Roger, And you do not know the difference between a string particle and a CYM monad particle. Let's stop with the insults. Richard
On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 5:27 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote: > Hi Richard Ruquist > > You keep getting physical strings mixed up with theoretical strings. > And then you mix this up with monads. > > Theoretical strings are not physical and monads are not physical. > Period. You'd do better to stick to straight materialism since > you seem to have no understranding of idealism. > > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 10/11/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Richard Ruquist > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-10, 15:52:29 > Subject: Re: Re: more firewalls > > > Craig, > Neurons are made in accordance with physical laws. > > You are confusing string theory with comp which apparently makes everything. > > String theory monads are made in the big bang by having the excess > dimensions of the space of string theory curl up into 1000 planck > diameter particles that precipitate out of 3-D space. In fact they're > curling up is what allows 3-D space to inflate. As space is still > expanding, monads are apparently still being made. > > The monads exist in what would be commonly called a supernatural realm. > They solve the hard problems of consciousness. Neurons do not. That is > why they are needed. But the fact is that according to string theory, > they (the monads) exist. > > You can quibble with string theory if you like. In my models that > extend string theory to consciousness, string theory is assumed to be > correct, even if my modelling is incorrect. > All I claim is that my model is one possibility among many that > probably can never be proven. > Richard > > On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 2:47 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 2:32:40 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >>> >>> Craig, >>> The experiencers are the monads and the physical neurons.. >>> I conjure experiencers because I have experiences. >>> But it appears that two kinds of experiencers are necessary. >>> The BEC just connects them. I do not care what you call that. >>> Names are not important. >>> Richard >>> >> >> I agree that the names aren't important, but why are there two different >> unrelated kinds of experiences? Do the monads make the neurons, and if so, >> why? Or do the neurons make monads, and again, why? If you have either one, >> why have the other? >> >> Craig >> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Craig Weinberg >>> wrote: >>> > >>> > >>> > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >>> >> >>> >> Craig, >>> >> >>> >> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the >>> >> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if >>> >> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then >>> >> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. >>> >> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. >>> > >>> > >>> > I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I >>> > think >>> > that what you are describing would be technically categorized as >>> > interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed >>> > to be >>> > two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that >>> > doesn't...bleed? >>> > (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29) >>> > >>> >> >>> >> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory >>> >> monads.. >>> >> >>> >> For example take the binding problem where: >>> >> "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different >>> >> objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single >>> >> neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each >>> >> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) >>> >> However, at a density of 10^90/cc >>> >> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), >>> >> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for >>> >> "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial >>> >> location" >>> >> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) >>> > >>> > >>> > I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only >>> > tries >>> > to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually >>> > suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. The >>> > hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'? >>> > >>> >> >>> >> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things >>> >> because of the BEC entanglement connection. >>> >> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory >>> >> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness >>> >> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads >>> >> perhaps to solve the binding problem >>> >> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. >>> > >>> > >>> > This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and >>> > neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in >>> > what >>> > we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the idea of human >>> > consciousness being instantiated by a particular neuroscientific-quantum >>> > framework, but it still doesn't touch the hard problem. Why does this >>> > capacity to experience exist at all? Can't a BEC or microtubule ensemble >>> > perform each and every function that you say it does without conjuring >>> > an >>> > experiencer? >>> > >>> > Craig >>> > >>> >> >>> >> Richard >>> >> >>> > -- >>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> > Groups >>> > "Everything List" group. >>> > To view this discussion on the web visit >>> > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/SK1WBWfunroJ. >>> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> > everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>> > For more options, visit this group at >>> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/iPDr2MZS2MUJ. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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