### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```

On 03 Mar 2012, at 01:56, Joseph Knight wrote:

On Fri, Mar 2, 2012 at 3:03 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Let me ask a question to everybody. Consider the WM duplication,
starting from Helsinki, but this time, in W, you are reconstituted
in two exemplars, in exactly the same environment. Is the
probability, asked in Helsinki,  to find yourself in W equal to 2/3
or to 1/2.
My current answer, not yet verified with the logics, is that if the
two computations in W are exactly identical forever, then it is 1/2,
but if they diverge soon or later, then the probability is [2/3].

Why is that?

But I am not sure of this. What do you think?

My intuition is that the probability should be 2/3 in either case.

Thanks for answering. I will comment asap (busy week-end!). But so I
let also the others to think on the matter before I explain.
The question is more subtle than it looks. I don't have the answer in
local situations, but in front of the UD, it might be a little more
simple, but still hard.

I can give you another problem, equivalent to a question found by
Bostrom, which can give an hint:

Suppose you are again read and cut in Helsinki, and reconstituted in
Moscow and Washington, but now you are told in advance that in W you
will have an artificial brain made of big wires, and in W the
artificial brain will use thin wires. The level is correct, by
assumption. Also, the thin wires are solid and works perfectly from a
3p pov. What is the probability that you will find yourself in W?

Another way to handle this question is just to count the 1p
experiences, but this will not work (this leads to white noises, do
you see why?), so we have to separate the different 3-computations,
like you did, but not as much as leading to an absurdity in the
situation described by Bostrom (although he seems to defend it ...)

Bruno

PS I have to go, and I might be unable to comment before Monday
afternoon. I will comment Craig and Stephen asap, which means later,
sorry.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```

On 03 Mar 2012, at 04:44, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/29/2012 9:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Feb 2012, at 13:50, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2012/2/28 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel
brain was substituted for a digital brain.

Hi Quentin,

OK, but could you elaborate on this statement?

conscious as you're now in your biological body, and you would
steel *feel* and feel being you and conscious and all...

Hi Quentin,

We need to nail down exactly what continuity of self is. if
there is no you, as Brent wrote yesterday, what is
thatwhich is invariant with respect to substitution?

As I said, Brent made a sort of pedagogical mistake, but a big one,
which is often done, and which explains perhaps why some
materialist becomes person eliminativist.

The you is a construct of the brain. It is abstract. You can see
it as an information pattern, but a real stable one which can exist
in many representations.

And you can build it for any machine by using Kleene's second
diagonalization construction.

It is the key of the whole thing. So let me explain again. You can
certainly construct  a program D capable of doing some simple
duplication of an arbitrary object x and apply any transformation T
that you want on that duplicated object, perhaps with some
parameters:

Dx gives T(, xx, ),

Then applying D to itself, that is substituting x for D, leads to a
self-referential program:

DD gives T(, DD, ...).

You might add quotes to prevent an infinite loop:

Dx gives T(...'xx' ...) so that

DD gives T(... 'DD'...).

This is the trick used by Gödel, Kleene, Turing, Church, Post, ...
in all incompleteness and insolubility result, but also, in
abstract biology (see my paper amoeba, planaria, and dreaming
machine.

That define a relative you, trivially relative to you. It is the
I of computer science. It allows you to write a program referring
to its entire code/body in the course of its execution. In some
programming language, like the object oriented Smalltalk, for
example, it is a build in control structure called SELF.

This gives, unfortunately only a third person notion of self. It is
more my body than my soul, and that if why, to do the math, we
have to use the conjunction of truth, with belief, to get a notion
of first person. By the non definability of truth, this I cannot
be defined by the machine concerned, but it still exist, even if
doubly immaterial---because it is abstract, and in relation with
the non definable (by the machine) truth.

Both are invariant, by definition, when the comp substitution is
done at the right level. It means that the reconstituted person
will behave the same, and feel to be the same.

Dear Bruno,

Forgive the obvious question, but what you wrote here should be
the blue print for creating an AI, no? All that needs to be done
is to create a special purpose physical machine that can implement a
program with this structure, such that it is implemented fast
enough to be able to interact in our world at our level.

Yes. I wrote a self-regenerating programs, doing that. (see amoeba,
planaria and dreaming machine). But *any* programs once correct and
rich enough above those laws, and they can know it (in the Theaetus'
sense of knowing).

Is the differentiation that one might feel, given the wrong
substitution level, different from what might occur if a digital
continuity?

It depends on the wrongness of the substitution or the lack of
continuity... it's not binary outcome.

At some point it would have to be, for a digital system has a
fine grained level of sensitivity to differences, no? I am trying
to nail down the details of this idea.

The details are in the mathematics of self-reference.

Where? How is the degree of resolution or scope of a
computation coded in a computation? It seems that this is assumed in
the notion of computer grammars and semantics but has this question

Gödel 1931.
We can do that with programs, because from outside we already know
that they are program, and we know their substitution level. The
program cannot, but in this case we provide the information (we play
the role of the doctor).

Those does not feel any difference terms are a bit ambiguous
and vague, IMHO.

Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted
with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue
your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be
inconsistent, because comp ```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```

On 01 Mar 2012, at 19:39, acw wrote:

On 3/1/2012 18:16, meekerdb wrote:

But the 1p view of this is to be
conscious *of something*, which you describe as the computation seen
states that makes them an equivalence class with respect to the
computation seen from the inside?
If they happen to be implementing some particular machine being in
some particular state. The problem is that the machine can be self-
modifiable (or that the environment can change it), and the machine
won't know of this and not always recognize the change. This seems
like a highly non-trivial problem to me.

Yes. That's why I think we have to extract the equivalence class
structure from the ability of the machine to refer to itself at the
right level. It is not constructive, from the machine's point of view,
but this does not change the correct view of the correct machine, in
the correct situation, despite no one can define that correctness.
It is not trivial at all, but the contrary would have been astonishing.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```

On 01 Mar 2012, at 19:43, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Mar 2012, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical
processes not completely Turing emulable.

But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor
who proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is made
of matter) with a Turing emulation of it?

The doctor does not need to emulate the matter of my brain.
This is completely not Turing *emulable*. It is only (apparently)
Turing simulable, that is emulable at some digital truncation of
my brain. Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1p indeterminacy
on all more fine grained computations reaching my current states
in arithmetic/UD.

OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable
because there are infinitely many computations at the fine grained
level reaching your current state.  But  it is
simulable to an arbitrary degree.

If you can prove that.

I would say yes, but it does not seem obvious to prove. You have to
emulate bigger and bigger portions of the UD*, and the 1-view are
only defined in the limit, being unaware of the UD-delays. Not
obvious. It might be true, but in some non tractable sense. Hmm...
Interesting question.

I will think more on this, I smell a busy beaver situation. Your
decimals, of your prediction might take a very long time
to stabilize. I dunno.

But I'm still unclear on what constitutes my current states.
Why is there more than one?  Is it a set of states of computations
that constitutes a single state of consciousness?

If you say yes to the doctor, and if the doctor is luckily
accurate, the current state is the encoding of the universal
number + data that he got from the scanning. Basically, it is what
is sent through the teleportation.

From the 1-p view, that state is unique, indeed. It is you here
and now at the moment of the scanning (done very  quickly
for the sake of the argument).

There is no more than one. But its encoding, and its relevant
decoding, are generated infinitely often in the UD*, with different
the subjective same you, like the people in W and M before they
open the teletransporter box, just before differentiation.

Oops, I see that I wrote my current states, with a s.  So it
means I was talking about the 3p computational states in the UD*
corresponding on my (unique) current consciousness state. That
exists, in the comp theory.

Hope I am enough clear, tell otherwise if not.

Yes, that's what I thought you meant when I first studied your
theory.  But then I am not clear on the relation of this unique
current state to the many non-equivalent states at a lower, e.g.
quantum, level that constitute it at the quasi-classical level.  Is
the UD* not also computing all of those fine-grained states?

Yes, and it adds up to the domain of first person indeterminacy.
Usually I invoke the rule Y = II.  That is, two equivalent
computations (equivalent in the sense that it leads to the same
conscious experience) does not add up, but if they diverge at some
point, even in the far future, they will add up. It is like in QM,
there is a need for possible distinction in principle.

Let me ask a question to everybody. Consider the WM duplication,
starting from Helsinki, but this time, in W, you are reconstituted in
two exemplars, in exactly the same environment. Is the probability,
asked in Helsinki,  to find yourself in W equal to 2/3 or to 1/2.
My current answer, not yet verified with the logics, is that if the
two computations in W are exactly identical forever, then it is 1/2,
but if they diverge soon or later, then the probability is 1/2. But I
am not sure of this. What do you think?

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 3/2/2012 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Mar 2012, at 19:43, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Mar 2012, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes not
completely Turing emulable.

But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who proposes to
replace some part of your brain (which is made of matter) with a Turing emulation
of it?

The doctor does not need to emulate the matter of my brain. This is completely not
Turing *emulable*. It is only (apparently) Turing simulable, that is emulable at
some digital truncation of my brain. Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1p
indeterminacy on all more fine grained computations reaching my current states in
arithmetic/UD.

OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable because there are
infinitely many computations at the fine grained level reaching your current state.
But it is simulable to an arbitrary degree.

If you can prove that.

I would say yes, but it does not seem obvious to prove. You have to emulate bigger and
bigger portions of the UD*, and the 1-view are only defined in the limit, being
unaware of the UD-delays. Not obvious. It might be true, but in some non tractable
sense. Hmm... Interesting question.

I will think more on this, I smell a busy beaver situation. Your decimals, of your
prediction might take a very long time to stabilize. I dunno.

But I'm still unclear on what constitutes my current states.  Why is there more
than one?  Is it a set of states of computations that constitutes a single state of
consciousness?

If you say yes to the doctor, and if the doctor is luckily accurate, the current
state is the encoding of the universal number + data that he got from the scanning.
Basically, it is what is sent through the teleportation.

From the 1-p view, that state is unique, indeed. It is you here and now at the
moment of the scanning (done very quickly for the sake of the argument).

There is no more than one. But its encoding, and its relevant decoding, are generated
infinitely often in the UD*, with different continuations, leading to your current
self-indeterminacy. It is the subjective same you, like the people in W and M before
they open the teletransporter box, just before differentiation.

Oops, I see that I wrote my current states, with a s.  So it means I was talking
about the 3p computational states in the UD* corresponding on my (unique) current
consciousness state. That exists, in the comp theory.

Hope I am enough clear, tell otherwise if not.

Yes, that's what I thought you meant when I first studied your theory.  But then I am
not clear on the relation of this unique current state to the many non-equivalent
states at a lower, e.g. quantum, level that constitute it at the quasi-classical
level.  Is the UD* not also computing all of those fine-grained states?

Yes, and it adds up to the domain of first person indeterminacy. Usually I invoke the
rule Y = II.  That is, two equivalent computations (equivalent in the sense that it
leads to the same conscious experience) does not add up, but if they diverge at some
point, even in the far future, they will add up. It is like in QM, there is a need for
possible distinction in principle.

Let me ask a question to everybody. Consider the WM duplication, starting from Helsinki,
but this time, in W, you are reconstituted in two exemplars, in exactly the same
environment. Is the probability, asked in Helsinki,  to find yourself in W equal to 2/3
or to 1/2.
My current answer, not yet verified with the logics, is that if the two computations in
W are exactly identical forever, then it is 1/2, but if they diverge soon or later, then
the probability is 1/2. But I am not sure of this. What do you think?

I think there's a typo and the second 1/2 was intended to be 2/3.  I wonder though why we
should consider an hypothesis like in exactly the same environment (to the quantum
level?) which is nomologically impossible.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```

On 02 Mar 2012, at 19:17, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/2/2012 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Mar 2012, at 19:43, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Mar 2012, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical
processes not completely Turing emulable.

But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor
who proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is made
of matter) with a Turing emulation of it?

The doctor does not need to emulate the matter of my brain.
This is completely not Turing *emulable*. It is only
(apparently) Turing simulable, that is emulable at some digital
truncation of my brain. Indeed matter is what emerges from the
1p indeterminacy on all more fine grained computations reaching
my current states in arithmetic/UD.

OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable
because there are infinitely many computations at the fine
grained level reaching your current state.  But it is simulable
to an arbitrary degree.

If you can prove that.

I would say yes, but it does not seem obvious to prove. You have
to emulate bigger and bigger portions of the UD*, and the 1-view
are only defined in the limit, being unaware of the UD-delays.
Not obvious. It might be true, but in some non tractable sense.
Hmm... Interesting question.

I will think more on this, I smell a busy beaver situation. Your
decimals, of your prediction might take a very long time to
stabilize. I dunno.

But I'm still unclear on what constitutes my current states.
Why is there more than one?  Is it a set of states of
computations that constitutes a single state of consciousness?

If you say yes to the doctor, and if the doctor is luckily
accurate, the current state is the encoding of the universal
number + data that he got from the scanning. Basically, it is
what is sent through the teleportation.

From the 1-p view, that state is unique, indeed. It is you here
and now at the moment of the scanning (done very quickly for
the sake of the argument).

There is no more than one. But its encoding, and its relevant
decoding, are generated infinitely often in the UD*, with
indeterminacy. It is the subjective same you, like the people in
W and M before they open the teletransporter box, just before
differentiation.

Oops, I see that I wrote my current states, with a s.  So it
means I was talking about the 3p computational states in the UD*
corresponding on my (unique) current consciousness state. That
exists, in the comp theory.

Hope I am enough clear, tell otherwise if not.

Yes, that's what I thought you meant when I first studied your
theory.  But then I am not clear on the relation of this unique
current state to the many non-equivalent states at a lower, e.g.
quantum, level that constitute it at the quasi-classical level.
Is the UD* not also computing all of those fine-grained states?

Yes, and it adds up to the domain of first person indeterminacy.
Usually I invoke the rule Y = II.  That is, two equivalent
computations (equivalent in the sense that it leads to the same
conscious experience) does not add up, but if they diverge at some
point, even in the far future, they will add up. It is like in QM,
there is a need for possible distinction in principle.

Let me ask a question to everybody. Consider the WM duplication,
starting from Helsinki, but this time, in W, you are reconstituted
in two exemplars, in exactly the same environment. Is the
probability, asked in Helsinki,  to find yourself in W equal to 2/3
or to 1/2.
My current answer, not yet verified with the logics, is that if the
two computations in W are exactly identical forever, then it is
1/2, but if they diverge soon or later, then the probability is
1/2. But I am not sure of this. What do you think?

I think there's a typo and the second 1/2 was intended to be 2/3.

Oops.

I wonder though why we should consider an hypothesis like in
exactly the same environment (to the quantum level?) which is
nomologically impossible.

I meant, an environment sufficiently similar so that the first person
experiences are identical. It is more easy to use virtual environment,
so that we can use the comp subst level to make sure (thanks to the
comp determinacy!) that the processing of the two brains will be
exactly identical.

(exactly identical is what we told the cleaning service, hoping they
will not put some flowers, or anything different in the two rooms
which could make the experience diverging!)

So 1/2 or 2/3?

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To ```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```On Fri, Mar 2, 2012 at 3:03 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

Let me ask a question to everybody. Consider the WM duplication, starting
from Helsinki, but this time, in W, you are reconstituted in two exemplars,
in exactly the same environment. Is the probability, asked in Helsinki,  to
find yourself in W equal to 2/3 or to 1/2.
My current answer, not yet verified with the logics, is that if the two
computations in W are exactly identical forever, then it is 1/2, but if
they diverge soon or later, then the probability is [2/3].

Why is that?

But I am not sure of this. What do you think?

My intuition is that the probability should be 2/3 in either case.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

--
Joseph Knight

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/29/2012 9:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Feb 2012, at 13:50, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2012/2/28 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
mailto:stephe...@charter.net

On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel
brain was substituted for a digital brain.

Hi Quentin,

OK, but could you elaborate on this statement?

conscious as you're now in your biological body, and you would steel
*feel* and feel being you and conscious and all...

Hi Quentin,

We need to nail down exactly what continuity of self is. if there
is no you, as Brent wrote yesterday, what is that which is
invariant with respect to substitution?

As I said, Brent made a sort of pedagogical mistake, but a big one,
which is often done, and which explains perhaps why some materialist
becomes person eliminativist.

The you is a construct of the brain. It is abstract. You can see it
as an information pattern, but a real stable one which can exist in
many representations.

And you can build it for any machine by using Kleene's second
diagonalization construction.

It is the key of the whole thing. So let me explain again. You can
certainly construct  a program D capable of doing some simple
duplication of an arbitrary object x and apply any transformation T
that you want on that duplicated object, perhaps with some parameters:

Dx gives T(, xx, ),

Then applying D to itself, that is substituting x for D, leads to a
self-referential program:

DD gives T(, DD, ...).

You might add quotes to prevent an infinite loop:

Dx gives T(...'xx' ...) so that

DD gives T(... 'DD'...).

This is the trick used by Gödel, Kleene, Turing, Church, Post, ... in
all incompleteness and insolubility result, but also, in abstract
biology (see my paper amoeba, planaria, and dreaming machine.

That define a relative you, trivially relative to you. It is the I
of computer science. It allows you to write a program referring to its
entire code/body in the course of its execution. In some programming
language, like the object oriented Smalltalk, for example, it is a
build in control structure called SELF.

This gives, unfortunately only a third person notion of self. It is
more my body than my soul, and that if why, to do the math, we
have to use the conjunction of truth, with belief, to get a notion of
first person. By the non definability of truth, this I cannot be
defined by the machine concerned, but it still exist, even if doubly
immaterial---because it is abstract, and in relation with the non
definable (by the machine) truth.

Both are invariant, by definition, when the comp substitution is done
at the right level. It means that the reconstituted person will behave
the same, and feel to be the same.

Dear Bruno,

Forgive the obvious question, but what you wrote here should be the
blue print for creating an AI, no? All that needs to be done is to
create a special purpose physical machine that can implement a program
with this structure, such that it is implemented fast enough to be
able to interact in our world at our level.

Is the differentiation that one _might_ feel, given the wrong
substitution level, different from what _might_ occur if a
generate complete continuity?

It depends on the wrongness of the substitution or the lack of
continuity... it's not binary outcome.

At some point it would have to be, for a digital system has a
fine grained level of sensitivity to differences, no? I am trying to
nail down the details of this idea.

The details are in the mathematics of self-reference.

Where? How is the degree of resolution or scope of a
computation coded in a computation? It seems that this is assumed in the
notion of computer grammars and semantics but has this question been

Those does not feel any difference terms are a bit ambiguous
and vague, IMHO.

Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted
with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can
substitue your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that
to be inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of
matter is non-computable... it is the limit of the infinities
of computation that goes through your consciousness current state.

Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire
occur in a strictly classical way, for example by strictly
classical level measurement of brain structure?

Yes, and if it is, it is a big indication that comp is somehow wrong...

AFAIK, it would only prevent ```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
Hello Stephen,

On 29 Feb 2012, at 20:26, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/29/2012 4:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:17, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted
with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue
your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be
inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is
non-computable... it is the limit of the infinities of
computation that goes through your consciousness current state.

[SPK1]
Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital
strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level
measurement of brain structure? Any dependence of consciousness on
quantum entanglement will prevent any form of digital substitution.

This is not correct. It would only make the comp subst. level
lower, for we would need to Turing-emulated the entire quantum
system. What you say would be true if a quantum computer was not
Turing emulable, but it is. Sure, there is an exponential slow-
down, but the UD does not care, nor the 'first persons' who cannot
be aware of the delays.

Bruno

[SPK2]
This might not be a bad thing for Bruno's ontological argument -
as it would show that 1p indeterminacy is a function or
endomorphism of entire universes in the many-worlds sense - but

Dear Bruno,

Did you not see this last comment [SPK2] that I wrote? We need to
distinguish between the actions on and by physical systems, such as
human brains, and the platonic level systems.

We certainly have to do that locally, when we say 'yes' to the doctor,
or when the doctor builds the artificial brain. But the reasoning
leads to a conceptual distinction between the physical systems and the
objects of Platonia.
Roughly speaking, the objects in Platonia are specific numbers and
numbers relations, while physics is a relative sum on all computations
going through my actual computational state. This follows form step
seven.

Your remark seemed to be one that was considering my comment [SPK1]
as if it where discussing the Platonic level aspect. This is just
probably a confusion caused by our use of the same words for the two
completely different levels. For example, a physical system is a UTM
if it can implement any enumerable recursive algorithm, aka is
programable in the Turing Thesis sense, but its actual behavior is
limited by its resources, transition speeds, etc.

It is the difference between a UM, and a UM implemented in some other
UM. When we implement a UM physically, we Implement a UM in some local
subparts of the physical reality, which is itself emerging from the
sum on all UMs' computations going through my current state.
Note that the physical reality is not in Platonia. It is how the
border of Platonia looks to me, taking into account the infinity of
UMs and computations to which I belong.

An abstract Platonic Machine, such as what you consider in SANE04,
does not have any such limits.

I am not sure which one you are talking about.

I think that we should consider a formal way to describe these
relations. Perhaps some one that is fluent in Category theory will
come to help us in these discussions.

I have used category theory in Conscience et mécanisme, but it helps
only for the semantics of the 1-person (S4Grz, S4Grz1, X1*). It is
also very distracting. It is better to understand well the problem
before musing on the tools which can solve them. The problem *is* a
problem in computer science, which has already good tools.

We need a way to define the idea of the limit of the infinities of
computations that go through a given consciousness state in a way
that is more clear given that a given consciousness state is still
a very ambiguous notion.

We can bet that some equivalence relation is at play, like all similar
1p in non-diverging computations, yes. But this is necessarily a non
constructive notion, and that is why it is simpler to start with the
logic of measure 'one' extracted directly from the modalities of self-
reference.

Is Löbianity required for bare consciousness, e.g. consciousness
without self-awareness? It seems to me that our entire discussion
seems to assume that consciousness is just the inside aspect of
computation.

I have come to be open to the idea that bare consciousness needs only
one UM, or even less. Löbianity is required for self-consciousness,
and for the machine able to reason on all this, making the interview
enough rich to extract physics.
But Löbianity is basically given once the machine believes in the
(arithmetical) induction axioms. All chatting UMs obeys to Gödel's
second incompleteness theorem, but only the ```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```

On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical
processes not completely Turing emulable.

But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who
proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is made of
matter) with a Turing emulation of it?

The doctor does not need to emulate the matter of my brain. This is
completely not Turing *emulable*. It is only (apparently) Turing
simulable, that is emulable at some digital truncation of my brain.
Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1p indeterminacy on all more
fine grained computations reaching my current states in arithmetic/UD.

it:

[Quentin] The turing emulation is not of the matter but of the
mind... Computationalism, is the theory that the mind is some sort
of information processor... the brain made of matter is just an
UTM... any UTM could do the job, the emulation is not of the brain
made of matter but of the consciousness.

[Brent]: But suppose I'm only replacing a small part of my brain.
There's on reason to suppose that part, by itself, is conscious.

OK. A priori. Assuming that part being rather small.

Consciousness is supposed to be realized by the computation that the
brain is doing.

But here we might have to be cautious. Natural language can fails to
describe what is going on. My consciousness is not really realized by
the computation made by the brain, it is only the content of my belief
(computer generated) as far as it corresponds to some truth. It is not
associated with any singular brain, but with the infinity of
equivalent state reached by infinity of computations. The material
brain is a sort of first (plural) person moiré effect due to the
statistical interference of all those computations.

So the question becomes, at what level of fidelity must I emulate
that piece of brain I'm going to replace.  One answer would be at
the lowest possible level, i.e. emulate the quarks and electrons and
vacuum field fluctuations, then I'll be sure to survive with
consciousness unchanged.

I am not sure you can ever be sure, but you might find a reasonable
level. Already with the actual physics, I am not sure you can get all
the vacuum field fluctuations, because there are infinities of them.
Given that the artifficial brain is digital, you will have to make a
truncation (unless you believe in a *locally* digital physics, but
this should not be possible with comp). In fact comp entails that
matter has no lowest level, if we want all decimals exact.

But that's emulating the matter of that piece of my brain, which
Bruno says is not completely emulable.  If that can't be done, why
should I believe there is any level that I should say 'yes' to?

You should not believe in it 100% rationally. That's why you will need
some act of faith, and just hope you bet on the comp right level. If
comp is true, it cannot be entirely justified. It can only be refuted,
or hope for. You *can* believe in it, if you want extend your life, or
get a new brain expected to be better performing.

With the future first artificial brains, there will be bugs, and
objective reasons to be anxious. The first people with artificial
brain will complain on many things. They will say, I did survive, but
I feel something is different, it is very hard to sleep, and my dreams
seems more weird and a bit frightening. They will lose some biological
rythmic cycles related to the metabolism, they might suffer headache.
Worst, some people will say that they survive very well, but outsider
will disagree, because they will not behave normally, etc. Artificial
brains will be an evolving technology.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 3/1/2012 3:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hello Stephen,

On 29 Feb 2012, at 20:26, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/29/2012 4:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:17, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted
with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue
your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be
inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is
non-computable... it is the limit of the infinities of computation
that goes through your consciousness current state.

[SPK1]
Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital
strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level
measurement of brain structure? Any dependence of consciousness on
quantum entanglement will prevent any form of digital substitution.

This is not correct. It would only make the comp subst. level lower,
for we would need to Turing-emulated the entire quantum system. What
you say would be true if a quantum computer was not Turing emulable,
but it is. Sure, there is an exponential slow-down, but the UD does
not care, nor the 'first persons' who cannot be aware of the delays.

Bruno

[SPK2]
This might not be a bad thing for Bruno's ontological argument - as
it would show that 1p indeterminacy is a function or endomorphism
of entire universes in the many-worlds sense - but would doom any

Dear Bruno,

Did you not see this last comment [SPK2] that I wrote? We need to
distinguish between the actions on and by physical systems, such as
human brains, and the platonic level systems.

We certainly have to do that locally, when we say 'yes' to the doctor,
or when the doctor builds the artificial brain. But the reasoning
leads to a conceptual distinction between the physical systems and the
objects of Platonia.
Roughly speaking, the objects in Platonia are specific numbers and
numbers relations, while physics is a relative sum on all computations
going through my actual computational state. This follows form step
seven.

Dear Bruno,

In my thinking physics is a relative to mutual consistencies of 1p,
via bisimilations. Bisimulation is explained here
bisimulation algebras are telescoping then they seem to include the
intersection of 'infinite number of computations.

Your remark seemed to be one that was considering my comment [SPK1]
as if it where discussing the Platonic level aspect. This is just
probably a confusion caused by our use of the same words for the two
completely different levels. For example, a physical system is a UTM
if it can implement any enumerable recursive algorithm, aka is
programable in the Turing Thesis sense, but its actual behavior is
limited by its resources, transition speeds, etc.

It is the difference between a UM, and a UM implemented in some other
UM. When we implement a UM physically, we Implement a UM in some local
subparts of the physical reality, which is itself emerging from the
sum on all UMs' computations going through my current state.
Note that the physical reality is not in Platonia. It is how the
border of Platonia looks to me, taking into account the infinity of
UMs and computations to which I belong.

I watched a You tube video
last night on Aristotle's Metaphysics and in it there was a comment on
why Aristotle was skeptical of Plato's Theory of Forms. My skepticism is
very similar. One has to show how the Forms necessarily give rise to the
appearances of physical worlds if we are to use Plato's theory of
ontology. This is where and why I have trouble with UDA 8.

An abstract Platonic Machine, such as what you consider in SANE04,
does not have any such limits.

I am not sure which one you are talking about.

Platonic machines do not have any limits except those of the
logic that they are defined in. This is not a problem until we notice
that there is not any a priori reason why one form of logic is chosen
over another. Given that the models of Arithmetic are many and not just
one, we need to be a bit careful that we are not being parochial in our
thinking that the logic we are using is absolute to the minimization
of all others. My contention is that we have a natural prejudice for
Integer based arithmetic and bivalent logic because those are the one
that best match the way our explanations of our physical world work.
Umm, my wording here is a bit ambiguous, but I hope the idea is
transmitted OK..

I think that we should consider a formal way to describe these
relations. Perhaps some one that is fluent in Category theory will
come to help us in these discussions.

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes not completely
Turing emulable.

But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who proposes to replace
some part of your brain (which is made of matter) with a Turing emulation of it?

The doctor does not need to emulate the matter of my brain. This is completely not
Turing *emulable*. It is only (apparently) Turing simulable, that is emulable at some
digital truncation of my brain. Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1p indeterminacy
on all more fine grained computations reaching my current states in arithmetic/UD.

OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable because there are infinitely
many computations at the fine grained level reaching your current state.  But it is
simulable to an arbitrary degree.

But I'm still unclear on what constitutes my current states.  Why is there more than
one?  Is it a set of states of computations that constitutes a single state of consciousness?

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```

On 01 Mar 2012, at 14:49, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 3/1/2012 3:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hello Stephen,

On 29 Feb 2012, at 20:26, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/29/2012 4:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:17, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted
with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can
substitue your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that
to be inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of
matter is non-computable... it is the limit of the infinities
of computation that goes through your consciousness current
state.

[SPK1]
Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire
occur in a strictly classical way, for example by strictly
classical level measurement of brain structure? Any dependence
of consciousness on quantum entanglement will prevent any form
of digital substitution.

This is not correct. It would only make the comp subst. level
lower, for we would need to Turing-emulated the entire quantum
system. What you say would be true if a quantum computer was not
Turing emulable, but it is. Sure, there is an exponential slow-
down, but the UD does not care, nor the 'first persons' who
cannot be aware of the delays.

Bruno

[SPK2]
This might not be a bad thing for Bruno's ontological argument -
as it would show that 1p indeterminacy is a function or
endomorphism of entire universes in the many-worlds sense -

Dear Bruno,

Did you not see this last comment [SPK2] that I wrote? We need
to distinguish between the actions on and by physical systems,
such as human brains, and the platonic level systems.

We certainly have to do that locally, when we say 'yes' to the
doctor, or when the doctor builds the artificial brain. But the
reasoning leads to a conceptual distinction between the physical
systems and the objects of Platonia.
Roughly speaking, the objects in Platonia are specific numbers and
numbers relations, while physics is a relative sum on all
computations going through my actual computational state. This
follows form step seven.

Dear Bruno,

In my thinking physics is a relative to mutual consistencies of
1p, via bisimilations. Bisimulation is explained here.

Unfortunately I don't understand. I told you at that time. You might
give examples. What does A and B denote? What is the relationship
between your notion of simulation, and the notion from computer science.

Since bisimulation algebras are telescoping then they seem to
include the intersection of 'infinite number of computations.

This is too much unclear.

Your remark seemed to be one that was considering my comment
[SPK1] as if it where discussing the Platonic level aspect. This
is just probably a confusion caused by our use of the same words
for the two completely different levels. For example, a physical
system is a UTM if it can implement any enumerable recursive
algorithm, aka is programable in the Turing Thesis sense, but
its actual behavior is limited by its resources, transition
speeds, etc.

It is the difference between a UM, and a UM implemented in some
other UM. When we implement a UM physically, we Implement a UM in
some local subparts of the physical reality, which is itself
emerging from the sum on all UMs' computations going through my
current state.
Note that the physical reality is not in Platonia. It is how the
border of Platonia looks to me, taking into account the infinity
of UMs and computations to which I belong.

I watched a You tube video last night on Aristotle's Metaphysics
and in it there was a comment on why Aristotle was skeptical of
Plato's Theory of Forms. My skepticism is very similar.
One has to show how the Forms necessarily give rise to the
appearances of physical worlds if we are to use Plato's theory of
ontology. This is where and why I have trouble with UDA 8.

You still don't get the point. My whole work is just a precise
formulation of One has to show how the Forms necessarily give rise to
the appearances of physical worlds if we are to assume comp.

The work is negative. It does not explains much things, it shows that
if we are rational and willing to assume the comp hyp in the cognitive
science, then we can no more use anything found by the physicists to
explain anything else, including physics.

UDA shows that the only explanations possible have to rely on numbers
(or equivalent), and no more (than definitions). There is no choice in
the matter. It is a negative theorem showing that physics is
metaphysically wrong at the start, even if locally fertile and useful.
And I show that we can do that *only* by interviewing universal self-
introspecting machines, and that ```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 3/1/2012 16:54, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes
not completely Turing emulable.

But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who
proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is made of matter)
with a Turing emulation of it?

The doctor does not need to emulate the matter of my brain. This is
completely not Turing *emulable*. It is only (apparently) Turing
simulable, that is emulable at some digital truncation of my brain.
Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1p indeterminacy on all more
fine grained computations reaching my current states in arithmetic/UD.

OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable because
there are infinitely many computations at the fine grained level
reaching your current state. But it is simulable to an arbitrary degree.

The way I understand it, yes, it should be simulable for certain bounds,
but never globally emulable - this in a twofold way: one in that the
local 3p structure that we infer might contain reals in the limit (or
rationals, computable reals) and another in that we can't know of all
valid 1p continuations some of which could be outside the local 3p
structure we estimated by induction. To elaborate in the first: consider
a mathematical structure which has some symmetries and can be computed
up to some level of detail k, but you can also compute it to a finer
level of detail k+1, and to a finer level 2*k, ... and so on. Eventually
in the limit, you get reals. We only care that the abstract structure
that we call a mind is implemented in our bodies/brains which are
implemented in some physical or arithmetical or computational substrate.
Such implementations being statistically common (for example in a
quantum dovetailer) make local future continuations probable. Of course,
unusual continuations are possible and we cannot find them all due to
Rice's theorem - we cannot know if some computation also happens to
implement the structure/computations that represent our mind - we might
be able to prove it in some specific case, but not in all cases.

But I'm still unclear on what constitutes my current states. Why is
there more than one? Is it a set of states of computations that
constitutes a single state of consciousness?
Even in the trivial case where we're given a particular physics
implementation, we can find another which behaves exactly the same and
still implements the same function (this is trivial because it's always
possible to add useless or equivalent code to a program). However, for
our minds we can allow for a lot more variability - I conjecture that
most quantum randomness is below our substitution level and it
faithfully implements our mind at the higher level (quasi-classically,
at subst. level). Of course, there are some problems here - there can be
continuations where we will think we are still 'ourselves', but our mind
has been changed by stuff going below the substitution level - in which
case, the notion of observer is too fuzzy and personal (when will we
think we are not ourselves anymore? when will others think we are not
ourselves?)

A single computation can be implemented by an infinity of other
computations, thus with COMP, an infinity of programs will all have the
same subjective experience (some specific class which implements the
observer).

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 3/1/2012 9:57 AM, acw wrote:

On 3/1/2012 16:54, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes
not completely Turing emulable.

But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who
proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is made of matter)
with a Turing emulation of it?

The doctor does not need to emulate the matter of my brain. This is
completely not Turing *emulable*. It is only (apparently) Turing
simulable, that is emulable at some digital truncation of my brain.
Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1p indeterminacy on all more
fine grained computations reaching my current states in arithmetic/UD.

OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable because
there are infinitely many computations at the fine grained level
reaching your current state. But it is simulable to an arbitrary degree.

The way I understand it, yes, it should be simulable for certain bounds, but never
globally emulable - this in a twofold way: one in that the local 3p structure that we
infer might contain reals in the limit (or rationals, computable reals) and another in
that we can't know of all valid 1p continuations some of which could be outside the
local 3p structure we estimated by induction. To elaborate in the first: consider a
mathematical structure which has some symmetries and can be computed up to some level of
detail k, but you can also compute it to a finer level of detail k+1, and to a finer
level 2*k, ... and so on. Eventually in the limit, you get reals. We only care that
the abstract structure that we call a mind is implemented in our bodies/brains which are
implemented in some physical or arithmetical or computational substrate. Such
implementations being statistically common (for example in a quantum dovetailer) make
local future continuations probable. Of course, unusual continuations are possible and
we cannot find them all due to Rice's theorem - we cannot know if some computation also
happens to implement the structure/computations that represent our mind - we might be
able to prove it in some specific case, but not in all cases.

But I'm still unclear on what constitutes my current states. Why is
there more than one? Is it a set of states of computations that
constitutes a single state of consciousness?
Even in the trivial case where we're given a particular physics implementation, we can
find another which behaves exactly the same and still implements the same function (this
is trivial because it's always possible to add useless or equivalent code to a program).
However, for our minds we can allow for a lot more variability - I conjecture that most
quantum randomness is below our substitution level and it faithfully implements our mind
at the higher level (quasi-classically, at subst. level).

Yes, I think that must be the case simply from considerations of biological evolution.
But that implies that a state of consciousness or a state of mind is a computationally
fuzzy object. It is constituted by uncountably many threads through each of many
(infinitely many?) states which are not identical but are similar enough to constitute a
conscious state.  But the 1p view of this is to be conscious *of something*, which you
describe as the computation seen from the inside.  What is it about these threads
through different states that makes them an equivalence class with respect to the
computation seen from the inside?

Brent

Of course, there are some problems here - there can be continuations where we will think
we are still 'ourselves', but our mind has been changed by stuff going below the
substitution level - in which case, the notion of observer is too fuzzy and personal
(when will we think we are not ourselves anymore? when will others think we are not
ourselves?)

A single computation can be implemented by an infinity of other computations, thus with
COMP, an infinity of programs will all have the same subjective experience (some
specific class which implements the observer).

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```

On 01 Mar 2012, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical
processes not completely Turing emulable.

But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who
proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is made of
matter) with a Turing emulation of it?

The doctor does not need to emulate the matter of my brain. This
is completely not Turing *emulable*. It is only (apparently) Turing
simulable, that is emulable at some digital truncation of my brain.
Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1p indeterminacy on all more
fine grained computations reaching my current states in arithmetic/
UD.

OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable because
there are infinitely many computations at the fine grained level
reaching your current state.  But it is simulable to an arbitrary
degree.

If you can prove that.

I would say yes, but it does not seem obvious to prove. You have to
emulate bigger and bigger portions of the UD*, and the 1-view are only
defined in the limit, being unaware of the UD-delays. Not obvious. It
might be true, but in some non tractable sense. Hmm... Interesting
question.

I will think more on this, I smell a busy beaver situation. Your
decimals, of your prediction might take a very long time to stabilize.
I dunno.

But I'm still unclear on what constitutes my current states.  Why
is there more than one?  Is it a set of states of computations that
constitutes a single state of consciousness?

If you say yes to the doctor, and if the doctor is luckily accurate,
the current state is the encoding of the universal number + data
that he got from the scanning. Basically, it is what is sent through
the teleportation.

From the 1-p view, that state is unique, indeed. It is you here and
now at the moment of the scanning (done very quickly for the sake of
the argument).

There is no more than one. But its encoding, and its relevant
decoding, are generated infinitely often in the UD*, with different
subjective same you, like the people in W and M before they open the
teletransporter box, just before differentiation.

Oops, I see that I wrote my current states, with a s.  So it means
I was talking about the 3p computational states in the UD*
corresponding on my (unique) current consciousness state. That exists,
in the comp theory.

Hope I am enough clear, tell otherwise if not.

Bruno

Brent

--
Groups Everything List group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 3/1/2012 18:16, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/1/2012 9:57 AM, acw wrote:

On 3/1/2012 16:54, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes
not completely Turing emulable.

But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who
proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is made of matter)
with a Turing emulation of it?

The doctor does not need to emulate the matter of my brain. This is
completely not Turing *emulable*. It is only (apparently) Turing
simulable, that is emulable at some digital truncation of my brain.
Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1p indeterminacy on all more
fine grained computations reaching my current states in arithmetic/UD.

OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable because
there are infinitely many computations at the fine grained level
reaching your current state. But it is simulable to an arbitrary degree.

The way I understand it, yes, it should be simulable for certain
bounds, but never globally emulable - this in a twofold way: one in
that the local 3p structure that we infer might contain reals in the
limit (or rationals, computable reals) and another in that we can't
know of all valid 1p continuations some of which could be outside the
local 3p structure we estimated by induction. To elaborate in the
first: consider a mathematical structure which has some symmetries and
can be computed up to some level of detail k, but you can also compute
it to a finer level of detail k+1, and to a finer level 2*k, ... and
so on. Eventually in the limit, you get reals. We only care that the
abstract structure that we call a mind is implemented in our
bodies/brains which are implemented in some physical or arithmetical
or computational substrate. Such implementations being statistically
common (for example in a quantum dovetailer) make local future
continuations probable. Of course, unusual continuations are possible
and we cannot find them all due to Rice's theorem - we cannot know if
some computation also happens to implement the structure/computations
that represent our mind - we might be able to prove it in some
specific case, but not in all cases.

But I'm still unclear on what constitutes my current states. Why is
there more than one? Is it a set of states of computations that
constitutes a single state of consciousness?

Even in the trivial case where we're given a particular physics
implementation, we can find another which behaves exactly the same and
still implements the same function (this is trivial because it's
always possible to add useless or equivalent code to a program).
However, for our minds we can allow for a lot more variability - I
conjecture that most quantum randomness is below our substitution
level and it faithfully implements our mind at the higher level
(quasi-classically, at subst. level).

Yes, I think that must be the case simply from considerations of
biological evolution. But that implies that a state of consciousness
or a state of mind is a computationally fuzzy object.
We cannot know what computation we happen to be and even if we choose a
doctor that does it correctly, we can find one machine of infinitely
many equivalent ones. At the same time, the notion of universal
computation is quite fuzzy - we can express it in infinitely many
systems, yet even just one interpretation is enough to 'understand' what
it is - the consequences of the Church-Turing Thesis.

It is

constituted by uncountably many threads through each of many (infinitely
many?) states which are not identical but are similar enough to
constitute a conscious state.
Hmm. There can only be countably (infinitely) many programs or states
(enumerable), but there can be uncountably many histories (in the limit,
non-enumerable)...

But the 1p view of this is to be
conscious *of something*, which you describe as the computation seen
states that makes them an equivalence class with respect to the
computation seen from the inside?
If they happen to be implementing some particular machine being in some
particular state. The problem is that the machine can be self-modifiable
(or that the environment can change it), and the machine won't know of
this and not always recognize the change. This seems like a highly
non-trivial problem to me.

Brent

Of course, there are some problems here - there can be continuations
where we will think we are still 'ourselves', but our mind has been
changed by stuff going below the substitution level - in which case,
the notion of observer is too fuzzy and personal (when will we think
we are not ourselves anymore? when will others think we are not
ourselves?)

A single computation can be implemented by an infinity of other
computations, thus with COMP, an infinity of programs ```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 3/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Mar 2012, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes not completely
Turing emulable.

But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who proposes to replace
some part of your brain (which is made of matter) with a Turing emulation of it?

The doctor does not need to emulate the matter of my brain. This is completely not
Turing *emulable*. It is only (apparently) Turing simulable, that is emulable at some
digital truncation of my brain. Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1p
indeterminacy on all more fine grained computations reaching my current states in
arithmetic/UD.

OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable because there are
infinitely many computations at the fine grained level reaching your current state.
But it is simulable to an arbitrary degree.

If you can prove that.

I would say yes, but it does not seem obvious to prove. You have to emulate bigger and
bigger portions of the UD*, and the 1-view are only defined in the limit, being unaware
of the UD-delays. Not obvious. It might be true, but in some non tractable sense. Hmm...
Interesting question.

I will think more on this, I smell a busy beaver situation. Your decimals, of your
prediction might take a very long time to stabilize. I dunno.

But I'm still unclear on what constitutes my current states.  Why is there more than
one?  Is it a set of states of computations that constitutes a single state of
consciousness?

If you say yes to the doctor, and if the doctor is luckily accurate, the current
state is the encoding of the universal number + data that he got from the scanning.
Basically, it is what is sent through the teleportation.

From the 1-p view, that state is unique, indeed. It is you here and now at the
moment of the scanning (done very quickly for the sake of the argument).

There is no more than one. But its encoding, and its relevant decoding, are generated
infinitely often in the UD*, with different continuations, leading to your current
self-indeterminacy. It is the subjective same you, like the people in W and M before
they open the teletransporter box, just before differentiation.

Oops, I see that I wrote my current states, with a s.  So it means I was talking
about the 3p computational states in the UD* corresponding on my (unique) current
consciousness state. That exists, in the comp theory.

Hope I am enough clear, tell otherwise if not.

Yes, that's what I thought you meant when I first studied your theory.  But then I am not
clear on the relation of this unique current state to the many non-equivalent states at
a lower, e.g. quantum, level that constitute it at the quasi-classical level.  Is the UD*
not also computing all of those fine-grained states?

Brent

Bruno

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything
List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to

For more options, visit this group at

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/

No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com
Version: 2012.0.1913 / Virus Database: 2114/4844 - Release Date: 03/01/12

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything
List group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 3/1/2012 10:39 AM, acw wrote:

On 3/1/2012 18:16, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/1/2012 9:57 AM, acw wrote:

On 3/1/2012 16:54, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes
not completely Turing emulable.

But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who
proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is made of matter)
with a Turing emulation of it?

The doctor does not need to emulate the matter of my brain. This is
completely not Turing *emulable*. It is only (apparently) Turing
simulable, that is emulable at some digital truncation of my brain.
Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1p indeterminacy on all more
fine grained computations reaching my current states in arithmetic/UD.

OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable because
there are infinitely many computations at the fine grained level
reaching your current state. But it is simulable to an arbitrary degree.

The way I understand it, yes, it should be simulable for certain
bounds, but never globally emulable - this in a twofold way: one in
that the local 3p structure that we infer might contain reals in the
limit (or rationals, computable reals) and another in that we can't
know of all valid 1p continuations some of which could be outside the
local 3p structure we estimated by induction. To elaborate in the
first: consider a mathematical structure which has some symmetries and
can be computed up to some level of detail k, but you can also compute
it to a finer level of detail k+1, and to a finer level 2*k, ... and
so on. Eventually in the limit, you get reals. We only care that the
abstract structure that we call a mind is implemented in our
bodies/brains which are implemented in some physical or arithmetical
or computational substrate. Such implementations being statistically
common (for example in a quantum dovetailer) make local future
continuations probable. Of course, unusual continuations are possible
and we cannot find them all due to Rice's theorem - we cannot know if
some computation also happens to implement the structure/computations
that represent our mind - we might be able to prove it in some
specific case, but not in all cases.

But I'm still unclear on what constitutes my current states. Why is
there more than one? Is it a set of states of computations that
constitutes a single state of consciousness?

Even in the trivial case where we're given a particular physics
implementation, we can find another which behaves exactly the same and
still implements the same function (this is trivial because it's
always possible to add useless or equivalent code to a program).
However, for our minds we can allow for a lot more variability - I
conjecture that most quantum randomness is below our substitution
level and it faithfully implements our mind at the higher level
(quasi-classically, at subst. level).

Yes, I think that must be the case simply from considerations of
biological evolution. But that implies that a state of consciousness
or a state of mind is a computationally fuzzy object.
We cannot know what computation we happen to be and even if we choose a doctor that
does it correctly, we can find one machine of infinitely many equivalent ones. At the
same time, the notion of universal computation is quite fuzzy - we can express it in
infinitely many systems, yet even just one interpretation is enough to 'understand' what
it is - the consequences of the Church-Turing Thesis.

It is

constituted by uncountably many threads through each of many (infinitely
many?) states which are not identical but are similar enough to
constitute a conscious state.
Hmm. There can only be countably (infinitely) many programs or states (enumerable), but
there can be uncountably many histories (in the limit, non-enumerable)...

But the 1p view of this is to be
conscious *of something*, which you describe as the computation seen
states that makes them an equivalence class with respect to the
computation seen from the inside?
If they happen to be implementing some particular machine being in some particular
state. The problem is that the machine can be self-modifiable (or that the environment
can change it), and the machine won't know of this and not always recognize the change.

Hmmm. I thought the idea of the UD was to abstract computation away from any particular
machine, so that states (or consciousness or the world) were identified with states of
finitely many (but arbitrarily increasing) threads of computation.

This seems like a highly non-trivial problem to me.

An understatement.  :-)

Brent

Of course, there are some problems here - there can be continuations
where we will think we are still 'ourselves', but our mind has been
changed by stuff going ```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 3/1/2012 19:06, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/1/2012 10:39 AM, acw wrote:

On 3/1/2012 18:16, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/1/2012 9:57 AM, acw wrote:

On 3/1/2012 16:54, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical
processes
not completely Turing emulable.

But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who
proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is made of
matter)
with a Turing emulation of it?

The doctor does not need to emulate the matter of my brain. This is
completely not Turing *emulable*. It is only (apparently) Turing
simulable, that is emulable at some digital truncation of my brain.
Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1p indeterminacy on all more
fine grained computations reaching my current states in
arithmetic/UD.

OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable because
there are infinitely many computations at the fine grained level
reaching your current state. But it is simulable to an arbitrary
degree.

The way I understand it, yes, it should be simulable for certain
bounds, but never globally emulable - this in a twofold way: one in
that the local 3p structure that we infer might contain reals in the
limit (or rationals, computable reals) and another in that we can't
know of all valid 1p continuations some of which could be outside the
local 3p structure we estimated by induction. To elaborate in the
first: consider a mathematical structure which has some symmetries and
can be computed up to some level of detail k, but you can also compute
it to a finer level of detail k+1, and to a finer level 2*k, ... and
so on. Eventually in the limit, you get reals. We only care that the
abstract structure that we call a mind is implemented in our
bodies/brains which are implemented in some physical or arithmetical
or computational substrate. Such implementations being statistically
common (for example in a quantum dovetailer) make local future
continuations probable. Of course, unusual continuations are possible
and we cannot find them all due to Rice's theorem - we cannot know if
some computation also happens to implement the structure/computations
that represent our mind - we might be able to prove it in some
specific case, but not in all cases.

But I'm still unclear on what constitutes my current states. Why is
there more than one? Is it a set of states of computations that
constitutes a single state of consciousness?

Even in the trivial case where we're given a particular physics
implementation, we can find another which behaves exactly the same and
still implements the same function (this is trivial because it's
always possible to add useless or equivalent code to a program).
However, for our minds we can allow for a lot more variability - I
conjecture that most quantum randomness is below our substitution
level and it faithfully implements our mind at the higher level
(quasi-classically, at subst. level).

Yes, I think that must be the case simply from considerations of
biological evolution. But that implies that a state of consciousness
or a state of mind is a computationally fuzzy object.

We cannot know what computation we happen to be and even if we choose
a doctor that does it correctly, we can find one machine of
infinitely many equivalent ones. At the same time, the notion of
universal computation is quite fuzzy - we can express it in infinitely
many systems, yet even just one interpretation is enough to
'understand' what it is - the consequences of the Church-Turing Thesis.
It is

constituted by uncountably many threads through each of many (infinitely
many?) states which are not identical but are similar enough to
constitute a conscious state.

Hmm. There can only be countably (infinitely) many programs or states
(enumerable), but there can be uncountably many histories (in the
limit, non-enumerable)...

But the 1p view of this is to be
conscious *of something*, which you describe as the computation seen
states that makes them an equivalence class with respect to the
computation seen from the inside?

If they happen to be implementing some particular machine being in
some particular state. The problem is that the machine can be
self-modifiable (or that the environment can change it), and the
machine won't know of this and not always recognize the change.

Hmmm. I thought the idea of the UD was to abstract computation away from
any particular machine, so that states (or consciousness or the world)
were identified with states of finitely many (but arbitrarily

The UD has to be implemented somehow (for example in arithmetic or a
physical machine, or in some other Turing Universal machine). The UD is
a concrete program that can run on a TM or in any other language (as
long as the ```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```

On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:17, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted
with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue
your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be
inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is non-
computable... it is the limit of the infinities of computation that
goes through your consciousness current state.

Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital
strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level
measurement of brain structure? Any dependence of consciousness on
quantum entanglement will prevent any form of digital substitution.

This is not correct. It would only make the comp subst. level lower,
for we would need to Turing-emulated the entire quantum system. What
you say would be true if a quantum computer was not Turing emulable,
but it is. Sure, there is an exponential slow-down, but the UD does
not care, nor the 'first persons' who cannot be aware of the delays.

Bruno

This might not be a bad thing for Bruno's ontological argument - as
it would show that 1p indeterminacy is a function or endomorphism of
entire universes in the many-worlds sense - but would doom any

Onward!

Stephen

--
Groups Everything List group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```

On 28 Feb 2012, at 21:41, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/28/2012 12:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 28, 10:43 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any
substituted for a digital brain.

What if you have two digital substitute brains? Do you become both
copies yourself at once and still not feel any difference? If not,
and

you are in brain A, do you appear inside brain B if you turn brain A
off?

Disembodied consciousness is silly.

Craig

The implication of Comp is that there is no you.  You are an
abstraction, a fiction, just another element in a model of the world.

OK, but I would avoid the word fiction, because people are used to
believe that fiction are not real. yet people believe that prime
number are real, not fiction (except in extravagant non standard
philosophy of math). I bet that Craig will jump on this little gift
you offer to him!
The type of fiction, or better, as you said abstraction are real
concept, causally efficacious thanks to the laws of addition and
multiplication.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```

On 28 Feb 2012, at 23:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2012/2/28 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
On Feb 28, 10:43 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any
substituted for a digital brain.

What if you have two digital substitute brains? Do you become both
copies yourself at once

No

OK. The question of Craig is a bit ambiguous though.

and still not feel any difference? If not, and
you are in brain A, do you appear inside brain B if you turn brain A
off?

Brain A and Brain B will feel has being a continuation of the you
before substitution... they'll both be your future you and both
feel it... the you before is no more. (even if you keep your
current body... it's just adding a brain C... and same reasonning).

Disembodied consciousness is silly.

I don't think consciousness can exist without a body and an
environment... without that what to be conscious of ? The
substitution is not something about disembodiment.

I have to say that I would have answer like here some years ago, but I
am a bit less sure now. Strangely we can be conscious of nothing
except of the fact that we are conscious. This seems to occur in some
reports of salvia divinorum users (either as a blissful or terrorizing
experience. It opens me to the idea that universal machine are
conscious at the start. But you remain correct, in the sense that all
universal machine needs a code, which plays somehow the role of a
relative body. The continuations of such a machine is literally given
by all possible experiences. For any memorizable experience a local
and relative embodiement is unavoidable, and its corresponding
primitive matter will be the usual sum on all continuations, which
in the case of the virgin (non programmed) universal machine, is just
all computations.

I would say.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```

On 28 Feb 2012, at 23:19, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2012/2/28 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any
substituted for a digital brain.

Hi Quentin,

OK, but could you elaborate on this statement?

conscious as you're now in your biological body, and you would steel
*feel* and feel being you and conscious and all...

Is the differentiation that one might feel, given the wrong
substitution level, different from what might occur if a digital
continuity?

It depends on the wrongness of the substitution or the lack of
continuity... it's not binary outcome.

Yes. There are *many sense* in which we can survive with a wrong
substitution.

Those does not feel any difference terms are a bit ambiguous and
vague, IMHO.

Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted
with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue
your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be
inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is non-
computable... it is the limit of the infinities of computation that
goes through your consciousness current state.

Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital
strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level
measurement of brain structure?

Yes, and if it is, it is a big indication that comp is somehow
wrong...

Any dependence of consciousness on quantum entanglement will prevent
any form of digital substitution. This might not be a bad thing for
Bruno's ontological argument - as it would show that 1p
indeterminacy is a function or endomorphism of entire universes in
the many-worlds sense - but would doom any change of immortality via

Sure, but if the level is that down... then even if it is still
compatible with comp, for all practical purposes, it's the same as
if it was wrong...

Not for the conceptual result. Physics remains a branch of digital
machine's theory. But FAPP, you are right, except for the death or
near death experiences. I think.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```

On 28 Feb 2012, at 23:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 28, 5:15 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

the you
before is no more.

That's what I have been arguing all along. Yes, doctor = Yes, death.
It's delightful that there will be a digital imposter/identical twin
who believes that they are someone with the same qualities that I
believed I had, before I died, but it really it invalidates any
pretensions comp has of honoring 1p experience.

Well, that's make clear that you believe in zombie.

Disembodied consciousness is silly.

I don't think consciousness can exist without a body and an
environment...

Wait, so we actually agree on something?

I think we all agree on this. But comp explains the origin of the
coupling brain/environment. They are not ontologically primitive,
though.

without that what to be conscious of ? The substitution is not
something

Bruno says all kinds of arithmetic dreams.

By the MGA.

But how can the
substitution not be synonymous with disembodied 'processes'? What
binds the experience of the program to the silicon?

The relative proportion of computation going through your state in
which silicon are observed.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/28/2012 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2012/2/28 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
mailto:stephe...@charter.net

On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any
was substituted for a digital brain.

Hi Quentin,

OK, but could you elaborate on this statement?

conscious as you're now in your biological body, and you would steel
*feel* and feel being you and conscious and all...

Hi Quentin,

We need to nail down exactly what continuity of self is. if there
is no you, as Brent wrote yesterday, what is that which is invariant
with respect to substitution?

Is the differentiation that one _might_ feel, given the wrong
substitution level, different from what _might_ occur if a
complete continuity?

It depends on the wrongness of the substitution or the lack of
continuity... it's not binary outcome.

At some point it would have to be, for a digital system has a fine
grained level of sensitivity to differences, no? I am trying to nail
down the details of this idea.

Those does not feel any difference terms are a bit ambiguous and
vague, IMHO.

Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted
with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue
your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be
inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is
non-computable... it is the limit of the infinities of
computation that goes through your consciousness current state.

Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital
strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level
measurement of brain structure?

Yes, and if it is, it is a big indication that comp is somehow wrong...

AFAIK, it would only prevent the continuation of the idea that we
are only that which is within our skin. We might finally escape from
the modular clock world of gears and levers that the Parminidean and
Newtonian world view entails.

Any dependence of consciousness on quantum entanglement will
prevent any form of digital substitution. This might not be a bad
thing for Bruno's ontological argument - as it would show that 1p
indeterminacy is a function or endomorphism of entire universes
in the many-worlds sense - but would doom any change of

Sure, but if the level is that down... then even if it is still
compatible with comp, for all practical purposes, it's the same as if
it was wrong...

I am not so sure. I think that the way that QM systems are linear
will still allow substitution, but not in the usual way of thinking. The
problem that I see is the lack of understanding of QM's implications.

Onward!

Stephen

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/29/2012 12:50 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/28/2012 9:40 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 3:41 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/28/2012 12:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 28, 10:43 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.com  wrote:

Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any
substituted for a digital brain.

What if you have two digital substitute brains? Do you become both
copies yourself at once and still not feel any difference? If not, and
you are in brain A, do you appear inside brain B if you turn brain A
off?

Disembodied consciousness is silly.

Craig

The implication of Comp is that there is no you.  You are an
abstraction, a fiction, just another element in a model of the world.

Brent

Hi,

Just a question about the semantics. What difference is there
between a you and an abstraction that is indistinguishable from it?

The difference is that there isn't *a* you, there are arbitrarily
many or at least there will be momentarily.  The absraction is tracing
just one of these.  This is already a consequence of MWI in which
quantum events cause you to split into orthogonal subspaces.  To the
extent consciousness is realized by classical processes the splitting
only happens when the quantum events have classical level effects.

Hi Brent,

So we could say that the you is tied to a particular world.
Would it be consistent to think of this notion of realized by classical
processes as an abstraction of the same kind, i.e. a tracing of
individual 1p content, each of which is generated by a potential
infinity of computations? I am trying to tease out the relation of
COMP's ontology picture with that of MWI.

Onward!

Stephen

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```

On 29 Feb 2012, at 13:50, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2012/2/28 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any
substituted for a digital brain.

Hi Quentin,

OK, but could you elaborate on this statement?

conscious as you're now in your biological body, and you would
steel *feel* and feel being you and conscious and all...

Hi Quentin,

We need to nail down exactly what continuity of self is. if
there is no you, as Brent wrote yesterday, what is that which is
invariant with respect to substitution?

As I said, Brent made a sort of pedagogical mistake, but a big one,
which is often done, and which explains perhaps why some materialist
becomes person eliminativist.

The you is a construct of the brain. It is abstract. You can see it
as an information pattern, but a real stable one which can exist in
many representations.

And you can build it for any machine by using Kleene's second
diagonalization construction.

It is the key of the whole thing. So let me explain again. You can
certainly construct  a program D capable of doing some simple
duplication of an arbitrary object x and apply any transformation T
that you want on that duplicated object, perhaps with some parameters:

Dx gives T(, xx, ),

Then applying D to itself, that is substituting x for D, leads to a
self-referential program:

DD gives T(, DD, ...).

You might add quotes to prevent an infinite loop:

Dx gives T(...'xx' ...) so that

DD gives T(... 'DD'...).

This is the trick used by Gödel, Kleene, Turing, Church, Post, ... in
all incompleteness and insolubility result, but also, in abstract
biology (see my paper amoeba, planaria, and dreaming machine.

That define a relative you, trivially relative to you. It is the I
of computer science. It allows you to write a program referring to its
entire code/body in the course of its execution. In some programming
language, like the object oriented Smalltalk, for example, it is a
build in control structure called SELF.

This gives, unfortunately only a third person notion of self. It is
more my body than my soul, and that if why, to do the math, we
have to use the conjunction of truth, with belief, to get a notion of
first person. By the non definability of truth, this I cannot be
defined by the machine concerned, but it still exist, even if doubly
immaterial---because it is abstract, and in relation with the non
definable (by the machine) truth.

Both are invariant, by definition, when the comp substitution is done
at the right level. It means that the reconstituted person will behave
the same, and feel to be the same.

Is the differentiation that one might feel, given the wrong
substitution level, different from what might occur if a digital
continuity?

It depends on the wrongness of the substitution or the lack of
continuity... it's not binary outcome.

At some point it would have to be, for a digital system has a
fine grained level of sensitivity to differences, no? I am trying to
nail down the details of this idea.

The details are in the mathematics of self-reference.

Those does not feel any difference terms are a bit ambiguous and
vague, IMHO.

Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted
with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue
your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be
inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is non-
computable... it is the limit of the infinities of computation
that goes through your consciousness current state.

Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital
strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level
measurement of brain structure?

Yes, and if it is, it is a big indication that comp is somehow
wrong...

AFAIK, it would only prevent the continuation of the idea that
we are only that which is within our skin. We might finally escape
from the modular clock world of gears and levers that the
Parminidean and Newtonian world view entails.

But comp escapes this. If I am a machine, then the reality, globally
cannot be a machine, and from the point of view of any machine, his 1-
I cannot be a machine either, even if it *is* a machine ... from God
(Truth) point of view.

Here there is a quite difficult idea, made simple by the self-
reference logic, which is that:

G* proves that Bp is extensionally equivalent to Bp  p. (they prove
the same arithmetical p),

But G, and thus the machine, does ```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```On Feb 29, 4:45 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Feb 2012, at 22:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 28, 3:41 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

The implication of Comp is that there is no you.  You are an
abstraction, a fiction,
just another element in a model of the world.

That's why I say comp has only a pseudo-1p conception of
consciousness. It's not difficult to claim that the hard problem isn't
so hard if you allow the hardness of it to be fictional.

It is not fictional in the sense of unreal. But in the sense of
abstract, or immaterial.
You make my point to Brent already.

How does this translate though into answering the very non-abstract
question of 'Doctor, is this treatment any different from me
swallowing the business end of a shotgun?'. If I indeed wake up from
the procedure, it is not clear whether I am arbitrarily limited to one
replacement brain at a time (which means what? that I can kill myself
every day and get a restored brain every night?) or can I wake up as a
massively redundant RAID of disposable brains, or a cluster of
parallel processing identities spread out as identities all over the
world where I would experience my new separate bodies something like
fingers on my hands. I can't think of any plausible restriction
against this in comp. Either you don't become a digital brain at all
or you can become an army of simultaneous selves.

This is really the core issue of the whole thing. Symbol grounding,
primitive matter, the Explanatory Gap  Hard Problem are all different
aspects of this chain of custody issue. Who carries the ball of
consciousness? Atoms? Computation? Cells? Persons?

For human beings I think it has to be people. Just as you would not
call someone who had been catastrophically disabled a non-person, we
should not call a hypertrophied computer a non-machine. Even if the
person is in a vegetative state, we still treat their body and legacy
with human significance as opposed to scrapping it in the landfill.
This isn't a justification based on sentiment, it is an observation of
how these questions have been treated thus far in society. There would
be no reason to treat a disabled computer with any dignity at all - no
need to try to resuscitate it if we have another backup computer
conveniently available. This is not the case with children and
siblings.

With comp, chain of custody is lost entirely. As was suggested, 'you'
are reduced to an abstraction which is forever lost to the mysteries
of arithmetic ether. Will we be summoned to incarnate as a 23rd
century SmartToaster because we happen to have a popular 'toasty'
voice? Will we be doomed to live in an eternity of toast monitoring
because some programmer found the 100 exabyte eDVD of our identity in
the bargain bin of the RIAA?

Can nobody else see why these absurdities are unavoidable in comp?

Craig

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```On Feb 29, 5:03 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Feb 2012, at 23:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 28, 5:15 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

the you
before is no more.

That's what I have been arguing all along. Yes, doctor = Yes, death.
It's delightful that there will be a digital imposter/identical twin
who believes that they are someone with the same qualities that I
believed I had, before I died, but it really it invalidates any
pretensions comp has of honoring 1p experience.

Well, that's make clear that you believe in zombie.

No, I believe in puppets. Don't you?

Disembodied consciousness is silly.

I don't think consciousness can exist without a body and an
environment...

Wait, so we actually agree on something?

I think we all agree on this. But comp explains the origin of the
coupling brain/environment. They are not ontologically primitive,
though.

I don't know that even physicists would say that matter is
ontologically primitive these days, but comp goes a step further to
say that matter is completely Turing emulable.

without that what to be conscious of ? The substitution is not
something

Bruno says all kinds of arithmetic dreams.

By the MGA.

But how can the
substitution not be synonymous with disembodied 'processes'? What
binds the experience of the program to the silicon?

The relative proportion of computation going through your state in
which silicon are observed.

?

Craig

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/29/2012 1:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:17, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a program, that
obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a digital one), but comp
shows that to be inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is
non-computable... it is the limit of the infinities of computation that goes through

Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital uploading argument
if functional substitution cannot occur in a strictly classical way, for example by
strictly classical level measurement of brain structure? Any dependence of
consciousness on quantum entanglement will prevent any form of digital substitution.

This is not correct. It would only make the comp subst. level lower, for we would need
to Turing-emulated the entire quantum system. What you say would be true if a quantum
computer was not Turing emulable, but it is. Sure, there is an exponential slow-down,
but the UD does not care, nor the 'first persons' who cannot be aware of the delays.

An exponential slowdown may be OK if you're substituting for the whole world, but having a
part of my brain running much slower would be a good reason to say no to the doctor.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/29/2012 5:47 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/29/2012 12:50 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/28/2012 9:40 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 3:41 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/28/2012 12:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 28, 10:43 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.com  wrote:

Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any
substituted for a digital brain.

What if you have two digital substitute brains? Do you become both
copies yourself at once and still not feel any difference? If not, and
you are in brain A, do you appear inside brain B if you turn brain A
off?

Disembodied consciousness is silly.

Craig

The implication of Comp is that there is no you.  You are an abstraction, a
fiction, just another element in a model of the world.

Brent

Hi,

Just a question about the semantics. What difference is there between a you and
an abstraction that is indistinguishable from it?

The difference is that there isn't *a* you, there are arbitrarily many or at least
there will be momentarily.  The absraction is tracing just one of these.  This is
already a consequence of MWI in which quantum events cause you to split into
orthogonal subspaces.  To the extent consciousness is realized by classical processes
the splitting only happens when the quantum events have classical level effects.

Hi Brent,

So we could say that the you is tied to a particular world. Would it be
consistent to think of this notion of realized by classical processes as an
abstraction of the same kind, i.e. a tracing of individual 1p content, each of which is
generated by a potential infinity of computations? I am trying to tease out the relation
of COMP's ontology picture with that of MWI.

That's roughly the picture I have of how comp is supposed to work. For any given state of
your consciousness there are infinitely many threads of different computations that go
through that state.  These have different continuations and these result in quantum
uncertainty as to which future you experience.  However, I'm not sure how classicality
figures into this.  The materialist view is that almost all microscopic quantum randomness
has no effect on consciousness and so 'a conscious state' would correspond to a large
number of similar computational states rather than just one.

Brent

Onward!

Stephen

No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com
Version: 2012.0.1913 / Virus Database: 2114/4840 - Release Date: 02/28/12

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything
List group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/29/2012 8:35 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 29, 4:45 am, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be  wrote:

On 28 Feb 2012, at 22:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 28, 3:41 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

The implication of Comp is that there is no you.  You are an
abstraction, a fiction,
just another element in a model of the world.

That's why I say comp has only a pseudo-1p conception of
consciousness. It's not difficult to claim that the hard problem isn't
so hard if you allow the hardness of it to be fictional.

It is not fictional in the sense of unreal. But in the sense of
abstract, or immaterial.
You make my point to Brent already.

How does this translate though into answering the very non-abstract
question of 'Doctor, is this treatment any different from me
swallowing the business end of a shotgun?'. If I indeed wake up from
the procedure, it is not clear whether I am arbitrarily limited to one
replacement brain at a time (which means what? that I can kill myself
every day and get a restored brain every night?) or can I wake up as a
massively redundant RAID of disposable brains, or a cluster of
parallel processing identities spread out as identities all over the
world where I would experience my new separate bodies something like
fingers on my hands. I can't think of any plausible restriction
against this in comp. Either you don't become a digital brain at all
or you can become an army of simultaneous selves.

As you suggest, you are already an army of simultaneous selves.  At least that's Daniel
Dennett's 'multiple drafts' model in Consciousness Explained.  By that theory, the Borg
just have more multiple drafts before they settle on what they think.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```

On 29 Feb 2012, at 17:47, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/29/2012 1:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:17, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted
with a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue
your brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be
inconsistent, because comp implies that any piece of matter is
non-computable... it is the limit of the infinities of
computation that goes through your consciousness current state.

Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital
strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level
measurement of brain structure? Any dependence of consciousness on
quantum entanglement will prevent any form of digital substitution.

This is not correct. It would only make the comp subst. level
lower, for we would need to Turing-emulated the entire quantum
system. What you say would be true if a quantum computer was not
Turing emulable, but it is. Sure, there is an exponential slow-
down, but the UD does not care, nor the 'first persons' who cannot
be aware of the delays.

An exponential slowdown may be OK if you're substituting for the
whole world, but having a part of my brain running much slower would
be a good reason to say no to the doctor.

In step seven you don't need no more to say yes to the doctor. You are
in a universe with a running UD. It makes notably all the quantum
continuations. And there, you can't be aware of the exponential slow
down.

Step seven eliminates the doctor, and replaced it by a robust universe.
Step eight eliminates the robust universe.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```

On 29 Feb 2012, at 17:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 29, 4:45 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 28 Feb 2012, at 22:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 28, 3:41 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

The implication of Comp is that there is no you.  You are an
abstraction, a fiction,
just another element in a model of the world.

That's why I say comp has only a pseudo-1p conception of
consciousness. It's not difficult to claim that the hard problem
isn't

so hard if you allow the hardness of it to be fictional.

It is not fictional in the sense of unreal. But in the sense of
abstract, or immaterial.
You make my point to Brent already.

How does this translate though into answering the very non-abstract
question of 'Doctor, is this treatment any different from me
swallowing the business end of a shotgun?'. If I indeed wake up from
the procedure, it is not clear whether I am arbitrarily limited to one
replacement brain at a time (which means what? that I can kill myself
every day and get a restored brain every night?) or can I wake up as a
massively redundant RAID of disposable brains, or a cluster of
parallel processing identities spread out as identities all over the
world where I would experience my new separate bodies something like
fingers on my hands. I can't think of any plausible restriction
against this in comp. Either you don't become a digital brain at all
or you can become an army of simultaneous selves.

This is a bit ambiguous, but this is already the case with QM. Comp
provides an explanation why that happens.

This is really the core issue of the whole thing. Symbol grounding,
primitive matter, the Explanatory Gap  Hard Problem are all different
aspects of this chain of custody issue. Who carries the ball of
consciousness? Atoms? Computation? Cells? Persons?

Persons. enough rich individuals (rich in cognitive abilities, but
they are cheap).

For human beings I think it has to be people. Just as you would not
call someone who had been catastrophically disabled a non-person, we
should not call a hypertrophied computer a non-machine. Even if the
person is in a vegetative state, we still treat their body and legacy
with human significance as opposed to scrapping it in the landfill.
This isn't a justification based on sentiment, it is an observation of
how these questions have been treated thus far in society. There would
be no reason to treat a disabled computer with any dignity at all - no
need to try to resuscitate it if we have another backup computer
conveniently available. This is not the case with children and
siblings.

With comp, chain of custody is lost entirely. As was suggested, 'you'
are reduced to an abstraction which is forever lost to the mysteries
of arithmetic ether. Will we be summoned to incarnate as a 23rd
century SmartToaster because we happen to have a popular 'toasty'
voice? Will we be doomed to live in an eternity of toast monitoring
because some programmer found the 100 exabyte eDVD of our identity in
the bargain bin of the RIAA?

Can nobody else see why these absurdities are unavoidable in comp?

Absurdities is not contradiction. You have to compare with the QM
absurdities and the alternatives.

Science is not wishful thinking.
I do not pretend that  comp is true. Just that it make Plato closer to
the truth than Aristotle, and this in a way which explains how to
derive the laws of physics from comp, so that we might test it.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```

On 29 Feb 2012, at 17:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 29, 5:03 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 28 Feb 2012, at 23:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 28, 5:15 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

the you
before is no more.

That's what I have been arguing all along. Yes, doctor = Yes, death.
It's delightful that there will be a digital imposter/identical twin
who believes that they are someone with the same qualities that I
believed I had, before I died, but it really it invalidates any
pretensions comp has of honoring 1p experience.

Well, that's make clear that you believe in zombie.

No, I believe in puppets. Don't you?

Sure. But the guy who comes back from the hospital does not look like
a puppet to me, nor to you. And its has to be one, if yes-doctor = yes-
death, as you argued. That puppet is by definition a zombie. Stathis

Disembodied consciousness is silly.

I don't think consciousness can exist without a body and an
environment...

Wait, so we actually agree on something?

I think we all agree on this. But comp explains the origin of the
coupling brain/environment. They are not ontologically primitive,
though.

I don't know that even physicists would say that matter is
ontologically primitive these days, but comp goes a step further to
say that matter is completely Turing emulable.

Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes
not completely Turing emulable.

without that what to be conscious of ? The substitution is not
something

Bruno says all kinds of arithmetic dreams.

By the MGA.

But how can the
substitution not be synonymous with disembodied 'processes'? What
binds the experience of the program to the silicon?

The relative proportion of computation going through your state in
which silicon are observed.

?

By UDA step seven (in the case of comp + robust universe).

Tell me first if you get the sixth first steps, and I explain the
seven one, if you are interested.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/29/2012 4:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Feb 2012, at 20:17, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with
a program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your
brain with a digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent,
because comp implies that any piece of matter is non-computable...
it is the limit of the infinities of computation that goes through

[SPK1]
Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital
strictly classical way, for example by strictly classical level
measurement of brain structure? Any dependence of consciousness on
quantum entanglement will prevent any form of digital substitution.

This is not correct. It would only make the comp subst. level lower,
for we would need to Turing-emulated the entire quantum system. What
you say would be true if a quantum computer was not Turing emulable,
but it is. Sure, there is an exponential slow-down, but the UD does
not care, nor the 'first persons' who cannot be aware of the delays.

Bruno

[SPK2]
This might not be a bad thing for Bruno's ontological argument - as
it would show that 1p indeterminacy is a function or endomorphism of
entire universes in the many-worlds sense - but would doom any

Dear Bruno,

Did you not see this last comment [SPK2] that I wrote? We need to
distinguish between the actions on and by physical systems, such as
human brains, and the platonic level systems. Your remark seemed to be
one that was considering my comment [SPK1] as if it where discussing the
Platonic level aspect. This is just probably a confusion caused by our
use of the same words for the two completely different levels. For
example, a physical system is a UTM if it can implement any enumerable
recursive algorithm, aka is programable in the Turing Thesis sense,
but its actual behavior is limited by its resources, transition speeds,
etc. An abstract Platonic Machine, such as what you consider in SANE04,
does not have any such limits.
I think that we should consider a formal way to describe these
relations. Perhaps some one that is fluent in Category theory will come
to help us in these discussions. We need a way to define the idea of
the limit of the infinities of computations that go through a given
consciousness state in a way that is more clear given that a given
consciousness state is still a very ambiguous notion.

Onward!

Stephen

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes not completely
Turing emulable.

But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who proposes to replace some
part of your brain (which is made of matter) with a Turing emulation of it?

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```2012/2/29 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net

On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes not
completely Turing emulable.

But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who proposes
to replace some part of your brain (which is made of matter) with a Turing
emulation of it?

The turing emulation is not of the matter but of the mind...
Computationalism, is the theory that the mind is some sort of information
processor... the brain made of matter is just an UTM... any UTM could do
the job, the emulation is not of the brain made of matter but of the
consciousness.

Quentin

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/29/2012 12:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2012/2/29 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net

On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes not
completely
Turing emulable.

But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who proposes
to
replace some part of your brain (which is made of matter) with a Turing
emulation of it?

The turing emulation is not of the matter but of the mind... Computationalism, is the
theory that the mind is some sort of information processor... the brain made of matter
is just an UTM... any UTM could do the job, the emulation is not of the brain made of
matter but of the consciousness.

But suppose I'm only replacing a small part of my brain.  There's on reason to suppose
that part, by itself, is conscious.  Consciousness is supposed to be realized by the
computation that the brain is doing.  So the question becomes, at what level of fidelity
must I emulate that piece of brain I'm going to replace.  One answer would be at the
lowest possible level, i.e. emulate the quarks and electrons and vacuum field
fluctuations, then I'll be sure to survive with consciousness unchanged.  But that's
emulating the matter of that piece of my brain, which Bruno says is not completely
emulable.  If that can't be done, why should I believe there is any level that I should
say 'yes' to?

Brent

Quentin

Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups

Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything
List group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com
Version: 2012.0.1913 / Virus Database: 2114/4842 - Release Date: 02/29/12

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/28/2012 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 27 Feb 2012, at 20:02, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/27/2012 12:26 PM, ronaldheld wrote:

What observations or measurements can I perform that would falsify
COMP?

Hi,

Any measurement of a physical process that cannot be simulated by
a Turing Machine equivalent computation.

That would contradict digital physics. But digital physics is
self-contradictory (indeed it implies comp which implies the falsity
of digital physics). Roughly speaking: if I am a machine, then
everything else is not.

Dear Bruno,

Let me see if my thoughts are correct as I can best write them.
COMP is the conjunction of Yes Doctor, the Church Thesis and
Arithmetic Realism, correct? I am now not sure of the definition of
Digital physics given this thread so far... From what I can tell, Yes
Doctor is built on the idea of functional substitutability at some level
or scale for physical systems, such that a given algorithm will run on
any functionally equivalent physical system; it is basically a
restatement of computational universality. This idea shows us that our
consciousness is not dependent on a particular form of physical system
if and only if our consciousness is algorithmic or computable in the
Turing sense. I am agnostic on this because I do not see any evidence
(pace Tegmark) that our brain's implementation of consciousness does not
involve quantum entanglement.
My answer to Ronald's question was based on what I thought I
understood of COMP, so it seems that I still do not understand COMP.
Does not COMP require that any observation of our physical world be
faithfully representable as a _finite_ list of yes or no type questions

IOW, any non-computational physical process.

Comp implies non-comp (non Turing emulable first plural person)
physical processes. Indeed the comp primitive matter is not Turing
emulable, it is an infinite sum on infinite computations.

But this definition (of comp primitive matter) is fraught with
the measure problem! Does this exclude an infinite collection of
possible worlds to represent the physical systems that can implement
that infinite computations? I suppose that you could say that it does as
the UD will generate all possible Turing machine states, infinitely
often (why?), which (by comp) includes all your virtual reconstitutions
corresponding to (hopefully) consistent extensions of yourself, in all
possible (locally) emulable environments or computational histories.
The usual idea that I am considering is that a physical system will
have to be potentially infinite to satisfy the requirements of a
universal Turing machine, as it has to have at least an infinite tape.
You write:

Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine
state] at space-time
(x,t), we are obliged  to associate  [the pain  I  feel at  space-time
(x,t)]  to a  type or a  sheaf of
computations  (existing  forever  in  the arithmetical  Platonia  which
is  accepted  as  existing

independently of  our  selves  with  arithmetical  realism).

This seems to bypass the requirement of the concrete implementation
of the UTM by appeal to the independent of the truth value of sigma_1
sentences (or equivalent) such that you can then claim that:

not only physics has been  epistemologically  reduced to machine
psychology, but that ''matter'' has been ontologically  reduced  to
''mind'' where mind  is defined  as  the  object  study of fundamental
machine psychology.

Therefore any considerations of, for example, thermodynamics is
irrelevant as such would be derivable from the accidental correctness
of Sigma_1 sentences.  This is interesting on its own as it strongly
resembles the occasionalism
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occasionalism of Malebranche and others
that was proposed to explain psycho-psychical parallelism between mental
and physical events. Pratt's residuation
solves this problem without AR's idealism, among other things, by
reducing global computations to pairwise interactions between a
potentially infinite number of computations. This is a form of
accidentalism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accidentalism, but is more
subtle as the relationship between mental and physical states/events
does not need a causal explication. Additionally, Pratt's residuation
proposal  (similar to this
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Residuated_lattice concept) generates
only consistent extensions of first person indeterminacy modulo
arbitrarily large memory resources. It is only when memory resources are
limited to being finite (Forgetfulness as what occurs in the Telephone
game ```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```2012/2/28 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net

On 2/28/2012 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 27 Feb 2012, at 20:02, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/27/2012 12:26 PM, ronaldheld wrote:

What observations or measurements can I perform that would falsify
COMP?

Hi,

Any measurement of a physical process that cannot be simulated by a
Turing Machine equivalent computation.

That would contradict digital physics. But digital physics is
self-contradictory (indeed it implies comp which implies the falsity of
digital physics). Roughly speaking: if I am a machine, then everything
else is not.

Dear Bruno,

Let me see if my thoughts are correct as I can best write them. COMP
is the conjunction of Yes Doctor, the Church Thesis and Arithmetic
Realism, correct? I am now not sure of the definition of Digital physics
given this thread so far... From what I can tell, Yes Doctor is built on
the idea of functional substitutability at some level or scale for physical
systems, such that a given algorithm will run on any functionally
equivalent physical system; it is basically a restatement of computational
universality. This idea shows us that our consciousness is not dependent on
a particular form of physical system if and only if our consciousness is
algorithmic or computable in the Turing sense. I am agnostic on this
because I do not see any evidence (pace Tegmark) that our brain's
implementation of consciousness does not involve quantum entanglement.
My answer to Ronald's question was based on what I thought I
understood of COMP, so it seems that I still do not understand COMP. Does
not COMP require that any observation of our physical world be faithfully
representable as a *finite* list of yes or no type questions and their

Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any
substituted for a digital brain.

Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a
program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a
digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because comp implies
that any piece of matter is non-computable... it is the limit of the
infinities of computation that goes through your consciousness current
state.

IOW, any non-computational physical process.

Comp implies non-comp (non Turing emulable first plural person) physical
processes. Indeed the comp primitive matter is not Turing emulable, it is
an infinite sum on infinite computations.

But this definition (of comp primitive matter) is fraught with the
measure problem! Does this exclude an infinite collection of possible
worlds to represent the physical systems that can implement that infinite
computations? I suppose that you could say that it does as the UD will
generate all possible Turing machine states, infinitely often (why?), which
(by comp) includes all your virtual reconstitutions corresponding to
(hopefully) consistent extensions of yourself, in all possible (locally)
emulable environments or computational histories.
The usual idea that I am considering is that a physical system will
have to be potentially infinite to satisfy the requirements of a universal
Turing machine, as it has to have at least an infinite tape. You write:

Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine
state] at space-time
(x,t), we are obliged  to associate  [the pain  I  feel at  space-time
(x,t)]  to a  type or a  sheaf of
computations  (existing  forever  in  the arithmetical  Platonia  which
is  accepted  as  existing
independently of  our  selves  with  arithmetical  realism).

This seems to bypass the requirement of the concrete implementation of
the UTM by appeal to the independent of the truth value of sigma_1
sentences (or equivalent) such that you can then claim that:

not only physics has been  epistemologically  reduced to machine
psychology, but that ‘‘matter’’ has been ontologically  reduced  to
‘‘mind’’ where mind  is defined  as  the  object  study of fundamental
machine psychology.

Therefore any considerations of, for example, thermodynamics is
irrelevant as such would be derivable from the accidental correctness of
Sigma_1 sentences.  This is interesting on its own as it strongly resembles
the occasionalism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occasionalism of
Malebranche and others that was proposed to explain psycho-psychical
parallelism between mental and physical events. Pratt's
this problem without AR's idealism, among other things, by reducing
global computations to pairwise interactions between a potentially infinite
number of ```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```

On 28 Feb 2012, at 16:29, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 27 Feb 2012, at 20:02, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/27/2012 12:26 PM, ronaldheld wrote:

What observations or measurements can I perform that would falsify
COMP?

Hi,

Any measurement of a physical process that cannot be simulated
by a Turing Machine equivalent computation.

That would contradict digital physics. But digital physics is self-
contradictory (indeed it implies comp which implies the falsity of
digital physics). Roughly speaking: if I am a machine, then
everything else is not.

Dear Bruno,

Let me see if my thoughts are correct as I can best write them.
COMP is the conjunction of Yes Doctor, the Church Thesis and
Arithmetic Realism, correct?

Yes, but note that this is redundant. yes doctor means yes for a
digital transplant. Church thesis is needed to make the term digital
mathematically precise. And AR is needed to make Church thesis making
sense.

I am now not sure of the definition of Digital physics given this
thread so far... From what I can tell, Yes Doctor is built on the
idea of functional substitutability at some level or scale for
physical systems, such that a given algorithm will run on any
functionally equivalent physical system; it is basically a
restatement of computational universality.

I can say yes, to be short. but logically, universality is not used
here. But this is a technical point on which I don't want to digress
now. Primitive recursive function can have equivalent programs,
despite there is no universal primitive recursive functions.

This idea shows us that our consciousness is not dependent on a
particular form of physical system if and only if our consciousness
is algorithmic or computable in the Turing sense. I am agnostic on
this because I do not see any evidence (pace Tegmark) that our
brain's implementation of consciousness does not involve quantum
entanglement.
My answer to Ronald's question was based on what I thought I
understood of COMP, so it seems that I still do not understand COMP.
Does not COMP require that any observation of our physical world be
faithfully representable as a finite list of yes or no type

See Quentin's comment.
Comp is a priori neutral on any question of physics, until physics is
derived from comp.

IOW, any non-computational physical process.

Comp implies non-comp (non Turing emulable first plural person)
physical processes. Indeed the comp primitive matter is not
Turing emulable, it is an infinite sum on infinite computations.

But this definition (of comp primitive matter) is fraught with
the measure problem!

OK, but a precise one that we can handle with mathematical tools.
That's the progress. Comp is fraught with tuns of problems. Comp is
just a toll for making those problem precise.

Does this exclude an infinite collection of possible worlds to
represent the physical systems that can implement that infinite
computations?

A priori, no. Now in your sentence, the word worlds is ambiguous, so
I  chose favorable interpretations of it, to make sense of what you say.

I suppose that you could say that it does as the UD will generate
all possible Turing machine states, infinitely often (why?),

Due to the closure of the diagonalization, it can be proved that the
phi_i sequence goes through all equivalent programs an infinity of
times. It is called the padding theorem. It is obvious for most
computer scientists, because you can always add useless code, but it
is also a consequence of Kleene's second recursion theorem.

which (by comp) includes all your virtual reconstitutions
corresponding to (hopefully) consistent extensions of yourself, in
all possible (locally) emulable environments or computational
histories.
The usual idea that I am considering is that a physical system
will have to be potentially infinite to satisfy the requirements of
a universal Turing machine, as it has to have at least an infinite
tape.

The tape is not part of the universal machine. It is better to think
about the universal machine as the code of such a machine on the tape
(of some other one). Once a fixed ontological toe is given, a
universal machine is a number. It is a finite object. This is
important to keep in mind. i would not say that human or juming spider
are Löbian (and thus universal) if that needs some infinity. For the
1p, it is different because the 1p is indeterminate on infinity of
computations, and this structures the logic differently.

You write:

Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a
machine state] at space-time
(x,t), we are obliged  to associate  [the pain  I  feel at  space-
time  (x,t)]  to a  type or a  sheaf of
computations  (existing  forever  in  the arithmetical  Platonia
which  is  accepted  as  ```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/28/2012 7:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Dear Bruno,

Let me see if my thoughts are correct as I can best write them. COMP is the
conjunction of Yes Doctor, the Church Thesis and Arithmetic Realism, correct? I am now
not sure of the definition of Digital physics given this thread so far... From what I
can tell, Yes Doctor is built on the idea of functional substitutability at some level
or scale for physical systems, such that a given algorithm will run on any functionally
equivalent physical system; it is basically a restatement of computational universality.
This idea shows us that our consciousness is not dependent on a particular form of
physical system if and only if our consciousness is algorithmic or computable in the
Turing sense. I am agnostic on this because I do not see any evidence (pace Tegmark)
that our brain's implementation of consciousness does not involve quantum entanglement.

This is ambiguous.  Tegmark showed that quantum decoherence of ion locations in neural
processes is much faster than neural signaling, therefore brain processing is almost all
classical.  It is classical *because* there is quantum entanglement between the ions and
the environment.  It is quantum entanglement with an environment (something with many
degrees of freedom) that produces decoherence and classical behavior.  If you substitute
for some neurons a silicon chip that is designed to be functionally identical, that
functionally identical means it acts as a classical device to implement a certain
computational algorithm.  Of course it will be quantum entangled with its environment
because that's what makes it classical.

Maybe you meant you that you think brain processes may involve quantum coherent
superpositions - but that's what Tegmark refuted.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any
substituted for a digital brain.

Hi Quentin,

OK, but could you elaborate on this statement? Is the
differentiation that one _might_ feel, given the wrong substitution
procedure is conducted that fails to generate complete continuity? Those
does not feel any difference terms are a bit ambiguous and vague, IMHO.

Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a
program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain
with a digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because
comp implies that any piece of matter is non-computable... it is the
limit of the infinities of computation that goes through your
consciousness current state.

Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital
classical way, for example by strictly classical level measurement of
brain structure? Any dependence of consciousness on quantum entanglement
will prevent any form of digital substitution. This might not be a bad
thing for Bruno's ontological argument - as it would show that 1p
indeterminacy is a function or endomorphism of entire universes in the
many-worlds sense - but would doom any change of immortality via digital

Onward!

Stephen

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/28/2012 1:32 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/28/2012 7:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Dear Bruno,

Let me see if my thoughts are correct as I can best write them.
COMP is the conjunction of Yes Doctor, the Church Thesis and
Arithmetic Realism, correct? I am now not sure of the definition of
Digital physics given this thread so far... From what I can tell,
Yes Doctor is built on the idea of functional substitutability at
some level or scale for physical systems, such that a given algorithm
will run on any functionally equivalent physical system; it is
basically a restatement of computational universality. This idea
shows us that our consciousness is not dependent on a particular form
of physical system if and only if our consciousness is algorithmic or
computable in the Turing sense. I am agnostic on this because I do
not see any evidence (pace Tegmark) that our brain's implementation
of consciousness does not involve quantum entanglement.

This is ambiguous.  Tegmark showed that quantum decoherence of ion
locations in neural processes is much faster than neural signaling,
therefore brain processing is almost all classical.  It is classical
*because* there is quantum entanglement between the ions and the
environment.  It is quantum entanglement with an environment
(something with many degrees of freedom) that produces decoherence and
classical behavior.  If you substitute for some neurons a silicon chip
that is designed to be functionally identical, that functionally
identical means it acts as a classical device to implement a certain
computational algorithm.  Of course it will be quantum entangled with
its environment because that's what makes it classical.

Maybe you meant you that you think brain processes may involve quantum
coherent superpositions - but that's what Tegmark refuted.

Brent
--

Dear Brent,

Not so fast! Tegmark's argument only holds, if it can be
experimentally verified that is,_only_ for ion transport based
processes. Consider theexperimental evidence
http://newscenter.lbl.gov/feature-stories/2010/05/10/untangling-quantum-entanglement/
for quantum entanglement in the photosynthesis process in algea, does
that not make you pause just a little bit in making your proclamation?

Onward!

Stephen

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/28/2012 1:40 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Stephen did wrote that, not me... ;)

2012/2/28 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net

On 2/28/2012 7:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Dear Bruno,

Let me see if my thoughts are correct as I can best write
them. COMP is the conjunction of Yes Doctor, the Church Thesis
and Arithmetic Realism, correct? I am now not sure of the
definition of Digital physics given this thread so far... From
what I can tell, Yes Doctor is built on the idea of functional
substitutability at some level or scale for physical systems,
such that a given algorithm will run on any functionally
equivalent physical system; it is basically a restatement of
computational universality. This idea shows us that our
consciousness is not dependent on a particular form of physical
system if and only if our consciousness is algorithmic or
computable in the Turing sense. I am agnostic on this because I
do not see any evidence (pace Tegmark) that our brain's
implementation of consciousness does not involve quantum
entanglement.

This is ambiguous.  Tegmark showed that quantum decoherence of ion
locations in neural processes is much faster than neural
signaling, therefore brain processing is almost all classical.  It
is classical *because* there is quantum entanglement between the
ions and the environment.  It is quantum entanglement with an
environment (something with many degrees of freedom) that produces
decoherence and classical behavior.  If you substitute for some
neurons a silicon chip that is designed to be functionally
identical, that functionally identical means it acts as a
classical device to implement a certain computational algorithm.
Of course it will be quantum entangled with its environment

because that's what makes it classical.

Maybe you meant you that you think brain processes may involve
quantum coherent superpositions - but that's what Tegmark refuted.

Brent

Hi Quentin,

Thank you for that. ;-)

Onward!

Stephen

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/28/2012 2:38 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 1:32 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/28/2012 7:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Dear Bruno,

Let me see if my thoughts are correct as I can best write them.
COMP is the conjunction of Yes Doctor, the Church Thesis and
Arithmetic Realism, correct? I am now not sure of the definition of
Digital physics given this thread so far... From what I can tell,
Yes Doctor is built on the idea of functional substitutability at
some level or scale for physical systems, such that a given
algorithm will run on any functionally equivalent physical system;
it is basically a restatement of computational universality. This
idea shows us that our consciousness is not dependent on a
particular form of physical system if and only if our consciousness
is algorithmic or computable in the Turing sense. I am agnostic on
this because I do not see any evidence (pace Tegmark) that our
brain's implementation of consciousness does not involve quantum
entanglement.

This is ambiguous.  Tegmark showed that quantum decoherence of ion
locations in neural processes is much faster than neural signaling,
therefore brain processing is almost all classical.  It is classical
*because* there is quantum entanglement between the ions and the
environment.  It is quantum entanglement with an environment
(something with many degrees of freedom) that produces decoherence
and classical behavior.  If you substitute for some neurons a silicon
chip that is designed to be functionally identical, that
functionally identical means it acts as a classical device to
implement a certain computational algorithm.  Of course it will be
quantum entangled with its environment because that's what makes it
classical.

Maybe you meant you that you think brain processes may involve
quantum coherent superpositions - but that's what Tegmark refuted.

Brent
--

Dear Brent,

Not so fast! Tegmark's argument only holds, if it can be
experimentally verified that is, _only_ for ion transport based
processes. Consider theexperimental evidence
http://newscenter.lbl.gov/feature-stories/2010/05/10/untangling-quantum-entanglement/
for quantum entanglement in the photosynthesis process in algea, does
that not make you pause just a little bit in making your proclamation?
Also see http://arxiv.org/abs/1012.4059 (dec. 18, 2010), Focus on
quantum effects and noise in biomolecules
http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/13/11/115002 ,
http://arxiv.org/abs/1104.2337 for the latest on the topic.
Classicality is not so easy to assume any more. I may seem unusually
confident but I do have indirect knowledge, via personal friend, of the
latest work at UC Berkeley on this question.

Onward!

Stephen

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/28/2012 11:38 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 1:32 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/28/2012 7:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Dear Bruno,

Let me see if my thoughts are correct as I can best write them. COMP is the
conjunction of Yes Doctor, the Church Thesis and Arithmetic Realism, correct? I am
now not sure of the definition of Digital physics given this thread so far... From
what I can tell, Yes Doctor is built on the idea of functional substitutability at
some level or scale for physical systems, such that a given algorithm will run on any
functionally equivalent physical system; it is basically a restatement of
computational universality. This idea shows us that our consciousness is not dependent
on a particular form of physical system if and only if our consciousness is
algorithmic or computable in the Turing sense. I am agnostic on this because I do not
see any evidence (pace Tegmark) that our brain's implementation of consciousness does
not involve quantum entanglement.

This is ambiguous.  Tegmark showed that quantum decoherence of ion locations in neural
processes is much faster than neural signaling, therefore brain processing is almost
all classical.  It is classical *because* there is quantum entanglement between the
ions and the environment.  It is quantum entanglement with an environment (something
with many degrees of freedom) that produces decoherence and classical behavior.  If you
substitute for some neurons a silicon chip that is designed to be functionally
identical, that functionally identical means it acts as a classical device to
implement a certain computational algorithm.  Of course it will be quantum entangled
with its environment because that's what makes it classical.

Maybe you meant you that you think brain processes may involve quantum coherent
superpositions - but that's what Tegmark refuted.

Brent
--

Dear Brent,

Not so fast! Tegmark's argument only holds, if it can be experimentally verified
that is,_only_ for ion transport based processes. Consider theexperimental evidence
http://newscenter.lbl.gov/feature-stories/2010/05/10/untangling-quantum-entanglement/
for quantum entanglement in the photosynthesis process in algea, does that not make you
pause just a little bit in making your proclamation?

No. Obviously all processes are quantum, the question is whether neural signaling involves
coherent superpositions.

Brent

Onward!

Stephen

No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com
Version: 2012.0.1913 / Virus Database: 2114/4837 - Release Date: 02/28/12

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything
List group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```On Feb 28, 10:43 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any
substituted for a digital brain.

What if you have two digital substitute brains? Do you become both
copies yourself at once and still not feel any difference? If not, and
you are in brain A, do you appear inside brain B if you turn brain A
off?

Disembodied consciousness is silly.

Craig

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/28/2012 11:48 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 2:38 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 1:32 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/28/2012 7:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Dear Bruno,

Let me see if my thoughts are correct as I can best write them. COMP is the
conjunction of Yes Doctor, the Church Thesis and Arithmetic Realism, correct? I am
now not sure of the definition of Digital physics given this thread so far... From
what I can tell, Yes Doctor is built on the idea of functional substitutability at
some level or scale for physical systems, such that a given algorithm will run on any
functionally equivalent physical system; it is basically a restatement of
computational universality. This idea shows us that our consciousness is not
dependent on a particular form of physical system if and only if our consciousness is
algorithmic or computable in the Turing sense. I am agnostic on this because I do not
see any evidence (pace Tegmark) that our brain's implementation of consciousness does
not involve quantum entanglement.

This is ambiguous.  Tegmark showed that quantum decoherence of ion locations in neural
processes is much faster than neural signaling, therefore brain processing is almost
all classical.  It is classical *because* there is quantum entanglement between the
ions and the environment.  It is quantum entanglement with an environment (something
with many degrees of freedom) that produces decoherence and classical behavior.  If
you substitute for some neurons a silicon chip that is designed to be functionally
identical, that functionally identical means it acts as a classical device to
implement a certain computational algorithm.  Of course it will be quantum entangled
with its environment because that's what makes it classical.

Maybe you meant you that you think brain processes may involve quantum coherent
superpositions - but that's what Tegmark refuted.

Brent
--

Dear Brent,

Not so fast! Tegmark's argument only holds, if it can be experimentally verified
that is, _only_ for ion transport based processes. Consider theexperimental evidence
http://newscenter.lbl.gov/feature-stories/2010/05/10/untangling-quantum-entanglement/
for quantum entanglement in the photosynthesis process in algea, does that not make you
pause just a little bit in making your proclamation?
Also see http://arxiv.org/abs/1012.4059 (dec. 18, 2010), Focus on quantum effects
and noise in biomolecules http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/13/11/115002 ,
http://arxiv.org/abs/1104.2337 for the latest on the topic.

None of those have anything to do with neural signaling in the brain.  They are about
metabolism and other molecular level processes.  If you think that the brain works by
molecular level processes then you need to explain why it is made of neurons with very
complex and extensive axon interconnections.  If consciousness were implemented by
molecular level information processing then a brain could be structured like a liver.

Brent

Classicality is not so easy to assume any more. I may seem unusually confident but I do
have indirect knowledge, via personal friend, of the latest work at UC Berkeley on this
question.

Onward!

Stephen

No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com
Version: 2012.0.1913 / Virus Database: 2114/4837 - Release Date: 02/28/12

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything
List group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/28/2012 12:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 28, 10:43 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.com  wrote:

Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any
substituted for a digital brain.

What if you have two digital substitute brains? Do you become both
copies yourself at once and still not feel any difference? If not, and
you are in brain A, do you appear inside brain B if you turn brain A
off?

Disembodied consciousness is silly.

Craig

The implication of Comp is that there is no you.  You are an abstraction, a fiction,
just another element in a model of the world.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```On Feb 28, 3:41 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

The implication of Comp is that there is no you.  You are an abstraction,
a fiction,
just another element in a model of the world.

That's why I say comp has only a pseudo-1p conception of
consciousness. It's not difficult to claim that the hard problem isn't
so hard if you allow the hardness of it to be fictional.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```2012/2/28 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com

On Feb 28, 10:43 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any
substituted for a digital brain.

What if you have two digital substitute brains? Do you become both
copies yourself at once

No

and still not feel any difference? If not, and
you are in brain A, do you appear inside brain B if you turn brain A
off?

Brain A and Brain B will feel has being a continuation of the you before
substitution... they'll both be your future you and both feel it... the you
before is no more. (even if you keep your current body... it's just
adding a brain C... and same reasonning).

Disembodied consciousness is silly.

I don't think consciousness can exist without a body and an environment...
without that what to be conscious of ? The substitution is not something

Quentin

Craig

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```2012/2/28 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net

On 2/28/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any
substituted for a digital brain.

Hi Quentin,

OK, but could you elaborate on this statement?

It means an hypothetical you after mind uploading would feel as conscious
as you're now in your biological body, and you would steel *feel* and feel
being you and conscious and all...

Is the differentiation that one *might* feel, given the wrong
substitution level, different from what *might* occur if a digital
continuity?

It depends on the wrongness of the substitution or the lack of
continuity... it's not binary outcome.

Those does not feel any difference terms are a bit ambiguous and vague,
IMHO.

Digital physics says that the whole universe can be substituted with a
program, that obviously imply comp (that we can substitue your brain with a
digital one), but comp shows that to be inconsistent, because comp implies
that any piece of matter is non-computable... it is the limit of the
infinities of computation that goes through your consciousness current
state.

Can you see how this would be a problem for the entire digital
classical way, for example by strictly classical level measurement of brain
structure?

Yes, and if it is, it is a big indication that comp is somehow wrong...

Any dependence of consciousness on quantum entanglement will prevent any
form of digital substitution. This might not be a bad thing for Bruno's
ontological argument - as it would show that 1p indeterminacy is a function
or endomorphism of entire universes in the many-worlds sense - but would

Sure, but if the level is that down... then even if it is still compatible
with comp, for all practical purposes, it's the same as if it was wrong...

Quentin

Onward!

Stephen

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```On Feb 28, 5:15 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

the you
before is no more.

That's what I have been arguing all along. Yes, doctor = Yes, death.
It's delightful that there will be a digital imposter/identical twin
who believes that they are someone with the same qualities that I
believed I had, before I died, but it really it invalidates any
pretensions comp has of honoring 1p experience.

Disembodied consciousness is silly.

I don't think consciousness can exist without a body and an environment...

Wait, so we actually agree on something?

without that what to be conscious of ? The substitution is not something

Bruno says all kinds of arithmetic dreams. But how can the
substitution not be synonymous with disembodied 'processes'? What
binds the experience of the program to the silicon?

Craig

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```2012/2/28 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com

On Feb 28, 5:15 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

the you
before is no more.

That's what I have been arguing all along. Yes, doctor = Yes, death.

No... tell me where is the you of 1 second ago ? When I say no more.. I
mean that... the you now, is not the you of one second ago, that you one
second ago is in the past, he is in the past and nowhere to be found in the
current moment, in the current moment, there is only the current you.

Beside that, that identity question is the same in MWI context.

It's delightful that there will be a digital imposter/identical twin
who believes that they are someone with the same qualities that I
believed I had, before I died, but it really it invalidates any
pretensions comp has of honoring 1p experience.

Disembodied consciousness is silly.

I don't think consciousness can exist without a body and an
environment...

Wait, so we actually agree on something?

without that what to be conscious of ? The substitution is not something

Bruno says all kinds of arithmetic dreams. But how can the
substitution not be synonymous with disembodied 'processes'? What
binds the experience of the program to the silicon?

Craig

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```On Feb 28, 6:10 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/2/28 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com

On Feb 28, 5:15 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

the you
before is no more.

That's what I have been arguing all along. Yes, doctor = Yes, death.

No... tell me where is the you of 1 second ago ?

I'm still here. The passage of time isn't objectively real. Nothing is
actually disappearing or passing away because of time alone.

When I say no more.. I
mean that... the you now, is not the you of one second ago, that you one
second ago is in the past, he is in the past and nowhere to be found in the
current moment, in the current moment, there is only the current you.

No, the current me contains my entire history. Nothing is lost, even
if I can't consciously recall particular memories. I don't remember
learning to read these words, but the experience of learning to read
them now is part of my perception of them. It's an inertial frame of
semantic relation that accumulates through experience, regardless of
the passage of time.

Beside that, that identity question is the same in MWI context.

It fails in that context too. The logic doesn't hold up. If I replace
my brain with a digital device, I either go on living my life or I do
not. If I do, then there can be no difference between one digital
brain and two and I would have to be now be living my life out of two
or (or two thousand) brains simultaneously. I think that this is the
only viable answer if we believe in comp, since the idea of arithmetic
truth makes identity something like an eternal radio frequency which
can be accessed at any time and plugged into any universal machine. To
me, it's clear that what would happen instead is that replacing your
brain with a digital puppet would cause you to lapse into a coma and
then die, while your body lived on doing an uncanny imitation of you
for an amazed audience.

Craig

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/28/2012 3:41 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/28/2012 12:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 28, 10:43 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.com  wrote:

Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any
substituted for a digital brain.

What if you have two digital substitute brains? Do you become both
copies yourself at once and still not feel any difference? If not, and
you are in brain A, do you appear inside brain B if you turn brain A
off?

Disembodied consciousness is silly.

Craig

The implication of Comp is that there is no you.  You are an
abstraction, a fiction, just another element in a model of the world.

Brent

Hi,

Just a question about the semantics. What difference is there
between a you and an abstraction that is indistinguishable from it?

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/28/2012 3:39 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/28/2012 11:48 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Not so fast! Tegmark's argument only holds, if it can be
experimentally verified that is, _only_ for ion transport based
processes. Consider theexperimental evidence
http://newscenter.lbl.gov/feature-stories/2010/05/10/untangling-quantum-entanglement/
for quantum entanglement in the photosynthesis process in algea,
does that not make you pause just a little bit in making your
proclamation?

Also see http://arxiv.org/abs/1012.4059Dear Brent,
(dec. 18, 2010), Focus on quantum effects and noise in biomolecules
http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/13/11/115002 ,
http://arxiv.org/abs/1104.2337 for the latest on the topic.

None of those have anything to do with neural signaling in the brain.
They are about metabolism and other molecular level processes.  If you
think that the brain works by molecular level processes then you need
to explain why it is made of neurons with very complex and extensive
axon interconnections.  If consciousness were implemented by molecular
level information processing then a brain could be structured like a
liver.

OK, I look forward to you getting a scan of your neuron connection
network and getting it run as a computational simulation. Then I might
have email conversations with two Brents! ;-)

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/28/2012 9:40 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 3:41 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/28/2012 12:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Feb 28, 10:43 am, Quentin Anciauxallco...@gmail.com  wrote:

Comp substitute consciousness... such as you could not feel any
substituted for a digital brain.

What if you have two digital substitute brains? Do you become both
copies yourself at once and still not feel any difference? If not, and
you are in brain A, do you appear inside brain B if you turn brain A
off?

Disembodied consciousness is silly.

Craig

The implication of Comp is that there is no you.  You are an abstraction, a
fiction, just another element in a model of the world.

Brent

Hi,

Just a question about the semantics. What difference is there between a you and an
abstraction that is indistinguishable from it?

The difference is that there isn't *a* you, there are arbitrarily many or at least there
will be momentarily.  The absraction is tracing just one of these.  This is already a
consequence of MWI in which quantum events cause you to split into orthogonal
subspaces.  To the extent consciousness is realized by classical processes the splitting
only happens when the quantum events have classical level effects.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

```

### Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

```
On 2/28/2012 9:43 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/28/2012 3:39 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/28/2012 11:48 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Not so fast! Tegmark's argument only holds, if it can be experimentally verified
that is, _only_ for ion transport based processes. Consider theexperimental evidence
http://newscenter.lbl.gov/feature-stories/2010/05/10/untangling-quantum-entanglement/
for quantum entanglement in the photosynthesis process in algea, does that not make
you pause just a little bit in making your proclamation?

Also see http://arxiv.org/abs/1012.4059Dear Brent,
(dec. 18, 2010), Focus on quantum effects and noise in biomolecules
http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/13/11/115002 , http://arxiv.org/abs/1104.2337
for the latest on the topic.

None of those have anything to do with neural signaling in the brain.  They are about
metabolism and other molecular level processes.  If you think that the brain works by
molecular level processes then you need to explain why it is made of neurons with very
complex and extensive axon interconnections.  If consciousness were implemented by
molecular level information processing then a brain could be structured like a liver.

OK, I look forward to you getting a scan of your neuron connection network and
getting it run as a computational simulation. Then I might have email conversations with
two Brents! ;-)

That would an impressive technological achievement.  But it might involve destroying the
first Brent.  :(

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to