On 14 Aug 2009, at 03:21, Colin Hales wrote:
Here's a nice pic to use in discussion from GEB. The map for a
formal system (a tree). A formal system could not draw this picture.
It is entirely and only ever 'a tree'. Humans dance in the forest.
col
You may compare Hofstadter's
On 14 Aug 2009, at 04:11, Brent Meeker wrote:
Colin Hales wrote:
Here's a nice pic to use in discussion from GEB. The map for a
formal system (a tree). A formal system could not draw this picture.
Where's your proof of this assertion?
Indeed. A case could be make that only a formal
I think I have at least two problems, not necessarily well formulated.
I accept that there are concepts(mathematical) that are not necessrily
part of the physical Universe(Multiverse). I do not see that there are
only the abstractions.
Also, Bruno mentions QM, as being included in COMP. QM is an
On 14 Aug, 03:11, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Colin Hales wrote:
Here's a nice pic to use in discussion from GEB. The map for a
formal system (a tree). A formal system could not draw this picture.
Where's your proof of this assertion?
Seconded.
On 13 Aug 2009, at 02:42, Colin Hales wrote:
It starts with the simple posit that if COMP is true then all
differences between a COMP world (AC) and the natural world (NC)
should be zero under all circumstances and the AC/NC distinction
would be false.
The difference between natural
2009/8/13 Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/12 Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au:
My motivation to kill COMP is purely aimed at bring a halt to the delusion
of the AGI community that Turing-computing will ever create a mind. They are
throwing
On 13 Aug, 01:42, Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au wrote:
I am not saying humans are magical. I am saying that humans do /not/
operate formally like COMP and that '/formally handling
inconsistency/' is not the same thing as '/delivering inconsistency by
being an informal/
On 13 Aug 2009, at 10:53, 1Z wrote:
On 13 Aug, 01:42, Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au wrote:
I am not saying humans are magical. I am saying that humans do /not/
operate formally like COMP and that '/formally handling
inconsistency/' is not the same thing as '/delivering
On 13 Aug, 10:30, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 13 Aug 2009, at 10:53, 1Z wrote:
On 13 Aug, 01:42, Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au wrote:
I am not saying humans are magical. I am saying that humans do /not/
operate formally like COMP and that '/formally
Colin Hales wrote:
Here's a nice pic to use in discussion from GEB. The map for a
formal system (a tree). A formal system could not draw this picture.
Where's your proof of this assertion?
Brent
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you
Hi,
I guess I am pretty much over the need for any 'ism whatever. I can
re-classify my ideas in terms of an 'ism, but that process tells me
nothing extra and offers no extra empirical clue. I think I can classify
fairly succinctly the difference between approaches:
*(A) Colin*
(a) There is a
2009/8/12 Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au:
My motivation to kill COMP is purely aimed at bring a halt to the delusion
of the AGI community that Turing-computing will ever create a mind. They are
throwing away $millions based on a false belief. Their expectations need to
be
Colin,
We agree on the conclusion. We disagree on vocabulary, and on the
validity of your reasoning.
Let us call I-comp the usual indexical mechanism discussed in this
list (comp).
Let us call m-comp the thesis that there is a primitive natural
world, and that it can be described by a
On 11 Aug 2009, at 02:06, ronaldheld wrote:
I am behind, because I was away delivering Science talk to Star Trek
fans.
I am uncertain what to take away from this thread, and could use the
clarification.
I will think about it. It could help if you were a bit more specific.
As an aside,
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/12 Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au:
My motivation to kill COMP is purely aimed at bring a halt to the delusion
of the AGI community that Turing-computing will ever create a mind. They are
throwing away $millions based on a false belief. Their
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Colin,
We agree on the conclusion. We disagree on vocabulary, and on the
validity of your reasoning.
Let us call I-comp the usual indexical mechanism discussed in this
list (comp).
Let us call m-comp the thesis that there is a primitive natural
world, and that it
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Aug 2009, at 09:08, Colin Hales wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Aug 2009, at 04:37, Colin Hales wrote:
Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
refutation of computationalism.
It's going through peer review at the moment.
The basic
Hi Colin,
It seems that to me that until one understands the nature of the extreme
Idealism that COMP entails, no arguement based on the physical will do...
I refute it thus!
-Dr. Johnson http://www.samueljohnson.com/refutati.html
Onward!
Stephen
- Original Message -
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Aug 2009, at 04:37, Colin Hales wrote:
Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
refutation of computationalism.
It's going through peer review at the moment.
The basic problem that most people fall foul of is the conflation of
On 10 Aug 2009, at 09:08, Colin Hales wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Aug 2009, at 04:37, Colin Hales wrote:
Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
refutation of computationalism.
It's going through peer review at the moment.
The basic problem that most
On 10 Aug, 03:54, Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au wrote:
ronaldheld wrote:
As a formally trained Physicist, what do I accept? that Physics is
well represented mathematically? That the Multiverse is composed of
mathematical structures some of which represent physical laws? Or
On 10 Aug 2009, at 11:04, 1Z wrote (to Colin Hales):
I am not sure what you are saying here. Computationalism is
generally taken to be a claim about the mind, and is quite a
respectable thesis
I agree
Bruno's comp is something rather different and idiosyncratic
You keep saying this.
Hi Peter,
Bruno's comp is something rather different and idiosyncratic
You keep saying this. This is a lie.
I am not yet entirely sure of this. Let me correct my statement by
saying that this is just a common lie, similar to those who have been
made purposefully in the seventies,
I am behind, because I was away delivering Science talk to Star Trek
fans.
I am uncertain what to take away from this thread, and could use the
clarification.
As an aside, I read(or tried to) read the SANE paper on the plane.
Ronald
On Aug 10, 11:24
ronaldheld wrote:
As a formally trained Physicist, what do I accept? that Physics is
well represented mathematically? That the Multiverse is composed of
mathematical structures some of which represent physical laws? Or
something else?
Ronald
On Mon, Aug 10, 2009 at 12:54:00PM +1000, Colin Hales wrote:
ronaldheld wrote:
As a formally trained Physicist, what do I accept? that Physics is
well represented mathematically? That the Multiverse is composed of
mathematical structures some of which represent physical laws? Or
regrettable snips to get at the heart of it. One thing at a time. Hope
you don't mind.
russell standish wrote:
Nobody is suggesting that brains are Turing machines. All that is
being suggested (by COMP) is that brains perform computations (and
nothing but), hence can be perfectly emulated by
On 08 Aug 2009, at 05:20, ronaldheld wrote:
As a formally trained Physicist, what do I accept?
It depends of many things. Most physicists and non physicists take
more or less for granted an Aristotelian picture of reality.
Now, if you are willing to believe that you can survive classical
On 08 Aug 2009, at 20:01, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Actually physicians have literally created new interesting branch in
math
I mean physicists of course. So sorry.
Well, actually I know a physician, Philippe Smets, the creator of
IRIDIA, where I am working, who was a physician, not a
As a formally trained Physicist, what do I accept? that Physics is
well represented mathematically? That the Multiverse is composed of
mathematical structures some of which represent physical laws? Or
something else?
Ronald
On Aug 6, 10:23 pm, Brent
Hi,
it seems you start with the assumptions that an AI can't do science as
humans... to conclude just that.
Regards,
Quentin
2009/8/6 Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au:
Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed refutation
of computationalism.
It's going through
On 06 Aug 2009, at 04:37, Colin Hales wrote:
Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
refutation of computationalism.
It's going through peer review at the moment.
The basic problem that most people fall foul of is the conflation of
'physics-as-computation' with
On Thu, Aug 06, 2009 at 12:37:38PM +1000, Colin Hales wrote:
(b) is not a claim of truth or falsehood. It is a claim that the very
idea of Sa ever proposing COMP (= doubting that COMP is true) is
impossible. This is because it is a formal system trying, with a fixed,
formal set of rules
On 6 Aug, 03:37, Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au wrote:
(b) is not a claim of truth or falsehood. It is a claim that the very
idea of Sa ever proposing COMP (= doubting that COMP is true) is
impossible. This is because it is a formal system trying, with a fixed,
formal set of
Brent Meeker wrote:
Colin Hales wrote:
Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
refutation of computationalism.
It's going through peer review at the moment.
The basic problem that most people fall foul of is the conflation of
'physics-as-computation' with the
If computationalism is true, and computation is the source of
conscious experience, then shouldn't we expect that what is
ontologically real is the simplest possible universe that can develop
and support physical systems that are Turing equivalent?
Does our universe look like such a universe?
Colin Hales wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Colin Hales wrote:
Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
refutation of computationalism.
It's going through peer review at the moment.
The basic problem that most people fall foul of is the conflation of
Rex Allen wrote:
If computationalism is true, and computation is the source of
conscious experience, then shouldn't we expect that what is
ontologically real is the simplest possible universe that can develop
and support physical systems that are Turing equivalent?
Does our universe look
Brent Meeker wrote:
Colin Hales wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Colin Hales wrote:
Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
refutation of computationalism.
It's going through peer review at the moment.
The basic problem that most people fall foul
Colin Hales wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Colin Hales wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Colin Hales wrote:
Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
refutation of computationalism.
It's going through peer review at the moment.
The basic problem that
On 31 July, 22:39, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
I note that the recent posts by Peter Jones - aka the mysterious 1Z,
and the originator of the curiously useful 'real in the sense I am
real' or RITSIAR - occurred shortly after my taking his name in vain.
Hmm...
Anyway, this
Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
refutation of computationalism.
It's going through peer review at the moment.
The basic problem that most people fall foul of is the conflation of
'physics-as-computation' with the type of computation that is being
carried out in
Colin Hales wrote:
Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
refutation of computationalism.
It's going through peer review at the moment.
The basic problem that most people fall foul of is the conflation of
'physics-as-computation' with the type of computation that
On Mon, Aug 3, 2009 at 7:43 AM, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
John,
Is not the difference between human and non human a human illusion?
With Church Turing thesis we can suspect the existence of universal
illusions.
Maybe illusions can be detected due to timing discrepancies between
Bruno,
let me continue as 'enfent terrible':
Isn't the Church Thesis - and whatever WE suspect by it - also human
illusions?
(Watch out: the next question will concern 'numbers'!)
John M
On Mon, Aug 3, 2009 at 6:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
John,
Is not the difference
2009/8/1 John Mikes jami...@gmail.com:
Hi John
Actually, I posted the diatribe just before setting off on the
seven-hour drive to the Scottish hills. It's raining just at the
moment so I'm taking the opportunity to thank you for your post and
for your concern for my welfare, but this is
David Nyman wrote:
...
Now, you don't of course have to accept COMP. But if you want to be a
physical realist, it means you can only hang on to the computational
explanation of mind by eliminating the mind itself from reality.
Personally, not being committed to such an explanation, this
David,
I thought you are facing the Scottish mountains for a relaxation and instead
here is a long - enjoyable- tirade about ideas which I try to put below into
a shorthand form by *my* vocabulary. But first a plea to Mrs. N:
*'please, do keep David away from te computer for the time of the
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