness to take place, it's just that physics has nothing to say about whether billions of synapses will suddenly begin firing in complex synchronized patterns or not. Physics doesn't care. Can neurons fire when conditions are right? Yes. Can our thoughts and intentions directly control conditions in the brain? YES. Of course. Obviously. Otherwise we wouldn't care any more about the human brain than we would a wasps nest. It's not that physics needs to be amended, it is that experience is part of physics, and physics is part of experience. If physics cannot predict even in theory when the neurons will fire then *by definition* the neurons behave contrary to physics. If the neurons fire based on the participation of a personal identity in response to events in a person's life, then how could physics predict them without predicting a person's entire life? Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/WbDsasW2s9EJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 12:52 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: If physics cannot predict even in theory when the neurons will fire then *by definition* the neurons behave contrary to physics. If the neurons fire based on the participation of a personal identity in response to events in a person's life, then how could physics predict them without predicting a person's entire life? When you replace the spark plugs in your car you don't need to know everywhere the car is going to go for the duration of its existence. You just need to know how the spark plugs respond to voltage, current, temperature and so on. If you can't predict this even in theory then your car has magical spark plugs and you won't be able to replace them. Same with your brain. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On 9/27/2012 10:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, September 27, 2012 7:45:07 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 11:30 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws. Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is possible but it is contrary to all science. This applies even if the whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is at the level of the simulation. That is not what I believe at all. I have corrected you and others on this many times but you won't hear it. Nothing unusual needs to happen in the brain for ordinary consciousness to take place, it's just that physics has nothing to say about whether billions of synapses will suddenly begin firing in complex synchronized patterns or not. Physics doesn't care. Can neurons fire when conditions are right? Yes. Can our thoughts and intentions directly control conditions in the brain? YES. Of course. Obviously. Otherwise we wouldn't care any more about the human brain than we would a wasps nest. It's not that physics needs to be amended, it is that experience is part of physics, and physics is part of experience. If physics cannot predict even in theory when the neurons will fire then *by definition* the neurons behave contrary to physics. If the neurons fire based on the participation of a personal identity in response to events in a person's life, then how could physics predict them without predicting a person's entire life? Craig Good point! Physical systems are completely blind to their history, or so we are told... -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On Thursday, September 27, 2012 11:29:12 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 12:52 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: If physics cannot predict even in theory when the neurons will fire then *by definition* the neurons behave contrary to physics. If the neurons fire based on the participation of a personal identity in response to events in a person's life, then how could physics predict them without predicting a person's entire life? When you replace the spark plugs in your car you don't need to know everywhere the car is going to go for the duration of its existence. You just need to know how the spark plugs respond to voltage, current, temperature and so on. If you can't predict this even in theory then your car has magical spark plugs and you won't be able to replace them. Same with your brain. The spark plugs don't fire in response to the will of the driver, the brain does. This isn't magic, this is the ordinary process by which we participate in the world in every waking moment of our lives. It is not the same. Building a car that you can drive with your mind is one thing, building a car that can predict where you want to drive to next month is completely different. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/FeHnQESa7FgJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On 25 Sep 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch jason...@gmail.com wrote: Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someone is able to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon. The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying qualia. With comp a physical events is explained in term of measure and machine/number relative consciousness selection (à la WM-duplication way). Physics is phenomenal. It is an internal consciousness selection made on coherent computations (arithmetical relations). We can't explain physics without a theory of quanta, which, in comp, is a sub-theory of a theory of consciousness/qualia. Consciousness is not epiphenomenal: it is the extractor of the physical realities in arithmetic. We could say that consciousness is the universal self-accelerating property of the universal number which makes possible the differentiation of the experience, and then the physical reality is a projection. I could consider consciousness as the main force in the universe, even if it is also a phenomenal reality (the ontology being only arithmetic, or finite combinatorial relations). We are on the same page here then. My only question is, if consciousness is the main force in the universe, doesn't it make more sense to see arithmetic as the condenser of experiences into physical realism? It makes sense once we assume comp, as we attach consciousness to computations, whose existence is guarantied by arithmetic. I can easily see why experience would need semiotic compressions to organize itself, but I can see no reason that arithmetic or physical realities would possibly need to be 'extracted', or even what that would mean. This is what the Universal Dovetailer Argument explains. Why execute a program if all possible outcomes are already computable? To be computable is not enough, if the computations are not done, relatively to the situation you are in. Your question is like why should I pay this beer if I can show that I can pay it?. Bruno Craig If you associate consciousness with the unconscious (automated) inference in self-consistency, you can explain formally that self- accelerating relative processes. It makes consciousness the cause of all motions in the physical universe, even if the cause are given by infinities of arithmetical relations + the (apparently plural personal) self-selection. Bruno By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has qualia or some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal, without causal efficacy of its own. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- li...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/LIsQ202GwckJ . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On Wednesday, September 26, 2012 3:45:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Sep 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch jason...@gmail.com wrote: Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someone is able to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon. The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying qualia. With comp a physical events is explained in term of measure and machine/number relative consciousness selection (à la WM-duplication way). Physics is phenomenal. It is an internal consciousness selection made on coherent computations (arithmetical relations). We can't explain physics without a theory of quanta, which, in comp, is a sub-theory of a theory of consciousness/qualia. Consciousness is not epiphenomenal: it is the extractor of the physical realities in arithmetic. We could say that consciousness is the universal self-accelerating property of the universal number which makes possible the differentiation of the experience, and then the physical reality is a projection. I could consider consciousness as the main force in the universe, even if it is also a phenomenal reality (the ontology being only arithmetic, or finite combinatorial relations). We are on the same page here then. My only question is, if consciousness is the main force in the universe, doesn't it make more sense to see arithmetic as the condenser of experiences into physical realism? It makes sense once we assume comp, as we attach consciousness to computations, whose existence is guarantied by arithmetic. Are you saying that arithmetic guarantees consciousness because it obviously supervenes on awareness, or do you say that consciousness is specifically inevitable from arithmetic truth. If the latter, then it sounds like you are saying that some arithmetic functions can only be expressed as pain or blue...in which case, how are they really arithmetic. Besides, we have never seen a computation turn blue or create blueness. I can easily see why experience would need semiotic compressions to organize itself, but I can see no reason that arithmetic or physical realities would possibly need to be 'extracted', or even what that would mean. This is what the Universal Dovetailer Argument explains. If it does, then I don't understand it. If you can explain it with a common sense example as a metaphor, then I might be able to get more of it. Why execute a program if all possible outcomes are already computable? To be computable is not enough, if the computations are not done, relatively to the situation you are in. Your question is like why should I pay this beer if I can show that I can pay it?. Yes, why should I pay for the beer if it's arithmetically inevitable that I have paid for the beer in the future? Craig ;' Bruno Craig If you associate consciousness with the unconscious (automated) inference in self-consistency, you can explain formally that self- accelerating relative processes. It makes consciousness the cause of all motions in the physical universe, even if the cause are given by infinities of arithmetical relations + the (apparently plural personal) self-selection. Bruno By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has qualia or some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal, without causal efficacy of its own. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/LIsQ202GwckJ. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the pain they are experiencing? Is it all coincidental? There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the painful stimulus to the subject saying that hurts, and this completely explains the observable behaviour. We can't observe the experience itself. If the experience had separate causal powers we would be able to observe its effects: we would see that neurons were miraculously firing contrary to physical law, and explain this as the immaterial soul affecting the physical world. I find the entire concept of epiphenominalism to be self-defeating: if it were true, there is no reason to expect anyone to ever have proposed it. If consciousness were truly an epiphenomenon then the experience of it and the resulting wonder about it would necessarily be private and non-shareable. In other words, whoever is experiencing the consciousness with all its intrigue can in no way effect changes in the physical world. So then who is it that proposes the theory of epiphenominalism to explain the mystery of conscious experience? It can't be the causally inefficacious experiencer. The only consistent answer epiphenominalism can offer is that the theory of epiphenominalism comes from a causally efficacious entity which in no way is effected by experiences. It might as well be a considered a non-experiencer, for it would behave the same regardless of whether it experienced something or if it were a zombie. The experiencer would behave the same if he were a zombie, since that is the definition of a zombie. I know I'm not a zombie and I believe that other people aren't zombies either, but I can't be sure. Epiphenominalism is forced to defend the absurd notion that epiphenominalism (and all other theories of consciousness) are proposed by things that have never experienced consciousness. Perhaps instead, its core assumption is wrong. The reason for all these books and discussion threads about consciousness is that experiences and consciousness are causally efficacious. If they weren't then why is anyone talking about them? The people talking about them could be zombies. There is nothing in any observation of peoples' behaviour that *proves* they are conscious, because consciousness is not causally efficacious. It is emergent, at a higher level of description, supervenient or epiphenomenal - but not separately causally efficacious, or the problem of other minds and zombies would not exist. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote: On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the pain they are experiencing? Is it all coincidental? There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the painful stimulus to the subject saying that hurts, and this completely explains the observable behaviour. But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical events or not? There are multiple levels involved here and you may be missing the forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms. Saying the consciousness is irrelevant in the processes of the brain may be like saying human psychology is irrelevant in the price moves of the stock market. Of course, you might explain the price moves in terms of atomic interactions, but you are missing the effects of higher-level phenomenon, which are real and do make a difference. We can't observe the experience itself. I'm not convinced of this. While today, we have difficulty in even defining the term, in the future, with better tools and understanding of minds and consciousness, we may indeed be able to tell if a certain process implements the right combination of processes to have what we would call a mind. By tracing the flows of information in its mind, we might even know what it is and isn't aware of. Albeit at a low resolution, scientists have already extracted from brain scans what people are seeing: http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mindreading-software-could-record-your-dreams.html If the experience had separate causal powers we would be able to observe its effects: we would see that neurons were miraculously firing contrary to physical law, and explain this as the immaterial soul affecting the physical world. It sounds like you are saying either epiphenomenalism is true or interactionism is true ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)#Dualist_views_of_mental_causation ). Both of these are forms of dualism, and I think both are false. Violations of physics are not required for consciousness to have effects. After all, no violations of physics are required for human psychology to have effects on stock prices. I find the entire concept of epiphenominalism to be self-defeating: if it were true, there is no reason to expect anyone to ever have proposed it. If consciousness were truly an epiphenomenon then the experience of it and the resulting wonder about it would necessarily be private and non-shareable. In other words, whoever is experiencing the consciousness with all its intrigue can in no way effect changes in the physical world. So then who is it that proposes the theory of epiphenominalism to explain the mystery of conscious experience? It can't be the causally inefficacious experiencer. The only consistent answer epiphenominalism can offer is that the theory of epiphenominalism comes from a causally efficacious entity which in no way is effected by experiences. It might as well be a considered a non-experiencer, for it would behave the same regardless of whether it experienced something or if it were a zombie. The experiencer would behave the same if he were a zombie, since that is the definition of a zombie. Dualist theories, including epiphenominalism, lead to the notion that zombies are logically consistent. I don't think zombies make any sense. Do you? I know I'm not a zombie and I believe that other people aren't zombies either, but I can't be sure. If you were a zombie, you would still know that you were not a zombie, and still believe other people are not zombies either, but you could not be sure. This follows because the notion of knowing, which I define as possessing information, applies equally to zombie and non-zombie brains. Both brains have identical information content, so they both know exactly the same things. They both know what red is like, they both know what pain is like. It's just there is some magical notion of there being a difference between them which is completely illogical. Zombies don't make sense, and therefore neither do dualist theories such as epihenominalism. Epiphenominalism is forced to defend the absurd notion that epiphenominalism (and all other theories of consciousness) are proposed by things that have never experienced consciousness. Perhaps instead, its core assumption is wrong. The reason for all these books and discussion threads about consciousness is that experiences and consciousness are causally efficacious. If they weren't then why is anyone talking about them? The people talking about them could be zombies. There is nothing in any observation of peoples' behaviour that *proves* they are conscious, Consciousness is defined on dictionary.com as awareness of sensations, thoughts, surrounds, etc. Awareness
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On 9/26/2012 11:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com mailto:stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the pain they are experiencing? Is it all coincidental? There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the painful stimulus to the subject saying that hurts, and this completely explains the observable behaviour. But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical events or not? There are multiple levels involved here and you may be missing the forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms. Saying the consciousness is irrelevant in the processes of the brain may be like saying human psychology is irrelevant in the price moves of the stock market. Of course, you might explain the price moves in terms of atomic interactions, but you are missing the effects of higher-level phenomenon, which are real and do make a difference. We can't observe the experience itself. I'm not convinced of this. While today, we have difficulty in even defining the term, in the future, with better tools and understanding of minds and consciousness, we may indeed be able to tell if a certain process implements the right combination of processes to have what we would call a mind. By tracing the flows of information in its mind, we might even know what it is and isn't aware of. Albeit at a low resolution, scientists have already extracted from brain scans what people are seeing: http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mindreading-software-could-record-your-dreams.html If the experience had separate causal powers we would be able to observe its effects: we would see that neurons were miraculously firing contrary to physical law, and explain this as the immaterial soul affecting the physical world. It sounds like you are saying either epiphenomenalism is true or interactionism is true ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)#Dualist_views_of_mental_causation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29#Dualist_views_of_mental_causation ). Both of these are forms of dualism, and I think both are false. Because they assume a substantive and thus separable substrate, the y are false. Violations of physics are not required for consciousness to have effects. After all, no violations of physics are required for human psychology to have effects on stock prices. Demonstrating that minds are not epiphenomena! I find the entire concept of epiphenominalism to be self-defeating: if it were true, there is no reason to expect anyone to ever have proposed it. If consciousness were truly an epiphenomenon then the experience of it and the resulting wonder about it would necessarily be private and non-shareable. In other words, whoever is experiencing the consciousness with all its intrigue can in no way effect changes in the physical world. So then who is it that proposes the theory of epiphenominalism to explain the mystery of conscious experience? It can't be the causally inefficacious experiencer. The only consistent answer epiphenominalism can offer is that the theory of epiphenominalism comes from a causally efficacious entity which in no way is effected by experiences. It might as well be a considered a non-experiencer, for it would behave the same regardless of whether it experienced something or if it were a zombie. The experiencer would behave the same if he were a zombie, since that is the definition of a zombie. Dualist theories, including epiphenominalism, lead to the notion that zombies are logically consistent. I don't think zombies make any sense. Do you? These dualisms consider mind and body to be separable, this is where they fail. If Mind and body are merely distinct aspect of the same basic primitive then we get a prediction that zombies are not possible. Every mind must have an embodiment and every body must have (some kind of) a mind. I know I'm not a zombie and I believe that other people aren't zombies either, but I can't be sure. If you were a zombie, you would still know that you were not a zombie, and still believe other people are not zombies either, but you could not be sure. How does this follow the definition of a zombie? They have no qualia thus no ability to reason about qualia! This follows because the notion of knowing, which I define as possessing information, applies equally to zombie and non-zombie brains. Both brains have identical information content, so they both know exactly the same things. Then what makes a zombie a zombie???
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 11:09 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 9/26/2012 11:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote: On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the pain they are experiencing? Is it all coincidental? There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the painful stimulus to the subject saying that hurts, and this completely explains the observable behaviour. But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical events or not? There are multiple levels involved here and you may be missing the forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms. Saying the consciousness is irrelevant in the processes of the brain may be like saying human psychology is irrelevant in the price moves of the stock market. Of course, you might explain the price moves in terms of atomic interactions, but you are missing the effects of higher-level phenomenon, which are real and do make a difference. We can't observe the experience itself. I'm not convinced of this. While today, we have difficulty in even defining the term, in the future, with better tools and understanding of minds and consciousness, we may indeed be able to tell if a certain process implements the right combination of processes to have what we would call a mind. By tracing the flows of information in its mind, we might even know what it is and isn't aware of. Albeit at a low resolution, scientists have already extracted from brain scans what people are seeing: http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mindreading-software-could-record-your-dreams.html If the experience had separate causal powers we would be able to observe its effects: we would see that neurons were miraculously firing contrary to physical law, and explain this as the immaterial soul affecting the physical world. It sounds like you are saying either epiphenomenalism is true or interactionism is true ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)#Dualist_views_of_mental_causation ). Both of these are forms of dualism, and I think both are false. Because they assume a substantive and thus separable substrate, the y are false. Violations of physics are not required for consciousness to have effects. After all, no violations of physics are required for human psychology to have effects on stock prices. Demonstrating that minds are not epiphenomena! Well, it at least shows emergent things can have effects. A truck is an emergent phenomenon, but it can still run you over. So though consciousness might be emergent we can't plainly rule out that it can have no effects. I find the entire concept of epiphenominalism to be self-defeating: if it were true, there is no reason to expect anyone to ever have proposed it. If consciousness were truly an epiphenomenon then the experience of it and the resulting wonder about it would necessarily be private and non-shareable. In other words, whoever is experiencing the consciousness with all its intrigue can in no way effect changes in the physical world. So then who is it that proposes the theory of epiphenominalism to explain the mystery of conscious experience? It can't be the causally inefficacious experiencer. The only consistent answer epiphenominalism can offer is that the theory of epiphenominalism comes from a causally efficacious entity which in no way is effected by experiences. It might as well be a considered a non-experiencer, for it would behave the same regardless of whether it experienced something or if it were a zombie. The experiencer would behave the same if he were a zombie, since that is the definition of a zombie. Dualist theories, including epiphenominalism, lead to the notion that zombies are logically consistent. I don't think zombies make any sense. Do you? These dualisms consider mind and body to be separable, this is where they fail. If Mind and body are merely distinct aspect of the same basic primitive then we get a prediction that zombies are not possible. Right, and I think the converse is also true. If zombies are not possible, then dualism must be wrong. Every mind must have an embodiment and every body must have (some kind of) a mind. I know I'm not a zombie and I believe that other people aren't zombies either, but I can't be sure. If you were a zombie, you would still know that you were not a zombie, and still believe other people are not zombies either, but you could not be sure. How does this follow the definition of a zombie? They have no qualia thus no ability to reason about qualia! Zombies can reason. They can do absolutely everything you can do, except they are not conscious. They are also
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someone is able to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon. The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying qualia. With comp a physical events is explained in term of measure and machine/number relative consciousness selection (à la WM-duplication way). Physics is phenomenal. It is an internal consciousness selection made on coherent computations (arithmetical relations). We can't explain physics without a theory of quanta, which, in comp, is a sub-theory of a theory of consciousness/qualia. Consciousness is not epiphenomenal: it is the extractor of the physical realities in arithmetic. We could say that consciousness is the universal self-accelerating property of the universal number which makes possible the differentiation of the experience, and then the physical reality is a projection. I could consider consciousness as the main force in the universe, even if it is also a phenomenal reality (the ontology being only arithmetic, or finite combinatorial relations). If you associate consciousness with the unconscious (automated) inference in self-consistency, you can explain formally that self- accelerating relative processes. It makes consciousness the cause of all motions in the physical universe, even if the cause are given by infinities of arithmetical relations + the (apparently plural personal) self-selection. Bruno By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has qualia or some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal, without causal efficacy of its own. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch jason...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someone is able to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon. The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying qualia. With comp a physical events is explained in term of measure and machine/number relative consciousness selection (à la WM-duplication way). Physics is phenomenal. It is an internal consciousness selection made on coherent computations (arithmetical relations). We can't explain physics without a theory of quanta, which, in comp, is a sub-theory of a theory of consciousness/qualia. Consciousness is not epiphenomenal: it is the extractor of the physical realities in arithmetic. We could say that consciousness is the universal self-accelerating property of the universal number which makes possible the differentiation of the experience, and then the physical reality is a projection. I could consider consciousness as the main force in the universe, even if it is also a phenomenal reality (the ontology being only arithmetic, or finite combinatorial relations). We are on the same page here then. My only question is, if consciousness is the main force in the universe, doesn't it make more sense to see arithmetic as the condenser of experiences into physical realism? I can easily see why experience would need semiotic compressions to organize itself, but I can see no reason that arithmetic or physical realities would possibly need to be 'extracted', or even what that would mean. Why execute a program if all possible outcomes are already computable? Craig If you associate consciousness with the unconscious (automated) inference in self-consistency, you can explain formally that self- accelerating relative processes. It makes consciousness the cause of all motions in the physical universe, even if the cause are given by infinities of arithmetical relations + the (apparently plural personal) self-selection. Bruno By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has qualia or some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal, without causal efficacy of its own. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript:. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript: . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/LIsQ202GwckJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someone is able to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon. The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying qualia. By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has qualia or some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal, without causal efficacy of its own. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On Mon, Sep 24, 2012 at 10:45 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote: On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someone is able to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon. The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying qualia. By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has qualia or some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal, without causal efficacy of its own. If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the pain they are experiencing? Is it all coincidental? I find the entire concept of epiphenominalism to be self-defeating: if it were true, there is no reason to expect anyone to ever have proposed it. If consciousness were truly an epiphenomenon then the experience of it and the resulting wonder about it would necessarily be private and non-shareable. In other words, whoever is experiencing the consciousness with all its intrigue can in no way effect changes in the physical world. So then who is it that proposes the theory of epiphenominalism to explain the mystery of conscious experience? It can't be the causally inefficacious experiencer. The only consistent answer epiphenominalism can offer is that the theory of epiphenominalism comes from a causally efficacious entity which in no way is effected by experiences. It might as well be a considered a non-experiencer, for it would behave the same regardless of whether it experienced something or if it were a zombie. Epiphenominalism is forced to defend the absurd notion that epiphenominalism (and all other theories of consciousness) are proposed by things that have never experienced consciousness. Perhaps instead, its core assumption is wrong. The reason for all these books and discussion threads about consciousness is that experiences and consciousness are causally efficacious. If they weren't then why is anyone talking about them? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Wednesday, September 19, 2012 1:10:10 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: I didn't mean to say that any information can be functionally useful without qualia, only that there is a proof of concept for the principle that some information can be used functionally without qualia. This is why blindsight is such a big deal in philosophy of mind. It absolutely disproves the representational theory of qualia, It doesn't, because we haven't shown no visual qualia exists in the brain of someone with blindsight. All we know is that the part of the brain responsible for talking is isolated from that qualia. It is like there being two people sitting side by side, one with there eyes closed, and one with their eyes open. You ask the person with their eyes closed if they can see and from their response conclude that neither person experienced sight. You haven't proven anything about the person with their eyes open. I don't have to prove anything about them, because the person with their eyes closed knows how many fingers I am holding up. He is getting information but doesn't know how. He has no experience of qualia associated with it. in that we know for certain that it is not necessary to experience personal visual qualia in order to receive personally useful information. They are not inseparable on the level of a human person. You can have one without the other. For example, they may still have reflexes, like the ability to avoid obsticles or catch a thrown ball, but the language center of their brain is disconnected, and so the part of the brain that talks says it can't see. I understand, but people with blindsight don't have a problem with their speech centers. They don't, but their speech center is blind as the data from their visual sense never makes it to all the parts of the brain it would normally. See the BBC Brain Series: http://mindhacks.com/2007/08/08/excellent-bbc-brain-story-series-available-online/ http://mindhacks.com/ 2007/08/08/excellent-bbc-brain-story-series-available-online/ It has some good explanations of this concept, showing various waves of activity emanating from different parts of the brain to others, which is also a good model for attention. It doesn't matter in this case though, because with blindsight it is only the visual processing which is damaged. The psychology of the person is not split so that what they say is a reflection of what they intend to say. It depends on the form of brain damage. Sure, but that isn't a consideration in the cases of blindsight that have been studied. At the sub-personal level, sure, there is all kinds of specialization and sharing of experience, but I think it is a-mereological What does mereological mean? Mereology is the study of part-whole relations: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/ like (1) The handle is part of the mug. (2) This cap is part of my pen. (3) The left half is your part of the cake. (4) The cutlery is part of the tableware. (5) The contents of this bag is only part of what I bought. (6) That area is part of the living room. (7) The outermost points are part of the perimeter. (8) The first act was the best part of the play. I am saying that phenomenology is, in its purest expression, unlike all of these. Irony is and is not part of a story. I am and am not my mind. I am and am not a thing. etc. My hypothesis is that subjectivity is time, and that time is orthogonal to space, so that by virtue of subjectivity occupying no space (or being mereologically agnostic toward space is more like it), it is free from the constraints that we associate with objects and objective conditions. Hence, private imagination is like omnipotence except that it completely lacks the satisfaction that it seeks from public realism. and not a feed-forward information process of activity emanations like you are assuming. If it were, all qualia would be superfluous. No, qualia are neccessary. How do you explain blindsight then? Which qualia are necessary? How do you explain synesthesia and anosognosia? Where do these qualia come from? Why would they be necessary? I don't believe zombies are logically consistent. What is a person with blindsight but a visual zombie? It seems you think they are possible. Read smulleyan's story on the guy who takes a pill that obliterates his awareness and tell me if you think it is possible, and if not, why not. I'm not the one who is curious about this. I understand my position and your position completely. Why fight it? Why not try looking at the evidence for what it actually says? Information doesn't need experience. Even if it did, how would it conjure such a thing out of thin air, and why doesn't it do that when we are looking? Why does information never appear as a disembodied entity, say haunting the internet or appearing spontaneously
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On 20 Sep 2012, at 12:03, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Jason Resch Pragmatically speaking, the self has to be a singular, focussed point. I have trouble understanding how that can be done with a network of nerve signals. The semantic of all programs, like the so called denotational semantics, involves abstract points in abstract space. We don't need physical or geometrical points as consciousness is related to the abstract emulation. You should not reduce a person to the network of its nerves, as the person is an immaterial entity, only using its brain, like you are using a computer right now. It might help you to understand that weak materialism (the doctrine asserting the existence of primitive substance) is not compatible with computationalism, so your network of nerves is mainly a fictitious way to describe the brain as an object. You are using a physical supervenience thesis which simply can't work once we assume comp (and don't throw consciousness in the trash). Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/20/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list@googlegroups.com Time: 2012-09-19, 11:51:00 Subject: Re: Bruno's Restaurant On Sep 19, 2012, at 8:02 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Jason Resch My ionterpretation of the result of the brain splitting on pain perception is that her self is on one side and the feeling of pain is on the other. Thus she feels the pain, but cannot associate to her self (doesn't care). I would agree, but add that the self, in this case, is found in the connected parts of the majority of her brain. Jason Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/19/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list@googlegroups.com Time: 2012-09-18, 14:14:31 Subject: Re: Bruno's Restaurant On Sep 18, 2012, at 12:53 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 9/18/2012 10:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote: No it is absolutely necessary. If you had no knowledge regarding what you were seeing, no qualia at all, you would be blind and dysfunctional. You might cite blund sighr as a counter example, but actually i think it is evidence of modularity if mind. Those with blind sight appear to have a disconnect between the visual processing parts of their brain and others. For example, they may still have reflexes, like the ability to avoid obsticles or catch a thrown ball, but the language center of their brain is disconnected, and so the part of the brain that talks says it can't see. I agree. But it raises a question about the woman who feels pain but doesn't care. Who is it that doesn't care? Obviously the conscious person who tells you they don't care. But is there another, inarticulate person who feels the pain? or does care? Brent, Good question, and a scary thought. I think this might be likely in the case of a fully split brain, but correspondingly less likely the smaller the isolated (disconnected) part of the brain is. Unconsciousness under anesthesia results from brain regions becoming isolated from each other. Maybe they are still conscious but cut off from the memory, motion control, and speaking areas, so we have no evidence of the consciousness of the sub-regions. Jason Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Thursday, September 20, 2012 2:28:05 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 2:28 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: oof, this is getting too long. truncation ahoy... the upgraded Google Groups keeps spontaneously disposing of my writings. On Wednesday, September 19, 2012 1:10:10 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: Yes and no. I think if we are being precise, we have to admit that there is something about the nature of subjective experience which makes the 'all together and at once' actually elide the differences between the 'bunch of independent aspects' so that they aren't experienced as independent aspects. That's the elliptical-algebraic-gestalt quality. I think they separate aspects represent a single state of high dimensionality. This concept is elaborated in a book, I think it is called universe of consciousness but I will have to verify this. I was right, it was this book: http://www.amazon.com/Universe-Consciousness-Matter-Becomes-Imagination/dp/0465013775 Here is a video presentation by one of the authors: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AgQgfb-HkQk I think you might like him. Yes, I have seen him before. I think he is on the right track in that his model is panpsychist and that he sees the differences between assemblies and integrated wholes. Where he goes wrong, (as do most) is at the beginning where he assumes information states as a given rather than breaking that down to the capacity for afferent perception. Nothing can have an information state unless it can be informed. Once you have that capacity (sense), you already have consciousness of a primitive sort. Just as the camera can be divided, so too can the diode. He is arbitrarily considering the diode to be an integrated whole with two states, but it too as an assembly which we have manufactured. The whole line of reasoning that stems from the assumption that information is an independently real phenomenon is incompatible with shedding light on consciousness. Assuming information is great for controlling material processes and transmitting experiences, but there isn't anything there so it can't create experiences. You already need to be able to read the CD as music to play the information on the CD as music. No amount of sophisticated encoding on a CD can make you hear music if you are deaf. To us the diode seems like one thing with two functional states, but that's like saying that Tokyo has two states by averaging out the number of green traffic lights versus red traffic lights. Function is an interpretation, not an objective fact. Dimensionality sounds too discrete to me. I can go along with 'single state' but I think it's a distraction to see qualia as a plot within a dimensional space. It is not necessary to experience any dimensionality to have a feeling, rather it creates its own dimension. I can be hungry or ravenous, but there is no dimension of physiological potential qualities which hunger is predisposed to constellate within. The experience is primary and the dimensionality is secondary. I don't think they are necessary for consciousness, but they are necessary to be informed. For consciousness all that you need is an awareness of an awareness - which is a participatory experience of detection. Semiconductors have detection, but their detection has no detection. Ours do, because they are the detections of living sub-persons. You can create a supervisory process that is aware of an awarness, rather easily, in any programming language. The semiconductor is still only aware of charge comparisons. And you might as well say neurons are only aware of neurotransmitters. Why do you reduce programs to silicon, but you not reduce human thoughts to the squirted solutions of neurotransmitters? It seems there is an inherent bias in your reasoning and or arguments. Because we know for a fact that our consciousness correlates with neural activity (not caused but correlates) and we know that computers not only show no sign of having a consciousness that resembles that of any biological organism, but I understand that the behavior of computers of any degree of sophistication plainly reveals the precise absence of any biological personality traits and the presence of non-cohering impersonality. The idea that something is supervising something is purely our projection, like saying that the capstone of a pyramid is supervising the base. All that is really going on is that we are able to read an aggregate sense into unconscious chains of causal logic. At some level of depth though, does it matter what happens on the smallest scales? Do your neurons care about what the quarks and gluons are doing inside the nucleus of an oxygen atom inside a water molecule, floating in the cytoplasm? I think they don't have to care because they embody what the quarks and gluons are doing. They are
Re: Re: Bruno's Restaurant
Hi Bruno Marchal You could be right, but as I see it, organizing and focusing all of that complex network of nerves and their signals into a singular mental point would --to my mind at least-- be done by a singular intelligent agent. A self, in other words. And an intelligent self would act out of a center, which does the choosing, in ideal space or in real space. Call it a central processing unit if you prefer computer language. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/20/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-20, 07:33:10 Subject: Re: Bruno's Restaurant On 20 Sep 2012, at 12:03, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Jason Resch Pragmatically speaking, the self has to be a singular, focussed point. I have trouble understanding how that can be done with a network of nerve signals. The semantic of all programs, like the so called denotational semantics, involves abstract points in abstract space. We don't need physical or geometrical points as consciousness is related to the abstract emulation. You should not reduce a person to the network of its nerves, as the person is an immaterial entity, only using its brain, like you are using a computer right now. It might help you to understand that weak materialism (the doctrine asserting the existence of primitive substance) is not compatible with computationalism, so your network of nerves is mainly a fictitious way to describe the brain as an object. You are using a physical supervenience thesis which simply can't work once we assume comp (and don't throw consciousness in the trash). Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/20/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list@googlegroups.com Time: 2012-09-19, 11:51:00 Subject: Re: Bruno's Restaurant On Sep 19, 2012, at 8:02 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Jason Resch My ionterpretation of the result of the brain splitting on pain perception is that her self is on one side and the feeling of pain is on the other. Thus she feels the pain, but cannot associate to her self (doesn't care). I would agree, but add that the self, in this case, is found in the connected parts of the majority of her brain. Jason Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/19/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list@googlegroups.com Time: 2012-09-18, 14:14:31 Subject: Re: Bruno's Restaurant On Sep 18, 2012, at 12:53 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 9/18/2012 10:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote: No it is absolutely necessary. If you had no knowledge regarding what you were seeing, no qualia at all, you would be blind and dysfunctional. You might cite blund sighr as a counter example, but actually i think it is evidence of modularity if mind. Those with blind sight appear to have a disconnect between the visual processing parts of their brain and others. For example, they may still have reflexes, like the ability to avoid obsticles or catch a thrown ball, but the language center of their brain is disconnected, and so the part of the brain that talks says it can't see. I agree. But it raises a question about the woman who feels pain but doesn't care. Who is it that doesn't care? Obviously the conscious person who tells you they don't care. But is there another, inarticulate person who feels the pain? or does care? Brent, Good question, and a scary thought. I think this might be likely in the case of a fully split brain, but correspondingly less likely the smaller the isolated (disconnected) part of the brain is. Unconsciousness under anesthesia results from brain regions becoming isolated from each other. Maybe they are still conscious but cut off from the memory, motion control, and speaking areas, so we have no evidence of the consciousness of the sub-regions. Jason Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On 20 Sep 2012, at 14:27, Craig Weinberg wrote: Because we know for a fact that our consciousness correlates with neural activity ... We don't know that. It is a theory, a belief, an assumption, ... Some people have believed that consciousness correlates to the state of the liver. We never know if a theory is true. We can only know when a theory is false. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Thursday, September 20, 2012 10:14:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Sep 2012, at 14:27, Craig Weinberg wrote: Because we know for a fact that our consciousness correlates with neural activity ... We don't know that. It is a theory, a belief, an assumption, ... Some people have believed that consciousness correlates to the state of the liver. We never know if a theory is true. We can only know when a theory is false. Bruno I would agree that it would be only a theory that brain changes 'produce' consciousness, but I would say that we can say with confidence that changes in our awareness are more tightly synchronized with changes in brain activity than with those of the liver, or any other thing in the universe that we can observe. When we stimulate the brain magnetically, that event correlates directly with subjective experience. I don't think that there is anything else we could stimulate which would cause that. Craig http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/TofyxHpAp0MJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On 20 Sep 2012, at 16:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, September 20, 2012 10:14:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Sep 2012, at 14:27, Craig Weinberg wrote: Because we know for a fact that our consciousness correlates with neural activity ... We don't know that. It is a theory, a belief, an assumption, ... Some people have believed that consciousness correlates to the state of the liver. We never know if a theory is true. We can only know when a theory is false. Bruno I would agree that it would be only a theory that brain changes 'produce' consciousness, but I would say that we can say with confidence that changes in our awareness are more tightly synchronized with changes in brain activity than with those of the liver, or any other thing in the universe that we can observe. I agree, and it is close to my working *hypothesis*, although dispensable by choosing a lower level. The problem is in the choice of the theory used for making sense of a correlation between changes in our awareness and changes in brain activity. When we stimulate the brain magnetically, that event correlates directly with subjective experience. I don't think that there is anything else we could stimulate which would cause that. It follows from your hypothesis. With comp this would be relatively occurring (in some sense, as it really occurs out of time in arithmetical platonia) when you stimulate any relatively concrete universal machine emulating the magnetic stimulation of the brain (where emulating means simulating at the correct subst level, or below). It looks to me like a don't ask theory. It takes Matter ( PRIMITIVE matter) for granted, it takes consciousness for granted, and it relates the two by some sort of magical trick or, with all my respect, pompous word. It is coherent, as PRIMITIVE Matter is consistent with non-comp, but it looks like making both matter and mind incomprehensible at the start, and then it introduces puppets in the picture. Bruno Craig http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/TofyxHpAp0MJ . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:55:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Sep 2012, at 16:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, September 20, 2012 10:14:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Sep 2012, at 14:27, Craig Weinberg wrote: Because we know for a fact that our consciousness correlates with neural activity ... We don't know that. It is a theory, a belief, an assumption, ... Some people have believed that consciousness correlates to the state of the liver. We never know if a theory is true. We can only know when a theory is false. Bruno I would agree that it would be only a theory that brain changes 'produce' consciousness, but I would say that we can say with confidence that changes in our awareness are more tightly synchronized with changes in brain activity than with those of the liver, or any other thing in the universe that we can observe. I agree, and it is close to my working *hypothesis*, although dispensable by choosing a lower level. The problem is in the choice of the theory used for making sense of a correlation between changes in our awareness and changes in brain activity. When we stimulate the brain magnetically, that event correlates directly with subjective experience. I don't think that there is anything else we could stimulate which would cause that. It follows from your hypothesis. With comp this would be relatively occurring (in some sense, as it really occurs out of time in arithmetical platonia) when you stimulate any relatively concrete universal machine emulating the magnetic stimulation of the brain (where emulating means simulating at the correct subst level, or below). It looks to me like a don't ask theory. It takes Matter ( PRIMITIVE matter) for granted, it takes consciousness for granted, and it relates the two by some sort of magical trick or, with all my respect, pompous word. It is coherent, as PRIMITIVE Matter is consistent with non-comp, but it looks like making both matter and mind incomprehensible at the start, and then it introduces puppets in the picture. Mind has to be incomprehensible from the start because comprehension is an experience which supervenes on mind. Matter isn't primitive, but rather a second order representation of sense. There is no magic trick that relates mind and matter, it is the neutral monism of sense which presents itself to itself as mind and presents its non-self to its (self presented as self) as matter. Computation arises as a third order meta-representation of relation between the presented and the re-presented. Craig Bruno Craig http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/TofyxHpAp0MJ. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/BhXWKawYnxwJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On 9/20/2012 7:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Sep 2012, at 14:27, Craig Weinberg wrote: Because we know for a fact that our consciousness correlates with neural activity ... We don't know that. It is a theory, a belief, an assumption, ... Some people have believed that consciousness correlates to the state of the liver. We never know if a theory is true. We can only know when a theory is false. But correlates with isn't a theory - it's closer to a fact; the sort of thing we use to find that a theory is false. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On 9/20/2012 12:05 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:55:27 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Sep 2012, at 16:47, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, September 20, 2012 10:14:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Sep 2012, at 14:27, Craig Weinberg wrote: Because we know for a fact that our consciousness correlates with neural activity ... We don't know that. It is a theory, a belief, an assumption, ... Some people have believed that consciousness correlates to the state of the liver. We never know if a theory is true. We can only know when a theory is false. Bruno I would agree that it would be only a theory that brain changes 'produce' consciousness, but I would say that we can say with confidence that changes in our awareness are more tightly synchronized with changes in brain activity than with those of the liver, or any other thing in the universe that we can observe. I agree, and it is close to my working *hypothesis*, although dispensable by choosing a lower level. The problem is in the choice of the theory used for making sense of a correlation between changes in our awareness and changes in brain activity. When we stimulate the brain magnetically, that event correlates directly with subjective experience. I don't think that there is anything else we could stimulate which would cause that. It follows from your hypothesis. With comp this would be relatively occurring (in some sense, as it really occurs out of time in arithmetical platonia) when you stimulate any relatively concrete universal machine emulating the magnetic stimulation of the brain (where emulating means simulating at the correct subst level, or below). It looks to me like a don't ask theory. It takes Matter (PRIMITIVE matter) for granted, it takes consciousness for granted, and it relates the two by some sort of magical trick or, with all my respect, pompous word. It is coherent, as PRIMITIVE Matter is consistent with non-comp, but it looks like making both matter and mind incomprehensible at the start, and then it introduces puppets in the picture. Mind has to be incomprehensible from the start because comprehension is an experience which supervenes on mind. Matter isn't primitive, but rather a second order representation of sense. There is no magic trick that relates mind and matter, it is the neutral monism of sense which presents itself to itself as mind and presents its non-self to its (self presented as self) as matter. Computation arises as a third order meta-representation of relation between the presented and the re-presented. Craig Hi Craig, You need to show how we can get some kind of closure in the map for this to work... Otherwise its a regress... -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On 9/20/2012 9:45 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, September 20, 2012 9:23:08 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 9/20/2012 12:05 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: snip Hi Craig, You need to show how we can get some kind of closure in the map for this to work... Otherwise its a regress... Hi Stephen, If sense is truly primordial, then it is beyond both closure and regress. Craig Fundamentally, yes I agree with you, but let's not disallow for a pull-back... -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Bruno's Restaurant
Hi Craig Weinberg Since there are so many pseudo pain centers (qualia) this suggests that reduction of perceived pain to its pseudo-origins in the brain is esssentially impossible. This means also that pragmatic logic is in order, so that the meaning of the multiple qualia is in the single, unified qualia we feel. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/19/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-18, 16:06:41 Subject: Re: Bruno's Restaurant On Tuesday, September 18, 2012 1:33:50 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Sep 18, 2012, at 10:38 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, September 18, 2012 10:29:44 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: Here is an example: Functional MRI scans have indicated that an area of the brain, called the anterior cingulate cortex, processes pain information to determine how a person is affected. Severing the link to this part of the brain has a curious effect on one's reaction to pain. A condition known as pain dissociation is the result. Along with brain surgery such as lobotomy or cingulotomy, the condition may also occur through the administration of certain drugs such as morphine. Those with pain dissociation still perceive pain; they are aware of its location and intensity but pain is no longer unpleasant or distressing. Paul Brand, a surgeon and author on the subject of pain recounted the case of a woman who had suffered with a severe and chronic pain for more than a decade: She agreed to a surgery that would separate the neural pathways between her frontal lobes and the rest of her brain. The surgery was a success. Brand visited the woman a year later, and inquired about her pain. She said, ?h, yes, its still there. I just don't worry about it anymore.? With a smile she continued, ?n fact, it's still agonizing. But I don't mind.? The conclusion: even seemingly simple qualia, like pain are far from simple. That is a conclusion, but I think the wrong one. Human qualia are not simple, but that does not at all mean that qualia re not simple. I agree with this. We are titanically enormous organisms made of other organisms. Our human experience is loaded with cognitive, emotional, and sensory qualia, corresponding to the evolution of life, our species, cultures, families, and individuals. Our pain is a Taj Mahal, and if you remove enough bricks, some towers fall and maybe one part of the palace no longer relates to another part. What you describe suggests exactly that - some part of us feels the pain on a sub-personal level, but the personal level is not alarmed by it because it's qualia has lost the red end of it's spectrum so to speak and now is blue-shifted toward an anesthetized intellectual quality of being. I mostly agree with what you are saying here. I think Marvin Minksy understands this well, and provides a good explanation: Marvin Minsky considers it to be ? huge mistake-that attempt to reify 'feeling' as an independent entity, with an essence that's indescribable. As I see it, feelings are not strange alien things. It is precisely those cognitive changes themselves that constitute what 'hurting' is-and this also includes all those clumsy attempts to represent and summarize those changes. The big mistake comes from looking for some single, simple, 'essence' of hurting, rather than recognizing that this is the word we use for complex rearrangement of our disposition of resources.? He's right that there is no essence of hurting (qualia is always a subject, not an object, so it's essence is the same as it's 'envelope'. It's a-mereological. He's completely wrong about hurting being something other than what it is though. He didn't claim they are something they are not, just that they are not irreducable. What is reducible other than the quality of being able to explain it as something else? Hurting is not really hurting, it's totally non-hurting mechanisms interacting unconsciously. Hurting is an experience. A complex rearrangement of our disposition of resources is completely irrelevant. Complex to who? Why would 'rearrangements' 'feel' like something? Consciousness is awareness of information. Not in my view. Information is one category of experiences that one can be conscious of. Whether I listen to an mp3 file as a song, or look at it as a graphic animation, it is the same information that I am aware of, yet the experience that I am conscious of is not merely different, but unrecognizable. I could not tell the difference between Mozart and Nicki Minaj by looking at a visualization with no sound. Once you commit to this possibility, the rest falls into place. There is no such thing as information. There are strategies of informing each other by superimposing one territory over another (like ink stains on bleached wood
Re: Re: Bruno's Restaurant
Hi Jason Resch My ionterpretation of the result of the brain splitting on pain perception is that her self is on one side and the feeling of pain is on the other. Thus she feels the pain, but cannot associate to her self (doesn't care). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/19/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list@googlegroups.com Time: 2012-09-18, 14:14:31 Subject: Re: Bruno's Restaurant On Sep 18, 2012, at 12:53 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 9/18/2012 10:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote: No it is absolutely necessary. If you had no knowledge regarding what you were seeing, no qualia at all, you would be blind and dysfunctional. You might cite blund sighr as a counter example, but actually i think it is evidence of modularity if mind. Those with blind sight appear to have a disconnect between the visual processing parts of their brain and others. For example, they may still have reflexes, like the ability to avoid obsticles or catch a thrown ball, but the language center of their brain is disconnected, and so the part of the brain that talks says it can't see. I agree. But it raises a question about the woman who feels pain but doesn't care. Who is it that doesn't care? Obviously the conscious person who tells you they don't care. But is there another, inarticulate person who feels the pain? or does care? Brent, Good question, and a scary thought. I think this might be likely in the case of a fully split brain, but correspondingly less likely the smaller the isolated (disconnected) part of the brain is. Unconsciousness under anesthesia results from brain regions becoming isolated from each other. Maybe they are still conscious but cut off from the memory, motion control, and speaking areas, so we have no evidence of the consciousness of the sub-regions. Jason Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Bruno's Restaurant
Hi Jason Resch Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/19/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list@googlegroups.com Time: 2012-09-18, 14:14:31 Subject: Re: Bruno's Restaurant On Sep 18, 2012, at 12:53 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/18/2012 10:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote: No it is absolutely necessary. If you had no knowledge regarding what you were seeing, no qualia at all, you would be blind and dysfunctional. You might cite blund sighr as a counter example, but actually i think it is evidence of modularity if mind. Those with blind sight appear to have a disconnect between the visual processing parts of their brain and others. For example, they may still have reflexes, like the ability to avoid obsticles or catch a thrown ball, but the language center of their brain is disconnected, and so the part of the brain that talks says it can't see. I agree. But it raises a question about the woman who feels pain but doesn't care. Who is it that doesn't care? Obviously the conscious person who tells you they don't care. But is there another, inarticulate person who feels the pain? or does care? Brent, Good question, and a scary thought. I think this might be likely in the case of a fully split brain, but correspondingly less likely the smaller the isolated (disconnected) part of the brain is. Unconsciousness under anesthesia results from brain regions becoming isolated from each other. Maybe they are still conscious but cut off from the memory, motion control, and speaking areas, so we have no evidence of the consciousness of the sub-regions. Jason Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On 18 Sep 2012, at 18:05, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, September 18, 2012 11:02:21 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: My hypothesis is that human qualia is an iconic capitulation of sub- personal and super-personal qualia - meta qualia which synergistically recovers richer qualities of experience from the Totality. Okay. But it will remain only a hypothesis until you (or someone else) shows how it explains new things or gathers some evidence for it. Sure, yeah it's only a hypothesis. I don't know what I'm supposed to do with it. What it explains is old things: consciousness, the hard problem, I though you were assuming consciousness. I don't think that a theory which assumes consciousness can solve the hard problem. Bruno explanatory gap, maybe some important things about physics (how quantum mechanics actually makes sense empirically). It's a way to interpret in a realistic way what we have until now accepted unrealistic interpretations of. There isn't a mechanism because qualia are not objects. They are sensitivities to other experiences. It is a circular to say qualia (sensations / experiences) are sensitivities (sensations) of experiences. It isn't in the case of qualia. If I'm right, sensation is always a capitulation and a diffraction of itself. It is the a-mereological and trans-rational nature of the ground of being from which the mereological and logical antithesis is foregrounded. James Hutton, considered a father of Geology, was largely unread because his prose was so difficult to parse. He had many great ideas, he even beat Charles Darwin regarding the idea of natural selection ( http://www.strangescience.net/hutton.htm ). Yet, his style of writing was so impenetrable that most of his ideas were ignored in his life time. After he died one of his friends took up re-writing his books and it became a huge success. It would be great to collaborate with someone who can write about it in a more accessible way. Sign me up. They are presentations through which we access significant experiences. They are generated as much on our own anthropological level as they are on sub-personal physiological levels and super- personal evolutionary levels. Where do you get this stuff? From the future? , the only difference that makes a difference are the firings patterns of neurons. Patterns make no difference to anything without pattern recognition. There are no 'patterns' in and of themselves. The color of X-Rays, for instance, is just as patterned as the color green. The firing patterns of neurons is noticed by other neurons and groups of neurons. Because they host entities which can recognize each others patterns. If we look at neuron patterns, they are meaningless to us unless we can correlate them to something familiar. If you look at some MRI scan of them, they are meaningless, but not if you *are* them. Then they do the correlation for you. No, they're still meaningless. Just as an mp3 file that you look at visually is not the song that you think the file represents aurally. The file is just a form. You need perception to in-form your experience of the form (which itself is only a perception of a lower level of more physical-tangible qualia). This is the only time information that makes a difference to other neurons is communicated. At each moment, all the differences, all the information a neuron has received is boiled down to one bit: to fire or not to fire. Pure speculation. Neurons fire, but single cell organisms respond to their environment without nervous systems. Neurons might respond to their environment independently, but neighboring neurons don't care what their neighbors might be thinking, what matters is whether their neighbors are firing. It's the same as saying that cars in traffic don't care what their neighbors might be thinking as long as they follow the flow of traffic and show normative judgment and awareness of driving laws. The point is that the purpose of the communication between neurons is only the tip of the iceberg. Their common purpose is to facilitate human perception and participation in a human scale world. There is firing, but those are only the semaphores and gestures which correlate with experiences but are only the vehicle through which the sharing of experience is modulated. So in your theory the firing plays is only a minor role in the operation and function of the brain? It's the same role that traffic signals, airports, and harbors play in the operation and function of all of the cities on Earth. Minor in the sense that they aren't the purpose or the content of the cities, but not minor in the sense that malfunctions will be catastrophic. Our brains are civilizations of sub-persons. They do things together but they also experience things, which we experience as well but in this iconicized
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Wednesday, September 19, 2012 9:10:43 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Sep 2012, at 18:05, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, September 18, 2012 11:02:21 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: My hypothesis is that human qualia is an iconic capitulation of sub-personal and super-personal qualia - meta qualia which synergistically recovers richer qualities of experience from the Totality. Okay. But it will remain only a hypothesis until you (or someone else) shows how it explains new things or gathers some evidence for it. Sure, yeah it's only a hypothesis. I don't know what I'm supposed to do with it. What it explains is old things: consciousness, the hard problem, I though you were assuming consciousness. I don't think that a theory which assumes consciousness can solve the hard problem. Bruno I think it solves the hard problem by 1) exposing the bigger picture, in which all problems are experiences within consciousness, including the hard problem. 2) With the understanding that sense is primordial, consciousness is inescapable and ubiquitous in all real universes and so needs no justification in any other terms (as all terms are only sub-ontological and a-posteriori to sense.) The answer to Why do we experience anything at all? is Because all there ever can be is experience. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/6BE_k9lnmxsJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
Hi Roger, Did you mean to write something in your e-mail? I didn't see anything in your reply besides hi Jason Resch and your woodey Allen quote. Jason On Sep 19, 2012, at 8:03 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Jason Resch Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/19/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list@googlegroups.com Time: 2012-09-18, 14:14:31 Subject: Re: Bruno's Restaurant On Sep 18, 2012, at 12:53 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/18/2012 10:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote: No it is absolutely necessary. If you had no knowledge regarding what you were seeing, no qualia at all, you would be blind and dysfunctional. You might cite blund sighr as a counter example, but actually i think it is evidence of modularity if mind. Those with blind sight appear to have a disconnect between the visual processing parts of their brain and others. For example, they may still have reflexes, like the ability to avoid obsticles or catch a thrown ball, but the language center of their brain is disconnected, and so the part of the brain that talks says it can't see. I agree. But it raises a question about the woman who feels pain but doesn't care. Who is it that doesn't care? Obviously the conscious person who tells you they don't care. But is there another, inarticulate person who feels the pain? or does care? Brent, Good question, and a scary thought. I think this might be likely in the case of a fully split brain, but correspondingly less likely the smaller the isolated (disconnected) part of the brain is. Unconsciousness under anesthesia results from brain regions becoming isolated from each other. Maybe they are still conscious but cut off from the memory, motion control, and speaking areas, so we have no evidence of the consciousness of the sub-regions. Jason Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Sep 19, 2012, at 8:02 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Jason Resch My ionterpretation of the result of the brain splitting on pain perception is that her self is on one side and the feeling of pain is on the other. Thus she feels the pain, but cannot associate to her self (doesn't care). I would agree, but add that the self, in this case, is found in the connected parts of the majority of her brain. Jason Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/19/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list@googlegroups.com Time: 2012-09-18, 14:14:31 Subject: Re: Bruno's Restaurant On Sep 18, 2012, at 12:53 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 9/18/2012 10:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote: No it is absolutely necessary. If you had no knowledge regarding what you were seeing, no qualia at all, you would be blind and dysfunctional. You might cite blund sighr as a counter example, but actually i think it is evidence of modularity if mind. Those with blind sight appear to have a disconnect between the visual processing parts of their brain and others. For example, they may still have reflexes, like the ability to avoid obsticles or catch a thrown ball, but the language center of their brain is disconnected, and so the part of the brain that talks says it can't see. I agree. But it raises a question about the woman who feels pain but doesn't care. Who is it that doesn't care? Obviously the conscious person who tells you they don't care. But is there another, inarticulate person who feels the pain? or does care? Brent, Good question, and a scary thought. I think this might be likely in the case of a fully split brain, but correspondingly less likely the smaller the isolated (disconnected) part of the brain is. Unconsciousness under anesthesia results from brain regions becoming isolated from each other. Maybe they are still conscious but cut off from the memory, motion control, and speaking areas, so we have no evidence of the consciousness of the sub-regions. Jason Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
oof, this is getting too long. truncation ahoy... the upgraded Google Groups keeps spontaneously disposing of my writings. On Wednesday, September 19, 2012 1:10:10 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: Yes and no. I think if we are being precise, we have to admit that there is something about the nature of subjective experience which makes the 'all together and at once' actually elide the differences between the 'bunch of independent aspects' so that they aren't experienced as independent aspects. That's the elliptical-algebraic-gestalt quality. I think they separate aspects represent a single state of high dimensionality. This concept is elaborated in a book, I think it is called universe of consciousness but I will have to verify this. Dimensionality sounds too discrete to me. I can go along with 'single state' but I think it's a distraction to see qualia as a plot within a dimensional space. It is not necessary to experience any dimensionality to have a feeling, rather it creates its own dimension. I can be hungry or ravenous, but there is no dimension of physiological potential qualities which hunger is predisposed to constellate within. The experience is primary and the dimensionality is secondary. I don't think they are necessary for consciousness, but they are necessary to be informed. For consciousness all that you need is an awareness of an awareness - which is a participatory experience of detection. Semiconductors have detection, but their detection has no detection. Ours do, because they are the detections of living sub-persons. You can create a supervisory process that is aware of an awarness, rather easily, in any programming language. The semiconductor is still only aware of charge comparisons. The idea that something is supervising something is purely our projection, like saying that the capstone of a pyramid is supervising the base. All that is really going on is that we are able to read an aggregate sense into unconscious chains of causal logic. At some level of depth though, does it matter what happens on the smallest scales? Do your neurons care about what the quarks and gluons are doing inside the nucleus of an oxygen atom inside a water molecule, floating in the cytoplasm? I think they don't have to care because they embody what the quarks and gluons are doing. They are those 'cares'. When you find a point at which the higher levels don't care then you can abstract out and replace the lower levels so long there is functional equivalence from the perspective of the higher levels. I don't think it works that way. There is nothing that can be done to silicon glass that will make it into food we can eat. Same goes for silicon intelligence being able to feel. The divergence between us and silicon is just too fundamental to be bridged - like reptile and mammal. We took the road less traveled and that road may only allow one traveler per universe. It only seems to make sense form the retrospective view of consciousness where we take it for granted. If we start instead from a universe of resources and dispositions, then the idea that a rearrangement of them should entail some kind of experience is a completely metaphysical, magical just-so story that has no basis in science. No it is absolutely necessary. If you had no knowledge regarding what you were seeing, no qualia at all, you would be blind and dysfunctional. Not true. Blindsight proves this. Common experience with computers and machines suggests this. If I had no qualia at all, I wouldn't exist, but in theory, if there were no such thing as qualia, a universe of information processing would continue humming along nicely forever. People with blind sight are not fully functional. Otherwise it wouldn't be a condition we know about. Sure, but nonetheless they are exhibiting a sub-personal function without a personal qualia. We can't be certain there is no qualia. Why not? It may be technically possible that they are all lying or that their speech centers are all damaged in such a way that they only malfunction when patients try to talk about their problem, but I think it's sophistry to entertain that seriously. That shows that one is not defined by the other. It shows that there is no functional reason for personal qualia to exist in theory. Of course in reality, personal qualia is all that matters to us, so it's absurd to suggest that something could function 'normally' without it, but that is the retrospective view of consciousness. If we start with the prospective view of consciousness, and say 'ok, I am building a universe completely from scratch.', what problem am I solving by conjuring qualia? If function is what matters, then qualia cannot. If qualia matters instead, then function can matter too (because it modulates qualia). You should watch some videos on youtube of people with
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 6:07 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Monday, September 17, 2012 5:44:16 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Sep 17, 2012, at 3:26 PM, Stephen P. King step...@charter.net wrote: On 9/17/2012 1:20 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: Stephen - the Matrix video is a faithful interpretation of comp, but Craig's story is not, unless he includes the crucial narrative - that of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal. I expect Craig to say that the simulated Craig, the one making the yummy noises, is a zombie, and has no actual experience or inner narrative. He is entitled of course to that position. He is just saying no to the doctor. Terren Dear Terren, You are completely missing his point. He is highlighting the fact that there is a difference that makes a difference between the case of of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal and of the real Craig eating the real meal. Unless the neurons themselves are directly and independently responsible for qualia, (which is doubtful because there would be no clear mechanism for an individual neuron to articulate the wonder of its sensations to the brain as a whole) There is no more or less of a mechanism within neurons than there is for the brain as a whole to explain qualia. Neurons have neuron qualia, humans have human qualia. While that may be, brains can only talk about brain qualia. They are silent on neuron qualia, carbon atom qualia, or electron qualia. There isn't a mechanism because qualia are not objects. They are sensitivities to other experiences. It is a circular to say qualia (sensations / experiences) are sensitivities (sensations) of experiences. They are presentations through which we access significant experiences. They are generated as much on our own anthropological level as they are on sub-personal physiological levels and super-personal evolutionary levels. Where do you get this stuff? , the only difference that makes a difference are the firings patterns of neurons. Patterns make no difference to anything without pattern recognition. There are no 'patterns' in and of themselves. The color of X-Rays, for instance, is just as patterned as the color green. The firing patterns of neurons is noticed by other neurons and groups of neurons. This is the only time information that makes a difference to other neurons is communicated. At each moment, all the differences, all the information a neuron has received is boiled down to one bit: to fire or not to fire. Pure speculation. Neurons fire, but single cell organisms respond to their environment without nervous systems. Neurons might respond to their environment independently, but neighboring neurons don't care what their neighbors might be thinking, what matters is whether their neighbors are firing. You are conflating the physiology associated with human experience with the ontology of subjective experience in general. Information and bits are not real, they are analytical abstractions that are not capable of any causes or effects. According to you, only experiences are real. If this is where you stand then you should admit that this idea gives up any hope of explaining anything about experience. Using information theory, and known limitations if information representation in physics, It could be shown that a biological brain has only some certain and finite information available to it. This places an upper bound on the things it knows and can talk about. An equivalent artificial brain could be engineered to contain the same information and the same knowledge. There would be nothing the biological brain could know that the artificial brain does not: they were created to have identical information content. If one knows 2+2 is 4, they both do, if one knows what red is like, they both do. Information feels nothing and knows nothing, and it never will. I didn't say information feels or knows, only that the brains, (biological or artificial), in the above hypothetical, have the same limited information and therefore neither is wiser or more knowledgeable than the other. Jason Craig Jason There has to be a grundlagen level at which there is not a simulation, there has to be a real thing that the simulations are some deformed copy of. I have postulated, following an idea from Stephen Woolfram, that a physical system (in its evolution) in the real word *is* the best possible simulation and thus it is literally the real thing that all images that we might have of it in our minds are mere simulations. Craig is diving deep into this idea and looking at it from the inside and reporting to us his observations. On Sun, Sep 16, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Stephen P. King step...@charter.net wrote: On 9/16/2012 9:29 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Background: After refusing to serve Bruno's brother in law with the simulated brain
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On 9/18/2012 12:25 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 6:37 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Terren, Comp is false is too strong. He is explaining how comp is incomplete. The movie graph argument is flawed. I'm not sure what that means, that comp is incomplete. You either start from the assumption that your consciousness can be faithfully preserved (or duplicated) by a brain transplant, or you don't. What am I missing? I admit I haven't followed all of the list postings lately, but I haven't seen a coherent explanation of why the movie graph argument is flawed... if I missed it, can you point me to where this was articulated? T Hi Terren, I have no problem at all with the idea that my consciousness can be faithfully preserved (or duplicated) by a brain transplant so long as functional equivalence is exactly maintained. But the MGA seems to neglect the very real possibility that consciousness seems to depend on things that don't happen just as much as it depends on things that do happen. Maudlin and Bruno are effectively arguing that things that don't happen are thus irrelevant and should and even must be dismissed in considering consciousness. We are being sold a bill of goods if we continue to thing in terms of classical logic that does not look at both sides of a set (the members, boundary and the set's complement) as involved in a function. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Bruno's Restaurant
Hi Jason Resch If you get a duplicate of this, I apologize. I'm still working on the problem. Could it not be that just as our five senses (touch, sight, etc.) tell us what is going on in the outside world, that we also have sensors inside to detect pain and pleasure ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/18/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-18, 01:50:45 Subject: Re: Bruno's Restaurant On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 6:10 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: I think that comp is almost true, except for when applied to consciousness itself, in which case it is exactly false. I wasn't asserting it so much as I was illustrating exactly why that is the case. Does anyone have any common sense analogy or story which makes sense of comp as a generator of consciousness? Craig, I'll give this a shot. Imagine there is a life form with only the most simple form of qualia. ?t can only experience two states of being: pain and the absence of pain. Further, let's say this creature has, say 10 semi-independent regions in its brain, each responsible for different functions but also each is connected to every other, to varying degrees. ?ach can affect any other region in various ways. When the creature is in a state of pain, each of the 10 regions of the brain are notified of this state. ?(This is communicated from the creature's pain receptors to all other parts of its brain). The awareness of this state has different effects on each region, and the regions in turn affect the creature's thoughts and behaviors. ?or example, one region begins telling the other regions of the brain to do whatever they can to make it stop. ?nother region expresses the associated behaviors and thoughts that pertain to stress and anxiety. ? third region of the brain might increase the readiness or propensity to flee, hide, cry for help, or scream. ?he states of the various regions have cascading and circular affects on other regions, and the entire focus of the brain may quickly shift (from what it was thinking before) to the single subject and pursuit of ending the pain. ?aken to the extreme, this effect might become all-encompassing, or even debilitating. In the above example, the perception of pain is described in terms of information and the effect that information has on the internal states of processes in the brain. The presence of the information, indicating pain, is through a very complex process, interpreted in numerous ways by different sub-agents in the brain to yield all the effects normally associated with the experience. Jason P.S. Try this little experiment from your own home: close your eyes and slowly begin to pinch the skin on the back of your hand. ?ay particular attention to the feeling as it crosses the threshold from mere feeling into pain. ?oncentrate on what it is that is different between that perception (of the light pinch) and the pain (of the string pinch). ?ou may find that it is just information, along with an increasing anxiety and desire to make it stop. ?xperiments have found that certain people with brain damage or on certain drugs can experience the pain without the discomfort. ?here is a separate part of the brain responsible for making pain?ncomfortable! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Tuesday, September 18, 2012 1:50:47 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 6:10 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: I think that comp is almost true, except for when applied to consciousness itself, in which case it is exactly false. I wasn't asserting it so much as I was illustrating exactly why that is the case. Does anyone have any common sense analogy or story which makes sense of comp as a generator of consciousness? Craig, I'll give this a shot. Imagine there is a life form with only the most simple form of qualia. It can only experience two states of being: pain and the absence of pain. Further, let's say this creature has, say 10 semi-independent regions in its brain, each responsible for different functions but also each is connected to every other, to varying degrees. Each can affect any other region in various ways. When the creature is in a state of pain, each of the 10 regions of the brain are notified of this state. (This is communicated from the creature's pain receptors to all other parts of its brain). The awareness of this state has different effects on each region, and the regions in turn affect the creature's thoughts and behaviors. For example, one region begins telling the other regions of the brain to do whatever they can to make it stop. Another region expresses the associated behaviors and thoughts that pertain to stress and anxiety. A third region of the brain might increase the readiness or propensity to flee, hide, cry for help, or scream. The states of the various regions have cascading and circular affects on other regions, and the entire focus of the brain may quickly shift (from what it was thinking before) to the single subject and pursuit of ending the pain. Taken to the extreme, this effect might become all-encompassing, or even debilitating. In the above example, the perception of pain is described in terms of information and the effect that information has on the internal states of processes in the brain. The presence of the information, indicating pain, is through a very complex process, interpreted in numerous ways by different sub-agents in the brain to yield all the effects normally associated with the experience. Jason P.S. Try this little experiment from your own home: close your eyes and slowly begin to pinch the skin on the back of your hand. Pay particular attention to the feeling as it crosses the threshold from mere feeling into pain. Concentrate on what it is that is different between that perception (of the light pinch) and the pain (of the string pinch). You may find that it is just information, along with an increasing anxiety and desire to make it stop. Experiments have found that certain people with brain damage or on certain drugs can experience the pain without the discomfort. There is a separate part of the brain responsible for making pain uncomfortable! What you have then is 10 regions of the brain (are they self categorized? formally partitioned? who knows there are a such thing as brain regions besides us?) which have no experience or qualia whatsoever, yet can detect notifications of a presumably epiphenomenal state of pain. If the brain is doing all of the work, why does the top level organism have some other worthless abstraction layer of experience when, as blindsight proves, we are perfectly capable of processing information without any conscious qualia at all. Information is very close to consciousness, but ultimately fails to sustain itself. The pixels on your screen have no way to detect each other or process the image that you see as a coherent gestalt, and the processor behind the graphics generation has no way to detect the visual end result, and if it did, it would be completely superfluous. Your graphics card does not need to see anything. To me it makes more sense to see information as nothing but the semiotic protocols developed by perceptual participation (experience) to elaborate and deepen the qualitative richness of those experiences. Of course, the protocols which are maps of one level of experience are the territory of another, which is what makes it confusing to try to reverse engineer consciousness from such an incredibly complex example as a Homo sapien. Our pinch is a continuum of sensory, emotional, and cognitive interaction because we are made of the qualia of hundreds of billions of neurons and billions of lifetimes of different species and substances. That only means our pain can seem like information to us, not that all pain arises from information processing. Information does not concretely exist as an independent entity. There are forms which can be used to inform if they are intentionally treated that way, as a map, but nothing is just a map by itself. Every map is A territory (not THE territory). being used by another 'territory' as a
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 5:41 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 9/18/2012 12:25 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 6:37 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Terren, Comp is false is too strong. He is explaining how comp is incomplete. The movie graph argument is flawed. I'm not sure what that means, that comp is incomplete. You either start from the assumption that your consciousness can be faithfully preserved (or duplicated) by a brain transplant, or you don't. What am I missing? I admit I haven't followed all of the list postings lately, but I haven't seen a coherent explanation of why the movie graph argument is flawed... if I missed it, can you point me to where this was articulated? T Hi Terren, I have no problem at all with the idea that my consciousness can be faithfully preserved (or duplicated) by a brain transplant so long as functional equivalence is exactly maintained. But the MGA seems to neglect the very real possibility that consciousness seems to depend on things that don't happen just as much as it depends on things that do happen. Maudlin and Bruno are effectively arguing that things that don't happen are thus irrelevant and should and even must be dismissed in considering consciousness. We are being sold a bill of goods if we continue to thing in terms of classical logic that does not look at both sides of a set (the members, boundary and the set's complement) as involved in a function. Stephen, I think I addressed this point in another thread. Things do happen in what you and I might call physical universes, and they do matter and are relevant for our experience. Bruno's first point is only that due to indeterminacy, we never see any one physical universe underlying ourselves, but an infinite continuum. His second point is that this makes physics explainable in terms of something else (physics is no longer the bottom layer in the sciences). I don't see that you, Bruno, or I disagree regarding computationalism or arithmatical realism. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Bruno's Restaurant
Roger, Comments below: On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 7:04 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Jason Resch If you get a duplicate of this, I apologize. I'm still working on the problem. I did see some duplicates from you yesterday, but this message was not duplicated. In general, I think there has also been an overall improvement to the formatting of your messages, I no longer see unrecognized characters, or long black lines, so whatever you have done on your e-mail client, it's created a big improvement. Could it not be that just as our five senses (touch, sight, etc.) tell us what is going on in the outside world, that we also have sensors inside to detect pain and pleasure ? The sense of touch is complex, there are actually several different types of touch sensitive nerves. Different cells detect: heat, cold, pressure, vibration, and chemical irritation. However, this only constitutes information sent to the brain. Whether it is interpreted as pain or pleasure depends not on the type of the nerve but on how the brain is set up to interpret those signals. Jason Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/18/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-18, 01:50:45 Subject: Re: Bruno's Restaurant On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 6:10 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: I think that comp is almost true, except for when applied to consciousness itself, in which case it is exactly false. I wasn't asserting it so much as I was illustrating exactly why that is the case. Does anyone have any common sense analogy or story which makes sense of comp as a generator of consciousness? Craig, I'll give this a shot. Imagine there is a life form with only the most simple form of qualia. ?t can only experience two states of being: pain and the absence of pain. Further, let's say this creature has, say 10 semi-independent regions in its brain, each responsible for different functions but also each is connected to every other, to varying degrees. ?ach can affect any other region in various ways. When the creature is in a state of pain, each of the 10 regions of the brain are notified of this state. ?(This is communicated from the creature's pain receptors to all other parts of its brain). The awareness of this state has different effects on each region, and the regions in turn affect the creature's thoughts and behaviors. ?or example, one region begins telling the other regions of the brain to do whatever they can to make it stop. ?nother region expresses the associated behaviors and thoughts that pertain to stress and anxiety. ? third region of the brain might increase the readiness or propensity to flee, hide, cry for help, or scream. ?he states of the various regions have cascading and circular affects on other regions, and the entire focus of the brain may quickly shift (from what it was thinking before) to the single subject and pursuit of ending the pain. ?aken to the extreme, this effect might become all-encompassing, or even debilitating. In the above example, the perception of pain is described in terms of information and the effect that information has on the internal states of processes in the brain. The presence of the information, indicating pain, is through a very complex process, interpreted in numerous ways by different sub-agents in the brain to yield all the effects normally associated with the experience. Jason P.S. Try this little experiment from your own home: close your eyes and slowly begin to pinch the skin on the back of your hand. ?ay particular attention to the feeling as it crosses the threshold from mere feeling into pain. ?oncentrate on what it is that is different between that perception (of the light pinch) and the pain (of the string pinch). ?ou may find that it is just information, along with an increasing anxiety and desire to make it stop. ?xperiments have found that certain people with brain damage or on certain drugs can experience the pain without the discomfort. ?here is a separate part of the brain responsible for making pain?ncomfortable! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 7:31 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Tuesday, September 18, 2012 1:50:47 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 6:10 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: I think that comp is almost true, except for when applied to consciousness itself, in which case it is exactly false. I wasn't asserting it so much as I was illustrating exactly why that is the case. Does anyone have any common sense analogy or story which makes sense of comp as a generator of consciousness? Craig, I'll give this a shot. Imagine there is a life form with only the most simple form of qualia. It can only experience two states of being: pain and the absence of pain. Further, let's say this creature has, say 10 semi-independent regions in its brain, each responsible for different functions but also each is connected to every other, to varying degrees. Each can affect any other region in various ways. When the creature is in a state of pain, each of the 10 regions of the brain are notified of this state. (This is communicated from the creature's pain receptors to all other parts of its brain). The awareness of this state has different effects on each region, and the regions in turn affect the creature's thoughts and behaviors. For example, one region begins telling the other regions of the brain to do whatever they can to make it stop. Another region expresses the associated behaviors and thoughts that pertain to stress and anxiety. A third region of the brain might increase the readiness or propensity to flee, hide, cry for help, or scream. The states of the various regions have cascading and circular affects on other regions, and the entire focus of the brain may quickly shift (from what it was thinking before) to the single subject and pursuit of ending the pain. Taken to the extreme, this effect might become all-encompassing, or even debilitating. In the above example, the perception of pain is described in terms of information and the effect that information has on the internal states of processes in the brain. The presence of the information, indicating pain, is through a very complex process, interpreted in numerous ways by different sub-agents in the brain to yield all the effects normally associated with the experience. Jason P.S. Try this little experiment from your own home: close your eyes and slowly begin to pinch the skin on the back of your hand. Pay particular attention to the feeling as it crosses the threshold from mere feeling into pain. Concentrate on what it is that is different between that perception (of the light pinch) and the pain (of the string pinch). You may find that it is just information, along with an increasing anxiety and desire to make it stop. Experiments have found that certain people with brain damage or on certain drugs can experience the pain without the discomfort. There is a separate part of the brain responsible for making pain uncomfortable! What you have then is 10 regions of the brain (are they self categorized? formally partitioned? who knows there are a such thing as brain regions besides us?) Here is an example: Functional MRI scans have indicated that an area of the brain, called the *anterior cingulate cortex*, processes pain information to determine how a person is affected. Severing the link to this part of the brain has a curious effect on one's reaction to pain. A condition known as *pain dissociation* is the result. Along with brain surgery such as lobotomy or cingulotomy, the condition may also occur through the administration of certain drugs such as morphine. Those with pain dissociation still perceive pain; they are aware of its location and intensity but pain is no longer unpleasant or distressing. Paul Brand, a surgeon and author on the subject of pain recounted the case of a woman who had suffered with a severe and chronic pain for more than a decade: She agreed to a surgery that would separate the neural pathways between her frontal lobes and the rest of her brain. The surgery was a success. Brand visited the woman a year later, and inquired about her pain. She said, “Oh, yes, its still there. I just don't worry about it anymore.” With a smile she continued, “In fact, it's still agonizing. But I don't mind.” The conclusion: even seemingly simple qualia, like pain are far from simple. I think Marvin Minksy understands this well, and provides a good explanation: Marvin Minsky considers it to be “a huge mistake-that attempt to reify 'feeling' as an independent entity, with an essence that's indescribable. As I see it, feelings are not strange alien things. It is precisely those cognitive changes themselves that constitute what 'hurting' is-and this also includes all those clumsy attempts to represent and summarize those changes. The big mistake comes from looking for some single, simple, 'essence' of hurting, rather than
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Tuesday, September 18, 2012 2:02:20 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 6:07 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Monday, September 17, 2012 5:44:16 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Sep 17, 2012, at 3:26 PM, Stephen P. King step...@charter.net wrote: On 9/17/2012 1:20 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: Stephen - the Matrix video is a faithful interpretation of comp, but Craig's story is not, unless he includes the crucial narrative - that of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal. I expect Craig to say that the simulated Craig, the one making the yummy noises, is a zombie, and has no actual experience or inner narrative. He is entitled of course to that position. He is just saying no to the doctor. Terren Dear Terren, You are completely missing his point. He is highlighting the fact that there is a difference that makes a difference between the case of of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal and of the real Craig eating the real meal. Unless the neurons themselves are directly and independently responsible for qualia, (which is doubtful because there would be no clear mechanism for an individual neuron to articulate the wonder of its sensations to the brain as a whole) There is no more or less of a mechanism within neurons than there is for the brain as a whole to explain qualia. Neurons have neuron qualia, humans have human qualia. While that may be, brains can only talk about brain qualia. They are silent on neuron qualia, carbon atom qualia, or electron qualia. My hypothesis is that human qualia is an iconic capitulation of sub-personal and super-personal qualia - meta qualia which synergistically recovers richer qualities of experience from the Totality. There isn't a mechanism because qualia are not objects. They are sensitivities to other experiences. It is a circular to say qualia (sensations / experiences) are sensitivities (sensations) of experiences. It isn't in the case of qualia. If I'm right, sensation is always a capitulation and a diffraction of itself. It is the a-mereological and trans-rational nature of the ground of being from which the mereological and logical antithesis is foregrounded. They are presentations through which we access significant experiences. They are generated as much on our own anthropological level as they are on sub-personal physiological levels and super-personal evolutionary levels. Where do you get this stuff? From the future? , the only difference that makes a difference are the firings patterns of neurons. Patterns make no difference to anything without pattern recognition. There are no 'patterns' in and of themselves. The color of X-Rays, for instance, is just as patterned as the color green. The firing patterns of neurons is noticed by other neurons and groups of neurons. Because they host entities which can recognize each others patterns. If we look at neuron patterns, they are meaningless to us unless we can correlate them to something familiar. This is the only time information that makes a difference to other neurons is communicated. At each moment, all the differences, all the information a neuron has received is boiled down to one bit: to fire or not to fire. Pure speculation. Neurons fire, but single cell organisms respond to their environment without nervous systems. Neurons might respond to their environment independently, but neighboring neurons don't care what their neighbors might be thinking, what matters is whether their neighbors are firing. It's the same as saying that cars in traffic don't care what their neighbors might be thinking as long as they follow the flow of traffic and show normative judgment and awareness of driving laws. The point is that the purpose of the communication between neurons is only the tip of the iceberg. Their common purpose is to facilitate human perception and participation in a human scale world. There is firing, but those are only the semaphores and gestures which correlate with experiences but are only the vehicle through which the sharing of experience is modulated. You are conflating the physiology associated with human experience with the ontology of subjective experience in general. Information and bits are not real, they are analytical abstractions that are not capable of any causes or effects. According to you, only experiences are real. If this is where you stand then you should admit that this idea gives up any hope of explaining anything about experience. Not at all. Admitting that experience is the ground of being is the necessary starting point to explain anything about experience. There is a whole new universe to explore. Using information theory, and known limitations if information representation in
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 9:37 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Tuesday, September 18, 2012 2:02:20 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 6:07 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Monday, September 17, 2012 5:44:16 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Sep 17, 2012, at 3:26 PM, Stephen P. King step...@charter.net wrote: On 9/17/2012 1:20 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: Stephen - the Matrix video is a faithful interpretation of comp, but Craig's story is not, unless he includes the crucial narrative - that of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal. I expect Craig to say that the simulated Craig, the one making the yummy noises, is a zombie, and has no actual experience or inner narrative. He is entitled of course to that position. He is just saying no to the doctor. Terren Dear Terren, You are completely missing his point. He is highlighting the fact that there is a difference that makes a difference between the case of of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal and of the real Craig eating the real meal. Unless the neurons themselves are directly and independently responsible for qualia, (which is doubtful because there would be no clear mechanism for an individual neuron to articulate the wonder of its sensations to the brain as a whole) There is no more or less of a mechanism within neurons than there is for the brain as a whole to explain qualia. Neurons have neuron qualia, humans have human qualia. While that may be, brains can only talk about brain qualia. They are silent on neuron qualia, carbon atom qualia, or electron qualia. My hypothesis is that human qualia is an iconic capitulation of sub-personal and super-personal qualia - meta qualia which synergistically recovers richer qualities of experience from the Totality. Okay. But it will remain only a hypothesis until you (or someone else) shows how it explains new things or gathers some evidence for it. There isn't a mechanism because qualia are not objects. They are sensitivities to other experiences. It is a circular to say qualia (sensations / experiences) are sensitivities (sensations) of experiences. It isn't in the case of qualia. If I'm right, sensation is always a capitulation and a diffraction of itself. It is the a-mereological and trans-rational nature of the ground of being from which the mereological and logical antithesis is foregrounded. James Hutton, considered a father of Geology, was largely unread because his prose was so difficult to parse. He had many great ideas, he even beat Charles Darwin regarding the idea of natural selection ( http://www.strangescience.net/hutton.htm ). Yet, his style of writing was so impenetrable that most of his ideas were ignored in his life time. After he died one of his friends took up re-writing his books and it became a huge success. They are presentations through which we access significant experiences. They are generated as much on our own anthropological level as they are on sub-personal physiological levels and super-personal evolutionary levels. Where do you get this stuff? From the future? , the only difference that makes a difference are the firings patterns of neurons. Patterns make no difference to anything without pattern recognition. There are no 'patterns' in and of themselves. The color of X-Rays, for instance, is just as patterned as the color green. The firing patterns of neurons is noticed by other neurons and groups of neurons. Because they host entities which can recognize each others patterns. If we look at neuron patterns, they are meaningless to us unless we can correlate them to something familiar. If you look at some MRI scan of them, they are meaningless, but not if you *are* them. Then they do the correlation for you. This is the only time information that makes a difference to other neurons is communicated. At each moment, all the differences, all the information a neuron has received is boiled down to one bit: to fire or not to fire. Pure speculation. Neurons fire, but single cell organisms respond to their environment without nervous systems. Neurons might respond to their environment independently, but neighboring neurons don't care what their neighbors might be thinking, what matters is whether their neighbors are firing. It's the same as saying that cars in traffic don't care what their neighbors might be thinking as long as they follow the flow of traffic and show normative judgment and awareness of driving laws. The point is that the purpose of the communication between neurons is only the tip of the iceberg. Their common purpose is to facilitate human perception and participation in a human scale world. There is firing, but those are only the semaphores and gestures which correlate with experiences but are only the vehicle through which the sharing of experience is
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Tuesday, September 18, 2012 11:02:21 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: My hypothesis is that human qualia is an iconic capitulation of sub-personal and super-personal qualia - meta qualia which synergistically recovers richer qualities of experience from the Totality. Okay. But it will remain only a hypothesis until you (or someone else) shows how it explains new things or gathers some evidence for it. Sure, yeah it's only a hypothesis. I don't know what I'm supposed to do with it. What it explains is old things: consciousness, the hard problem, explanatory gap, maybe some important things about physics (how quantum mechanics actually makes sense empirically). It's a way to interpret in a realistic way what we have until now accepted unrealistic interpretations of. There isn't a mechanism because qualia are not objects. They are sensitivities to other experiences. It is a circular to say qualia (sensations / experiences) are sensitivities (sensations) of experiences. It isn't in the case of qualia. If I'm right, sensation is always a capitulation and a diffraction of itself. It is the a-mereological and trans-rational nature of the ground of being from which the mereological and logical antithesis is foregrounded. James Hutton, considered a father of Geology, was largely unread because his prose was so difficult to parse. He had many great ideas, he even beat Charles Darwin regarding the idea of natural selection ( http://www.strangescience.net/hutton.htm ). Yet, his style of writing was so impenetrable that most of his ideas were ignored in his life time. After he died one of his friends took up re-writing his books and it became a huge success. It would be great to collaborate with someone who can write about it in a more accessible way. Sign me up. They are presentations through which we access significant experiences. They are generated as much on our own anthropological level as they are on sub-personal physiological levels and super-personal evolutionary levels. Where do you get this stuff? From the future? , the only difference that makes a difference are the firings patterns of neurons. Patterns make no difference to anything without pattern recognition. There are no 'patterns' in and of themselves. The color of X-Rays, for instance, is just as patterned as the color green. The firing patterns of neurons is noticed by other neurons and groups of neurons. Because they host entities which can recognize each others patterns. If we look at neuron patterns, they are meaningless to us unless we can correlate them to something familiar. If you look at some MRI scan of them, they are meaningless, but not if you *are* them. Then they do the correlation for you. No, they're still meaningless. Just as an mp3 file that you look at visually is not the song that you think the file represents aurally. The file is just a form. You need perception to in-form your experience of the form (which itself is only a perception of a lower level of more physical-tangible qualia). This is the only time information that makes a difference to other neurons is communicated. At each moment, all the differences, all the information a neuron has received is boiled down to one bit: to fire or not to fire. Pure speculation. Neurons fire, but single cell organisms respond to their environment without nervous systems. Neurons might respond to their environment independently, but neighboring neurons don't care what their neighbors might be thinking, what matters is whether their neighbors are firing. It's the same as saying that cars in traffic don't care what their neighbors might be thinking as long as they follow the flow of traffic and show normative judgment and awareness of driving laws. The point is that the purpose of the communication between neurons is only the tip of the iceberg. Their common purpose is to facilitate human perception and participation in a human scale world. There is firing, but those are only the semaphores and gestures which correlate with experiences but are only the vehicle through which the sharing of experience is modulated. So in your theory the firing plays is only a minor role in the operation and function of the brain? It's the same role that traffic signals, airports, and harbors play in the operation and function of all of the cities on Earth. Minor in the sense that they aren't the purpose or the content of the cities, but not minor in the sense that malfunctions will be catastrophic. Our brains are civilizations of sub-persons. They do things together but they also experience things, which we experience as well but in this iconicized presentation. Our personal experience comes through our sub-personal experience, not through sub-personal functions. On the personal level, we
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On 9/18/2012 9:05 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: My hypothesis is that human qualia is an iconic capitulation of sub-personal and super-personal qualia - meta qualia which synergistically recovers richer qualities of experience from the Totality. Okay. But it will remain only a hypothesis until you (or someone else) shows how it explains new things or gathers some evidence for it. Sure, yeah it's only a hypothesis. I don't know what I'm supposed to do with it. What you do with an hypothesis is test it; see whether it makes a false prediction that is observable. Brent What it explains is old things: consciousness, the hard problem, explanatory gap, maybe some important things about physics (how quantum mechanics actually makes sense empirically). It's a way to interpret in a realistic way what we have until now accepted unrealistic interpretations of. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Tuesday, September 18, 2012 12:09:54 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 9/18/2012 9:05 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: My hypothesis is that human qualia is an iconic capitulation of sub-personal and super-personal qualia - meta qualia which synergistically recovers richer qualities of experience from the Totality. Okay. But it will remain only a hypothesis until you (or someone else) shows how it explains new things or gathers some evidence for it. Sure, yeah it's only a hypothesis. I don't know what I'm supposed to do with it. What you do with an hypothesis is test it; see whether it makes a false prediction that is observable. I have been testing it in the sense that I can't come up with any counterfactuals, whereas I can with all of the other competing hypothesis. It's not the same thing as having a hypothesis about a particular phenomenon, because this phenomenon, if I am right, contains all others, including 'hypothesis testing' itself. Craig Brent What it explains is old things: consciousness, the hard problem, explanatory gap, maybe some important things about physics (how quantum mechanics actually makes sense empirically). It's a way to interpret in a realistic way what we have until now accepted unrealistic interpretations of. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/QUD4pM_SelYJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Sep 18, 2012, at 10:38 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, September 18, 2012 10:29:44 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: Here is an example: Functional MRI scans have indicated that an area of the brain, called the anterior cingulate cortex, processes pain information to determine how a person is affected. Severing the link to this part of the brain has a curious effect on one's reaction to pain. A condition known as pain dissociation is the result. Along with brain surgery such as lobotomy or cingulotomy, the condition may also occur through the administration of certain drugs such as morphine. Those with pain dissociation still perceive pain; they are aware of its location and intensity but pain is no longer unpleasant or distressing. Paul Brand, a surgeon and author on the subject of pain recounted the case of a woman who had suffered with a severe and chronic pain for more than a decade: She agreed to a surgery that would separate the neural pathways between her frontal lobes and the rest of her brain. The surgery was a success. Brand visited the woman a year later, and inquired about her pain. She said, “Oh, yes, its still there. I just don't worry about it anymor e.” With a smile she continued, “In fact, it's still agonizing. But I don't mind.” The conclusion: even seemingly simple qualia, like pain are far from simple. That is a conclusion, but I think the wrong one. Human qualia are not simple, but that does not at all mean that qualia re not simple. I agree with this. We are titanically enormous organisms made of other organisms. Our human experience is loaded with cognitive, emotional, and sensory qualia, corresponding to the evolution of life, our species, cultures, families, and individuals. Our pain is a Taj Mahal, and if you remove enough bricks, some towers fall and maybe one part of the palace no longer relates to another part. What you describe suggests exactly that - some part of us feels the pain on a sub-personal level, but the personal level is not alarmed by it because it's qualia has lost the red end of it's spectrum so to speak and now is blue-shifted toward an anesthetized intellectual quality of being. I mostly agree with what you are saying here. I think Marvin Minksy understands this well, and provides a good explanation: Marvin Minsky considers it to be “a huge mistake-that attempt to rei fy 'feeling' as an independent entity, with an essence that's indesc ribable. As I see it, feelings are not strange alien things. It is precisely those cognitive changes themselves that constitute what ' hurting' is-and this also includes all those clumsy attempts to repr esent and summarize those changes. The big mistake comes from looki ng for some single, simple, 'essence' of hurting, rather than recogn izing that this is the word we use for complex rearrangement of our disposition of resources.” He's right that there is no essence of hurting (qualia is always a subject, not an object, so it's essence is the same as it's 'envelope'. It's a-mereological. He's completely wrong about hurting being something other than what it is though. He didn't claim they are something they are not, just that they are not irreducable. Hurting is an experience. A complex rearrangement of our disposition of resources is completely irrelevant. Complex to who? Why would 'rearrangements' 'feel' like something? Consciousness is awareness of information. You might be aware of the information, like the fact that you are looking at a computer screen, or the knowledge of what the text on that screen is. You might be aware that you are in a state of pain, and you might also be aware of the fact that it is uncomfortable and want it to end. Some people, like the woman in my example, can have the awareness of being in pain without the awareness that they want it to end. It only seems to make sense form the retrospective view of consciousness where we take it for granted. If we start instead from a universe of resources and dispositions, then the idea that a rearrangement of them should entail some kind of experience is a completely metaphysical, magical just-so story that has no basis in science. No it is absolutely necessary. If you had no knowledge regarding what you were seeing, no qualia at all, you would be blind and dysfunctional. You might cite blund sighr as a counter example, but actually i think it is evidence of modularity if mind. Those with blind sight appear to have a disconnect between the visual processing parts of their brain and others. For example, they may still have reflexes, like the ability to avoid obsticles or catch a thrown ball, but the language center of their brain is disconnected, and so the part of the brain that talks says it can't see. Sure, to us it makes sense that the feeling of pain should
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On 9/18/2012 10:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote: No it is absolutely necessary. If you had no knowledge regarding what you were seeing, no qualia at all, you would be blind and dysfunctional. You might cite blund sighr as a counter example, but actually i think it is evidence of modularity if mind. Those with blind sight appear to have a disconnect between the visual processing parts of their brain and others. For example, they may still have reflexes, like the ability to avoid obsticles or catch a thrown ball, but the language center of their brain is disconnected, and so the part of the brain that talks says it can't see. I agree. But it raises a question about the woman who feels pain but doesn't care. Who is it that doesn't care? Obviously the conscious person who tells you they don't care. But is there another, inarticulate person who feels the pain? or does care? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Sep 18, 2012, at 12:53 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/18/2012 10:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote: No it is absolutely necessary. If you had no knowledge regarding what you were seeing, no qualia at all, you would be blind and dysfunctional. You might cite blund sighr as a counter example, but actually i think it is evidence of modularity if mind. Those with blind sight appear to have a disconnect between the visual processing parts of their brain and others. For example, they may still have reflexes, like the ability to avoid obsticles or catch a thrown ball, but the language center of their brain is disconnected, and so the part of the brain that talks says it can't see. I agree. But it raises a question about the woman who feels pain but doesn't care. Who is it that doesn't care? Obviously the conscious person who tells you they don't care. But is there another, inarticulate person who feels the pain? or does care? Brent, Good question, and a scary thought. I think this might be likely in the case of a fully split brain, but correspondingly less likely the smaller the isolated (disconnected) part of the brain is. Unconsciousness under anesthesia results from brain regions becoming isolated from each other. Maybe they are still conscious but cut off from the memory, motion control, and speaking areas, so we have no evidence of the consciousness of the sub-regions. Jason Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Tuesday, September 18, 2012 2:16:25 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Sep 18, 2012, at 12:53 PM, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net javascript: wrote: On 9/18/2012 10:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote: No it is absolutely necessary. If you had no knowledge regarding what you were seeing, no qualia at all, you would be blind and dysfunctional. You might cite blund sighr as a counter example, but actually i think it is evidence of modularity if mind. Those with blind sight appear to have a disconnect between the visual processing parts of their brain and others. For example, they may still have reflexes, like the ability to avoid obsticles or catch a thrown ball, but the language center of their brain is disconnected, and so the part of the brain that talks says it can't see. I agree. But it raises a question about the woman who feels pain but doesn't care. Who is it that doesn't care? Obviously the conscious person who tells you they don't care. But is there another, inarticulate person who feels the pain? or does care? Brent, Good question, and a scary thought. I think this might be likely in the case of a fully split brain, but correspondingly less likely the smaller the isolated (disconnected) part of the brain is. Unconsciousness under anesthesia results from brain regions becoming isolated from each other. Maybe they are still conscious but cut off from the memory, motion control, and speaking areas, so we have no evidence of the consciousness of the sub-regions. Jason That's where the concepts of level and depth of qualia come in. For something to rise to the top level of human awareness means a lot. It may not mean as much to swat a mosquito. Would the experience of being a mosquito calibrate so that it's lifetime (short in our terms) seemed long to them? Do mosquito children mourn the loss of their swatted parents? I doubt it. They may very well have experiences that we wouldn't dream of, but the depth - the gravitas of human consciousness is either much greater than theirs is objectively, or it will just always seem that way anthropically from our perspective. Either way, we don't care about the mosquito so much, unless we take certain Eastern philosophies to their most literal extreme. My guess is that their qualia is orders of magnitude less significant. They may feel pain, but like the woman whose experience of pain has been sub-personalized, they may not care so much. The cohesiveness of the qualia - the figurative height of the tower of privacy and the enormous history of intentional significance which built it since the beginning of time...that is what makes this whole thing liveable. That's what keeps us from weeping for the grated carrots and avoiding eating our own foot for a snack. Craig Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/T_wX_SkcTIQJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
Stephen - the Matrix video is a faithful interpretation of comp, but Craig's story is not, unless he includes the crucial narrative - that of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal. I expect Craig to say that the simulated Craig, the one making the yummy noises, is a zombie, and has no actual experience or inner narrative. He is entitled of course to that position. He is just saying no to the doctor. Terren On Sun, Sep 16, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 9/16/2012 9:29 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Background: After refusing to serve Bruno's brother in law with the simulated brain at my restaurant, I decide to make peace by inviting myself to go along with Brother in law B1ll to his favorite restaurant. It's the best in the city!, says B1ll. That sounds great, because I am really hungry., I reply anxiously. When we arrive we find a dark, silent building, full of empty seats. B1ll gestures for me to sit which I do and, it suddenly sounds like a restaurant. I hear sizzling and clanking for the kitchen and suddenly a waiter appears, offering me a menu. Just as I notice that the waiter bears a curious resemblance to Bruno, I wonder why he has not given B1ll a menu too. I've already ordered, says B1ll. I look down at the menu, but I see only one item on it. It is called The thing that you want to order. Wow. This is impressive. I look up and notice that what the waiter's nametag says. Ok, Brun-0, you win. I'll have a number not-not-one, with everything on it. Coming right up, monsieur. Would you like Löbian salad or Gödelian soup with that? The umlauts are excellent this time of year Sure Voila, Brun-0 exclaims. Seeing the confusion on my face, he gestures at the menu in my hand with a gracefully circular extension of his fingers, over and over, rotating in space hypnotically, until I realize that he wants me to turn the menu over. On the back of the menu is a beautiful HD video screen, which pops into life with a movie of someone sitting at...Hey!! It's Me! It's a movie of me, rendered so perfectly it looks absolutely real. I am being served a giant silver domed platter, which is removed to unveil a beautiful...menu. The camera pans down the gorgeous menu of sumptuous sounding descriptions of food. As the camera zooms into a closeup on the calligraphy, it can be seen that each culinary turn of phrase is constructed of beautifully written formulas and equations like G and Gp where p is delicious and G = emulated gustatory resource and p = Non-regurgitation parameters'. To my surprise, I now witness myself in the movie pick a fork and knife and begin eating the menu and thoroughly enjoying every bite. I seem to be making the exact yummy sounds and faces that I would expect. Turning to B1ll, I ask, What did you order? I already ate., he replies. As I look down at my clean plate and remember the great meal that I just had, I feel unusually satisfied. Curiously I can't remember exactly what it was that I ate, but I no reason to care. I can't care. I believe that I must have eaten exactly what I wanted. Craig Check out the Matrix version of this story: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7BuQFUhsRM -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Monday, September 17, 2012 1:20:10 PM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: Stephen - the Matrix video is a faithful interpretation of comp, but Craig's story is not, unless he includes the crucial narrative - that of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal. I expect Craig to say that the simulated Craig, the one making the yummy noises, is a zombie, There is no simulated Craig. There is only an animated menu being interpreted by Craig as a simulation of himself. I'm demonstrating that the idea of there even being a zombie is superfluous. The map is not the territory. There is no such thing in a concrete and absolute sense as a map. The map is a subjective interpretation of interacting territories. A map is only a piece of paper with ink unless you assume a map reader. (It's not even that of course, since paper and ink are only concretely real to other large assemblies of molecules). and has no actual experience or inner narrative. He is entitled of course to that position. He is just saying no to the doctor. These words have no actual experience or inner narrative. If a doctor wanted me to replace my brain with these words, yes I would say no. Craig Terren On Sun, Sep 16, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Stephen P. King step...@charter.netjavascript: wrote: On 9/16/2012 9:29 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Background: After refusing to serve Bruno's brother in law with the simulated brain at my restaurant, I decide to make peace by inviting myself to go along with Brother in law B1ll to his favorite restaurant. It's the best in the city!, says B1ll. That sounds great, because I am really hungry., I reply anxiously. When we arrive we find a dark, silent building, full of empty seats. B1ll gestures for me to sit which I do and, it suddenly sounds like a restaurant. I hear sizzling and clanking for the kitchen and suddenly a waiter appears, offering me a menu. Just as I notice that the waiter bears a curious resemblance to Bruno, I wonder why he has not given B1ll a menu too. I've already ordered, says B1ll. I look down at the menu, but I see only one item on it. It is called The thing that you want to order. Wow. This is impressive. I look up and notice that what the waiter's nametag says. Ok, Brun-0, you win. I'll have a number not-not-one, with everything on it. Coming right up, monsieur. Would you like Löbian salad or Gödelian soup with that? The umlauts are excellent this time of year Sure Voila, Brun-0 exclaims. Seeing the confusion on my face, he gestures at the menu in my hand with a gracefully circular extension of his fingers, over and over, rotating in space hypnotically, until I realize that he wants me to turn the menu over. On the back of the menu is a beautiful HD video screen, which pops into life with a movie of someone sitting at...Hey!! It's Me! It's a movie of me, rendered so perfectly it looks absolutely real. I am being served a giant silver domed platter, which is removed to unveil a beautiful...menu. The camera pans down the gorgeous menu of sumptuous sounding descriptions of food. As the camera zooms into a closeup on the calligraphy, it can be seen that each culinary turn of phrase is constructed of beautifully written formulas and equations like G and Gp where p is delicious and G = emulated gustatory resource and p = Non-regurgitation parameters'. To my surprise, I now witness myself in the movie pick a fork and knife and begin eating the menu and thoroughly enjoying every bite. I seem to be making the exact yummy sounds and faces that I would expect. Turning to B1ll, I ask, What did you order? I already ate., he replies. As I look down at my clean plate and remember the great meal that I just had, I feel unusually satisfied. Curiously I can't remember exactly what it was that I ate, but I no reason to care. I can't care. I believe that I must have eaten exactly what I wanted. Craig Check out the Matrix version of this story: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7BuQFUhsRM -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript:. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/9h2yCipK1VkJ. To post to this group, send email to
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On 9/17/2012 1:20 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: Stephen - the Matrix video is a faithful interpretation of comp, but Craig's story is not, unless he includes the crucial narrative - that of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal. I expect Craig to say that the simulated Craig, the one making the yummy noises, is a zombie, and has no actual experience or inner narrative. He is entitled of course to that position. He is just saying no to the doctor. Terren Dear Terren, You are completely missing his point. He is highlighting the fact that there is a difference that makes a difference between the case of of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal and of the real Craig eating the real meal. There has to be a grundlagen level at which there is not a simulation, there has to be a real thing that the simulations are some deformed copy of. I have postulated, following an idea from Stephen Woolfram, that a physical system (in its evolution) in the real word *is* the best possible simulation and thus it is literally the real thing that all images that we might have of it in our minds are mere simulations. Craig is diving deep into this idea and looking at it from the inside and reporting to us his observations. On Sun, Sep 16, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 9/16/2012 9:29 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Background: After refusing to serve Bruno's brother in law with the simulated brain at my restaurant, I decide to make peace by inviting myself to go along with Brother in law B1ll to his favorite restaurant. It's the best in the city!, says B1ll. That sounds great, because I am really hungry., I reply anxiously. When we arrive we find a dark, silent building, full of empty seats. B1ll gestures for me to sit which I do and, it suddenly sounds like a restaurant. I hear sizzling and clanking for the kitchen and suddenly a waiter appears, offering me a menu. Just as I notice that the waiter bears a curious resemblance to Bruno, I wonder why he has not given B1ll a menu too. I've already ordered, says B1ll. I look down at the menu, but I see only one item on it. It is called The thing that you want to order. Wow. This is impressive. I look up and notice that what the waiter's nametag says. Ok, Brun-0, you win. I'll have a number not-not-one, with everything on it. Coming right up, monsieur. Would you like Löbian salad or Gödelian soup with that? The umlauts are excellent this time of year Sure Voila, Brun-0 exclaims. Seeing the confusion on my face, he gestures at the menu in my hand with a gracefully circular extension of his fingers, over and over, rotating in space hypnotically, until I realize that he wants me to turn the menu over. On the back of the menu is a beautiful HD video screen, which pops into life with a movie of someone sitting at...Hey!! It's Me! It's a movie of me, rendered so perfectly it looks absolutely real. I am being served a giant silver domed platter, which is removed to unveil a beautiful...menu. The camera pans down the gorgeous menu of sumptuous sounding descriptions of food. As the camera zooms into a closeup on the calligraphy, it can be seen that each culinary turn of phrase is constructed of beautifully written formulas and equations like G and Gp where p is delicious and G = emulated gustatory resource and p = Non-regurgitation parameters'. To my surprise, I now witness myself in the movie pick a fork and knife and begin eating the menu and thoroughly enjoying every bite. I seem to be making the exact yummy sounds and faces that I would expect. Turning to B1ll, I ask, What did you order? I already ate., he replies. As I look down at my clean plate and remember the great meal that I just had, I feel unusually satisfied. Curiously I can't remember exactly what it was that I ate, but I no reason to care. I can't care. I believe that I must have eaten exactly what I wanted. Craig Check out the Matrix version of this story: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7BuQFUhsRM -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 4:26 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 9/17/2012 1:20 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: Stephen - the Matrix video is a faithful interpretation of comp, but Craig's story is not, unless he includes the crucial narrative - that of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal. I expect Craig to say that the simulated Craig, the one making the yummy noises, is a zombie, and has no actual experience or inner narrative. He is entitled of course to that position. He is just saying no to the doctor. Terren Dear Terren, You are completely missing his point. He is highlighting the fact that there is a difference that makes a difference between the case of of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal and of the real Craig eating the real meal. There has to be a grundlagen level at which there is not a simulation, there has to be a real thing that the simulations are some deformed copy of. I have postulated, following an idea from Stephen Woolfram, that a physical system (in its evolution) in the real word *is* the best possible simulation and thus it is literally the real thing that all images that we might have of it in our minds are mere simulations. Craig is diving deep into this idea and looking at it from the inside and reporting to us his observations. Craig is just asserting that comp is false. The Matrix video only makes sense if you assume comp. The fact that you called that video the matrix version of Craig's story was confusing to me because the two rest on different assumptions. The movie shows us the character eating and enjoying the simulated steak. In Craig's story he has no experience of it. If you assume comp then there is no primary real version of anything (by the movie graph argument). Real is only phenomenological, like a dream. You can never know, not even in principle, whether you are the real version, it doesn't even make sense to ask the question. Below the substitution level, there are an infinite ocean of universal machines that instantiate your current state. Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Sep 17, 2012, at 3:26 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 9/17/2012 1:20 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: Stephen - the Matrix video is a faithful interpretation of comp, but Craig's story is not, unless he includes the crucial narrative - that of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal. I expect Craig to say that the simulated Craig, the one making the yummy noises, is a zombie, and has no actual experience or inner narrative. He is entitled of course to that position. He is just saying no to the doctor. Terren Dear Terren, You are completely missing his point. He is highlighting the fact that there is a difference that makes a difference between the case of of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal and of the real Craig eating the real meal. Unless the neurons themselves are directly and independently responsible for qualia, (which is doubtful because there would be no clear mechanism for an individual neuron to articulate the wonder of its sensations to the brain as a whole), the only difference that makes a difference are the firings patterns of neurons. This is the only time information that makes a difference to other neurons is communicated. At each moment, all the differences, all the information a neuron has received is boiled down to one bit: to fire or not to fire. Using information theory, and known limitations if information representation in physics, It could be shown that a biological brain has only some certain and finite information available to it. This places an upper bound on the things it knows and can talk about. An equivalent artificial brain could be engineered to contain the same information and the same knowledge. There would be nothing the biological brain could know that the artificial brain does not: they were created to have identical information content. If one knows 2+2 is 4, they both do, if one knows what red is like, they both do. Jason There has to be a grundlagen level at which there is not a simulation, there has to be a real thing that the simulations are some deformed copy of. I have postulated, following an idea from Stephen Woolfram, that a physical system (in its evolution) in the real word *is* the best possible simulation and thus it is literally the real thing that all images that we might have of it in our minds are mere simulations. Craig is diving deep into this idea and looking at it from the inside and reporting to us his observations. On Sun, Sep 16, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 9/16/2012 9:29 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Background: After refusing to serve Bruno's brother in law with the simulated brain at my restaurant, I decide to make peace by inviting myself to go along with Brother in law B1ll to his favorite restaurant. It's the best in the city!, says B1ll. That sounds great, because I am really hungry., I reply anxiously. When we arrive we find a dark, silent building, full of empty seats. B1ll gestures for me to sit which I do and, it suddenly sounds like a restaurant. I hear sizzling and clanking for the kitchen and suddenly a waiter appears, offering me a menu. Just as I notice that the waiter bears a curious resemblance to Bruno, I wonder why he has not given B1ll a menu too. I've already ordered, says B1ll. I look down at the menu, but I see only one item on it. It is called The thing that you want to order. Wow. This is impressive. I look up and notice that what the waiter's nametag says. Ok, Brun-0, you win. I'll have a number not-not-one, with everything on it. Coming right up, monsieur. Would you like Löbian salad or Göd elian soup with that? The umlauts are excellent this time of year Sure Voila, Brun-0 exclaims. Seeing the confusion on my face, he gestures at the menu in my hand with a gracefully circular extension of his fingers, over and over, rotating in space hypnotically, until I realize that he wants me to turn the menu over. On the back of the menu is a beautiful HD video screen, which pops into life with a movie of someone sitting at...Hey!! It's Me! It's a movie of me, rendered so perfectly it looks absolutely real. I am being served a giant silver domed platter, which is removed to unveil a beautiful...menu. The camera pans down the gorgeous menu of sumptuous sounding descriptions of food. As the camera zooms into a closeup on the calligraphy, it can be seen that each culinary turn of phrase is constructed of beautifully written formulas and equations like G and Gp where p is delicious and G = emulated gustatory resource and p = Non- regurgitation parameters'. To my surprise, I now witness myself in the movie pick a fork and knife and begin eating the menu and thoroughly enjoying every bite. I seem to be making the exact yummy sounds and faces that I would expect. Turning to B1ll, I ask, What did you order? I
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On 9/17/2012 5:41 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 4:26 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 9/17/2012 1:20 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: Stephen - the Matrix video is a faithful interpretation of comp, but Craig's story is not, unless he includes the crucial narrative - that of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal. I expect Craig to say that the simulated Craig, the one making the yummy noises, is a zombie, and has no actual experience or inner narrative. He is entitled of course to that position. He is just saying no to the doctor. Terren Dear Terren, You are completely missing his point. He is highlighting the fact that there is a difference that makes a difference between the case of of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal and of the real Craig eating the real meal. There has to be a grundlagen level at which there is not a simulation, there has to be a real thing that the simulations are some deformed copy of. I have postulated, following an idea from Stephen Woolfram, that a physical system (in its evolution) in the real word *is* the best possible simulation and thus it is literally the real thing that all images that we might have of it in our minds are mere simulations. Craig is diving deep into this idea and looking at it from the inside and reporting to us his observations. Craig is just asserting that comp is false. The Matrix video only makes sense if you assume comp. The fact that you called that video the matrix version of Craig's story was confusing to me because the two rest on different assumptions. The movie shows us the character eating and enjoying the simulated steak. In Craig's story he has no experience of it. If you assume comp then there is no primary real version of anything (by the movie graph argument). Real is only phenomenological, like a dream. You can never know, not even in principle, whether you are the real version, it doesn't even make sense to ask the question. Below the substitution level, there are an infinite ocean of universal machines that instantiate your current state. Terren Hi Terren, Comp is false is too strong. He is explaining how comp is incomplete. The movie graph argument is flawed. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Monday, September 17, 2012 5:44:16 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Sep 17, 2012, at 3:26 PM, Stephen P. King step...@charter.netjavascript: wrote: On 9/17/2012 1:20 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: Stephen - the Matrix video is a faithful interpretation of comp, but Craig's story is not, unless he includes the crucial narrative - that of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal. I expect Craig to say that the simulated Craig, the one making the yummy noises, is a zombie, and has no actual experience or inner narrative. He is entitled of course to that position. He is just saying no to the doctor. Terren Dear Terren, You are completely missing his point. He is highlighting the fact that there is a difference that makes a difference between the case of of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal and of the real Craig eating the real meal. Unless the neurons themselves are directly and independently responsible for qualia, (which is doubtful because there would be no clear mechanism for an individual neuron to articulate the wonder of its sensations to the brain as a whole) There is no more or less of a mechanism within neurons than there is for the brain as a whole to explain qualia. Neurons have neuron qualia, humans have human qualia. There isn't a mechanism because qualia are not objects. They are sensitivities to other experiences. They are presentations through which we access significant experiences. They are generated as much on our own anthropological level as they are on sub-personal physiological levels and super-personal evolutionary levels. , the only difference that makes a difference are the firings patterns of neurons. Patterns make no difference to anything without pattern recognition. There are no 'patterns' in and of themselves. The color of X-Rays, for instance, is just as patterned as the color green. This is the only time information that makes a difference to other neurons is communicated. At each moment, all the differences, all the information a neuron has received is boiled down to one bit: to fire or not to fire. Pure speculation. Neurons fire, but single cell organisms respond to their environment without nervous systems. You are conflating the physiology associated with human experience with the ontology of subjective experience in general. Information and bits are not real, they are analytical abstractions that are not capable of any causes or effects. Using information theory, and known limitations if information representation in physics, It could be shown that a biological brain has only some certain and finite information available to it. This places an upper bound on the things it knows and can talk about. An equivalent artificial brain could be engineered to contain the same information and the same knowledge. There would be nothing the biological brain could know that the artificial brain does not: they were created to have identical information content. If one knows 2+2 is 4, they both do, if one knows what red is like, they both do. Information feels nothing and knows nothing, and it never will. Craig Jason There has to be a grundlagen level at which there is not a simulation, there has to be a real thing that the simulations are some deformed copy of. I have postulated, following an idea from Stephen Woolfram, that a physical system (in its evolution) in the real word *is* the best possible simulation and thus it is literally the real thing that all images that we might have of it in our minds are mere simulations. Craig is diving deep into this idea and looking at it from the inside and reporting to us his observations. On Sun, Sep 16, 2012 at 12:32 PM, Stephen P. King step...@charter.netjavascript: wrote: On 9/16/2012 9:29 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Background: After refusing to serve Bruno's brother in law with the simulated brain at my restaurant, I decide to make peace by inviting myself to go along with Brother in law B1ll to his favorite restaurant. It's the best in the city!, says B1ll. That sounds great, because I am really hungry., I reply anxiously. When we arrive we find a dark, silent building, full of empty seats. B1ll gestures for me to sit which I do and, it suddenly sounds like a restaurant. I hear sizzling and clanking for the kitchen and suddenly a waiter appears, offering me a menu. Just as I notice that the waiter bears a curious resemblance to Bruno, I wonder why he has not given B1ll a menu too. I've already ordered, says B1ll. I look down at the menu, but I see only one item on it. It is called The thing that you want to order. Wow. This is impressive. I look up and notice that what the waiter's nametag says.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
I think that comp is almost true, except for when applied to consciousness itself, in which case it is exactly false. I wasn't asserting it so much as I was illustrating exactly why that is the case. Does anyone have any common sense analogy or story which makes sense of comp as a generator of consciousness? Craig On Monday, September 17, 2012 6:37:39 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 9/17/2012 5:41 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 4:26 PM, Stephen P. King step...@charter.netjavascript: wrote: On 9/17/2012 1:20 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: Stephen - the Matrix video is a faithful interpretation of comp, but Craig's story is not, unless he includes the crucial narrative - that of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal. I expect Craig to say that the simulated Craig, the one making the yummy noises, is a zombie, and has no actual experience or inner narrative. He is entitled of course to that position. He is just saying no to the doctor. Terren Dear Terren, You are completely missing his point. He is highlighting the fact that there is a difference that makes a difference between the case of of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal and of the real Craig eating the real meal. There has to be a grundlagen level at which there is not a simulation, there has to be a real thing that the simulations are some deformed copy of. I have postulated, following an idea from Stephen Woolfram, that a physical system (in its evolution) in the real word *is* the best possible simulation and thus it is literally the real thing that all images that we might have of it in our minds are mere simulations. Craig is diving deep into this idea and looking at it from the inside and reporting to us his observations. Craig is just asserting that comp is false. The Matrix video only makes sense if you assume comp. The fact that you called that video the matrix version of Craig's story was confusing to me because the two rest on different assumptions. The movie shows us the character eating and enjoying the simulated steak. In Craig's story he has no experience of it. If you assume comp then there is no primary real version of anything (by the movie graph argument). Real is only phenomenological, like a dream. You can never know, not even in principle, whether you are the real version, it doesn't even make sense to ask the question. Below the substitution level, there are an infinite ocean of universal machines that instantiate your current state. Terren Hi Terren, Comp is false is too strong. He is explaining how comp is incomplete. The movie graph argument is flawed. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/SNzEvkmgMbwJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 6:37 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Terren, Comp is false is too strong. He is explaining how comp is incomplete. The movie graph argument is flawed. I'm not sure what that means, that comp is incomplete. You either start from the assumption that your consciousness can be faithfully preserved (or duplicated) by a brain transplant, or you don't. What am I missing? I admit I haven't followed all of the list postings lately, but I haven't seen a coherent explanation of why the movie graph argument is flawed... if I missed it, can you point me to where this was articulated? T -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
I don't think there is much in the way of common sense if you want an explanation of consciousness from comp. I think it is fairly non-intuitive. The mainstream account which holds both comp and materialism doesn't address it. The only account I know of that explains consciousness from comp is Bruno's - and that is probably the polar opposite to common sense! Terren On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 7:10 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I think that comp is almost true, except for when applied to consciousness itself, in which case it is exactly false. I wasn't asserting it so much as I was illustrating exactly why that is the case. Does anyone have any common sense analogy or story which makes sense of comp as a generator of consciousness? Craig On Monday, September 17, 2012 6:37:39 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 9/17/2012 5:41 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 4:26 PM, Stephen P. King step...@charter.net wrote: On 9/17/2012 1:20 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: Stephen - the Matrix video is a faithful interpretation of comp, but Craig's story is not, unless he includes the crucial narrative - that of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal. I expect Craig to say that the simulated Craig, the one making the yummy noises, is a zombie, and has no actual experience or inner narrative. He is entitled of course to that position. He is just saying no to the doctor. Terren Dear Terren, You are completely missing his point. He is highlighting the fact that there is a difference that makes a difference between the case of of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal and of the real Craig eating the real meal. There has to be a grundlagen level at which there is not a simulation, there has to be a real thing that the simulations are some deformed copy of. I have postulated, following an idea from Stephen Woolfram, that a physical system (in its evolution) in the real word *is* the best possible simulation and thus it is literally the real thing that all images that we might have of it in our minds are mere simulations. Craig is diving deep into this idea and looking at it from the inside and reporting to us his observations. Craig is just asserting that comp is false. The Matrix video only makes sense if you assume comp. The fact that you called that video the matrix version of Craig's story was confusing to me because the two rest on different assumptions. The movie shows us the character eating and enjoying the simulated steak. In Craig's story he has no experience of it. If you assume comp then there is no primary real version of anything (by the movie graph argument). Real is only phenomenological, like a dream. You can never know, not even in principle, whether you are the real version, it doesn't even make sense to ask the question. Below the substitution level, there are an infinite ocean of universal machines that instantiate your current state. Terren Hi Terren, Comp is false is too strong. He is explaining how comp is incomplete. The movie graph argument is flawed. -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/SNzEvkmgMbwJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 6:10 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: I think that comp is almost true, except for when applied to consciousness itself, in which case it is exactly false. I wasn't asserting it so much as I was illustrating exactly why that is the case. Does anyone have any common sense analogy or story which makes sense of comp as a generator of consciousness? Craig, I'll give this a shot. Imagine there is a life form with only the most simple form of qualia. It can only experience two states of being: pain and the absence of pain. Further, let's say this creature has, say 10 semi-independent regions in its brain, each responsible for different functions but also each is connected to every other, to varying degrees. Each can affect any other region in various ways. When the creature is in a state of pain, each of the 10 regions of the brain are notified of this state. (This is communicated from the creature's pain receptors to all other parts of its brain). The awareness of this state has different effects on each region, and the regions in turn affect the creature's thoughts and behaviors. For example, one region begins telling the other regions of the brain to do whatever they can to make it stop. Another region expresses the associated behaviors and thoughts that pertain to stress and anxiety. A third region of the brain might increase the readiness or propensity to flee, hide, cry for help, or scream. The states of the various regions have cascading and circular affects on other regions, and the entire focus of the brain may quickly shift (from what it was thinking before) to the single subject and pursuit of ending the pain. Taken to the extreme, this effect might become all-encompassing, or even debilitating. In the above example, the perception of pain is described in terms of information and the effect that information has on the internal states of processes in the brain. The presence of the information, indicating pain, is through a very complex process, interpreted in numerous ways by different sub-agents in the brain to yield all the effects normally associated with the experience. Jason P.S. Try this little experiment from your own home: close your eyes and slowly begin to pinch the skin on the back of your hand. Pay particular attention to the feeling as it crosses the threshold from mere feeling into pain. Concentrate on what it is that is different between that perception (of the light pinch) and the pain (of the string pinch). You may find that it is just information, along with an increasing anxiety and desire to make it stop. Experiments have found that certain people with brain damage or on certain drugs can experience the pain without the discomfort. There is a separate part of the brain responsible for making pain uncomfortable! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno's Restaurant
On 9/16/2012 9:29 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: Background: After refusing to serve Bruno's brother in law with the simulated brain at my restaurant, I decide to make peace by inviting myself to go along with Brother in law B1ll to his favorite restaurant. It's the best in the city!, says B1ll. That sounds great, because I am really hungry., I reply anxiously. When we arrive we find a dark, silent building, full of empty seats. B1ll gestures for me to sit which I do and, it suddenly sounds like a restaurant. I hear sizzling and clanking for the kitchen and suddenly a waiter appears, offering me a menu. Just as I notice that the waiter bears a curious resemblance to Bruno, I wonder why he has not given B1ll a menu too. I've already ordered, says B1ll. I look down at the menu, but I see only one item on it. It is called The thing that you want to order. Wow. This is impressive. I look up and notice that what the waiter's nametag says. Ok, Brun-0, you win. I'll have a number not-not-one, with everything on it. Coming right up, monsieur. Would you like Löbian salad or Gödelian soup with that? The umlauts are excellent this time of year Sure Voila, Brun-0 exclaims. Seeing the confusion on my face, he gestures at the menu in my hand with a gracefully circular extension of his fingers, over and over, rotating in space hypnotically, until I realize that he wants me to turn the menu over. On the back of the menu is a beautiful HD video screen, which pops into life with a movie of someone sitting at...Hey!! It's Me! It's a movie of me, rendered so perfectly it looks absolutely real. I am being served a giant silver domed platter, which is removed to unveil a beautiful...menu. The camera pans down the gorgeous menu of sumptuous sounding descriptions of food. As the camera zooms into a closeup on the calligraphy, it can be seen that each culinary turn of phrase is constructed of beautifully written formulas and equations like G and Gp where p is delicious and G = emulated gustatory resource and p = Non-regurgitation parameters'. To my surprise, I now witness myself in the movie pick a fork and knife and begin eating the menu and thoroughly enjoying every bite. I seem to be making the exact yummy sounds and faces that I would expect. Turning to B1ll, I ask, What did you order? I already ate., he replies. As I look down at my clean plate and remember the great meal that I just had, I feel unusually satisfied. Curiously I can't remember exactly what it was that I ate, but I no reason to care. I can't care. I believe that I must have eaten exactly what I wanted. Craig Check out the Matrix version of this story: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7BuQFUhsRM -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
