Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 1 Jul 2019, at 09:45, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, June 30, 2019 at 1:13:00 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 28 Jun 2019, at 16:52, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> If an ARM processor running any ARM code [ http://www.toves.org/books/arm/ 
>>  ] program is ever conscious, or a computer 
>> consisting of 10^10 ARM processors running multiprocessor ARM code is ever 
>> conscious them the "computationalist theory of mind" holds. If not, it 
>> doesn’t.
> 
> The point is that elementary arithmetic run, out of tie and space, in the 
> precise mathematical sense of “run”, all programs, infinitely often with a 
> precise mathematical redundancy, and once you agree that such 10^100 ARM 
> processor are conscious, they get the same problem as us, which computations 
> run them. By reasoning they know that below their substitution level there 
> should be a complex statistics on *all* computations, and above, there are 
> the laws of physics and finitely many universal neighbours. 
> 
> Keep in mind that all universal system can imitate all other universal 
> system. That play a role in metaphysics, not in applications. 
> 
> I read a summary of a paper justifying the (rather complex and mysterious) 
> kinetic of enzymes by the fact that some could exploits some quantum 
> computation. That could lower down the substitution level a lot and 10^10 ARM 
> might not been enough, if the substitution level is at the biochemical level. 
> But again, the weak Mechanist assumption I work with is that it exists such a 
> level (being totally neutral on it in particular).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> I think I meant 10^100 (vs. 10^10 I wrote, or rather size - in this case - 
> doesn't matter). And the ARMs could be replaced by QuARMs (ARMs w/qubits). It 
> still would not have the experientiality of biocomputers.
> 
> But the idea of computing as elementary arithmetic run, out of time and 
> space, in the precise mathematical sense of “run”, all programs, infinitely 
> often with a precise mathematical redundancy is certainly a 'Platonic' or 
> immaterially pure idea of computing (and of course I call it 'fictional', but 
> that's OK).

OK. Computation is a mathematical notion. 




> But following Donald Rumsfeld, you compute with the computers you have (the 
> stuff engineers can use to make ''computers' - of whatever materials, 
> including biomaterials), not with the computers  you don't have (Platonic 
> arithmetic).

Thanks God, there is still no patent for using the numbers, and you don’t have 
to pay taxes when using the model opens rule.

So, no need to invoke a “physical-ontological universe” to explain why a 
machine needs a concrete computer, relatively to itself to make a concrete 
computation relatively to some other universal numbers, be it a colleague, a 
friend, a teacher, …

The goal here is not to sell computers. But to understand where the illusion of 
physical computers comes from, and why that illusion is persistent.

We believe already, by computer science and Mechanism, that such illusion 
exist, are lawful, and gives rise to physical realities, and this in a way 
precise enough to be tested experimentally, and Quantum Mechanics does confirms 
the main features made obligatory from Mechanism.

That does not make biocomputing, and unconventional programming less 
interesting, but it found them on rigorous, and rather simple (conceptually) 
base.

Bruno 





> 
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
> 
> 
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Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, June 30, 2019 at 1:13:00 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Jun 2019, at 16:52, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
> If an ARM processor running any ARM code [ http://www.toves.org/books/arm/ ] 
> program is ever conscious, or a computer consisting of 10^10 ARM processors 
> running multiprocessor ARM code is ever conscious them the 
> "computationalist theory of mind" holds. If not, it doesn’t.
>
>
> The point is that elementary arithmetic run, out of tie and space, in the 
> precise mathematical sense of “run”, all programs, infinitely often with a 
> precise mathematical redundancy, and once you agree that such 10^100 ARM 
> processor are conscious, they get the same problem as us, which 
> computations run them. By reasoning they know that below their substitution 
> level there should be a complex statistics on *all* computations, and 
> above, there are the laws of physics and finitely many universal 
> neighbours. 
>
> Keep in mind that all universal system can imitate all other universal 
> system. That play a role in metaphysics, not in applications. 
>
> I read a summary of a paper justifying the (rather complex and mysterious) 
> kinetic of enzymes by the fact that some could exploits some quantum 
> computation. That could lower down the substitution level a lot and 10^10 
> ARM might not been enough, if the substitution level is at the biochemical 
> level. But again, the weak Mechanist assumption I work with is that it 
> exists such a level (being totally neutral on it in particular).
>
> Bruno
>
>
I think I meant 10^100 (vs. 10^10 I wrote, or rather size - in this case - 
doesn't matter). And the ARMs could be replaced by QuARMs (ARMs w/qubits). 
It still would not have the *experientiality* of biocomputers.

But the idea of computing as *elementary arithmetic run, out of time and 
space, in the precise mathematical sense of “run”, all programs, infinitely 
often with a precise mathematical redundancy is* certainly a 'Platonic' or 
immaterially pure idea of computing (and of course I call it 'fictional', 
but that's OK). But following Donald Rumsfeld, *you compute with the 
computers you have *(the stuff engineers can use to make ''computers' - of 
whatever materials, including *biomaterials*), *not with the computers * 
you don't have (Platonic arithmetic).


@philipthrift



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Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Jun 2019, at 16:52, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, June 28, 2019 at 4:58:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 26 Jun 2019, at 16:23, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, June 26, 2019 at 8:45:42 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 26 Jun 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, June 26, 2019 at 3:55:26 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 25 Jun 2019, at 20:17, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Tuesday, June 25, 2019 at 10:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 The universal machine provides an account of its 
 body/code/theory/finite-things/number (the []p of G1 and Z1, according to 
 some nuances, as well as G1* and Z1*). 
 
 I don’t know what you mean by psychical body. With mechanism, the very 
 notion of body is psychical, and the soul is not material, not even 
 reducible (by the machine itself) to anything 3p-representable.
 
 With mechanism, we can be neutral on some informon particle or psychon, as 
 long as their relevant doing is Turing emulable. 
 
 From a logical point of view, your theory might still be confirmed in the 
 universal machine discourses and phenomenologies.
 
 We have started the interview of the universal machines relatively 
 recently, 1931. It is an infinite story. Today we want to believe that 
 they are docile slaves, but even without mechanism, they somehow warned us 
 that they aren’t.
 
 Bruno
 
 
  
 
 The "psychical body" is just the fundamental panpsychic assumption: Just 
 as we think things have physical properties (mass, charge, polarity, ...) 
 we think those same things have psychical (or experiential) properties 
 (qualia, phenomenologicals like colors, taste, freedom, happiness, 
 selfness, …).
>>> 
>>> Of course we have already agree to disagree on this. I mean, I do not 
>>> assume the physical reality, and with mechanism, things like mass, charge 
>>> .. have to be explained from G*, qG* (number theology, as I call it).
>>> 
>>> 
 
 Modal provability mathematics relates to them - experiential semantics - 
 as being a (possible) denotational semantics counterpoint.
>>> 
>>> That seems nice, but if that work, that would be a reason more to 
>>> distinguish “pan” (in oanpsychism) from anything physical, given that the 
>>> modal provability logic are consequence of arithmetic (without further 
>>> assumption).
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> In the end I can see number crunching - of numbers of whatever level or 
>>> "universality" - only being a mere model (or simulation) at best of what 
>>> there is in reality - which is called matter. 
>> 
>> I have no logical problem with this, as long as you say “no” to the 
>> digitalist doctor.
>> 
>> I do have a problem of motivation, because I have no clue what you mean by 
>> “matter”. If it is the “observable by universal machine”, then, by saying 
>> yes to the doctor, it is quasi-trivial that numbers observe things, and it 
>> is argued,  less trivially that it should be the same observable as ours, 
>> making the digital mechanist hypothesis testable.
>> 
>> Note that the Digital Mechanist hypothesis makes the Digital Physicalist 
>> hypothesis inconsistent. Many are wrong on this (unless I am wrong in my 
>> work, of course).
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> matter = material substratum 
>> 
>> The existence of a material substratum was posited by John Locke 
>> ,
> 
> I would have said that Aristotle, and perhaps the ancient atomist did come up 
> with this before.
> 
> 
> 
>> with conceptual similarities to Baruch Spinoza 
>> 's substance 
> 
> 
> I tend to agree with you, but among my students this year I have a 
> philosopher who like very much Spinoza, and he criticises a lot that 
> interpretation of Spinoza. Now, he considers only Spinoza treatise “the 
> Ethic”, and dismiss most of his other writing. I find Spinoza not enough 
> clear on this.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> and Immanuel Kant 's concept of 
>> the noumenon  (in The Critique of 
>> Pure Reason ).
> 
> Again, I agree with you, but hereto Kant is unclear, and different readers 
> have different opinion on this.
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypokeimenon 
>> 
> 
> Substance is the latine for the greek Hypostasis. The word “substance" in 
> philosophy is sometimes used for Aristotle’s primary matter, which is at the 
> antipode of the use of “hypostasis” by the neoplatonist, where the hypostases 
> are more like fundamental modes of view.
> 
> The "material hypostases” (sensible and intelligible matter) are more close 
> to 

Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, June 28, 2019 at 4:58:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 26 Jun 2019, at 16:23, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, June 26, 2019 at 8:45:42 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 26 Jun 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, June 26, 2019 at 3:55:26 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 25 Jun 2019, at 20:17, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, June 25, 2019 at 10:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 The universal machine provides an account of its 
 body/code/theory/finite-things/number (the []p of G1 and Z1, according to 
 some nuances, as well as G1* and Z1*). 

 I don’t know what you mean by psychical body. With mechanism, the very 
 notion of body is psychical, and the soul is not material, not even 
 reducible (by the machine itself) to anything 3p-representable.

 With mechanism, we can be neutral on some informon particle or psychon, 
 as long as their relevant doing is Turing emulable. 

 From a logical point of view, your theory might still be confirmed in 
 the universal machine discourses and phenomenologies.

 We have started the interview of the universal machines relatively 
 recently, 1931. It is an infinite story. Today we want to believe that 
 they 
 are docile slaves, but even without mechanism, they somehow warned us that 
 they aren’t.

 Bruno


>>>  
>>>
>>> The "psychical body" is just the fundamental panpsychic assumption: Just 
>>> as we think things have physical properties (mass, charge, polarity, ...) 
>>> we think those same things have psychical (or experiential) properties 
>>> (qualia, phenomenologicals like colors, taste, freedom, happiness, 
>>> selfness, …).
>>>
>>>
>>> Of course we have already agree to disagree on this. I mean, I do not 
>>> assume the physical reality, and with mechanism, things like mass, charge 
>>> .. have to be explained from G*, qG* (number theology, as I call it).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Modal provability mathematics relates to them - *experiential semantics* 
>>> - as being a (possible) *denotational semantics *counterpoint.
>>>
>>>
>>> That seems nice, but if that work, that would be a reason more to 
>>> distinguish “pan” (in oanpsychism) from anything physical, given that the 
>>> modal provability logic are consequence of arithmetic (without further 
>>> assumption).
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> In the end I can see *number crunching* - of numbers of whatever level 
>> or "universality" - only being a mere model (or simulation) *at best* of 
>> what there is in reality - which is called* matter*. 
>>
>>
>> I have no logical problem with this, as long as you say “no” to the 
>> digitalist doctor.
>>
>> I do have a problem of motivation, because I have no clue what you mean 
>> by “matter”. If it is the “observable by universal machine”, then, by 
>> saying yes to the doctor, it is quasi-trivial that numbers observe things, 
>> and it is argued,  less trivially that it should be the same observable as 
>> ours, making the digital mechanist hypothesis testable.
>>
>> Note that the Digital Mechanist hypothesis makes the Digital Physicalist 
>> hypothesis inconsistent. Many are wrong on this (unless I am wrong in my 
>> work, of course).
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> matter = material substratum 
>
> The existence of a *material substratum* was posited by John Locke 
> , 
>
>
> I would have said that Aristotle, and perhaps the ancient atomist did come 
> up with this before.
>
>
>
> with conceptual similarities to Baruch Spinoza 
> 's *substance* 
>
>
>
> I tend to agree with you, but among my students this year I have a 
> philosopher who like very much Spinoza, and he criticises a lot that 
> interpretation of Spinoza. Now, he considers only Spinoza treatise “the 
> Ethic”, and dismiss most of his other writing. I find Spinoza not enough 
> clear on this.
>
>
>
>
> and Immanuel Kant 's concept 
> of the *noumenon * (in *The 
> Critique of Pure Reason 
> *).
>
>
> Again, I agree with you, but hereto Kant is unclear, and different readers 
> have different opinion on this.
>
>
>
>
> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypokeimenon
>
>
>
> Substance is the latine for the greek Hypostasis. The word “substance" in 
> philosophy is sometimes used for Aristotle’s primary matter, which is at 
> the antipode of the use of “hypostasis” by the neoplatonist, where the 
> hypostases are more like fundamental modes of view.
>
> The "material hypostases” (sensible and intelligible matter) are more 
> close to the modern idea of “invariant” in physics than of a material 
> substance that things should be made-of.
>  I don’t assume that type of thing. Like 

Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 26 Jun 2019, at 16:23, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, June 26, 2019 at 8:45:42 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 26 Jun 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, June 26, 2019 at 3:55:26 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 25 Jun 2019, at 20:17, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tuesday, June 25, 2019 at 10:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>> The universal machine provides an account of its 
>>> body/code/theory/finite-things/number (the []p of G1 and Z1, according to 
>>> some nuances, as well as G1* and Z1*). 
>>> 
>>> I don’t know what you mean by psychical body. With mechanism, the very 
>>> notion of body is psychical, and the soul is not material, not even 
>>> reducible (by the machine itself) to anything 3p-representable.
>>> 
>>> With mechanism, we can be neutral on some informon particle or psychon, as 
>>> long as their relevant doing is Turing emulable. 
>>> 
>>> From a logical point of view, your theory might still be confirmed in the 
>>> universal machine discourses and phenomenologies.
>>> 
>>> We have started the interview of the universal machines relatively 
>>> recently, 1931. It is an infinite story. Today we want to believe that they 
>>> are docile slaves, but even without mechanism, they somehow warned us that 
>>> they aren’t.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> The "psychical body" is just the fundamental panpsychic assumption: Just as 
>>> we think things have physical properties (mass, charge, polarity, ...) we 
>>> think those same things have psychical (or experiential) properties 
>>> (qualia, phenomenologicals like colors, taste, freedom, happiness, 
>>> selfness, …).
>> 
>> Of course we have already agree to disagree on this. I mean, I do not assume 
>> the physical reality, and with mechanism, things like mass, charge .. have 
>> to be explained from G*, qG* (number theology, as I call it).
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Modal provability mathematics relates to them - experiential semantics - as 
>>> being a (possible) denotational semantics counterpoint.
>> 
>> That seems nice, but if that work, that would be a reason more to 
>> distinguish “pan” (in oanpsychism) from anything physical, given that the 
>> modal provability logic are consequence of arithmetic (without further 
>> assumption).
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> In the end I can see number crunching - of numbers of whatever level or 
>> "universality" - only being a mere model (or simulation) at best of what 
>> there is in reality - which is called matter. 
> 
> I have no logical problem with this, as long as you say “no” to the 
> digitalist doctor.
> 
> I do have a problem of motivation, because I have no clue what you mean by 
> “matter”. If it is the “observable by universal machine”, then, by saying yes 
> to the doctor, it is quasi-trivial that numbers observe things, and it is 
> argued,  less trivially that it should be the same observable as ours, making 
> the digital mechanist hypothesis testable.
> 
> Note that the Digital Mechanist hypothesis makes the Digital Physicalist 
> hypothesis inconsistent. Many are wrong on this (unless I am wrong in my 
> work, of course).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> matter = material substratum 
> 
> The existence of a material substratum was posited by John Locke 
> ,

I would have said that Aristotle, and perhaps the ancient atomist did come up 
with this before.



> with conceptual similarities to Baruch Spinoza 
> 's substance 


I tend to agree with you, but among my students this year I have a philosopher 
who like very much Spinoza, and he criticises a lot that interpretation of 
Spinoza. Now, he considers only Spinoza treatise “the Ethic”, and dismiss most 
of his other writing. I find Spinoza not enough clear on this.




> and Immanuel Kant 's concept of 
> the noumenon  (in The Critique of 
> Pure Reason ).

Again, I agree with you, but hereto Kant is unclear, and different readers have 
different opinion on this.



> 
> - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypokeimenon 
> 

Substance is the latine for the greek Hypostasis. The word “substance" in 
philosophy is sometimes used for Aristotle’s primary matter, which is at the 
antipode of the use of “hypostasis” by the neoplatonist, where the hypostases 
are more like fundamental modes of view.

The "material hypostases” (sensible and intelligible matter) are more close to 
the modern idea of “invariant” in physics than of a material substance that 
things should be made-of.
 I don’t assume that type of thing. Like God, it is too much unclear to be 
assumed in a fundamental theory, I think. 

With the computationalist theory of mind, it does not make sense at all. 

Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, June 26, 2019 at 8:45:42 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 26 Jun 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, June 26, 2019 at 3:55:26 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 25 Jun 2019, at 20:17, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, June 25, 2019 at 10:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> The universal machine provides an account of its 
>>> body/code/theory/finite-things/number (the []p of G1 and Z1, according to 
>>> some nuances, as well as G1* and Z1*). 
>>>
>>> I don’t know what you mean by psychical body. With mechanism, the very 
>>> notion of body is psychical, and the soul is not material, not even 
>>> reducible (by the machine itself) to anything 3p-representable.
>>>
>>> With mechanism, we can be neutral on some informon particle or psychon, 
>>> as long as their relevant doing is Turing emulable. 
>>>
>>> From a logical point of view, your theory might still be confirmed in 
>>> the universal machine discourses and phenomenologies.
>>>
>>> We have started the interview of the universal machines relatively 
>>> recently, 1931. It is an infinite story. Today we want to believe that they 
>>> are docile slaves, but even without mechanism, they somehow warned us that 
>>> they aren’t.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>  
>>
>> The "psychical body" is just the fundamental panpsychic assumption: Just 
>> as we think things have physical properties (mass, charge, polarity, ...) 
>> we think those same things have psychical (or experiential) properties 
>> (qualia, phenomenologicals like colors, taste, freedom, happiness, 
>> selfness, …).
>>
>>
>> Of course we have already agree to disagree on this. I mean, I do not 
>> assume the physical reality, and with mechanism, things like mass, charge 
>> .. have to be explained from G*, qG* (number theology, as I call it).
>>
>>
>>
>> Modal provability mathematics relates to them - *experiential semantics* 
>> - as being a (possible) *denotational semantics *counterpoint.
>>
>>
>> That seems nice, but if that work, that would be a reason more to 
>> distinguish “pan” (in oanpsychism) from anything physical, given that the 
>> modal provability logic are consequence of arithmetic (without further 
>> assumption).
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>
> In the end I can see *number crunching* - of numbers of whatever level or 
> "universality" - only being a mere model (or simulation) *at best* of 
> what there is in reality - which is called* matter*. 
>
>
> I have no logical problem with this, as long as you say “no” to the 
> digitalist doctor.
>
> I do have a problem of motivation, because I have no clue what you mean by 
> “matter”. If it is the “observable by universal machine”, then, by saying 
> yes to the doctor, it is quasi-trivial that numbers observe things, and it 
> is argued,  less trivially that it should be the same observable as ours, 
> making the digital mechanist hypothesis testable.
>
> Note that the Digital Mechanist hypothesis makes the Digital Physicalist 
> hypothesis inconsistent. Many are wrong on this (unless I am wrong in my 
> work, of course).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

matter = material substratum 

The existence of a *material substratum* was posited by John Locke 
, with conceptual similarities to 
Baruch 
Spinoza 's *substance* and 
Immanuel 
Kant 's concept of the *noumenon 
* (in *The Critique of Pure Reason 
*).

- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypokeimenon

@philipthrift

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Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 26 Jun 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, June 26, 2019 at 3:55:26 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 25 Jun 2019, at 20:17, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, June 25, 2019 at 10:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> The universal machine provides an account of its 
>> body/code/theory/finite-things/number (the []p of G1 and Z1, according to 
>> some nuances, as well as G1* and Z1*). 
>> 
>> I don’t know what you mean by psychical body. With mechanism, the very 
>> notion of body is psychical, and the soul is not material, not even 
>> reducible (by the machine itself) to anything 3p-representable.
>> 
>> With mechanism, we can be neutral on some informon particle or psychon, as 
>> long as their relevant doing is Turing emulable. 
>> 
>> From a logical point of view, your theory might still be confirmed in the 
>> universal machine discourses and phenomenologies.
>> 
>> We have started the interview of the universal machines relatively recently, 
>> 1931. It is an infinite story. Today we want to believe that they are docile 
>> slaves, but even without mechanism, they somehow warned us that they aren’t.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> The "psychical body" is just the fundamental panpsychic assumption: Just as 
>> we think things have physical properties (mass, charge, polarity, ...) we 
>> think those same things have psychical (or experiential) properties (qualia, 
>> phenomenologicals like colors, taste, freedom, happiness, selfness, …).
> 
> Of course we have already agree to disagree on this. I mean, I do not assume 
> the physical reality, and with mechanism, things like mass, charge .. have to 
> be explained from G*, qG* (number theology, as I call it).
> 
> 
>> 
>> Modal provability mathematics relates to them - experiential semantics - as 
>> being a (possible) denotational semantics counterpoint.
> 
> That seems nice, but if that work, that would be a reason more to distinguish 
> “pan” (in oanpsychism) from anything physical, given that the modal 
> provability logic are consequence of arithmetic (without further assumption).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> In the end I can see number crunching - of numbers of whatever level or 
> "universality" - only being a mere model (or simulation) at best of what 
> there is in reality - which is called matter. 

I have no logical problem with this, as long as you say “no” to the digitalist 
doctor.

I do have a problem of motivation, because I have no clue what you mean by 
“matter”. If it is the “observable by universal machine”, then, by saying yes 
to the doctor, it is quasi-trivial that numbers observe things, and it is 
argued,  less trivially that it should be the same observable as ours, making 
the digital mechanist hypothesis testable.

Note that the Digital Mechanist hypothesis makes the Digital Physicalist 
hypothesis inconsistent. Many are wrong on this (unless I am wrong in my work, 
of course).

Bruno



> 
> @philipthrift
> 
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Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, June 26, 2019 at 3:55:26 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Jun 2019, at 20:17, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, June 25, 2019 at 10:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> The universal machine provides an account of its 
>> body/code/theory/finite-things/number (the []p of G1 and Z1, according to 
>> some nuances, as well as G1* and Z1*). 
>>
>> I don’t know what you mean by psychical body. With mechanism, the very 
>> notion of body is psychical, and the soul is not material, not even 
>> reducible (by the machine itself) to anything 3p-representable.
>>
>> With mechanism, we can be neutral on some informon particle or psychon, 
>> as long as their relevant doing is Turing emulable. 
>>
>> From a logical point of view, your theory might still be confirmed in the 
>> universal machine discourses and phenomenologies.
>>
>> We have started the interview of the universal machines relatively 
>> recently, 1931. It is an infinite story. Today we want to believe that they 
>> are docile slaves, but even without mechanism, they somehow warned us that 
>> they aren’t.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>  
>
> The "psychical body" is just the fundamental panpsychic assumption: Just 
> as we think things have physical properties (mass, charge, polarity, ...) 
> we think those same things have psychical (or experiential) properties 
> (qualia, phenomenologicals like colors, taste, freedom, happiness, 
> selfness, …).
>
>
> Of course we have already agree to disagree on this. I mean, I do not 
> assume the physical reality, and with mechanism, things like mass, charge 
> .. have to be explained from G*, qG* (number theology, as I call it).
>
>
>
> Modal provability mathematics relates to them - *experiential semantics* 
> - as being a (possible) *denotational semantics *counterpoint.
>
>
> That seems nice, but if that work, that would be a reason more to 
> distinguish “pan” (in oanpsychism) from anything physical, given that the 
> modal provability logic are consequence of arithmetic (without further 
> assumption).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>

In the end I can see *number crunching* - of numbers of whatever level or 
"universality" - only being a mere model (or simulation) *at best* of what 
there is in reality - which is called* matter*. 

@philipthrift

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Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 25 Jun 2019, at 21:14, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/25/2019 9:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 24 Jun 2019, at 19:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/24/2019 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 24 Jun 2019, at 05:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/23/2019 1:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>  That sounds a bit observer dependent.
>> 
>> Yes. It is. The physical reality becomes a first person plural view of 
>> arithmetic seen by itself from the universal number/machine perspective. 
>> An observer is just a (Löbian) machine seen from the material modes of 
>> the self ([]p & p with p sigma_1, or []p & <>t, or []p & <>t & p).
>> 
> Which raises the question of why we each see (from the inside) the same 
> physical world.
 
 It is a symptom that we are not more than universal numbers, given that we 
 get the conclusion that all universal machine/number have the same physics.
>>> 
>>> How exactly "the same".  Can you show that the observed  physics is the 
>>> only possible physics?
>> 
>> 
>> Yes. Compare the physics in the head of the universal machine with the 
>> observation. What we see, if it is does not belong to that machine’s 
>> internal physics, but is consistent with it,
> 
> OK.  Is what's in the head of the universal machine consistent with there 
> being three families of fermions?  Is it consistent with the Standard Model?  
> Is it consistent with conservation of energy-momentum?  See, the problem is 
> that you have no way saying what is or isn't in the head of the universal 
> machine...so almost anything may be consistent.

Consistency is cheap, but we require the arithmetical soundness assumption, 
which is much stronger. 

The rest are interesting open problem, a bit premature as we don’t even have 
any particles yet.

The point is that we have no choice, here. To invoke an ontology will not help. 

Keep in mind that physicalism does not work with mechanism. That has been 
proven, but the persistence of the mind-body problem since long is by itself an 
illustration of the failure of physicalism to solve the mind-body problem. Then 
we get the quantum logic, which is, Imo, hardly a coincidence.

Physics explains the fermions, but physicalism prevents consciousness to have 
any access on them without using non-computationalist assumption. That is the 
problem (not for physicists, but for physicalist).



> 
> 
>> can be defined as the local geography-history (indexically contingent, and 
>> usually treated with the diamond in the modes.
>> 
>> If there is a contradiction between the machine’s physics and the 
>> observation, then mechanism is false, or we are in a malevolent simulation.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
 
 Digital Mechanism provides a new powerful invariant for physics: the 
 physical laws are invariant for all observers, and is invariant for the 
 change of the ontology (combinators, numbers, etc.).
 
 Digital mechanism explains why there is an apparent physical universe,
>>> 
>>> I don't see that explanation? 
>> 
>> I might ask what you miss in the UDA, which shows that physics is reduced to 
>> an indexical statistics
> 
> It doesn't "show" that,

It does. You have to refute the argument. Which step would be wrong?




> it hypothesizes that it must be so.  It's like hypothesizing God. 


But it does not hypothesize more than elementary arithmetic, and digital 
mechanism.




> Is God consistent with human suffering?  He must be, otherwise the hypothesis 
> is false.

No problem with this, but I don’t see any relation with the fact that UDA 
enforce the existence of a reduction of physics to arithmetic, making mechanism 
testable. If some fermlons will be lacking, prove it, then the evidences for 
those fermions will be evidences against Digital Mechanism.
Without doing this, you are the one speculating on future results to keep your 
own physicalist god alive (Matter).



> 
>> on all relative computations ((aka sigma_1 sentences, by a normal form 
>> theorem of Kleene, and some subtleties about G* and Z*).
>> 
>> Then what are you missing in AUDA (the arithmetical translation of UDA in 
>> arithmetic). The main things have been found by Goödel, Löb, Feferman, 
>> Friedman, Boolos, Goldblatt, up to Solvay’s1976 theorem: the discovery of G 
>> and G*.
>> 
>> The probability (a credibility or plausibility, actually) one is given, for 
>> the observable, by the logic of []p & <>t. I justify this by thought 
>> experience, Kripke semantics, and the bastard calculus in Timeaeus and 
>> Plotinus (and got evidence that Moderatus got it already from its 
>> interpretation of the Parmenides). 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Why is not each person is a different universe, as they are in different 
>>> 

Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 25 Jun 2019, at 20:17, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, June 25, 2019 at 10:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> The universal machine provides an account of its 
> body/code/theory/finite-things/number (the []p of G1 and Z1, according to 
> some nuances, as well as G1* and Z1*). 
> 
> I don’t know what you mean by psychical body. With mechanism, the very notion 
> of body is psychical, and the soul is not material, not even reducible (by 
> the machine itself) to anything 3p-representable.
> 
> With mechanism, we can be neutral on some informon particle or psychon, as 
> long as their relevant doing is Turing emulable. 
> 
> From a logical point of view, your theory might still be confirmed in the 
> universal machine discourses and phenomenologies.
> 
> We have started the interview of the universal machines relatively recently, 
> 1931. It is an infinite story. Today we want to believe that they are docile 
> slaves, but even without mechanism, they somehow warned us that they aren’t.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
>  
> 
> The "psychical body" is just the fundamental panpsychic assumption: Just as 
> we think things have physical properties (mass, charge, polarity, ...) we 
> think those same things have psychical (or experiential) properties (qualia, 
> phenomenologicals like colors, taste, freedom, happiness, selfness, …).

Of course we have already agree to disagree on this. I mean, I do not assume 
the physical reality, and with mechanism, things like mass, charge .. have to 
be explained from G*, qG* (number theology, as I call it).


> 
> Modal provability mathematics relates to them - experiential semantics - as 
> being a (possible) denotational semantics counterpoint.

That seems nice, but if that work, that would be a reason more to distinguish 
“pan” (in oanpsychism) from anything physical, given that the modal provability 
logic are consequence of arithmetic (without further assumption).

Bruno



> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
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>  
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Re: determinism and randomness in QM

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 6/25/2019 9:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 24 Jun 2019, at 19:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 6/24/2019 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 24 Jun 2019, at 05:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 6/23/2019 1:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 That sounds a bit observer dependent.

Yes. It is. The physical reality becomes a first person plural 
view of arithmetic seen by itself from the universal 
number/machine perspective. An observer is just a (Löbian) machine 
seen from the material modes of the self ([]p & p with p sigma_1, 
or []p & <>t, or []p & <>t & p).


Which raises the question of why we each see (from the inside) the 
same physical world.


It is a symptom that we are not more than universal numbers, given 
that we get the conclusion that all universal machine/number have 
the same physics.


How exactly "the same".  Can you show that the observed physics is 
the only possible physics?



Yes. Compare the physics in the head of the universal machine with the 
observation. What we see, if it is does not belong to that machine’s 
internal physics, but is consistent with it,


OK.  Is what's in the head of the universal machine consistent with 
there being three families of fermions?  Is it consistent with the 
Standard Model?  Is it consistent with conservation of energy-momentum?  
See, the problem is that you have no way saying what is or isn't in the 
head of the universal machine...so almost anything may be consistent.



can be defined as the local geography-history (indexically contingent, 
and usually treated with the diamond in the modes.


If there is a contradiction between the machine’s physics and the 
observation, then mechanism is false, or we are in a malevolent 
simulation.









Digital Mechanism provides a new powerful invariant for physics: the 
physical laws are invariant for all observers, and is invariant for 
the change of the ontology (combinators, numbers, etc.).


Digital mechanism explains why there is an apparent physical universe,


I don't see that explanation?


I might ask what you miss in the UDA, which shows that physics is 
reduced to an indexical statistics


It doesn't "show" that, it hypothesizes that it must be so.  It's like 
hypothesizing God.  Is God consistent with human suffering?  He must be, 
otherwise the hypothesis is false.


on all relative computations ((aka sigma_1 sentences, by a normal form 
theorem of Kleene, and some subtleties about G* and Z*).


Then what are you missing in AUDA (the arithmetical translation of UDA 
in arithmetic). The main things have been found by Goödel, Löb, 
Feferman, Friedman, Boolos, Goldblatt, up to Solvay’s1976 theorem: the 
discovery of G and G*.


The probability (a credibility or plausibility, actually) one is 
given, for the observable, by the logic of []p & <>t. I justify this 
by thought experience, Kripke semantics, and the bastard calculus in 
Timeaeus and Plotinus (and got evidence that Moderatus got it already 
from its interpretation of the Parmenides).




Why is not each person is a different universe, as they are in 
different dreams.


I am not sure I understand the question. Each person is supported by 
an infinity of computations, and they diverge, a bit like the W vs M 
divergence in the self-duplication, except that it is a continuous 
transformation of some sort. The person $are* in different 
dream/computations, but some type of dream are sharable


But some types are not.  So why are we in a sharable one?  Are you 
hypothesizing the there are other people who are only in unsharable 
dreams?  It seems you are invoking the "might theory is consistent with 
everything" rule.


and long histories develops, in the limit of all first person 
experience (due to the invariance of consciousness for the 
arithmetical delays in the stepping of the universal dovetailer).


Finding the propositional modes of self-reference explains why we have 
bodies, soul and qualia, and why we are conscious, and why we are in 
front of the … unknown.


Only in some idiosyncratic meaning of "explain".

But to progress, we need to progress also in the quantified modal 
logic of provability, and to better extracts Quantum Logic, etc.


It might not work. The fact is that it works up to now,


It does no work up to now.  It is just sufficiently expansive that no 
contradiction is apparent.


Brent

and is the only precise and testable theory addressing the Mind-Body 
problem, to my knowledge.


Bruno






Brent

and why the laws of physics are really laws, and, and this is better 
than physics, why the physical reality separates into sharable 
quanta, and non sharable qualia.


Bruno






Brent

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Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, June 25, 2019 at 10:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> The universal machine provides an account of its 
> body/code/theory/finite-things/number (the []p of G1 and Z1, according to 
> some nuances, as well as G1* and Z1*). 
>
> I don’t know what you mean by psychical body. With mechanism, the very 
> notion of body is psychical, and the soul is not material, not even 
> reducible (by the machine itself) to anything 3p-representable.
>
> With mechanism, we can be neutral on some informon particle or psychon, as 
> long as their relevant doing is Turing emulable. 
>
> From a logical point of view, your theory might still be confirmed in the 
> universal machine discourses and phenomenologies.
>
> We have started the interview of the universal machines relatively 
> recently, 1931. It is an infinite story. Today we want to believe that they 
> are docile slaves, but even without mechanism, they somehow warned us that 
> they aren’t.
>
> Bruno
>
>
 

The "psychical body" is just the fundamental panpsychic assumption: Just as 
we think things have physical properties (mass, charge, polarity, ...) we 
think those same things have psychical (or experiential) properties 
(qualia, phenomenologicals like colors, taste, freedom, happiness, 
selfness, ...).

Modal provability mathematics relates to them - *experiential semantics* - 
as being a (possible) *denotational semantics *counterpoint.

@philipthrift

>
>

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Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 24 Jun 2019, at 19:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/24/2019 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 24 Jun 2019, at 05:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/23/2019 1:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
  That sounds a bit observer dependent.
 
 Yes. It is. The physical reality becomes a first person plural view of 
 arithmetic seen by itself from the universal number/machine perspective. 
 An observer is just a (Löbian) machine seen from the material modes of the 
 self ([]p & p with p sigma_1, or []p & <>t, or []p & <>t & p).
 
>>> Which raises the question of why we each see (from the inside) the same 
>>> physical world.
>> 
>> It is a symptom that we are not more than universal numbers, given that we 
>> get the conclusion that all universal machine/number have the same physics.
> 
> How exactly "the same".  Can you show that the observed  physics is the only 
> possible physics?


Yes. Compare the physics in the head of the universal machine with the 
observation. What we see, if it is does not belong to that machine’s internal 
physics, but is consistent with it, can be defined as the local 
geography-history (indexically contingent, and usually treated with the diamond 
in the modes.

If there is a contradiction between the machine’s physics and the observation, 
then mechanism is false, or we are in a malevolent simulation.




> 
>> 
>> Digital Mechanism provides a new powerful invariant for physics: the 
>> physical laws are invariant for all observers, and is invariant for the 
>> change of the ontology (combinators, numbers, etc.).
>> 
>> Digital mechanism explains why there is an apparent physical universe,
> 
> I don't see that explanation? 

I might ask what you miss in the UDA, which shows that physics is reduced to an 
indexical statistics on all relative computations ((aka sigma_1 sentences, by a 
normal form theorem of Kleene, and some subtleties about G* and Z*).

Then what are you missing in AUDA (the arithmetical translation of UDA in 
arithmetic). The main things have been found by Goödel, Löb, Feferman, 
Friedman, Boolos, Goldblatt, up to Solvay’s1976 theorem: the discovery of G and 
G*.

The probability (a credibility or plausibility, actually) one is given, for the 
observable, by the logic of []p & <>t. I justify this by thought experience, 
Kripke semantics, and the bastard calculus in Timeaeus and Plotinus (and got 
evidence that Moderatus got it already from its interpretation of the 
Parmenides). 



> Why is not each person is a different universe, as they are in different 
> dreams.

I am not sure I understand the question. Each person is supported by an 
infinity of computations, and they diverge, a bit like the W vs M divergence in 
the self-duplication, except that it is a continuous transformation of some 
sort. The person $are* in different dream/computations, but some type of dream 
are sharable and long histories develops, in the limit of all first person 
experience (due to the invariance of consciousness for the arithmetical delays 
in the stepping of the universal dovetailer).

Finding the propositional modes of self-reference explains why we have bodies, 
soul and qualia, and why we are conscious, and why we are in front of the … 
unknown. But to progress, we need to progress also in the quantified modal 
logic of provability, and to better extracts Quantum Logic, etc. 

It might not work. The fact is that it works up to now, and is the only precise 
and testable theory addressing the Mind-Body problem, to my knowledge.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
>> and why the laws of physics are really laws, and, and this is better than 
>> physics, why the physical reality separates into sharable quanta, and non 
>> sharable qualia.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
>>> -- 
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>>> "Everything List" group.
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>>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
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>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/40792d73-e1bf-b0d2-de47-434be6bd6fce%40verizon.net
>>>  
>>> .
>> 
>> -- 
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>> "Everything List" group.
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>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
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>>  
>> 

Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 24 Jun 2019, at 19:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, June 24, 2019 at 5:12:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 24 Jun 2019, at 11:26, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, June 24, 2019 at 4:13:51 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 24 Jun 2019, at 05:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/23/2019 1:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
  That sounds a bit observer dependent.
 
 Yes. It is. The physical reality becomes a first person plural view of 
 arithmetic seen by itself from the universal number/machine perspective. 
 An observer is just a (Löbian) machine seen from the material modes of the 
 self ([]p & p with p sigma_1, or []p & <>t, or []p & <>t & p).
 
>>> Which raises the question of why we each see (from the inside) the same 
>>> physical world.
>> 
>> It is a symptom that we are not more than universal numbers, given that we 
>> get the conclusion that all universal machine/number have the same physics.
>> 
>> Digital Mechanism provides a new powerful invariant for physics: the 
>> physical laws are invariant for all observers, and is invariant for the 
>> change of the ontology (combinators, numbers, etc.).
>> 
>> Digital mechanism explains why there is an apparent physical universe, and 
>> why the laws of physics are really laws, and, and this is better than 
>> physics, why the physical reality separates into sharable quanta, and non 
>> sharable qualia.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>  
>> That every "universal machine/number" has "the same physics" would be 
>> consistent with materialism:
> 
> Yes. But materialism is not consistent with the stronger assumption of 
> Mechanism. The strong AI thesis is consistent with Materialism, although not 
> quite plausible. But weak materialism is inconsistent with the indexical part 
> of Digital mechanism: the idea that “I” survive the digital transplantation. 
> In that case I am “in arithmetic”, and physics has to be the sum on all 
> relative computations.
> 
> 
> 
>> There is just matter (that's all the cosmos is), and it's the matter that 
>> ever was or will be.
> 
> OK. But there a no evidences, and there are evidences to the contrary.
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> "Materialism is a philosophical perspective according to which all that 
>> occurs or exists has its origin and cause in matter and its transformations."
>> - 
>> https://www.academia.edu/38046481/A_Survey_of_Materialism_in_Thought_and_Communication
>>  
>> 
> And Weak Materialism is the more weak belief that some matter exists at the 
> ontological level. But that weak form of materialism is inconsistent with 
> mechanism. You would need a non Turing emulable explanation of the role of 
> consciousness and matter to subtract them from the prediction based on the 
> infinitely many dynamical representation that you have in arithmetic. See my 
> paper or ask me any question if this is not yet clear.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The model of man represents the unity of the two material aspects:
> 
>  a physiological [physical] body and a [phenomenological] psychical body.
> 
> https://www.academia.edu/35755477/Man_versus_Computer_Difference_of_the_Essences._The_Problem_of_the_Scientific_Creation
>  
> 
> 


The universal machine provides an account of its 
body/code/theory/finite-things/number (the []p of G1 and Z1, according to some 
nuances, as well as G1* and Z1*). 

I don’t know what you mean by psychical body. With mechanism, the very notion 
of body is psychical, and the soul is not material, not even reducible (by the 
machine itself) to anything 3p-representable.

With mechanism, we can be neutral on some informon particle or psychon, as long 
as their relevant doing is Turing emulable. 

>From a logical point of view, your theory might still be confirmed in the 
>universal machine discourses and phenomenologies.

We have started the interview of the universal machines relatively recently, 
1931. It is an infinite story. Today we want to believe that they are docile 
slaves, but even without mechanism, they somehow warned us that they aren’t.

Bruno





> @philipthrift
> 
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>  
> .

-- 
You 

Re: determinism and randomness in QM

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 6/24/2019 3:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
That every "universal machine/number" has "the same physics" would be 
consistent with materialism:


Yes. But materialism is not consistent with the stronger assumption of 
Mechanism. The strong AI thesis is consistent with Materialism, 
although not quite plausible. But weak materialism is inconsistent 
with the indexical part of Digital mechanism: the idea that “I” 
survive the digital transplantation.


But your argument for that inconsistency assumes a neat boundary between 
"I" and the environment, which I think is false.


Brent

In that case I am “in arithmetic”, and physics has to be the sum on 
all relative computations.



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Re: determinism and randomness in QM

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 6/24/2019 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 24 Jun 2019, at 05:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 6/23/2019 1:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 That sounds a bit observer dependent.

Yes. It is. The physical reality becomes a first person plural view 
of arithmetic seen by itself from the universal number/machine 
perspective. An observer is just a (Löbian) machine seen from the 
material modes of the self ([]p & p with p sigma_1, or []p & <>t, or 
[]p & <>t & p).


Which raises the question of why we each see (from the inside) the 
same physical world.


It is a symptom that we are not more than universal numbers, given 
that we get the conclusion that all universal machine/number have the 
same physics.


How exactly "the same".  Can you show that the observed  physics is the 
only possible physics?




Digital Mechanism provides a new powerful invariant for physics: the 
physical laws are invariant for all observers, and is invariant for 
the change of the ontology (combinators, numbers, etc.).


Digital mechanism explains why there is an apparent physical universe,


I don't see that explanation?  Why is not each person is a different 
universe, as they are in different dreams.


Brent

and why the laws of physics are really laws, and, and this is better 
than physics, why the physical reality separates into sharable quanta, 
and non sharable qualia.


Bruno






Brent

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Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, June 24, 2019 at 5:12:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Jun 2019, at 11:26, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, June 24, 2019 at 4:13:51 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 24 Jun 2019, at 05:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 6/23/2019 1:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>  That sounds a bit observer dependent.
>>
>> Yes. It is. The physical reality becomes a first person plural view of 
>> arithmetic seen by itself from the universal number/machine perspective. An 
>> observer is just a (Löbian) machine seen from the material modes of the 
>> self ([]p & p with p sigma_1, or []p & <>t, or []p & <>t & p).
>>
>> Which raises the question of why we each see (from the inside) the same 
>> physical world.
>>
>>
>> It is a symptom that we are not more than universal numbers, given that 
>> we get the conclusion that all universal machine/number have the same 
>> physics.
>>
>> Digital Mechanism provides a new powerful invariant for physics: the 
>> physical laws are invariant for all observers, and is invariant for the 
>> change of the ontology (combinators, numbers, etc.).
>>
>> Digital mechanism explains why there is an apparent physical universe, 
>> and why the laws of physics are really laws, and, and this is better than 
>> physics, why the physical reality separates into sharable quanta, and non 
>> sharable qualia.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>  
> That every "universal machine/number" has "the same physics" would be 
> consistent with materialism:
>
>
> Yes. But materialism is not consistent with the stronger assumption of 
> Mechanism. The strong AI thesis is consistent with Materialism, although 
> not quite plausible. But weak materialism is inconsistent with the 
> indexical part of Digital mechanism: the idea that “I” survive the digital 
> transplantation. In that case I am “in arithmetic”, and physics has to be 
> the sum on all relative computations.
>
>
>
> There is just matter (that's all the cosmos is), and it's the matter that 
> ever was or will be.
>
>
> OK. But there a no evidences, and there are evidences to the contrary.
>
>
>
>
> "Materialism is a philosophical perspective according to which all that 
> occurs or exists has its origin and cause in matter and its 
> transformations."
> - 
> https://www.academia.edu/38046481/A_Survey_of_Materialism_in_Thought_and_Communication
>
>
> And Weak Materialism is the more weak belief that some matter exists at 
> the ontological level. But that weak form of materialism is inconsistent 
> with mechanism. You would need a non Turing emulable explanation of the 
> role of consciousness and matter to subtract them from the prediction based 
> on the infinitely many dynamical representation that you have in 
> arithmetic. See my paper or ask me any question if this is not yet clear.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

The model of man represents the unity of *the two material aspects*:

 a physiological [physical] body and a [phenomenological] psychical 
body.

https://www.academia.edu/35755477/Man_versus_Computer_Difference_of_the_Essences._The_Problem_of_the_Scientific_Creation

@philipthrift

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Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 24 Jun 2019, at 11:26, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, June 24, 2019 at 4:13:51 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 24 Jun 2019, at 05:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/23/2019 1:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>  That sounds a bit observer dependent.
>>> 
>>> Yes. It is. The physical reality becomes a first person plural view of 
>>> arithmetic seen by itself from the universal number/machine perspective. An 
>>> observer is just a (Löbian) machine seen from the material modes of the 
>>> self ([]p & p with p sigma_1, or []p & <>t, or []p & <>t & p).
>>> 
>> Which raises the question of why we each see (from the inside) the same 
>> physical world.
> 
> It is a symptom that we are not more than universal numbers, given that we 
> get the conclusion that all universal machine/number have the same physics.
> 
> Digital Mechanism provides a new powerful invariant for physics: the physical 
> laws are invariant for all observers, and is invariant for the change of the 
> ontology (combinators, numbers, etc.).
> 
> Digital mechanism explains why there is an apparent physical universe, and 
> why the laws of physics are really laws, and, and this is better than 
> physics, why the physical reality separates into sharable quanta, and non 
> sharable qualia.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
>  
> That every "universal machine/number" has "the same physics" would be 
> consistent with materialism:

Yes. But materialism is not consistent with the stronger assumption of 
Mechanism. The strong AI thesis is consistent with Materialism, although not 
quite plausible. But weak materialism is inconsistent with the indexical part 
of Digital mechanism: the idea that “I” survive the digital transplantation. In 
that case I am “in arithmetic”, and physics has to be the sum on all relative 
computations.



> There is just matter (that's all the cosmos is), and it's the matter that 
> ever was or will be.

OK. But there a no evidences, and there are evidences to the contrary.


> 
> 
> "Materialism is a philosophical perspective according to which all that 
> occurs or exists has its origin and cause in matter and its transformations."
> - 
> https://www.academia.edu/38046481/A_Survey_of_Materialism_in_Thought_and_Communication
>  
> 
And Weak Materialism is the more weak belief that some matter exists at the 
ontological level. But that weak form of materialism is inconsistent with 
mechanism. You would need a non Turing emulable explanation of the role of 
consciousness and matter to subtract them from the prediction based on the 
infinitely many dynamical representation that you have in arithmetic. See my 
paper or ask me any question if this is not yet clear.

Bruno



> 
> @philipthrift
> 
>  
> 
> -- 
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>  
> .

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Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, June 24, 2019 at 4:13:51 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Jun 2019, at 05:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everyth...@googlegroups.com > wrote:
>
>
>
> On 6/23/2019 1:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>  That sounds a bit observer dependent.
>
> Yes. It is. The physical reality becomes a first person plural view of 
> arithmetic seen by itself from the universal number/machine perspective. An 
> observer is just a (Löbian) machine seen from the material modes of the 
> self ([]p & p with p sigma_1, or []p & <>t, or []p & <>t & p).
>
> Which raises the question of why we each see (from the inside) the same 
> physical world.
>
>
> It is a symptom that we are not more than universal numbers, given that we 
> get the conclusion that all universal machine/number have the same physics.
>
> Digital Mechanism provides a new powerful invariant for physics: the 
> physical laws are invariant for all observers, and is invariant for the 
> change of the ontology (combinators, numbers, etc.).
>
> Digital mechanism explains why there is an apparent physical universe, and 
> why the laws of physics are really laws, and, and this is better than 
> physics, why the physical reality separates into sharable quanta, and non 
> sharable qualia.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
 
That every "universal machine/number" has "the same physics" would be 
consistent with materialism: There is just matter (that's all the cosmos 
is), and it's the matter that ever was or will be.


"Materialism is a philosophical perspective according to which all that 
occurs or exists has its origin and cause in matter and its 
transformations."
- 
https://www.academia.edu/38046481/A_Survey_of_Materialism_in_Thought_and_Communication

@philipthrift

 

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Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 24 Jun 2019, at 05:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/23/2019 1:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>  That sounds a bit observer dependent.
>> 
>> Yes. It is. The physical reality becomes a first person plural view of 
>> arithmetic seen by itself from the universal number/machine perspective. An 
>> observer is just a (Löbian) machine seen from the material modes of the self 
>> ([]p & p with p sigma_1, or []p & <>t, or []p & <>t & p).
>> 
> Which raises the question of why we each see (from the inside) the same 
> physical world.

It is a symptom that we are not more than universal numbers, given that we get 
the conclusion that all universal machine/number have the same physics.

Digital Mechanism provides a new powerful invariant for physics: the physical 
laws are invariant for all observers, and is invariant for the change of the 
ontology (combinators, numbers, etc.).

Digital mechanism explains why there is an apparent physical universe, and why 
the laws of physics are really laws, and, and this is better than physics, why 
the physical reality separates into sharable quanta, and non sharable qualia.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
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>  
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Re: determinism and randomness in QM

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 6/23/2019 1:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 That sounds a bit observer dependent.

Yes. It is. The physical reality becomes a first person plural view of 
arithmetic seen by itself from the universal number/machine 
perspective. An observer is just a (Löbian) machine seen from the 
material modes of the self ([]p & p with p sigma_1, or []p & <>t, or 
[]p & <>t & p).


Which raises the question of why we each see (from the inside) the same 
physical world.


Brent

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Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 23 Jun 2019, at 12:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, June 23, 2019 at 3:55:44 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> For logical reason, when we assume the digital mechanist hypothesis, we just 
> cannot assume more than (very) elementary arithmetic.
> 
> The physical reality, to be explained, will need much more than arithmetic, 
> but it belongs to the phenomenology of the creature whose existence comes 
> from elementary arithmetic. There is no *ontological* physical reality: it is 
> determine by the statistics on all computations whose existence comes from 
> arithmetic (or anything Turing equivalent).
> 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It could that all physical reality can be modeled by the SKI combinator 
> calculus but with the added P (irreducible randomness) combinator, so it 
> becomes SKIP:
> 
> 
> https://poesophicalbits.blogspot.com/2013/06/skip-probabilistic-ski-combinator.html
>  
> 
> 
> But this leaves "Galileo's error" unaddressed, so ontological (and 
> irreducible) experientialities (or qualia) are assumed. Thus the prospect for 
> an experiential combinator calculus …

Why adding those things when we can explain them without ontological 
commitment. Only to claim that we are not Turing emulable?

Of course Mechanism might be wrong, but without any evidences for this, all 
ontological enrichment on the arithmetical reality seems quite speculative to 
me.
To be franc, I fear that the motivation is a form of racism, the deny that some 
entities would be able to think/be-conscious, just because they have a very 
different skin that our’s.

Bruno






> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
>  
> 
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Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, June 23, 2019 at 3:55:44 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> For logical reason, when we assume the digital mechanist hypothesis, we 
> just cannot assume more than (very) elementary arithmetic.
>
> The physical reality, to be explained, will need much more than 
> arithmetic, but it belongs to the phenomenology of the creature whose 
> existence comes from elementary arithmetic. There is no *ontological* 
> physical reality: it is determine by the statistics on all computations 
> whose existence comes from arithmetic (or anything Turing equivalent).
>
>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>
It could that all *physical* reality can be modeled by the SKI combinator 
calculus but with the added P (irreducible randomness) combinator, so it 
becomes *SKIP*:


https://poesophicalbits.blogspot.com/2013/06/skip-probabilistic-ski-combinator.html

But this leaves "Galileo's error" unaddressed, so ontological (and 
irreducible) experientialities (or qualia) are assumed. Thus the prospect 
for an *experiential *combinator calculus ...

@philipthrift


 

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Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jun 2019, at 00:38, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 8:43:08 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 20 Jun 2019, at 00:26, Lawrence Crowell > > wrote:
>> 
>> On Tuesday, June 18, 2019 at 6:02:54 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 18 Jun 2019, at 02:14, Lawrence Crowell > 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> The stochastic aspects of QM emerge in measurement, where the modulus 
>>> square of amplitudes are probabilities and there are these random outcomes. 
>>> The measurement of a quantum state is not a quantum process, but has 
>>> stochastic outcomes predicted by QM. Based on the Hamkin's work where I 
>>> only looked at the slides and not yet the paper, it seems possible to do 
>>> this with quantum computer.
>>> 
>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/computational-self-reference-and-the-universal-algorithm-queen-mary-university-of-london-june-2019/
>>>  
>>> 
>>> slides:
>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp-content/uploads/Computational-self-reference-and-the-universal-algorithm-QMUL-2019-1.pdf
>>>  
>>> 
>>> I wrote a couple of elementary Python codes for the QE machine IBM has to 
>>> prepare states and run then through Hadamard gates. The thought occurred to 
>>> me that this Quining could be done quantum mechanically as a set of 
>>> Hadamard gates that duplicate a qubit or an bipartite entangled qubit. This 
>>> is a part of my ansatz that a measurement is a sort of Gödel numbering of 
>>> quantum states as qubit data in other quantum states.
>>> Quantum computations are mapped into an orthomodular lattice that does not 
>>> obey the distributive property. The distributive law of p and (q or r) = (p 
>>> and q) or (p and r) fails. The reason is due to the Heisenberg uncertainty 
>>> principle. Suppose we let p = momentum in the interval [0, P], q = position 
>>> in the interval [-x, x] and r = particle in interval [x, y]. The 
>>> proposition p and (q or r) is true if this spread in momentum [0, P] is 
>>> equal to the reciprocal of the spread of position [-x, y] with
>>> P = ħ/sqrt(y^2 + x^2).
>>> The distributive law would then mean
>>> P = ħ/|y| or P = ħ/|x|
>>> which is clearly false. This is the major difference with quantum logic and 
>>> Boolean classical logic. These lattices of quantum logic have polytope 
>>> realizations.
>>> This is in fact another way of realizing that QM can't be built up from 
>>> classical physics. If this were the case then quantum orthomodular 
>>> lattices, which act on convex sets on L^p spaces with p = ½ would be 
>>> somehow built from lattices acting on convex sets with p → ∞. This is for 
>>> any deterministic system, whether Newtonian physics or a Turing machine. It 
>>> is this flip between convex sets that is difficult to understand. With p = 
>>> ½ and the duality between two convex sets as 1/p + 1/q = 1 the dual to QM 
>>> also has L^2 measure. This is spacetime with the Gaussian interval. For a p 
>>> → ∞ the dual is q = 1 which is a purely stochastic system, say an idealized 
>>> set of dice or roulette wheel with no deterministic predictability.
>>> The point of Quining statements quantum mechanically is that this might be 
>>> a start for looking at a quantum measurement as a way that quantum states 
>>> encode qubit information of other quantum states. It is a sort of Gödel 
>>> self-reference, and my suspicion is the so called measurement problem is 
>>> not solvable. The decoherence of states is then a case where p = ½ → 1 with 
>>> an outcome. That is pure randomness.
>> 
>> With mechanism, that randomness is reduced into the indeterminacy in 
>> self-multiplication experience. It come from the many-histories internal 
>> interpretation of arithmetic, in which all sound universal numbers 
>> converges. The quantum aspect of nature is just how the (sigma_1) 
>> arithmetical reality looks like from inside. This explains where the 
>> apparent collapse comes from, in a similar way than Everett, but it explains 
>> also where the wave comes from. Eventually quantum mechanics is just a modal 
>> internal view of arithmetic, or anything Turing equivalent. The math, and 
>> quantum physics confirms computationalism up to now, where physicalism and 
>> materialism are inconsistent, or consciousness or person eliminative.
>> 
>> 
>> Thanks for addressing this.
>> 
>> I guess in a way I do not entirely understand this. The above illustration 
>> is the main difference between Boolean and quantum logic.
> 
> OK. I have no problem with this. I agree and understand that quantum logic 
> cannot be embedded or extended into a classical logic. This is related to the 
> fact that there is no local hidden variable theory compatible with the 
> quantum experiments.
> 
> But this does not mean that quantum logic 

Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Lawrence Crowell]

Continuing on below

On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 5:38:53 PM UTC-5, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 8:43:08 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 20 Jun 2019, at 00:26, Lawrence Crowell  
>> wrote:
>>
>> On Tuesday, June 18, 2019 at 6:02:54 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 18 Jun 2019, at 02:14, Lawrence Crowell  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> The stochastic aspects of QM emerge in measurement, where the modulus 
>>> square of amplitudes are probabilities and there are these random outcomes. 
>>> The measurement of a quantum state is not a quantum process, but has 
>>> stochastic outcomes predicted by QM. Based on the Hamkin's work where I 
>>> only looked at the slides and not yet the paper, it seems possible to do 
>>> this with quantum computer. 
>>>
>>>
>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/computational-self-reference-and-the-universal-algorithm-queen-mary-university-of-london-june-2019/
>>>
>>> slides:
>>>
>>>
>>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp-content/uploads/Computational-self-reference-and-the-universal-algorithm-QMUL-2019-1.pdf
>>>
>>> I wrote a couple of elementary Python codes for the QE machine IBM has 
>>> to prepare states and run then through Hadamard gates. The thought occurred 
>>> to me that this Quining could be done quantum mechanically as a set of 
>>> Hadamard gates that duplicate a qubit or an bipartite entangled qubit. This 
>>> is a part of my ansatz that a measurement is a sort of Gödel numbering of 
>>> quantum states as qubit data in other quantum states.
>>>
>>> Quantum computations are mapped into an orthomodular lattice that does 
>>> not obey the distributive property. The distributive law of p and (q or r) 
>>> = (p and q) or (p and r) fails. The reason is due to the Heisenberg 
>>> uncertainty principle. Suppose we let p = momentum in the interval [0, P], 
>>> q = position in the interval [-x, x] and r = particle in interval [x, y]. 
>>> The proposition p and (q or r) is true if this spread in momentum [0, P] is 
>>> equal to the reciprocal of the spread of position [-x, y] with
>>>
>>> P = ħ/sqrt(y^2 + x^2).
>>>
>>> The distributive law would then mean
>>>
>>> P = ħ/|y| or P = ħ/|x|
>>>
>>> which is clearly false. This is the major difference with quantum logic 
>>> and Boolean classical logic. These lattices of quantum logic have polytope 
>>> realizations.
>>>
>>> This is in fact another way of realizing that QM can't be built up from 
>>> classical physics. If this were the case then quantum orthomodular 
>>> lattices, which act on convex sets on L^p spaces with p = ½ would be 
>>> somehow built from lattices acting on convex sets with p → ∞. This is for 
>>> any deterministic system, whether Newtonian physics or a Turing machine. It 
>>> is this flip between convex sets that is difficult to understand. With p = 
>>> ½ and the duality between two convex sets as 1/p + 1/q = 1 the dual to QM 
>>> also has L^2 measure. This is spacetime with the Gaussian interval. For a p 
>>> → ∞ the dual is q = 1 which is a purely stochastic system, say an idealized 
>>> set of dice or roulette wheel with no deterministic predictability.
>>>
>>> The point of Quining statements quantum mechanically is that this might 
>>> be a start for looking at a quantum measurement as a way that quantum 
>>> states encode qubit information of other quantum states. It is a sort of 
>>> Gödel self-reference, and my suspicion is the so called measurement problem 
>>> is not solvable. The decoherence of states is then a case where p = ½ → 1 
>>> with an outcome. That is pure randomness.
>>>
>>>
>>> With mechanism, that randomness is reduced into the indeterminacy in 
>>> self-multiplication experience. It come from the many-histories internal 
>>> interpretation of arithmetic, in which all sound universal numbers 
>>> converges. The quantum aspect of nature is just how the (sigma_1) 
>>> arithmetical reality looks like from inside. This explains where the 
>>> apparent collapse comes from, in a similar way than Everett, but it 
>>> explains also where the wave comes from. Eventually quantum mechanics is 
>>> just a modal internal view of arithmetic, or anything Turing equivalent. 
>>> The math, and quantum physics confirms computationalism up to now, where 
>>> physicalism and materialism are inconsistent, or consciousness or person 
>>> eliminative.
>>>
>>>
>> Thanks for addressing this.
>>
>> I guess in a way I do not entirely understand this. The above 
>> illustration is the main difference between Boolean and quantum logic.
>>
>>
>> OK. I have no problem with this. I agree and understand that quantum 
>> logic cannot be embedded or extended into a classical logic. This is 
>> related to the fact that there is no local hidden variable theory 
>> compatible with the quantum experiments.
>>
>> But this does not mean that quantum logic cannot have a classical 
>> explanation. In fact the quantum formalism is by itself a classical 
>> description, even local and deterministic, but 

Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 8:43:08 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 20 Jun 2019, at 00:26, Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, June 18, 2019 at 6:02:54 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 18 Jun 2019, at 02:14, Lawrence Crowell  
>> wrote:
>>
>> The stochastic aspects of QM emerge in measurement, where the modulus 
>> square of amplitudes are probabilities and there are these random outcomes. 
>> The measurement of a quantum state is not a quantum process, but has 
>> stochastic outcomes predicted by QM. Based on the Hamkin's work where I 
>> only looked at the slides and not yet the paper, it seems possible to do 
>> this with quantum computer. 
>>
>>
>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/computational-self-reference-and-the-universal-algorithm-queen-mary-university-of-london-june-2019/
>>
>> slides:
>>
>>
>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp-content/uploads/Computational-self-reference-and-the-universal-algorithm-QMUL-2019-1.pdf
>>
>> I wrote a couple of elementary Python codes for the QE machine IBM has to 
>> prepare states and run then through Hadamard gates. The thought occurred to 
>> me that this Quining could be done quantum mechanically as a set of 
>> Hadamard gates that duplicate a qubit or an bipartite entangled qubit. This 
>> is a part of my ansatz that a measurement is a sort of Gödel numbering of 
>> quantum states as qubit data in other quantum states.
>>
>> Quantum computations are mapped into an orthomodular lattice that does 
>> not obey the distributive property. The distributive law of p and (q or r) 
>> = (p and q) or (p and r) fails. The reason is due to the Heisenberg 
>> uncertainty principle. Suppose we let p = momentum in the interval [0, P], 
>> q = position in the interval [-x, x] and r = particle in interval [x, y]. 
>> The proposition p and (q or r) is true if this spread in momentum [0, P] is 
>> equal to the reciprocal of the spread of position [-x, y] with
>>
>> P = ħ/sqrt(y^2 + x^2).
>>
>> The distributive law would then mean
>>
>> P = ħ/|y| or P = ħ/|x|
>>
>> which is clearly false. This is the major difference with quantum logic 
>> and Boolean classical logic. These lattices of quantum logic have polytope 
>> realizations.
>>
>> This is in fact another way of realizing that QM can't be built up from 
>> classical physics. If this were the case then quantum orthomodular 
>> lattices, which act on convex sets on L^p spaces with p = ½ would be 
>> somehow built from lattices acting on convex sets with p → ∞. This is for 
>> any deterministic system, whether Newtonian physics or a Turing machine. It 
>> is this flip between convex sets that is difficult to understand. With p = 
>> ½ and the duality between two convex sets as 1/p + 1/q = 1 the dual to QM 
>> also has L^2 measure. This is spacetime with the Gaussian interval. For a p 
>> → ∞ the dual is q = 1 which is a purely stochastic system, say an idealized 
>> set of dice or roulette wheel with no deterministic predictability.
>>
>> The point of Quining statements quantum mechanically is that this might 
>> be a start for looking at a quantum measurement as a way that quantum 
>> states encode qubit information of other quantum states. It is a sort of 
>> Gödel self-reference, and my suspicion is the so called measurement problem 
>> is not solvable. The decoherence of states is then a case where p = ½ → 1 
>> with an outcome. That is pure randomness.
>>
>>
>> With mechanism, that randomness is reduced into the indeterminacy in 
>> self-multiplication experience. It come from the many-histories internal 
>> interpretation of arithmetic, in which all sound universal numbers 
>> converges. The quantum aspect of nature is just how the (sigma_1) 
>> arithmetical reality looks like from inside. This explains where the 
>> apparent collapse comes from, in a similar way than Everett, but it 
>> explains also where the wave comes from. Eventually quantum mechanics is 
>> just a modal internal view of arithmetic, or anything Turing equivalent. 
>> The math, and quantum physics confirms computationalism up to now, where 
>> physicalism and materialism are inconsistent, or consciousness or person 
>> eliminative.
>>
>>
> Thanks for addressing this.
>
> I guess in a way I do not entirely understand this. The above illustration 
> is the main difference between Boolean and quantum logic.
>
>
> OK. I have no problem with this. I agree and understand that quantum logic 
> cannot be embedded or extended into a classical logic. This is related to 
> the fact that there is no local hidden variable theory compatible with the 
> quantum experiments.
>
> But this does not mean that quantum logic cannot have a classical 
> explanation. In fact the quantum formalism is by itself a classical 
> description, even local and deterministic, but hard to interpret in any 
> local realistic way.
>
> Assuming the mechanist hypothesis, we have a similar (to QM) form of 
> indeterminacy, due to the fact that we can be duplicated, and in that 

Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 20 Jun 2019, at 00:26, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Tuesday, June 18, 2019 at 6:02:54 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 18 Jun 2019, at 02:14, Lawrence Crowell > > wrote:
>> 
>> The stochastic aspects of QM emerge in measurement, where the modulus square 
>> of amplitudes are probabilities and there are these random outcomes. The 
>> measurement of a quantum state is not a quantum process, but has stochastic 
>> outcomes predicted by QM. Based on the Hamkin's work where I only looked at 
>> the slides and not yet the paper, it seems possible to do this with quantum 
>> computer.
>> 
>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/computational-self-reference-and-the-universal-algorithm-queen-mary-university-of-london-june-2019/
>>  
>> 
>> slides:
>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp-content/uploads/Computational-self-reference-and-the-universal-algorithm-QMUL-2019-1.pdf
>>  
>> 
>> I wrote a couple of elementary Python codes for the QE machine IBM has to 
>> prepare states and run then through Hadamard gates. The thought occurred to 
>> me that this Quining could be done quantum mechanically as a set of Hadamard 
>> gates that duplicate a qubit or an bipartite entangled qubit. This is a part 
>> of my ansatz that a measurement is a sort of Gödel numbering of quantum 
>> states as qubit data in other quantum states.
>> Quantum computations are mapped into an orthomodular lattice that does not 
>> obey the distributive property. The distributive law of p and (q or r) = (p 
>> and q) or (p and r) fails. The reason is due to the Heisenberg uncertainty 
>> principle. Suppose we let p = momentum in the interval [0, P], q = position 
>> in the interval [-x, x] and r = particle in interval [x, y]. The proposition 
>> p and (q or r) is true if this spread in momentum [0, P] is equal to the 
>> reciprocal of the spread of position [-x, y] with
>> P = ħ/sqrt(y^2 + x^2).
>> The distributive law would then mean
>> P = ħ/|y| or P = ħ/|x|
>> which is clearly false. This is the major difference with quantum logic and 
>> Boolean classical logic. These lattices of quantum logic have polytope 
>> realizations.
>> This is in fact another way of realizing that QM can't be built up from 
>> classical physics. If this were the case then quantum orthomodular lattices, 
>> which act on convex sets on L^p spaces with p = ½ would be somehow built 
>> from lattices acting on convex sets with p → ∞. This is for any 
>> deterministic system, whether Newtonian physics or a Turing machine. It is 
>> this flip between convex sets that is difficult to understand. With p = ½ 
>> and the duality between two convex sets as 1/p + 1/q = 1 the dual to QM also 
>> has L^2 measure. This is spacetime with the Gaussian interval. For a p → ∞ 
>> the dual is q = 1 which is a purely stochastic system, say an idealized set 
>> of dice or roulette wheel with no deterministic predictability.
>> The point of Quining statements quantum mechanically is that this might be a 
>> start for looking at a quantum measurement as a way that quantum states 
>> encode qubit information of other quantum states. It is a sort of Gödel 
>> self-reference, and my suspicion is the so called measurement problem is not 
>> solvable. The decoherence of states is then a case where p = ½ → 1 with an 
>> outcome. That is pure randomness.
> 
> With mechanism, that randomness is reduced into the indeterminacy in 
> self-multiplication experience. It come from the many-histories internal 
> interpretation of arithmetic, in which all sound universal numbers converges. 
> The quantum aspect of nature is just how the (sigma_1) arithmetical reality 
> looks like from inside. This explains where the apparent collapse comes from, 
> in a similar way than Everett, but it explains also where the wave comes 
> from. Eventually quantum mechanics is just a modal internal view of 
> arithmetic, or anything Turing equivalent. The math, and quantum physics 
> confirms computationalism up to now, where physicalism and materialism are 
> inconsistent, or consciousness or person eliminative.
> 
> 
> Thanks for addressing this.
> 
> I guess in a way I do not entirely understand this. The above illustration is 
> the main difference between Boolean and quantum logic.

OK. I have no problem with this. I agree and understand that quantum logic 
cannot be embedded or extended into a classical logic. This is related to the 
fact that there is no local hidden variable theory compatible with the quantum 
experiments.

But this does not mean that quantum logic cannot have a classical explanation. 
In fact the quantum formalism is by itself a classical description, even local 
and deterministic, but hard to interpret in any local realistic way.

Assuming the mechanist hypothesis, 

Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Tuesday, June 18, 2019 at 6:02:54 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Jun 2019, at 02:14, Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> The stochastic aspects of QM emerge in measurement, where the modulus 
> square of amplitudes are probabilities and there are these random outcomes. 
> The measurement of a quantum state is not a quantum process, but has 
> stochastic outcomes predicted by QM. Based on the Hamkin's work where I 
> only looked at the slides and not yet the paper, it seems possible to do 
> this with quantum computer. 
>
>
> http://jdh.hamkins.org/computational-self-reference-and-the-universal-algorithm-queen-mary-university-of-london-june-2019/
>
> slides:
>
>
> http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp-content/uploads/Computational-self-reference-and-the-universal-algorithm-QMUL-2019-1.pdf
>
> I wrote a couple of elementary Python codes for the QE machine IBM has to 
> prepare states and run then through Hadamard gates. The thought occurred to 
> me that this Quining could be done quantum mechanically as a set of 
> Hadamard gates that duplicate a qubit or an bipartite entangled qubit. This 
> is a part of my ansatz that a measurement is a sort of Gödel numbering of 
> quantum states as qubit data in other quantum states.
>
> Quantum computations are mapped into an orthomodular lattice that does not 
> obey the distributive property. The distributive law of p and (q or r) = (p 
> and q) or (p and r) fails. The reason is due to the Heisenberg uncertainty 
> principle. Suppose we let p = momentum in the interval [0, P], q = position 
> in the interval [-x, x] and r = particle in interval [x, y]. The 
> proposition p and (q or r) is true if this spread in momentum [0, P] is 
> equal to the reciprocal of the spread of position [-x, y] with
>
> P = ħ/sqrt(y^2 + x^2).
>
> The distributive law would then mean
>
> P = ħ/|y| or P = ħ/|x|
>
> which is clearly false. This is the major difference with quantum logic 
> and Boolean classical logic. These lattices of quantum logic have polytope 
> realizations.
>
> This is in fact another way of realizing that QM can't be built up from 
> classical physics. If this were the case then quantum orthomodular 
> lattices, which act on convex sets on L^p spaces with p = ½ would be 
> somehow built from lattices acting on convex sets with p → ∞. This is for 
> any deterministic system, whether Newtonian physics or a Turing machine. It 
> is this flip between convex sets that is difficult to understand. With p = 
> ½ and the duality between two convex sets as 1/p + 1/q = 1 the dual to QM 
> also has L^2 measure. This is spacetime with the Gaussian interval. For a p 
> → ∞ the dual is q = 1 which is a purely stochastic system, say an idealized 
> set of dice or roulette wheel with no deterministic predictability.
>
> The point of Quining statements quantum mechanically is that this might be 
> a start for looking at a quantum measurement as a way that quantum states 
> encode qubit information of other quantum states. It is a sort of Gödel 
> self-reference, and my suspicion is the so called measurement problem is 
> not solvable. The decoherence of states is then a case where p = ½ → 1 with 
> an outcome. That is pure randomness.
>
>
> With mechanism, that randomness is reduced into the indeterminacy in 
> self-multiplication experience. It come from the many-histories internal 
> interpretation of arithmetic, in which all sound universal numbers 
> converges. The quantum aspect of nature is just how the (sigma_1) 
> arithmetical reality looks like from inside. This explains where the 
> apparent collapse comes from, in a similar way than Everett, but it 
> explains also where the wave comes from. Eventually quantum mechanics is 
> just a modal internal view of arithmetic, or anything Turing equivalent. 
> The math, and quantum physics confirms computationalism up to now, where 
> physicalism and materialism are inconsistent, or consciousness or person 
> eliminative.
>
>
Thanks for addressing this.

I guess in a way I do not entirely understand this. The above illustration 
is the main difference between Boolean and quantum logic. It is not clear 
to me in what way quantum mechanics is σ_1 arithmetic viewed from the 
"inside." I guess I am not sure what is meant by σ_1 arithmetic. 

The space of computation for quantum computers is not clear. Aaronson 
showed the space is a bounded quantum polynomial space, which contains P 
and now appears to extend into NP. The measure of quantum computing is 
PSPACE is as yet not known. 

Quantum logic are in nondistributive orthomodular lattices of p = ½ convex 
functions, classical probability systems p = 1 and deterministic systems 
without a definable measure. We do not think of deterministic classical 
systems, or for that matter Turing machines as having a measure over which 
one integrates a density. The classical probability system and 
deterministic system are in a dual relationship, as are quantum mechanics 
and spacetime physics with 

Re: determinism and randomness in QM

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 18 Jun 2019, at 02:14, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> The stochastic aspects of QM emerge in measurement, where the modulus square 
> of amplitudes are probabilities and there are these random outcomes. The 
> measurement of a quantum state is not a quantum process, but has stochastic 
> outcomes predicted by QM. Based on the Hamkin's work where I only looked at 
> the slides and not yet the paper, it seems possible to do this with quantum 
> computer.
> 
> http://jdh.hamkins.org/computational-self-reference-and-the-universal-algorithm-queen-mary-university-of-london-june-2019/
> slides:
> http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp-content/uploads/Computational-self-reference-and-the-universal-algorithm-QMUL-2019-1.pdf
> I wrote a couple of elementary Python codes for the QE machine IBM has to 
> prepare states and run then through Hadamard gates. The thought occurred to 
> me that this Quining could be done quantum mechanically as a set of Hadamard 
> gates that duplicate a qubit or an bipartite entangled qubit. This is a part 
> of my ansatz that a measurement is a sort of Gödel numbering of quantum 
> states as qubit data in other quantum states.
> Quantum computations are mapped into an orthomodular lattice that does not 
> obey the distributive property. The distributive law of p and (q or r) = (p 
> and q) or (p and r) fails. The reason is due to the Heisenberg uncertainty 
> principle. Suppose we let p = momentum in the interval [0, P], q = position 
> in the interval [-x, x] and r = particle in interval [x, y]. The proposition 
> p and (q or r) is true if this spread in momentum [0, P] is equal to the 
> reciprocal of the spread of position [-x, y] with
> P = ħ/sqrt(y^2 + x^2).
> The distributive law would then mean
> P = ħ/|y| or P = ħ/|x|
> which is clearly false. This is the major difference with quantum logic and 
> Boolean classical logic. These lattices of quantum logic have polytope 
> realizations.
> This is in fact another way of realizing that QM can't be built up from 
> classical physics. If this were the case then quantum orthomodular lattices, 
> which act on convex sets on L^p spaces with p = ½ would be somehow built from 
> lattices acting on convex sets with p → ∞. This is for any deterministic 
> system, whether Newtonian physics or a Turing machine. It is this flip 
> between convex sets that is difficult to understand. With p = ½ and the 
> duality between two convex sets as 1/p + 1/q = 1 the dual to QM also has L^2 
> measure. This is spacetime with the Gaussian interval. For a p → ∞ the dual 
> is q = 1 which is a purely stochastic system, say an idealized set of dice or 
> roulette wheel with no deterministic predictability.
> The point of Quining statements quantum mechanically is that this might be a 
> start for looking at a quantum measurement as a way that quantum states 
> encode qubit information of other quantum states. It is a sort of Gödel 
> self-reference, and my suspicion is the so called measurement problem is not 
> solvable. The decoherence of states is then a case where p = ½ → 1 with an 
> outcome. That is pure randomness.

With mechanism, that randomness is reduced into the indeterminacy in 
self-multiplication experience. It come from the many-histories internal 
interpretation of arithmetic, in which all sound universal numbers converges. 
The quantum aspect of nature is just how the (sigma_1) arithmetical reality 
looks like from inside. This explains where the apparent collapse comes from, 
in a similar way than Everett, but it explains also where the wave comes from. 
Eventually quantum mechanics is just a modal internal view of arithmetic, or 
anything Turing equivalent. The math, and quantum physics confirms 
computationalism up to now, where physicalism and materialism are inconsistent, 
or consciousness or person eliminative.


> Now of course we can ask what we mean by random, and that is undefinable. 
> Given any set of binary strings of length n there are N = 2^n of these, and 
> in general for n → ∞ there is no universal Turing machine which can compress 
> these into any general algorithm, or equivalently the Halting problem can't 
> be solved. A glance at this should indicate that N is the power set of n and 
> this is not Cantor diagonalizable. Chaitin found there is an uncomputable 
> Halting probability for any subset of these strings. Randomness is then 
> something that can't be encoded in an algorithm, only pseudo-randomness.
> The situation is then similar to the fifth axiom of geometry. In geometry one 
> may consider the 5th axiom as true and remain within a consistent geometry. 
> One may similarly stay within the confines of QM, but there is this nagging 
> issue of decoherence or measurement. One may conversely assume the 5th axiom 
> is false, but now one has a huge set of geometries that are not consistent 
> with each other. Similarly in QM one may adopt a particular quantum 
> interpretation.


QM cannot be invoked except as a toll to 

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Dennis Ochei]

Craig,
I've been trying to stay focused studying the past few days (medical exam
D: ), but now im procrastinating

So which of the following are you advancing

No implementation of rules could ever perfectly exemplify (or at least to
such a degree that no human could every tell it was a mere implementation
of rules and not the real thing) the behavior of:

1)  an electron
2) an atom
3) a molecule
4) a macro-molecule
5) an organelle
6) a cell
7) a sponge
8) a nematode
9) a fruit fly
10) a frog
11) a dog
12) a rhesus macaque
13) a human

?




On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 11:41 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Monday, September 9, 2013 11:39:31 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:

 (Resending complete email - trying to do this on a phone.)

 On Tuesday, September 10, 2013, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



 On Thursday, September 5, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:





 My position would suggest that the more mechanistic the conditions of
 the test, the more it stacks the test in favor of not being able to tell
 the difference. If you want to fool someone into thinking an AI is alive,
 get a small group of people who lean toward aspberger's traits and show
 them short, unrelated examples in a highly controlled context.


 You accept, of course, that people with Aspbergers have feelings even
 though they don't express them like everyone else?


 Certainly. I was using the idea of selecting for Aspberger traits as a way
 of stacking the deck toward a result that de-emphasizes emotional
 discernment of others behavior.




 If you want to really bring out the differences between the two, use a
 diverse audience and have them interact freely for a long time in many
 different contexts, often without oversight. What you are looking for is
 aesthetic cues that may not even be able to be named - intuitions of
 something about the AI being off or untrustworthy, continuity gaps,
 non-fluidity, etc. It's sort of like taking a video screen out into the
 sunlight. You get a better view of what it isn't when you can see more of
 what it is.


 It sounds like you're proposing a variant of the Turing Test. What would
 you say if the diverse audience decided the AI probably had feelings, or
 probably had feelings but different to most people's, like the Aspergers
 case?


 Between the two tests, I'm showing the opposite of what is typically
 intended by the Turing Test. I am proposing a way to test the extent to
 which any given Turing-type test reflects the bias of the interpreter
 rather than any intrinsic quality of the target of the test.

 It's hard to say for sure that a positive outcome for the test has any
 meaning. It's mainly to prove a negative. Maybe only one person out of ten
 million can pick up on the subtle cues that give away the simulation, and
 maybe they are too shy to speak up in public. Maybe only dogs can tell its
 not a person. My hunch though is that this is academic. I expect that
 simulations will always be pretty easy to figure out given enough time and
 diversity of audience and interaction. If at some point in time that is no
 longer the case, the ability to tell the difference will probably be
 available as an app for our own augmented human systems.

 Craig



 --
 Stathis Papaioannou



 --
 Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tuesday, September 10, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Monday, September 9, 2013 11:39:31 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:

 (Resending complete email - trying to do this on a phone.)

 On Tuesday, September 10, 2013, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



 On Thursday, September 5, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:





 My position would suggest that the more mechanistic the conditions of
 the test, the more it stacks the test in favor of not being able to tell
 the difference. If you want to fool someone into thinking an AI is alive,
 get a small group of people who lean toward aspberger's traits and show
 them short, unrelated examples in a highly controlled context.


 You accept, of course, that people with Aspbergers have feelings even
 though they don't express them like everyone else?


 Certainly. I was using the idea of selecting for Aspberger traits as a way
 of stacking the deck toward a result that de-emphasizes emotional
 discernment of others behavior.




 If you want to really bring out the differences between the two, use a
 diverse audience and have them interact freely for a long time in many
 different contexts, often without oversight. What you are looking for is
 aesthetic cues that may not even be able to be named - intuitions of
 something about the AI being off or untrustworthy, continuity gaps,
 non-fluidity, etc. It's sort of like taking a video screen out into the
 sunlight. You get a better view of what it isn't when you can see more of
 what it is.


 It sounds like you're proposing a variant of the Turing Test. What would
 you say if the diverse audience decided the AI probably had feelings, or
 probably had feelings but different to most people's, like the Aspergers
 case?


 Between the two tests, I'm showing the opposite of what is typically
 intended by the Turing Test. I am proposing a way to test the extent to
 which any given Turing-type test reflects the bias of the interpreter
 rather than any intrinsic quality of the target of the test.

 It's hard to say for sure that a positive outcome for the test has any
 meaning. It's mainly to prove a negative. Maybe only one person out of ten
 million can pick up on the subtle cues that give away the simulation, and
 maybe they are too shy to speak up in public. Maybe only dogs can tell its
 not a person. My hunch though is that this is academic. I expect that
 simulations will always be pretty easy to figure out given enough time and
 diversity of audience and interaction. If at some point in time that is no
 longer the case, the ability to tell the difference will probably be
 available as an app for our own augmented human systems.

 Craig


You are assuming the entities around you either are or aren't conscious,
but you have no way of telling. If you have no way of telling, then how do
you know those around you are conscious, and how do you know that computers
aren't? By analogy with your own experience, you can say that those like
you are conscious, but you do this on the basis of their behaviour being
like yours, not on the basis of any special tests let alone dissection to
see what they are composed of. You say this test is invalid, but you
presumably use it all the time. You also claim to know that a computer is
not conscious regardless of its behaviour, but you need a test for
consciousness and you have admitted you don't have one. The best test you
can propose is an intuition, but you admit that only one in ten million
might have this intuition; and it would not be possible to know if this one
in ten million were right, nor if the many others who falsely claimed to
have the intuition were wrong.


The way you talk implies that at least in principle there is a definitive
test for consciousness, but there is no such test.

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, September 10, 2013 2:07:26 AM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:

 Craig,
 I've been trying to stay focused studying the past few days (medical exam 
 D: ), but now im procrastinating

 So which of the following are you advancing

 No implementation of rules could ever perfectly exemplify (or at least to 
 such a degree that no human could every tell it was a mere implementation 
 of rules and not the real thing) the behavior of:

 1)  an electron
 2) an atom
 3) a molecule
 4) a macro-molecule
 5) an organelle
 6) a cell
 7) a sponge
 8) a nematode
 9) a fruit fly
 10) a frog
 11) a dog
 12) a rhesus macaque
 13) a human

 ?


I am advancing the idea that that there is a formula. We can say that the 
numbers on your list, 1-13, can correspond to what I call the pathetic 
constant (p). The higher the number, the more likely that we, as humans 
will attribute feelings and/or the expectation that the public phenomena is 
associated with a private experience which is worthy of our consideration. 
If we misattribute a high p value (i.e. human feelings) to a very low p 
phenomenon then we are committing the pathetic fallacy 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pathetic_fallacy).

In light of that, let me reorganize the chart:

(13) myself
(12) people who remind me of myself
(11) people who are familiar
(10) people who look or behave in an unfamiliar way
(9) living primates
(8) living mammals
(7) animals
(6) reptiles, insects
(5) plants
(4) cells under a microscope
(3) movies of any of the above
(2) photos of any of the above
(1) dead bodies of animals
(0) stuffed animals (taxidermy)
(-1) stuffed animals (synthetic), robot looking robots
(-2) cartoons, fictional characters, graphic simulations, entopic 
hallucinations
(-3) AI, verbal simulations
(-4) natural phenomena - clouds, mountains
(-5) significant objects - jewels, antiques
(-6) common objects - trash can, pile of sand
(-7/14) invisible abstraction - wraps around from absolutely generic 
unconsciousness to God concepts

When we try to include phenomena which we cannot directly interact with, 
such as those on an astrophysical or subatomic scale, or 'information' 
constructs, we have to fit it into our natural schema intuitively, which I 
think is both deceptive on one level and potentially contains true insights 
on another.

If we looked at a pile of yeast, it might look to us like powder (-6) but 
the actual yeast cells deserve more of a (4 to 5) rating. The gap going in 
that direction would be an antipathetic gap. Treating a stuffed animal (-2) 
as a pet (7 to 9) would be a pathetic gap.

To make matters more complicated, our own state of consciousness alters and 
distorts the scale. A child's empathy may differ from an adult's. A child 
who has been traumatized by a bear may feel different about animals and be 
more susceptible to a pathetic gap because of their fear. Their toy bear 
may have to be thrown out. The entire scale is made of prejudice, but it is 
not prejudice which is completely unfounded. The lens through which we 
empathize with others is made of accumulated aesthetic experiences which 
have roots beyond our conscious mind. Our history as a species with snakes 
and spiders is present in the attitudes of people - some people more than 
others, and some cultures more than others.

It's not the rules that make something seem alive, it is the aesthetic 
presence. We are exquisitely sensitive to the aesthetics of living 
organisms. We may not be able to tell the difference between a real plant 
and a plastic plant from 10 yards away, but if we can look at it close up, 
touch the leaves, smell it, we can know very quickly what we are dealing 
with. We can be easily misdirected with simulations - puppets, trompe 
l'oeil, etc, but this superficial empathy is not exactly the same as our 
deep, even subconscious understanding, and it is certainly not the same as 
what the entity we are judging is experiencing.

To simulate an aesthetic presence is not necessarily possible. We can make 
synthetic fabrics now that have a natural feel to a much greater degree 
than was possible 20 years ago, but we can still tell the difference on 
some level, and our skin can tell the difference. If we keep improving the 
fabric, it may be possible that at some point no expert will be able to 
tell the difference without scientific tools, but that is not necessarily 
true. A human being who has a talent for appreciating fabric may have a 
palette whose sensitivity will always learn to spot a fake.

The assumption you make is that we are talking about degrees of complexity, 
and that complexity is an objective value defined in mathematical terms. My 
view is that the complexity is only the tip of the iceberg. What we are 
really talking about is sensitivity and authenticity. A woodgrain laminate 
is easy to distinguish from a hardwood floor to someone who is paying 
attention, but not as easy as it is to distinguish a mannequin from a 
living person. Even a 

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thursday, September 5, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:





 My position would suggest that the more mechanistic the conditions of the
 test, the more it stacks the test in favor of not being able to tell the
 difference. If you want to fool someone into thinking an AI is alive, get a
 small group of people who lean toward aspberger's traits and show them
 short, unrelated examples in a highly controlled context.


You accept, of course, that people with Aspbergers have fe


 If you want to really bring out the differences between the two, use a
 diverse audience and have them interact freely for a long time in many
 different contexts, often without oversight. What you are looking for is
 aesthetic cues that may not even be able to be named - intuitions of
 something about the AI being off or untrustworthy, continuity gaps,
 non-fluidity, etc. It's sort of like taking a video screen out into the
 sunlight. You get a better view of what it isn't when you can see more of
 what it is.



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Stathis Papaioannou]

(Resending complete email - trying to do this on a phone.)

On Tuesday, September 10, 2013, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



 On Thursday, September 5, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:





 My position would suggest that the more mechanistic the conditions of the
 test, the more it stacks the test in favor of not being able to tell the
 difference. If you want to fool someone into thinking an AI is alive, get a
 small group of people who lean toward aspberger's traits and show them
 short, unrelated examples in a highly controlled context.


 You accept, of course, that people with Aspbergers have feelings even
 though they don't express them like everyone else?


 If you want to really bring out the differences between the two, use a
 diverse audience and have them interact freely for a long time in many
 different contexts, often without oversight. What you are looking for is
 aesthetic cues that may not even be able to be named - intuitions of
 something about the AI being off or untrustworthy, continuity gaps,
 non-fluidity, etc. It's sort of like taking a video screen out into the
 sunlight. You get a better view of what it isn't when you can see more of
 what it is.


It sounds like you're proposing a variant of the Turing Test. What would
you say if the diverse audience decided the AI probably had feelings, or
probably had feelings but different to most people's, like the Aspergers
case?


 --
 Stathis Papaioannou



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, September 9, 2013 11:39:31 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:

 (Resending complete email - trying to do this on a phone.)

 On Tuesday, September 10, 2013, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



 On Thursday, September 5, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:





 My position would suggest that the more mechanistic the conditions of 
 the test, the more it stacks the test in favor of not being able to tell 
 the difference. If you want to fool someone into thinking an AI is alive, 
 get a small group of people who lean toward aspberger's traits and show 
 them short, unrelated examples in a highly controlled context. 


 You accept, of course, that people with Aspbergers have feelings even 
 though they don't express them like everyone else?


Certainly. I was using the idea of selecting for Aspberger traits as a way 
of stacking the deck toward a result that de-emphasizes emotional 
discernment of others behavior.
 

  

 If you want to really bring out the differences between the two, use a 
 diverse audience and have them interact freely for a long time in many 
 different contexts, often without oversight. What you are looking for is 
 aesthetic cues that may not even be able to be named - intuitions of 
 something about the AI being off or untrustworthy, continuity gaps, 
 non-fluidity, etc. It's sort of like taking a video screen out into the 
 sunlight. You get a better view of what it isn't when you can see more of 
 what it is.


 It sounds like you're proposing a variant of the Turing Test. What would 
 you say if the diverse audience decided the AI probably had feelings, or 
 probably had feelings but different to most people's, like the Aspergers 
 case?


Between the two tests, I'm showing the opposite of what is typically 
intended by the Turing Test. I am proposing a way to test the extent to 
which any given Turing-type test reflects the bias of the interpreter 
rather than any intrinsic quality of the target of the test.

It's hard to say for sure that a positive outcome for the test has any 
meaning. It's mainly to prove a negative. Maybe only one person out of ten 
million can pick up on the subtle cues that give away the simulation, and 
maybe they are too shy to speak up in public. Maybe only dogs can tell its 
not a person. My hunch though is that this is academic. I expect that 
simulations will always be pretty easy to figure out given enough time and 
diversity of audience and interaction. If at some point in time that is no 
longer the case, the ability to tell the difference will probably be 
available as an app for our own augmented human systems.

Craig

 

 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou



 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou


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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Dennis Ochei]

also, unless we come up with a clever way of raising the cost of reneging,
we wont be able to make any bets

On Tuesday, September 3, 2013, Dennis Ochei wrote:

 1) rationality (logic) in this case is to mean founded on justified
 principles. This is inherently a normative judgment. the principles that
 govern a deterministic system needn't appeal to our psychology as
 justified, this is what i mean by determined doesn't mean logical. none of
 my desires seem to me logically justified, but that doesnt imply they are
 not deterministic.

 2) your thesis is essentially, i cant see how a set of rules could lead
 to to desire, i cant see how a set of rules could lead something that has
 experiences that seem to have irreducible qualities, therefore there can be
 no such rules. that's fine i suppose, but I'm unable to pretend that your
 blindness is some sort of insight. i just think you havent looked hard
 enough

 On Tuesday, September 3, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 8:57:13 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:

 Craig,

 What UV looks like will depend on how it is transduced into the nervous
 system. I could add a new opsin into your blue cones and it would appear to
 be a shade of blue.


 Sure, we can look at an infra-red camera too and see IR light as green or
 some other color. That isn't what I'm talking about. I am talking about new
 primary colors.


 Or, I could achieve the transduction in such a way that UV doesn't confuse
 with blue. In which case UV will look different from other colors *in way
 you cannot describe because you don't have access to how you condition your
 behavior based of the intensity of UV light. *


 It wouldn't matter if you did have access to how you condition your
 behavior based on the intensity of the UV light. Color cannot be
 described, it can only be experienced directly. I don't want you to waste
 our time trying to tell me what I already know.


 http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/light-revisited/is-visible-light-electromagnetic/




 I've told you in a rudimentary form what is required to build a system
 that has drives and motivations, from parts that are inanimate.


 Not at all. You are projecting drives and motivations onto a system that
 is unconsciously serving a function that serves your drives and motivations.


 Nature has constructed such a device using 302 neurons. It learns, and it
 has motivations.


 The neurons are an expression of the motivations, not the other way around.


 Is your argument here that if we model the nematode deterministically, its
 ability to learn and its biological drives will vanish like smoke?


 Does a rabbit's taste for carrots vanish just because we model him as Bugs
 Bunny? Yes. Models, cartoons, figures, functions, shapes, descriptions,
 simulations...none of them can have any sense of being or feeling. Bugs
 Bunny is not a rabbit. He is a symbol which reminds our psychology of
 particular themes which overlap with rabbit themes.


 Because if so, I'd bet good money that you're wrong.


 Sure, I'd love to take that bet. I was going to say $10,000 but I don't
 think that you are going to pay that when you lose. What amount sounds good?


  Drives are traceable to electrochemical gradients trying to resolve
 themselves, driven by thermodynamic laws. Logic is how the pipes are
 connected up, desire is the water pump.


 I agree that microphysical events correspond to microphenomenal
 experiences, but that does not mean that all that has to happen to scale up
 an inanimate object's thermodynamic motives to mammalian quality emotions
 is that it must be configured in the correct shapes. That is an assumption,
 and a seductively popular one, but it is 100% wrong. Using the hypothesis
 of sense as the sole universal primitive, we should anticipate that the
 relevant qualifier of sensitivity is not structure but experience. Giving
 your cat a computer will not make him computer literate, and dressing a
 water pump up in human clothes does not cause a human. The clues are all
 around us. No machine or program has every succeeded in being anything but
 completely impersonal and psychologically empty.


 Furthermore, deterministic does not equal logical. There is no logic
 behind why opposites attract, even though this logically leads to like
 dissolving like. Whatever axioms there are in this universe



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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 11:36:29 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:

 1) rationality (logic) in this case is to mean founded on justified 
 principles. This is inherently a normative judgment. the principles that 
 govern a deterministic system needn't appeal to our psychology as justified,


Determinism is a logical justification of cause and effect or else it is 
meaningless. No particular determination need be justified by our 
expectations, but determinism in general is an expectation of a logic of 
causality - an airtight logic of perfect correspondence. Rationality is 
more of a broad term which I would not apply to determinism in the strict 
sense of a deterministic cosmology. Rationality implies more tolerance of 
humanistic dimensions like free will. A person can freely choose to act 
rationally or irrationally, but in a deterministic universe, the logic 
would be that a person always acts to complete effects set into motion by 
prior cause. Logic is scripted and automated. Rationality can be 
responsive. You're welcome to use words in whatever way you like, but I 
don't want to dwell on word definitions. If by introducing rationality as a 
logic equivalence you mean to soften determinism, then I think we should 
stick to the word logic, since the determinism that I argue against has a 
zero tolerance for soft reasoning. Determinism is a closed shop of locked 
steps with all novelty being a pseudo-novelty derived from recombination.
 

 this is what i mean by determined doesn't mean logical. none of my desires 
 seem to me logically justified, but that doesnt imply they are not 
 deterministic.


The fact that you have desires at all does not make sense in a 
deterministic universe. It gets confusing if you pull examples from real 
life. If we are going to talk about the fantasy world of determinism, we 
should refer only to those things which we can justify as being logically 
deterministic.


 2) your thesis is essentially, i cant see how a set of rules could lead 
 to to desire,


No, my thesis is not that I can't see something, it is that I can see 
something that others may not. Nobody, including you can see how a set of 
rules could lead to desire. My thesis is that fact, along with many others, 
suggests that 'rules' are an abstraction which are fictional and derived 
from experience, whereas desire is a concrete fact from which abstractions 
can be derived. 

My thesis is that there is an important difference between presentations 
and representations, such that a natural presence has a coherent footprint 
across multiple levels of sense, which is itself multi-coherent and 
self-generated. By contrast, a representation, such as a 'rule', 
'function', 'process', 'pattern', 'figure', or 'information' is a second 
order, symbiotic phenomenon within a natural presentation. Representations 
are not whole and are not grounded in the totality of nature (space, time, 
matter, energy, significance, entropy, sense, motive) but are rather a 
facade, like a hologram, which makes sense only from a particular set of 
externally defined perspectives.
 

 i cant see how a set of rules could lead something that has experiences 
 that seem to have irreducible qualities, therefore there can be no such 
 rules. 


Even if that wasn't a misrepresentation of my position, it isn't even a 
good Straw Man. Why would the impotence of 'rules' to create natural 
phenomena mean that there can be no rules? When did I imply that there 
can't be any rules?
 

 that's fine i suppose, but I'm unable to pretend that your blindness is 
 some sort of insight. i just think you havent looked hard enough


I can tell from your responses that you haven't looked at my blindness at 
all, only your own, dressed up to sound like me.

Craig
 


 On Tuesday, September 3, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 8:57:13 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:

 Craig,

 What UV looks like will depend on how it is transduced into the nervous 
 system. I could add a new opsin into your blue cones and it would appear to 
 be a shade of blue. 


 Sure, we can look at an infra-red camera too and see IR light as green or 
 some other color. That isn't what I'm talking about. I am talking about new 
 primary colors.
  

 Or, I could achieve the transduction in such a way that UV doesn't 
 confuse with blue. In which case UV will look different from other colors 
 *in way you cannot describe because you don't have access to how you 
 condition your behavior based of the intensity of UV light. *


 It wouldn't matter if you did have access to how you condition your 
 behavior based on the intensity of the UV light. Color cannot be 
 described, it can only be experienced directly. I don't want you to waste 
 our time trying to tell me what I already know.


 http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/light-revisited/is-visible-light-electromagnetic/

  


 I've told you in a rudimentary form what is required to build a system 
 that has 

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Dennis Ochei]

 Determinism is a logical justification of cause and effect or else it is
 meaningless...


 Sure, whatever, I was speaking colloquially, I wasn't using it in a
technical fashion.

 Nobody, including you can see how a set of rules could lead to desire


mmhmm, what's your evidence of this? This seems to be an empirical
statement and arguing seems to be going nowhere. How are you determining if
a given set of rules exhibits desires? That is, supposing (although
apparently it is impossible [can you see my eyes rolling?]) someone dropped
the rules on your lap that produce desire, how would you tell? Are there
sets of rules that do not produce desire that you are likely to confuse as
exhibiting desire? Would you deny or accept the claim, No matter what
behavior the rules produce, since the behavior emanates from rules, it
cannot be desire? And essentially, what would convince you your thesis is
wrong?

Even if that wasn't a misrepresentation of my position, it isn't even a
 good Straw Man.


me: ...therefore there can be no such rules [that could lead something that
has experiences that seem to have irreducible qualities]. I didn't claim
that that you thought there were no rules period.




On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 7:18 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 11:36:29 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:

 1) rationality (logic) in this case is to mean founded on justified
 principles. This is inherently a normative judgment. the principles that
 govern a deterministic system needn't appeal to our psychology as justified,


 Determinism is a logical justification of cause and effect or else it is
 meaningless. No particular determination need be justified by our
 expectations, but determinism in general is an expectation of a logic of
 causality - an airtight logic of perfect correspondence. Rationality is
 more of a broad term which I would not apply to determinism in the strict
 sense of a deterministic cosmology. Rationality implies more tolerance of
 humanistic dimensions like free will. A person can freely choose to act
 rationally or irrationally, but in a deterministic universe, the logic
 would be that a person always acts to complete effects set into motion by
 prior cause. Logic is scripted and automated. Rationality can be
 responsive. You're welcome to use words in whatever way you like, but I
 don't want to dwell on word definitions. If by introducing rationality as a
 logic equivalence you mean to soften determinism, then I think we should
 stick to the word logic, since the determinism that I argue against has a
 zero tolerance for soft reasoning. Determinism is a closed shop of locked
 steps with all novelty being a pseudo-novelty derived from recombination.


 this is what i mean by determined doesn't mean logical. none of my
 desires seem to me logically justified, but that doesnt imply they are not
 deterministic.


 The fact that you have desires at all does not make sense in a
 deterministic universe. It gets confusing if you pull examples from real
 life. If we are going to talk about the fantasy world of determinism, we
 should refer only to those things which we can justify as being logically
 deterministic.


 2) your thesis is essentially, i cant see how a set of rules could lead
 to to desire,


 No, my thesis is not that I can't see something, it is that I can see
 something that others may not. Nobody, including you can see how a set of
 rules could lead to desire. My thesis is that fact, along with many others,
 suggests that 'rules' are an abstraction which are fictional and derived
 from experience, whereas desire is a concrete fact from which abstractions
 can be derived.

 My thesis is that there is an important difference between presentations
 and representations, such that a natural presence has a coherent footprint
 across multiple levels of sense, which is itself multi-coherent and
 self-generated. By contrast, a representation, such as a 'rule',
 'function', 'process', 'pattern', 'figure', or 'information' is a second
 order, symbiotic phenomenon within a natural presentation. Representations
 are not whole and are not grounded in the totality of nature (space, time,
 matter, energy, significance, entropy, sense, motive) but are rather a
 facade, like a hologram, which makes sense only from a particular set of
 externally defined perspectives.


 i cant see how a set of rules could lead something that has experiences
 that seem to have irreducible qualities, therefore there can be no such
 rules.


 Even if that wasn't a misrepresentation of my position, it isn't even a
 good Straw Man. Why would the impotence of 'rules' to create natural
 phenomena mean that there can be no rules? When did I imply that there
 can't be any rules?


 that's fine i suppose, but I'm unable to pretend that your blindness is
 some sort of insight. i just think you havent looked hard enough


 I can tell from your responses that you haven't looked at my 

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, September 4, 2013 1:46:14 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:

 Determinism is a logical justification of cause and effect or else it is 
 meaningless...


  Sure, whatever, I was speaking colloquially, I wasn't using it in a 
 technical fashion.

  Nobody, including you can see how a set of rules could lead to desire


 mmhmm, what's your evidence of this? This seems to be an empirical 
 statement and arguing seems to be going nowhere. How are you determining if 
 a given set of rules exhibits desires? That is, supposing (although 
 apparently it is impossible [can you see my eyes rolling?]) someone dropped 
 the rules on your lap that produce desire, how would you tell? Are there 
 sets of rules that do not produce desire that you are likely to confuse as 
 exhibiting desire? Would you deny or accept the claim, No matter what 
 behavior the rules produce, since the behavior emanates from rules, it 
 cannot be desire? And essentially, what would convince you your thesis is 
 wrong?


Rules don't produce anything, just as triangles or steps don't produce 
anything. They are abstractions we use to analyze experiences after the 
fact. To ask what my evidence is is the same as asking what evidence I have 
that this emoticon ;) is not actually happy. The evidence is in our shared 
understanding (as is all evidence). What would convince you that your 
thesis is wrong?
 


 Even if that wasn't a misrepresentation of my position, it isn't even a 
 good Straw Man. 

  
 me: ...therefore there can be no such rules [that could lead something 
 that has experiences that seem to have irreducible qualities]. I didn't 
 claim that that you thought there were no rules period.


Sorry, I see what you mean. It was more of the same claim twice. Since I 
don't believe X can exist, I also don't believe that X can exist (at all). 
My view is that since I understand why X doesn't yield Y, I'm not swayed by 
the counter argument 'maybe you don't understand X as much as you 
think'...which leads us back to 'maybe you don't understand my 
understanding as much as you want me to think'...

Thanks,
Craig
 


  


 On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 7:18 AM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
  wrote:



 On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 11:36:29 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:

 1) rationality (logic) in this case is to mean founded on justified 
 principles. This is inherently a normative judgment. the principles that 
 govern a deterministic system needn't appeal to our psychology as justified,


 Determinism is a logical justification of cause and effect or else it is 
 meaningless. No particular determination need be justified by our 
 expectations, but determinism in general is an expectation of a logic of 
 causality - an airtight logic of perfect correspondence. Rationality is 
 more of a broad term which I would not apply to determinism in the strict 
 sense of a deterministic cosmology. Rationality implies more tolerance of 
 humanistic dimensions like free will. A person can freely choose to act 
 rationally or irrationally, but in a deterministic universe, the logic 
 would be that a person always acts to complete effects set into motion by 
 prior cause. Logic is scripted and automated. Rationality can be 
 responsive. You're welcome to use words in whatever way you like, but I 
 don't want to dwell on word definitions. If by introducing rationality as a 
 logic equivalence you mean to soften determinism, then I think we should 
 stick to the word logic, since the determinism that I argue against has a 
 zero tolerance for soft reasoning. Determinism is a closed shop of locked 
 steps with all novelty being a pseudo-novelty derived from recombination.
  

 this is what i mean by determined doesn't mean logical. none of my 
 desires seem to me logically justified, but that doesnt imply they are not 
 deterministic.


 The fact that you have desires at all does not make sense in a 
 deterministic universe. It gets confusing if you pull examples from real 
 life. If we are going to talk about the fantasy world of determinism, we 
 should refer only to those things which we can justify as being logically 
 deterministic.


 2) your thesis is essentially, i cant see how a set of rules could lead 
 to to desire,


 No, my thesis is not that I can't see something, it is that I can see 
 something that others may not. Nobody, including you can see how a set of 
 rules could lead to desire. My thesis is that fact, along with many others, 
 suggests that 'rules' are an abstraction which are fictional and derived 
 from experience, whereas desire is a concrete fact from which abstractions 
 can be derived. 

 My thesis is that there is an important difference between presentations 
 and representations, such that a natural presence has a coherent footprint 
 across multiple levels of sense, which is itself multi-coherent and 
 self-generated. By contrast, a representation, such as a 'rule', 
 'function', 'process', 'pattern', 

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Dennis Ochei]

 Rules don't produce anything, just as triangles or steps don't produce
 anything


What about something like Conway's Game of Life? Why is it wrong to see the
behavior of the game as produced by the rules of the game and initial
conditions?

 To ask what my evidence is is the same as asking what evidence I have that
 this emoticon...


So are you or are you not making a predictive statement about what can be
done using a system of rules? What exactly is it you are saying cannot be
done? (Not what cannot be *explained*, but what cannot be done). What are
the practical implications?


On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 1:20 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Wednesday, September 4, 2013 1:46:14 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:

 Determinism is a logical justification of cause and effect or else it is
 meaningless...


  Sure, whatever, I was speaking colloquially, I wasn't using it in a
 technical fashion.

  Nobody, including you can see how a set of rules could lead to desire


 mmhmm, what's your evidence of this? This seems to be an empirical
 statement and arguing seems to be going nowhere. How are you determining if
 a given set of rules exhibits desires? That is, supposing (although
 apparently it is impossible [can you see my eyes rolling?]) someone dropped
 the rules on your lap that produce desire, how would you tell? Are there
 sets of rules that do not produce desire that you are likely to confuse as
 exhibiting desire? Would you deny or accept the claim, No matter what
 behavior the rules produce, since the behavior emanates from rules, it
 cannot be desire? And essentially, what would convince you your thesis is
 wrong?


 Rules don't produce anything, just as triangles or steps don't produce
 anything. They are abstractions we use to analyze experiences after the
 fact. To ask what my evidence is is the same as asking what evidence I have
 that this emoticon ;) is not actually happy. The evidence is in our shared
 understanding (as is all evidence). What would convince you that your
 thesis is wrong?



 Even if that wasn't a misrepresentation of my position, it isn't even a
 good Straw Man.


 me: ...therefore there can be no such rules [that could lead something
 that has experiences that seem to have irreducible qualities]. I didn't
 claim that that you thought there were no rules period.


 Sorry, I see what you mean. It was more of the same claim twice. Since I
 don't believe X can exist, I also don't believe that X can exist (at all).
 My view is that since I understand why X doesn't yield Y, I'm not swayed by
 the counter argument 'maybe you don't understand X as much as you
 think'...which leads us back to 'maybe you don't understand my
 understanding as much as you want me to think'...

 Thanks,
 Craig






 On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 7:18 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 11:36:29 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:

 1) rationality (logic) in this case is to mean founded on justified
 principles. This is inherently a normative judgment. the principles that
 govern a deterministic system needn't appeal to our psychology as 
 justified,


 Determinism is a logical justification of cause and effect or else it is
 meaningless. No particular determination need be justified by our
 expectations, but determinism in general is an expectation of a logic of
 causality - an airtight logic of perfect correspondence. Rationality is
 more of a broad term which I would not apply to determinism in the strict
 sense of a deterministic cosmology. Rationality implies more tolerance of
 humanistic dimensions like free will. A person can freely choose to act
 rationally or irrationally, but in a deterministic universe, the logic
 would be that a person always acts to complete effects set into motion by
 prior cause. Logic is scripted and automated. Rationality can be
 responsive. You're welcome to use words in whatever way you like, but I
 don't want to dwell on word definitions. If by introducing rationality as a
 logic equivalence you mean to soften determinism, then I think we should
 stick to the word logic, since the determinism that I argue against has a
 zero tolerance for soft reasoning. Determinism is a closed shop of locked
 steps with all novelty being a pseudo-novelty derived from recombination.


 this is what i mean by determined doesn't mean logical. none of my
 desires seem to me logically justified, but that doesnt imply they are not
 deterministic.


 The fact that you have desires at all does not make sense in a
 deterministic universe. It gets confusing if you pull examples from real
 life. If we are going to talk about the fantasy world of determinism, we
 should refer only to those things which we can justify as being logically
 deterministic.


 2) your thesis is essentially, i cant see how a set of rules could
 lead to to desire,


 No, my thesis is not that I can't see something, it is that I can see
 something that others may not. 

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, September 4, 2013 2:45:30 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:

 Rules don't produce anything, just as triangles or steps don't produce 
 anything


 What about something like Conway's Game of Life? Why is it wrong to see 
 the behavior of the game as produced by the rules of the game and initial 
 conditions?


Because something has to be able to 
1) privately sense the conditions which are being 'ruled', 
2) respond to those conditions with a public facing motive-strategy, and 
3) have the power to cause a public effect using 2 (i.e. the power to 
influence distant 1 experiences). 
Otherwise it's rules, schmules. What cares about the rules, and how is the 
more fundamental issue. Once we have the factory, the workers, the raw 
materials, then sure, policies and procedures can be said to 'produce' a 
product, but what policies can produce an effect ab initio?


  To ask what my evidence is is the same as asking what evidence I have 
 that this emoticon...


 So are you or are you not making a predictive statement about what can be 
 done using a system of rules? What exactly is it you are saying cannot be 
 done? (Not what cannot be *explained*, but what cannot be done). What are 
 the practical implications?


One practical implication is that we don't have to worry about accidentally 
creating AI which can feel or suffer. Otherwise I suppose the practical 
consequences are to do with how we live individually and socially - to see 
clearly where private and public approaches are appropriate and avoid the 
pathological extremes. I mean the implications are huge, ultimately...the 
reconciliation of religion, philosophy, and science, the dawn of a new era 
of understanding, blah blah blah, but that's anybody's guess.

Systems of rules are great, and they can only be better if we understand 
more about what it is that we are ruling. Or if/when they aren't great, we 
can understand that there is a whole other half of the universe we can look 
to for ways to escape them. The effects of over-signifying the quantitative 
are so pervasive and invasive that its going to take a miracle for people 
to adjust to a different view. It's like a hardcore meth addict considering 
for the first time that maybe there is a down-side to the drug.



 On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 1:20 PM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
  wrote:



 On Wednesday, September 4, 2013 1:46:14 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:

 Determinism is a logical justification of cause and effect or else it is 
 meaningless...


  Sure, whatever, I was speaking colloquially, I wasn't using it in a 
 technical fashion.

  Nobody, including you can see how a set of rules could lead to desire


 mmhmm, what's your evidence of this? This seems to be an empirical 
 statement and arguing seems to be going nowhere. How are you determining if 
 a given set of rules exhibits desires? That is, supposing (although 
 apparently it is impossible [can you see my eyes rolling?]) someone dropped 
 the rules on your lap that produce desire, how would you tell? Are there 
 sets of rules that do not produce desire that you are likely to confuse as 
 exhibiting desire? Would you deny or accept the claim, No matter what 
 behavior the rules produce, since the behavior emanates from rules, it 
 cannot be desire? And essentially, what would convince you your thesis is 
 wrong?


 Rules don't produce anything, just as triangles or steps don't produce 
 anything. They are abstractions we use to analyze experiences after the 
 fact. To ask what my evidence is is the same as asking what evidence I have 
 that this emoticon ;) is not actually happy. The evidence is in our shared 
 understanding (as is all evidence). What would convince you that your 
 thesis is wrong?
  


 Even if that wasn't a misrepresentation of my position, it isn't even a 
 good Straw Man. 

  
 me: ...therefore there can be no such rules [that could lead something 
 that has experiences that seem to have irreducible qualities]. I didn't 
 claim that that you thought there were no rules period.


 Sorry, I see what you mean. It was more of the same claim twice. Since I 
 don't believe X can exist, I also don't believe that X can exist (at all). 
 My view is that since I understand why X doesn't yield Y, I'm not swayed by 
 the counter argument 'maybe you don't understand X as much as you 
 think'...which leads us back to 'maybe you don't understand my 
 understanding as much as you want me to think'...

 Thanks,
 Craig
  


  


 On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 7:18 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 11:36:29 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:

 1) rationality (logic) in this case is to mean founded on justified 
 principles. This is inherently a normative judgment. the principles that 
 govern a deterministic system needn't appeal to our psychology as 
 justified,


 Determinism is a logical justification of cause and effect or else it 
 is meaningless. No particular 

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, September 4, 2013 4:54:20 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:

 but what policies can produce an effect ab initio?

 then is there anything wrong with saying the *implementation* of the rules 
 of GOL produce the behavior of the game?


Nothing wrong with that, no, just like there's nothing wrong with saying 
that the implementation of a cookie cutter produces the shape of the 
cookie. I'm pointing out that it's still the metal and the cookie dough, 
and the intent of the baker that are doing the heavy lifting.
 




 i think you missed the nuance of what i was asking. (i was trying 
 fecklessly to make it clear with few words) i dont want moral implications, 
 but empirical ones. I might observe identical outputs from an AI that 
 doesn't really feel and a human or something else that uncontroversially 
 does feel. I might observe the exact same thing whether or not the ai has 
 a true inner life. what can i predict i might see or hear that is a 
 consequence of your position bring true that isnt merely a consequence of 
 your position being believed to be true? (obstensibly, we wouldnt worry 
 about building ai's that can feel if we believed your position, even if it 
 was false)


My position would suggest that the more mechanistic the conditions of the 
test, the more it stacks the test in favor of not being able to tell the 
difference. If you want to fool someone into thinking an AI is alive, get a 
small group of people who lean toward aspberger's traits and show them 
short, unrelated examples in a highly controlled context. If you want to 
really bring out the differences between the two, use a diverse audience 
and have them interact freely for a long time in many different contexts, 
often without oversight. What you are looking for is aesthetic cues that 
may not even be able to be named - intuitions of something about the AI 
being off or untrustworthy, continuity gaps, non-fluidity, etc. It's sort 
of like taking a video screen out into the sunlight. You get a better view 
of what it isn't when you can see more of what it is.



 On Wednesday, September 4, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Wednesday, September 4, 2013 2:45:30 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:

 Rules don't produce anything, just as triangles or steps don't produce 
 anything


 What about something like Conway's Game of Life? Why is it wrong to see 
 the behavior of the game as produced by the rules of the game and initial 
 conditions?


 Because something has to be able to 
 1) privately sense the conditions which are being 'ruled', 
 2) respond to those conditions with a public facing motive-strategy, and 
 3) have the power to cause a public effect using 2 (i.e. the power to 
 influence distant 1 experiences). 
 Otherwise it's rules, schmules. What cares about the rules, and how is 
 the more fundamental issue. Once we have the factory, the workers, the raw 
 materials, then sure, policies and procedures can be said to 'produce' a 
 product, but what policies can produce an effect ab initio?


  To ask what my evidence is is the same as asking what evidence I have 
 that this emoticon...


 So are you or are you not making a predictive statement about what can 
 be done using a system of rules? What exactly is it you are saying cannot 
 be done? (Not what cannot be *explained*, but what cannot be done). 
 What are the practical implications?


 One practical implication is that we don't have to worry about 
 accidentally creating AI which can feel or suffer. Otherwise I suppose the 
 practical consequences are to do with how we live individually and socially 
 - to see clearly where private and public approaches are appropriate and 
 avoid the pathological extremes. I mean the implications are huge, 
 ultimately...the reconciliation of religion, philosophy, and science, the 
 dawn of a new era of understanding, blah blah blah, but that's anybody's 
 guess.

 Systems of rules are great, and they can only be better if we understand 
 more about what it is that we are ruling. Or if/when they aren't great, we 
 can understand that there is a whole other half of the universe we can look 
 to for ways to escape them. The effects of over-signifying the quantitative 
 are so pervasive and invasive that its going to take a miracle for people 
 to adjust to a different view. It's like a hardcore meth addict considering 
 for the first time that maybe there is a down-side to the drug.



 On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 1:20 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Wednesday, September 4, 2013 1:46:14 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:

 Determinism is a logical justification of cause and effect or else it is 
 meaningless...


  Sure, whatever, I was speaking colloquially, I wasn't using it in a 
 technical fashion.

  Nobody, including you can see how a set of rules could lead to desire


 mmhmm, what's your evidence of this? This seems to be an empirical 
 statement and arguing seems to be going nowhere. How are you 

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Telmo Menezes]

On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 6:41 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 9/2/2013 8:50 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:


 No matter how complex a system is, it can never be complex enough to contain
 itself, and is therefore unable to perceive itself directly as a
 deterministic process. Only in the special cases, where the major causes of
 its action are made apparent, such as when someone holds a gun to its head,
 will it realize that it is acting in compulsion and not freedom. In other
 cases, when the desire to act comes about in a subtle fashion, the system
 might say to itself, I did x because I wanted to do x, and I could have
 wanted to do y. The system may be satisfied with such an explanation,
 without probing into a complete physical description of what constitutes
 wanting. Since the causal explanation is not easily available or
 comprehensible (it arose out of the particular and peculiar interaction of
 many subunits of the system in question), the system settles with the
 explanation that it acted freely and could have done otherwise. This is how
 an eight cylinder engine mistakes itself for something which is the specific
 opposite of engines.


 Good explanation.  Craig has failed to absorb the dictum of Schopenhauer:
 Der Mensh Kann wohl tun, was er will, aber er kann nicht wollen, was er
 will.

Buddhists might disagree with Schopenhauer. At least in the sense that
they believe it possible to suppress desire. It is perhaps interesting
that the way they claim this to be possible is to observe the wanter.

Telmo.

 Brent

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Dennis Ochei]

this is in line with schopenhauer's views. he was essentially a
buddhist. you can want not to want, in which case you cannot will yourself
to want to want. you can have and act upon the desire to change your
desires, but that doesn't constitute willing what you want. instead, this
constitutes just another form of acting in accordance to one's wants

On Tuesday, September 3, 2013, Telmo Menezes wrote:

 On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 6:41 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.netjavascript:;
 wrote:
  On 9/2/2013 8:50 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
 
 
  No matter how complex a system is, it can never be complex enough to
 contain
  itself, and is therefore unable to perceive itself directly as a
  deterministic process. Only in the special cases, where the major causes
 of
  its action are made apparent, such as when someone holds a gun to its
 head,
  will it realize that it is acting in compulsion and not freedom. In other
  cases, when the desire to act comes about in a subtle fashion, the system
  might say to itself, I did x because I wanted to do x, and I could have
  wanted to do y. The system may be satisfied with such an explanation,
  without probing into a complete physical description of what constitutes
  wanting. Since the causal explanation is not easily available or
  comprehensible (it arose out of the particular and peculiar interaction
 of
  many subunits of the system in question), the system settles with the
  explanation that it acted freely and could have done otherwise. This is
 how
  an eight cylinder engine mistakes itself for something which is the
 specific
  opposite of engines.
 
 
  Good explanation.  Craig has failed to absorb the dictum of Schopenhauer:
  Der Mensh Kann wohl tun, was er will, aber er kann nicht wollen, was er
  will.

 Buddhists might disagree with Schopenhauer. At least in the sense that
 they believe it possible to suppress desire. It is perhaps interesting
 that the way they claim this to be possible is to observe the wanter.

 Telmo.

  Brent
 
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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Telmo Menezes]

On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 12:43 PM, Dennis Ochei do.infinit...@gmail.com wrote:
 this is in line with schopenhauer's views. he was essentially a buddhist.
 you can want not to want, in which case you cannot will yourself to want to
 want. you can have and act upon the desire to change your desires, but that
 doesn't constitute willing what you want. instead, this constitutes just
 another form of acting in accordance to one's wants

Ok. I was thinking about Schopenhauer's sentence on my bike ride to
work and I cannot decide if it's a deep insight or a language trick.
My problem is with the meaning of want and the possibility that by
applying the verb to itself we might just be breaking language
somehow. Sorry for the rambling.

 On Tuesday, September 3, 2013, Telmo Menezes wrote:

 On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 6:41 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
  On 9/2/2013 8:50 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
 
 
  No matter how complex a system is, it can never be complex enough to
  contain
  itself, and is therefore unable to perceive itself directly as a
  deterministic process. Only in the special cases, where the major causes
  of
  its action are made apparent, such as when someone holds a gun to its
  head,
  will it realize that it is acting in compulsion and not freedom. In
  other
  cases, when the desire to act comes about in a subtle fashion, the
  system
  might say to itself, I did x because I wanted to do x, and I could have
  wanted to do y. The system may be satisfied with such an explanation,
  without probing into a complete physical description of what constitutes
  wanting. Since the causal explanation is not easily available or
  comprehensible (it arose out of the particular and peculiar interaction
  of
  many subunits of the system in question), the system settles with the
  explanation that it acted freely and could have done otherwise. This is
  how
  an eight cylinder engine mistakes itself for something which is the
  specific
  opposite of engines.
 
 
  Good explanation.  Craig has failed to absorb the dictum of
  Schopenhauer:
  Der Mensh Kann wohl tun, was er will, aber er kann nicht wollen, was er
  will.

 Buddhists might disagree with Schopenhauer. At least in the sense that
 they believe it possible to suppress desire. It is perhaps interesting
 that the way they claim this to be possible is to observe the wanter.

 Telmo.

  Brent
 
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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[meekerdb]

On 9/3/2013 3:54 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 12:43 PM, Dennis Ocheido.infinit...@gmail.com  wrote:

this is in line with schopenhauer's views. he was essentially a buddhist.
you can want not to want, in which case you cannot will yourself to want to
want. you can have and act upon the desire to change your desires, but that
doesn't constitute willing what you want. instead, this constitutes just
another form of acting in accordance to one's wants

Ok. I was thinking about Schopenhauer's sentence on my bike ride to
work and I cannot decide if it's a deep insight or a language trick.
My problem is with the meaning of want and the possibility that by
applying the verb to itself we might just be breaking language
somehow. Sorry for the rambling.



I think it's the same insight that Hume expressed, Reason is, and ought only to be the 
slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.


Brent

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

 of freedom 
in the first place. Such a feeling cannot be explained under determinism, 
not without resorting to goofy just-so-stories and denial of undeniable 
phenomena.
 


 No matter how complex a system is, it can never be complex enough to 
 contain itself, and is therefore unable to perceive itself directly as a 
 deterministic process. Only in the special cases, where the major causes of 
 its action are made apparent, such as when someone holds a gun to its head, 
 will it realize that it is acting in compulsion and not freedom. 


Why would holding a gun to someone's head be any different than a person 
holding a gun to their own head? If it were different, how would that 
change their response without their having the power to choose to change it?
 

 In other cases, when the desire to act comes about in a subtle fashion, 
 the system might say to itself, I did x because I wanted to do x, and I 
 could have wanted to do y. The system may be satisfied with such an 
 explanation, 


What would it matter whether a system was satisfied with some explanation 
or not? If you have no free will, then your satisfaction is meaningless - 
you are a powerless puppet. Does it matter whether a stone is satisfied 
with rolling down hill?

without probing into a complete physical description of what constitutes 
 wanting. Since the causal explanation is not easily available or 
 comprehensible (it arose out of the particular and peculiar interaction of 
 many subunits of the system in question), the system settles with the 
 explanation that it acted freely and could have done otherwise. This is how 
 an eight cylinder engine mistakes itself for something which is the 
 specific opposite of engines.


Why would the explanation that it acted 'freely' be a possible explanation 
in a deterministic universe? What are you talking about?
 


 You can deny that you are such a system, but I don't think you could deny 
 these things are true of a complex deterministic system.


I deny that a deterministic universe could produce even a single thought of 
'freedom' or 'will', just as I deny that you can produce even a single 
image of a color that does not exist.
 


 Lastly, it is trivial to build a deterministic system that desires in a 
 prototypical form. All you need is a system that exhibits operant learning. 
 1) Wire some sensors to trigger effectors. 2) In the event that the 
 effectors bring about certain event (they might bathe the sensors in a 
 certain chemical), strengthen the ability of sensors that were active 
 directly before the event (that activated the effectors) to trigger the 
 effectors they are wired to. 3) In the event that the chemical bath is 
 removed, weaken the strength of sensors that were active right before the 
 removal of the chemical. The system will begin to want to do things that 
 increase the concentration of the chemical and dislike doing things that 
 lower it. If the concentration exhibits noisy behavior (is not solely a 
 function of the effectors of the system in question), then the system will 
 even develop novel, unpredictable behavior.


Novel and unpredictable behavior is not intentional behavior. You conflate 
local causes with understanding. A garage door spring 'wants' to contract 
to the extent that the material behaves *as if* it wants to contract. That 
doesn't mean that attaching a garage door to the spring imparts an 
understanding to the spring about doors and houses and cars. It doesn't 
mean that pushing the garage door opener involves some system view 
intentionality about garages. There may be, on the microphysical level of  
the spring's metal, some microphenomenal correlate to 'wanting' which is 
distantly ancestral to our own...and I suspect that there is, but no amount 
of configuring that metal is going to allow it to become aware of anything 
beyond those primitive interactions. If it did, the universe would be 
overflowing with intelligent non-biological species, or at least contain a 
single one.


 Desire and qualia pose no real problem for determinism.


Why not? If I can program something to perform a function, why would I want 
to invent 'desire' or 'qualia' out of thin air in order to do what is 
already being done directly? If there is no free will, then desire is 
epiphenomenal, and an epiphenomenon which even has a hint of an illusion 
that it *might* be causally efficacious is a deal breaker for determinism.

Thanks,
Craig

 


 On Monday, September 2, 2013 5:15:47 PM UTC-5, chris peck wrote:

  Hi Brent

 I think the researchers would agree. Its definately present stimuli they 
 have in mind.

 All the best



 --- Original Message ---

 From: meekerdb meek...@verizon.net
 Sent: 3 September 2013 4:11 AM
 To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

  On 9/2/2013 7:34 AM, chris peck wrote:
  
 The study you're citing firstly claims the 60% of the variance they 
 uncovered is explained by 'spontaneous' brain

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Dennis Ochei]

 not exist.



 Lastly, it is trivial to build a deterministic system that desires in a
 prototypical form. All you need is a system that exhibits operant learning.
 1) Wire some sensors to trigger effectors. 2) In the event that the
 effectors bring about certain event (they might bathe the sensors in a
 certain chemical), strengthen the ability of sensors that were active
 directly before the event (that activated the effectors) to trigger the
 effectors they are wired to. 3) In the event that the chemical bath is
 removed, weaken the strength of sensors that were active right before the
 removal of the chemical. The system will begin to want to do things that
 increase the concentration of the chemical and dislike doing things that
 lower it. If the concentration exhibits noisy behavior (is not solely a
 function of the effectors of the system in question), then the system will
 even develop novel, unpredictable behavior.


 Novel and unpredictable behavior is not intentional behavior. You conflate
 local causes with understanding. A garage door spring 'wants' to contract
 to the extent that the material behaves *as if* it wants to contract. That
 doesn't mean that attaching a garage door to the spring imparts an
 understanding to the spring about doors and houses and cars. It doesn't
 mean that pushing the garage door opener involves some system view
 intentionality about garages. There may be, on the microphysical level of
 the spring's metal, some microphenomenal correlate to 'wanting' which is
 distantly ancestral to our own...and I suspect that there is, but no amount
 of configuring that metal is going to allow it to become aware of anything
 beyond those primitive interactions. If it did, the universe would be
 overflowing with intelligent non-biological species, or at least contain a
 single one.


 Desire and qualia pose no real problem for determinism.


 Why not? If I can program something to perform a function, why would I
 want to invent 'desire' or 'qualia' out of thin air in order to do what is
 already being done directly? If there is no free will, then desire is
 epiphenomenal, and an epiphenomenon which even has a hint of an illusion
 that it *might* be causally efficacious is a deal breaker for determinism.

 Thanks,
 Craig




 On Monday, September 2, 2013 5:15:47 PM UTC-5, chris peck wrote:

  Hi Brent

 I think the researchers would agree. Its definately present stimuli they
 have in mind.

 All the best



 --- Original Message ---

 From: meekerdb meek...@verizon.net
 Sent: 3 September 2013 4:11 AM
 To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

  On 9/2/2013 7:34 AM, chris peck wrote:

 The study you're citing firstly claims the 60% of the variance they
 uncovered is explained by 'spontaneous' brain activity not 60% of all brain
 activity. More importantly, by spontaneous they just mean brain activity
 that has not been triggered by external stimuli:


 And how could they possibly know whether some brain event was triggered
 by a stored perception of you grandmother when you were five?  All they can
 say is it wasn't triggered by a *present* external stimuli.

 Brent

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

 that does not exist.
  


 Lastly, it is trivial to build a deterministic system that desires in a 
 prototypical form. All you need is a system that exhibits operant learning. 
 1) Wire some sensors to trigger effectors. 2) In the event that the 
 effectors bring about certain event (they might bathe the sensors in a 
 certain chemical), strengthen the ability of sensors that were active 
 directly before the event (that activated the effectors) to trigger the 
 effectors they are wired to. 3) In the event that the chemical bath is 
 removed, weaken the strength of sensors that were active right before the 
 removal of the chemical. The system will begin to want to do things that 
 increase the concentration of the chemical and dislike doing things that 
 lower it. If the concentration exhibits noisy behavior (is not solely a 
 function of the effectors of the system in question), then the system will 
 even develop novel, unpredictable behavior.


 Novel and unpredictable behavior is not intentional behavior. You 
 conflate local causes with understanding. A garage door spring 'wants' to 
 contract to the extent that the material behaves *as if* it wants to 
 contract. That doesn't mean that attaching a garage door to the spring 
 imparts an understanding to the spring about doors and houses and cars. It 
 doesn't mean that pushing the garage door opener involves some system view 
 intentionality about garages. There may be, on the microphysical level of  
 the spring's metal, some microphenomenal correlate to 'wanting' which is 
 distantly ancestral to our own...and I suspect that there is, but no amount 
 of configuring that metal is going to allow it to become aware of anything 
 beyond those primitive interactions. If it did, the universe would be 
 overflowing with intelligent non-biological species, or at least contain a 
 single one.


 Desire and qualia pose no real problem for determinism.


 Why not? If I can program something to perform a function, why would I 
 want to invent 'desire' or 'qualia' out of thin air in order to do what is 
 already being done directly? If there is no free will, then desire is 
 epiphenomenal, and an epiphenomenon which even has a hint of an illusion 
 that it *might* be causally efficacious is a deal breaker for 
 determinism.

 Thanks,
 Craig

  


 On Monday, September 2, 2013 5:15:47 PM UTC-5, chris peck wrote:

  Hi Brent

 I think the researchers would agree. Its definately present stimuli 
 they have in mind.

 All the best



 --- Original Message ---

 From: meekerdb meek...@verizon.net
 Sent: 3 September 2013 4:11 AM
 To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

  On 9/2/2013 7:34 AM, chris peck wrote:
  
 The study you're citing firstly claims the 60% of the variance they 
 uncovered is explained by 'spontaneous' brain activity not 60% of all 
 brain 
 activity. More importantly, by spontaneous they just mean brain activity 
 that has not been triggered by external stimuli:


 And how could they possibly know whether some brain event was triggered 
 by a stored perception of you grandmother when you were five?  All they 
 can 
 say is it wasn't triggered by a *present* external stimuli.

 Brent
  
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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 12:41:09 AM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

  On 9/2/2013 8:50 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
  

  No matter how complex a system is, it can never be complex enough to 
 contain itself, and is therefore unable to perceive itself directly as a 
 deterministic process. Only in the special cases, where the major causes of 
 its action are made apparent, such as when someone holds a gun to its head, 
 will it realize that it is acting in compulsion and not freedom. In other 
 cases, when the desire to act comes about in a subtle fashion, the system 
 might say to itself, I did x because I wanted to do x, and I could have 
 wanted to do y. The system may be satisfied with such an explanation, 
 without probing into a complete physical description of what constitutes 
 wanting. Since the causal explanation is not easily available or 
 comprehensible (it arose out of the particular and peculiar interaction of 
 many subunits of the system in question), the system settles with the 
 explanation that it acted freely and could have done otherwise. This is how 
 an eight cylinder engine mistakes itself for something which is the 
 specific opposite of engines.


 Good explanation.  Craig has failed to absorb the dictum of Schopenhauer: 
 Der Mensh Kann wohl tun, was er will, aber er kann nicht wollen, was er 
 will.


I used to argue that point all the time. My reasoning was that you are 
never free to want 'the bad thing' (even if to you the bad thing is what 
others might consider a good thing) - whatever your desire, it is already 
defined for you as desirable. That logic is sound as far as it goes, but it 
cannot help explain how the feeling of rubber stamping the effect of a 
desire to a public action makes sense in a deterministic universe. What is 
overlooked is the difference between sub-personal and impersonal 
influences. 

Just because we are not aware of the origins of our desires does not mean 
that we do not intentionally participate in generating them. Humans are 
complex on many levels, and simple on other levels. If we try to look at 
the simple levels through the lens of sub-personal complexity, we lose 
ourselves. Every cell of our body is the same stem cell. They are all us in 
microcosm. The feeling of the whole is present as the feeling of the parts 
to some extent, and it is absent to some extent. As with the Libet type 
experiments, we get into trouble when we assume that the ability to act 
freely is identical to the ability to know that ability, and to report it, 
and to know that we are reporting it, especially when the private 
experience is rooted in eternity and the action is rooted in public 
locality.

Thanks,
Craig


 Brent
  

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

It's a sleight of hand because it assumes a single self on a single level 
which does the wanting and the willing and the discerning between the two.

On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 6:54:46 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:

 On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 12:43 PM, Dennis Ochei 
 do.inf...@gmail.comjavascript: 
 wrote: 
  this is in line with schopenhauer's views. he was essentially a 
 buddhist. 
  you can want not to want, in which case you cannot will yourself to want 
 to 
  want. you can have and act upon the desire to change your desires, but 
 that 
  doesn't constitute willing what you want. instead, this constitutes 
 just 
  another form of acting in accordance to one's wants 

 Ok. I was thinking about Schopenhauer's sentence on my bike ride to 
 work and I cannot decide if it's a deep insight or a language trick. 
 My problem is with the meaning of want and the possibility that by 
 applying the verb to itself we might just be breaking language 
 somehow. Sorry for the rambling. 

  On Tuesday, September 3, 2013, Telmo Menezes wrote: 
  
  On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 6:41 AM, meekerdb 
  meek...@verizon.netjavascript: 
 wrote: 
   On 9/2/2013 8:50 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote: 
   
   
   No matter how complex a system is, it can never be complex enough to 
   contain 
   itself, and is therefore unable to perceive itself directly as a 
   deterministic process. Only in the special cases, where the major 
 causes 
   of 
   its action are made apparent, such as when someone holds a gun to its 
   head, 
   will it realize that it is acting in compulsion and not freedom. In 
   other 
   cases, when the desire to act comes about in a subtle fashion, the 
   system 
   might say to itself, I did x because I wanted to do x, and I could 
 have 
   wanted to do y. The system may be satisfied with such an explanation, 
   without probing into a complete physical description of what 
 constitutes 
   wanting. Since the causal explanation is not easily available or 
   comprehensible (it arose out of the particular and peculiar 
 interaction 
   of 
   many subunits of the system in question), the system settles with the 
   explanation that it acted freely and could have done otherwise. This 
 is 
   how 
   an eight cylinder engine mistakes itself for something which is the 
   specific 
   opposite of engines. 
   
   
   Good explanation.  Craig has failed to absorb the dictum of 
   Schopenhauer: 
   Der Mensh Kann wohl tun, was er will, aber er kann nicht wollen, was 
 er 
   will. 
  
  Buddhists might disagree with Schopenhauer. At least in the sense that 
  they believe it possible to suppress desire. It is perhaps interesting 
  that the way they claim this to be possible is to observe the wanter. 
  
  Telmo. 
  
   Brent 
   
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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Dennis Ochei]

 description of what constitutes
 wanting. Since the causal explanation is not easily available or
 comprehensible (it arose out of the particular and peculiar interaction of
 many subunits of the system in question), the system settles with the
 explanation that it acted freely and could have done otherwise. This is how
 an eight cylinder engine mistakes itself for something which is the
 specific opposite of engines.


 Why would the explanation that it acted 'freely' be a possible
 explanation in a deterministic universe? What are you talking about?



 You can deny that you are such a system, but I don't think you could
 deny these things are true of a complex deterministic system.


 I deny that a deterministic universe could produce even a single thought
 of 'freedom' or 'will', just as I deny that you can produce even a single
 image of a color that does not exist.



 Lastly, it is trivial to build a deterministic system that desires in a
 prototypical form. All you need is a system that exhibits operant learning.
 1) Wire some sensors to trigger effectors. 2) In the event that the
 effectors bring about certain event (they might bathe the sensors in a
 certain chemical), strengthen the ability of sensors that were active
 directly before the event (that activated the effectors) to trigger the
 effectors they are wired to. 3) In the event that the chemical bath is
 removed, weaken the strength of sensors that were active right before the
 removal of the chemical. The system will begin to want to do things that
 increase the concentration of the chemical and dislike doing things that
 lower it. If the concentration exhibits noisy behavior (is not solely a
 function of the effectors of the system in question), then the system will
 even develop novel, unpredictable behavior.


 Novel and unpredictable behavior is not intentional behavior. You
 conflate local causes with understanding. A garage door spring 'wants' to
 contract to the extent that the material behaves *as if* it wants to
 contract. That doesn't mean that attaching a garage door to the spring
 imparts an understanding to the spring about doors and houses and cars. It
 doesn't mean that pushing the garage door opener involves some system view
 intentionality about garages. There may be, on the microphysical level of
 the spring's metal, some microphenomenal correlate to 'wanting' which is
 distantly ancestral to our own...and I suspect that there is, but no amount
 of configuring that metal is going to allow it to become aware of anything
 beyond those primitive interactions. If it did, the universe would be
 overflowing with intelligent non-biological species, or at least contain a
 single one.


 Desire and qualia pose no real problem for determinism.


 Why not? If I can program something to perform a function, why would I
 want to invent 'desire' or 'qualia' out of thin air in order to do what is
 already being done directly? If there is no free will, then desire is
 epiphenomenal, and an epiphenomenon which even has a hint of an illusion
 that it *might* be causally efficacious is a deal breaker for
 determinism.

 Thanks,
 Craig




 On Monday, September 2, 2013 5:15:47 PM UTC-5, chris peck wrote:

  Hi Brent

 I think the researchers would agree. Its definately present stimuli
 they have in mind.

 All the best



 --- Original Message ---

 From: meekerdb meek...@verizon.net
 Sent: 3 September 2013 4:11 AM
 To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

  On 9/2/2013 7:34 AM, chris peck wrote:

 The study you're citing firstly claims the 60% of the variance they
 uncovered is explained by 'spontaneous' brain activity not 60% of all brain
 activity. More importantly, by spontaneous they just mean brain activity
 that has not been triggered by external stimuli:


 And how could they possibly know whether some brain event was triggered
 by a stored perception of you grandmother when you were five?  All they can
 say is it wasn't triggered by a *present* external stimuli.

 Brent

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

 the major causes 
 of 
 its action are made apparent, such as when someone holds a gun to its 
 head, 
 will it realize that it is acting in compulsion and not freedom. 


 Why would holding a gun to someone's head be any different than a person 
 holding a gun to their own head? If it were different, how would that 
 change their response without their having the power to choose to change it?
  

 In other cases, when the desire to act comes about in a subtle fashion, 
 the system might say to itself, I did x because I wanted to do x, and I 
 could have wanted to do y. The system may be satisfied with such an 
 explanation, 


 What would it matter whether a system was satisfied with some 
 explanation or not? If you have no free will, then your satisfaction is 
 meaningless - you are a powerless puppet. Does it matter whether a stone is 
 satisfied with rolling down hill?

 without probing into a complete physical description of what constitutes 
 wanting. Since the causal explanation is not easily available or 
 comprehensible (it arose out of the particular and peculiar interaction of 
 many subunits of the system in question), the system settles with the 
 explanation that it acted freely and could have done otherwise. This is 
 how 
 an eight cylinder engine mistakes itself for something which is the 
 specific opposite of engines.


 Why would the explanation that it acted 'freely' be a possible 
 explanation in a deterministic universe? What are you talking about?
  


 You can deny that you are such a system, but I don't think you could 
 deny these things are true of a complex deterministic system.


 I deny that a deterministic universe could produce even a single thought 
 of 'freedom' or 'will', just as I deny that you can produce even a single 
 image of a color that does not exist.
  


 Lastly, it is trivial to build a deterministic system that desires in a 
 prototypical form. All you need is a system that exhibits operant 
 learning. 
 1) Wire some sensors to trigger effectors. 2) In the event that the 
 effectors bring about certain event (they might bathe the sensors in a 
 certain chemical), strengthen the ability of sensors that were active 
 directly before the event (that activated the effectors) to trigger the 
 effectors they are wired to. 3) In the event that the chemical bath is 
 removed, weaken the strength of sensors that were active right before the 
 removal of the chemical. The system will begin to want to do things that 
 increase the concentration of the chemical and dislike doing things that 
 lower it. If the concentration exhibits noisy behavior (is not solely a 
 function of the effectors of the system in question), then the system will 
 even develop novel, unpredictable behavior.


 Novel and unpredictable behavior is not intentional behavior. You 
 conflate local causes with understanding. A garage door spring 'wants' to 
 contract to the extent that the material behaves *as if* it wants to 
 contract. That doesn't mean that attaching a garage door to the spring 
 imparts an understanding to the spring about doors and houses and cars. It 
 doesn't mean that pushing the garage door opener involves some system view 
 intentionality about garages. There may be, on the microphysical level of  
 the spring's metal, some microphenomenal correlate to 'wanting' which is 
 distantly ancestral to our own...and I suspect that there is, but no amount 
 of configuring that metal is going to allow it to become aware of anything 
 beyond those primitive interactions. If it did, the universe would be 
 overflowing with intelligent non-biological species, or at least contain a 
 single one.


 Desire and qualia pose no real problem for determinism.


 Why not? If I can program something to perform a function, why would I 
 want to invent 'desire' or 'qualia' out of thin air in order to do what is 
 already being done directly? If there is no free will, then desire is 
 epiphenomenal, and an epiphenomenon which even has a hint of an illusion 
 that it *might* be causally efficacious is a deal breaker for 
 determinism.

 Thanks,
 Craig

  


 On Monday, September 2, 2013 5:15:47 PM UTC-5, chris peck wrote:

  Hi Brent

 I think the researchers would agree. Its definately present stimuli 
 they have in mind.

 All the best



 --- Original Message ---

 From: meekerdb meek...@verizon.net
 Sent: 3 September 2013 4:11 AM
 To: everyth...@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

  On 9/2/2013 7:34 AM, chris peck wrote:
  
 The study you're citing firstly claims the 60% of the variance they 
 uncovered is explained by 'spontaneous' brain activity not 60% of all 
 brain 
 activity. More importantly, by spontaneous they just mean brain activity 
 that has not been triggered by external stimuli:


 And how could they possibly know whether some brain event was 
 triggered by a stored perception of you grandmother when you were five?  
 All they can say is it wasn't

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 3:42:53 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

 On 9/3/2013 12:32 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote: 
  Telmo and Brent, 
  
  The Humean quote sums it up nicely. You can think of a human as a 
 collection of desires 
  and a reasoning process that arbitrates between and attempts to realize 
 them. In the 
  process of reasoning, one might bring about new desires, but reasoning 
 is always 
  employed by desires one currently has. 
  
  Just couple days ago I was trying futilely to logically deduce what it 
 is that I should 
  want to do, I realized that logic is the servant of desire, (im not 
 quite as eloquent 
  as hume, it seems...) and to find a logically justified want is futile. 
 Desire is 
  inherently illogical. 

 I'd say extralogical.  That doesn't mean though that your desires aren't 
 caused (by 
 evolution, by metabolism,...).  Many of them may even be predictable - 
 that's how 
 advertising agencies make a living. 


*Your* desires can be included in your experience by evolution, etc, 
provided that desire in general exists as a possibility in the universe. No 
amount of statistical reproduction of inanimate objects or unconscious 
machines could cause a desire to appear out of nowhere though. Could it? 
Why would it?

Craig
 


  Turns out Hume beat me to this insight by quite a bit, but I suppose he 
 had a head start, =p 
  
  It seems that if we were completely logical, we would simply cease to 
 function 

 Dostoevsky beat you to that one, If everything on Earth were rational, 
 nothing would 
 happen.  But he had a head start too. :-) 


 Brent 


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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Dennis Ochei]

Craig,

What UV looks like will depend on how it is transduced into the nervous
system. I could add a new opsin into your blue cones and it would appear to
be a shade of blue. Or, I could achieve the transduction in such a way that
UV doesn't confuse with blue. In which case UV will look different from
other colors *in way you cannot describe because you don't have access to
how you condition your behavior based of the intensity of UV light. *

I've told you in a rudimentary form what is required to build a system that
has drives and motivations, from parts that are inanimate. Nature has
constructed such a device using 302 neurons. It learns, and it has
motivations. Is your argument here that if we model the nematode
deterministically, its ability to learn and its biological drives will
vanish like smoke? Because if so, I'd bet good money that you're wrong.
Drives are traceable to electrochemical gradients trying to resolve
themselves, driven by thermodynamic laws. Logic is how the pipes are
connected up, desire is the water pump.

Furthermore, deterministic does not equal logical. There is no logic behind
why opposites attract, even though this logically leads to like dissolving
like. Whatever axioms there are in this universe, they are not logically
justified.


On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 3:33 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 3:42:53 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

 On 9/3/2013 12:32 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
  Telmo and Brent,
 
  The Humean quote sums it up nicely. You can think of a human as a
 collection of desires
  and a reasoning process that arbitrates between and attempts to realize
 them. In the
  process of reasoning, one might bring about new desires, but reasoning
 is always
  employed by desires one currently has.
 
  Just couple days ago I was trying futilely to logically deduce what it
 is that I should
  want to do, I realized that logic is the servant of desire, (im not
 quite as eloquent
  as hume, it seems...) and to find a logically justified want is futile.
 Desire is
  inherently illogical.

 I'd say extralogical.  That doesn't mean though that your desires
 aren't caused (by
 evolution, by metabolism,...).  Many of them may even be predictable -
 that's how
 advertising agencies make a living.


 *Your* desires can be included in your experience by evolution, etc,
 provided that desire in general exists as a possibility in the universe. No
 amount of statistical reproduction of inanimate objects or unconscious
 machines could cause a desire to appear out of nowhere though. Could it?
 Why would it?

 Craig



  Turns out Hume beat me to this insight by quite a bit, but I suppose he
 had a head start, =p
 
  It seems that if we were completely logical, we would simply cease to
 function

 Dostoevsky beat you to that one, If everything on Earth were rational,
 nothing would
 happen.  But he had a head start too. :-)


 Brent

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 8:57:13 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:

 Craig,

 What UV looks like will depend on how it is transduced into the nervous 
 system. I could add a new opsin into your blue cones and it would appear to 
 be a shade of blue. 


Sure, we can look at an infra-red camera too and see IR light as green or 
some other color. That isn't what I'm talking about. I am talking about new 
primary colors.
 

 Or, I could achieve the transduction in such a way that UV doesn't confuse 
 with blue. In which case UV will look different from other colors *in way 
 you cannot describe because you don't have access to how you condition your 
 behavior based of the intensity of UV light. *


It wouldn't matter if you did have access to how you condition your 
behavior based on the intensity of the UV light. Color cannot be 
described, it can only be experienced directly. I don't want you to waste 
our time trying to tell me what I already know.

http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/light-revisited/is-visible-light-electromagnetic/

 


 I've told you in a rudimentary form what is required to build a system 
 that has drives and motivations, from parts that are inanimate.


Not at all. You are projecting drives and motivations onto a system that is 
unconsciously serving a function that serves your drives and motivations.
 

 Nature has constructed such a device using 302 neurons. It learns, and it 
 has motivations. 


The neurons are an expression of the motivations, not the other way around.
 

 Is your argument here that if we model the nematode deterministically, its 
 ability to learn and its biological drives will vanish like smoke? 


Does a rabbit's taste for carrots vanish just because we model him as Bugs 
Bunny? Yes. Models, cartoons, figures, functions, shapes, descriptions, 
simulations...none of them can have any sense of being or feeling. Bugs 
Bunny is not a rabbit. He is a symbol which reminds our psychology of 
particular themes which overlap with rabbit themes.
 

 Because if so, I'd bet good money that you're wrong.


Sure, I'd love to take that bet. I was going to say $10,000 but I don't 
think that you are going to pay that when you lose. What amount sounds good?
 

 Drives are traceable to electrochemical gradients trying to resolve 
 themselves, driven by thermodynamic laws. Logic is how the pipes are 
 connected up, desire is the water pump.


I agree that microphysical events correspond to microphenomenal 
experiences, but that does not mean that all that has to happen to scale up 
an inanimate object's thermodynamic motives to mammalian quality emotions 
is that it must be configured in the correct shapes. That is an assumption, 
and a seductively popular one, but it is 100% wrong. Using the hypothesis 
of sense as the sole universal primitive, we should anticipate that the 
relevant qualifier of sensitivity is not structure but experience. Giving 
your cat a computer will not make him computer literate, and dressing a 
water pump up in human clothes does not cause a human. The clues are all 
around us. No machine or program has every succeeded in being anything but 
completely impersonal and psychologically empty.


 Furthermore, deterministic does not equal logical. There is no logic 
 behind why opposites attract, even though this logically leads to like 
 dissolving like. Whatever axioms there are in this universe, they are not 
 logically justified.


Determinism doesn't explain why opposites attract, but given that they do 
in some particular context, determinism is the logic of the consequences of 
that attraction. Determinism doesn't address everything, but whatever it 
does address is considered to behave according to the logic of the 
precedents which have been established. If determinism was not logical, how 
could it claim to determine anything?

Craig
 



 On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 3:33 PM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
  wrote:



 On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 3:42:53 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

 On 9/3/2013 12:32 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote: 
  Telmo and Brent, 
  
  The Humean quote sums it up nicely. You can think of a human as a 
 collection of desires 
  and a reasoning process that arbitrates between and attempts to 
 realize them. In the 
  process of reasoning, one might bring about new desires, but reasoning 
 is always 
  employed by desires one currently has. 
  
  Just couple days ago I was trying futilely to logically deduce what it 
 is that I should 
  want to do, I realized that logic is the servant of desire, (im not 
 quite as eloquent 
  as hume, it seems...) and to find a logically justified want is 
 futile. Desire is 
  inherently illogical. 

 I'd say extralogical.  That doesn't mean though that your desires 
 aren't caused (by 
 evolution, by metabolism,...).  Many of them may even be predictable - 
 that's how 
 advertising agencies make a living. 


 *Your* desires can be included in your experience by evolution, etc, 
 

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Dennis Ochei]

1) rationality (logic) in this case is to mean founded on justified
principles. This is inherently a normative judgment. the principles that
govern a deterministic system needn't appeal to our psychology as
justified, this is what i mean by determined doesn't mean logical. none of
my desires seem to me logically justified, but that doesnt imply they are
not deterministic.

2) your thesis is essentially, i cant see how a set of rules could lead to
to desire, i cant see how a set of rules could lead something that has
experiences that seem to have irreducible qualities, therefore there can be
no such rules. that's fine i suppose, but I'm unable to pretend that your
blindness is some sort of insight. i just think you havent looked hard
enough

On Tuesday, September 3, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 8:57:13 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote:

 Craig,

 What UV looks like will depend on how it is transduced into the nervous
 system. I could add a new opsin into your blue cones and it would appear to
 be a shade of blue.


 Sure, we can look at an infra-red camera too and see IR light as green or
 some other color. That isn't what I'm talking about. I am talking about new
 primary colors.


 Or, I could achieve the transduction in such a way that UV doesn't
 confuse with blue. In which case UV will look different from other colors
 *in way you cannot describe because you don't have access to how you
 condition your behavior based of the intensity of UV light. *


 It wouldn't matter if you did have access to how you condition your
 behavior based on the intensity of the UV light. Color cannot be
 described, it can only be experienced directly. I don't want you to waste
 our time trying to tell me what I already know.


 http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/light-revisited/is-visible-light-electromagnetic/




 I've told you in a rudimentary form what is required to build a system
 that has drives and motivations, from parts that are inanimate.


 Not at all. You are projecting drives and motivations onto a system that
 is unconsciously serving a function that serves your drives and motivations.


 Nature has constructed such a device using 302 neurons. It learns, and it
 has motivations.


 The neurons are an expression of the motivations, not the other way around.


 Is your argument here that if we model the nematode deterministically,
 its ability to learn and its biological drives will vanish like smoke?


 Does a rabbit's taste for carrots vanish just because we model him as Bugs
 Bunny? Yes. Models, cartoons, figures, functions, shapes, descriptions,
 simulations...none of them can have any sense of being or feeling. Bugs
 Bunny is not a rabbit. He is a symbol which reminds our psychology of
 particular themes which overlap with rabbit themes.


 Because if so, I'd bet good money that you're wrong.


 Sure, I'd love to take that bet. I was going to say $10,000 but I don't
 think that you are going to pay that when you lose. What amount sounds good?


 Drives are traceable to electrochemical gradients trying to resolve
 themselves, driven by thermodynamic laws. Logic is how the pipes are
 connected up, desire is the water pump.


 I agree that microphysical events correspond to microphenomenal
 experiences, but that does not mean that all that has to happen to scale up
 an inanimate object's thermodynamic motives to mammalian quality emotions
 is that it must be configured in the correct shapes. That is an assumption,
 and a seductively popular one, but it is 100% wrong. Using the hypothesis
 of sense as the sole universal primitive, we should anticipate that the
 relevant qualifier of sensitivity is not structure but experience. Giving
 your cat a computer will not make him computer literate, and dressing a
 water pump up in human clothes does not cause a human. The clues are all
 around us. No machine or program has every succeeded in being anything but
 completely impersonal and psychologically empty.


 Furthermore, deterministic does not equal logical. There is no logic
 behind why opposites attract, even though this logically leads to like
 dissolving like. Whatever axioms there are in this universe, they are not
 logically justified.


 Determinism doesn't explain why opposites attract, but given that they do
 in some particular context, determinism is the logic of the consequences of
 that attraction. Determinism doesn't address everything, but whatever it
 does address is considered to behave according to the logic of the
 precedents which have been established. If determinism was not logical, how
 could it claim to determine anything?

 Craig




 On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 3:33 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 3:42:53 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

 On 9/3/2013 12:32 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
  Telmo and Brent,
 
  The Humean quote sums it up nicely. You can think of a human as a
 collection of desires
  and a reasoning process that 

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[meekerdb]

On 9/2/2013 7:34 AM, chris peck wrote:
The study you're citing firstly claims the 60% of the variance they uncovered is 
explained by 'spontaneous' brain activity not 60% of all brain activity. More 
importantly, by spontaneous they just mean brain activity that has not been triggered by 
external stimuli:


And how could they possibly know whether some brain event was triggered by a stored 
perception of you grandmother when you were five?  All they can say is it wasn't triggered 
by a *present* external stimuli.


Brent

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, September 2, 2013 2:11:05 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

  On 9/2/2013 7:34 AM, chris peck wrote:
  
 The study you're citing firstly claims the 60% of the variance they 
 uncovered is explained by 'spontaneous' brain activity not 60% of all brain 
 activity. More importantly, by spontaneous they just mean brain activity 
 that has not been triggered by external stimuli:


 And how could they possibly know whether some brain event was triggered by 
 a stored perception of you grandmother when you were five?� All they can 
 say is it wasn't triggered by a *present* external stimuli.


Yes, that's true of course, but 

1) 60% is a lot of stored perceptions triggering themselves for no reason.
2) The spontaneous activity is associated with behavioral changes. Kind of 
an odd thing for an archive of stored data to do independently of external 
stimuli.

We should ask, at what point do *present* stimuli go dormant, and of how 
long, before they spontaneously (non-spontaneously) resurface as something 
that looks exactly like free will would look? We should not expect that 
free will can be proved to any greater extent than this.

Again, if we were dealing with something which we knew for a fact had no 
intention or creativity, then sure, what the study shows is only that we 
don't know where 60% of the activity is coming from, so maybe it is just 
housekeeping or scheduled tasks running, or whatever. Since we do have a 
sense that there is a difference between behavior that is intentional, 
accidental, coerced, and subconsciously driven, and that those categories 
are distinct, it would be absurdly unscientific and biased to rule out this 
rather large footprint in the brain as belonging to our own shoe.

Thanks,
Craig



 Brent
  

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[meekerdb]

On 9/2/2013 11:29 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Monday, September 2, 2013 2:11:05 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

On 9/2/2013 7:34 AM, chris peck wrote:

The study you're citing firstly claims the 60% of the variance they 
uncovered is
explained by 'spontaneous' brain activity not 60% of all brain activity. 
More
importantly, by spontaneous they just mean brain activity that has not been
triggered by external stimuli:


And how could they possibly know whether some brain event was triggered by 
a stored
perception of you grandmother when you were five?� All they can say is it 
wasn't
triggered by a *present* external stimuli.


Yes, that's true of course, but

1) 60% is a lot of stored perceptions triggering themselves for no reason.


First, by what standard is it known that 60% is too much?  Second, the stored perceptions 
are triggering themselves (although that's what you'd like to believe). They are triggered 
by the brain activities preceding them, which in turn were triggered by prior activities, 
which in turn...and so on back till you were five and saw your grandmother.  Third, 
suppose some of the activity was for no reason, i.e. quantum randomness.



2) The spontaneous activity is associated with behavioral changes. Kind of an odd thing 
for an archive of stored data to do independently of external stimuli.


First, you have no standard by which to judge it  odd.  Second, there's no evidence it 
is independent of external stimuli - only of *present* external stimuli.




We should ask, at what point do *present* stimuli go dormant, and of how long, before 
they spontaneously (non-spontaneously) resurface as something that looks exactly like 
free will would look? We should not expect that free will can be proved to any greater 
extent than this.


This is just the compatibilist view.  It's called free will just because it's too hard 
to trace all the causal contributions to the will.




Again, if we were dealing with something which we knew for a fact had no intention or 
creativity,


How could you ever know that?  Only by being able to accurately predict all its actions.  
Which would imply free will = unpredictable will.


then sure, what the study shows is only that we don't know where 60% of the activity is 
coming from, so maybe it is just housekeeping or scheduled tasks running, or whatever. 
Since we do have a sense that there is a difference between behavior that is 
intentional, accidental, coerced, and subconsciously driven, and that those categories 
are distinct,


We also have a sense that the Earth is flat and Sun orbits around it.

Brent

it would be absurdly unscientific and biased to rule out this rather large footprint in 
the brain as belonging to our own shoe.


Thanks,
Craig



Brent

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[chris peck]

Hi Brent

I think the researchers would agree. Its definately present stimuli they have 
in mind.

All the best



--- Original Message ---

From: meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
Sent: 3 September 2013 4:11 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

On 9/2/2013 7:34 AM, chris peck wrote:
 The study you're citing firstly claims the 60% of the variance they uncovered 
 is
 explained by 'spontaneous' brain activity not 60% of all brain activity. More
 importantly, by spontaneous they just mean brain activity that has not been 
 triggered by
 external stimuli:

And how could they possibly know whether some brain event was triggered by a 
stored
perception of you grandmother when you were five?  All they can say is it 
wasn't triggered
by a *present* external stimuli.

Brent

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Dennis Ochei]

Hi Craig,

I've been following the pattern of thought you've be exhibiting this entire 
thread, trying to understand why you believe in such a strange way. In all 
cases it seems to stem from ignorance of the processes that bring about 
your behavior, compounded with the belief that we lose something of value 
if we discard the concept of free will.

First, I feel you are being willfully blind to the constraints your biology 
puts on your supposedly free will. Daily, I stop doing the things I love 
to do to pass fluids or the corpses of carbon based organisms through my 
mouth. Later, defecate or micturate, further activities that honestly, I 
would rather not do. At night, I sleep, though I would rather stay up 
through the night. Though I am not enslaved in doing these things, I am 
certainly not free in a metaphysical sense. This illusory free will you are 
bound to is an artifact that emerges in a system that is complex enough to 
reflect on what it does, yet cannot completely grasp the causes of that 
which it does do. A system like this can trace some of the factors that 
contribute to its actions, but not all of them, and those factors it cannot 
picture seem to have no definite value, and therefore it thinks there is no 
logical contradction in believing that it could have done y in the 
situation in which it actually did action x.

Furthermore, a system that can draw a large number of distinctions about 
the distribution of energy crossing its surface and respond in a large 
variety of ways, and yet does not understand how these distinctions are 
made, will, when asked how it determines an object is yellow, respond i 
don't know, it just looks yellow.

No matter how complex a system is, it can never be complex enough to 
contain itself, and is therefore unable to perceive itself directly as a 
deterministic process. Only in the special cases, where the major causes of 
its action are made apparent, such as when someone holds a gun to its head, 
will it realize that it is acting in compulsion and not freedom. In other 
cases, when the desire to act comes about in a subtle fashion, the system 
might say to itself, I did x because I wanted to do x, and I could have 
wanted to do y. The system may be satisfied with such an explanation, 
without probing into a complete physical description of what constitutes 
wanting. Since the causal explanation is not easily available or 
comprehensible (it arose out of the particular and peculiar interaction of 
many subunits of the system in question), the system settles with the 
explanation that it acted freely and could have done otherwise. This is how 
an eight cylinder engine mistakes itself for something which is the 
specific opposite of engines.

You can deny that you are such a system, but I don't think you could deny 
these things are true of a complex deterministic system.

Lastly, it is trivial to build a deterministic system that desires in a 
prototypical form. All you need is a system that exhibits operant learning. 
1) Wire some sensors to trigger effectors. 2) In the event that the 
effectors bring about certain event (they might bathe the sensors in a 
certain chemical), strengthen the ability of sensors that were active 
directly before the event (that activated the effectors) to trigger the 
effectors they are wired to. 3) In the event that the chemical bath is 
removed, weaken the strength of sensors that were active right before the 
removal of the chemical. The system will begin to want to do things that 
increase the concentration of the chemical and dislike doing things that 
lower it. If the concentration exhibits noisy behavior (is not solely a 
function of the effectors of the system in question), then the system will 
even develop novel, unpredictable behavior.

Desire and qualia pose no real problem for determinism.

On Monday, September 2, 2013 5:15:47 PM UTC-5, chris peck wrote:

  Hi Brent

 I think the researchers would agree. Its definately present stimuli they 
 have in mind.

 All the best



 --- Original Message ---

 From: meekerdb meek...@verizon.net javascript:
 Sent: 3 September 2013 4:11 AM
 To: everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript:
 Subject: Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

  On 9/2/2013 7:34 AM, chris peck wrote:
  
 The study you're citing firstly claims the 60% of the variance they 
 uncovered is explained by 'spontaneous' brain activity not 60% of all brain 
 activity. More importantly, by spontaneous they just mean brain activity 
 that has not been triggered by external stimuli:


 And how could they possibly know whether some brain event was triggered by 
 a stored perception of you grandmother when you were five?  All they can 
 say is it wasn't triggered by a *present* external stimuli.

 Brent
  
 -- 
 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
 Everything List group.
 To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
 email to everything-li

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[meekerdb]

On 9/2/2013 8:50 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:


No matter how complex a system is, it can never be complex enough to contain itself, and 
is therefore unable to perceive itself directly as a deterministic process. Only in the 
special cases, where the major causes of its action are made apparent, such as when 
someone holds a gun to its head, will it realize that it is acting in compulsion and not 
freedom. In other cases, when the desire to act comes about in a subtle fashion, the 
system might say to itself, I did x because I wanted to do x, and I could have wanted to 
do y. The system may be satisfied with such an explanation, without probing into a 
complete physical description of what constitutes wanting. Since the causal explanation 
is not easily available or comprehensible (it arose out of the particular and peculiar 
interaction of many subunits of the system in question), the system settles with the 
explanation that it acted freely and could have done otherwise. This is how an eight 
cylinder engine mistakes itself for something which is the specific opposite of engines.


Good explanation.  Craig has failed to absorb the dictum of Schopenhauer: Der Mensh Kann 
wohl tun, was er will, aber er kann nicht wollen, was er will.


Brent

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 22 August 2013 15:23, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:

 Hi Chris / Stathis

 I probably shouldn't have used the word adaptive.

 I think Craig is arguing :

 1) whatever 'feels'/psychological states emerge from the universe must be
 compatible with its fundamental nature.

 2) Anxiety implies that I really could avoid some feared event.

 3) But que sera sera in a determined universe. what will be will be. I can't
 avoid my fate.

 consequently, anxiety can not emerge within a determined universe because of
 2 and 1.

 Initially I took issue with 2) in the following way: I felt that uncertainty
 about a unavoidable fate would provide space for anxiety to emerge. But the
 more I thought about Craig's position the less tenable I thought this was. I
 think his position is very compelling (if I understand it). If nothing has
 ever avoided a fate how has the sense that this can be achieved emerged?
 What is it about the universe that allows for this delusion? What is it
 built out of?

It's not a delusion. The animals that are anxious about predators
avoid them and pass on their genes, while the ones that aren't anxious
don't avoid them, get eaten, and don't pass on their genes. How is
this more problematic in a deterministic world?

 Anyway the questions flooded in. So i thought what if 'anxiety' doesn't
 imply the ability to avoid a fate. Maybe its just an epiphenomenal 'feel'
 that floats above psychological uncertainty and isn't really susceptible to
 further analysis. That didn't seem to conflict with a determined universe
 readily.

But you *can* avoid your fate in a determined universe. If you were
not anxious, your fate would be different, so anxiety helps you avoid
it. This is so whether or not the counterfactual is realised in a
multiverse.

 Chris, as for whether any of this is plausible, probable etc. I'm afraid I
 wouldn't even begin to know how to assess that. And to be honest I'm not
 even sure whether Craig would accept my paraphrase of his argument.

 All the best.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, August 21, 2013 11:20:09 PM UTC-4, chris peck wrote:

  Hi Craig
 *
 am saying that the ontology of desire is impossible under strong 
 determinism. Deterministic and random processes cannot possibly produce 
 desire - not because desire is special, but because it doesn't make any 
 sense. You are talking about putting in a gas pedal on a bowling ball.*

 I think I can meet you half way and agree that in a determined universe 
 wants, desires and anxieties would be futile. They wouldn't make sense from 
 an adaptive point of view.

 But I'm not convinced they make no logical sense. For example they could 
 be epiphenomena coming along for the ride, unnecessarily colouring the 
 unraveling of pre-written events.

 The determined universe might be inefficient, if you like, carrying along 
 with it baggage that isn't really used. The wants and anxieties would be 
 implied by the universe's initial conditions and not everything in those 
 conditions need be functional. I don't see a logical contradiction there. 


Can't that logic be used to justify anything though? Why do we have 
telekinesis and and time travel-at-will?...Well, maybe its just an 
epiphenomenon that's left over from something else. It's unfalsifiable and 
no different from a religious faith, except in reverse. Instead of reaching 
for a supernatural explanation, determinism compulsively reaches for a 
sub-natural explanation. The compulsion is the same - taking comfort in the 
familiar. Instead of God did it. it's just Some unconscious mechanism 
did it..

The whole point of determinism and physical closure is to avoid 
unjustifiable surprises. If we are going to allow that desires are 
conjured randomly in the midst of barren austerity for no conceivable 
purpose, then why bother to assert that there are any deterministic laws at 
all. Maybe they are epiphenomena coming along for the ride? Why not say 
that the laws of physics are a random conspiracy of brain chemicals, 
zexires, which give the impression of validating each other because it 
makes us more tender and juicy for the hideous demons who raise us as 
cattle?

Thanks,
Craig



 All the best.

 --
 Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 19:13:57 -0700
 From: whats...@gmail.com javascript:
 To: everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript:
 Subject: Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade



 On Wednesday, August 21, 2013 8:33:06 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:

 On 21 August 2013 03:59, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: 

  It is possible to make the distinction between doing something by 
 accident 
  and intentionally, between enslavement and freedom, while still 
  acknowledging that brain mechanisms are either determined or random. 
  
  
  Why would such a distinction be meaningful to a deterministic or random 
  process though? I think you are smuggling our actual sense of intention 
 into 
  this theoretical world which is only deterministic-random 
 (unintentional). 

 If you are saying that something cannot be emotionally meaningful if 
 it is random or determined you are wrong. Patients are anxious about 
 the result of a medical test even though they know the answer is 
 determined and gamblers are anxious about the outcome of their bet 
 even though they know it is random. 


 But that's only because of the impact that the random or determined 
 condition has on our free participation. We have anxiety because a 
 particular condition threatens to constrain our free will or cause 
 unpleasant sensations. They are inextricably linked. A sensation can only 
 be so unpleasant if we retain the power to escape it voluntarily. It is 
 only when we we think that a situation will be unpleasant and that we will 
 not be able to avoid it that anxiety is caused. We can't say whether we 
 would have anxiety in a deterministic universe unless we knew for sure that 
 we had been in a deterministic universe at at some point, but logically, it 
 would not make sense for any such thing as anxiety to arise in a universe 
 of involuntary spectators. What would be the justification of such an 
 emotion? Anxiety makes sense if you have free will. If anything anxiety is 
 caused by the ability to imagine the loss of the effectiveness of your free 
 will.
  


  I do something intentionally if I want to do it and am aware that I am 
  doing it; this is compatible with either type of brain mechanism. 
  
  
  Only if you have the possibility of something 'wanting' to do something 
 in 
  the first place. Wanting doesn't make sense deterministically or 
 randomly. 
  In the words of Yoda, 'there is no try, either do or do not'. 

 You know that you have wants, and you conclude from this that your 
 brain cannot function deterministically or randomly. You make this 
 claim repeatedly and without justification. 


 My brain has nothing to do with it. I am saying that the ontology of 
 desire is impossible under strong determinism. Deterministic and random 
 processes cannot

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

The emotional life of very many animals, including the human animal, is 
critical to their survival in fact.

Right, although only in fact, and not under the theory of strong 
determinism. In strong determinism the only thing that could matter to an 
animal's survival is its behavior. As long as they behave like animals, 
stay in family groups, have a social order, etc, no 'emotion' would impact 
that behavior in any way, especially if there were no free will. It's 
pretty easy to make something look like it has emotion - like this = :) 

But, of course that's because our consciousness includes metaphor and 
empathy. We might look at animals touching each other or fighting each 
other and say that there is emotion there, and there is, but in a 
theoretical deterministic universe, why would there be anything but the 
touching and fighting, just as there are storms in the atmosphere or 
supernovas exploding. Animals collide and bond with each other. So what?

Thanks,
Craig

On Thursday, August 22, 2013 12:07:00 AM UTC-4, cdemorsella wrote:

  The determined universe might be inefficient, if you like, carrying 
 along with it baggage that isn't really used. The wants and anxieties would 
 be implied by the universe's initial conditions and not everything in those 
 conditions need be functional. I don't see a logical contradiction there.

  

 Chris I follow what you are saying, but wouldn’t you also agree that it 
 seems like a whole lot of energy and evolutionary lineage is invested in 
 desire and the full panoply of the emotional spectra. Doesn’t it seem more 
 probable that it has been very much selected for by evolutionary pressure. 
 That it is not a mere hitchhiker along the ride on t crest of some 
 inevitable collapsing wave in a deterministic universe playing out the 
 preordained.

 Conservation of energy seems to be a first principal of all evolved 
 systems, the easier an organism can navigate the flows of its reality in 
 the huge numbers game of evolutionary pressure the better its chances are 
 of surviving and passing on its heredity. Nature favors the emergence of 
 efficient design (not always resulting in efficient designs  though but 
 that’s another story). It seems to me that the energy required in order to 
 maintain our emotional and felt/experienced existence; to maintain this 
 elaborate illusion of free will (it would be an illusion in a preordained 
 world) is so great that unless it played an essential role in our lives and 
 favored the individual’s hereditary success in whom it expressed then it 
 would have been evolved out of us and would have never developed in the 
 mammalian branch in the first place. 

 The emotional life of very many animals, including the human animal, is 
 critical to their survival in fact.

 Can something so critical be an accidental epiphenomena emerging out of 
 the inefficiency of the program? Besides wouldn’t the program evolve to be 
 as efficient as it could; doesn’t the conservation of energy apply to the 
 deterministic universe itself or does it get to play by different rules?

 By the way I enjoy how you argue your position, very cogent and well laid 
 out; it’s just that I feel that proposing that the poetry and depth of the 
 experience of feeling that all of us to one degree or another experience, 
 could be an accidental co-phenomena; a kind of side show that is a 
 distracting superficial phenomena of no bearing or consequence to the 
 underlying preordained script is not supported by the evidence that nature 
 places a lot of energy and attention on developing and evolving precisely 
 those phenomena in a lot of life forms we can study.

 Thanks for the interesting thread,

 Chris

  

 *From:* everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript: [mailto:
 everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript:] *On Behalf Of *chris peck
 *Sent:* Wednesday, August 21, 2013 8:20 PM
 *To:* everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript:
 *Subject:* RE: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

  

 Hi Craig
 *
 am saying that the ontology of desire is impossible under strong 
 determinism. Deterministic and random processes cannot possibly produce 
 desire - not because desire is special, but because it doesn't make any 
 sense. You are talking about putting in a gas pedal on a bowling ball.*

 I think I can meet you half way and agree that in a determined universe 
 wants, desires and anxieties would be futile. They wouldn't make sense from 
 an adaptive point of view.

 But I'm not convinced they make no logical sense. For example they could 
 be epiphenomena coming along for the ride, unnecessarily colouring the 
 unraveling of pre-written events.

 The determined universe might be inefficient, if you like, carrying along 
 with it baggage that isn't really used. The wants and anxieties would be 
 implied by the universe's initial conditions and not everything in those 
 conditions need be functional. I don't see a logical contradiction there. 

 All the best

RE: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[chris peck]

Can't that logic be used to justify anything though?

no. For example:

 Why do we have telekinesis and and time travel-at-will?...Well, maybe its 
 just an epiphenomenon that's left over from something else.

it can't be used to justify that.

We have no reason to believe in telekinesis Craig nor time travel at will. 
Anxiety on the other hand is common. Yes?

 Instead of reaching for a supernatural explanation, determinism compulsively 
 reaches for a sub-natural explanation.

I don't think so. Determinism is a view people are driven to based on what they 
know about the world. Its an end point, a conclusion. It doesn't 'compulsively 
reach' for anything.

The compulsion is the same - taking comfort in the familiar. Instead of God 
did it. it's just Some unconscious mechanism did it..

Comfort in the familiar? You think theres comfort to be had in determinism? 
That it is familiar? I don't think people feel that way.

Whatever. when people make claims as bold as yours, that determinism is 
logically incompatible with the existance of anxiety; then I want to see 
whether they are serious or just  bigging up pet theories with claims they 
can't justify. You're evading the question and kicking up mud.

 The whole point of determinism and physical closure is to avoid 
 unjustifiable surprises.

Like I said, there isn't a point to determinism. It is a conclusion that is 
reached.

 If we are going to allow that desires are conjured randomly in the midst 
 of barren austerity for no conceivable purpose, then why bother to assert 
 that there are any deterministic laws at all.

Who's conjuring what and whats barren and austere??? What are you talking 
about? 

Look, It is because the world can be decribed by laws that are deterministic or 
probabilistic that we feel led to and caught between this pincer. Between 
randomness and fate. You put the cart way before the horse. 


 aybe they are epiphenomena coming along for the ride? Why not say that the 
 laws of physics are a random conspiracy of brain chemicals, zexires, which 
 give the impression of validating each other because it makes us more tender 
 and juicy for the hideous demons who raise us as cattle?

You're out with fairies tonight Craig. Good luck to you.

Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2013 03:34:59 -0700
From: whatsons...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

The emotional life of very many animals, including the human animal, is 
critical to their survival in fact.

Right, although only in fact, and not under the theory of strong determinism. 
In strong determinism the only thing that could matter to an animal's survival 
is its behavior. As long as they behave like animals, stay in family groups, 
have a social order, etc, no 'emotion' would impact that behavior in any way, 
especially if there were no free will. It's pretty easy to make something look 
like it has emotion - like this = :) 

But, of course that's because our consciousness includes metaphor and empathy. 
We might look at animals touching each other or fighting each other and say 
that there is emotion there, and there is, but in a theoretical deterministic 
universe, why would there be anything but the touching and fighting, just as 
there are storms in the atmosphere or supernovas exploding. Animals collide and 
bond with each other. So what?

Thanks,
Craig

On Thursday, August 22, 2013 12:07:00 AM UTC-4, cdemorsella wrote: The 
determined universe might be inefficient, if you like, carrying along with it 
baggage that isn't really used. The wants and anxieties would be implied by the 
universe's initial conditions and not everything in those conditions need be 
functional. I don't see a logical contradiction there. Chris I follow what you 
are saying, but wouldn’t you also agree that it seems like a whole lot of 
energy and evolutionary lineage is invested in desire and the full panoply of 
the emotional spectra. Doesn’t it seem more probable that it has been very much 
selected for by evolutionary pressure. That it is not a mere hitchhiker along 
the ride on t crest of some inevitable collapsing wave in a deterministic 
universe playing out the preordained.Conservation of energy seems to be a first 
principal of all evolved systems, the easier an organism can navigate the flows 
of its reality in the huge numbers game of evolutionary pressure the better its 
chances are of surviving and passing on its heredity. Nature favors the 
emergence of efficient design (not always resulting in efficient designs  
though but that’s another story). It seems to me that the energy required in 
order to maintain our emotional and felt/experienced existence; to maintain 
this elaborate illusion of free will (it would be an illusion in a preordained 
world) is so great that unless it played an essential role in our lives and 
favored the individual’s hereditary success in whom it expressed then it would 
have been evolved out of us and would have

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[John Mikes]

Brent wrote:

*Just *any* response?  Doesn't the response have to be something we can
identify as intelligent or purposeful?*
Depends on your definition of 'intelligent or purposeful' - Oh, and of
RESPONSE of course. My def. of response includes your characterisation.
*
Brent wrote:
* So do you agree that if we build a machine, such as a Mars Rover, that
exhibits intelligence in its response then we may conclude it is
aware/conscious?*
Aware like a thermostat? conscious like the response of it? YES.
We use loose meanings and draw even looser conclusions.  We are loosers.

Bren t wrote:

*To exhibit intelligence the Rover would have to do more than follow
instructions, it would have to learn from experience, act and plan through
simulation and prediction.  If it did exhibit intelligence like that, I'd
grant it 'consciousness', whatever that means.  If it learns and acts based
on chemical types I'd grant it has a sense of smell.  To say it's
conscious is just a way of modeling how it learns and acts that we can
relate to (what Dennett calls the intentional stance).*
*
*
That's exactly what I called your 'right' to call *consciousness* whatever
fits your purpose. I have no firm rules between conscious and its noun
(-ness). Both may be related to the 'inventory' we know of.

JM





*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*


On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 9:59 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 8/17/2013 2:01 PM, John Mikes wrote:

 Consciousness is different: it is a hoax some high hatted
 scientists/pholosophers invented to make themselves smart. No basis, every
 author uses the term for a content that fits her/his theoretical stance.
 Me, too.
 Mine is: a response to relations we get to know about. Nothing more. Not
 human/elephant/dolphin, not universe, not awareness, not nothing, just
 RESPONSE.


 Just *any* response?  Doesn't the response have to be something we can
 identify as intelligent or purposeful?


  By anything on anything. You may even include the figments of the
 Physical World into the inventory.


 So do you agree that if we build a machine, such as a Mars Rover, that
 exhibits intelligence in its response then we may conclude it is
 aware/conscious?

 Brent

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RE: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Chris de Morsella]

 I am enslaved if someone physically constrains me or threatens me in
order to make me behave in a certain way; this is also compatible with
either type of brain mechanism.

I would argue that people can be as much enslaved by chains within their
minds, and that belief and habit have the potential to be as powerful a
constraint as bonds of iron can ever be. Habit  belief, once established in
a host brain are exceedingly difficult to root out; they remain and operate
largely unexamined by the person affected by them, generating assumed truth,
unquestioned assumptions and deciding actions and judgments that are
generated from within the inner universe the marvelously and massively
parallel, and also very noisy brains. 

Habit  belief often reflect and enforce external enslavement; we become
habituated into our various assorted lots in life, and after the habit takes
root we are largely driven forward along the desired behavioral patterns by
the well rooted habits inside of us.

And in some senses habitual behavior is a great thing; I love not having to
think about everything that is constantly occurring and which demands a
response from the brain. Habitual behavior to the rescue J

But the unexamined habit and belief can imprison a brain as or even more
effectively than physical imprisonment can.

Apart from this one minor quibble, I agree with the thrust of your argument
that we all intuitively grasp our own free will in a most visceral sense,
and that while it cannot be defined precisely or pinned down or proved; that
just because it is a little fuzzy and impossible to rigorously define does
not mean it therefore does not exist or must remain outside of any serious
discussion on such matters.

Even if free will does not exist -- in which case it matter not whether we
believe in it or not - it appears that regardless of whether free will truly
exists or not, our belief in free will is vital for our morality. When we
believe we have free will that we, the inner self-aware agents in our brains
are deciding our actions then we tend to behave in more moral ways;
conversely when we are led to believe that free will does not exist and that
we are chatty marionettes driven by a fundamental determinism or programs
outside of our control then we behave in far less moral manners. 

So, even if we inhabit a deterministic universe, that universe has found it
necessary - in us (self-aware and at least semi-conscious beings)  -- to
develop/evolve this elaborate inner charade, to produce an illusion of free
will that is so perfect in us that few question its existence.

One could argue that the very fact that this very real sensation and
experience of having free will and of being conscious has evolved to the
exquisite degree that it has evolved in us is indicative of a deep
centrality of importance to our being. Believing in free will, which seems
very evolved in us - after all, human individuals, on average, very much
tend to believe in their own free will  --believing in it, independent of
whether it actually exists or not in the underlying physical reality matrix
in which our virtual mental entities are most intimately immersed seems
vital to our being. and on many levels from the moral, to the motivational
and emotional.

Behaviorism misses the mark, sure behaviors can be induced, subjects
controlled through conditioning, but that is merely generating superficial
behavioral effects and demonstrating that behaviors can be imprinted on
minds. It is not therefore a theory of the mind.

It's akin to the torturers belief in the methodology of torture; while it is
true that the one tortured will eventually become broken by torture and seek
above all to please the torturer and will tell them whatever they want to
hear. this in no ways actually implies that anything of value has been
achieved. The information extracted by torture all too often proves to be of
little value. 

Not calling behaviorists torturers although I find their world view tortured
J

The poetry of the mind is not so easily reducible, the esthetics of inner
life cannot be so easily dissected and defined. That which is most beautiful
and real in us. self-emerging within this truly vast dynamic
electro-chemical inner-verse is the mind.

I suspect the mind is rather much more a subtle multi-faceted,
multi-reflecting, dynamically inter-acting and co-evolving self-emergent
entity, which quite self-evidently, transcends the crude attempts of
reducing this symphony to an impoverished assemblage of deterministic
behaviors and mental programs.

-Chris

 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 10:59 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

 



On Monday, August 19, 2013 11:02:00 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:

 

 

On 17 August 2013 04:01, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: 
wrote:

The objection

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 21 August 2013 03:59, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 It is possible to make the distinction between doing something by accident
 and intentionally, between enslavement and freedom, while still
 acknowledging that brain mechanisms are either determined or random.


 Why would such a distinction be meaningful to a deterministic or random
 process though? I think you are smuggling our actual sense of intention into
 this theoretical world which is only deterministic-random (unintentional).

If you are saying that something cannot be emotionally meaningful if
it is random or determined you are wrong. Patients are anxious about
the result of a medical test even though they know the answer is
determined and gamblers are anxious about the outcome of their bet
even though they know it is random.

 I do something intentionally if I want to do it and am aware that I am
 doing it; this is compatible with either type of brain mechanism.


 Only if you have the possibility of something 'wanting' to do something in
 the first place. Wanting doesn't make sense deterministically or randomly.
 In the words of Yoda, 'there is no try, either do or do not'.

You know that you have wants, and you conclude from this that your
brain cannot function deterministically or randomly. You make this
claim repeatedly and without justification.

 I am enslaved if someone physically constrains me or threatens me in order
 to make me behave in a certain way; this is also compatible with either type
 of brain mechanism.


 In the deterministic universe, you would be enslave no matter what, so what
 difference would it make whether your constraint is internally programmatic
 or externally modified?

I don't think being a slave to brain processes is considered to be
real slavery by most people. You are free to differ in your
definition.

 Some questions for determinist thinkers:

 Can we effectively doubt that we have free will?

 I can't effectively doubt that I decide to do something and do it. I can
 effectively doubt that my actions are random, that they are determined, or
 that they are neither random nor determined


 It sounds like you are agreeing with me?

On this point, yes; but I'm using the common, legal or compatibilist
definition of free will, not yours.

 Or is the doubt a mental abstraction which denies the very capacity for
 intentional reasoning upon which the doubt itself is based?

 Yes: if I intend to do something, I can't doubt that I intend to do it,
 for otherwise I wouldn't intend to do it.


 If you doubt anything though, it is because you intend to believe what is
 true and your sense is that some proposition is not true. To say I doubt
 that there is a such thing as free will (intention) is itself an
 intentional, free-will act. You are saying not just that there is a sense of
 doubt, but that you voluntarily invest your personal authority in that
 doubt.

I don't doubt free will in the common, legal or compatibilist sense. I
doubt it in your sense, since it is not even conceptually possible.

 How would an illusion of doubt be justified, either randomly or
 deterministically? What function would an illusion of doubt serve, even in
 the most blue-sky hypothetical way?
 Why wouldn’t determinism itself be just as much of an illusion as free
 will or doubt under determinism?

 Determinism and randomness can be doubted. There is no problem here.


 Only because we live in a universe which supports voluntary intentional
 doubt. They couldn't be doubted in a universe which was limited to
 determinism and randomness. That's my point. To doubt, you need to be able
 to determine personally. Free will is the power not just to predict but to
 dictate.

I can doubt something if it was determined at the beginning of the
universe that I would doubt it. Where is the logical problem with
that?

 For psychology not to be reducible to physiology, something extra would be
 needed, such as non-physical soul.


 Then the opposite would have to be true also. For select brain physiology
 not to be reducible to psychology, you would need some homunculus running
 translation traffic in infinite regress. Non-physical and soul are labels
 which are not useful to me. Physics is reducible to sense, and sense tends
 to polarize as public and private phenomena.

A house is reducible to bricks because if you put all the bricks in
place the house necessarily follows. Psychology is reducible to
physiology because if you put all the physiology in place the
psychology follows necessarily.

 Absent this something extra, the reduction stands. That's my definition of
 reductionism. If your definition is different then, according to this
 different definition, it could be that reductionism is wrong in this case.


 Physical reductionism is wrong because it arbitrarily starts with objects as
 real and subjects as somehow other than real. It's not really reductionism,
 it's just stealth dualism, where mind-soul is recategorized as an
 

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, August 21, 2013 8:33:06 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:

 On 21 August 2013 03:59, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: 
 wrote: 

  It is possible to make the distinction between doing something by 
 accident 
  and intentionally, between enslavement and freedom, while still 
  acknowledging that brain mechanisms are either determined or random. 
  
  
  Why would such a distinction be meaningful to a deterministic or random 
  process though? I think you are smuggling our actual sense of intention 
 into 
  this theoretical world which is only deterministic-random 
 (unintentional). 

 If you are saying that something cannot be emotionally meaningful if 
 it is random or determined you are wrong. Patients are anxious about 
 the result of a medical test even though they know the answer is 
 determined and gamblers are anxious about the outcome of their bet 
 even though they know it is random. 


But that's only because of the impact that the random or determined 
condition has on our free participation. We have anxiety because a 
particular condition threatens to constrain our free will or cause 
unpleasant sensations. They are inextricably linked. A sensation can only 
be so unpleasant if we retain the power to escape it voluntarily. It is 
only when we we think that a situation will be unpleasant and that we will 
not be able to avoid it that anxiety is caused. We can't say whether we 
would have anxiety in a deterministic universe unless we knew for sure that 
we had been in a deterministic universe at at some point, but logically, it 
would not make sense for any such thing as anxiety to arise in a universe 
of involuntary spectators. What would be the justification of such an 
emotion? Anxiety makes sense if you have free will. If anything anxiety is 
caused by the ability to imagine the loss of the effectiveness of your free 
will.
 


  I do something intentionally if I want to do it and am aware that I am 
  doing it; this is compatible with either type of brain mechanism. 
  
  
  Only if you have the possibility of something 'wanting' to do something 
 in 
  the first place. Wanting doesn't make sense deterministically or 
 randomly. 
  In the words of Yoda, 'there is no try, either do or do not'. 

 You know that you have wants, and you conclude from this that your 
 brain cannot function deterministically or randomly. You make this 
 claim repeatedly and without justification. 


My brain has nothing to do with it. I am saying that the ontology of desire 
is impossible under strong determinism. Deterministic and random processes 
cannot possibly produce desire - not because desire is special, but because 
it doesn't make any sense. You are talking about putting in a gas pedal on 
a bowling ball.


  I am enslaved if someone physically constrains me or threatens me in 
 order 
  to make me behave in a certain way; this is also compatible with either 
 type 
  of brain mechanism. 
  
  
  In the deterministic universe, you would be enslave no matter what, so 
 what 
  difference would it make whether your constraint is internally 
 programmatic 
  or externally modified? 

 I don't think being a slave to brain processes is considered to be 
 real slavery by most people. You are free to differ in your 
 definition. 


Why not? What exactly is the difference whether your enslavement is 
internally based or externally based?
 


  Some questions for determinist thinkers: 
  
  Can we effectively doubt that we have free will? 
  
  I can't effectively doubt that I decide to do something and do it. I 
 can 
  effectively doubt that my actions are random, that they are determined, 
 or 
  that they are neither random nor determined 
  
  
  It sounds like you are agreeing with me? 

 On this point, yes; but I'm using the common, legal or compatibilist 
 definition of free will, not yours. 


Ok
 


  Or is the doubt a mental abstraction which denies the very capacity 
 for 
  intentional reasoning upon which the doubt itself is based? 
  
  Yes: if I intend to do something, I can't doubt that I intend to do it, 
  for otherwise I wouldn't intend to do it. 
  
  
  If you doubt anything though, it is because you intend to believe what 
 is 
  true and your sense is that some proposition is not true. To say I 
 doubt 
  that there is a such thing as free will (intention) is itself an 
  intentional, free-will act. You are saying not just that there is a 
 sense of 
  doubt, but that you voluntarily invest your personal authority in that 
  doubt. 

 I don't doubt free will in the common, legal or compatibilist sense. I 
 doubt it in your sense, since it is not even conceptually possible. 


It doesn't have to be conceptually possible, it is more primitive than 
concept. We have no choice but to experience it directly, and can only deny 
that this is the case by demonstrating that we have the power to do that as 
an act of free will.
 


  How would an illusion of doubt be 

RE: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[chris peck]

 Hi Craig

am saying that the ontology of desire is impossible 
under strong determinism. Deterministic and random processes cannot 
possibly produce desire - not because desire is special, but because it 
doesn't make any sense. You
are talking about putting in a gas pedal on a bowling ball.

I think I can meet you half way and agree that in a determined universe wants, 
desires and anxieties would be futile. They wouldn't make sense from an 
adaptive point of view.

But I'm not convinced they make no logical sense. For example they could be 
epiphenomena coming along for the ride, unnecessarily colouring the unraveling 
of pre-written events.

The determined universe might be inefficient, if you like, carrying along with 
it baggage that isn't really used. The wants and anxieties would be implied by 
the universe's initial conditions and not everything in those conditions need 
be functional. I don't see a logical contradiction there. 

All the best.

Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 19:13:57 -0700
From: whatsons...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade



On Wednesday, August 21, 2013 8:33:06 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:On 21 August 
2013 03:59, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:



 It is possible to make the distinction between doing something by accident

 and intentionally, between enslavement and freedom, while still

 acknowledging that brain mechanisms are either determined or random.





 Why would such a distinction be meaningful to a deterministic or random

 process though? I think you are smuggling our actual sense of intention into

 this theoretical world which is only deterministic-random (unintentional).



If you are saying that something cannot be emotionally meaningful if

it is random or determined you are wrong. Patients are anxious about

the result of a medical test even though they know the answer is

determined and gamblers are anxious about the outcome of their bet

even though they know it is random.


But that's only because of the impact that the random or determined condition 
has on our free participation. We have anxiety because a particular condition 
threatens to constrain our free will or cause unpleasant sensations. They are 
inextricably linked. A sensation can only be so unpleasant if we retain the 
power to escape it voluntarily. It is only when we we think that a situation 
will be unpleasant and that we will not be able to avoid it that anxiety is 
caused. We can't say whether we would have anxiety in a deterministic universe 
unless we knew for sure that we had been in a deterministic universe at at some 
point, but logically, it would not make sense for any such thing as anxiety to 
arise in a universe of involuntary spectators. What would be the justification 
of such an emotion? Anxiety makes sense if you have free will. If anything 
anxiety is caused by the ability to imagine the loss of the effectiveness of 
your free will.
 


 I do something intentionally if I want to do it and am aware that I am

 doing it; this is compatible with either type of brain mechanism.





 Only if you have the possibility of something 'wanting' to do something in

 the first place. Wanting doesn't make sense deterministically or randomly.

 In the words of Yoda, 'there is no try, either do or do not'.



You know that you have wants, and you conclude from this that your

brain cannot function deterministically or randomly. You make this

claim repeatedly and without justification.


My brain has nothing to do with it. I am saying that the ontology of desire is 
impossible under strong determinism. Deterministic and random processes cannot 
possibly produce desire - not because desire is special, but because it doesn't 
make any sense. You are talking about putting in a gas pedal on a bowling ball.



 I am enslaved if someone physically constrains me or threatens me in order

 to make me behave in a certain way; this is also compatible with either type

 of brain mechanism.





 In the deterministic universe, you would be enslave no matter what, so what

 difference would it make whether your constraint is internally programmatic

 or externally modified?



I don't think being a slave to brain processes is considered to be

real slavery by most people. You are free to differ in your

definition.


Why not? What exactly is the difference whether your enslavement is internally 
based or externally based?
 


 Some questions for determinist thinkers:



 Can we effectively doubt that we have free will?



 I can't effectively doubt that I decide to do something and do it. I can

 effectively doubt that my actions are random, that they are determined, or

 that they are neither random nor determined





 It sounds like you are agreeing with me?



On this point, yes; but I'm using the common, legal or compatibilist

definition of free will, not yours.


Ok
 


 Or is the doubt a mental abstraction which denies the very

RE: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Chris de Morsella]

 The determined universe might be inefficient, if you like, carrying along
with it baggage that isn't really used. The wants and anxieties would be
implied by the universe's initial conditions and not everything in those
conditions need be functional. I don't see a logical contradiction there.

 

Chris I follow what you are saying, but wouldn't you also agree that it
seems like a whole lot of energy and evolutionary lineage is invested in
desire and the full panoply of the emotional spectra. Doesn't it seem more
probable that it has been very much selected for by evolutionary pressure.
That it is not a mere hitchhiker along the ride on t crest of some
inevitable collapsing wave in a deterministic universe playing out the
preordained.

Conservation of energy seems to be a first principal of all evolved systems,
the easier an organism can navigate the flows of its reality in the huge
numbers game of evolutionary pressure the better its chances are of
surviving and passing on its heredity. Nature favors the emergence of
efficient design (not always resulting in efficient designs  though but
that's another story). It seems to me that the energy required in order to
maintain our emotional and felt/experienced existence; to maintain this
elaborate illusion of free will (it would be an illusion in a preordained
world) is so great that unless it played an essential role in our lives and
favored the individual's hereditary success in whom it expressed then it
would have been evolved out of us and would have never developed in the
mammalian branch in the first place. 

The emotional life of very many animals, including the human animal, is
critical to their survival in fact.

Can something so critical be an accidental epiphenomena emerging out of the
inefficiency of the program? Besides wouldn't the program evolve to be as
efficient as it could; doesn't the conservation of energy apply to the
deterministic universe itself or does it get to play by different rules?

By the way I enjoy how you argue your position, very cogent and well laid
out; it's just that I feel that proposing that the poetry and depth of the
experience of feeling that all of us to one degree or another experience,
could be an accidental co-phenomena; a kind of side show that is a
distracting superficial phenomena of no bearing or consequence to the
underlying preordained script is not supported by the evidence that nature
places a lot of energy and attention on developing and evolving precisely
those phenomena in a lot of life forms we can study.

Thanks for the interesting thread,

Chris

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of chris peck
Sent: Wednesday, August 21, 2013 8:20 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: RE: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

 

Hi Craig

am saying that the ontology of desire is impossible under strong
determinism. Deterministic and random processes cannot possibly produce
desire - not because desire is special, but because it doesn't make any
sense. You are talking about putting in a gas pedal on a bowling ball.

I think I can meet you half way and agree that in a determined universe
wants, desires and anxieties would be futile. They wouldn't make sense from
an adaptive point of view.

But I'm not convinced they make no logical sense. For example they could be
epiphenomena coming along for the ride, unnecessarily colouring the
unraveling of pre-written events.

The determined universe might be inefficient, if you like, carrying along
with it baggage that isn't really used. The wants and anxieties would be
implied by the universe's initial conditions and not everything in those
conditions need be functional. I don't see a logical contradiction there. 

All the best.

  _  

Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 19:13:57 -0700
From: whatsons...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade



On Wednesday, August 21, 2013 8:33:06 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:

On 21 August 2013 03:59, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: 

 It is possible to make the distinction between doing something by
accident 
 and intentionally, between enslavement and freedom, while still 
 acknowledging that brain mechanisms are either determined or random. 
 
 
 Why would such a distinction be meaningful to a deterministic or random 
 process though? I think you are smuggling our actual sense of intention
into 
 this theoretical world which is only deterministic-random (unintentional).


If you are saying that something cannot be emotionally meaningful if 
it is random or determined you are wrong. Patients are anxious about 
the result of a medical test even though they know the answer is 
determined and gamblers are anxious about the outcome of their bet 
even though they know it is random. 


But that's only because of the impact that the random or determined
condition has on our free participation. We have anxiety because a
particular

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 22 August 2013 13:20, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
 Hi Craig


 am saying that the ontology of desire is impossible under strong
 determinism. Deterministic and random processes cannot possibly produce
 desire - not because desire is special, but because it doesn't make any
 sense. You are talking about putting in a gas pedal on a bowling ball.


 I think I can meet you half way and agree that in a determined universe
 wants, desires and anxieties would be futile. They wouldn't make sense from
 an adaptive point of view.

That's no more true for a determined universe than it is for a
non-determined universe.

 But I'm not convinced they make no logical sense. For example they could be
 epiphenomena coming along for the ride, unnecessarily colouring the
 unraveling of pre-written events.

 The determined universe might be inefficient, if you like, carrying along
 with it baggage that isn't really used. The wants and anxieties would be
 implied by the universe's initial conditions and not everything in those
 conditions need be functional. I don't see a logical contradiction there.

 All the best.

If it were possible to have the same behaviour without consciousness
then consciousness would not have evolved - there would be no adaptive
value to it. That is one reason why I think consciousness must be a
necessary side-effect of intelligent behaviour, at least in organic
machines such as we are.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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RE: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[chris peck]

Hi Chris / Stathis

I probably shouldn't have used the word adaptive.

I think Craig is arguing :

1) whatever 'feels'/psychological states emerge from the universe must be 
compatible with its fundamental nature.

2) Anxiety implies that I really could avoid some feared event.

3) But que sera sera in a determined universe. what will be will be. I can't 
avoid my fate.

consequently, anxiety can not emerge within a determined universe because of 2 
and 1.

Initially I took issue with 2) in the following way: I felt that uncertainty 
about a unavoidable fate would provide space for anxiety to emerge. But the 
more I thought about Craig's position the less tenable I thought this was. I 
think his position is very compelling (if I understand it). If nothing has ever 
avoided a fate how has the sense that this can be achieved emerged? What is it 
about the universe that allows for this delusion? What is it built out of?

Anyway the questions flooded in. So i thought what if 'anxiety' doesn't imply 
the ability to avoid a fate. Maybe its just an epiphenomenal 'feel' that floats 
above psychological uncertainty and isn't really susceptible to further 
analysis. That didn't seem to conflict with a determined universe readily.

Chris, as for whether any of this is plausible, probable etc. I'm afraid I 
wouldn't even begin to know how to assess that. And to be honest I'm not even 
sure whether Craig would accept my paraphrase of his argument.

All the best.

 From: stath...@gmail.com
 Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2013 15:01:35 +1000
 Subject: Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 
 On 22 August 2013 13:20, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
  Hi Craig
 
 
  am saying that the ontology of desire is impossible under strong
  determinism. Deterministic and random processes cannot possibly produce
  desire - not because desire is special, but because it doesn't make any
  sense. You are talking about putting in a gas pedal on a bowling ball.
 
 
  I think I can meet you half way and agree that in a determined universe
  wants, desires and anxieties would be futile. They wouldn't make sense from
  an adaptive point of view.
 
 That's no more true for a determined universe than it is for a
 non-determined universe.
 
  But I'm not convinced they make no logical sense. For example they could be
  epiphenomena coming along for the ride, unnecessarily colouring the
  unraveling of pre-written events.
 
  The determined universe might be inefficient, if you like, carrying along
  with it baggage that isn't really used. The wants and anxieties would be
  implied by the universe's initial conditions and not everything in those
  conditions need be functional. I don't see a logical contradiction there.
 
  All the best.
 
 If it were possible to have the same behaviour without consciousness
 then consciousness would not have evolved - there would be no adaptive
 value to it. That is one reason why I think consciousness must be a
 necessary side-effect of intelligent behaviour, at least in organic
 machines such as we are.
 
 
 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou
 
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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, August 19, 2013 11:02:00 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:




 On 17 August 2013 04:01, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com 
 javascript:wrote:

 The objection that the terms ‘consciousness’ or ‘free will’ are used in 
 too many different ways to be understandable is one of the most common 
 arguments that I run into. I agree that it is a superficially valid 
 objection, but on deeper consideration, it should be clear that it is a 
 specious and ideologically driven detour.

 The term *free will* is not as precise as a more scientific term might 
 be (I tend to use *motive*, *efferent participation*, or *private 
 intention*), but it isn’t nearly the problem that it is made to be in a 
 debate. Any eight year old knows well enough what free will refers to. 
 Nobody on Earth can fail to understand the difference between doing 
 something by accident and intentionally, or between enslavement and 
 freedom. The claim that these concepts are somehow esoteric doesn’t wash, 
 unless you already have an expectation of a kind of verbal-logical 
 supremacy in which nothing is allowed to exist until we can agree on a 
 precise set of terms which give it existence. I think that this expectation 
 is not a neutral or innocuous position, but actually contaminates the 
 debate over free will, stacking the deck unintentionally in favor of the 
 determinism.

 It is possible to make the distinction between doing something by accident 
 and intentionally, between enslavement and freedom, while still 
 acknowledging that brain mechanisms are either determined or random. 


Why would such a distinction be meaningful to a deterministic or random 
process though? I think you are smuggling our actual sense of intention 
into this theoretical world which is only deterministic-random 
(unintentional).
 

 I do something intentionally if I want to do it and am aware that I am 
 doing it; this is compatible with either type of brain mechanism. 


Only if you have the possibility of something 'wanting' to do something in 
the first place. Wanting doesn't make sense deterministically or randomly. 
In the words of Yoda, 'there is no try, either do or do not'.
 

 I am enslaved if someone physically constrains me or threatens me in order 
 to make me behave in a certain way; this is also compatible with either 
 type of brain mechanism.


In the deterministic universe, you would be enslave no matter what, so what 
difference would it make whether your constraint is internally programmatic 
or externally modified?
 

  It’s subtle, but ontologically, it is a bit like letting a burglar talk 
 you into opening up the door to the house for them since breaking a window 
 would only make a mess for you to clean up. Because the argument for hard 
 determinism begins with an assumption that impartiality and objectivity are 
 inherently desirable in all things, it asks that you put your king in check 
 from the start. The argument doubles down on this leverage with the 
 implication that subjective intuition is notoriously naive and flawed, so 
 that not putting your king in check from the start is framed as a weak 
 position. This is the James Randi kind of double-bind. If you don’t submit 
 to his rules, then you are already guilty of fraud, and part of his rules 
 are that you have no say in what his rules will be.

 This is the sleight of hand which is also used by Daniel Dennett as well. 
 What poses as a fair consideration of hard determinism is actually a 
 stealth maneuver to create determinism – to demand that the subject submit 
 to the forced disbelief system and become complicit in undermining their 
 own authority. The irony is that it is only through a personal/social, 
 political attack on subjectivity that the false perspective of objectivity 
 can be introduced. It is accepted only by presentation pf an argument of 
 personal insignificance so that the subject is shamed and bullied into 
 imagining itself an object. Without knowing it, one person’s will has been 
 voluntarily overpowered and confounded by another person’s free will into 
 accepting that this state of affairs is not really happening. In presenting 
 free will and consciousness as a kind of stage magic, the materialist 
 magician performs a meta-magic trick on the audience.

 Some questions for determinist thinkers:

- Can we effectively doubt that we have free will?

 I can't effectively doubt that I decide to do something and do it. I can 
  effectively doubt that my actions are random, that they are determined, or 
 that they are neither random nor determined


It sounds like you are agreeing with me? 


- Or is the doubt a mental abstraction which denies the very capacity 
for intentional reasoning upon which the doubt itself is based?

 Yes: if I intend to do something, I can't doubt that I intend to do it, 
 for otherwise I wouldn't intend to do it. 


If you doubt anything though, it is because you intend to believe what is 
true and 

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 17 August 2013 04:01, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

 The objection that the terms ‘consciousness’ or ‘free will’ are used in
 too many different ways to be understandable is one of the most common
 arguments that I run into. I agree that it is a superficially valid
 objection, but on deeper consideration, it should be clear that it is a
 specious and ideologically driven detour.

 The term *free will* is not as precise as a more scientific term might be
 (I tend to use *motive*, *efferent participation*, or *private intention*),
 but it isn’t nearly the problem that it is made to be in a debate. Any
 eight year old knows well enough what free will refers to. Nobody on Earth
 can fail to understand the difference between doing something by accident
 and intentionally, or between enslavement and freedom. The claim that these
 concepts are somehow esoteric doesn’t wash, unless you already have an
 expectation of a kind of verbal-logical supremacy in which nothing is
 allowed to exist until we can agree on a precise set of terms which give it
 existence. I think that this expectation is not a neutral or innocuous
 position, but actually contaminates the debate over free will, stacking the
 deck unintentionally in favor of the determinism.

It is possible to make the distinction between doing something by accident
and intentionally, between enslavement and freedom, while still
acknowledging that brain mechanisms are either determined or random. I do
something intentionally if I want to do it and am aware that I am doing it;
this is compatible with either type of brain mechanism. I am enslaved if
someone physically constrains me or threatens me in order to make me behave
in a certain way; this is also compatible with either type of brain
mechanism.

 It’s subtle, but ontologically, it is a bit like letting a burglar talk
 you into opening up the door to the house for them since breaking a window
 would only make a mess for you to clean up. Because the argument for hard
 determinism begins with an assumption that impartiality and objectivity are
 inherently desirable in all things, it asks that you put your king in check
 from the start. The argument doubles down on this leverage with the
 implication that subjective intuition is notoriously naive and flawed, so
 that not putting your king in check from the start is framed as a weak
 position. This is the James Randi kind of double-bind. If you don’t submit
 to his rules, then you are already guilty of fraud, and part of his rules
 are that you have no say in what his rules will be.

 This is the sleight of hand which is also used by Daniel Dennett as well.
 What poses as a fair consideration of hard determinism is actually a
 stealth maneuver to create determinism – to demand that the subject submit
 to the forced disbelief system and become complicit in undermining their
 own authority. The irony is that it is only through a personal/social,
 political attack on subjectivity that the false perspective of objectivity
 can be introduced. It is accepted only by presentation pf an argument of
 personal insignificance so that the subject is shamed and bullied into
 imagining itself an object. Without knowing it, one person’s will has been
 voluntarily overpowered and confounded by another person’s free will into
 accepting that this state of affairs is not really happening. In presenting
 free will and consciousness as a kind of stage magic, the materialist
 magician performs a meta-magic trick on the audience.

 Some questions for determinist thinkers:

- Can we effectively doubt that we have free will?

 I can't effectively doubt that I decide to do something and do it. I can
 effectively doubt that my actions are random, that they are determined, or
that they are neither random nor determined


- Or is the doubt a mental abstraction which denies the very capacity
for intentional reasoning upon which the doubt itself is based?

 Yes: if I intend to do something, I can't doubt that I intend to do it,
for otherwise I wouldn't intend to do it.


- How would an illusion of doubt be justified, either randomly or
deterministically? What function would an illusion of doubt serve, even in
the most blue-sky hypothetical way?
- Why wouldn’t determinism itself be just as much of an illusion as
free will or doubt under determinism?

 Determinism and randomness can be doubted. There is no problem here.

 Another common derailment is to conflate the position of recognizing the
 phenomenon of subjectivity as authentic with religious faith, naive
 realism, or soft-headed sentimentality. This also is ironic, as it is an
 attack on the ego of the subject, not on the legitimacy of the issue. There
 is no reason to presume any theistic belief is implied just because
 determinism can be challenged at its root rather than on technicalities. To
 challenge determinism at its root requires (appropriately) the freedom to
 question the 

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[meekerdb]

On 8/17/2013 10:09 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Don't be so evasive, Brent.  Being dense is how science works. It's about stripping away 
your assumptions. Your assumption is that somehow a sense of smell is an expected 
outcome of chemical detection, so I ask you to explain why you assume that. You are 
bluffing.


And you're putting no thought into the problem. Otherwise you'd have realized that 
smell/chemical detection doesn't have the angular disribution and projective geometry of 
sight or the localization of touch and so you could have answered you own questions if 
you'd actually been interested in the answer.


Brent

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Alberto G. Corona]

I can nothing but laugh at at a Physicist pontificating about what
they call free will . It show how far the destruction of philosophy
by metaphisical-ideological-religious reductionism has gone since
Occam.

Calvin would be surprised about the twists that have suffered his
theory of predestination by ignorants of the history of ideas that
know nothing but the fashionable discussions of their concrete time.

2013/8/18, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
 On 8/17/2013 10:09 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
 Don't be so evasive, Brent.  Being dense is how science works. It's about
 stripping away
 your assumptions. Your assumption is that somehow a sense of smell is an
 expected
 outcome of chemical detection, so I ask you to explain why you assume
 that. You are
 bluffing.

 And you're putting no thought into the problem. Otherwise you'd have
 realized that
 smell/chemical detection doesn't have the angular disribution and projective
 geometry of
 sight or the localization of touch and so you could have answered you own
 questions if
 you'd actually been interested in the answer.

 Brent

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Alberto.

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

Synesthesia proves that data can be formatted in multiple ways,
irrespective of assumed correlations. A computer proves this also. Your
argument is essentially that we couldn't look at the data of an mp3 in any
other way except listening to it with an ear. You'd have realized that
visual/alphanumeric detection doesn't have the harmonic oscillation and
melodic structure to contain music theory.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Just-so_story

Try again?

Craig


On Sun, Aug 18, 2013 at 2:47 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 8/17/2013 10:09 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

 Don't be so evasive, Brent.  Being dense is how science works. It's about
 stripping away your assumptions. Your assumption is that somehow a sense of
 smell is an expected outcome of chemical detection, so I ask you to explain
 why you assume that. You are bluffing.


 And you're putting no thought into the problem. Otherwise you'd have
 realized that smell/chemical detection doesn't have the angular disribution
 and projective geometry of sight or the localization of touch and so you
 could have answered you own questions if you'd actually been interested in
 the answer.

 Brent

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[John Mikes]

Brent, your 'quip' comes close, but...
It is a fundamental view of the world as we see it (the MODEL of it we know
about). We can detect the affecting of many factors we know about, which is
a portion only. We THINK the rest is up to us. It isn't - however we are
not slaves of deterministic effects. There are conter-effects to choose
from and stronger/weaker argumentative decisions to pnder. So we HAVE som
(free? relatively so) choices within given situations where we have effects
to ponder. Even the counterproductive decision is such a result.
When the Sun traveled the Dome of the Sky - that was congruent with the
model of that time. Today we are not much smarter just think so. We have
other (mis)beliefs we hold true. We call it conventional science (maybe QM?
-  anyway The Physical World (ask Bruno).

Consciousness is different: it is a hoax some high hatted
scientists/pholosophers invented to make themselves smart. No basis, every
author uses the term for a content that fits her/his theoretical stance.
Me, too.
Mine is: a response to relations we get to know about. Nothing more. Not
human/elephant/dolphin, not universe, not awareness, not nothing, just
RESPONSE.
By anything on anything. You may even include the figments of the Physical
World into the inventory.

We spend too much time on items of our fictions we indeed do not know much
about. We even get Nobel prizes for them. (Not me).

Then comes a religious indoctrination and steals the list.

John  Mikes



On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 2:45 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 8/16/2013 11:01 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

 Nobody on Earth can fail to understand the difference between doing
 something by accident and intentionally,


 Really?  Intentionally usually means with conscious forethought.  But the
 Grey Walter and Libet experiments make it doubtful that consciousness of
 intention precedes the decision.

 Remember when nobody on Earth could doubt that the Sun traveled across the
 dome of the sky and the Earth was flat.

 Brent

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[meekerdb]

On 8/17/2013 2:01 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Consciousness is different: it is a hoax some high hatted scientists/pholosophers 
invented to make themselves smart. No basis, every author uses the term for a content 
that fits her/his theoretical stance.

Me, too.
Mine is: a response to relations we get to know about. Nothing more. Not 
human/elephant/dolphin, not universe, not awareness, not nothing, just RESPONSE.


Just *any* response?  Doesn't the response have to be something we can identify as 
intelligent or purposeful?


By anything on anything. You may even include the figments of the Physical World into 
the inventory.


So do you agree that if we build a machine, such as a Mars Rover, that exhibits 
intelligence in its response then we may conclude it is aware/conscious?


Brent

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, August 17, 2013 9:59:26 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

  On 8/17/2013 2:01 PM, John Mikes wrote:
  
 Consciousness is different: it is a hoax some high hatted 
 scientists/pholosophers invented to make themselves smart. No basis, every 
 author uses the term for a content that fits her/his theoretical stance. 
 Me, too. 
 Mine is: a response to relations we get to know about. Nothing more. Not 
 human/elephant/dolphin, not universe, not awareness, not nothing, just 
 RESPONSE.  
  

 Just *any* response?  Doesn't the response have to be something we can 
 identify as intelligent or purposeful?

  By anything on anything. You may even include the figments of the 
 Physical World into the inventory. 


 So do you agree that if we build a machine, such as a Mars Rover, that 
 exhibits intelligence in its response then we may conclude it is 
 aware/conscious?



What if you wanted to build a Mars Rover that was completely unconscious, 
but still followed a sophisticated set of instructions. Would that be 
impossible? If the Mars Rover detects enough different kinds of compounds 
in the Martian atmosphere, is there no way of preventing it from developing 
a sense of smell?

 Craig



 Brent
  

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[meekerdb]

On 8/17/2013 7:05 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Saturday, August 17, 2013 9:59:26 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

On 8/17/2013 2:01 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Consciousness is different: it is a hoax some high hatted 
scientists/pholosophers
invented to make themselves smart. No basis, every author uses the term for 
a
content that fits her/his theoretical stance.
Me, too.
Mine is: a response to relations we get to know about. Nothing more. Not
human/elephant/dolphin, not universe, not awareness, not nothing, just 
RESPONSE.


Just *any* response?  Doesn't the response have to be something we can 
identify as
intelligent or purposeful?


By anything on anything. You may even include the figments of the Physical 
World
into the inventory.


So do you agree that if we build a machine, such as a Mars Rover, that 
exhibits
intelligence in its response then we may conclude it is aware/conscious?



What if you wanted to build a Mars Rover that was completely unconscious, but still 
followed a sophisticated set of instructions. Would that be impossible? If the Mars 
Rover detects enough different kinds of compounds in the Martian atmosphere, is there no 
way of preventing it from developing a sense of smell?


To exhibit intelligence the Rover would have to do more than follow instructions, it 
would have to learn from experience, act and plan through simulation and prediction.  If 
it did exhibit intelligence like that, I'd grant it 'consciousness', whatever that means.  
If it learns and acts based on chemical types I'd grant it has a sense of smell.  To say 
it's conscious is just a way of modeling how it learns and acts that we can relate to 
(what Dennett calls the intentional stance).


Brent


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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, August 17, 2013 11:14:22 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

  On 8/17/2013 7:05 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  


 On Saturday, August 17, 2013 9:59:26 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: 

  On 8/17/2013 2:01 PM, John Mikes wrote:
  
 Consciousness is different: it is a hoax some high hatted 
 scientists/pholosophers invented to make themselves smart. No basis, every 
 author uses the term for a content that fits her/his theoretical stance. 
 Me, too. 
 Mine is: a response to relations we get to know about. Nothing more. Not 
 human/elephant/dolphin, not universe, not awareness, not nothing, just 
 RESPONSE.  
  

 Just *any* response?  Doesn't the response have to be something we can 
 identify as intelligent or purposeful?

  By anything on anything. You may even include the figments of the 
 Physical World into the inventory. 


 So do you agree that if we build a machine, such as a Mars Rover, that 
 exhibits intelligence in its response then we may conclude it is 
 aware/conscious?
  


 What if you wanted to build a Mars Rover that was completely unconscious, 
 but still followed a sophisticated set of instructions. Would that be 
 impossible? If the Mars Rover detects enough different kinds of compounds 
 in the Martian atmosphere, is there no way of preventing it from developing 
 a sense of smell?
  

 To exhibit intelligence the Rover would have to do more than follow 
 instructions, it would have to learn from experience, act and plan through 
 simulation and prediction.


Would you say that it is impossible to build a machine which learns and 
plans without it developing perception and qualia automatically? Could any 
set of instructions suppress this development? If qualia can appear 
anywhere that learning and planning behaviors can be inferred, does that 
mean that there are also be programs or processes which must be protected 
from qualitative contamination or leakage?

 

   If it did exhibit intelligence like that, I'd grant it 'consciousness', 
 whatever that means.  


Why would you grant that it has a quality which you claim not to understand?

 

 If it learns and acts based on chemical types I'd grant it has a sense of 
 smell. 


Would the sense of smell be like our sense of smell automatically, or could 
its sense of smell be analogous to our sense of touch, or intuition, or 
sense of humor? Why have any of them? What does a sense of smell add to 
your understanding of how chemical detection works? If there were no such 
thing as smell, could anything even remotely resembling olfactory qualia be 
justified quantitatively?

Unless you can explain exactly why you grant a machine qualities that you 
claim not to understand and why you grant a superfluous aesthetic dimension 
to simple stochastic predictive logic, I will consider the perspective that 
you offer as lacking any serious scientific justification. 
 

 To say it's conscious is just a way of modeling how it learns and acts 
 that we can relate to (what Dennett calls the intentional stance).


If that were true, then nobody should mind if they spend the rest of their 
life under comatose-level anesthetic while we replace their brain with a 
device that models how it learns in the same way that you once did. 

It's not true though. There is an important difference between feeling and 
doing, between being awake and having your body walk around. Can you really 
not see that? Can you really not see why a machine that acts like we expect 
a person to act doesn't have to mean that the machine's abilities 
automatically conjure feeling, seeing, smelling, etc out of thin air?

Craig

 


 Brent


  

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[meekerdb]

On 8/17/2013 8:59 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Saturday, August 17, 2013 11:14:22 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

On 8/17/2013 7:05 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Saturday, August 17, 2013 9:59:26 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

On 8/17/2013 2:01 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Consciousness is different: it is a hoax some high hatted
scientists/pholosophers invented to make themselves smart. No basis, 
every
author uses the term for a content that fits her/his theoretical stance.
Me, too.
Mine is: a response to relations we get to know about. Nothing more. Not
human/elephant/dolphin, not universe, not awareness, not nothing, just 
RESPONSE.


Just *any* response?  Doesn't the response have to be something we can 
identify
as intelligent or purposeful?


By anything on anything. You may even include the figments of the 
Physical
World into the inventory.


So do you agree that if we build a machine, such as a Mars Rover, that 
exhibits
intelligence in its response then we may conclude it is aware/conscious?



What if you wanted to build a Mars Rover that was completely unconscious, 
but still
followed a sophisticated set of instructions. Would that be impossible? If 
the Mars
Rover detects enough different kinds of compounds in the Martian 
atmosphere, is
there no way of preventing it from developing a sense of smell?


To exhibit intelligence the Rover would have to do more than follow 
instructions,
it would have to learn from experience, act and plan through simulation and 
prediction.


Would you say that it is impossible to build a machine which learns and plans without it 
developing perception and qualia automatically? Could any set of instructions suppress 
this development? If qualia can appear anywhere that learning and planning behaviors can 
be inferred, does that mean that there are also be programs or processes which must be 
protected from qualitative contamination or leakage?



  If it did exhibit intelligence like that, I'd grant it 'consciousness', 
whatever
that means.


Why would you grant that it has a quality which you claim not to understand?


Because it helps me understand what it would do as it helps me understand what other 
people may do.  I didn't claim not to understand it, but I'm not sure your understanding 
is the same as mine.





If it learns and acts based on chemical types I'd grant it has a sense of 
smell.


Would the sense of smell be like our sense of smell automatically, or could its sense of 
smell be analogous to our sense of touch, or intuition, or sense of humor?


No. As you would realize if you thought about it.

Why have any of them? What does a sense of smell add to your understanding of how 
chemical detection works?


Don't be so dense, Craig.

If there were no such thing as smell, could anything even remotely resembling olfactory 
qualia be justified quantitatively?


Unless you can explain exactly why you grant a machine qualities that you claim not to 
understand and why you grant a superfluous aesthetic dimension to simple stochastic 
predictive logic, I will consider the perspective that you offer as lacking any serious 
scientific justification.


To say it's conscious is just a way of modeling how it learns and acts 
that we can
relate to (what Dennett calls the intentional stance).


If that were true, then nobody should mind if they spend the rest of their life under 
comatose-level anesthetic while we replace their brain with a device that models how it 
learns in the same way that you once did.


I specifically wrote and acts above.

Brent



It's not true though. There is an important difference between feeling and doing, 
between being awake and having your body walk around. Can you really not see that? Can 
you really not see why a machine that acts like we expect a person to act doesn't have 
to mean that the machine's abilities automatically conjure feeling, seeing, smelling, 
etc out of thin air?


Craig



Brent


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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, August 18, 2013 12:24:18 AM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

  On 8/17/2013 8:59 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  


 On Saturday, August 17, 2013 11:14:22 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: 

  On 8/17/2013 7:05 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  


 On Saturday, August 17, 2013 9:59:26 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: 

  On 8/17/2013 2:01 PM, John Mikes wrote:
  
 Consciousness is different: it is a hoax some high hatted 
 scientists/pholosophers invented to make themselves smart. No basis, every 
 author uses the term for a content that fits her/his theoretical stance. 
 Me, too. 
 Mine is: a response to relations we get to know about. Nothing more. Not 
 human/elephant/dolphin, not universe, not awareness, not nothing, just 
 RESPONSE.  
  

 Just *any* response?  Doesn't the response have to be something we can 
 identify as intelligent or purposeful?

  By anything on anything. You may even include the figments of the 
 Physical World into the inventory. 


 So do you agree that if we build a machine, such as a Mars Rover, that 
 exhibits intelligence in its response then we may conclude it is 
 aware/conscious?
  


 What if you wanted to build a Mars Rover that was completely unconscious, 
 but still followed a sophisticated set of instructions. Would that be 
 impossible? If the Mars Rover detects enough different kinds of compounds 
 in the Martian atmosphere, is there no way of preventing it from developing 
 a sense of smell?
  

 To exhibit intelligence the Rover would have to do more than follow 
 instructions, it would have to learn from experience, act and plan through 
 simulation and prediction.


 Would you say that it is impossible to build a machine which learns and 
 plans without it developing perception and qualia automatically? Could any 
 set of instructions suppress this development? If qualia can appear 
 anywhere that learning and planning behaviors can be inferred, does that 
 mean that there are also be programs or processes which must be protected 
 from qualitative contamination or leakage?

  
  
   If it did exhibit intelligence like that, I'd grant it 'consciousness', 
 whatever that means.  


 Why would you grant that it has a quality which you claim not to 
 understand?
  

 Because it helps me understand what it would do as it helps me understand 
 what other people may do.  I didn't claim not to understand it, but I'm not 
 sure your understanding is the same as mine.


But why does it help you understand anything? It sounds like you are saying 
that granting a system consciousness is a formality that you find 
superfluous, but then you are saying that this empty gesture helps you 
understand something.
 


  
  
  
 If it learns and acts based on chemical types I'd grant it has a sense of 
 smell. 


 Would the sense of smell be like our sense of smell automatically, or 
 could its sense of smell be analogous to our sense of touch, or intuition, 
 or sense of humor? 
  

 No. As you would realize if you thought about it.


That was an either or question, so it can't have an answer of 'no'. 
 


  Why have any of them? What does a sense of smell add to your 
 understanding of how chemical detection works? 
  

 Don't be so dense, Craig.


Don't be so evasive, Brent.  Being dense is how science works. It's about 
stripping away your assumptions. Your assumption is that somehow a sense of 
smell is an expected outcome of chemical detection, so I ask you to explain 
why you assume that. You are bluffing.

How about this. Could a TV show be closed captioned so thoroughly that a 
deaf person could read it and have the same experience as someone who 
listened to the show? Is a scroll of type that reads [grunting] enough of 
an understanding of the sound that it represents to say it is identical? 
Could there be a particular sound which would best and most unambiguously 
fit the description of [grunting], or could the description be extended to 
such a length and nuance that any sound could be described with 100% 
fidelity?


  If there were no such thing as smell, could anything even remotely 
 resembling olfactory qualia be justified quantitatively?

 Unless you can explain exactly why you grant a machine qualities that you 
 claim not to understand and why you grant a superfluous aesthetic dimension 
 to simple stochastic predictive logic, I will consider the perspective that 
 you offer as lacking any serious scientific justification. 
  

  To say it's conscious is just a way of modeling how it learns and acts 
 that we can relate to (what Dennett calls the intentional stance).
  

 If that were true, then nobody should mind if they spend the rest of their 
 life under comatose-level anesthetic while we replace their brain with a 
 device that models how it learns in the same way that you once did. 
  

 I specifically wrote and acts above.


I specifically omitted 'acts' because it is too loaded with metaphorical 
connotations in this context. You are trying to smuggle intention into an 
algorithm 

Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[meekerdb]

On 8/16/2013 11:01 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Nobody on Earth can fail to understand the difference between doing something by 
accident and intentionally,


Really?  Intentionally usually means with conscious forethought.  But the Grey Walter and 
Libet experiments make it doubtful that consciousness of intention precedes the decision.


Remember when nobody on Earth could doubt that the Sun traveled across the dome of the sky 
and the Earth was flat.


Brent

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Re: Determinism - Tricks of the Trade

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, August 16, 2013 2:45:56 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

  On 8/16/2013 11:01 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  
 Nobody on Earth can fail to understand the difference between doing 
 something by accident and intentionally,


 Really?� Intentionally usually means with conscious forethought.� But 
 the Grey Walter and Libet experiments make it doubtful that consciousness 
 of intention precedes the decision.


Cognition is not necessary to discern the intentional from the 
unintentional. A salmon who swims upstream does so with more intent than a 
dead salmon floats downstream. Intention is more primitive than thought as 
thought itself is driven by the intention to influence your environment. 

The experiments that you mention do not make intention doubtful at all, 
they only suggest that intention exists at the sub-personal level as well. 
Breaking down events on the scale of an individual person to micro-events 
on which no individual exists is the first mistake. Because intention has 
everything to do with time and causality, we cannot assume that our naive 
experience of time holds true outside of our own perceptual frame. 

The presumption that intention is a complex computational sequence building 
up to a personal feeling of taking action voluntarily unnecessarily biases 
the bottom-up view. I think that what is actually going on is that time 
itself is a relativistic measure which extends from more fundamental 
sensory qualities of significance, rhythm, and memory. This means that 
personal time happens on a personally scaled inertial frame - just as c is 
a velocity which is infinite within any given inertial frame, our 
experience of exercising our will is roughly instantaneous. The exercise of 
will relates to our context, so seeking faster, sub-personal inertial 
frames for insight is like trying to measure the plot of a movie by 
analyzing the patterns of pixels on the screen. It does not illuminate the 
physics of will, it obscures it.



 Remember when nobody on Earth could doubt that the Sun traveled across the 
 dome of the sky and the Earth was flat.


The perception that the Earth is flat is more important that the knowledge 
that the Earth is round. The sophisticated view is useful for some 
purposes, but the native view is indispensable. With free will it is not 
enough to know that the world is round, we must know why it seems flat, and 
why the flat seeming and round seeming are both true in their own context.

Thanks,
Craig


 Brent
  

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Re: Determinism in the case of bifurcations and symmetry breaking

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Stephen,

Nature computes itself by evolving in time

Let me put then my question this way. When Nature computes itself does 
the next state is uniquely determined the previous steps? Or, to make 
the next state, does Nature play a dice?


I would appreciate if you explain how bifurcations and symmetry breaking 
could happen along the way that you have described.


Evgenii


On 25.03.2012 23:11 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 3/25/2012 2:46 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/25/2012 2:43 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Let us take Benard cells for example. It is a good idea. I guess that
in this case the incompressible Navier-Stokes equations with the
Boussinesq approximation for free convection should suffer.

If I understand correctly, bifurcation in this case arises when we
increase the temperature difference between two plates. That is, if
we consider the stationary Navier-Stokes equations on the top of
thermal gradient Del T in the system, there is a critical Del T after
that we have several solutions.

To be back to my question. One could construct a system of equations
from the stationary Navier-Stokes equations + Del T(time). In this
case we have a problem that at some time when we reach a critical Del
T, the system of equation has suddenly several solution and the
question would be which one will be chosen.

On the other hand, one could use the transient Navier-Stokes
equations directly and it seems that in this case the problem of
bifurcation will not arise as such. Well, in this case there are
numerical problems.


And then one could use molecular dynamics directly - but this raises a
different kind of numerical problem: how to put in the initial
conditions for 1e28 molecules. But nature manages.

Brent


Dear Brent and Evgenii,

Nature computes itself by evolving in time. The universe is not a
program running somewhere else. It is a universal computer, and there is
nothing outside of it. ~David Deutsch

A possible easy answer as to how Nature manages to put in the initial
conditions is to consider that the actual evolution physical system of
those 1e28 molecules, etc. is the actual computation of its behavior, as
Stephen Wolfram has already pointed out. This makes sense once we cast
aside the idea that computations are somehow objectively alienated from
the physical world. When and if we consider that the evolution of each
and every physical system is its own computation of itself and that
computational universality is more or less just a mapping of the
functions involved and not some crypto-substance dualism that completely
separates the computations from the physical systems, then the
difficulties of measures and so forth vanish. We no more need to invoke
immaterial programs than we need to conjure immaterial spirits to
explain these things and trying in vain to eliminate that which is so
obviously real, our subjective consciousness, as at best an illusion, is
equally a fools game. Dualism will work iff used correctly.
In a sense, we might think of all of the functionally equivalent
computations of the behavior of a system define transformations
(endomorphism?) on a space whose fixed point is identified with the
actual physical system itself. Dually we can say that all of the
physical dynamics of a system define a logical algebra whose
(Kleene)fixed point
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knaster%E2%80%93Tarski_theorem is the
semantics of the computation. Abstract and concrete aspects touch in
the actual objects themselves.
IMHO, it is what Hegel and Marx tried to explain with their theories of
alienation
http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20110402044539AAlw9hI that
is the error. There is no actual dichotomy between mind and body or
particular from Totality, there is only a problem of how to explain how
bodies interact with bodies and how to minds interact with minds. We
have most of the solutions to these problems already outlined before us
in QM, GR and the work of Marchal, Turing, Barwise, Kleene, Wolfram,
etc. What we actually struggle for is our individual understanding of
these principles. When we are trying to built predictive models of
physical phenomena to control aspects of them, we are not capable of
creating simulations that are more faithful to the systems themselves
and so have to use approximations and other devices to overcome this
shortcoming.

Onward!

Stephen



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Re: Determinism in the case of bifurcations and symmetry breaking

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Let us take Benard cells for example. It is a good idea. I guess that in 
this case the incompressible Navier-Stokes equations with the Boussinesq 
approximation for free convection should suffer.


If I understand correctly, bifurcation in this case arises when we 
increase the temperature difference between two plates. That is, if we 
consider the stationary Navier-Stokes equations on the top of thermal 
gradient Del T in the system, there is a critical Del T after that we 
have several solutions.


To be back to my question. One could construct a system of equations 
from the stationary Navier-Stokes equations + Del T(time). In this case 
we have a problem that at some time when we reach a critical Del T, the 
system of equation has suddenly several solution and the question would 
be which one will be chosen.


On the other hand, one could use the transient Navier-Stokes equations 
directly and it seems that in this case the problem of bifurcation will 
not arise as such. Well, in this case there are numerical problems.


My question would be if physical laws allow for the first situation when 
at some point during transient solution a mathematical model has several 
solutions. If yes, then I do not understand how physics chose the one of 
possible solutions.


Evgenii

On 25.03.2012 05:50 Russell Standish said the following:

Look up the literature on catastrophe theory. There were many examples
of just these phenomena cooked up (particularly by Zimmerman IIRC)
some good, many not so good. I'm sure you should be able to find
something appropriate - maybe the appearance of Benard cells for
instance.

Cheers

On Sat, Mar 24, 2012 at 10:05:00PM +0100, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Hi Stephen,

I am not sure if I completely understand you. My question was rather
what happens in Nature if we assume that its mathematical model
includes bifurcations and/or symmetry breaking.

Do you know a simple mathematical model with bifurcations and/or
symmetry breaking? It might be good to consider this on a simple
example.

Say, I do not understand how do you apply statistics in this case.
Either it is unclear to me how infinite computational power will
help.

Evgenii



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Re: Determinism in the case of bifurcations and symmetry breaking

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

I have found Logistic Map

http://mathworld.wolfram.com/LogisticMap.html

Here the system has very different outcomes depending from initial 
conditions (now I understand your use of statistics). Yet, each 
trajectory is deterministic.


Hence, this was not my question. Sorry for being unclear. Bifurcations 
in Logistic Map is a result of uncertainty in initial conditions. I was 
thinking more in terms of Transient Equation of Everything. Does it 
allow for multiple solutions at some times or not?


In this case, Wolfram seems to support determinism:

http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/recent/ultimateknowledge/

It looks probabilistic because there is a lot of complicated stuff 
going on that we’re not seeing–notably in the very structure and 
connectivity of space and time.


But really it’s all completely deterministic.

«That somehow knowing the laws of the universe would tell us how humans 
would act–and give us a way to compute and predict human behavior.»


«Of course, to many people this always seemed implausible–because we 
feel that we have some form of free will.»


«And now, with computational irreducibility, we can see how this can 
still be consistent with deterministic underlying laws.»


Evgenii

On 25.03.2012 06:23 Stephen P. King said the following:

Hi Evgenii,

You might also find Stephen Wolfram's work with cellular automate
replete with examples of bifurcations and symmetry breaking. My thought
was considering how to construct models of the behavior of bifurcating
and symmetry breaking systems. I was thinking in second-order terms, as
it where... Thus the use of statistics...

Onward!

Stephen



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Re: Determinism in the case of bifurcations and symmetry breaking

[meekerdb]

On 3/25/2012 2:43 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Let us take Benard cells for example. It is a good idea. I guess that in this case the 
incompressible Navier-Stokes equations with the Boussinesq approximation for free 
convection should suffer.


If I understand correctly, bifurcation in this case arises when we increase the 
temperature difference between two plates. That is, if we consider the stationary 
Navier-Stokes equations on the top of thermal gradient Del T in the system, there is a 
critical Del T after that we have several solutions.


To be back to my question. One could construct a system of equations from the stationary 
Navier-Stokes equations + Del T(time). In this case we have a problem that at some time 
when we reach a critical Del T, the system of equation has suddenly several solution and 
the question would be which one will be chosen.


On the other hand, one could use the transient Navier-Stokes equations directly and it 
seems that in this case the problem of bifurcation will not arise as such. Well, in this 
case there are numerical problems.


And then one could use molecular dynamics directly - but this raises a different kind of 
numerical problem: how to put in the initial conditions for 1e28 molecules.  But nature 
manages.


Brent



My question would be if physical laws allow for the first situation when at some point 
during transient solution a mathematical model has several solutions. If yes, then I do 
not understand how physics chose the one of possible solutions.


Evgenii

On 25.03.2012 05:50 Russell Standish said the following:

Look up the literature on catastrophe theory. There were many examples
of just these phenomena cooked up (particularly by Zimmerman IIRC)
some good, many not so good. I'm sure you should be able to find
something appropriate - maybe the appearance of Benard cells for
instance.

Cheers

On Sat, Mar 24, 2012 at 10:05:00PM +0100, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Hi Stephen,

I am not sure if I completely understand you. My question was rather
what happens in Nature if we assume that its mathematical model
includes bifurcations and/or symmetry breaking.

Do you know a simple mathematical model with bifurcations and/or
symmetry breaking? It might be good to consider this on a simple
example.

Say, I do not understand how do you apply statistics in this case.
Either it is unclear to me how infinite computational power will
help.

Evgenii





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Re: Determinism in the case of bifurcations and symmetry breaking

[Stephen P. King]

On 3/25/2012 2:46 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/25/2012 2:43 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Let us take Benard cells for example. It is a good idea. I guess that 
in this case the incompressible Navier-Stokes equations with the 
Boussinesq approximation for free convection should suffer.


If I understand correctly, bifurcation in this case arises when we 
increase the temperature difference between two plates. That is, if 
we consider the stationary Navier-Stokes equations on the top of 
thermal gradient Del T in the system, there is a critical Del T after 
that we have several solutions.


To be back to my question. One could construct a system of equations 
from the stationary Navier-Stokes equations + Del T(time). In this 
case we have a problem that at some time when we reach a critical Del 
T, the system of equation has suddenly several solution and the 
question would be which one will be chosen.


On the other hand, one could use the transient Navier-Stokes 
equations directly and it seems that in this case the problem of 
bifurcation will not arise as such. Well, in this case there are 
numerical problems.


And then one could use molecular dynamics directly - but this raises a 
different kind of numerical problem: how to put in the initial 
conditions for 1e28 molecules.  But nature manages.


Brent


Dear Brent and Evgenii,

Nature computes itself by evolving in time. The universe is not a 
program running somewhere else. It is a universal computer, and there is 
nothing outside of it. ~David Deutsch


A possible easy answer as to how Nature manages to put in the 
initial conditions is to consider that the actual evolution physical 
system of those 1e28 molecules, etc. is the actual computation of its 
behavior, as Stephen Wolfram has already pointed out. This makes sense 
once we cast aside the idea that computations are somehow objectively 
alienated from the physical world. When and if we consider that the 
evolution of each and every physical system is its own computation of 
itself and that computational universality is more or less just a 
mapping of the functions involved and not some crypto-substance dualism 
that completely separates the computations from the physical systems, 
then the difficulties of measures and so forth vanish. We no more need 
to invoke immaterial programs than we need to conjure immaterial spirits 
to explain these things and trying in vain to eliminate that which is so 
obviously real, our subjective consciousness, as at best an illusion, is 
equally a fools game. Dualism will work iff used correctly.
In a sense, we might think of all of the functionally equivalent 
computations of the behavior of a system define transformations 
(endomorphism?) on a space whose fixed point is identified with the 
actual physical system itself. Dually we can say that all of the 
physical dynamics of a system define a logical algebra whose 
(Kleene)fixed point 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knaster%E2%80%93Tarski_theorem is the 
semantics of the computation. Abstract and concrete aspects touch in 
the actual objects themselves.
IMHO, it is what Hegel and Marx tried to explain with their 
theories of alienation 
http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20110402044539AAlw9hI that 
is the error. There is no actual dichotomy between mind and body or 
particular from Totality, there is only a problem of how to explain how 
bodies interact with bodies and how to minds interact with minds. We 
have most of the solutions to these problems already outlined before us 
in QM, GR and the work of Marchal, Turing, Barwise, Kleene, Wolfram, 
etc. What we actually struggle for is our individual understanding of 
these principles. When we are trying to built predictive models of 
physical phenomena to control aspects of them, we are not capable of 
creating simulations that are more faithful to the systems themselves 
and so have to use approximations and other devices to overcome this 
shortcoming.


Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Determinism in the case of bifurcations and symmetry breaking

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Hi Stephen,

I am not sure if I completely understand you. My question was rather 
what happens in Nature if we assume that its mathematical model includes 
bifurcations and/or symmetry breaking.


Do you know a simple mathematical model with bifurcations and/or 
symmetry breaking? It might be good to consider this on a simple example.


Say, I do not understand how do you apply statistics in this case. 
Either it is unclear to me how infinite computational power will help.


Evgenii


On 23.03.2012 22:27 Stephen P. King said the following:

On 3/23/2012 3:08 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

In physics there are bifurcations and symmetry breaking. What happens
then if I solve some transient problem for a system where a
bifurcation or symmetry breaking happens. How the choice will be made?

Evgenii


Hi!

We would use statistics to model such a scenario or, if able to access
infinite computational power, we would compute faithful simulations of
the solutions and see which best matches the environmental requirements
of the universes from which those bifurcations or any other form of
symmetry breaking occurs. Given infinite computational powers there is
no such thing as randomness in a 3-p sense. This is known as
omniscience. We have seen it before...

One thing that most models of statistic fail to sample is the
environment in which a stochastic event occurs, thus they integrate over
them and smears out the very facts that might otherwise inform us of
exactly how and why a choice was made.

Onward!



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Re: Determinism in the case of bifurcations and symmetry breaking

[Russell Standish]

Look up the literature on catastrophe theory. There were many examples
of just these phenomena cooked up (particularly by Zimmerman IIRC)
some good, many not so good. I'm sure you should be able to find
something appropriate - maybe the appearance of Benard cells for
instance.

Cheers

On Sat, Mar 24, 2012 at 10:05:00PM +0100, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
 Hi Stephen,
 
 I am not sure if I completely understand you. My question was rather
 what happens in Nature if we assume that its mathematical model
 includes bifurcations and/or symmetry breaking.
 
 Do you know a simple mathematical model with bifurcations and/or
 symmetry breaking? It might be good to consider this on a simple
 example.
 
 Say, I do not understand how do you apply statistics in this case.
 Either it is unclear to me how infinite computational power will
 help.
 
 Evgenii
 
 
 On 23.03.2012 22:27 Stephen P. King said the following:
 On 3/23/2012 3:08 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
 In physics there are bifurcations and symmetry breaking. What happens
 then if I solve some transient problem for a system where a
 bifurcation or symmetry breaking happens. How the choice will be made?
 
 Evgenii
 
 Hi!
 
 We would use statistics to model such a scenario or, if able to access
 infinite computational power, we would compute faithful simulations of
 the solutions and see which best matches the environmental requirements
 of the universes from which those bifurcations or any other form of
 symmetry breaking occurs. Given infinite computational powers there is
 no such thing as randomness in a 3-p sense. This is known as
 omniscience. We have seen it before...
 
 One thing that most models of statistic fail to sample is the
 environment in which a stochastic event occurs, thus they integrate over
 them and smears out the very facts that might otherwise inform us of
 exactly how and why a choice was made.
 
 Onward!
 
 
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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Determinism in the case of bifurcations and symmetry breaking

[Stephen P. King]

On 3/23/2012 3:08 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
In physics there are bifurcations and symmetry breaking. What happens 
then if I solve some transient problem for a system where a 
bifurcation or symmetry breaking happens. How the choice will be made?


Evgenii


Hi!

We would use statistics to model such a scenario or, if able to 
access infinite computational power, we would compute faithful 
simulations of the solutions and see which best matches the 
environmental requirements of the universes from which those 
bifurcations or any other form of symmetry breaking occurs. Given 
infinite computational powers there is no such thing as randomness in a 
3-p sense. This is known as omniscience. We have seen it before...


One thing that most models of statistic fail to sample is the 
environment in which a stochastic event occurs, thus they integrate over 
them and smears out the very facts that might otherwise inform us of 
exactly how and why a choice was made.


Onward!

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Re: Determinism and consciousness

[Craig Weinberg]

On Jan 18, 10:36 am, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:


  Someone doubting mechanism is not necessarily solipsist.



 Why not?

Because they understand that mechanism is the mirror image of
solipsism, and the relation of the two is what gives rise to realism.

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Re: Determinism and consciousness

[Craig Weinberg]

On Jan 19, 11:01 am, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Thu, Jan 19, 2012 at 10:28 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:

 On Jan 18, 10:36 am, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:



Someone doubting mechanism is not necessarily solipsist.

   Why not?

  Because they understand that mechanism is the mirror image of
  solipsism, and the relation of the two is what gives rise to realism.

 I don't know what that means.

That mechanism and solipsism are like magnetism and electricity. They
are two opposite aspects of the same thing. Everything in the cosmos
is solipsistic on the inside and mechanistic on the outside. Some
things, like the human brain, are developed much more in the direction
of solipsism than mechanism.

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Re: Determinism, Randomness, and Free Will

[Bruno Marchal]

From what I know, ordinal number are used in *infinite* game  
theory ... May be some bank can provide some money lending once you  
promise to pay the interest at time omega? May be we can extend the  
state debts up to aleph_one? Cute!


To be sure, such ordinal analysis can provide, in principle, some  
information on finite proof strategy too, but I have no idea that this  
could lead to practical applications. If we can do money with logic,  
now, ...


Well, BP hire a cineast, Reagan was an actor, Obama is a pothead, so  
why not a logician in Wall Street?  It shows how much americans have  
imagination.  Nice.


I will send an application. I will ask for an Omega figure salary.

Thanks for the news ;-)

Bruno


On 02 Jun 2010, at 19:19, Brent Meeker wrote:


Hey Bruno, how'd you like a seven figure salary (in USD).

Brent

 Original Message 
Something like this is happening these days, or it seems so :-)
http://christianmarks.wordpress.com/2010/05/25/mathematical-logic-finds-unexpected-application-on-wall-street/

Somedody, in [FOM], wrote: It's obvious that ordinals are what you  
need in game theory to

represent
ever-more complex versions of I know that he knows that (I know X,  
He knows I know X, I

know
he knows I know X, ...) which is just omega+2 as an ordinal, so if  
you have a war between

competing
algorithms trying to outguess each other then this can be  
interpereted in the ordinals.

But I can't believe
that a competent mathematician and programmer who understands this  
concept and ordinal

notations
up to, say, Gamma_0 will gain any insight useful in financial  
practice from the more

arcane systems
of ordinal notations.

s.


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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