Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-04-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

Le 07-mars-07, à 04:40, Jesse Mazer wrote :

 http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/ 
 0d5915764b7f3e08/fc56caf79ce58750?#fc56caf79ce58750

 Jesse

That is: 14 Mar 2001: Jesse wrote (in part):

 A lot of people have a lot of different ideas about TOE's on this  
 list, so
  maybe the global measure issue could help clarify where we all stand  
 in
  relation to each other...do people have specific proposals about  
 this?  I
  guess the other relevant question is, what is the set of everything  
 that
  you're putting the measure on...all computations?  All mathematical
  structures?  All observer-moments?


John M asked also:

 BTW:
 what do you mean by interviewing the L-machine?


Jesse's question is *the* important question in the list. I just recall  
it. But also, I will take the opportunity of John's question to explain  
a bit more the interview of the Lobian machine, and what that is, and  
how it helps to provide answers to Jesse's questions, when we assume  
explicitly the comp hyp. Asap, because I'm busy. I will try to give  
answers without too much technical details, but that is really what  
makes that exercise difficult. I hope I can do that already this week.   
Of course everyone can use the question of Jesse to make a bit more  
precise where they stand from the others indeed, I'm interested too.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-04-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


Well thanks Russell. Note that I was not doing a critic. I have the  
usual problem with the word philosophy, which in many places (on the  
continent means just marxism or the more (postmodern) relativism.  
But here I was mainly complaining that sometimes people talk like if  
I was proposing some new theory or vision, like some honest pholosopher  
can do.
I am more modest than that, or ... less modest perhaps.  I just take  
seriously a very old theory (mechanism) and try to explain the  
consequences: the testable breakdown of materialism.

Best Regards,

Bruno



Le 04-avr.-07, à 04:16, Russell Standish a écrit :


 On Tue, Apr 03, 2007 at 05:37:25PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Hi Mark,

 Just a preliminary remark before I comment your post. Contrary to what
 Russell says in his book, I am not at all a philosopher, I am not
 trying to propose a view of the world or a conception of reality. As I

 I meant the term in the most positive of senses, in much the way that
 Science was called Natural Philosophy a few centuries ago. Indeed
 Bruno knows far more philosophy than the vast majority of scientists,
 and probably more than the average professional philosopher.

 Cheers

 --  

 --- 
 -
 A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
 Mathematics   
 UNSW SYDNEY 2052   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au
 --- 
 -

 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-04-03 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Mark,

Just a preliminary remark before I comment your post. Contrary to what 
Russell says in his book, I am not at all a philosopher, I am not 
trying to propose a view of the world or a conception of reality. As I 
said in the joining post my initial goal was just to understand 
molecular biology, or more precisely to understand the relation between 
molecular biology and biochemistry. In that context I have eventually 
discover Godel's proof, and through it I have guess an abstract 
biology, not dependent upon any chemistry. But this was presupposing 
some form of what later I called comp and I eventually realized that 
if I could relate that abstract biology with real biology then, in 
some deep global sense, it is (bio)chemistry which should obey to the 
law of abstract biology (despite James D. Watson's slogan). So, it is 
very early that I did understand that comp entails a reversal between 
mind and matter, between physics and machine's number theoretical 
bio-psycho-theo-logy. The rest in the effort to communicate that 
*problem*: I mean, that if comp is true, then the physical science have 
to be reduced to an abstract digital biology.

This is all what I say: if COMP is true, then the laws of physics are 
not primary. Comp is really a precise version of what Peter called 
standard computationalism. It is just a computer science update of 
Descartes' Mechanism, the idea that we are, from a correct third person 
point of view, machine (cf yes doctor). The fact that matter (as 
substrate; not as appearances) disappears is just an unavoidable 
consequence of comp. This I can, and I already have, explain on the 
list in all details (just ask if you want we go through the UDA again). 
I know we are wrong on this mind/body issue since more than 1500 years, 
i.e. since the scientist, due to political pression abandoned 
theology to the political authorities.  The millenium before it is 
plain that the intellectuals were aware that the mind/matter primacy 
question was an OPEN problem. All what I show is that with comp, it is 
still an open probIem. I think the Roman Church has some responsibility 
in making many people taking for granted that matter is an independent 
primary substrate making up our reality. It is a sort of metaphysical 
demagogy, given that we have been probably programmed by million of 
years evolution to take our neighborhood for granted. Of course this 
idea could be true of course, but then comp has to be false. For comp 
being false you have to put in our body some infinite non computable 
object, that is, something which cannot be emulated even by a quantum 
computer.  People are free trying to develop such theories, but those 
who are serious until now have to make speculative move (like the 
falsity of QM, for example). Actually people are free to take the 
reversal result as an argument against comp, but then it is certainly 
not a knock down, for the reason that computer science is full of 
counter-intuitive results.

Indeed the second part of my work consists in interviewing a 
(sufficiently chatty, lobian) universal machine, and the discovery is 
that the machine introduced many subtle nuances on the 
geometrical/physical difference corresponding to the difference between 
necessary points of view (1-person, 3-person, 3-person plural, 
computable, true, provable, etc.). Now, when you just define the 
computationalist notion of matter, which, by the UDA, is given the 
third person sharable measure on uncertainty on accessible UD states, 
in the language of a lobian machine, you get a quantum logic which 
confirms (≠ proves) comp, and thus does not (yet) refute it.



Le 02-avr.-07, à 17:36, Mark Peaty a écrit :


 Bruno:
 With comp, what holds 'your lot together are the relation between
 numbers. The apparent third person infinite regression stops at the
 level of those relations. The first person is most probably confronted
 with many infinities, but this should not be considered as
 problematical.

 MP: But what *relation* is there really?



I will say more in a post to John, but the relation are any one that 
you can define with classical logic languages and  addition and 
multiplication. For example, the relation x is little than y , which 
has the definition: Ez(x + z = y)   (Ez = it exists a number z), or the 
relation (x divides y) which has the definition Ez(x * z) = y. Godel 
has shown you can define most computer science notion in arithmetic, 
meaning by similar definition (involving only addition and 
multiplication). His result show that we cannot unify completely 
arithmetical truth, i.e. there is no theory capable of proving all true 
arithmetical proposition.




 I just feel like this
 kind of discussion goes round and round in endless convolutions.


I don't think so at all. The list is just a bit pedagogical so many 
explanations are repeated. I have no idea how many people really get 
the whole UDA.




 Platonia is some kind of Never-never land; 

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-04-03 Thread Russell Standish

On Tue, Apr 03, 2007 at 05:37:25PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Hi Mark,
 
 Just a preliminary remark before I comment your post. Contrary to what 
 Russell says in his book, I am not at all a philosopher, I am not 
 trying to propose a view of the world or a conception of reality. As I 

I meant the term in the most positive of senses, in much the way that
Science was called Natural Philosophy a few centuries ago. Indeed
Bruno knows far more philosophy than the vast majority of scientists,
and probably more than the average professional philosopher.

Cheers

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-04-02 Thread Mark Peaty

Bruno:
 With comp, what holds 'your lot together are the relation between 
 numbers. The apparent third person infinite regression stops at the 
 level of those relations. The first person is most probably confronted 
 with many infinities, but this should not be considered as 
 problematical.

MP: But what *relation* is there really? I just feel like this
kind of discussion goes round and round in endless convolutions.
Platonia is some kind of Never-never land; that numbers exist
anywhere except inside human skulls and nowadays within
phenotypic prostheses like electronic computers is NOT a proven
fact, it is a glorious assumption!

I mean the big and unanswered question is WHERE are numbers?
Mathematicians now seem to be very sophisticated with WHAT
numbers could BE, and _do_ also apparently, but very very big
numbers which could represent everything significant about
you, me, or the likelihood of a self referencing computer
working out that it knows that it knows something really
important, how can these 'relate'? Surely they have to be
related by someone or something else! I guess what I am saying
is that numbers need something which is not numbers in which, or
by means of which they can exist for each other. I call it
'existence', and use the name of Janus as my symbol or emblem of
this. But I don't expect any such symbol or emblem to resolve 
the paradoxes of our existence and experience of existence. As 
far as I can see, which admittedly is not very far, all 
explanations that purport to be *ultimate* explanations are 
doomed to a process of infinite recursion and regression.

There was an Englishman called Kenneth Craik, who wrote a little 
book called 'The Nature of Explanation'. Unfortunately he died 
in his early thirties in a car accident in 1945 I think. I go 
along with his thesis - as I remember it from reading the book a 
decade or more ago - that the representational power of 
mathematics stems from its evolution of complex mathematical 
objects out of the interactions of simple elements, which can 
mirror many significant aspects of the physical/noumenal world 
because the latter seems to be manifesting a closely analogous 
evolution of aggregations of fundamental chemical elements, 
sub-atomic particles and so forth.

For better or worse I must advocate what is hereabouts a virtual 
heresy: that people can never be reduced to numbers. To be a 
person entails the experience of 'I' and 'thou', 'me' and 'you'. 
There can be no me without you and no 'us' without 'them'. If a 
modest Loebian machine cannot work this out, then it needs to go 
back to school. Perhaps it can though, [if all worlds are 
possible and must happen], maybe it is just a matter of time 
before one or more smart, introspective, self-sustaining 
processors/processes emerges from a BOINC type distributed 
system. My bet is that the Silico-Electric ONE [or two, ...] 
will coalesce around the control and accounting of money, money 
being the embodiment of negative entropy in the cultural world. 
For what it's worth I think that such a creature will realise 
that ethics is part of the foundation of its world: a 
fundamental tool for the maximising of 'negative entropy'.



Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/





Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Le 06-mars-07, à 09:44, Mark Peaty a écrit :
 

 Thank you Bruno!

 You and Russell between you have managed to strike some sparks of
 illumination from the rocky inside of my skull. There is no beacon fire
 to report but I start to get a glimmering of why you want to *assume*
 comp and see where it leads.

 It seems that self-reference and recursion are fundamental properties 
 of
 anything that is interesting in all this, which rather seems to be 
 the
 flavour of the new millennium.

 Just in thinking superficially about the Many Worlds though, it seems 
 to
 pose a 'binding problem'. Now, I know that might sound like a leakage 
 of
 concept from objections to identity theory in brain and mind theory. 
 But
 what I am thinking about is this bit:

 6) this means that if I take the comp hyp seriously, then, to predict
 the results of any experiment/experience, I have to localize all the
 infinitely many instantiations of my current state in the UD, look at
 the uncountable comp histories going through that states, and compute
 the statistics bearing on all consistent first person
 self-continuation.

  A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation
 of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the
 ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n
 [infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know'
 that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled. 
 What
 holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another
 infinite regression.
 
 
 
 With comp, what holds 'your lot together are the relation between 
 numbers. The apparent third person 

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-04-02 Thread John Mikes
Mark,
you asked interesting questions, but I think the fundamental ones are still
'out there':
MP:(bold and in bold):
I mean the big and unanswered question is WHERE are numbers?
I would ask (joining your heresy):

1. Where did numbers come from? (an answer may be: They are GOD to believe
in).

2. How do they act?
Bruno wrote: the relationship between numbers. How does a RELATIONSHIP
act? it is an abstraction. Only substrates IN relationship act. The numbers
are abstractions (or: the contents we assign to them are abstractions?) so
here we face abstractions of abstractions. If one considers the
not-so-physical world (numbers?)
  -  a-spatial  -  (and of course   -  a-temporal  -), your question is out
of whack.
*MP next:
 what I am saying is that numbers need something which is not numbers -
   (to exist - my addition-JM)
I believe it can be incorporated into the identification of
  n u m b er 

if you ask only about their existence. Anything exists what we think about -
if not otherwise: in our thought. (I just had some exchange on this with
Stathis in a different aspect.)

John M
[EMAIL PROTECTED]







On 4/2/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


 Bruno:
  With comp, what holds 'your lot together are the relation between
  numbers. The apparent third person infinite regression stops at the
  level of those relations. The first person is most probably confronted
  with many infinities, but this should not be considered as
  problematical.

 MP: But what *relation* is there really? I just feel like this
 kind of discussion goes round and round in endless convolutions.
 Platonia is some kind of Never-never land; that numbers exist
 anywhere except inside human skulls and nowadays within
 phenotypic prostheses like electronic computers is NOT a proven
 fact, it is a glorious assumption!

 I mean the big and unanswered question is WHERE are numbers?
 Mathematicians now seem to be very sophisticated with WHAT
 numbers could BE, and _do_ also apparently, but very very big
 numbers which could represent everything significant about
 you, me, or the likelihood of a self referencing computer
 working out that it knows that it knows something really
 important, how can these 'relate'? Surely they have to be
 related by someone or something else! I guess what I am saying
 is that numbers need something which is not numbers in which, or
 by means of which they can exist for each other. I call it
 'existence', and use the name of Janus as my symbol or emblem of
 this. But I don't expect any such symbol or emblem to resolve
 the paradoxes of our existence and experience of existence. As
 far as I can see, which admittedly is not very far, all
 explanations that purport to be *ultimate* explanations are
 doomed to a process of infinite recursion and regression.

 There was an Englishman called Kenneth Craik, who wrote a little
 book called 'The Nature of Explanation'. Unfortunately he died
 in his early thirties in a car accident in 1945 I think. I go
 along with his thesis - as I remember it from reading the book a
 decade or more ago - that the representational power of
 mathematics stems from its evolution of complex mathematical
 objects out of the interactions of simple elements, which can
 mirror many significant aspects of the physical/noumenal world
 because the latter seems to be manifesting a closely analogous
 evolution of aggregations of fundamental chemical elements,
 sub-atomic particles and so forth.

 For better or worse I must advocate what is hereabouts a virtual
 heresy: that people can never be reduced to numbers. To be a
 person entails the experience of 'I' and 'thou', 'me' and 'you'.
 There can be no me without you and no 'us' without 'them'. If a
 modest Loebian machine cannot work this out, then it needs to go
 back to school. Perhaps it can though, [if all worlds are
 possible and must happen], maybe it is just a matter of time
 before one or more smart, introspective, self-sustaining
 processors/processes emerges from a BOINC type distributed
 system. My bet is that the Silico-Electric ONE [or two, ...]
 will coalesce around the control and accounting of money, money
 being the embodiment of negative entropy in the cultural world.
 For what it's worth I think that such a creature will realise
 that ethics is part of the foundation of its world: a
 fundamental tool for the maximising of 'negative entropy'.



 Regards

 Mark Peaty  CDES

 [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/





 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  Le 06-mars-07, à 09:44, Mark Peaty a écrit :
 
 
  Thank you Bruno!
 
  You and Russell between you have managed to strike some sparks of
  illumination from the rocky inside of my skull. There is no beacon fire
  to report but I start to get a glimmering of why you want to *assume*
  comp and see where it leads.
 
  It seems that self-reference and recursion are fundamental properties
  of
  anything that is interesting in all this, which rather seems to be
 

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-28 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Brent,

As you can guess, I am searching an old post of view which I intended 
to answer, and then I take opportunity to comment some other one, on 
some point which are perhaps somehow important ...

Le 17-mars-07, à 21:19, Brent Meeker a écrit :


 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :

 But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent
 universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite
 arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything).

 And how do things run in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in
 logic, as well as epistemic ones?


 Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material
 primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis.

 I don't believe either one - I just contemplate them. ;-)

 Since it is not at all clear to me that Peano arithmetic, or any 
 mathematics, exists I'm uncertain as to whether there is greater 
 explanatory power in your UDA as compared to Peter's some things 
 exist and others don't.


The goal of the UDA is not  to explain anything. The goal of the UD 
Argument is to show that the physicalist notion of Matter does not 
explain neither appearance of matter nor mind.
UDA is negative. It only illustrate that with comp the mind body 
problem is two times more difficult than it is usually thought. You 
have to explain BOTH Mind and Matter (and actually you have to explain 
matter from mind, cf the reversal).

Only when UDA is translated in the language of a Lobian machine, did it 
begin to give positive and verifiable informations on 
matter/appearances.

Bruno






http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-28 Thread John Mikes
That's all fine and I appreciate the position (once we 'have gotten' to
circumstances providing the idea of a Loeb machine) - what I want to inject
is Dr. Johnson's stone,
which is not 'mind-stuff'' and in his shoe DID HURT (his mind). Not vice
versa.
Please, let it go as a remark outside the discussion.
John

On 3/28/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


 Hi Brent,

 As you can guess, I am searching an old post of view which I intended
 to answer, and then I take opportunity to comment some other one, on
 some point which are perhaps somehow important ...

 Le 17-mars-07, à 21:19, Brent Meeker a écrit :

 
  Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
  Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
 
  But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent
  universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite
  arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything).
 
  And how do things run in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in
  logic, as well as epistemic ones?
 
 
  Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material
  primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis.
 
  I don't believe either one - I just contemplate them. ;-)
 
  Since it is not at all clear to me that Peano arithmetic, or any
  mathematics, exists I'm uncertain as to whether there is greater
  explanatory power in your UDA as compared to Peter's some things
  exist and others don't.


 The goal of the UDA is not  to explain anything. The goal of the UD
 Argument is to show that the physicalist notion of Matter does not
 explain neither appearance of matter nor mind.
 UDA is negative. It only illustrate that with comp the mind body
 problem is two times more difficult than it is usually thought. You
 have to explain BOTH Mind and Matter (and actually you have to explain
 matter from mind, cf the reversal).

 Only when UDA is translated in the language of a Lobian machine, did it
 begin to give positive and verifiable informations on
 matter/appearances.

 Bruno






 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


 


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-21 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 20-mars-07, à 18:05, Brent Meeker a écrit :

 What are those relations?  Is it a matter of the provenance of the 
 numbers, e.g. being computed by some subprocess of the UD?  Or is an 
 inherent relation like being relatively prime?


It is an inherent relation like being prime, or being the godel number 
of a proof of f, etc.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-21 Thread Brent Meeker

Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Le 20-mars-07, à 18:05, Brent Meeker a écrit :
 
 What are those relations?  Is it a matter of the provenance of the 
 numbers, e.g. being computed by some subprocess of the UD?  Or is an 
 inherent relation like being relatively prime?
 
 
 It is an inherent relation like being prime, or being the godel number 
 of a proof of f, etc.

I didn't think godel numbering was unique?  If I just cite a number, like 
12345678987654321, is it either the godel number of a proof or not?

Brent

 
 Bruno
 
 
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 
 
  
 
 


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-20 Thread Bruno Marchal

Le 06-mars-07, à 07:44, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh a écrit :


 Thank you for welcoming me Mark,
 I agree with you about the problem with the concept of entropy, but 
 not all your points. Actually I like this hypothesis, and as Bruno put 
 it we might be able to describe the Why question about physical laws, 
 which is very interesting.


 4) There exist a universal dovetailer (consequence of Church thesis,
 but we could drop Church thesis and define comp in term of turing
 machine instead).

 5) Never underestimate the dumbness of the universal dovetailer: not
 only it generates all computational histories, but it generates them
 all infinitely often, + all variations, + all real oracles (and those
 oracles are uncountable).

 Let me know where's my mistake:

 1.We are referring to one (actually an infinitely long sub-sequence of 
 that) history of such universal dovetailer, as some state of our 
 world.


I don't think so. Worlds or world-views emerge globally from UD* (UD's 
execution).





 2.Because that machine is a TM, a history has to be countable, 
 regardless of compression or expansion of time to allow infinite 
 power.


Not really. An history can be revised infinitely often so that our 
first person historical point of view could be infinite and even 
uncountable.



 3.So we're referring to some state of our universe as a countable one.


Like many, especially in the recent posts, forget the points of view 
distinctions.




 4.A universal state is not countable.

Probably false from a 3 person view. Probably true from 1 person view.




 Every time a bit is sampled, the Multiverse branches
 with the observed bit being 0 or 1 depending on your branch. If you
  were to continue for an infinite amount of time, each observer will
 have observed a real number. However after any finite amount of time,
 all the observers have are rational approximations to real numbers.

 But we're talking about uncountability of information necessary to 
 represent instantaneous state of a universe, not about the 
 uncountability of possible universes. (Maybe I didn't get your point)
 What you are saying just proves that we have uncountable number of 
 universes.

With comp, this arguably follows indeed.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 06-mars-07, à 09:44, Mark Peaty a écrit :



 Thank you Bruno!

 You and Russell between you have managed to strike some sparks of
 illumination from the rocky inside of my skull. There is no beacon fire
 to report but I start to get a glimmering of why you want to *assume*
 comp and see where it leads.

 It seems that self-reference and recursion are fundamental properties 
 of
 anything that is interesting in all this, which rather seems to be 
 the
 flavour of the new millennium.

 Just in thinking superficially about the Many Worlds though, it seems 
 to
 pose a 'binding problem'. Now, I know that might sound like a leakage 
 of
 concept from objections to identity theory in brain and mind theory. 
 But
 what I am thinking about is this bit:

 6) this means that if I take the comp hyp seriously, then, to predict
 the results of any experiment/experience, I have to localize all the
 infinitely many instantiations of my current state in the UD, look at
 the uncountable comp histories going through that states, and compute
 the statistics bearing on all consistent first person
 self-continuation.

  A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation
 of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the
 ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n
 [infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know'
 that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled. 
 What
 holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another
 infinite regression.



With comp, what holds 'your lot together are the relation between 
numbers. The apparent third person infinite regression stops at the 
level of those relations. The first person is most probably confronted 
with many infinities, but this should not be considered as 
problematical.








 **
 A quick aside, hopefully not totally unrelated: Am I right that a valid
 explanation of the zero point energy is that it is impossible *in
 principle* to  measure the state of something

Why can't we measure the state of something? Even with just QM, the 
many-world idea has been invented for abandoning the idea that a 
measurement pertubates what is observed.



 and therefore *we* must
 acknowledge the indeterminacy

We must acknowledge indeterminacy once we postulate comp, given that it 
makes us self-duplicable, and indeed self-duplicated all the time.

Bruno


 and so must everything else which exists
 because we are nothing special, except we think we know we are here, 
 and
 if we are bound by quantum indeterminacy, so is everything else [unless
 it can come up with a good excuse!]?

 [Perhaps this is more on Stathis's question to Russell: Is a real 
 number
 an infinite process?]

 **



 Regards

 Mark Peaty  CDES

 [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/





 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 Le 05-mars-07, à 15:03, Mark Peaty a écrit :



 Nobody here has yet explained in plain-English why we have entropy. 
 Oh
 well, surely, in the Many Worlds, that's just one of the universes 
 that
 can happen!



 Not really. That would make the comp hyp or the everything idea
 trivial, and both the everything hyp  and the comp hyp would loose
 any explicative power. (It *is* the problem with Schmidhuber's comp,
 *and* with Tegmark's form of mathematicalism: see older posts for
 that).





 Except that, for plain-English reasons stated above, there
 are *and always have been* infinity x infinity x infinity of entropic
 universes.

 It doesn't make sense.  Call me a heretic if you like, but I will
 'stick
 to my guns' here: If it can't be put into plain-English then it
 probably
 isn't true!




 I will try. I will, by the same token, answer Mohsen question here:




 Mohsen:

 I don't know if in the hypothesis of simulation, the conflict of
 Countable and Uncountable has been considered.





 1) I assume the comp hyp, if only for the sake of the reasoning. The
 comp hyp is NOT the hypothesis of simulation, but it is the hypothesis
 that we are in principle self-simulable by a digital machine.

 2) Then we have to distinguish the first person points of view (1-pov)
 from third person points of view (3-pov), and eventually we will have
 to distinguish all Plotinus' hypostases.  With comp, we are 
 duplicable.
 I can be read and cut (copy) in Brussels, and be pasted in 
 Washington
 and Moscow simultaneously. This gives a simple example where:
 a) from the third point of view, there is no indeterminacy. An 
 external
 (3-pov) observer can predict Bruno will be in Washington AND in 
 Moscow.
 b) from a first person point of view, there is an indeterminacy, I 
 will
 feel myself in washington OR in Moscow, not in the two places at once.

 3) Whatever means I use to quantify the first person indeterminacy, 
 the
 result will not depend on possible large delays between the
 reconstitutions, nor of the virtual/material/purely-mathematical
 character of the reconstitution.

 

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-20 Thread Brent Meeker

Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Le 06-mars-07, à 09:44, Mark Peaty a écrit :
 

 Thank you Bruno!

 You and Russell between you have managed to strike some sparks of
 illumination from the rocky inside of my skull. There is no beacon fire
 to report but I start to get a glimmering of why you want to *assume*
 comp and see where it leads.

 It seems that self-reference and recursion are fundamental properties 
 of
 anything that is interesting in all this, which rather seems to be 
 the
 flavour of the new millennium.

 Just in thinking superficially about the Many Worlds though, it seems 
 to
 pose a 'binding problem'. Now, I know that might sound like a leakage 
 of
 concept from objections to identity theory in brain and mind theory. 
 But
 what I am thinking about is this bit:

 6) this means that if I take the comp hyp seriously, then, to predict
 the results of any experiment/experience, I have to localize all the
 infinitely many instantiations of my current state in the UD, look at
 the uncountable comp histories going through that states, and compute
 the statistics bearing on all consistent first person
 self-continuation.

  A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation
 of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the
 ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n
 [infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know'
 that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled. 
 What
 holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another
 infinite regression.
 
 
 
 With comp, what holds 'your lot together are the relation between 
 numbers. The apparent third person infinite regression stops at the 
 level of those relations. 

What are those relations?  Is it a matter of the provenance of the numbers, 
e.g. being computed by some subprocess of the UD?  Or is an inherent relation 
like being relatively prime?

Brent Meeker


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-19 Thread Russell Standish

On Mon, Mar 19, 2007 at 01:03:04PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 I don't mean the white rabbits from the Turing machine, I mean the ones
 outside it. If we accept that an abstract machine can just exist, without
 benefit of a separate physical reality, why not also accept that
 non-computational talking white rabbits can also just exist? That is, why
 should computations have a privileged ontological status in the everything?
 
 Stathis Papaioannou
 
 

That's not an assumption I make. The only thing given priveleged
ontological status are the descriptions (or infinite length strings -
binary or in your choice of alphabet). These are not the
outputs of any computational process, although they can be considered
as generated dynamically by a UD if you wish (although not necessary).


-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-19 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/19/07, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


 On Mon, Mar 19, 2007 at 01:03:04PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  I don't mean the white rabbits from the Turing machine, I mean the ones
  outside it. If we accept that an abstract machine can just exist,
 without
  benefit of a separate physical reality, why not also accept that
  non-computational talking white rabbits can also just exist? That is,
 why
  should computations have a privileged ontological status in the
 everything?
 
  Stathis Papaioannou
 
 

 That's not an assumption I make. The only thing given priveleged
 ontological status are the descriptions (or infinite length strings -
 binary or in your choice of alphabet). These are not the
 outputs of any computational process, although they can be considered
 as generated dynamically by a UD if you wish (although not necessary).


OK, I just read bitstring as something generated by a computer, but I see
that you deliberately differentiate the descriptions from the Schmidhuber
ensemble, making your theory more general:

http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks/docs/occam/node2.html

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-18 Thread Russell Standish

On Sat, Mar 17, 2007 at 03:25:51PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 One response to this idea is that the non-computational worlds are overrun
 with white rabbits, whereas the computational worlds allow the calculation
 of a local measure, such as Russell Standish has described, which explains
 the orderly universe we know. However, this doesn't explain why the
 non-computational white rabbits don't suddenly intrude in the next moment:
 what's to say that their relative measure should be less than the orderly
 computational worlds' relative measure?

Actually, this is exactly what I do claim, so if you think I haven't
succeeded, I'd be very interested in learning why.

Note that the non-appearance of white rabbits comes from what I call
robustness of the observer, and robustness is not a general property
of Turing machines, which is why the white rabbit problem seems so
intractable in comp.

I argue why robustness should be a very likely property of observers
from evolutionary reasons, but perhaps the weakness of the argument is not yet
calculating the relative proportion of robust observers to non-robust
observers and relating this to the relative proportion of white
rabbits. I certainly believe it should more than compensate, but
perhaps I'm being overly optimistic.

Cheers

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-18 Thread Russell Standish

On Sat, Mar 17, 2007 at 04:02:49PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be 
 honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) 
 associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus 
 Matter (or our measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like 
 to justify a quantum topology or deep enough universal machine.
 
 Bruno
 
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 

No - just the non-white rabbitness of it :) And a few other things...

-- 


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Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-18 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
I don't mean the white rabbits from the Turing machine, I mean the ones
outside it. If we accept that an abstract machine can just exist, without
benefit of a separate physical reality, why not also accept that
non-computational talking white rabbits can also just exist? That is, why
should computations have a privileged ontological status in the everything?

Stathis Papaioannou


On 3/19/07, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


 On Sat, Mar 17, 2007 at 03:25:51PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  One response to this idea is that the non-computational worlds are
 overrun
  with white rabbits, whereas the computational worlds allow the
 calculation
  of a local measure, such as Russell Standish has described, which
 explains
  the orderly universe we know. However, this doesn't explain why the
  non-computational white rabbits don't suddenly intrude in the next
 moment:
  what's to say that their relative measure should be less than the
 orderly
  computational worlds' relative measure?

 Actually, this is exactly what I do claim, so if you think I haven't
 succeeded, I'd be very interested in learning why.

 Note that the non-appearance of white rabbits comes from what I call
 robustness of the observer, and robustness is not a general property
 of Turing machines, which is why the white rabbit problem seems so
 intractable in comp.

 I argue why robustness should be a very likely property of observers
 from evolutionary reasons, but perhaps the weakness of the argument is not
 yet
 calculating the relative proportion of robust observers to non-robust
 observers and relating this to the relative proportion of white
 rabbits. I certainly believe it should more than compensate, but
 perhaps I'm being overly optimistic.

 Cheers

 --


 
 A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
 Mathematics
 UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au

 

 


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-17 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/17/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

  But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent
   universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite
   arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything).
 
 
  And while we're at it, why exclude non-mathematical structures?

 I guess that depends on what you mean by mathematical structures.  I
 would take any non-contradictory set of axioms to define a mathematical
 structure.  I'm not sure what it would mean to include self-contradictory
 structures.  If you regard mathematics as a game of propositions it just
 means every wff is a theorem.  But if you regard mathematics as existing
 (even in Platonia) I'm at a loss.


What I meant was the naive interpretation of everything exists: cartoon
characters in cartoon worlds *just there* rather than generated by some
computer simulation or set of physical laws, as our universe seems to be. If
you look at only computations in Platonia, you could argue that such
structures (which as a matter of fact could be generated computationally, so
perhaps non-mathematical was a poor choice of words) would be of low
measure. However, what of the ones outside the computer? It seems to me
they should have the same ontological status as the abstract computer, but
it is then impossible to assign them a measure which makes the weirder ones
less likely, as has been done with computation.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-17 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :

 But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent 
 universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite 
 arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything).

 And how do things run in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in 
 logic, as well as epistemic ones?


Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material 
primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. It is just 
up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. 
This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense 
of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both 
materialism and computationalism. The argument should make us more 
modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind.

Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by 
interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces 
an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, 
knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to 
the (arithmetical hypostases):

p  (truth)
Bp (provable)
Bp  p (knowable, correctly provabie)

Bp  Dp (gamblings)
Bp  Dp  p (correct gambling, feeling)

And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the 
hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and 
what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have 
explained some time ago, determines each a geometrical (Kripke) 
multiverse.

It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus 
theology) experimentally testable.

As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major 
discovery:

The universal machine (talks bits)
The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks 
qubits).

The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits 
to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of 
both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication).

I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be 
honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) 
associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus 
Matter (or our measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like 
to justify a quantum topology or deep enough universal machine.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-17 Thread John M
I was so glad to have some 'text' on UD(A),  comp,  the P-words (Platonia, 
Paeano, Plotinus), the hypostases, in your post. Alas! Still all techy, only 
for the adepts. Not in Mark's required plain language. (English or what?) 
(I still stumble among them).  
My question now:
How do we distinguish Everything from Almost Everything? We are still 
'walled in' by our (or: OK, let's call it:  the Loeb machine's) knowledge base. 
How can we know that we include things we do not know ABOUT? (Part of the real 
total Everything, of course) and build our 'world' on a partial model - called 
(our?) Everything? Then, by some event unforeseeable some 'left-out' effect 
may show up and we happily and self-justifiedly refuse it, as nonsense 
(happened many times in the conventional reductionist sciences). 
How are we better? 
We have no idea if we know but a negligible bit or almost all. We may be the 
laughing stock for an alien with wider knowledgebase (and: 'smarter'). 
Ad vocem 'smarter': 
I am sorry for the greatgrandkids who - in your remark of yesterday may not be 
smarter than we are, just have a wider source of information (epistemy). Does 
that mean that you do not believe we are 'smarter' than humans of 2-3 millennia 
ago? (Could be, because you base much knowledge on Plato etc., - the old 
Greeks). I still hold to the Leninian wisdom that quantity turns into quality 
and increasing the info-basis MAY(?) result in also smarter understganding - 
i.e. better wisdom. 
So I put on hold my regret for the greatgrandkids for now.

Regards

John M 
 

  - Original Message - 
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Saturday, March 17, 2007 11:02 AM
  Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument




  Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :

   But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent 
   universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite 
   arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything).
  
   And how do things run in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in 
   logic, as well as epistemic ones?


  Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material 
  primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. It is just 
  up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. 
  This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense 
  of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both 
  materialism and computationalism. The argument should make us more 
  modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind.

  Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by 
  interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces 
  an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, 
  knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to 
  the (arithmetical hypostases):

  p  (truth)
  Bp (provable)
  Bp  p (knowable, correctly provabie)

  Bp  Dp (gamblings)
  Bp  Dp  p (correct gambling, feeling)

  And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the 
  hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and 
  what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have 
  explained some time ago, determines each a geometrical (Kripke) 
  multiverse.

  It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus 
  theology) experimentally testable.

  As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major 
  discovery:

  The universal machine (talks bits)
  The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks 
  qubits).

  The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits 
  to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of 
  both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication).

  I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be 
  honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) 
  associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus 
  Matter (or our measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like 
  to justify a quantum topology or deep enough universal machine.

  Bruno

  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


  


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12:12 PM


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-17 Thread Brent Meeker

Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :
 
 But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent 
 universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite 
 arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything).

 And how do things run in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in 
 logic, as well as epistemic ones?
 
 
 Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material 
 primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. 

I don't believe either one - I just contemplate them. ;-)  

Since it is not at all clear to me that Peano arithmetic, or any mathematics, 
exists I'm uncertain as to whether there is greater explanatory power in your 
UDA as compared to Peter's some things exist and others don't.

It is just 
 up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. 
 This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense 
 of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both 
 materialism and computationalism. 

When you've written this before I've asked what contradiction you derive from 
the conjunction of materialism and computationalism.  IIRC you said there was 
not a contradiction.

But you are right, I should study your argument more carefully; I don't really 
see how you get QM, much less particle physics, out of it.

Brent Meeker

The argument should make us more 
 modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind.
 
 Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by 
 interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces 
 an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, 
 knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to 
 the (arithmetical hypostases):
 
 p  (truth)
 Bp (provable)
 Bp  p (knowable, correctly provabie)
 
 Bp  Dp (gamblings)
 Bp  Dp  p (correct gambling, feeling)
 
 And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the 
 hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and 
 what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have 
 explained some time ago, determines each a geometrical (Kripke) 
 multiverse.
 
 It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus 
 theology) experimentally testable.
 
 As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major 
 discovery:
 
 The universal machine (talks bits)
 The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks 
 qubits).
 
 The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits 
 to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of 
 both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication).
 
 I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be 
 honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) 
 associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus 
 Matter (or our measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like 
 to justify a quantum topology or deep enough universal machine.
 
 Bruno
 
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
 
 
  
 
 


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-16 Thread Torgny Tholerus

Brent Meeker skrev:
 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
   
 I have written some more about infinity, in the paper attached (3
 pages), called Infinity Does Not Exist.
 
 Well it doesn't exist under the assumption that it doesn't exist.  I actually 
 agree with you that it doesn't exist - though not because it's *logically* 
 impossible.  I think what you've shown is that there are other consistent 
 number systems - which just illustrates the point that what you get from 
 logic and mathematics depends on what you take as axioms and rules of 
 inference.

 But the problem is that a lot of mathematics would become very difficult and 
 convoluted if we didn't allow infinity (and infinitesimals).  This doesn't 
 bother physicists much because they are accustomed to regarding mathematics 
 as an approximate model and only using as much infinity as seems useful.
   

When it concerns mathematics, I have developped a set of integers that I 
myself call unnatural numbers.  An unnatural number U is an integer 
that is bigger than every natural number N.  And the inverse of an 
unnatural number (1/U) is more close to zero than any real number.  You 
can count with these unnatural number in the same way as ordinary 
integers.  So you will have that U+1 is not equal to U, and N*N  
sqrt(U), and so on.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus



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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-16 Thread Torgny Tholerus





John M skrev:

  
  
  
  
  I looked at your paper, interesting. 
  One question:
  what do you mean by "exist"
  (Notably: "does NOT exist)?
  
  We think about it (no matter in how vague terms
and weak understanding), we talk about it, our mind has a place in our
thinking for that term, - does this not suffice for (in a WIDER???
meaning) existence?

When human beings think of "infinity", they think of a *very* big set,
where the end of the set is hidden in a big black cloud, far, far
away. In that way they can say that you have a mapping of the set onto
a true subset of the set, because they only see the visible part of the
set, and there it is true that there is such a mapping there. But what
happens inside the cloud they don't see. They don't see that there are
mappings missing in the end of the set...

-- 
Torgny Tholerus


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-16 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/16/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

  I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and other small
  numbers but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e. almost all
  of them.  A theory that just says all integers exist doesn't help
  answer that.  But if the integers are something we make up (or are
  hardwired by evolution) then it makes sense that we are only
  acquainted with small ones.
 
 
  OK, but there are other questions that defy such an explanation. Suppose
  the universe were infinite, as per Tegmark Level 1, and contained an
  infinite number of observers. Wouldn't that make your measure
  effectively zero? And yet here you are.
 
  Stathis Papaioannou

 Another observation refuting Tegmark! :-)

 Seriously, even in the finite universe we observe my probability is almost
 zero.  Almost everything and and everyone is improbable, just like my
 winning the lottery when I buy one [in] a million tickets is improbable -
 but someone has to win.  So it's a question of relative measure.  Each
 integer has zero measure in the set of all integers - yet we are acquainted
 with some and not others.  So why is the acquaintance measure of small
 integers so much greater than that of integers greater than 10^10^20 (i.e.
 almost all of them).  What picks out the small integers?


There are factors creating a local measure, even if the Plenitude is
infinite and measureless. Although the chance that you will be you is zero
or almost zero if you consider the Plenitude as God's big lucky dip, you
have to be someone given that we are talking about observers, and once you
are that fantastically improbable person, it becomes a certainty that you
will remain him for as long as there are future versions of him extant
anywhere at all. Thus, the first person perspective, necessarily from within
the plenitude, makes a global impossibility a local certainty.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-16 Thread Jesse Mazer

Torgny Tholerus  wrote:

When it concerns mathematics, I have developped a set of integers that I
myself call unnatural numbers.  An unnatural number U is an integer
that is bigger than every natural number N.  And the inverse of an
unnatural number (1/U) is more close to zero than any real number.

Actually, mathematicians have already developed ideas along these 
lines--google hyperreal numbers (see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperreal_number for starters) and 
non-standard analysis (see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-standard_analysis ). And if you enter 
nonstandard analysis on amazon you can also find some formal 
introductions, such as 
http://www.amazon.com/Lectures-Hyperreals-Introduction-Nonstandard-Mathematics/dp/038798464X/

Jesse

_
Exercise your brain! Try Flexicon. 
http://games.msn.com/en/flexicon/default.htm?icid=flexicon_hmemailtaglinemarch07


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-16 Thread Brent Meeker

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
 
 On 3/16/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
   I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and
 other small
   numbers but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e.
 almost all
   of them.  A theory that just says all integers exist
 doesn't help
   answer that.  But if the integers are something we make up
 (or are
   hardwired by evolution) then it makes sense that we are only
   acquainted with small ones.
  
  
   OK, but there are other questions that defy such an explanation.
 Suppose
   the universe were infinite, as per Tegmark Level 1, and contained an
   infinite number of observers. Wouldn't that make your measure
   effectively zero? And yet here you are.
  
   Stathis Papaioannou
 
 Another observation refuting Tegmark! :-)
 
 Seriously, even in the finite universe we observe my probability is
 almost zero.  Almost everything and and everyone is improbable, just
 like my winning the lottery when I buy one [in] a million tickets is
 improbable - but someone has to win.  So it's a question of relative
 measure.  Each integer has zero measure in the set of all integers -
 yet we are acquainted with some and not others.  So why is the
 acquaintance measure of small integers so much greater than that
 of integers greater than 10^10^20 ( i.e. almost all of them).  What
 picks out the small integers?
 
 
 There are factors creating a local measure, even if the Plenitude is 
 infinite and measureless. Although the chance that you will be you is 
 zero or almost zero if you consider the Plenitude as God's big lucky 
 dip, you have to be someone given that we are talking about observers, 
 and once you are that fantastically improbable person, 

In other words, That's just the way it is., which comports with my complaint 
that such theories are empty.

Brent Meeker

it becomes a 
 certainty that you will remain him for as long as there are future 
 versions of him extant anywhere at all. Thus, the first person 
 perspective, necessarily from within the plenitude, makes a global 
 impossibility a local certainty.
 
 Stathis Papaioannou
 
 
 
  


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-16 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/17/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 There are factors creating a local measure, even if the Plenitude is
  infinite and measureless. Although the chance that you will be you is
  zero or almost zero if you consider the Plenitude as God's big lucky
  dip, you have to be someone given that we are talking about observers,
  and once you are that fantastically improbable person,

 In other words, That's just the way it is., which comports with my
 complaint that such theories are empty.

 Brent Meeker

 it becomes a
  certainty that you will remain him for as long as there are future
  versions of him extant anywhere at all. Thus, the first person
  perspective, necessarily from within the plenitude, makes a global
  impossibility a local certainty.
 
  Stathis Papaioannou


If only one part of the possible actually exists, that isn't like being the
one person in a million who has to win the lottery, it is more like waking
up to find that money has miraculously appeared in your bedroom overnight
without there being any lottery. We could say that's just the way it is,
but it could have been an infinite number of other ways as well. On the
other hand, if everything exists, it is no surprise that you and every other
particular thing exist. The only thing that needs ontological explanation is
the everything: why everything rather than something or nothing? If it were
possible that the reality we experience could be a simulation running on an
abstract machine in Platonia, that would be an answer to this question,
because the machine in Platonia can't not run. That's highly speculative, of
course: maybe the brain will turn out to be non-computational, or maybe
someone will come up with a formulation of computationalism which defeats
Putnam/Maudlin/Marchal type arguments, and we are back with a physical
Universe without ultimate explanation.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-16 Thread Brent Meeker

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
 
 On 3/17/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
   There are factors creating a local measure, even if the Plenitude is
   infinite and measureless. Although the chance that you will be you is
   zero or almost zero if you consider the Plenitude as God's big lucky
   dip, you have to be someone given that we are talking about
 observers,
   and once you are that fantastically improbable person,
 
 In other words, That's just the way it is., which comports with my
 complaint that such theories are empty.
 
 Brent Meeker
 
  it becomes a
   certainty that you will remain him for as long as there are future
   versions of him extant anywhere at all. Thus, the first person
   perspective, necessarily from within the plenitude, makes a global
   impossibility a local certainty.
  
   Stathis Papaioannou
 
 
 If only one part of the possible actually exists, that isn't like being 
 the one person in a million who has to win the lottery, it is more like 
 waking up to find that money has miraculously appeared in your bedroom 
 overnight without there being any lottery. We could say that's just the 
 way it is, but it could have been an infinite number of other ways as 
 well. On the other hand, if everything exists, it is no surprise that 
 you and every other particular thing exist. 

It's no explanation either.  It's just Everything exists and what you 
experience is just what you experience.  which Occam's razor trimes to What 
you experience is just what you experience.

The only thing that needs 
 ontological explanation is the everything: why everything rather than 
 something or nothing? If it were possible that the reality we experience 
 could be a simulation running on an abstract machine in Platonia, that 
 would be an answer to this question, because the machine in Platonia 
 can't not run. 

But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent universe?  or 
Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite arithmetic (which would be a 
much smaller everything).

And how do things run in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in logic, as 
well as epistemic ones?


Brent Meeker
An explanation that could explain anything, fails to explain at all.


That's highly speculative, of course: maybe the brain 
 will turn out to be non-computational, or maybe someone will come up 
 with a formulation of computationalism which defeats 
 Putnam/Maudlin/Marchal type arguments, and we are back with a physical 
 Universe without ultimate explanation.
 
 Stathis Papaioannou
 
 
  


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-16 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/17/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

  If only one part of the possible actually exists, that isn't like being
  the one person in a million who has to win the lottery, it is more like
  waking up to find that money has miraculously appeared in your bedroom
  overnight without there being any lottery. We could say that's just the
  way it is, but it could have been an infinite number of other ways as
  well. On the other hand, if everything exists, it is no surprise that
  you and every other particular thing exist.

 It's no explanation either.  It's just Everything exists and what you
 experience is just what you experience.  which Occam's razor trimes to
 What you experience is just what you experience.


You disagree that ensemble theories in conjunction with the anthropic
principle offer a possible explanation for the fine tuning of physical
constants in our universe (supposing there is fine tuning for the sake of
argument - I know Victor Stenger disagrees)? Of course, we are then left
with trying to explain why the ensemble, but that's the nature of any
explanation, including theological ones.

The only thing that needs
  ontological explanation is the everything: why everything rather than
  something or nothing? If it were possible that the reality we experience
  could be a simulation running on an abstract machine in Platonia, that
  would be an answer to this question, because the machine in Platonia
  can't not run.

 But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent
 universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite arithmetic
 (which would be a much smaller everything).


And while we're at it, why exclude non-mathematical structures? There seems
to be no reason why an abstract machine running a simulation of a fantastic
world should be ontologically privileged compared to the fantastic world
just existing complete in itself, not generated by any computation. This
would be closer to most forms of Idealism in Western philosophy, including
Plato's. Pythagoras was closer to the view that everything is made of
numbers.

One response to this idea is that the non-computational worlds are overrun
with white rabbits, whereas the computational worlds allow the calculation
of a local measure, such as Russell Standish has described, which explains
the orderly universe we know. However, this doesn't explain why the
non-computational white rabbits don't suddenly intrude in the next moment:
what's to say that their relative measure should be less than the orderly
computational worlds' relative measure?

And how do things run in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in logic, as
 well as epistemic ones?


No, it would be like a block universe.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-16 Thread Brent Meeker

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
 
 On 3/17/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
   If only one part of the possible actually exists, that isn't like
 being
   the one person in a million who has to win the lottery, it is
 more like
   waking up to find that money has miraculously appeared in your
 bedroom
   overnight without there being any lottery. We could say that's
 just the
   way it is, but it could have been an infinite number of other
 ways as
   well. On the other hand, if everything exists, it is no surprise
 that
   you and every other particular thing exist.
 
 It's no explanation either.  It's just Everything exists and what
 you experience is just what you experience.  which Occam's razor
 trimes to What you experience is just what you experience. 
 
 
 You disagree that ensemble theories in conjunction with the anthropic 
 principle offer a possible explanation for the fine tuning of physical 
 constants in our universe (supposing there is fine tuning for the sake 
 of argument - I know Victor Stenger disagrees)? 

No I would agree that an ensemble theory that includes some measure relative to 
a well define anthropomorphic principle has some explanatory power.  For 
example I would expect it to show that there is a higher probability of an 
intelligent life form finding intelligence to be rare and widely scattered.  
From what we know now, it seems that there could universes in which almost 
every star had a planet with intelligent life and one would be more likely to 
find oneself in such a universe than in the one we observe.  Vic has only 
considered everything in the very narrow sense of a range of values for the 
19 parameters of the standard model - not the much broader everything of 
Tegmark or even Bruno.

Of course, we are then 
 left with trying to explain why the ensemble, but that's the nature of 
 any explanation, including theological ones.
 
  The only thing that needs
   ontological explanation is the everything: why everything rather than
   something or nothing? If it were possible that the reality we
 experience
   could be a simulation running on an abstract machine in Platonia,
 that
   would be an answer to this question, because the machine in Platonia
   can't not run.
 
 But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent
 universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite
 arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything). 
 
 
 And while we're at it, why exclude non-mathematical structures? 

I guess that depends on what you mean by mathematical structures.  I would 
take any non-contradictory set of axioms to define a mathematical structure.  
I'm not sure what it would mean to include self-contradictory structures.  If 
you regard mathematics as a game of propositions it just means every wff is a 
theorem.  But if you regard mathematics as existing (even in Platonia) I'm at 
a loss.

Brent Meeker

There 
 seems to be no reason why an abstract machine running a simulation of a 
 fantastic world should be ontologically privileged compared to the 
 fantastic world just existing complete in itself, not generated by any 
 computation. This would be closer to most forms of Idealism in Western 
 philosophy, including Plato's. Pythagoras was closer to the view that 
 everything is made of numbers.
 
 One response to this idea is that the non-computational worlds are 
 overrun with white rabbits, whereas the computational worlds allow the 
 calculation of a local measure, such as Russell Standish has described, 
 which explains the orderly universe we know. However, this doesn't 
 explain why the non-computational white rabbits don't suddenly intrude 
 in the next moment: what's to say that their relative measure should be 
 less than the orderly computational worlds' relative measure?
 
 And how do things run in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in
 logic, as well as epistemic ones? 
 
 
 No, it would be like a block universe.
 
 Stathis Papaioannou
 
 
 
  


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 13-mars-07, à 18:55, Brent Meeker a écrit :

 Of course this is assuming that QM (which was discovered by applying 
 reductionist methods) is the correct EXACT theory - which is extremely 
 doubtful given its incompatibility with general relativity.


All right. But note that both String Theory and Loop Gravity (the main 
attempt to marry QM and GR) keep the quantum theory and changes the GR. 
Note that the most weird aspect of the quantum have been verified, and 
also that comp only predicts large feature of that weirdness.
(Note that QM should be completely false for coming back to aristotle, 
making QM an approximation makes its weirdness more weird).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-15 Thread Bruno Marchal

Le 14-mars-07, à 04:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

 On 3/13/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

   You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron 
 +
  proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its
  components;


 Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior
 entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from
 looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton,
 but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not
 genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction.

 Quantum weirdness is an observed fact. We assume that it is, somehow, 
 an intrinsic property of subatomic particles; but perhaps there is a 
 hidden factor or as yet undiscovered theory which may explain it 
 further.


That would be equivalent to adding hidden variables. But then they have 
to be non local (just to address the facts, not just the theory).
Of course if the hidden factor is given by the many worlds or comp, 
then such non local effects has to be retrospectively expected. But 
then we have to forget the idea that substance (decomposable reality) 
exists, but numbers.


 You could get a neutron at high enough energies, I suppose, but I 
 don't think that is what you mean. Is it possible to bring a proton 
 and an electron appropriately together and have them just sit there 
 next to each other?

Locally yes. In QM this is given by a tensor product of the 
corresponding states. But it is an exceptional state. With comp it is 
open if such physical state acn ever be prepared, even locally.

  There is no sense to say
 an atom is part of the UD. It is part of the necessary discourse of
 self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's
 psychology/theology.

 Isn't that the *ultimate* reduction of everything?

Given that a theology rarely eliminates subjects/person, I don't see in 
what reasonable sense this would be a reduction.


 Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is
 defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation
 from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it
 changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot
  identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see 
 the
 global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling
 for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description.
 People can look here for a cute knot table:
 http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html

 I was thinking of a physical knot, which is not the same as the 
 Platonic ideal, even if there is no such thing as a separate physical 
 reality.


I don't know what you mean by a physical knots. In any case the 
identity of a knots (mathematical, physical) rely in its topology, not 
in such or such cartesian picture, even the concrete knots I put in 
my pocket. The knots looses its identity if it is cut.



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-15 Thread Bruno Marchal

Le 14-mars-07, à 08:51, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :

 Infinity is a logically impossible concept.


I have read your little text. It is not so bad, actually ;).  Some 
early greeks have also defended the idea that GOD is finite. But I am 
not convinced. I think that Plotinus' idea that God is infinite has 
been a major advance in science, if not the major advance. We can come 
back on this later.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-15 Thread Torgny Tholerus




Bruno Marchal skrev:
Le 14-mars-07,  08:51, Torgny Tholerus a crit :
  
  Infinity is a logically impossible concept.
  
I have read your little text. It is not so bad, actually ;). Some
early greeks have also defended the idea that GOD is finite. But I am
not convinced. I think that Plotinus' idea that God is infinite has
been a major advance in science, if not the major advance. We can come
back on this later.
  

I have written some more about infinity, in the paper attached (3
pages), called Infinity Does Not Exist.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus


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infinity.doc
Description: MS-Word document


Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-15 Thread Brent Meeker

Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 Le 14-mars-07, à 04:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
 
 On 3/13/07, *Bruno Marchal* [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
   You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an
 electron +
   proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its
   components;
 
 
 Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior
 entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from
 looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton,
 but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not
 genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction.
 
 Quantum weirdness is an observed fact. We assume that it is,
 somehow, an intrinsic property of subatomic particles; but perhaps
 there is a hidden factor or as yet undiscovered theory which may
 explain it further.
 
 
 
 That would be equivalent to adding hidden variables. But then they have 
 to be non local (just to address the facts, not just the theory).
 Of course if the hidden factor is given by the many worlds or comp, 
 then such non local effects has to be retrospectively expected. But then 
 we have to forget the idea that substance (decomposable reality) exists, 
 but numbers.

If you admit non-local hidden variables then you can have a theory like Bohmian 
quantum mechanics in which randomness is all epistemological, like statistical 
mechanics, and there is no place for multiple-worlds.

 
 
 You could get a neutron at high enough energies, I suppose, but I
 don't think that is what you mean. Is it possible to bring a proton
 and an electron appropriately together and have them just sit there
 next to each other?
 
 
 Locally yes. 

I'm not sure what you mean by locally.  Since they have opposite charge they 
will be attracted by photon exchanges and will fall into some hydrogen atom 
state by emission of photons.

Brent Meeker

In QM this is given by a tensor product of the 
 corresponding states. But it is an exceptional state. With comp it is 
 open if such physical state acn ever be prepared, even locally.
 
 There is no sense to say
 an atom is part of the UD. It is part of the necessary discourse of
 self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's
 psychology/theology.
 
 Isn't that the *ultimate* reduction of everything?
 
 
 Given that a theology rarely eliminates subjects/person, I don't see in 
 what reasonable sense this would be a reduction.
 
 
 Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is
 defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation
 from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it
 changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot
 identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the
 global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling
 for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description.
 People can look here for a cute knot table:
 http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html
 
 I was thinking of a physical knot, which is not the same as the
 Platonic ideal, even if there is no such thing as a separate
 physical reality.
 
 
 I don't know what you mean by a physical knots. 

A remark only a mathematician could make ;-)

I think Bruno just means a knot is defined by the topology of its embedding in 
space - not by its material or its coordinates; as a triangle is defined by 
having three sides, not any particular size, orientation, or material.

Brent Meeker


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-15 Thread Brent Meeker

Torgny Tholerus wrote:
 Bruno Marchal skrev:
 Le 14-mars-07, à 08:51, Torgny Tholerus a écrit :

 Infinity is a logically impossible concept.

 I have read your little text. It is not so bad, actually ;). Some 
 early greeks have also defended the idea that GOD is finite. But I am 
 not convinced. I think that Plotinus' idea that God is infinite has 
 been a major advance in science, if not the major advance. We can come 
 back on this later.
 I have written some more about infinity, in the paper attached (3 
 pages), called Infinity Does Not Exist.
 
 -- 
 Torgny Tholerus

Well it doesn't exist under the assumption that it doesn't exist.  I actually 
agree with you that it doesn't exist - though not because it's *logically* 
impossible.  I think what you've shown is that there are other consistent 
number systems - which just illustrates the point that what you get from logic 
and mathematics depends on what you take as axioms and rules of inference.

But the problem is that a lot of mathematics would become very difficult and 
convoluted if we didn't allow infinity (and infinitesimals).  This doesn't 
bother physicists much because they are accustomed to regarding mathematics as 
an approximate model and only using as much infinity as seems useful.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-15 Thread John M
I looked at your paper, interesting. 
One question:
what do you mean by exist
(Notably: does NOT exist)?

We think about it (no matter in how vague terms and weak understanding), we 
talk about it, our mind has a place in our thinking for that term, - does this 
not suffice for (in a WIDER??? meaning) existence? 
I agree: it is  logically (physically?) hardly identifiable but do we stand 
only on a (material?) physical basis? 
And I make no difference between infinite small and infinite big. None of them 
understandable. Brent's 'infinitesimal' is a good idea in this topic, yet I 
consider it scale-oriented, an infinitesimally close in 1000 orders of 
magnitude smaller scale can be 'miles' away. (No 'real' miles implied) - 

Best regards

John M
- Original Message - 
  From: Torgny Tholerus 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2007 11:58 AM
  Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument


Le 14-mars-07, à 08:51, Torgny Tholerus a écrit : (among others)

  Infinity is a logically impossible concept. Infinity Does Not Exist.
  -- 
  Torgny Tholerus



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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-15 Thread John M
Bruno and Brent:
Are we back at the Aris-total i.e. the sum considered more than its 
(material-only!) components? Complexity of an assemblage includes more than 
what a reductionist 'component-analysis' can verify. Qualia, functions, even 
out-of-boundary effects are active in identifying an item. 
It is in our many centuries old explanatory ways to say 
a proton and an electron make a H-atom and vice versa. 

First off: hydrogen (gas) is not the assemblage of H-atoms, it is an 
observational item that - when destructed in certain ways - results in other 
observables resembling H-atoms or even protons and electrons (if you have the 
means to look at them - not in an n-th deduction and its calculations).  Same 
with 'other' atoms - molecules, singularly or in bunch. Reduced to a 2-D 
sketch. Nice game, I spent 50 years producing such (macromolecules that is) and 
'studied'/applied  them. Of course none of the destruction-result carries the 
proper charactersitics of the original ensemble. And NO proper 'observation' 
does exist.  
It is the explanatory attempt for a world(part?) -  not understood,  just 
regarded  as a model of whatever our epistemic enrichment has provided to THAT 
time. This is the 'reducing': to visualize this part as the total and utter   
the Aristotelian maxim. 

One can not extrapolate 'total ensemble' characteristics  from studying the so 
called parts we discovered so far. 
We can think only within our already acquired knowledge. 

John M

  - Original Message - 
  From: Brent Meeker 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2007 2:30 PM
  Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb 
question.



  Bruno Marchal wrote:
   
   
   Le 14-mars-07, à 04:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
   
   On 3/13/07, *Bruno Marchal* [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
   
 You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an
   electron +
 proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its
 components;
   
   
   Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior
   entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from
   looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton,
   but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not
   genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction.
   
   Quantum weirdness is an observed fact. We assume that it is,
   somehow, an intrinsic property of subatomic particles; but perhaps
   there is a hidden factor or as yet undiscovered theory which may
   explain it further.
   
   
   
   That would be equivalent to adding hidden variables. But then they have 
   to be non local (just to address the facts, not just the theory).
   Of course if the hidden factor is given by the many worlds or comp, 
   then such non local effects has to be retrospectively expected. But then 
   we have to forget the idea that substance (decomposable reality) exists, 
   but numbers.

  If you admit non-local hidden variables then you can have a theory like 
Bohmian quantum mechanics in which randomness is all epistemological, like 
statistical mechanics, and there is no place for multiple-worlds.

   
   
   You could get a neutron at high enough energies, I suppose, but I
   don't think that is what you mean. Is it possible to bring a proton
   and an electron appropriately together and have them just sit there
   next to each other?
   
   
   Locally yes. 

  I'm not sure what you mean by locally.  Since they have opposite charge 
they will be attracted by photon exchanges and will fall into some hydrogen 
atom state by emission of photons.

  Brent Meeker

  In QM this is given by a tensor product of the 
   corresponding states. But it is an exceptional state. With comp it is 
   open if such physical state acn ever be prepared, even locally.
   
   There is no sense to say
   an atom is part of the UD. It is part of the necessary discourse of
   self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's
   psychology/theology.
   
   Isn't that the *ultimate* reduction of everything?
   
   
   Given that a theology rarely eliminates subjects/person, I don't see in 
   what reasonable sense this would be a reduction.
   
   
   Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is
   defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation
   from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it
   changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot
   identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the
   global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling
   for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description.
   People can look here for a cute knot table:
   http

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-15 Thread Brent Meeker

John M wrote:
 Bruno and Brent:
 Are we back at the Aris-total i.e. the sum considered more than 
 its (material-only!) components? Complexity of an assemblage includes 
 more than what a reductionist 'component-analysis' can verify. 

But components are only part of a reductionist model - it also includes the 
interactions of the components, e.g how an electron interacts with a proton.  
To identify scientific reductionism with 'component-analysis' is a straw man.  
No one is satisfied with a reductionist model that just names components - the 
model must be able to go the other way and synthesize the behavior of the thing 
modeled.  Modeling a hydrogen atom as an electron interacting via photons with 
a proton is a successful model because it predicts behavoir of the hydrogen 
atom, e.g. it EM spectrum, its stability, the heat capacity of an H2 gas.

Qualia, 
 functions, even out-of-boundary effects are active in identifying an item.
 It is in our many centuries old explanatory ways to say
 a proton and an electron make a H-atom and vice versa.
  
 First off: hydrogen (gas) is not the assemblage of H-atoms, it is an 
 observational item that - when destructed in certain ways - results in 
 other observables resembling H-atoms or even protons and electrons (if 
 you have the means to look at them - not in an n-th deduction and its 
 calculations).  

How small does n have to be?  Does n=0 correspond to seeing photons?

Same with 'other' atoms - molecules, singularly or in 
 bunch. Reduced to a 2-D sketch. Nice game, I spent 50 years producing 
 such (macromolecules that is) and 'studied'/applied  them. Of course 
 none of the destruction-result carries the proper charactersitics of the 
 original ensemble. And NO proper 'observation' does exist.  

What's a proper observation? and why does its non-existence matter?

 It is the explanatory attempt for a world(part?) -  not understood, 
  just regarded  as a model of whatever our epistemic enrichment has 
 provided to THAT time. This is the 'reducing': to visualize this part as 
 the total and utter   the Aristotelian maxim.
  
 One can not extrapolate 'total ensemble' characteristics  from studying 
 the so called parts we discovered so far.
 We can think only within our already acquired knowledge.

Then how can we ever acquire additional knowledge?  The whole point of models 
like particles is to extrapolate beyond what we can observed.  When such 
extrapolations agree with further observations we put greater credence in them. 
 When the credence is great enough we start taking the model to be known - at 
least until we find a problem with it.  This is nothing esoteric, it's the way 
we learn what tables and chairs are as well as protons and electrons.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-15 Thread Brent Meeker

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
 
 On 3/15/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  
 
   But these ideas illustrate a problem with
   everything-exists.  Everything conceivable, i.e. not
   self-contradictory is so ill defined it seems impossible to
 assign
   any measure to it, and without a measure, something to pick
 out this
   rather than that, the theory is empty.  It just says what is
   possible is possible.  But if there a measure, something
 picks out
   this rather than that, we can ask why THAT measure?
  
  
   Isn't that like arguing that there can be no number 17 because
 there is
   no way to assign it a measure and it would get lost among all the
 other
   objects in Platonia?
  
   Stathis Papaioannou
 
 I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and other small
 numbers but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e. almost all
 of them.  A theory that just says all integers exist doesn't help
 answer that.  But if the integers are something we make up (or are
 hardwired by evolution) then it makes sense that we are only
 acquainted with small ones. 
 
  
 OK, but there are other questions that defy such an explanation. Suppose 
 the universe were infinite, as per Tegmark Level 1, and contained an 
 infinite number of observers. Wouldn't that make your measure 
 effectively zero? And yet here you are.
  
 Stathis Papaioannou

Another observation refuting Tegmark! :-)

Seriously, even in the finite universe we observe my probability is almost 
zero.  Almost everything and and everyone is improbable, just like my winning 
the lottery when I buy one a million tickets is improbable - but someone has to 
win.  So it's a question of relative measure.  Each integer has zero measure in 
the set of all integers - yet we are acquainted with some and not others.  So 
why is the acquaintance measure of small integers so much greater than that 
of integers greater than 10^10^20 (i.e. almost all of them).  What picks out 
the small integers?

Brent Meeker

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-15 Thread Brent Meeker

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
 Hi Brent,
 
 On Friday 16 March 2007 00:16:13 Brent Meeker wrote:
 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 On 3/15/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
   But these ideas illustrate a problem with
   everything-exists.  Everything conceivable, i.e. not
   self-contradictory is so ill defined it seems impossible to

 assign

   any measure to it, and without a measure, something to pick

 out this

   rather than that, the theory is empty.  It just says what is
   possible is possible.  But if there a measure, something

 picks out

   this rather than that, we can ask why THAT measure?
  
  
   Isn't that like arguing that there can be no number 17 because

 there is

   no way to assign it a measure and it would get lost among all the

 other

   objects in Platonia?
  
   Stathis Papaioannou

 I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and other small
 numbers but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e. almost all
 of them.  A theory that just says all integers exist doesn't help
 answer that.  But if the integers are something we make up (or are
 hardwired by evolution) then it makes sense that we are only
 acquainted with small ones.


 OK, but there are other questions that defy such an explanation. Suppose
 the universe were infinite, as per Tegmark Level 1, and contained an
 infinite number of observers. Wouldn't that make your measure
 effectively zero? And yet here you are.

 Stathis Papaioannou
 Another observation refuting Tegmark! :-)

 Seriously, even in the finite universe we observe my probability is almost
 zero.  Almost everything and and everyone is improbable, just like my
 winning the lottery when I buy one a million tickets is improbable - but
 someone has to win.  So it's a question of relative measure.  Each integer
 has zero measure in the set of all integers - yet we are acquainted with
 some and not others.  So why is the acquaintance measure of small
 integers so much greater than that of integers greater than 10^10^20 (i.e.
 almost all of them).  What picks out the small integers?

 Brent Meeker
 
 If you see each integer with a successor notation, 2 is S(1) and 3 is S(2) 
 which is S(S(1)) and so on, you see that big integers contains the small 
 integers and the smalls are over represented... just a though ;-)
 
 Quentin

Yes, I think there's a grain of truth in that.  The integers aren't *just out 
there*.  By Peano's, or anyone else's, axioms they are generated as needed.  We 
don't want to run out so we (except Torgny) always allow one more, but we never 
need the whole set at once until we want to make diagonalization arguments.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/16/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


 I don't know what you mean by a physical knots. In any case the
 identity of a knots (mathematical, physical) rely in its topology, not
 in such or such cartesian picture, even the concrete knots I put in
 my pocket. The knots looses its identity if it is cut.


There are related examples, like letters of the alphabet, which survive even
non-topological transformations and defy any algorithmic specification.
Nevertheless, any particular concrete example of a knotted string or letter
on a page is completely captured by a physical description. There is no
special knottiness or letterness ingredient that needs to be added to ensure
that they are knots or letters.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-14 Thread Mohsen Ravanbakhsh
Bent, Stathis,

Suppose that space is discrete. It has some elementary unit. Let's call it
SU.
Suppose there are 3 of these units out there in a right triangular fashion(
L shape)
Then what is the distance between two distant angles? is it made up of some
integer numbers of space unit? Pythagoras' theorem says no. You might say we
can not measure such distance because when we're talking about elements of
space there should be nothing smaller than it... So what is that distance?
How you gonna make a discrete space when it's intuitively continuous.

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh.

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-14 Thread Torgny Tholerus





Stathis Papaioannou skrev:
On 3/13/07, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
  
  
Not necessarily. If you draw a
diagonal on a square on a computer screen, it will be made up of a
discrete number of pixels despite what Pythagoras' theorem calculates.
Irrational in the real world may just be an illusion. 


I was trying to mark a distance in real world which is
irrational according to a rational unit(Width of pixels), and for such
diagonal the distance is an irrational number, although it might be
made up of rational numbers of another irrational unit (diagonal
pixels) 
I mean there's some irrational distance out there!
  
  
  How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete.

Yes, space (and time) is discrete. Everything in the universe is
finite, and the universe itself is finite. Infinity is a logically
impossible concept.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-14 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/14/07, Torgny Tholerus [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

  Stathis Papaioannou skrev:

 On 3/13/07, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

  *Not necessarily. If you draw a diagonal on a square on a computer
  screen, it will be made up of a discrete number of pixels despite what
  Pythagoras' theorem calculates. Irrational in the real world may just be an
  illusion. *
   I was trying to mark a distance in real world which is irrational
  according to a rational unit(Width of pixels), and for such diagonal the
  distance is an irrational number, although it might be made up of rational
  numbers of another irrational unit (diagonal pixels)
  I mean there's some irrational distance out there!
 

 How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete.

 Yes, space (and time) is discrete.  Everything in the universe is finite,
 and the universe itself is finite.  Infinity is a logically impossible
 concept.


I don't see that discrete and finite necessarily go together. The
integers are discrete, but not finite.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-14 Thread Torgny Tholerus





Stathis Papaioannou skrev:
On 3/14/07, Torgny Tholerus
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  
  
Stathis Papaioannou skrev:

  How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete.
  

Yes, space (and time) is discrete. Everything in the universe is
finite, and the universe itself is finite. Infinity is a logically
impossible concept.
  
  
I don't see that "discrete" and "finite" necessarily go together. The
integers are discrete, but not finite. 
  
  

No, the integers are finite. There exists only a finite numer of
integers. There exists a biggest integer N. It is true that you can
construct the integer N+1, but this integer is not a member of the set
of all integers.

Because everything is finite, you can conclude that the space-time is
discrete.

-- 
Torgny Tholerus


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-14 Thread Brent Meeker

Torgny Tholerus wrote:
 Stathis Papaioannou skrev:
 On 3/14/07, *Torgny Tholerus* [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 Stathis Papaioannou skrev:
 How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete.
 Yes, space (and time) is discrete.  Everything in the universe is
 finite, and the universe itself is finite.  Infinity is a
 logically impossible concept.


 I don't see that discrete and finite necessarily go together. The 
 integers are discrete, but not finite.
 No, the integers are finite.  There exists only a finite numer of 
 integers.  There exists a biggest integer N.  It is true that you can 
 construct the integer N+1, but this integer is not a member of the set 
 of all integers.

This must be computer arithmetic (modulo N?) - not Peano's.  :-)

 
 Because everything is finite, you can conclude that the space-time is 
 discrete.

That doesn't follow.  The universe could be finite and closed, like the 
interval [0,1] and space could still be a continuum.

But these ideas illustrate a problem with everything-exists.  Everything 
conceivable, i.e. not self-contradictory is so ill defined it seems impossible 
to assign any measure to it, and without a measure, something to pick out this 
rather than that, the theory is empty.  It just says what is possible is 
possible.  But if there a measure, something picks out this rather than that, 
we can ask why THAT measure?

Brent Meeker

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-14 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/15/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:



 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
  Stathis Papaioannou skrev:
  On 3/14/07, *Torgny Tholerus* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
  Stathis Papaioannou skrev:
  How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete.
  Yes, space (and time) is discrete.  Everything in the universe is
  finite, and the universe itself is finite.  Infinity is a
  logically impossible concept.
 
 
  I don't see that discrete and finite necessarily go together. The
  integers are discrete, but not finite.
  No, the integers are finite.  There exists only a finite numer of
  integers.  There exists a biggest integer N.  It is true that you can
  construct the integer N+1, but this integer is not a member of the set
  of all integers.

 This must be computer arithmetic (modulo N?) - not Peano's.  :-)

 
  Because everything is finite, you can conclude that the space-time is
  discrete.

 That doesn't follow.  The universe could be finite and closed, like the
 interval [0,1] and space could still be a continuum.

 But these ideas illustrate a problem with everything-exists.  Everything
 conceivable, i.e. not self-contradictory is so ill defined it seems
 impossible to assign any measure to it, and without a measure, something to
 pick out this rather than that, the theory is empty.  It just says what is
 possible is possible.  But if there a measure, something picks out this
 rather than that, we can ask why THAT measure?


Isn't that like arguing that there can be no number 17 because there is no
way to assign it a measure and it would get lost among all the other objects
in Platonia?

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-14 Thread Brent Meeker

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
 
 On 3/15/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  
 
 
 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
   Stathis Papaioannou skrev:
   On 3/14/07, *Torgny Tholerus*  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
   mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  
   Stathis Papaioannou skrev:
   How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete.
   Yes, space (and time) is discrete.  Everything in the
 universe is
   finite, and the universe itself is finite.  Infinity is a
   logically impossible concept.
  
  
   I don't see that discrete and finite necessarily go
 together. The
   integers are discrete, but not finite.
   No, the integers are finite.  There exists only a finite numer of
   integers.  There exists a biggest integer N.  It is true that you can
   construct the integer N+1, but this integer is not a member of
 the set
   of all integers.
 
 This must be computer arithmetic (modulo N?) - not Peano's.  :-)
 
  
   Because everything is finite, you can conclude that the space-time is
   discrete.
 
 That doesn't follow.  The universe could be finite and closed, like
 the interval [0,1] and space could still be a continuum.
 
 But these ideas illustrate a problem with
 everything-exists.  Everything conceivable, i.e. not
 self-contradictory is so ill defined it seems impossible to assign
 any measure to it, and without a measure, something to pick out this
 rather than that, the theory is empty.  It just says what is
 possible is possible.  But if there a measure, something picks out
 this rather than that, we can ask why THAT measure? 
 
  
 Isn't that like arguing that there can be no number 17 because there is 
 no way to assign it a measure and it would get lost among all the other 
 objects in Platonia?
  
 Stathis Papaioannou

I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and other small numbers 
but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e. almost all of them.  A theory 
that just says all integers exist doesn't help answer that.  But if the 
integers are something we make up (or are hardwired by evolution) then it 
makes sense that we are only acquainted with small ones.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-13 Thread Mohsen Ravanbakhsh
*Why?  Mathematical means nothing but not self-contradictory.  Sherlock
Holmes stories are mathematical.  That doesn't mean Sherlock Holmes exists
in some Platonic realm.
*

Brent,

What do you mean by that? I do not get your point.
Anyway I do not insist that it should be realizable. But I have examples in
which we need them!
Consider the use of Pythagoras theorem in nature. There are many cases in
which the distance between two points should be irrational.

-- 
Mohsen Ravanbakhsh,

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/13/07, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

*Why?  Mathematical means nothing but not self-contradictory.  Sherlock
 Holmes stories are mathematical.  That doesn't mean Sherlock Holmes exists
 in some Platonic realm.
 *

 Brent,

 What do you mean by that? I do not get your point.
 Anyway I do not insist that it should be realizable. But I have examples
 in which we need them!
 Consider the use of Pythagoras theorem in nature. There are many cases in
 which the distance between two points should be irrational.


Not necessarily. If you draw a diagonal on a square on a computer screen, it
will be made up of a discrete number of pixels despite what Pythagoras'
theorem calculates. Irrational in the real world may just be an illusion.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-13 Thread Bruno Marchal

Le 12-mars-07, à 12:37, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :



 OK, but it seems that we are using reductionism differently.




Perhaps. I am not so sure.


 You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron + 
 proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its 
 components;


Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior 
entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from 
looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton, 
but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not 
genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction.





 or you could say that it can be reduced to an electron + proton 
 because these two components appropriately juxtaposed are necessary 
 and sufficient to give rise to the hydrogen atom.

In general this is not the case.



 And if the atom is just a part of UD*, well, that's just another, more 
 impressive reduction.


But just comp, without the quantum, makes it implausible that an atom 
can be individuated so much that it makes sense to say it is just a 
part of the UD. And QM confirms this too. To compute the EXACT (all 
decimal) position of an electron in an hydrogen atom, soon or later you 
have to take into account of white rabbit path, where the electron 
will, for going from position x to the position y you are computing, 
follow the path x too earth, reacts locally and transforms itself into 
a white rabbit running for the democrat election in the US, loose the 
election and come back to y. Same with the UD, the object atom of 
hydrogen is only defined relatively to an infinity of first person 
plural expectation dependong on the WHOLE UD*. There is no sense to say 
an atom is part of the UD. It is part of the necessary discourse of 
self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's 
psychology/theology.



 As for knots, can't any particular physical knot be described in a 3D 
 coordinate system? This is similar to describing a particular physical 
 circle or triangle. 

Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is 
defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation 
from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it 
changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot 
identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the 
global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling 
for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description.
People can look here for a cute knot table:
http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html



 Only if God issues everyone with immaterial souls at birth, so that 
 reproducing the material or functional structure of the brain fails to 
 reproduce consciousness, would I say that reductionism does not 
 work...

OK, but then you identify reductionism with comp. I identify 
reductionism with the idea that something is entirely explainable in 
some finitary theory. From this I can explain that comp can be used to 
refute all reductionist theory of both matter and mind (and their 
relation).

I am aware it is a subtle point, but if you understand the Universal 
Dovetailer Argument (UDA) from step 1 to 8, in the version:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm
then you should, I think, understand that the idea that there is 
anything made of something, although locally true and useful for many 
practical purpose, is just wrong, globally. Even with just comp, but 
this is also entailed by the quantum empirical facts (even with the 
many-worlds view: if not they would not interfere). People can ask if 
they are not yet convinced by this. I have refer this by saying that if 
comp is true, physics is a branch of bio-psycho-theo-logy. matter 
emerges (logico-arithmetically, not temporally) from mind and number.

You can attach a mind to a body, like children does with dolls, but you 
cannot attach a body to a mind, you can and must attach an infinity of 
relative bodies to a mind. relative bodies are only defined by 
infinity of arithmetical relationships, not by sub-bodies.

(I know this contradicts Aristotle notion of Matter, but see Plotinus 
for old platonist reasons, a priori independent of comp and QM, to 
already suspect that Aristotle was wrong).


 unless you add the soul as an element in the reduction.


Of course, but *that* would make any explanation a reductionism.

Bruno





 Stathis Papaioannou

 On 3/12/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Le 11-mars-07, à 17:56, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

  Reductionism means breaking something up into simpler parts to 
 explain
  it. What's wrong with that?


 Because, assuming comp, neither matter nor mind (including perception)
 can be break up into simpler parts to be explained. That is what UDA 
 is
 all about. First person expection (both on mind and matter) are 
 already
 global notion 

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-13 Thread Mohsen Ravanbakhsh
*Not necessarily. If you draw a diagonal on a square on a computer screen,
it will be made up of a discrete number of pixels despite what Pythagoras'
theorem calculates. Irrational in the real world may just be an illusion.*
I was trying to mark a distance in real world which is irrational according
to a rational unit(Width of pixels), and for such diagonal the distance is
an irrational number, although it might be made up of rational numbers of
another irrational unit (diagonal pixels)
I mean there's some irrational distance out there!

-- 

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh.


On 3/13/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:



  On 3/13/07, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

  *Why?  Mathematical means nothing but not self-contradictory.  Sherlock
  Holmes stories are mathematical.  That doesn't mean Sherlock Holmes exists
  in some Platonic realm.
  *
 
  Brent,
 
  What do you mean by that? I do not get your point.
  Anyway I do not insist that it should be realizable. But I have examples
  in which we need them!
  Consider the use of Pythagoras theorem in nature. There are many cases
  in which the distance between two points should be irrational.
 

 Not necessarily. If you draw a diagonal on a square on a computer screen,
 it will be made up of a discrete number of pixels despite what Pythagoras'
 theorem calculates. Irrational in the real world may just be an illusion.

 Stathis Papaioannou





 


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-13 Thread Mark Peaty

Tangentially:

Brent: 'doesn't mean Sherlock Holmes exists in some Platonic
realm ...'

MP: For those who occasionally like a clever and entertaining
read unencumbered by deep social comment can I recommend the
adventures of Ms Thursday Next in 'The Eyre Affair' a novel by
Jasper FForde, and in the sequels, the names of which I have
forgotten at the moment. The author shows what could happen if
Platonia started really getting out of hand.




Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/





Brent Meeker wrote:
 Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote:
 /All actual measurements yield rational values.  Using real
  numbers in the equations of physics is probably merely a 
 convenience (since calculus is easier than finite 
 differences).  There is no evidence that defining an 
 instantaneous state requires uncountable information. /
 
 What about the realizability of mathematical concepts. Real
  numbers are mathematical, so they should have a
 counterpart in real world.
 
 Why?  Mathematical means nothing but not 
 self-contradictory.  Sherlock Holmes stories are 
 mathematical.  That doesn't mean Sherlock Holmes exists in 
 some Platonic realm.
 
 Brent Meeker
 
  
 
 

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-13 Thread Brent Meeker

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote:
 /Why?  Mathematical means nothing but not self-contradictory. 
  Sherlock Holmes stories are mathematical.  That doesn't mean Sherlock 
 Holmes exists in some Platonic realm.
 /
  
 Brent,
  
 What do you mean by that? 

Mathematics is just assuming some axioms and rules of inference and then 
proving theorems that follow from those.  There's no restriction except that it 
should be consistent, i.e. not every statement should be a theorem.  So you can 
regard a game of chess as a mathematical theorem or even a Sherlock Holmes 
story.  You may suppose these things exist in some sense, but clearly they 
don't exist in the same sense as your computer.

I do not get your point.
 Anyway I do not insist that it should be realizable. But I have examples 
 in which we need them!
 Consider the use of Pythagoras theorem in nature. There are many cases 
 in which the distance between two points should be irrational.

Only under the assumption that space has a Euclidean metric - which is begging 
the question.  From the operational viewpoint, all measurements yield integers 
(in some units).  Real numbers are introduced in the Platonic realm to insure 
that some integer equations have solutions.  Similarly imaginary numbers are 
introduced to complete the algebra.  They are all our inventions - except some 
people think the integers are not.

Brent Meeker


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-13 Thread Brent Meeker

Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 Le 12-mars-07, à 12:37, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
 
 
 
 OK, but it seems that we are using reductionism differently.
 
 
 
 
 
 Perhaps. I am not so sure.
 
 
 You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron
 + proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its
 components;
 
 
 
 Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior 
 entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from 
 looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton, 
 but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not genuine. 
 It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction.

Not only that, but QM admits of negative information, so some of the 
information you get from observing the parts may be cancelled out in a more 
comprehensive measurement.

 
 
 
 
 
 or you could say that it can be reduced to an electron + proton
 because these two components appropriately juxtaposed are necessary
 and sufficient to give rise to the hydrogen atom.
 
 
 In general this is not the case.
 
 
 
 And if the atom is just a part of UD*, well, that's just another,
 more impressive reduction.
 
 
 
 But just comp, without the quantum, makes it implausible that an atom 
 can be individuated so much that it makes sense to say it is just a part 
 of the UD. And QM confirms this too. To compute the EXACT (all decimal) 
 position of an electron in an hydrogen atom, soon or later you have to 
 take into account of white rabbit path, where the electron will, for 
 going from position x to the position y you are computing, follow the 
 path x too earth, reacts locally and transforms itself into a white 
 rabbit running for the democrat election in the US, loose the election 
 and come back to y. 

Of course this is assuming that QM (which was discovered by applying 
reductionist methods) is the correct EXACT theory - which is extremely doubtful 
given its incompatibility with general relativity.

Brent Meeker

Same with the UD, the object atom of hydrogen is 
 only defined relatively to an infinity of first person plural 
 expectation dependong on the WHOLE UD*. There is no sense to say an atom 
 is part of the UD. It is part of the necessary discourse of 
 self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's 
 psychology/theology.
 
 
 
 As for knots, can't any particular physical knot be described in a
 3D coordinate system? This is similar to describing a particular
 physical circle or triangle. 
 
 
 Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is 
 defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation 
 from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it 
 changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot 
 identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the 
 global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling for 
 sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description.
 People can look here for a cute knot table:
 http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html
 
 
 
 Only if God issues everyone with immaterial souls at birth, so that
 reproducing the material or functional structure of the brain fails
 to reproduce consciousness, would I say that reductionism does not
 work...
 
 
 OK, but then you identify reductionism with comp. I identify 
 reductionism with the idea that something is entirely explainable in 
 some finitary theory. From this I can explain that comp can be used to 
 refute all reductionist theory of both matter and mind (and their 
 relation).
 
 I am aware it is a subtle point, but if you understand the Universal 
 Dovetailer Argument (UDA) from step 1 to 8, in the version:
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm
 then you should, I think, understand that the idea that there is 
 anything made of something, although locally true and useful for many 
 practical purpose, is just wrong, globally. Even with just comp, but 
 this is also entailed by the quantum empirical facts (even with the 
 many-worlds view: if not they would not interfere). People can ask if 
 they are not yet convinced by this. I have refer this by saying that if 
 comp is true, physics is a branch of bio-psycho-theo-logy. matter 
 emerges (logico-arithmetically, not temporally) from mind and number.
 
 You can attach a mind to a body, like children does with dolls, but you 
 cannot attach a body to a mind, you can and must attach an infinity of 
 relative bodies to a mind. relative bodies are only defined by 
 infinity of arithmetical relationships, not by sub-bodies.
 
 (I know this contradicts Aristotle notion of Matter, but see Plotinus 
 for old platonist reasons, a priori independent of comp and QM, to 
 already suspect that Aristotle was wrong).
 
 
 unless you add the soul as an 

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-13 Thread Mohsen Ravanbakhsh
 Mathematics is just assuming some axioms and rules of inference and then
proving theorems that follow from those.  There's no restriction except that
it should be consistent, i.e. not every statement should be a theorem.  So
you can regard a game of chess as a mathematical theorem or even a Sherlock
Holmes story.  You may suppose these things exist in some sense, but
clearly they don't exist in the same sense as your computer.


Now I got it.

Only under the* *assumption that space has a Euclidean metric (*You are
assuming the same to oppose*)- which is begging the question.  From the
operational viewpoint (There are other viewpoints as you know), all
measurements yield integers (in some units (If you want to keep the same
unit for two measurements as I said you'd encounter the irrational
numbers)).  Real numbers are introduced in the Platonic realm to insure that
some integer equations have solutions(At least sometimes those equations
have some real counterparts).  Similarly imaginary numbers are introduced to
complete the algebra.  They are all our inventions - except some people
think the integers are not.
You're right to some extends, but my point still is a point!

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh.

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-13 Thread Brent Meeker

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote:
 Mathematics is just assuming some axioms and rules of inference and then 
 proving theorems that follow from those.  There's no restriction except 
 that it should be consistent, i.e. not every statement should be a 
 theorem.  So you can regard a game of chess as a mathematical theorem or 
 even a Sherlock Holmes story.  You may suppose these things exist in 
 some sense, but clearly they don't exist in the same sense as your 
 computer.
  
 
 Now I got it.
  
 Only under the* *assumption that space has a Euclidean metric (/You are 
 assuming the same to oppose/)- which is begging the question.  From the 
 operational viewpoint (There are other viewpoints as you know), 

Yes, but if they are not operational it is not clear how they relate to our 
world of experience.  Generally they are taken to be idealized models.

all 
 measurements yield integers (in some units (If you want to keep the same 
 unit for two measurements as I said you'd encounter the irrational 
 numbers)).  

No.  For example the most accurate measurement to confirm Pythogora's theorem 
now possible would be to use ultraviolet light and count the number of 
wavelengths along each side and the diagonal.  Those counts would all be 
integers.  At present this is a practical experimental limit and so one can 
imagine using shorter wavelengths and making more accurate measurements - which 
will still come out as integers.  But according to current theories of general 
relativity and quantum mechanics there is also a limit to how short the wave 
length can be; an in-principle limit.  Measurements never yield numbers that 
are not integers (or ratios of integers).

Brent Meeker

Real numbers are introduced in the Platonic realm to insure 
 that some integer equations have solutions(At least sometimes those 
 equations have some real counterparts).  Similarly imaginary numbers are 
 introduced to complete the algebra.  They are all our inventions - 
 except some people think the integers are not.
 You're right to some extends, but my point still is a point!
 
 Mohsen Ravanbakhsh.
 
 
  


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/13/07, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


 *Not necessarily. If you draw a diagonal on a square on a computer screen,
 it will be made up of a discrete number of pixels despite what Pythagoras'
 theorem calculates. Irrational in the real world may just be an illusion.
 *
 I was trying to mark a distance in real world which is irrational
 according to a rational unit(Width of pixels), and for such diagonal the
 distance is an irrational number, although it might be made up of rational
 numbers of another irrational unit (diagonal pixels)
 I mean there's some irrational distance out there!


How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/13/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron +
  proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its
  components;


 Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior
 entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from
 looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton,
 but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not
 genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction.


Quantum weirdness is an observed fact. We assume that it is, somehow, an
intrinsic property of subatomic particles; but perhaps there is a hidden
factor or as yet undiscovered theory which may explain it further.

 or you could say that it can be reduced to an electron + proton
  because these two components appropriately juxtaposed are necessary
  and sufficient to give rise to the hydrogen atom.

 In general this is not the case.


You could get a neutron at high enough energies, I suppose, but I don't
think that is what you mean. Is it possible to bring a proton and an
electron appropriately together and have them just sit there next to each
other?

 And if the atom is just a part of UD*, well, that's just another, more
  impressive reduction.


 But just comp, without the quantum, makes it implausible that an atom
 can be individuated so much that it makes sense to say it is just a
 part of the UD. And QM confirms this too. To compute the EXACT (all
 decimal) position of an electron in an hydrogen atom, soon or later you
 have to take into account of white rabbit path, where the electron
 will, for going from position x to the position y you are computing,
 follow the path x too earth, reacts locally and transforms itself into
 a white rabbit running for the democrat election in the US, loose the
 election and come back to y. Same with the UD, the object atom of
 hydrogen is only defined relatively to an infinity of first person
 plural expectation dependong on the WHOLE UD*. There is no sense to say
 an atom is part of the UD. It is part of the necessary discourse of
 self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's
 psychology/theology.


Isn't that the *ultimate* reduction of everything?

 As for knots, can't any particular physical knot be described in a 3D
  coordinate system? This is similar to describing a particular physical
  circle or triangle.

 Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is
 defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation
 from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it
 changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot
 identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the
 global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling
 for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description.
 People can look here for a cute knot table:
 http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html


I was thinking of a physical knot, which is not the same as the Platonic
ideal, even if there is no such thing as a separate physical reality.

 Only if God issues everyone with immaterial souls at birth, so that
  reproducing the material or functional structure of the brain fails to
  reproduce consciousness, would I say that reductionism does not
  work...

 OK, but then you identify reductionism with comp. I identify
 reductionism with the idea that something is entirely explainable in
 some finitary theory. From this I can explain that comp can be used to
 refute all reductionist theory of both matter and mind (and their
 relation).

 I am aware it is a subtle point, but if you understand the Universal
 Dovetailer Argument (UDA) from step 1 to 8, in the version:
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm
 then you should, I think, understand that the idea that there is
 anything made of something, although locally true and useful for many
 practical purpose, is just wrong, globally. Even with just comp, but
 this is also entailed by the quantum empirical facts (even with the
 many-worlds view: if not they would not interfere). People can ask if
 they are not yet convinced by this. I have refer this by saying that if
 comp is true, physics is a branch of bio-psycho-theo-logy. matter
 emerges (logico-arithmetically, not temporally) from mind and number.

 You can attach a mind to a body, like children does with dolls, but you
 cannot attach a body to a mind, you can and must attach an infinity of
 relative bodies to a mind. relative bodies are only defined by
 infinity of arithmetical relationships, not by sub-bodies.

 (I know this contradicts Aristotle notion of Matter, but see Plotinus
 for old platonist reasons, a priori independent of comp and QM, to
 already suspect that Aristotle was wrong).


  unless you add the soul as an element in the reduction.


 Of course, but 

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-12 Thread Bruno Marchal

Le 11-mars-07, à 17:56, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

 Reductionism means breaking something up into simpler parts to explain 
 it. What's wrong with that?


Because, assuming comp, neither matter nor mind (including perception) 
can be break up into simpler parts to be explained. That is what UDA is 
all about. First person expection (both on mind and matter) are already 
global notion relying on the whole UD*.
And empirical physics, currently quantum mechanics, confirms that 
indeed, we cannot explain matter by breaking it into parts. That is 
what violation of bell's inequality or more generally quantum 
information  is all about. This has been my first confirmation of 
comp by nature: non-locality is the easiest consequence of comp.

A good (and actually very deep) analogy is provided by the structure of 
knots (see the table of knots:

http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html

A knot is closed in its mathematical definition (unlike shoe tangle). 
You cannot break a knot in smaller parts, so that the whole structure 
is explained by the parts. Knots, like many topological structure, 
contains irreductible global information. The same for the notion of 
computations (and indeed those notions have deep relationship, see the 
following two impressive papers:

http://web.comlab.ox.ac.uk/oucl/work/samson.abramsky/tambook.pdf
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0606114

I know that Derek Parfit call comp the reductionist view. this is a 
very misleading use of vocabulary. Comp is the simplest destroyer of 
any reductionist attempt to understand anything, not just humans.


Bruno






 On 3/12/07, Bruno Marchal  [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Le 10-mars-07, à 18:42, John M a écrit :

  I don't deny the usefulness of science (even if it is reductionist) 
 ...


 How could science be reductionist? Science is the art of making
 hypotheses enough clear so as to make them doubtable and eventually
 testable.

 No scientist will ever say there is a primitive physical universe or 
 an
 ultimate God, or anything like that. All theories are hypothetical,
 including grandmother's one when asserting that the sun will rise
 tomorrow. The roots of our confidence in such or such theories are
  complex matter.

 Don't confuse science with the human approximation of it. Something
 quite interesting per se, also, but which develops itself.
 Lobian approximations of it are also rich of surprise, about 
 oneself.

 Science or better, the scientific attitude, invites us to listen to
 what the machine can say and dream of, nowadays. How could such an
 invitation be reductionist?

 I would say science is modesty. It is what makes faith necessary and
 possible.

 With comp, when science or reason grows polynomially (in a trip from G
 to G* for example), then faith has to grow super-exponentially.


  

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
OK, but it seems that we are using reductionism differently. You could say
that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron + proton because it
exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its components; or you could say
that it can be reduced to an electron + proton because these two components
appropriately juxtaposed are necessary and sufficient to give rise to the
hydrogen atom. And if the atom is just a part of UD*, well, that's just
another, more impressive reduction. As for knots, can't any particular
physical knot be described in a 3D coordinate system? This is similar to
describing a particular physical circle or triangle.

Only if God issues everyone with immaterial souls at birth, so that
reproducing the material or functional structure of the brain fails to
reproduce consciousness, would I say that reductionism does not work...
unless you add the soul as an element in the reduction.

Stathis Papaioannou

On 3/12/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


 Le 11-mars-07, à 17:56, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

  Reductionism means breaking something up into simpler parts to explain
  it. What's wrong with that?


 Because, assuming comp, neither matter nor mind (including perception)
 can be break up into simpler parts to be explained. That is what UDA is
 all about. First person expection (both on mind and matter) are already
 global notion relying on the whole UD*.
 And empirical physics, currently quantum mechanics, confirms that
 indeed, we cannot explain matter by breaking it into parts. That is
 what violation of bell's inequality or more generally quantum
 information  is all about. This has been my first confirmation of
 comp by nature: non-locality is the easiest consequence of comp.

 A good (and actually very deep) analogy is provided by the structure of
 knots (see the table of knots:

 http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html

 A knot is closed in its mathematical definition (unlike shoe tangle).
 You cannot break a knot in smaller parts, so that the whole structure
 is explained by the parts. Knots, like many topological structure,
 contains irreductible global information. The same for the notion of
 computations (and indeed those notions have deep relationship, see the
 following two impressive papers:

 http://web.comlab.ox.ac.uk/oucl/work/samson.abramsky/tambook.pdf
 http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0606114

 I know that Derek Parfit call comp the reductionist view. this is a
 very misleading use of vocabulary. Comp is the simplest destroyer of
 any reductionist attempt to understand anything, not just humans.


 Bruno





 
  On 3/12/07, Bruno Marchal  [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  Le 10-mars-07, à 18:42, John M a écrit :
 
   I don't deny the usefulness of science (even if it is reductionist)
  ...
 
 
  How could science be reductionist? Science is the art of making
  hypotheses enough clear so as to make them doubtable and eventually
  testable.
 
  No scientist will ever say there is a primitive physical universe or
  an
  ultimate God, or anything like that. All theories are hypothetical,
  including grandmother's one when asserting that the sun will rise
  tomorrow. The roots of our confidence in such or such theories are
   complex matter.
 
  Don't confuse science with the human approximation of it. Something
  quite interesting per se, also, but which develops itself.
  Lobian approximations of it are also rich of surprise, about
  oneself.
 
  Science or better, the scientific attitude, invites us to listen to
  what the machine can say and dream of, nowadays. How could such an
  invitation be reductionist?
 
  I would say science is modesty. It is what makes faith necessary and
  possible.
 
  With comp, when science or reason grows polynomially (in a trip from G
  to G* for example), then faith has to grow super-exponentially.
 
 
   
 
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-12 Thread Brent Meeker

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote:
 /All actual measurements yield rational values.  Using real numbers in 
 the equations of physics is probably merely a convenience (since 
 calculus is easier than finite differences).  There is no evidence that 
 defining an instantaneous state requires uncountable information. /
 
 What about the realizability of mathematical concepts. Real numbers are 
 mathematical, so they should have a counterpart in real world. 

Why?  Mathematical means nothing but not self-contradictory.  Sherlock Holmes 
stories are mathematical.  That doesn't mean Sherlock Holmes exists in some 
Platonic realm.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/11/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

  SP: ' ... it could take a long time to get there ... '

 MP: But is that according to the time frame of the laughing devil who
 threw me in there and who remains safely out of reach of
 acceleration-induced time dilation, or my wailing ghost which/who's mind
 and sensoria will be ever more wonderfully concentrated on 'what it is
 like to be' a piece of spaghetti, unable to see anything except *the
 destination*?


I'm not the best person on this list to answser, but I think the tidal
forces as you pass the event horizon of a very massive black hole would not
be enough to destroy you, since tidal forces are proportional to M/r^3 while
the Schwarzschild radius is proportional to M. Tidal forces will increase as
you approach the singularity, which is inevitable once you pass the event
horizon, but the time for this to happen is proportional to M. This refers
to your time frame: for the devil who threw you in, it would appear that you
never reach the event horizon.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

Le 10-mars-07, à 18:42, John M a écrit :

 I don't deny the usefulness of science (even if it is reductionist) ...


How could science be reductionist? Science is the art of making 
hypotheses enough clear so as to make them doubtable and eventually 
testable.

No scientist will ever say there is a primitive physical universe or an 
ultimate God, or anything like that. All theories are hypothetical, 
including grandmother's one when asserting that the sun will rise 
tomorrow. The roots of our confidence in such or such theories are 
complex matter.

Don't confuse science with the human approximation of it. Something 
quite interesting per se, also, but which develops itself.
Lobian approximations of it are also rich of surprise, about oneself.

Science or better, the scientific attitude, invites us to listen to 
what the machine can say and dream of, nowadays. How could such an 
invitation be reductionist?

I would say science is modesty. It is what makes faith necessary and 
possible.

With comp, when science or reason grows polynomially (in a trip from G 
to G* for example), then faith has to grow super-exponentially.


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-11 Thread John M
Bruno, 
please read my italic comments between your lines.
Thanks for Stathis to rush to my rescue (reductionsm),  
Stathis wrote:
Reductionism means breaking something up into simpler parts to explain it. 
What's wrong with that?
I will try to write my own version, a bit (not much)  different.

John
  - Original Message - 
  From: Bruno Marchal 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Sunday, March 11, 2007 10:45 AM
  Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb 
question.



  Le 10-mars-07, à 18:42, John M a écrit :


I don't deny the usefulness of science (even if it is reductionist) ...



  How could science be reductionist? Science is the art of making hypotheses 
enough clear so as to make them doubtable and eventually testable.
  My take on reductionist is to 'reduce' the observation to a 
boundary-enclosed model as our choice. It is a necessity for us, because we 
are not capable to encompass the totality and all its ramifications into our 
mind's work at once. Reduced (reductionist ) view is the way how humanity 
gathered our knowledge of the world. (Probably other animals do the same thing 
at their mind-level). 
  What I see here - and thank you, Bruno, for it, -  you are using a more 
advanced view of science than what I referred to as the conventional - 
historic, topically fragmented sciences of old. Where e.g. physics is based 
on the 'primitive' physical (material) worldview and  biology is what Darwin 
visualized. 
  Reductionist sciences established our technology. You use it, I use it. We 
just start to 'think' beyond it.
  *
  No scientist will ever say there is a primitive physical universe or an 
ultimate God, or anything like that. All theories are hypothetical, including 
grandmother's one when asserting that the sun will rise tomorrow. The roots of 
our confidence in such or such theories are complex matter.
  I wish we had more of your scientists. Academia as a general establishment 
is not so advanced yet.

  Don't confuse science with the human approximation of it. Something quite 
interesting per se, also, but which develops itself.
  Lobian approximations of it are also rich of surprise, about oneself.
  Now this is exactly what I mean. I would like to read a definition of 
'science' as you formulate it. Then again: how many 'scientists' have ever 
heard of a Lobian m?
  We are living here (list) in a vacuum and I was talking non-vacuum. 
  *
  Science or better, the scientific attitude, invites us to listen to what 
the machine can say and dream of, nowadays. How could such an invitation be 
reductionist?
  Here we go again: is the 'machine' superhuman? does it tell us things beyond 
our comprehension? How? We (Loeb etc.) invented and outlined it and its 
functionality. How can it be beyond those limits? 
  *
  I would say science is modesty. It is what makes faith necessary and possible.
  Faith in what? Not in 'hearsay', not in Alice-land, not in (really) reduced 
models of age-old worldviews. The 'supernatural' is a cop-out for the modesty 
to say:
  I know not  . 
  *
  With comp, when science or reason grows polynomially (in a trip from G to G* 
for example), then faith has to grow super-exponentially.
  I hope you have (Mark's) PLAIN ENGLISH TRANSLATION  to that in 
non-mathematico lingo.
  *
  Bruno

  regards
  John

  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-10 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/10/07, John Mikes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

i ENVY YOU, guys, to know so much about BHs to speak of a singularity.
 I would not go further than according to what is said about them, they
 may
 wash off whatever got into and turn into - sort of - a singularity.
 Galaxies, whatever, fall into those hypothetical BHs and who knows how
 much
 Dark Matter (the assumed), we just don't know - it all may be neatly
 stuffed
 in and escape from the habitual description of the 'singularity' as an
 indiscernible
 structural view, - or - as seemingly you assume: they homogenize (paste?)
 it all into a - well - singularity-content.

 Whoever KNOWS more about singularities, BHs, Dark Matter, should
 speak up - please: NO assumptions ('it got to be's) or deductions of such!



We don't know. We only guess on the basis of our best evidence and theories.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-10 Thread John M
Cher Quentin,
let me paraphrase (big):

so someone had an assumption: BH. OK, everybody has the right to fantasize. 
Especially if it sounds helpful.Then  
some mathematically loaded minds calculated within this assumption with 
quantities taken from other assumptions (pardon me: quantizing within other 
models in science). 
Then someone takes the results for real and examines if it gives infinity - a 
good game in the assumed topic. 
Then Olala: there it is. So: call it singularity. What? the 3+th level of an 
assumption, already taken as a fact in science. 
Careful analysis can show similar 'evolution' of other fiction into scientific 
facts. 

I don't deny the usefulness of science (even if it is reductionist) I happily 
use the results and even DID contribute to it, but when it comes to 
understanding - or at least evaluate reasonability, I use Occam's COMB to 
remove the added conclusions upon assumptions.
No hard feelings, it is MY opinion, and I am absolutely no missionary.

John M
  - Original Message - 
  From: Quentin Anciaux 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Friday, March 09, 2007 6:03 PM
  Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb 
question.



  Hi John,

  Singularity is just a name that means that the solutions of the equations 
  describing the BH gives infinity... It's what is a singularity. Does 
  the infinity is real (we must still be in accordance about what it means) 
  is another question, but accepting GR as a true approximation of reality, 
  singularity existence is a real question.

  Quentin

  On Friday 09 March 2007 23:37:49 John Mikes wrote:
   i ENVY YOU, guys, to know so much about BHs to speak of a singularity.
   I would not go further than according to what is said about them, they may
   wash off whatever got into and turn into - sort of - a singularity.
   Galaxies, whatever, fall into those hypothetical BHs and who knows how much
   Dark Matter (the assumed), we just don't know - it all may be neatly
   stuffed
   in and escape from the habitual description of the 'singularity' as an
   indiscernible
   structural view, - or - as seemingly you assume: they homogenize (paste?)
   it all into a - well - singularity-content.
  
   Whoever KNOWS more about singularities, BHs, Dark Matter, should
   speak up - please: NO assumptions ('it got to be's) or deductions of such!
  
   John M
  
   On 3/8/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 3/9/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
   
MP: Two thoughts come to my suspicious mind.
   
 1/   [Not far from the post-Freudian speculation :-] ... Attendance
 within the event horizon of a common or garden galactic variety black
 hole would seem to incorporate a one-way ticket *to* the singularity,
 would it not?
   
Yes, but it could take a very long time to get there in a massive enough
black hole.
   
Stathis Papaioannou
  
   



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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-10 Thread Jesse Mazer

John M:


Cher Quentin,
let me paraphrase (big):

so someone had an assumption: BH. OK, everybody has the right to fantasize. 
Especially if it sounds helpful.

Well, the basic assumption was more broad than that: it was that general 
relativity is a trustworthy theory of gravity. There's plenty of evidence 
that supports various predictions of GR which differ from Newtonian gravity, 
like the precession of the perihelion of Mercury's orbit, the gravitational 
lensing of light near stars and galaxies, and gravitational time dilation 
which can be measured at different altitudes on Earth (and it also needs to 
be taken into account when programming the clocks on board the orbiting GPS 
satellites). One of GR's predictions is that a sufficiently large collapsing 
star will form a black hole (another is that the universe must be either 
expanding or contracting, which lead to the Big Bang theory once redshift 
was observed). Black holes were theorized for a while, then in the last two 
decades they found observational evidence for a large number of likely black 
holes with telescopes.

Most physicists believe general relativity's predictions will cease to be 
accurate at the Planck scale of very short distances and times and very 
high energy densities, and that at these scales it will need to be replaced 
by a quantum theory of gravity. So although they are fairly confident that 
GR is correct about large collapsing stars forming a black hole with an 
event horizon and a size proportional to its mass (given by the 
'Swarzschild radius'), they think that the prediction of a singularity of 
infinite density at the center could be wrong, and that we'll need a theory 
of quantum gravity to understand what's really going on there.

Jesse

_
The average US Credit Score is 675. The cost to see yours: $0 by Experian. 
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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-10 Thread John Mikes
Dear Jesse,
thanks for the cool and objective words.
I take it back (not what I said: I mean the topic) further. Our edifice of
physical science
is a wonderful mental construct, balanced by applied math, all on quantities
fitting the reduced models of historical observations from the hand-ax on.
Explanations grew out from all consecutive levels  of our epistemic
enrichment and served as indisputable basis for later explanations (even if
they 'corrected' them, like the more than a dozen entropies and still
counting). Assumptions make good basis for thousands of level in consecutive
build-up we still use 'atoms', 'molecules' 'gravity' 'electricity', 'photon'
etc. etc. as our basis. Then comes your judgement that one theory in this
building looks finer than another. The learned
(brainwashed) scientist-mind finds them as natural as fish the nonexistence
of water. The huge amount of knowledge blocks any naive (elementary)
scrutiny of the basics.

I do not argue with your learned examples; within the system matches are
found especially quantitative ones, visualizing our select domain and
scale-restrictions.
'Observational evidence' is a belief in our up-to-date instrumental readings
explained INTO the theoretical faith as evidence. Wilson found the
background radiation because he had readings they were fitable and he new
about the idea of such possibility in view of the Big Bang (- assumption -
as we believe it today in our present cosmology). Eric Lerner's book (90s?)
presented some doubts (The Big Bang Never Was (title approximate) -) I added
some more upon my feeble thinking. How many ethers and phlogista do we
still have?
We got rid of elan vitale - but did we really?
I do not start a crusade against conventional science and understand the
reluctance of the practitioners to accept the endangerment of their wisdom.
Reductionist thinking (science) is the only one our mind is capable of
exercising (mine included), but I feel it is time to take a breath and a
wider view to elevate from the age-old concepts to the acceptance of
something else, without paradoxes, givens, axioms, in interconnection of
them all and ready for a change. Human science went through changes over the
millennia, even fundamental ones at times, there are more to come. I
remember the time when tachyon-observation was denied as false, because they
seemed FTL and this was prohibited. Theory over observed. I do not claim
that 'my views' are the call for a future, I did not invent them, just
picked up changing views (not so few on this list) and opened my mind to let
them in. Since I was not committed to the 'old' I had no problem. I allow
myself to be wrong and argue cautiously:
you may be right, I may be wrong, but I have to see that in a view broader
than the conventional physical teaching. I don't believe today my own
'macromolecules' I made and got patented, they are good within the old
theory. I saw 'effects' and applied the 'wisdom'  to explain them without
scrutiny. They worked. Not perfectly, as all we have has flaws (e.g.
airplanes fall out from the sky, medicines fail, buildings collapse, etc.,)
but we  are very confident in our science.  Well, I am not without scrutiny.

I love assumptions: they push forward our advancement. Just do not allow
them to become facts and basis for many levels of consecutive conclusions
without a grain of salt.

Your expressions (Most physicists believe, they are fairly confident,
or: general
relativity is a trustworthy theory of gravity and I do not go into
'gravity'. nor into the words of curvature of spacetime) are carefully
chosen. Religious people talk more straightforward in their religious
argumentation.

Excuse my lengthy reply,  I enjoyed your argument.
Regards

John M


On 3/10/07, Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


 John M:

 
 Cher Quentin,
 let me paraphrase (big):
 
 so someone had an assumption: BH. OK, everybody has the right to
 fantasize.
 Especially if it sounds helpful.

 Well, the basic assumption was more broad than that: it was that general
 relativity is a trustworthy theory of gravity. There's plenty of evidence
 that supports various predictions of GR which differ from Newtonian
 gravity,
 like the precession of the perihelion of Mercury's orbit, the
 gravitational
 lensing of light near stars and galaxies, and gravitational time dilation
 which can be measured at different altitudes on Earth (and it also needs
 to
 be taken into account when programming the clocks on board the orbiting
 GPS
 satellites). One of GR's predictions is that a sufficiently large
 collapsing
 star will form a black hole (another is that the universe must be either
 expanding or contracting, which lead to the Big Bang theory once redshift
 was observed). Black holes were theorized for a while, then in the last
 two
 decades they found observational evidence for a large number of likely
 black
 holes with telescopes.

 Most physicists believe general relativity's predictions will cease to be
 

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-10 Thread Mark Peaty


  SP: ' ... it could take a long time to get there ... '

MP: But is that according to the time frame of the laughing devil who 
threw me in there and who remains safely out of reach of 
acceleration-induced time dilation, or my wailing ghost which/who's mind 
and sensoria will be ever more wonderfully concentrated on 'what it is 
like to be' a piece of spaghetti, unable to see anything except *the 
destination*?
 
Regards
Mark Peaty  CDES
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
 


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


 On 3/9/07, *Mark Peaty* [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  

 MP: Two thoughts come to my suspicious mind.
 1/   [Not far from the post-Freudian speculation :-] ... Attendance
 within the event horizon of a common or garden galactic variety black
 hole would seem to incorporate a one-way ticket *to* the singularity,
 would it not?

  
 Yes, but it could take a very long time to get there in a massive 
 enough black hole.
  
 Stathis Papaioannou

  

 

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-09 Thread John Mikes
i ENVY YOU, guys, to know so much about BHs to speak of a singularity.
I would not go further than according to what is said about them, they may
wash off whatever got into and turn into - sort of - a singularity.
Galaxies, whatever, fall into those hypothetical BHs and who knows how much
Dark Matter (the assumed), we just don't know - it all may be neatly
stuffed
in and escape from the habitual description of the 'singularity' as an
indiscernible
structural view, - or - as seemingly you assume: they homogenize (paste?)
it all into a - well - singularity-content.

Whoever KNOWS more about singularities, BHs, Dark Matter, should
speak up - please: NO assumptions ('it got to be's) or deductions of such!

John M

On 3/8/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:



 On 3/9/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 MP: Two thoughts come to my suspicious mind.
  1/   [Not far from the post-Freudian speculation :-] ... Attendance
  within the event horizon of a common or garden galactic variety black
  hole would seem to incorporate a one-way ticket *to* the singularity,
  would it not?


 Yes, but it could take a very long time to get there in a massive enough
 black hole.

 Stathis Papaioannou



 


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-09 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Hi John,

Singularity is just a name that means that the solutions of the equations 
describing the BH gives infinity... It's what is a singularity. Does 
the infinity is real (we must still be in accordance about what it means) 
is another question, but accepting GR as a true approximation of reality, 
singularity existence is a real question.

Quentin

On Friday 09 March 2007 23:37:49 John Mikes wrote:
 i ENVY YOU, guys, to know so much about BHs to speak of a singularity.
 I would not go further than according to what is said about them, they may
 wash off whatever got into and turn into - sort of - a singularity.
 Galaxies, whatever, fall into those hypothetical BHs and who knows how much
 Dark Matter (the assumed), we just don't know - it all may be neatly
 stuffed
 in and escape from the habitual description of the 'singularity' as an
 indiscernible
 structural view, - or - as seemingly you assume: they homogenize (paste?)
 it all into a - well - singularity-content.

 Whoever KNOWS more about singularities, BHs, Dark Matter, should
 speak up - please: NO assumptions ('it got to be's) or deductions of such!

 John M

 On 3/8/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  On 3/9/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
  MP: Two thoughts come to my suspicious mind.
 
   1/   [Not far from the post-Freudian speculation :-] ... Attendance
   within the event horizon of a common or garden galactic variety black
   hole would seem to incorporate a one-way ticket *to* the singularity,
   would it not?
 
  Yes, but it could take a very long time to get there in a massive enough
  black hole.
 
  Stathis Papaioannou

 


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-08 Thread Mark Peaty


SP:' You wouldn't necessarily be squashed if you were inside the event 
horizon of a black hole provided that it was massive enough. Being 
inside the event horizon is not the same as being inside the singularity.'

MP: Two thoughts come to my suspicious mind.
1/   [Not far from the post-Freudian speculation :-] ... Attendance 
within the event horizon of a common or garden galactic variety black 
hole would seem to incorporate a one-way ticket *to* the singularity, 
would it not?

2/   I once heard someone on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's 
Radio National Science Show [on every Saturday after the midday news] 
describing our universe in these terms. His point was that whatever we 
might think about what was 'beyond' the bounds of 'our' universe, 
nothing from here can escape to 'there'. As I understand it this is in 
line with Einstein's concept of the universe being closed in upon 
itself, the key cause of which is gravity, the curvature of space-time.


MP: Going off at a tangent, I have a question which is quite possibly a 
dumb question that just needs to be asked because it CAN be asked.

Preamble: The expansion of the universe, characterised by the Hubble 
Constant I believe, is usually explained non-mathematically by analogy 
with the stretching of the surface of a balloon as the balloon is 
inflated. The balloon surface is stretched uniformly, pretty much, by 
its having everywhere the same tensile strength and elasticity and by 
the force which causes the deformation being applied equally all over 
because it is the averaged effect of all the gas particles within the 
contained volume. That much makes sense, and the overall effect is to 
cause point locations on the surface of the balloon to recede from one 
another at a rate which is proportional at any given moment to the 
distance between the points, measured along the surface.

Question: Would it be mathematically equivalent, or significantly 
different,  to consider the measured change in size and in distances as 
a uniform *contraction* of the metric, ie the measuring system, rather 
than an expansion of the location, so to speak. In particular, why is it 
not feasible to consider the Big Bang and subsequent Inflationary epoch 
as being in effect a collapse?

 
Regards
Mark Peaty  CDES
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
 


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


 On 3/8/07, *Mark Peaty* [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 NB: I hope that my imaginary destination in your speculation of
 possible
 post mortem exploits for my erstwhile sceptical soul is not a
 post-Freudian slip. I know that many of my contributions to this and
 other lists have lacked the erudite succinctness of those with greater
 talents; failure of concentration [AKA 'ADD'] has been a
 characteristic
 of life for me, but I think that 'awaking' to the innards of a black
 whole would do more than wonderfully concentrate the mind:
 concentration
 itself would become the major problem even for a ghost! =-O


 You wouldn't necessarily be squashed if you were inside the event 
 horizon of a black hole provided that it was massive enough. Being 
 inside the event horizon is not the same as being inside the singularity.

 Stathis Papaioannou

 

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-08 Thread John M
Stathis:
your starting the argument: IF the M-W-I(dea) is valid, it it seems to 
imply...which is a bit shaky (what if not?) - the law-like is a breakable 
compromise between confro nting arguments. Do I read some denigration of the 
White Rabbit? (coming from a wide interpretation of all possible)
Now to the meat of it: 
have you ever tried to outline the 'mind' of the early hiominid to survive? 
Before Immanuel Kant and even the Mother Goddess? Maybe with some notion of the 
most advanced and best weaponry 'ever': the hand--ax? or the 'mind' of an 
amoeba? 
Just asking questions in extension of ourselves.

John

  - Original Message - 
  From: Stathis Papaioannou 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2007 8:46 PM
  Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument
  SP wrote to BM:
  How so?  The Many Worlds idea seems to imply that you survive no matter what. 
The consequences of natural selection obtain only within worlds which are 
law-like - and we're back to the white rabbit problem. 

  You survive if a sufficiently close analogue of your mind survives. This can 
theoretically happen in many ways other than the obvious one (survival of your 
physical body): in parallel worlds, in a distant part of our own world if it is 
infinite in extent, in the Turing machine at the end of time. The white rabbit 
universes are a problem: since we don't observe them, maybe these theories are 
wrong, or maybe there is some other reason why we don't observe them. 

  Stathis Papaioannou


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

2007-03-08 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/9/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

MP: Two thoughts come to my suspicious mind.
 1/   [Not far from the post-Freudian speculation :-] ... Attendance
 within the event horizon of a common or garden galactic variety black
 hole would seem to incorporate a one-way ticket *to* the singularity,
 would it not?


Yes, but it could take a very long time to get there in a massive enough
black hole.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-08 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/9/07, John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


  Stathis:
 your starting the argument: IF the M-W-I(dea) is valid, it it seems to
 imply...which is a bit shaky (what if not?) - the law-like is a breakable
 compromise between confro nting arguments. Do I read some denigration of the
 White Rabbit? (coming from a wide interpretation of all possible)


I was merely pointing out that it is a problem to be explained, and Russell
has provided one explanation. As for the if, well, we wouldn't want to get
too dogmatic about the things we discuss here, would we?

 Now to the meat of it:
 have you ever tried to outline the 'mind' of the early hiominid to
 survive? Before Immanuel Kant and even the Mother Goddess? Maybe with some
 notion of the most advanced and best weaponry 'ever': the hand--ax? or the
 'mind' of an amoeba?
 Just asking questions in extension of ourselves.


You are perhaps asking about paleopsychology, a field I don't know anything
about, if anyone does. However, I was talking about what it means to survive
rather than the process whereby survival might be ensured.

Stathis Papaioannou

  - Original Message -
 *From:* Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
 *Sent:* Tuesday, March 06, 2007 8:46 PM
 *Subject:* Re: Evidence for the simulation argument
 SP wrote to BM:
 How so?  The Many Worlds idea seems to imply that you survive no matter
 what. The consequences of natural selection obtain only within worlds which
 are law-like - and we're back to the white rabbit problem.

 You survive if a sufficiently close analogue of your mind survives. This
 can theoretically happen in many ways other than the obvious one (survival
 of your physical body): in parallel worlds, in a distant part of our own
 world if it is infinite in extent, in the Turing machine at the end of time.
 The white rabbit universes are a problem: since we don't observe them, maybe
 these theories are wrong, or maybe there is some other reason why we don't
 observe them.

 Stathis Papaioannou


 


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-07 Thread Russell Standish

So are sets of cardinality \aleph_2 or sets of cardinality
\aleph_{\aleph_0}.

On the other hand, one set of cardinality 2^\aleph_0 appears to be big
enough to explain all of observed reality.

Maybe Tegmarkism is going too far...

On Wed, Mar 07, 2007 at 11:19:03AM +0330, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote:
 *All actual measurements yield rational values.  Using real numbers in the
 equations of physics is probably merely a convenience (since calculus is
 easier than finite differences).  There is no evidence that defining an
 instantaneous state requires uncountable information.*
 
 What about the realizability of mathematical concepts. Real numbers are
 mathematical, so they should have a counterpart in real world. What ever
 that counterpart is, it's toils the problem of uncountability.
 But I think your answer is the best shot.
 
 Mohsen Ravanbakhsh.
 
  

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks to Russell and Stathis

2007-03-07 Thread Mark Peaty

Firstly a big thank you to Russell Standish for providing that 
incredibly succinct 'bit stream' summary of universal-dovetailer 
ontology. [Though only a vocational mathematician would seriously call 
it 'very simple' even if it does have less than 1% of Bruno's word count 
for his essay on the subject.] Having the two approaches to the problem 
at hand has allowed me to get a bit of purchase on the beasty.

Thanks also to Stathis for that simple and lovely, 'obvious', question 
from left-field. I am now convinced that, no matter what others might 
say, each number is in fact a process. Bruno referred to some kind of 
Platonia, some unspeakably not-anywhere place as the source of numbers 
and other mathematical objects or relationships. That is all well and 
good but as far as I can see - still - the numbers and other 
mathematical objects that people use are words in the strictest sense. 
They arise in human minds through inter-subjective induction, empathic 
copying [mirror neurons], interaction with the world, etc. But they are 
created anew in each brain that learns them, same as all other 
constructs. Their fantastic power comes about because they reflect - 
emulate and simulate - emergent properties of the rest of the universe.

That this happens so successfully in so many people leads me to infer 
that the underlying principle organising the human mind, just as that 
organising the Great IT, the Multiverse, what ever, is harmonic resonance.

**
Meanwhile -
SP: 'How do you know that you are the same person from moment to moment 
in ordinary life? The physical processes in your brain create 
psychological continuity; that is, you know you are the same person 
today as yesterday because you have the same sense of personal identity, 
the same memories, woke up in the same environment, and so on. It is 
necessary and sufficient for survival that these psychological factors 
are generated, but it doesn't matter how this is achieved.'

MP: Yep! I am a story! I am not like a story, I *am* a story. It is *my* 
story and I'm sticking to it, except when I find there are aspects of it 
I don't like. The problem [or a problem] is that this does not take away 
any of the intrinsic paradox of our experience. As I have said many 
times our experience is what it is like to be the portrayal of self in 
the world created within one's brain. The rendition in its details is 
effectively *about* being a person in his/her world, moment by moment. 
The experience we argue about, and other, possibly less benighted, 
persons write poetry and songs about, is simply what it is like to be 
this rendition. The primary practical paradox for each of us is that 
unless this distinction is pointed out repeatedly, we mistake the 
rendition, the story,  for the world itself. We are doomed to live ever 
like this. From the recesses of my dark corner it looks as if Bruno can 
show us conclusively that this subjective-objective distinction is an 
inherent feature of any kind of universe that we humans have any real 
hope of understanding.

and as per the first part above, I think that the answer to the binding 
question in each domain is harmonic resonance. As far as I can see it 
accounts for why the pure gasses like to form molecular pairs; there 
have been reports recently that our sense of smell relies on inter and 
intra molecular vibrations as the fundamental [pun unintended] mechanism 
for detection and recognition of minuscule amounts of thousands of 
different airborne molecules; Steven Lehar has been banging his head 
against the wall for many years trying to point out to people how 
harmonic resonance can easily explain a huge range of Gestalt type 
capabilities clearly effected within the brain; correlations of brain 
wave frequencies have been discovered marking temporally related 
activities of the hippocampus and cortical regions shown through MR 
imaging to be involved in the creation or activation of memories. And 
the list goes on.

NB: I hope that my imaginary destination in your speculation of possible 
post mortem exploits for my erstwhile sceptical soul is not a 
post-Freudian slip. I know that many of my contributions to this and 
other lists have lacked the erudite succinctness of those with greater 
talents; failure of concentration [AKA 'ADD'] has been a characteristic 
of life for me, but I think that 'awaking' to the innards of a black 
whole would do more than wonderfully concentrate the mind: concentration 
itself would become the major problem even for a ghost! =-O

 
Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/

 



Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


 On 3/6/07, *Mark Peaty* [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  

 A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation
 of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the
 ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n
 [infinity^infinity] 

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks to Russell and Stathis

2007-03-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/8/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

NB: I hope that my imaginary destination in your speculation of possible
 post mortem exploits for my erstwhile sceptical soul is not a
 post-Freudian slip. I know that many of my contributions to this and
 other lists have lacked the erudite succinctness of those with greater
 talents; failure of concentration [AKA 'ADD'] has been a characteristic
 of life for me, but I think that 'awaking' to the innards of a black
 whole would do more than wonderfully concentrate the mind: concentration
 itself would become the major problem even for a ghost! =-O


You wouldn't necessarily be squashed if you were inside the event horizon of
a black hole provided that it was massive enough. Being inside the event
horizon is not the same as being inside the singularity.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-06 Thread Mark Peaty


Thank you Bruno!

You and Russell between you have managed to strike some sparks of 
illumination from the rocky inside of my skull. There is no beacon fire 
to report but I start to get a glimmering of why you want to *assume* 
comp and see where it leads.

It seems that self-reference and recursion are fundamental properties of 
anything that is interesting in all this, which rather seems to be the 
flavour of the new millennium.

Just in thinking superficially about the Many Worlds though, it seems to 
pose a 'binding problem'. Now, I know that might sound like a leakage of 
concept from objections to identity theory in brain and mind theory. But 
what I am thinking about is this bit:

6) this means that if I take the comp hyp seriously, then, to predict 
the results of any experiment/experience, I have to localize all the 
infinitely many instantiations of my current state in the UD, look at 
the uncountable comp histories going through that states, and compute 
the statistics bearing on all consistent first person 
self-continuation.

 A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation 
of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the 
ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n 
[infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know' 
that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled. What 
holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another 
infinite regression.

**
A quick aside, hopefully not totally unrelated: Am I right that a valid 
explanation of the zero point energy is that it is impossible *in 
principle* to  measure the state of something and therefore *we* must 
acknowledge the indeterminacy and so must everything else which exists 
because we are nothing special, except we think we know we are here, and 
if we are bound by quantum indeterminacy, so is everything else [unless 
it can come up with a good excuse!]?

[Perhaps this is more on Stathis's question to Russell: Is a real number 
an infinite process?]

**

 

Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/

 



Bruno Marchal wrote:
 Le 05-mars-07, à 15:03, Mark Peaty a écrit :


   
 Nobody here has yet explained in plain-English why we have entropy. Oh
 well, surely, in the Many Worlds, that's just one of the universes that
 can happen!
 


 Not really. That would make the comp hyp or the everything idea 
 trivial, and both the everything hyp  and the comp hyp would loose 
 any explicative power. (It *is* the problem with Schmidhuber's comp, 
 *and* with Tegmark's form of mathematicalism: see older posts for 
 that).




   
 Except that, for plain-English reasons stated above, there
 are *and always have been* infinity x infinity x infinity of entropic
 universes.

 It doesn't make sense.  Call me a heretic if you like, but I will 
 'stick
 to my guns' here: If it can't be put into plain-English then it 
 probably
 isn't true!
 



 I will try. I will, by the same token, answer Mohsen question here:




 Mohsen:
   
 I don't know if in the hypothesis of simulation, the conflict of 
 Countable and Uncountable has been considered.
 




 1) I assume the comp hyp, if only for the sake of the reasoning. The 
 comp hyp is NOT the hypothesis of simulation, but it is the hypothesis 
 that we are in principle self-simulable by a digital machine.

 2) Then we have to distinguish the first person points of view (1-pov) 
 from third person points of view (3-pov), and eventually we will have 
 to distinguish all Plotinus' hypostases.  With comp, we are duplicable. 
 I can be read and cut (copy) in Brussels, and be pasted in Washington 
 and Moscow simultaneously. This gives a simple example where:
 a) from the third point of view, there is no indeterminacy. An external 
 (3-pov) observer can predict Bruno will be in Washington AND in Moscow.
 b) from a first person point of view, there is an indeterminacy, I will 
 feel myself in washington OR in Moscow, not in the two places at once.

 3) Whatever means I use to quantify the first person indeterminacy, the 
 result will not depend on possible large delays between the 
 reconstitutions, nor of the virtual/material/purely-mathematical 
 character of the reconstitution.

 4) There exist a universal dovetailer (consequence of Church thesis, 
 but we could drop Church thesis and define comp in term of turing 
 machine instead).

 5) Never underestimate the dumbness of the universal dovetailer: not 
 only it generates all computational histories, but it generates them 
 all infinitely often, + all variations, + all real oracles (and those 
 oracles are uncountable).

 6) this means that if I take the comp hyp seriously, then, to predict 
 the results of any experiment/experience, I have to localize all the 
 infinitely many instantiations of my current state in the UD, look at 
 the uncountable comp histories going through that states, 

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-06 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/6/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


 A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation
 of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the
 ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n
 [infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know'
 that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled. What
 holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another
 infinite regression.


How do you know that you are the same person from moment to moment in
ordinary life? The physical processes in your brain create psychological
continuity; that is, you know you are the same person today as yesterday
because you have the same sense of personal identity, the same memories,
woke up in the same environment, and so on. It is necessary and sufficient
for survival that these psychological factors are generated, but it doesn't
matter how this is achieved. If you suddenly die today and are miraculously
recreated inside the event horizon of a black hole, no-one will ever be able
to find you again but you will be able to find yourself.

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-06 Thread Brent Meeker

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
 
 On 3/6/07, *Mark Peaty* [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  
 
 A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation
 of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the
 ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n
 [infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know'
 that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled.
 What
 holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another
 infinite regression.
 
  
 How do you know that you are the same person from moment to moment in 
 ordinary life? The physical processes in your brain create psychological 
 continuity; that is, you know you are the same person today as yesterday 
 because you have the same sense of personal identity, the same memories, 
 woke up in the same environment, and so on. It is necessary and 
 sufficient for survival that these psychological factors are generated, 
 but it doesn't matter how this is achieved. 

How so?  The Many Worlds idea seems to imply that you survive no matter what. 
The consequences of natural selection obtain only within worlds which are 
law-like - and we're back to the white rabbit problem.

Brent Meeker


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-06 Thread Russell Standish

On Wed, Mar 07, 2007 at 12:46:32PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 On 3/7/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 
   How do you know that you are the same person from moment to moment in
   ordinary life? The physical processes in your brain create psychological
   continuity; that is, you know you are the same person today as yesterday
   because you have the same sense of personal identity, the same memories,
   woke up in the same environment, and so on. It is necessary and
   sufficient for survival that these psychological factors are generated,
   but it doesn't matter how this is achieved.
 
  How so?  The Many Worlds idea seems to imply that you survive no matter
  what. The consequences of natural selection obtain only within worlds which
  are law-like - and we're back to the white rabbit problem.
 
 
 You survive if a sufficiently close analogue of your mind survives. This can
 theoretically happen in many ways other than the obvious one (survival of
 your physical body): in parallel worlds, in a distant part of our own world
 if it is infinite in extent, in the Turing machine at the end of time. The
 white rabbit universes are a problem: since we don't observe them, maybe
 these theories are wrong, or maybe there is some other reason why we don't
 observe them.
 
 Stathis Papaioannou
 

Well there is a reason we don't observe them, due to observational
selection effects tied to Occam's razor. This is written up in my Why
Occams Razor paper. Nobody has shot down the argument yet, in spite
of it being around on this list since 1999, and in spite of it being
published since 2004.

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-06 Thread Jesse Mazer

Russell Standish wrote:


Well there is a reason we don't observe them, due to observational
selection effects tied to Occam's razor. This is written up in my Why
Occams Razor paper. Nobody has shot down the argument yet, in spite
of it being around on this list since 1999, and in spite of it being
published since 2004.

The basic problem I have with this proposal is the starting assumption, 
where you say that the natural measure induced on the ensemble of bitstring 
is the uniform one. This sort of assumption is made by a number of TOEs 
including Schidhuber's, but it always seemed fairly arbitrary to me, not 
much different in principle from assuming that the measure produced by the 
laws of physics in our universe (which, under the MWI, will probably include 
some instances of every possible finite computation in some branch or 
another) should be taken as a starting point. I posted on this issue in one 
of my first posts on this list:

http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/0d5915764b7f3e08/fc56caf79ce58750?#fc56caf79ce58750

Jesse

_
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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-06 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/7/07, Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Russell Standish wrote:

 
 Well there is a reason we don't observe them, due to observational
 selection effects tied to Occam's razor. This is written up in my Why
 Occams Razor paper. Nobody has shot down the argument yet, in spite
 of it being around on this list since 1999, and in spite of it being
 published since 2004.

 The basic problem I have with this proposal is the starting assumption,
 where you say that the natural measure induced on the ensemble of
 bitstring
 is the uniform one. This sort of assumption is made by a number of TOEs
 including Schidhuber's, but it always seemed fairly arbitrary to me, not
 much different in principle from assuming that the measure produced by the
 laws of physics in our universe (which, under the MWI, will probably
 include
 some instances of every possible finite computation in some branch or
 another) should be taken as a starting point. I posted on this issue in
 one
 of my first posts on this list:


 http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/0d5915764b7f3e08/fc56caf79ce58750?#fc56caf79ce58750


If a uniform measure leads to the world we see, isn't that empirical
evidence that it is the correct one? A uniform measure, or no measure at all
(which seems to me equivalent), isn't really as arbitrary as some specific
measure from physics, which as you imply is what the whole everything idea
is trying to avoid. Could the question in theory be settled by experiment,
running the UD and counting the relative number of structures?

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-06 Thread Russell Standish

On Wed, Mar 07, 2007 at 04:30:57PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 On 3/7/07, Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 Russell Standish wrote:
 
  
  Well there is a reason we don't observe them, due to observational
  selection effects tied to Occam's razor. This is written up in my Why
  Occams Razor paper. Nobody has shot down the argument yet, in spite
  of it being around on this list since 1999, and in spite of it being
  published since 2004.
 
  The basic problem I have with this proposal is the starting assumption,
  where you say that the natural measure induced on the ensemble of
  bitstring
  is the uniform one. This sort of assumption is made by a number of TOEs
  including Schidhuber's, but it always seemed fairly arbitrary to me, not
  much different in principle from assuming that the measure produced by the
  laws of physics in our universe (which, under the MWI, will probably
  include
  some instances of every possible finite computation in some branch or
  another) should be taken as a starting point. I posted on this issue in
  one
  of my first posts on this list:
 
 
  http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/0d5915764b7f3e08/fc56caf79ce58750?#fc56caf79ce58750
 
 
 If a uniform measure leads to the world we see, isn't that empirical
 evidence that it is the correct one? A uniform measure, or no measure at all
 (which seems to me equivalent), isn't really as arbitrary as some specific
 measure from physics, which as you imply is what the whole everything idea
 is trying to avoid. Could the question in theory be settled by experiment,
 running the UD and counting the relative number of structures?
 
 Stathis Papaioannou
 

True, and this was the sense in which I adopted it for the
paper. 

However, I think there is an even better argument. By interposing
another suitable onto function (f:{0,1}*-{0,1}* say) between the
observer and the ensemble of strings, one can make the ensemble of
bitstrings have any measure one likes.

So by composing the observer function O(x) with f(x), we can perform
the treatment for an arbitrary measure as though the we had an
observer O(f(x)) observing strings selected from a uniform measure.

In short terms, one can write Without loss of generality, assume a
uniform measure over the strings.

Whichever way you cut it, structure is still in the eye of the
observer :)

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-06 Thread Mohsen Ravanbakhsh
*All actual measurements yield rational values.  Using real numbers in the
equations of physics is probably merely a convenience (since calculus is
easier than finite differences).  There is no evidence that defining an
instantaneous state requires uncountable information.*

What about the realizability of mathematical concepts. Real numbers are
mathematical, so they should have a counterpart in real world. What ever
that counterpart is, it's toils the problem of uncountability.
But I think your answer is the best shot.

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh.

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-05 Thread Mohsen Ravanbakhsh
I don't know if in the hypothesis of simulation, the conflict of Countable
and Uncountable has been considered.
When we're talking about a machine with an infinite power of computation,
we're considering a TM which has a countable number of states, even if it's
running an undecidable problem to produce the infinite possible outputs and
even we're considering time to be infinitely compressed to allow for the
infinity of the power of our machine, at the end the possible states of a TM
is Countably infinite.

But as one might notice we have some continuous and therefore Uncountable
parameters in our universe, like the measures of distance which are not
reducible to countable ones even considering the concept of precision. They
are naturally Uncountable.

Now the question is: can that kind of infinitely powerful machine simulate
this infinite reality?
Am I missing a point?
-- 

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh,

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-05 Thread Mark Peaty

Hello Moshen and welcome.

I think it is a very good question, and succinctly put.

I have been trying to ask the same question and get a plain-English 
answer, but without success. Of course, I could be missing 'the point' 
too, and it wouldn't be the first time by a long shot. :-)

If there was simply nothing, utterly and absolutely nothing, well that 
would be the end of it: 'No problemas!' as the cool dudes say. But there 
seems to be something, because I seem to be here, at the moment anyway, 
and I have this distinct belief that I was here yesterday living in this 
same house with all these recalcitrantly individualistic people who all 
play along with a story about being my wife and children. Appeals to 
solipsism degenerate into incoherent babbling; I really am here, even 
though my grasp of the facts about my existence gets shaken loose every 
so often. And you are here too, except you are over there. In short 
there IS a universe and it seems to be remarkably self-consistent.

I, like you, am confronted by the manifest existence of an objective 
reality. Being educated and impressed by the successes of the 
application of scientific method we are quite well equipped to accept 
certain problematic statements about the parts of the world we normally 
take for granted as 'real'. We have learned that the *appearances* of 
solidity, power, enduring nature, and so forth, which we experience as 
*qualities* of those things, are not the full story; that in fact the 
'*true* nature of things is that if you try and find absolute objective 
boundaries to things you can't and if you try to make any other kind of 
measurement, you have to make do with an approximation. Indeed, the more 
you wish to precisely specify anything about the location or motion of 
anything then the more you must accept a complex statistical description 
about the rest of its characteristics.

Well and good; normally we don't have to worry about this too much. It 
is only when we start persistently asking *How does it all work?* that 
the seemingly intractable problems begin. And for each of us there is 
some kind of recursive process: we read and interact with others  
[indeed some lucky people can apparently just wander into the next room 
and straight away *talk* on the topic with someone who is interested!], 
and then we cogitate and imagine things and some of you scribble arcane 
arithmetic and run mathematical 'what-ifs' on computers; finally we 
reach some kind of internal stability of viewpoint that allows a 
reassessment of things previously held to be clear, or problematic 
perhaps. But after some time, doubt sets in, we think something far 
enough through and see a problem or, more likely, we read of some new 
viewpoint which challenges what we believe and we feel we must take it 
seriously because of its apparent validity, consistency, etc, or it is 
presented by someone we respect. Either way we have to work to either 
assimilate it or uncover valid reasons for rejecting it.

The mathematicians who contribute here seemingly have no problems with a 
totally 'insubstantial' existence of numbers. Unlike me who has 
*ultimate* problems wrapping my head around the idea. I have not yet 
succeeded. You asked about 'assumptions' in you 'Joining' thread, but 
here by definition the only one is the existence of Many Worlds, which 
is hugely problematic because nobody really knows what it means. In my 
case it is obvious why, but in the case of those who *espouse* the 
Many-Worlds hypothesis, I have absolutely know idea how they can account 
for the purely logical - and therefore mathematically necessary, yes? - 
consequence of the problem you have so succinctly put. As I reason it, 
this 'continuous' aspect of location, even if it is only 'virtual' 
guarantees that the Many Worlds are always proliferating at a rate which 
must effectively be an infinity times an infinity of infinities. [I fear 
I might have underestimated the speed there, but as I say, my maths is 
not all that good!] In other words it seems to make no sense at all! 
Why? [Grin!] well because *my* world seems to be just one story. What 
keeps it together? It can't be any inherent smartness on my part! [Grin 
again; no false modesty there mate!] So *IT*, what I call 'The Great 
IT', is just doing IT'S thing.

Nobody here has yet explained in plain-English why we have entropy. Oh 
well, surely, in the Many Worlds, that's just one of the universes that 
can happen! Except that, for plain-English reasons stated above, there 
are *and always have been* infinity x infinity x infinity of entropic 
universes.

It doesn't make sense.  Call me a heretic if you like, but I will 'stick 
to my guns' here: If it can't be put into plain-English then it probably 
isn't true!

:-)

Regards

Mark Peaty  CDES

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/

 



Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote:
 I don't know if in the hypothesis of simulation, the conflict of 
 Countable and 

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 05-mars-07, à 15:03, Mark Peaty a écrit :


 Nobody here has yet explained in plain-English why we have entropy. Oh
 well, surely, in the Many Worlds, that's just one of the universes that
 can happen!


Not really. That would make the comp hyp or the everything idea 
trivial, and both the everything hyp  and the comp hyp would loose 
any explicative power. (It *is* the problem with Schmidhuber's comp, 
*and* with Tegmark's form of mathematicalism: see older posts for 
that).




 Except that, for plain-English reasons stated above, there
 are *and always have been* infinity x infinity x infinity of entropic
 universes.

 It doesn't make sense.  Call me a heretic if you like, but I will 
 'stick
 to my guns' here: If it can't be put into plain-English then it 
 probably
 isn't true!



I will try. I will, by the same token, answer Mohsen question here:




Mohsen:
 I don't know if in the hypothesis of simulation, the conflict of 
 Countable and Uncountable has been considered.




1) I assume the comp hyp, if only for the sake of the reasoning. The 
comp hyp is NOT the hypothesis of simulation, but it is the hypothesis 
that we are in principle self-simulable by a digital machine.

2) Then we have to distinguish the first person points of view (1-pov) 
from third person points of view (3-pov), and eventually we will have 
to distinguish all Plotinus' hypostases.  With comp, we are duplicable. 
I can be read and cut (copy) in Brussels, and be pasted in Washington 
and Moscow simultaneously. This gives a simple example where:
a) from the third point of view, there is no indeterminacy. An external 
(3-pov) observer can predict Bruno will be in Washington AND in Moscow.
b) from a first person point of view, there is an indeterminacy, I will 
feel myself in washington OR in Moscow, not in the two places at once.

3) Whatever means I use to quantify the first person indeterminacy, the 
result will not depend on possible large delays between the 
reconstitutions, nor of the virtual/material/purely-mathematical 
character of the reconstitution.

4) There exist a universal dovetailer (consequence of Church thesis, 
but we could drop Church thesis and define comp in term of turing 
machine instead).

5) Never underestimate the dumbness of the universal dovetailer: not 
only it generates all computational histories, but it generates them 
all infinitely often, + all variations, + all real oracles (and those 
oracles are uncountable).

6) this means that if I take the comp hyp seriously, then, to predict 
the results of any experiment/experience, I have to localize all the 
infinitely many instantiations of my current state in the UD, look at 
the uncountable comp histories going through that states, and compute 
the statistics bearing on all consistent first person 
self-continuation.

7) A naive reading of this leads to predict white rabbits (indeed the 
lewis Carroll one) and perhaps white noise, that is too much entropy 
... This leads to a cheap refutation of comp, ...

8) ... except that the math shows this is a bit too cheap. Now if comp 
is correct, AND if the physical laws are (approximately) correct, then 
we have to extract the physical laws
a) without assuming the existence of a physical universe,
b) from the comp statistics.

My (more technical) result is that computer science and mathematical 
logics gives already clues that indeed we can recover the physical laws 
from computer science, once we get the relevant description of the 
different points of view.

In particular, for Mohsen's question, the conflict between countable 
and uncountable appears to be an unavoidable conflict between first and 
third person points of view. The first person is bound up to interact 
with uncountable physical apparent reality.
But all self-referentially correct universal machine introspecting 
herself can discover the unavoidability of that conflict, and somehow 
meta-solve it, indeed by distinguishing explicitly those points of 
view again. When she does this, she discover a more subtle tension 
between recursively countable and non recursively countable. This 
tension is creative and can be proposed as a beginning of explanation 
of life and local neguentropy.

All this makes comp, and its related theology (theory of everything 
including persons, say), empirically testable: derive the comp-physics 
and compare with empirical nature.

Must go. Hope this helps, (see papers in my url for more, or just ask)

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-05 Thread Brent Meeker

Mark Peaty wrote:
 Hello Moshen and welcome.
 
 I think it is a very good question, and succinctly put.
 
 I have been trying to ask the same question and get a plain-English 
 answer, but without success. Of course, I could be missing 'the point' 
 too, and it wouldn't be the first time by a long shot. :-)
 
 If there was simply nothing, utterly and absolutely nothing, well that 
 would be the end of it: 'No problemas!' as the cool dudes say. But there 
 seems to be something, because I seem to be here, at the moment anyway, 
 and I have this distinct belief that I was here yesterday living in this 
 same house with all these recalcitrantly individualistic people who all 
 play along with a story about being my wife and children. Appeals to 
 solipsism degenerate into incoherent babbling; I really am here, even 
 though my grasp of the facts about my existence gets shaken loose every 
 so often. And you are here too, except you are over there. In short 
 there IS a universe and it seems to be remarkably self-consistent.
 
 I, like you, am confronted by the manifest existence of an objective 
 reality. Being educated and impressed by the successes of the 
 application of scientific method we are quite well equipped to accept 
 certain problematic statements about the parts of the world we normally 
 take for granted as 'real'. We have learned that the *appearances* of 
 solidity, power, enduring nature, and so forth, which we experience as 
 *qualities* of those things, are not the full story; that in fact the 
 '*true* nature of things is that if you try and find absolute objective 
 boundaries to things you can't and if you try to make any other kind of 
 measurement, you have to make do with an approximation. Indeed, the more 
 you wish to precisely specify anything about the location or motion of 
 anything then the more you must accept a complex statistical description 
 about the rest of its characteristics.
 
 Well and good; normally we don't have to worry about this too much. It 
 is only when we start persistently asking *How does it all work?* that 
 the seemingly intractable problems begin. And for each of us there is 
 some kind of recursive process: we read and interact with others  
 [indeed some lucky people can apparently just wander into the next room 
 and straight away *talk* on the topic with someone who is interested!], 
 and then we cogitate and imagine things and some of you scribble arcane 
 arithmetic and run mathematical 'what-ifs' on computers; finally we 
 reach some kind of internal stability of viewpoint that allows a 
 reassessment of things previously held to be clear, or problematic 
 perhaps. But after some time, doubt sets in, we think something far 
 enough through and see a problem or, more likely, we read of some new 
 viewpoint which challenges what we believe and we feel we must take it 
 seriously because of its apparent validity, consistency, etc, or it is 
 presented by someone we respect. Either way we have to work to either 
 assimilate it or uncover valid reasons for rejecting it.
 
 The mathematicians who contribute here seemingly have no problems with a 
 totally 'insubstantial' existence of numbers. Unlike me who has 
 *ultimate* problems wrapping my head around the idea. I have not yet 
 succeeded. You asked about 'assumptions' in you 'Joining' thread, but 
 here by definition the only one is the existence of Many Worlds, which 
 is hugely problematic because nobody really knows what it means. In my 
 case it is obvious why, but in the case of those who *espouse* the 
 Many-Worlds hypothesis, I have absolutely know idea how they can account 
 for the purely logical - and therefore mathematically necessary, yes? - 
 consequence of the problem you have so succinctly put. As I reason it, 
 this 'continuous' aspect of location, even if it is only 'virtual' 
 guarantees that the Many Worlds are always proliferating at a rate which 
 must effectively be an infinity times an infinity of infinities. [I fear 
 I might have underestimated the speed there, but as I say, my maths is 
 not all that good!] In other words it seems to make no sense at all! 
 Why? [Grin!] well because *my* world seems to be just one story. What 
 keeps it together? It can't be any inherent smartness on my part! [Grin 
 again; no false modesty there mate!] So *IT*, what I call 'The Great 
 IT', is just doing IT'S thing.
 
 Nobody here has yet explained in plain-English why we have entropy. 

I quite agree with you about Many Worlds - it's not even an hypothesis; it's a 
whole class of hypotheses.  And I don't think numbers exist either in the way 
that I exist, though I'm open to defining different kinds of existence.  But I 
think I can explain why we have entropy.

The short answer is that we have entropy for the same reason we have number and 
distance and duration and energy and temperature, etc.   We invented them.  
They are variables in our model of the world.  Usually in our model 

Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-05 Thread John Mikes
Jason, after Danny's very interesting treatise your reply gave me a clue I
completely misunderstood so far. As i wrote to Brent, my vocabulary is not
your
vocabulary and the meanings mix up. Simulation emerged to me as 'copying',
while
you lit up the little lamp to consider it as 'forming a simulacron' (sort
of), a way to
make - what I call - a model including those characteristics which we
might find
relevant. Which is a way of examining our topic in ' certain' detailing.

Thanks, it is interesting.

John M

On 3/4/07, Jason [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


 On Mar 4, 12:09 pm, Danny Mayes  [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  Why some intelligent beings in some other part of the
  multiverse may want to simulate or emulate our part of the multiverse is
  interesting as well, but is entirely unrelated to the logic of whether
 the
  entire entity is at least in part a simulation as set forth above.
 
  Danny Mayes

 I think such simulation will be the ultimate goal of technology for
 any intelligent and curious species.  Simulation is the ultimate form
 of exploration as it allows connections to be made between otherwise
 unreachable universes.  If every possible universe exists and each is
 non-interacting, the only way to explore the other possibilities for
 existance would be simulation.  Any universes where a Turing machine
 can be built can discover all Turing emulable universes.  New
 universes are not being created when a simulation is conducted, rather
 a connection is made to a possible existance which has always been
 there.

 Douglas Jones wrote a very interesting hypothetical conversation
 between a human and a highly advanced alien who lives in cyberspace
 where not only can any imaginable environment or universebe be
 simulated, but all beings like him had thier minds uploaded and are
 also simulated.  It is available at
 http://www.station1.net/douglasjones/aconvers.htm
 and is well worth the read.  Mind uploading and simulation I think
 would be desirable to any intelligent and sufficently advanced race.
 It offers unlimited freedom, immortality (or at least greatly extended
 existance), and the ability to participate in fully immersive game
 worlds which are subjectively indistingushable from any other
 reality.

 I believe there may even be a statistical argument for our existance
 in such a game world now.  Consider that in human history, about 60
 billion humans have ever lived.  If humanity reaches a technological
 singularity in the near future, and the majority of the human race
 uploaded their minds into computers, it would only take each person on
 average playing 10 lifetimes (600-700 years) worth of these immersive
 games before the bulk of human experience has been simulated as
 opposed to physical.  Considering such a civilization could last many
 billions of years if not longer, the simulated human experiences would
 greatly outweigh the physics-based ones.

 Jason


 


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-05 Thread Russell Standish

On Mon, Mar 05, 2007 at 04:31:23PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 I will try. I will, by the same token, answer Mohsen question here:
 
 
 
 
 Mohsen:
  I don't know if in the hypothesis of simulation, the conflict of 
  Countable and Uncountable has been considered.
 
 

...

 
 In particular, for Mohsen's question, the conflict between countable 
 and uncountable appears to be an unavoidable conflict between first and 
 third person points of view. 

Bruno's answer is right, but not necessarily the easiest to
understand. A very simple way of putting it is to consider sampling a
random bitstream. Every time a bit is sampled, the Multiverse branches
with the observed bit being 0 or 1 depending on your branch. If you
were to continue for an infinite amount of time, each observer will
have observed a real number. However after any finite amount of time,
all the observers have are rational approximations to real numbers.

Just so in our real world. You can either think of each of us as
sampling multiple random bitstream, or alternatively weaving together
all of the data streaming into our senses into a single bitstream. Its
mathematically equivalent, of course. All of our physical measurements
are rational approximations, and are continually refined as we
continue our measurements.

Cheers

-- 

A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 3/6/07, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


 Bruno's answer is right, but not necessarily the easiest to
 understand. A very simple way of putting it is to consider sampling a
 random bitstream. Every time a bit is sampled, the Multiverse branches
 with the observed bit being 0 or 1 depending on your branch. If you
 were to continue for an infinite amount of time, each observer will
 have observed a real number. However after any finite amount of time,
 all the observers have are rational approximations to real numbers.


Is that saying a real number has a contable infinity of decimal places?

Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-05 Thread Russell Standish

On Tue, Mar 06, 2007 at 12:48:40PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 On 3/6/07, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
 
  Bruno's answer is right, but not necessarily the easiest to
  understand. A very simple way of putting it is to consider sampling a
  random bitstream. Every time a bit is sampled, the Multiverse branches
  with the observed bit being 0 or 1 depending on your branch. If you
  were to continue for an infinite amount of time, each observer will
  have observed a real number. However after any finite amount of time,
  all the observers have are rational approximations to real numbers.
 
 
 Is that saying a real number has a contable infinity of decimal places?
 
 Stathis Papaioannou
 

Yes, of course. 

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-05 Thread Mohsen Ravanbakhsh
Thank you for welcoming me Mark,
I agree with you about the problem with the concept of entropy, but not all
your points. Actually I like this hypothesis, and as Bruno put it we might
be able to describe the Why question about physical laws, which is very
interesting.


4) There exist a universal dovetailer (consequence of Church thesis,
but we could drop Church thesis and define comp in term of turing
machine instead).

5) Never underestimate the dumbness of the universal dovetailer: not
only it generates all computational histories, but it generates them
all infinitely often, + all variations, + all real oracles (and those
oracles are uncountable).

Let me know where's my mistake:

1.We are referring to one (actually an infinitely long sub-sequence of that)
history of such universal dovetailer, as some state of our world.

2.Because that machine is a TM, a history has to be countable, regardless of
compression or expansion of time to allow infinite power.

3.So we're referring to some state of our universe as a countable one.

4.A universal state is not countable.

Every time a bit is sampled, the Multiverse branches
with the observed bit being 0 or 1 depending on your branch. If you
were to continue for an infinite amount of time, each observer will
have observed a real number. However after any finite amount of time,
all the observers have are rational approximations to real numbers.

But we're talking about uncountability of information necessary to represent
instantaneous state of a universe, not about the uncountability of possible
universes. (Maybe I didn't get your point)
What you are saying just proves that we have uncountable number of
universes.



-- 
Mohsen Ravanbakhsh,

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Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-05 Thread Brent Meeker

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote:
 
 Thank you for welcoming me Mark,
 I agree with you about the problem with the concept of entropy, but not 
 all your points. Actually I like this hypothesis, and as Bruno put it we 
 might be able to describe the Why question about physical laws, which is 
 very interesting.
 
 
 4) There exist a universal dovetailer (consequence of Church thesis,
 but we could drop Church thesis and define comp in term of turing
 machine instead).
 
 5) Never underestimate the dumbness of the universal dovetailer: not
 only it generates all computational histories, but it generates them
 all infinitely often, + all variations, + all real oracles (and those
 oracles are uncountable).
 
 Let me know where's my mistake:
 
 1.We are referring to one (actually an infinitely long sub-sequence of 
 that) history of such universal dovetailer, as some state of our world.
 
 2.Because that machine is a TM, a history has to be countable, 
 regardless of compression or expansion of time to allow infinite power.
 
 3.So we're referring to some state of our universe as a countable one.
 
 4.A universal state is not countable.
 
 Every time a bit is sampled, the Multiverse branches
 with the observed bit being 0 or 1 depending on your branch. If you
 were to continue for an infinite amount of time, each observer will
 have observed a real number. However after any finite amount of time,
 all the observers have are rational approximations to real numbers.
 
 But we're talking about uncountability of information necessary to 
 represent instantaneous state of a universe, not about the 
 uncountability of possible universes. (Maybe I didn't get your point)
 What you are saying just proves that we have uncountable number of 
 universes.

All actual measurements yield rational values.  Using real numbers in the 
equations of physics is probably merely a convenience (since calculus is easier 
than finite differences).  There is no evidence that defining an instantaneous 
state requires uncountable information.

Brent Meeker

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RE: Evidence for the simulation argument

2007-03-04 Thread Danny Mayes
I've no idea why we might be being simulated if we are being simulated. It
is actually very arrogant to assume that we are somehow the centre of the
simulation at all, like bacteria in my gut assuming that the universe, the
solar sysstem, humans were made for their benefit. 

 

Stathis Papaioannou

 

I have a problem with the very premise of asking why we are being simulated.
Having been a member of this list for years, I have seen objections to the
simulation argument raised repeatedly that are along the lines of it is
presumptuous to assume anyone would want to simulate us, or it is entirely
speculative and not based in science, etc.  I have also seen a fair amount
of discussion about how the simulation could be done.

 

To me, the logical chain is straightforward.  If you accept a MWI
interpretation or some other ensemble theory, then everything that can
happen does happen.  There is maybe a little wiggle room here, as perhaps
you can have a MWI with an enormous number of universes versus and infinite
number, depending on the nature of the underlying implementation, but as I
understand it from earlier discussions and from my reading, most interpret
MWI as requiring an actual infinity.

 

Now, after you have the MWI as the underlying foundation, there is really
only one additional question that needs to be answered.  Is there something
fundamentally primitively physical and non-reproducible about my existence
that would forever prohibit any attempt at reproduction?  When I say my
existence you have to include two possibilities.  First, if you want to
hold onto the primitive physical viewpoint you have to assume that there
is something about the nature of our apparent reality in the third person
that is simply not capable of emulation or simulation.  Second, you ALSO
have to assume there is something about our first person experience that is
also not capable of emulation or simulation.  This is where the primitive
physical proponents lose me.  I have thought about this a great deal, and
just can't figure out why I should assume there is something so special
about my experiences, memories, and thought process that it under no
circumstances could ever be capable of reproduction anywhere else in
existence (other than the naturally occurring copies of myself in other
parts of the multiverse, which are of course under this line of thinking
occurring at a primitive physical level).  

 

I am an attorney, so I guess I look at this at a little different
perspective than most on here with science related backgrounds.  I think
once you get to a certain level, whether it be with MWI, or string theory or
any other concept that can not be directly tested or observed, science loses
its ability to take you further and you have to look into other areas such
as logic and philosophy to finish the journey.  However, there is a
circumstantial case to be made for things even beyond strict science.  For
instance, I believe the circumstantial case for our universe being emulable
or simulable is strong given what we know about how our universe works so
far.  The reasons for this have probably been discussed around here
extensively, for instance the close relationship between math and physics,
and our ability to describe the things we observe in mathematical terms.  

 

To my way of thinking, the opponents to a simulation viewpoint are basically
left arguing a concept that there is something magical or spiritual
about human thought.  That it is a supernatural function that is forever
beyond the realm of science.  Either that or they do not accept an ensemble
theory.I could not disagree more with your statement that it is
arrogant to assume that we are somehow the center of the simulation.  On
the contrary, what is arrogant is to assume that in a universe in which it
is possible to simulate environments and universes (and this we know, just
check out a Playstation 3 game I will say only partially tongue in cheek),
is that we occupy a special location at the very top (or bottom depending on
how you look at it) of this hierarchy of natural and artificial creations.

 

I think one thing that hangs a lot of people up on this concept is the idea
that somewhere there IS a primitive, physical universe, and that we are just
a digital simulation being run in that more real universe.  This is NOT
necessary nor is it part of my thinking on the subject.  Maybe there is some
more real or primitive physical reality out there that is simulating our
entire quantum mechanical multiverse, but this is entirely speculative and
presumably beyond the realm of any potential scientific discussion.  When I
refer to our being simulated, I am assuming the simulation is occurring in
every way that is logically and physically possible in the multiverse, just
as every other part of the multiverse is being likewise simulated in every
way that is logically and physically possible in some other part.  This is
required, in fact is logically necessary 

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