Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-08 Thread John M
- Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: John M everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, August 07, 2006 9:25 PM Subject: RE: Bruno's argument - Comp John, Perhaps I have misunderstood if you were presenting an alternative theory: it's easy to misunderstand

RE: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-07 Thread W. C.
From: Brent Meeker ... But I like to eat. I like to eat steak. A world in which I can't eat steak is not perfect for me. People with common intelligence can easily *imagine* (or dream) what a PU will be. I guess I have uncommon intelligence :-) since I can't imagine what a PU would be.

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-07 Thread Brent Meeker
W. C. wrote: From: Brent Meeker ... But I like to eat. I like to eat steak. A world in which I can't eat steak is not perfect for me. People with common intelligence can easily *imagine* (or dream) what a PU will be. I guess I have uncommon intelligence :-) since I can't imagine what a

RE: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
] To: John M everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 7:22 AM Subject: RE: Bruno's argument - Comp John M writes: Earlier we lived in a telephone central switchboard, further back in a steam-engine. Not to mention the Turtle. The 'cat' specifies IMO ignorance

RE: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-06 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp To All: I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read (and write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask: is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require juice to work and if unplugged

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-06 Thread 1Z
- Original Message - From: 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Saturday, August 05, 2006 2:43 PM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp Norman Samish wrote: I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit may be a quantum

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-06 Thread Norman Samish
PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 5:35 AM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp Norman Samish wrote: 1Z, I don't know what you mean. That is unfortunate, because as far as I am concerned everyhting I am saying is obvious. (Have you read

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-06 Thread 1Z
Norman Samish wrote: Thanks - with your help plus Wikipedia I now have an hypothesis about your statement. It seems to boil down to Schrodinger's Cat has nothing to do with quantum computers other than they both depend on quantum superpositions. Correct. Fair enough. When I read

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-06 Thread Norman Samish
s and listen.Norman~~- Original Message - From: "1Z" [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: "Everything List" everything-list@googlegroups.comSent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 11:06 AMSubject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp Norman Samish wrote: Thanks - with your help

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Norman Samish wrote: I read Fabric of Reality several years ago, but didn't understand it well. I intuitively agree with Asher Peres that Deutsch's version of MWI too-flagrantly violates Occam's Razor. Perhaps I should read it again. I even attended a lecture by John Wheeler, David

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-06 Thread John M
Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: John M everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 7:22 AM Subject: RE: Bruno's argument - Comp John M writes: Earlier we lived in a telephone central switchboard, further back in a steam-engine. Not to mention the Turtle. The 'cat' specifies IMO

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-06 Thread John M
'original' and lost text, it was snatched away and mailed. The two are pretty different. Redface John - Original Message - From: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 8:12 AM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp Stathis: I know

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-06 Thread 1Z
Norman Samish wrote: I read Fabric of Reality several years ago, but didn't understand it well. I intuitively agree with Asher Peres that Deutsch's version of MWI too-flagrantly violates Occam's Razor. Perhaps I should read it again. This is diusputed, e.g. in

RE: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-06 Thread W. C.
From: Brent Meeker I don't think it's possible, because perfect is subjective. Perfect for the lion is bad for the antelope. Such problem doesn't exist in PU. In PU, there is no food chain like A eats B; B eats C; C eats D ... etc.. Perfect beings (both living and non-living) mean no

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-06 Thread Brent Meeker
W. C. wrote: From: Brent Meeker I don't think it's possible, because perfect is subjective. Perfect for the lion is bad for the antelope. Such problem doesn't exist in PU. In PU, there is no food chain like A eats B; B eats C; C eats D ... etc.. Perfect beings (both living and

RE: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-05 Thread W. C.
I think it's always good to have all different kinds of theories to explain our universe. Whatever current theories are, our understanding could be always limited by our limitations (as designed by the so-called Creator if any). So I always think it's possible to produce a perfect universe by

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-05 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Hi, The problem with perfection is that this word has *no* absolute meaning. Then depending on your culture/history it can have a different meaning. Stupid example: Imagine you are a serial killer... perfect world for you would be a world were you can kill at will ;) But you would say that a

RE: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-05 Thread W. C.
Good question. But I don't think we need to define perfect. You can check the dictionary to know its meaning. Your killing example won't exist in the PU. Otherwise it won't be PU. From: everything-list@googlegroups.com The problem with perfection is that this word has *no* absolute meaning.

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-05 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Hi, I've checked and I do not see an absolute meaning to perfection. Le Samedi 5 Août 2006 13:12, W. C. a écrit : Good question. But I don't think we need to define perfect. You can check the dictionary to know its meaning. Your killing example won't exist in the PU. Otherwise it won't be PU.

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-05 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 03-août-06, à 23:05, John M a écrit : Are we reinventing the religion? Yes. Now, it is not that science is suddenly so clever that it can solve the problem in religion. It is (justifiably assuming comp) that we can approach some religion's problem with the modesty inherent in the

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-05 Thread Bruno Marchal
OK John, I say more on your post. Le 03-août-06, à 23:05, John M a écrit : To All: I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read (and write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask: is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-05 Thread John M
: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Saturday, August 05, 2006 9:04 AM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp Le 03-août-06, à 23:05, John M a écrit : Are we reinventing the religion? Yes. Now, it is not that science is suddenly so clever that it can solve

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-05 Thread John M
, August 04, 2006 9:04 PM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit is may be a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the quantum computer in action

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-05 Thread 1Z
Norman Samish wrote: I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit is may be a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the quantum computer in action. Quantum computers are only

RE: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-05 Thread W. C.
From: Quentin Anciaux Hi, I've checked and I do not see an absolute meaning to perfection. OK. If you want more, I will say perfection in PU is *every being is perfect and feels perfect (if it has feeling)*. This doesn't mean that every being is exactly the same. They may have different

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-05 Thread Norman Samish
is Schrodinger's Cat possible in quantum universes without computational assistance? Norman - Original Message - From: 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Saturday, August 05, 2006 2:43 PM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp Norman Samish wrote

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-08-04 Thread Russell Standish
I think if you stack all possible recordings together in the way you suggest, connected in such as way as to be indistinguishable from a computation occuring with all its counterfactuals in the Multiverse, then what you have is a computation. Cheers On Fri, Aug 04, 2006 at 02:55:18PM +1000,

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-04 Thread John M
To All: I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read (and write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask: is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require juice to work and if unplugged they represent a very expensive paperweight. What

Re: Bruno's argument - Comp

2006-08-04 Thread Norman Samish
Message - From: John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2006 2:05 PM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp To All: I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read (and write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-08-03 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP): Consider a computer which is doing something (whether it is dreaming or musing or just running is the point in question). If there is no interaction between what it's running and the rest of the world I'd say it's not

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-08-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: The brain-with-wires-attached cannot interact with the environment, because all its sense organs have been removed and the stimulation is just coming from a recording. Instead of the wires + recording we could say that there is a special group of neurons

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-08-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Russell Standish writes: In the Multiverse, there is a huge difference between a recording and the actual computation. Only in one single universe (or history) of the ensemble do the two coincide. The recording is a computation issue is only a problem for single universe theory IMHO. Do

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-08-02 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: Consider a computer which is doing something (whether it is dreaming or musing or just running is the point in question). If there is no interaction between what it's running and the rest of the world I'd say it's not conscious. It doesn't necessarily need an

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-08-02 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: Consider a computer which is doing something (whether it is dreaming or musing or just running is the point in question). If there is no interaction between what it's running and the rest of the world I'd say it's not conscious. It

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-08-02 Thread Hal Finney
A useful model of computation is the Turing Machine. A TM has a tape with symbols on it; a head which moves along the tape and which can read and write symbols, and a state machine with a fixed number of states that controls head movement and symbol writing based on the current state and the

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-08-02 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP): Consider a computer which is doing something (whether it is dreaming or musing or just running is the point in question). If there is no interaction between what it's running and the rest of the world I'd say it's not conscious. It doesn't

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-08-01 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: Would you allow that one machine or computation may be emulated by another following some sort of mapping rule, and that consciousness may be preserved in this process? This would seem to be an assumption at the basis of functionalism and computationalism.

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-08-01 Thread 1Z
Brent Meeker wrote: And evolution constructs brains to be essentially deterministic for the same reason. So is it your theory that any deterministic sequence of states constitutes computation and the reason a rock doesn't instantiate computation is that, at the microscopic level its state

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-08-01 Thread 1Z
Brent Meeker wrote: 1Z wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: 1Z wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the computation. I don't think you can make the idea of information hidden

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-08-01 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: John M writes: Peter Jones writes: Hmm. Including limitations in time? Yes, if an infinite number of finite computations are run simultaneously on a system with a finite number of physical states. Stathis Papaioannou

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-08-01 Thread John M
of it' which was not addressed in your reply: mixing finite and infinite. Those marks drive me crazy. too. John - Original Message - From: 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, August 01, 2006 9:17 AM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-08-01 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: Would you allow that one machine or computation may be emulated by another following some sort of mapping rule, and that consciousness may be preserved in this process? This would seem to be an assumption at the basis of functionalism and

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-08-01 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: John M writes: Peter Jones writes: Hmm. Including limitations in time? Yes, if an infinite number of finite computations are run simultaneously on a system with a finite number of physical states. Stathis Papaioannou - So

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-08-01 Thread Brent Meeker
1Z wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: John M writes: Peter Jones writes: Hmm. Including limitations in time? Yes, if an infinite number of finite computations are run simultaneously on a system with a finite number of physical states. Stathis Papaioannou

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-08-01 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes: A computation is not a series of states. A computation is an implementation of an algorithm, and algorithms include conditional statements which must be modelled by something with counterfactual behaviour -- by something which *could have* execute the other branch.

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-08-01 Thread Russell Standish
On Wed, Aug 02, 2006 at 10:05:37AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Another question: I can see why a computer should be able to handle counterfactuals if it is to be of practical use, but what is wrong with saying that a recording implements a computation, whether that is adding two

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-31 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: I don't think intelligence is meaningful without an environment with which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its environment. What about an

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-07-31 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent meeker writes: [If] a computatation only dreams then how could you know whether it was intelligence, or just noise? We wouldn't know, but the computation itself would know if it were conscious, creating its own observer. If we say that noise contains hidden information

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-07-31 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
WC writes: In multiverses, I think it's possible to say there exists one universe which could include only one (super) being with nothing else. I mean this (super) being is the universe itself. So this super being knows everything right at the beginning of this universe. No need and

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-31 Thread 1Z
Brent Meeker wrote: I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the computation. I don't think you can make the idea of information hidden in noise well defined. By Shannon's measure noise is information. You

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-31 Thread 1Z
Brent Meeker wrote: I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the computation. I don't think you can make the idea of information hidden in noise well defined. By Shannon's measure noise is information. You

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-31 Thread Brent Meeker
1Z wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the computation. I don't think you can make the idea of information hidden in noise well defined. By Shannon's measure noise is

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-31 Thread 1Z
Brent Meeker wrote: 1Z wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the computation. I don't think you can make the idea of information hidden in noise well defined. By Shannon's

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-31 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: [If] a computatation only dreams then how could you know whether it was intelligence, or just noise? We wouldn't know, but the computation itself would know if it were conscious, creating its own observer. If we say that noise

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-31 Thread Brent Meeker
1Z wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: 1Z wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the computation. I don't think you can make the idea of information hidden in noise well defined. By

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-31 Thread 1Z
Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou Yes, that's roughly my idea. Of course you can't insist that a computation interact continuously to count as computation, only that it does occasionally or potentially. Most of the counterfactuals that make up a computation are internal. There has

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-31 Thread Brent Meeker
1Z wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou Yes, that's roughly my idea. Of course you can't insist that a computation interact continuously to count as computation, only that it does occasionally or potentially. Most of the counterfactuals that make up a computation are

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-31 Thread 1Z
Brent Meeker wrote: 1Z wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: The underlying physics of the thing will tell youwhether it is capable of supporting countefactuals without running a programme at all. There is something objectively machine-like about machines -- complex , but predictable

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-31 Thread John M
Stathis, excuse my naive ignorance: (below your reply) - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: 1Z everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, July 30, 2006 5:12 AM Subject: RE: Bruno's argument Peter Jones writes: Hmm. Including limitations in time

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-07-31 Thread Colin Hales
Brent Meeker wrote: 1Z wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the computation. I don't think you can make the idea of information hidden in noise well defined.

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-07-30 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an unnecessary complication. Suppose Klingon computers change their internal code every clock cycle according to the well-documented

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-07-30 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes: I can say that a hydrogen atom can't compute an entire virtual universe, because there isn't enough room. If you can map multiple computation states to one physical state, then all the requisite computations can be run in parallel on a very limited physical

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-30 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an unnecessary complication. Suppose Klingon computers change their internal code every clock cycle according to the

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-07-30 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: I don't think intelligence is meaningful without an environment with which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its environment. What about an intelligent, conscious being

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-30 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: I don't think intelligence is meaningful without an environment with which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its environment. What about an

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-07-30 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent meeker writes: I don't think intelligence is meaningful without an environment with which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its environment. What about an intelligent, conscious being

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-30 Thread C. W.
PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Bruno's argument Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: I don't think intelligence is meaningful without an environment with which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes computation and noise is a context

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-29 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an unnecessary complication. Suppose Klingon computers change their internal code every clock cycle according to the well-documented radioactive decay pattern of a sacred

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-29 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an unnecessary complication. Suppose Klingon computers change their internal code every clock cycle according to the well-documented radioactive decay pattern of

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-28 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 28-juil.-06, à 02:52, John M a écrit : Then again is the 'as - if' really a computation as in our today's vocabulary? Or, if you insist (and Bruno as well, that it IS) is it conceivable as our digital process, that embryonic first approach, or we may hope to understand later on a

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-28 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): There is a very impoertant difference between computations do not require a physical basis and computations do not require any *particular* physical basis (ie computations can be physical implemented by a wide

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-28 Thread John M
Please see after your remark/question at the end John - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Friday, July 28, 2006 10:48 AM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument Le 28-juil.-06, à 02:52, John M a écrit : Then again

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-28 Thread John M
'as - if'? It is a cheap excuse that we have no better one G. Sorry for just multiplying the words in this exchange. John M - Original Message - From: Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, July 27, 2006 10:32 PM Subject: RE: Bruno's argument John M Colin

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-28 Thread Colin Geoffrey Hales
Thanks, Colin, I feel we also agree in your last sentence statement, however I could not decide whether abstraction is reductionist model forming or a generalization into wider horizons? Patterns - I feel - are IMO definitely reductive. Abstraction I would characterise as a mapping into a

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-07-28 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an unnecessary complication. Suppose Klingon computers change their internal code every clock cycle according to the well-documented radioactive decay pattern of a sacred stone 2000 years ago. If

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-27 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Well, I think I have a better understanding now of the ideas leading me to start this thread - thanks to Bruno, Quentin and the other contributors. Moreover, I am leaning towards fundamentally changing my views on the implementation problem: if computationalism

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-07-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes: There is a very impoertant difference between computations do not require a physical basis and computations do not require any *particular* physical basis (ie computations can be physical implemented by a wide variety of systems) Yes, but any physical system can be seen

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-27 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: There is a very impoertant difference between computations do not require a physical basis and computations do not require any *particular* physical basis (ie computations can be physical implemented by a wide variety of systems) Yes, but

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-27 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: There is a very impoertant difference between computations do not require a physical basis and computations do not require any *particular* physical basis (ie computations can be physical implemented by a wide variety of systems) Yes,

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-27 Thread 1Z
Brent Meeker wrote: d the computations are implemented anyway by virtue of their status as mathematical objects. Or by virtue of there being universes. Something, anyway. You don't get implementation for free. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-27 Thread Colin Geoffrey Hales
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Well, I think I have a better understanding now of the ideas leading me to start this thread - thanks to Bruno, Quentin and the other contributors. Moreover, I am leaning towards fundamentally changing my views on the implementation problem: if computationalism is

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-07-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: Yes, but any physical system can be seen as implementing any computation with the appropriate rule mapping physical states to computational states. I think this is doubtful. For one thing there must be enough distinct states. It's all very well to imagine a

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-07-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): There is a very impoertant difference between computations do not require a physical basis and computations do not require any *particular* physical basis (ie computations can be physical implemented by a wide variety of systems) Yes, but any

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-27 Thread John M
computation of qualia and meaning? Certainly not the Turing or Church ways and not on Intel etc. processors. John M - Original Message - From: Colin Geoffrey Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, July 27, 2006 6:11 PM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-07-27 Thread Colin Hales
John M Colin, the entire discussion is too much for me, I pick some remarks of yours and ask only about them. I am glad to see that others are also struggling to find better and more fitting words... (I search for better fitting concepts as well to be expressed by those better fitting

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-26 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 26-juil.-06, à 07:55, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP): But certain computations are selected out through being isomorphic with physical structures and processes (or simulations thereof): I would have said that certain computations are selected out by

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-07-26 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
this preserves computationalism either. Stathis Papaioannou From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Bruno's argument Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2006 16:32:03 +0200 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Le 26-juil.-06, à 07:55, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-25 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 24-juil.-06, à 09:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : x-tad-bigger It's only a coincidence in the literal sense of the word, i.e. two things happening simultaneously. My point was to explore the idea of supervenience, which (to me, at any rate) at first glance seems a mysterious process, and we

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-07-25 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP): But certain computations are selected out through being isomorphic with physical structures and processes (or simulations thereof): I would have said that certain computations are selected out by giving high relative measure for locally stable

RE: Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-24 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Russell Standish writes (quoting SP): Whatifwejustsaythatthereisnomoretothesupervenienceofthe mentalonthephysicalthanthereistothesupervenienceofa parabolaonthetrajectoryofaprojectileundergravity?The projectiledoesn't"create"theparabola,whichexistsinPlatoniain

RE: Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-23 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Jesse Mazer writes (quoting SP): Whatyouseemtobesuggestingisthatnotallcomputationsareequivalent: somegiverisetomind,whileothers,apparentlysimilar,donot.Isn't thissimilartothereasoningofpeoplewhosaythatacomputercould neverbeconsciousbecauseevenifitexactlyemulatedahumanbrain,itis

RE: Bruno's argument

2006-07-23 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Russell Standish writes: Torefinetheproblemalittlefurther-weseeabraininour observedrealityonwhichourmindsupervenes.Andweseeother brains,forwhichwemustassumesupervenienceofotherpersons(the nozombiesassumption). Whatisthecauseofthissupervenience?Itisasymptomofthe

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-23 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Jul 23, 2006 at 06:53:50PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Russell Standish writes: To refine the problem a little further - we see a brain in our observed reality on which our mind supervenes. And we see other brains, for which we must assume supervenience of other persons

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-23 Thread 1Z
Brent Meeker wrote: 1Z wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: In other words it is not justified, based on our limited understanding of brains, to say we'll never be able to know how another feels based on observation of their brain. We don't know how insects or amoebae feel, either.

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-23 Thread 1Z
Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Jul 23, 2006 at 06:53:50PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Russell Standish writes: To refine the problem a little further - we see a brain in our observed reality on which our mind supervenes. And we see other brains, for which we must assume

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 22-juil.-06, à 22:02, Brent Meeker a écrit : No bigger than the assumption that other minds exists (a key assumption in comp if only through the trust to the doctor). Aren't those two propositions independent - that there are other minds and that we cannot possibly know what their

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-23 Thread Russell Standish
On Mon, Jul 24, 2006 at 12:35:02PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: What if we just say that there is no more to the supervenience of the mental on the physical than there is to the supervenience of a parabola on the trajectory of a projectile under gravity? The projectile doesn't create

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-22 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le Samedi 22 Juillet 2006 04:21, Brent Meeker a écrit : Quentin Anciaux wrote: But in this case what is the difference between knowing how and having the experience ? Seems to me there's a lot of difference between knowing how to shoot myself in the foot and having the experience of doing

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-22 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 21-juil.-06, à 17:52, Brent Meeker a écrit : If there is anything left over. I don't think it is sufficiently appreciated that this unknowability is an assumption. No bigger than the assumption that other minds exists (a key assumption in comp if only through the trust to the doctor).

Re: Bruno's argument

2006-07-22 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 20-juil.-06, à 13:46, Russell Standish a écrit : Bruno, I know in your theory that introspection is a vital component (the Goedel-like constructions), but I didn't see how this turns back onto the self-awareness issue. Did you develop this side of the argument? Yes sure. The

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