### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Le 07-mars-07, à 04:40, Jesse Mazer wrote : http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/ 0d5915764b7f3e08/fc56caf79ce58750?#fc56caf79ce58750 Jesse That is: 14 Mar 2001: Jesse wrote (in part): A lot of people have a lot of different ideas about TOE's on this list, so maybe the global measure issue could help clarify where we all stand in relation to each other...do people have specific proposals about this? I guess the other relevant question is, what is the set of everything that you're putting the measure on...all computations? All mathematical structures? All observer-moments? John M asked also: BTW: what do you mean by interviewing the L-machine? Jesse's question is *the* important question in the list. I just recall it. But also, I will take the opportunity of John's question to explain a bit more the interview of the Lobian machine, and what that is, and how it helps to provide answers to Jesse's questions, when we assume explicitly the comp hyp. Asap, because I'm busy. I will try to give answers without too much technical details, but that is really what makes that exercise difficult. I hope I can do that already this week. Of course everyone can use the question of Jesse to make a bit more precise where they stand from the others indeed, I'm interested too. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Well thanks Russell. Note that I was not doing a critic. I have the usual problem with the word philosophy, which in many places (on the continent means just marxism or the more (postmodern) relativism. But here I was mainly complaining that sometimes people talk like if I was proposing some new theory or vision, like some honest pholosopher can do. I am more modest than that, or ... less modest perhaps. I just take seriously a very old theory (mechanism) and try to explain the consequences: the testable breakdown of materialism. Best Regards, Bruno Le 04-avr.-07, à 04:16, Russell Standish a écrit : On Tue, Apr 03, 2007 at 05:37:25PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Mark, Just a preliminary remark before I comment your post. Contrary to what Russell says in his book, I am not at all a philosopher, I am not trying to propose a view of the world or a conception of reality. As I I meant the term in the most positive of senses, in much the way that Science was called Natural Philosophy a few centuries ago. Indeed Bruno knows far more philosophy than the vast majority of scientists, and probably more than the average professional philosopher. Cheers -- --- - A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --- - http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Hi Mark, Just a preliminary remark before I comment your post. Contrary to what Russell says in his book, I am not at all a philosopher, I am not trying to propose a view of the world or a conception of reality. As I said in the joining post my initial goal was just to understand molecular biology, or more precisely to understand the relation between molecular biology and biochemistry. In that context I have eventually discover Godel's proof, and through it I have guess an abstract biology, not dependent upon any chemistry. But this was presupposing some form of what later I called comp and I eventually realized that if I could relate that abstract biology with real biology then, in some deep global sense, it is (bio)chemistry which should obey to the law of abstract biology (despite James D. Watson's slogan). So, it is very early that I did understand that comp entails a reversal between mind and matter, between physics and machine's number theoretical bio-psycho-theo-logy. The rest in the effort to communicate that *problem*: I mean, that if comp is true, then the physical science have to be reduced to an abstract digital biology. This is all what I say: if COMP is true, then the laws of physics are not primary. Comp is really a precise version of what Peter called standard computationalism. It is just a computer science update of Descartes' Mechanism, the idea that we are, from a correct third person point of view, machine (cf yes doctor). The fact that matter (as substrate; not as appearances) disappears is just an unavoidable consequence of comp. This I can, and I already have, explain on the list in all details (just ask if you want we go through the UDA again). I know we are wrong on this mind/body issue since more than 1500 years, i.e. since the scientist, due to political pression abandoned theology to the political authorities. The millenium before it is plain that the intellectuals were aware that the mind/matter primacy question was an OPEN problem. All what I show is that with comp, it is still an open probIem. I think the Roman Church has some responsibility in making many people taking for granted that matter is an independent primary substrate making up our reality. It is a sort of metaphysical demagogy, given that we have been probably programmed by million of years evolution to take our neighborhood for granted. Of course this idea could be true of course, but then comp has to be false. For comp being false you have to put in our body some infinite non computable object, that is, something which cannot be emulated even by a quantum computer. People are free trying to develop such theories, but those who are serious until now have to make speculative move (like the falsity of QM, for example). Actually people are free to take the reversal result as an argument against comp, but then it is certainly not a knock down, for the reason that computer science is full of counter-intuitive results. Indeed the second part of my work consists in interviewing a (sufficiently chatty, lobian) universal machine, and the discovery is that the machine introduced many subtle nuances on the geometrical/physical difference corresponding to the difference between necessary points of view (1-person, 3-person, 3-person plural, computable, true, provable, etc.). Now, when you just define the computationalist notion of matter, which, by the UDA, is given the third person sharable measure on uncertainty on accessible UD states, in the language of a lobian machine, you get a quantum logic which confirms (≠ proves) comp, and thus does not (yet) refute it. Le 02-avr.-07, à 17:36, Mark Peaty a écrit : Bruno: With comp, what holds 'your lot together are the relation between numbers. The apparent third person infinite regression stops at the level of those relations. The first person is most probably confronted with many infinities, but this should not be considered as problematical. MP: But what *relation* is there really? I will say more in a post to John, but the relation are any one that you can define with classical logic languages and addition and multiplication. For example, the relation x is little than y , which has the definition: Ez(x + z = y) (Ez = it exists a number z), or the relation (x divides y) which has the definition Ez(x * z) = y. Godel has shown you can define most computer science notion in arithmetic, meaning by similar definition (involving only addition and multiplication). His result show that we cannot unify completely arithmetical truth, i.e. there is no theory capable of proving all true arithmetical proposition. I just feel like this kind of discussion goes round and round in endless convolutions. I don't think so at all. The list is just a bit pedagogical so many explanations are repeated. I have no idea how many people really get the whole UDA. Platonia is some kind of Never-never land;

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On Tue, Apr 03, 2007 at 05:37:25PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Mark, Just a preliminary remark before I comment your post. Contrary to what Russell says in his book, I am not at all a philosopher, I am not trying to propose a view of the world or a conception of reality. As I I meant the term in the most positive of senses, in much the way that Science was called Natural Philosophy a few centuries ago. Indeed Bruno knows far more philosophy than the vast majority of scientists, and probably more than the average professional philosopher. Cheers -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Bruno: With comp, what holds 'your lot together are the relation between numbers. The apparent third person infinite regression stops at the level of those relations. The first person is most probably confronted with many infinities, but this should not be considered as problematical. MP: But what *relation* is there really? I just feel like this kind of discussion goes round and round in endless convolutions. Platonia is some kind of Never-never land; that numbers exist anywhere except inside human skulls and nowadays within phenotypic prostheses like electronic computers is NOT a proven fact, it is a glorious assumption! I mean the big and unanswered question is WHERE are numbers? Mathematicians now seem to be very sophisticated with WHAT numbers could BE, and _do_ also apparently, but very very big numbers which could represent everything significant about you, me, or the likelihood of a self referencing computer working out that it knows that it knows something really important, how can these 'relate'? Surely they have to be related by someone or something else! I guess what I am saying is that numbers need something which is not numbers in which, or by means of which they can exist for each other. I call it 'existence', and use the name of Janus as my symbol or emblem of this. But I don't expect any such symbol or emblem to resolve the paradoxes of our existence and experience of existence. As far as I can see, which admittedly is not very far, all explanations that purport to be *ultimate* explanations are doomed to a process of infinite recursion and regression. There was an Englishman called Kenneth Craik, who wrote a little book called 'The Nature of Explanation'. Unfortunately he died in his early thirties in a car accident in 1945 I think. I go along with his thesis - as I remember it from reading the book a decade or more ago - that the representational power of mathematics stems from its evolution of complex mathematical objects out of the interactions of simple elements, which can mirror many significant aspects of the physical/noumenal world because the latter seems to be manifesting a closely analogous evolution of aggregations of fundamental chemical elements, sub-atomic particles and so forth. For better or worse I must advocate what is hereabouts a virtual heresy: that people can never be reduced to numbers. To be a person entails the experience of 'I' and 'thou', 'me' and 'you'. There can be no me without you and no 'us' without 'them'. If a modest Loebian machine cannot work this out, then it needs to go back to school. Perhaps it can though, [if all worlds are possible and must happen], maybe it is just a matter of time before one or more smart, introspective, self-sustaining processors/processes emerges from a BOINC type distributed system. My bet is that the Silico-Electric ONE [or two, ...] will coalesce around the control and accounting of money, money being the embodiment of negative entropy in the cultural world. For what it's worth I think that such a creature will realise that ethics is part of the foundation of its world: a fundamental tool for the maximising of 'negative entropy'. Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 06-mars-07, à 09:44, Mark Peaty a écrit : Thank you Bruno! You and Russell between you have managed to strike some sparks of illumination from the rocky inside of my skull. There is no beacon fire to report but I start to get a glimmering of why you want to *assume* comp and see where it leads. It seems that self-reference and recursion are fundamental properties of anything that is interesting in all this, which rather seems to be the flavour of the new millennium. Just in thinking superficially about the Many Worlds though, it seems to pose a 'binding problem'. Now, I know that might sound like a leakage of concept from objections to identity theory in brain and mind theory. But what I am thinking about is this bit: 6) this means that if I take the comp hyp seriously, then, to predict the results of any experiment/experience, I have to localize all the infinitely many instantiations of my current state in the UD, look at the uncountable comp histories going through that states, and compute the statistics bearing on all consistent first person self-continuation. A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n [infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know' that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled. What holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another infinite regression. With comp, what holds 'your lot together are the relation between numbers. The apparent third person

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Mark, you asked interesting questions, but I think the fundamental ones are still 'out there': MP:(bold and in bold): I mean the big and unanswered question is WHERE are numbers? I would ask (joining your heresy): 1. Where did numbers come from? (an answer may be: They are GOD to believe in). 2. How do they act? Bruno wrote: the relationship between numbers. How does a RELATIONSHIP act? it is an abstraction. Only substrates IN relationship act. The numbers are abstractions (or: the contents we assign to them are abstractions?) so here we face abstractions of abstractions. If one considers the not-so-physical world (numbers?) - a-spatial - (and of course - a-temporal -), your question is out of whack. *MP next: what I am saying is that numbers need something which is not numbers - (to exist - my addition-JM) I believe it can be incorporated into the identification of n u m b er if you ask only about their existence. Anything exists what we think about - if not otherwise: in our thought. (I just had some exchange on this with Stathis in a different aspect.) John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] On 4/2/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Bruno: With comp, what holds 'your lot together are the relation between numbers. The apparent third person infinite regression stops at the level of those relations. The first person is most probably confronted with many infinities, but this should not be considered as problematical. MP: But what *relation* is there really? I just feel like this kind of discussion goes round and round in endless convolutions. Platonia is some kind of Never-never land; that numbers exist anywhere except inside human skulls and nowadays within phenotypic prostheses like electronic computers is NOT a proven fact, it is a glorious assumption! I mean the big and unanswered question is WHERE are numbers? Mathematicians now seem to be very sophisticated with WHAT numbers could BE, and _do_ also apparently, but very very big numbers which could represent everything significant about you, me, or the likelihood of a self referencing computer working out that it knows that it knows something really important, how can these 'relate'? Surely they have to be related by someone or something else! I guess what I am saying is that numbers need something which is not numbers in which, or by means of which they can exist for each other. I call it 'existence', and use the name of Janus as my symbol or emblem of this. But I don't expect any such symbol or emblem to resolve the paradoxes of our existence and experience of existence. As far as I can see, which admittedly is not very far, all explanations that purport to be *ultimate* explanations are doomed to a process of infinite recursion and regression. There was an Englishman called Kenneth Craik, who wrote a little book called 'The Nature of Explanation'. Unfortunately he died in his early thirties in a car accident in 1945 I think. I go along with his thesis - as I remember it from reading the book a decade or more ago - that the representational power of mathematics stems from its evolution of complex mathematical objects out of the interactions of simple elements, which can mirror many significant aspects of the physical/noumenal world because the latter seems to be manifesting a closely analogous evolution of aggregations of fundamental chemical elements, sub-atomic particles and so forth. For better or worse I must advocate what is hereabouts a virtual heresy: that people can never be reduced to numbers. To be a person entails the experience of 'I' and 'thou', 'me' and 'you'. There can be no me without you and no 'us' without 'them'. If a modest Loebian machine cannot work this out, then it needs to go back to school. Perhaps it can though, [if all worlds are possible and must happen], maybe it is just a matter of time before one or more smart, introspective, self-sustaining processors/processes emerges from a BOINC type distributed system. My bet is that the Silico-Electric ONE [or two, ...] will coalesce around the control and accounting of money, money being the embodiment of negative entropy in the cultural world. For what it's worth I think that such a creature will realise that ethics is part of the foundation of its world: a fundamental tool for the maximising of 'negative entropy'. Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 06-mars-07, à 09:44, Mark Peaty a écrit : Thank you Bruno! You and Russell between you have managed to strike some sparks of illumination from the rocky inside of my skull. There is no beacon fire to report but I start to get a glimmering of why you want to *assume* comp and see where it leads. It seems that self-reference and recursion are fundamental properties of anything that is interesting in all this, which rather seems to be

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Hi Brent, As you can guess, I am searching an old post of view which I intended to answer, and then I take opportunity to comment some other one, on some point which are perhaps somehow important ... Le 17-mars-07, à 21:19, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit : But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent universe? or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything). And how do things run in Platonia? Do we need temporal modes in logic, as well as epistemic ones? Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. I don't believe either one - I just contemplate them. ;-) Since it is not at all clear to me that Peano arithmetic, or any mathematics, exists I'm uncertain as to whether there is greater explanatory power in your UDA as compared to Peter's some things exist and others don't. The goal of the UDA is not to explain anything. The goal of the UD Argument is to show that the physicalist notion of Matter does not explain neither appearance of matter nor mind. UDA is negative. It only illustrate that with comp the mind body problem is two times more difficult than it is usually thought. You have to explain BOTH Mind and Matter (and actually you have to explain matter from mind, cf the reversal). Only when UDA is translated in the language of a Lobian machine, did it begin to give positive and verifiable informations on matter/appearances. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

That's all fine and I appreciate the position (once we 'have gotten' to circumstances providing the idea of a Loeb machine) - what I want to inject is Dr. Johnson's stone, which is not 'mind-stuff'' and in his shoe DID HURT (his mind). Not vice versa. Please, let it go as a remark outside the discussion. John On 3/28/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Brent, As you can guess, I am searching an old post of view which I intended to answer, and then I take opportunity to comment some other one, on some point which are perhaps somehow important ... Le 17-mars-07, à 21:19, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit : But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent universe? or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything). And how do things run in Platonia? Do we need temporal modes in logic, as well as epistemic ones? Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. I don't believe either one - I just contemplate them. ;-) Since it is not at all clear to me that Peano arithmetic, or any mathematics, exists I'm uncertain as to whether there is greater explanatory power in your UDA as compared to Peter's some things exist and others don't. The goal of the UDA is not to explain anything. The goal of the UD Argument is to show that the physicalist notion of Matter does not explain neither appearance of matter nor mind. UDA is negative. It only illustrate that with comp the mind body problem is two times more difficult than it is usually thought. You have to explain BOTH Mind and Matter (and actually you have to explain matter from mind, cf the reversal). Only when UDA is translated in the language of a Lobian machine, did it begin to give positive and verifiable informations on matter/appearances. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Le 20-mars-07, à 18:05, Brent Meeker a écrit : What are those relations? Is it a matter of the provenance of the numbers, e.g. being computed by some subprocess of the UD? Or is an inherent relation like being relatively prime? It is an inherent relation like being prime, or being the godel number of a proof of f, etc. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 20-mars-07, à 18:05, Brent Meeker a écrit : What are those relations? Is it a matter of the provenance of the numbers, e.g. being computed by some subprocess of the UD? Or is an inherent relation like being relatively prime? It is an inherent relation like being prime, or being the godel number of a proof of f, etc. I didn't think godel numbering was unique? If I just cite a number, like 12345678987654321, is it either the godel number of a proof or not? Brent Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Le 06-mars-07, à 07:44, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh a écrit : Thank you for welcoming me Mark, I agree with you about the problem with the concept of entropy, but not all your points. Actually I like this hypothesis, and as Bruno put it we might be able to describe the Why question about physical laws, which is very interesting. 4) There exist a universal dovetailer (consequence of Church thesis, but we could drop Church thesis and define comp in term of turing machine instead). 5) Never underestimate the dumbness of the universal dovetailer: not only it generates all computational histories, but it generates them all infinitely often, + all variations, + all real oracles (and those oracles are uncountable). Let me know where's my mistake: 1.We are referring to one (actually an infinitely long sub-sequence of that) history of such universal dovetailer, as some state of our world. I don't think so. Worlds or world-views emerge globally from UD* (UD's execution). 2.Because that machine is a TM, a history has to be countable, regardless of compression or expansion of time to allow infinite power. Not really. An history can be revised infinitely often so that our first person historical point of view could be infinite and even uncountable. 3.So we're referring to some state of our universe as a countable one. Like many, especially in the recent posts, forget the points of view distinctions. 4.A universal state is not countable. Probably false from a 3 person view. Probably true from 1 person view. Every time a bit is sampled, the Multiverse branches with the observed bit being 0 or 1 depending on your branch. If you were to continue for an infinite amount of time, each observer will have observed a real number. However after any finite amount of time, all the observers have are rational approximations to real numbers. But we're talking about uncountability of information necessary to represent instantaneous state of a universe, not about the uncountability of possible universes. (Maybe I didn't get your point) What you are saying just proves that we have uncountable number of universes. With comp, this arguably follows indeed. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Le 06-mars-07, à 09:44, Mark Peaty a écrit : Thank you Bruno! You and Russell between you have managed to strike some sparks of illumination from the rocky inside of my skull. There is no beacon fire to report but I start to get a glimmering of why you want to *assume* comp and see where it leads. It seems that self-reference and recursion are fundamental properties of anything that is interesting in all this, which rather seems to be the flavour of the new millennium. Just in thinking superficially about the Many Worlds though, it seems to pose a 'binding problem'. Now, I know that might sound like a leakage of concept from objections to identity theory in brain and mind theory. But what I am thinking about is this bit: 6) this means that if I take the comp hyp seriously, then, to predict the results of any experiment/experience, I have to localize all the infinitely many instantiations of my current state in the UD, look at the uncountable comp histories going through that states, and compute the statistics bearing on all consistent first person self-continuation. A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n [infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know' that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled. What holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another infinite regression. With comp, what holds 'your lot together are the relation between numbers. The apparent third person infinite regression stops at the level of those relations. The first person is most probably confronted with many infinities, but this should not be considered as problematical. ** A quick aside, hopefully not totally unrelated: Am I right that a valid explanation of the zero point energy is that it is impossible *in principle* to measure the state of something Why can't we measure the state of something? Even with just QM, the many-world idea has been invented for abandoning the idea that a measurement pertubates what is observed. and therefore *we* must acknowledge the indeterminacy We must acknowledge indeterminacy once we postulate comp, given that it makes us self-duplicable, and indeed self-duplicated all the time. Bruno and so must everything else which exists because we are nothing special, except we think we know we are here, and if we are bound by quantum indeterminacy, so is everything else [unless it can come up with a good excuse!]? [Perhaps this is more on Stathis's question to Russell: Is a real number an infinite process?] ** Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 05-mars-07, à 15:03, Mark Peaty a écrit : Nobody here has yet explained in plain-English why we have entropy. Oh well, surely, in the Many Worlds, that's just one of the universes that can happen! Not really. That would make the comp hyp or the everything idea trivial, and both the everything hyp and the comp hyp would loose any explicative power. (It *is* the problem with Schmidhuber's comp, *and* with Tegmark's form of mathematicalism: see older posts for that). Except that, for plain-English reasons stated above, there are *and always have been* infinity x infinity x infinity of entropic universes. It doesn't make sense. Call me a heretic if you like, but I will 'stick to my guns' here: If it can't be put into plain-English then it probably isn't true! I will try. I will, by the same token, answer Mohsen question here: Mohsen: I don't know if in the hypothesis of simulation, the conflict of Countable and Uncountable has been considered. 1) I assume the comp hyp, if only for the sake of the reasoning. The comp hyp is NOT the hypothesis of simulation, but it is the hypothesis that we are in principle self-simulable by a digital machine. 2) Then we have to distinguish the first person points of view (1-pov) from third person points of view (3-pov), and eventually we will have to distinguish all Plotinus' hypostases. With comp, we are duplicable. I can be read and cut (copy) in Brussels, and be pasted in Washington and Moscow simultaneously. This gives a simple example where: a) from the third point of view, there is no indeterminacy. An external (3-pov) observer can predict Bruno will be in Washington AND in Moscow. b) from a first person point of view, there is an indeterminacy, I will feel myself in washington OR in Moscow, not in the two places at once. 3) Whatever means I use to quantify the first person indeterminacy, the result will not depend on possible large delays between the reconstitutions, nor of the virtual/material/purely-mathematical character of the reconstitution.

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 06-mars-07, à 09:44, Mark Peaty a écrit : Thank you Bruno! You and Russell between you have managed to strike some sparks of illumination from the rocky inside of my skull. There is no beacon fire to report but I start to get a glimmering of why you want to *assume* comp and see where it leads. It seems that self-reference and recursion are fundamental properties of anything that is interesting in all this, which rather seems to be the flavour of the new millennium. Just in thinking superficially about the Many Worlds though, it seems to pose a 'binding problem'. Now, I know that might sound like a leakage of concept from objections to identity theory in brain and mind theory. But what I am thinking about is this bit: 6) this means that if I take the comp hyp seriously, then, to predict the results of any experiment/experience, I have to localize all the infinitely many instantiations of my current state in the UD, look at the uncountable comp histories going through that states, and compute the statistics bearing on all consistent first person self-continuation. A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n [infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know' that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled. What holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another infinite regression. With comp, what holds 'your lot together are the relation between numbers. The apparent third person infinite regression stops at the level of those relations. What are those relations? Is it a matter of the provenance of the numbers, e.g. being computed by some subprocess of the UD? Or is an inherent relation like being relatively prime? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On Mon, Mar 19, 2007 at 01:03:04PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I don't mean the white rabbits from the Turing machine, I mean the ones outside it. If we accept that an abstract machine can just exist, without benefit of a separate physical reality, why not also accept that non-computational talking white rabbits can also just exist? That is, why should computations have a privileged ontological status in the everything? Stathis Papaioannou That's not an assumption I make. The only thing given priveleged ontological status are the descriptions (or infinite length strings - binary or in your choice of alphabet). These are not the outputs of any computational process, although they can be considered as generated dynamically by a UD if you wish (although not necessary). -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On 3/19/07, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Mon, Mar 19, 2007 at 01:03:04PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I don't mean the white rabbits from the Turing machine, I mean the ones outside it. If we accept that an abstract machine can just exist, without benefit of a separate physical reality, why not also accept that non-computational talking white rabbits can also just exist? That is, why should computations have a privileged ontological status in the everything? Stathis Papaioannou That's not an assumption I make. The only thing given priveleged ontological status are the descriptions (or infinite length strings - binary or in your choice of alphabet). These are not the outputs of any computational process, although they can be considered as generated dynamically by a UD if you wish (although not necessary). OK, I just read bitstring as something generated by a computer, but I see that you deliberately differentiate the descriptions from the Schmidhuber ensemble, making your theory more general: http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks/docs/occam/node2.html Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On Sat, Mar 17, 2007 at 03:25:51PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: One response to this idea is that the non-computational worlds are overrun with white rabbits, whereas the computational worlds allow the calculation of a local measure, such as Russell Standish has described, which explains the orderly universe we know. However, this doesn't explain why the non-computational white rabbits don't suddenly intrude in the next moment: what's to say that their relative measure should be less than the orderly computational worlds' relative measure? Actually, this is exactly what I do claim, so if you think I haven't succeeded, I'd be very interested in learning why. Note that the non-appearance of white rabbits comes from what I call robustness of the observer, and robustness is not a general property of Turing machines, which is why the white rabbit problem seems so intractable in comp. I argue why robustness should be a very likely property of observers from evolutionary reasons, but perhaps the weakness of the argument is not yet calculating the relative proportion of robust observers to non-robust observers and relating this to the relative proportion of white rabbits. I certainly believe it should more than compensate, but perhaps I'm being overly optimistic. Cheers -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On Sat, Mar 17, 2007 at 04:02:49PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus Matter (or our measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like to justify a quantum topology or deep enough universal machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ No - just the non-white rabbitness of it :) And a few other things... -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

I don't mean the white rabbits from the Turing machine, I mean the ones outside it. If we accept that an abstract machine can just exist, without benefit of a separate physical reality, why not also accept that non-computational talking white rabbits can also just exist? That is, why should computations have a privileged ontological status in the everything? Stathis Papaioannou On 3/19/07, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Sat, Mar 17, 2007 at 03:25:51PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: One response to this idea is that the non-computational worlds are overrun with white rabbits, whereas the computational worlds allow the calculation of a local measure, such as Russell Standish has described, which explains the orderly universe we know. However, this doesn't explain why the non-computational white rabbits don't suddenly intrude in the next moment: what's to say that their relative measure should be less than the orderly computational worlds' relative measure? Actually, this is exactly what I do claim, so if you think I haven't succeeded, I'd be very interested in learning why. Note that the non-appearance of white rabbits comes from what I call robustness of the observer, and robustness is not a general property of Turing machines, which is why the white rabbit problem seems so intractable in comp. I argue why robustness should be a very likely property of observers from evolutionary reasons, but perhaps the weakness of the argument is not yet calculating the relative proportion of robust observers to non-robust observers and relating this to the relative proportion of white rabbits. I certainly believe it should more than compensate, but perhaps I'm being overly optimistic. Cheers -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On 3/17/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent universe? or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything). And while we're at it, why exclude non-mathematical structures? I guess that depends on what you mean by mathematical structures. I would take any non-contradictory set of axioms to define a mathematical structure. I'm not sure what it would mean to include self-contradictory structures. If you regard mathematics as a game of propositions it just means every wff is a theorem. But if you regard mathematics as existing (even in Platonia) I'm at a loss. What I meant was the naive interpretation of everything exists: cartoon characters in cartoon worlds *just there* rather than generated by some computer simulation or set of physical laws, as our universe seems to be. If you look at only computations in Platonia, you could argue that such structures (which as a matter of fact could be generated computationally, so perhaps non-mathematical was a poor choice of words) would be of low measure. However, what of the ones outside the computer? It seems to me they should have the same ontological status as the abstract computer, but it is then impossible to assign them a measure which makes the weirder ones less likely, as has been done with computation. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit : But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent universe? or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything). And how do things run in Platonia? Do we need temporal modes in logic, as well as epistemic ones? Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. It is just up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both materialism and computationalism. The argument should make us more modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind. Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to the (arithmetical hypostases): p (truth) Bp (provable) Bp p (knowable, correctly provabie) Bp Dp (gamblings) Bp Dp p (correct gambling, feeling) And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have explained some time ago, determines each a geometrical (Kripke) multiverse. It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus theology) experimentally testable. As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major discovery: The universal machine (talks bits) The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks qubits). The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication). I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus Matter (or our measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like to justify a quantum topology or deep enough universal machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

I was so glad to have some 'text' on UD(A), comp, the P-words (Platonia, Paeano, Plotinus), the hypostases, in your post. Alas! Still all techy, only for the adepts. Not in Mark's required plain language. (English or what?) (I still stumble among them). My question now: How do we distinguish Everything from Almost Everything? We are still 'walled in' by our (or: OK, let's call it: the Loeb machine's) knowledge base. How can we know that we include things we do not know ABOUT? (Part of the real total Everything, of course) and build our 'world' on a partial model - called (our?) Everything? Then, by some event unforeseeable some 'left-out' effect may show up and we happily and self-justifiedly refuse it, as nonsense (happened many times in the conventional reductionist sciences). How are we better? We have no idea if we know but a negligible bit or almost all. We may be the laughing stock for an alien with wider knowledgebase (and: 'smarter'). Ad vocem 'smarter': I am sorry for the greatgrandkids who - in your remark of yesterday may not be smarter than we are, just have a wider source of information (epistemy). Does that mean that you do not believe we are 'smarter' than humans of 2-3 millennia ago? (Could be, because you base much knowledge on Plato etc., - the old Greeks). I still hold to the Leninian wisdom that quantity turns into quality and increasing the info-basis MAY(?) result in also smarter understganding - i.e. better wisdom. So I put on hold my regret for the greatgrandkids for now. Regards John M - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Saturday, March 17, 2007 11:02 AM Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit : But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent universe? or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything). And how do things run in Platonia? Do we need temporal modes in logic, as well as epistemic ones? Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. It is just up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both materialism and computationalism. The argument should make us more modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind. Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to the (arithmetical hypostases): p (truth) Bp (provable) Bp p (knowable, correctly provabie) Bp Dp (gamblings) Bp Dp p (correct gambling, feeling) And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have explained some time ago, determines each a geometrical (Kripke) multiverse. It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus theology) experimentally testable. As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major discovery: The universal machine (talks bits) The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks qubits). The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication). I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus Matter (or our measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like to justify a quantum topology or deep enough universal machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.5.446 / Virus Database: 268.18.12/724 - Release Date: 3/16/2007 12:12 PM --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit : But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent universe? or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything). And how do things run in Platonia? Do we need temporal modes in logic, as well as epistemic ones? Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. I don't believe either one - I just contemplate them. ;-) Since it is not at all clear to me that Peano arithmetic, or any mathematics, exists I'm uncertain as to whether there is greater explanatory power in your UDA as compared to Peter's some things exist and others don't. It is just up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both materialism and computationalism. When you've written this before I've asked what contradiction you derive from the conjunction of materialism and computationalism. IIRC you said there was not a contradiction. But you are right, I should study your argument more carefully; I don't really see how you get QM, much less particle physics, out of it. Brent Meeker The argument should make us more modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind. Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to the (arithmetical hypostases): p (truth) Bp (provable) Bp p (knowable, correctly provabie) Bp Dp (gamblings) Bp Dp p (correct gambling, feeling) And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have explained some time ago, determines each a geometrical (Kripke) multiverse. It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus theology) experimentally testable. As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major discovery: The universal machine (talks bits) The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks qubits). The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication). I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus Matter (or our measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like to justify a quantum topology or deep enough universal machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Brent Meeker skrev: Torgny Tholerus wrote: I have written some more about infinity, in the paper attached (3 pages), called Infinity Does Not Exist. Well it doesn't exist under the assumption that it doesn't exist. I actually agree with you that it doesn't exist - though not because it's *logically* impossible. I think what you've shown is that there are other consistent number systems - which just illustrates the point that what you get from logic and mathematics depends on what you take as axioms and rules of inference. But the problem is that a lot of mathematics would become very difficult and convoluted if we didn't allow infinity (and infinitesimals). This doesn't bother physicists much because they are accustomed to regarding mathematics as an approximate model and only using as much infinity as seems useful. When it concerns mathematics, I have developped a set of integers that I myself call unnatural numbers. An unnatural number U is an integer that is bigger than every natural number N. And the inverse of an unnatural number (1/U) is more close to zero than any real number. You can count with these unnatural number in the same way as ordinary integers. So you will have that U+1 is not equal to U, and N*N sqrt(U), and so on. -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

John M skrev: I looked at your paper, interesting. One question: what do you mean by "exist" (Notably: "does NOT exist)? We think about it (no matter in how vague terms and weak understanding), we talk about it, our mind has a place in our thinking for that term, - does this not suffice for (in a WIDER??? meaning) existence? When human beings think of "infinity", they think of a *very* big set, where the end of the set is hidden in a big black cloud, far, far away. In that way they can say that you have a mapping of the set onto a true subset of the set, because they only see the visible part of the set, and there it is true that there is such a mapping there. But what happens inside the cloud they don't see. They don't see that there are mappings missing in the end of the set... -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On 3/16/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and other small numbers but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e. almost all of them. A theory that just says all integers exist doesn't help answer that. But if the integers are something we make up (or are hardwired by evolution) then it makes sense that we are only acquainted with small ones. OK, but there are other questions that defy such an explanation. Suppose the universe were infinite, as per Tegmark Level 1, and contained an infinite number of observers. Wouldn't that make your measure effectively zero? And yet here you are. Stathis Papaioannou Another observation refuting Tegmark! :-) Seriously, even in the finite universe we observe my probability is almost zero. Almost everything and and everyone is improbable, just like my winning the lottery when I buy one [in] a million tickets is improbable - but someone has to win. So it's a question of relative measure. Each integer has zero measure in the set of all integers - yet we are acquainted with some and not others. So why is the acquaintance measure of small integers so much greater than that of integers greater than 10^10^20 (i.e. almost all of them). What picks out the small integers? There are factors creating a local measure, even if the Plenitude is infinite and measureless. Although the chance that you will be you is zero or almost zero if you consider the Plenitude as God's big lucky dip, you have to be someone given that we are talking about observers, and once you are that fantastically improbable person, it becomes a certainty that you will remain him for as long as there are future versions of him extant anywhere at all. Thus, the first person perspective, necessarily from within the plenitude, makes a global impossibility a local certainty. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Torgny Tholerus wrote: When it concerns mathematics, I have developped a set of integers that I myself call unnatural numbers. An unnatural number U is an integer that is bigger than every natural number N. And the inverse of an unnatural number (1/U) is more close to zero than any real number. Actually, mathematicians have already developed ideas along these lines--google hyperreal numbers (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperreal_number for starters) and non-standard analysis (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-standard_analysis ). And if you enter nonstandard analysis on amazon you can also find some formal introductions, such as http://www.amazon.com/Lectures-Hyperreals-Introduction-Nonstandard-Mathematics/dp/038798464X/ Jesse _ Exercise your brain! Try Flexicon. http://games.msn.com/en/flexicon/default.htm?icid=flexicon_hmemailtaglinemarch07 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/16/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and other small numbers but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e. almost all of them. A theory that just says all integers exist doesn't help answer that. But if the integers are something we make up (or are hardwired by evolution) then it makes sense that we are only acquainted with small ones. OK, but there are other questions that defy such an explanation. Suppose the universe were infinite, as per Tegmark Level 1, and contained an infinite number of observers. Wouldn't that make your measure effectively zero? And yet here you are. Stathis Papaioannou Another observation refuting Tegmark! :-) Seriously, even in the finite universe we observe my probability is almost zero. Almost everything and and everyone is improbable, just like my winning the lottery when I buy one [in] a million tickets is improbable - but someone has to win. So it's a question of relative measure. Each integer has zero measure in the set of all integers - yet we are acquainted with some and not others. So why is the acquaintance measure of small integers so much greater than that of integers greater than 10^10^20 ( i.e. almost all of them). What picks out the small integers? There are factors creating a local measure, even if the Plenitude is infinite and measureless. Although the chance that you will be you is zero or almost zero if you consider the Plenitude as God's big lucky dip, you have to be someone given that we are talking about observers, and once you are that fantastically improbable person, In other words, That's just the way it is., which comports with my complaint that such theories are empty. Brent Meeker it becomes a certainty that you will remain him for as long as there are future versions of him extant anywhere at all. Thus, the first person perspective, necessarily from within the plenitude, makes a global impossibility a local certainty. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On 3/17/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: There are factors creating a local measure, even if the Plenitude is infinite and measureless. Although the chance that you will be you is zero or almost zero if you consider the Plenitude as God's big lucky dip, you have to be someone given that we are talking about observers, and once you are that fantastically improbable person, In other words, That's just the way it is., which comports with my complaint that such theories are empty. Brent Meeker it becomes a certainty that you will remain him for as long as there are future versions of him extant anywhere at all. Thus, the first person perspective, necessarily from within the plenitude, makes a global impossibility a local certainty. Stathis Papaioannou If only one part of the possible actually exists, that isn't like being the one person in a million who has to win the lottery, it is more like waking up to find that money has miraculously appeared in your bedroom overnight without there being any lottery. We could say that's just the way it is, but it could have been an infinite number of other ways as well. On the other hand, if everything exists, it is no surprise that you and every other particular thing exist. The only thing that needs ontological explanation is the everything: why everything rather than something or nothing? If it were possible that the reality we experience could be a simulation running on an abstract machine in Platonia, that would be an answer to this question, because the machine in Platonia can't not run. That's highly speculative, of course: maybe the brain will turn out to be non-computational, or maybe someone will come up with a formulation of computationalism which defeats Putnam/Maudlin/Marchal type arguments, and we are back with a physical Universe without ultimate explanation. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/17/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: There are factors creating a local measure, even if the Plenitude is infinite and measureless. Although the chance that you will be you is zero or almost zero if you consider the Plenitude as God's big lucky dip, you have to be someone given that we are talking about observers, and once you are that fantastically improbable person, In other words, That's just the way it is., which comports with my complaint that such theories are empty. Brent Meeker it becomes a certainty that you will remain him for as long as there are future versions of him extant anywhere at all. Thus, the first person perspective, necessarily from within the plenitude, makes a global impossibility a local certainty. Stathis Papaioannou If only one part of the possible actually exists, that isn't like being the one person in a million who has to win the lottery, it is more like waking up to find that money has miraculously appeared in your bedroom overnight without there being any lottery. We could say that's just the way it is, but it could have been an infinite number of other ways as well. On the other hand, if everything exists, it is no surprise that you and every other particular thing exist. It's no explanation either. It's just Everything exists and what you experience is just what you experience. which Occam's razor trimes to What you experience is just what you experience. The only thing that needs ontological explanation is the everything: why everything rather than something or nothing? If it were possible that the reality we experience could be a simulation running on an abstract machine in Platonia, that would be an answer to this question, because the machine in Platonia can't not run. But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent universe? or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything). And how do things run in Platonia? Do we need temporal modes in logic, as well as epistemic ones? Brent Meeker An explanation that could explain anything, fails to explain at all. That's highly speculative, of course: maybe the brain will turn out to be non-computational, or maybe someone will come up with a formulation of computationalism which defeats Putnam/Maudlin/Marchal type arguments, and we are back with a physical Universe without ultimate explanation. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On 3/17/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: If only one part of the possible actually exists, that isn't like being the one person in a million who has to win the lottery, it is more like waking up to find that money has miraculously appeared in your bedroom overnight without there being any lottery. We could say that's just the way it is, but it could have been an infinite number of other ways as well. On the other hand, if everything exists, it is no surprise that you and every other particular thing exist. It's no explanation either. It's just Everything exists and what you experience is just what you experience. which Occam's razor trimes to What you experience is just what you experience. You disagree that ensemble theories in conjunction with the anthropic principle offer a possible explanation for the fine tuning of physical constants in our universe (supposing there is fine tuning for the sake of argument - I know Victor Stenger disagrees)? Of course, we are then left with trying to explain why the ensemble, but that's the nature of any explanation, including theological ones. The only thing that needs ontological explanation is the everything: why everything rather than something or nothing? If it were possible that the reality we experience could be a simulation running on an abstract machine in Platonia, that would be an answer to this question, because the machine in Platonia can't not run. But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent universe? or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything). And while we're at it, why exclude non-mathematical structures? There seems to be no reason why an abstract machine running a simulation of a fantastic world should be ontologically privileged compared to the fantastic world just existing complete in itself, not generated by any computation. This would be closer to most forms of Idealism in Western philosophy, including Plato's. Pythagoras was closer to the view that everything is made of numbers. One response to this idea is that the non-computational worlds are overrun with white rabbits, whereas the computational worlds allow the calculation of a local measure, such as Russell Standish has described, which explains the orderly universe we know. However, this doesn't explain why the non-computational white rabbits don't suddenly intrude in the next moment: what's to say that their relative measure should be less than the orderly computational worlds' relative measure? And how do things run in Platonia? Do we need temporal modes in logic, as well as epistemic ones? No, it would be like a block universe. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/17/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: If only one part of the possible actually exists, that isn't like being the one person in a million who has to win the lottery, it is more like waking up to find that money has miraculously appeared in your bedroom overnight without there being any lottery. We could say that's just the way it is, but it could have been an infinite number of other ways as well. On the other hand, if everything exists, it is no surprise that you and every other particular thing exist. It's no explanation either. It's just Everything exists and what you experience is just what you experience. which Occam's razor trimes to What you experience is just what you experience. You disagree that ensemble theories in conjunction with the anthropic principle offer a possible explanation for the fine tuning of physical constants in our universe (supposing there is fine tuning for the sake of argument - I know Victor Stenger disagrees)? No I would agree that an ensemble theory that includes some measure relative to a well define anthropomorphic principle has some explanatory power. For example I would expect it to show that there is a higher probability of an intelligent life form finding intelligence to be rare and widely scattered. From what we know now, it seems that there could universes in which almost every star had a planet with intelligent life and one would be more likely to find oneself in such a universe than in the one we observe. Vic has only considered everything in the very narrow sense of a range of values for the 19 parameters of the standard model - not the much broader everything of Tegmark or even Bruno. Of course, we are then left with trying to explain why the ensemble, but that's the nature of any explanation, including theological ones. The only thing that needs ontological explanation is the everything: why everything rather than something or nothing? If it were possible that the reality we experience could be a simulation running on an abstract machine in Platonia, that would be an answer to this question, because the machine in Platonia can't not run. But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent universe? or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite arithmetic (which would be a much smaller everything). And while we're at it, why exclude non-mathematical structures? I guess that depends on what you mean by mathematical structures. I would take any non-contradictory set of axioms to define a mathematical structure. I'm not sure what it would mean to include self-contradictory structures. If you regard mathematics as a game of propositions it just means every wff is a theorem. But if you regard mathematics as existing (even in Platonia) I'm at a loss. Brent Meeker There seems to be no reason why an abstract machine running a simulation of a fantastic world should be ontologically privileged compared to the fantastic world just existing complete in itself, not generated by any computation. This would be closer to most forms of Idealism in Western philosophy, including Plato's. Pythagoras was closer to the view that everything is made of numbers. One response to this idea is that the non-computational worlds are overrun with white rabbits, whereas the computational worlds allow the calculation of a local measure, such as Russell Standish has described, which explains the orderly universe we know. However, this doesn't explain why the non-computational white rabbits don't suddenly intrude in the next moment: what's to say that their relative measure should be less than the orderly computational worlds' relative measure? And how do things run in Platonia? Do we need temporal modes in logic, as well as epistemic ones? No, it would be like a block universe. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

Le 13-mars-07, à 18:55, Brent Meeker a écrit : Of course this is assuming that QM (which was discovered by applying reductionist methods) is the correct EXACT theory - which is extremely doubtful given its incompatibility with general relativity. All right. But note that both String Theory and Loop Gravity (the main attempt to marry QM and GR) keep the quantum theory and changes the GR. Note that the most weird aspect of the quantum have been verified, and also that comp only predicts large feature of that weirdness. (Note that QM should be completely false for coming back to aristotle, making QM an approximation makes its weirdness more weird). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

Le 14-mars-07, à 04:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : On 3/13/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron + proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its components; Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton, but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction. Quantum weirdness is an observed fact. We assume that it is, somehow, an intrinsic property of subatomic particles; but perhaps there is a hidden factor or as yet undiscovered theory which may explain it further. That would be equivalent to adding hidden variables. But then they have to be non local (just to address the facts, not just the theory). Of course if the hidden factor is given by the many worlds or comp, then such non local effects has to be retrospectively expected. But then we have to forget the idea that substance (decomposable reality) exists, but numbers. You could get a neutron at high enough energies, I suppose, but I don't think that is what you mean. Is it possible to bring a proton and an electron appropriately together and have them just sit there next to each other? Locally yes. In QM this is given by a tensor product of the corresponding states. But it is an exceptional state. With comp it is open if such physical state acn ever be prepared, even locally. There is no sense to say an atom is part of the UD. It is part of the necessary discourse of self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's psychology/theology. Isn't that the *ultimate* reduction of everything? Given that a theology rarely eliminates subjects/person, I don't see in what reasonable sense this would be a reduction. Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description. People can look here for a cute knot table: http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html I was thinking of a physical knot, which is not the same as the Platonic ideal, even if there is no such thing as a separate physical reality. I don't know what you mean by a physical knots. In any case the identity of a knots (mathematical, physical) rely in its topology, not in such or such cartesian picture, even the concrete knots I put in my pocket. The knots looses its identity if it is cut. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Le 14-mars-07, à 08:51, Torgny Tholerus a écrit : Infinity is a logically impossible concept. I have read your little text. It is not so bad, actually ;). Some early greeks have also defended the idea that GOD is finite. But I am not convinced. I think that Plotinus' idea that God is infinite has been a major advance in science, if not the major advance. We can come back on this later. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Bruno Marchal skrev: Le 14-mars-07, 08:51, Torgny Tholerus a crit : Infinity is a logically impossible concept. I have read your little text. It is not so bad, actually ;). Some early greeks have also defended the idea that GOD is finite. But I am not convinced. I think that Plotinus' idea that God is infinite has been a major advance in science, if not the major advance. We can come back on this later. I have written some more about infinity, in the paper attached (3 pages), called Infinity Does Not Exist. -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~--- infinity.doc Description: MS-Word document

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 14-mars-07, à 04:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : On 3/13/07, *Bruno Marchal* [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron + proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its components; Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton, but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction. Quantum weirdness is an observed fact. We assume that it is, somehow, an intrinsic property of subatomic particles; but perhaps there is a hidden factor or as yet undiscovered theory which may explain it further. That would be equivalent to adding hidden variables. But then they have to be non local (just to address the facts, not just the theory). Of course if the hidden factor is given by the many worlds or comp, then such non local effects has to be retrospectively expected. But then we have to forget the idea that substance (decomposable reality) exists, but numbers. If you admit non-local hidden variables then you can have a theory like Bohmian quantum mechanics in which randomness is all epistemological, like statistical mechanics, and there is no place for multiple-worlds. You could get a neutron at high enough energies, I suppose, but I don't think that is what you mean. Is it possible to bring a proton and an electron appropriately together and have them just sit there next to each other? Locally yes. I'm not sure what you mean by locally. Since they have opposite charge they will be attracted by photon exchanges and will fall into some hydrogen atom state by emission of photons. Brent Meeker In QM this is given by a tensor product of the corresponding states. But it is an exceptional state. With comp it is open if such physical state acn ever be prepared, even locally. There is no sense to say an atom is part of the UD. It is part of the necessary discourse of self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's psychology/theology. Isn't that the *ultimate* reduction of everything? Given that a theology rarely eliminates subjects/person, I don't see in what reasonable sense this would be a reduction. Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description. People can look here for a cute knot table: http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html I was thinking of a physical knot, which is not the same as the Platonic ideal, even if there is no such thing as a separate physical reality. I don't know what you mean by a physical knots. A remark only a mathematician could make ;-) I think Bruno just means a knot is defined by the topology of its embedding in space - not by its material or its coordinates; as a triangle is defined by having three sides, not any particular size, orientation, or material. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Torgny Tholerus wrote: Bruno Marchal skrev: Le 14-mars-07, à 08:51, Torgny Tholerus a écrit : Infinity is a logically impossible concept. I have read your little text. It is not so bad, actually ;). Some early greeks have also defended the idea that GOD is finite. But I am not convinced. I think that Plotinus' idea that God is infinite has been a major advance in science, if not the major advance. We can come back on this later. I have written some more about infinity, in the paper attached (3 pages), called Infinity Does Not Exist. -- Torgny Tholerus Well it doesn't exist under the assumption that it doesn't exist. I actually agree with you that it doesn't exist - though not because it's *logically* impossible. I think what you've shown is that there are other consistent number systems - which just illustrates the point that what you get from logic and mathematics depends on what you take as axioms and rules of inference. But the problem is that a lot of mathematics would become very difficult and convoluted if we didn't allow infinity (and infinitesimals). This doesn't bother physicists much because they are accustomed to regarding mathematics as an approximate model and only using as much infinity as seems useful. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

I looked at your paper, interesting. One question: what do you mean by exist (Notably: does NOT exist)? We think about it (no matter in how vague terms and weak understanding), we talk about it, our mind has a place in our thinking for that term, - does this not suffice for (in a WIDER??? meaning) existence? I agree: it is logically (physically?) hardly identifiable but do we stand only on a (material?) physical basis? And I make no difference between infinite small and infinite big. None of them understandable. Brent's 'infinitesimal' is a good idea in this topic, yet I consider it scale-oriented, an infinitesimally close in 1000 orders of magnitude smaller scale can be 'miles' away. (No 'real' miles implied) - Best regards John M - Original Message - From: Torgny Tholerus To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2007 11:58 AM Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument Le 14-mars-07, à 08:51, Torgny Tholerus a écrit : (among others) Infinity is a logically impossible concept. Infinity Does Not Exist. -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

Bruno and Brent: Are we back at the Aris-total i.e. the sum considered more than its (material-only!) components? Complexity of an assemblage includes more than what a reductionist 'component-analysis' can verify. Qualia, functions, even out-of-boundary effects are active in identifying an item. It is in our many centuries old explanatory ways to say a proton and an electron make a H-atom and vice versa. First off: hydrogen (gas) is not the assemblage of H-atoms, it is an observational item that - when destructed in certain ways - results in other observables resembling H-atoms or even protons and electrons (if you have the means to look at them - not in an n-th deduction and its calculations). Same with 'other' atoms - molecules, singularly or in bunch. Reduced to a 2-D sketch. Nice game, I spent 50 years producing such (macromolecules that is) and 'studied'/applied them. Of course none of the destruction-result carries the proper charactersitics of the original ensemble. And NO proper 'observation' does exist. It is the explanatory attempt for a world(part?) - not understood, just regarded as a model of whatever our epistemic enrichment has provided to THAT time. This is the 'reducing': to visualize this part as the total and utter the Aristotelian maxim. One can not extrapolate 'total ensemble' characteristics from studying the so called parts we discovered so far. We can think only within our already acquired knowledge. John M - Original Message - From: Brent Meeker To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2007 2:30 PM Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question. Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 14-mars-07, à 04:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : On 3/13/07, *Bruno Marchal* [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron + proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its components; Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton, but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction. Quantum weirdness is an observed fact. We assume that it is, somehow, an intrinsic property of subatomic particles; but perhaps there is a hidden factor or as yet undiscovered theory which may explain it further. That would be equivalent to adding hidden variables. But then they have to be non local (just to address the facts, not just the theory). Of course if the hidden factor is given by the many worlds or comp, then such non local effects has to be retrospectively expected. But then we have to forget the idea that substance (decomposable reality) exists, but numbers. If you admit non-local hidden variables then you can have a theory like Bohmian quantum mechanics in which randomness is all epistemological, like statistical mechanics, and there is no place for multiple-worlds. You could get a neutron at high enough energies, I suppose, but I don't think that is what you mean. Is it possible to bring a proton and an electron appropriately together and have them just sit there next to each other? Locally yes. I'm not sure what you mean by locally. Since they have opposite charge they will be attracted by photon exchanges and will fall into some hydrogen atom state by emission of photons. Brent Meeker In QM this is given by a tensor product of the corresponding states. But it is an exceptional state. With comp it is open if such physical state acn ever be prepared, even locally. There is no sense to say an atom is part of the UD. It is part of the necessary discourse of self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's psychology/theology. Isn't that the *ultimate* reduction of everything? Given that a theology rarely eliminates subjects/person, I don't see in what reasonable sense this would be a reduction. Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description. People can look here for a cute knot table: http

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

John M wrote: Bruno and Brent: Are we back at the Aris-total i.e. the sum considered more than its (material-only!) components? Complexity of an assemblage includes more than what a reductionist 'component-analysis' can verify. But components are only part of a reductionist model - it also includes the interactions of the components, e.g how an electron interacts with a proton. To identify scientific reductionism with 'component-analysis' is a straw man. No one is satisfied with a reductionist model that just names components - the model must be able to go the other way and synthesize the behavior of the thing modeled. Modeling a hydrogen atom as an electron interacting via photons with a proton is a successful model because it predicts behavoir of the hydrogen atom, e.g. it EM spectrum, its stability, the heat capacity of an H2 gas. Qualia, functions, even out-of-boundary effects are active in identifying an item. It is in our many centuries old explanatory ways to say a proton and an electron make a H-atom and vice versa. First off: hydrogen (gas) is not the assemblage of H-atoms, it is an observational item that - when destructed in certain ways - results in other observables resembling H-atoms or even protons and electrons (if you have the means to look at them - not in an n-th deduction and its calculations). How small does n have to be? Does n=0 correspond to seeing photons? Same with 'other' atoms - molecules, singularly or in bunch. Reduced to a 2-D sketch. Nice game, I spent 50 years producing such (macromolecules that is) and 'studied'/applied them. Of course none of the destruction-result carries the proper charactersitics of the original ensemble. And NO proper 'observation' does exist. What's a proper observation? and why does its non-existence matter? It is the explanatory attempt for a world(part?) - not understood, just regarded as a model of whatever our epistemic enrichment has provided to THAT time. This is the 'reducing': to visualize this part as the total and utter the Aristotelian maxim. One can not extrapolate 'total ensemble' characteristics from studying the so called parts we discovered so far. We can think only within our already acquired knowledge. Then how can we ever acquire additional knowledge? The whole point of models like particles is to extrapolate beyond what we can observed. When such extrapolations agree with further observations we put greater credence in them. When the credence is great enough we start taking the model to be known - at least until we find a problem with it. This is nothing esoteric, it's the way we learn what tables and chairs are as well as protons and electrons. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/15/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But these ideas illustrate a problem with everything-exists. Everything conceivable, i.e. not self-contradictory is so ill defined it seems impossible to assign any measure to it, and without a measure, something to pick out this rather than that, the theory is empty. It just says what is possible is possible. But if there a measure, something picks out this rather than that, we can ask why THAT measure? Isn't that like arguing that there can be no number 17 because there is no way to assign it a measure and it would get lost among all the other objects in Platonia? Stathis Papaioannou I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and other small numbers but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e. almost all of them. A theory that just says all integers exist doesn't help answer that. But if the integers are something we make up (or are hardwired by evolution) then it makes sense that we are only acquainted with small ones. OK, but there are other questions that defy such an explanation. Suppose the universe were infinite, as per Tegmark Level 1, and contained an infinite number of observers. Wouldn't that make your measure effectively zero? And yet here you are. Stathis Papaioannou Another observation refuting Tegmark! :-) Seriously, even in the finite universe we observe my probability is almost zero. Almost everything and and everyone is improbable, just like my winning the lottery when I buy one a million tickets is improbable - but someone has to win. So it's a question of relative measure. Each integer has zero measure in the set of all integers - yet we are acquainted with some and not others. So why is the acquaintance measure of small integers so much greater than that of integers greater than 10^10^20 (i.e. almost all of them). What picks out the small integers? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi Brent, On Friday 16 March 2007 00:16:13 Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/15/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But these ideas illustrate a problem with everything-exists. Everything conceivable, i.e. not self-contradictory is so ill defined it seems impossible to assign any measure to it, and without a measure, something to pick out this rather than that, the theory is empty. It just says what is possible is possible. But if there a measure, something picks out this rather than that, we can ask why THAT measure? Isn't that like arguing that there can be no number 17 because there is no way to assign it a measure and it would get lost among all the other objects in Platonia? Stathis Papaioannou I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and other small numbers but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e. almost all of them. A theory that just says all integers exist doesn't help answer that. But if the integers are something we make up (or are hardwired by evolution) then it makes sense that we are only acquainted with small ones. OK, but there are other questions that defy such an explanation. Suppose the universe were infinite, as per Tegmark Level 1, and contained an infinite number of observers. Wouldn't that make your measure effectively zero? And yet here you are. Stathis Papaioannou Another observation refuting Tegmark! :-) Seriously, even in the finite universe we observe my probability is almost zero. Almost everything and and everyone is improbable, just like my winning the lottery when I buy one a million tickets is improbable - but someone has to win. So it's a question of relative measure. Each integer has zero measure in the set of all integers - yet we are acquainted with some and not others. So why is the acquaintance measure of small integers so much greater than that of integers greater than 10^10^20 (i.e. almost all of them). What picks out the small integers? Brent Meeker If you see each integer with a successor notation, 2 is S(1) and 3 is S(2) which is S(S(1)) and so on, you see that big integers contains the small integers and the smalls are over represented... just a though ;-) Quentin Yes, I think there's a grain of truth in that. The integers aren't *just out there*. By Peano's, or anyone else's, axioms they are generated as needed. We don't want to run out so we (except Torgny) always allow one more, but we never need the whole set at once until we want to make diagonalization arguments. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

On 3/16/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I don't know what you mean by a physical knots. In any case the identity of a knots (mathematical, physical) rely in its topology, not in such or such cartesian picture, even the concrete knots I put in my pocket. The knots looses its identity if it is cut. There are related examples, like letters of the alphabet, which survive even non-topological transformations and defy any algorithmic specification. Nevertheless, any particular concrete example of a knotted string or letter on a page is completely captured by a physical description. There is no special knottiness or letterness ingredient that needs to be added to ensure that they are knots or letters. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Bent, Stathis, Suppose that space is discrete. It has some elementary unit. Let's call it SU. Suppose there are 3 of these units out there in a right triangular fashion( L shape) Then what is the distance between two distant angles? is it made up of some integer numbers of space unit? Pythagoras' theorem says no. You might say we can not measure such distance because when we're talking about elements of space there should be nothing smaller than it... So what is that distance? How you gonna make a discrete space when it's intuitively continuous. Mohsen Ravanbakhsh. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Stathis Papaioannou skrev: On 3/13/07, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Not necessarily. If you draw a diagonal on a square on a computer screen, it will be made up of a discrete number of pixels despite what Pythagoras' theorem calculates. Irrational in the real world may just be an illusion. I was trying to mark a distance in real world which is irrational according to a rational unit(Width of pixels), and for such diagonal the distance is an irrational number, although it might be made up of rational numbers of another irrational unit (diagonal pixels) I mean there's some irrational distance out there! How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete. Yes, space (and time) is discrete. Everything in the universe is finite, and the universe itself is finite. Infinity is a logically impossible concept. -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On 3/14/07, Torgny Tholerus [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou skrev: On 3/13/07, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: *Not necessarily. If you draw a diagonal on a square on a computer screen, it will be made up of a discrete number of pixels despite what Pythagoras' theorem calculates. Irrational in the real world may just be an illusion. * I was trying to mark a distance in real world which is irrational according to a rational unit(Width of pixels), and for such diagonal the distance is an irrational number, although it might be made up of rational numbers of another irrational unit (diagonal pixels) I mean there's some irrational distance out there! How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete. Yes, space (and time) is discrete. Everything in the universe is finite, and the universe itself is finite. Infinity is a logically impossible concept. I don't see that discrete and finite necessarily go together. The integers are discrete, but not finite. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Stathis Papaioannou skrev: On 3/14/07, Torgny Tholerus [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou skrev: How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete. Yes, space (and time) is discrete. Everything in the universe is finite, and the universe itself is finite. Infinity is a logically impossible concept. I don't see that "discrete" and "finite" necessarily go together. The integers are discrete, but not finite. No, the integers are finite. There exists only a finite numer of integers. There exists a biggest integer N. It is true that you can construct the integer N+1, but this integer is not a member of the set of all integers. Because everything is finite, you can conclude that the space-time is discrete. -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Torgny Tholerus wrote: Stathis Papaioannou skrev: On 3/14/07, *Torgny Tholerus* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou skrev: How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete. Yes, space (and time) is discrete. Everything in the universe is finite, and the universe itself is finite. Infinity is a logically impossible concept. I don't see that discrete and finite necessarily go together. The integers are discrete, but not finite. No, the integers are finite. There exists only a finite numer of integers. There exists a biggest integer N. It is true that you can construct the integer N+1, but this integer is not a member of the set of all integers. This must be computer arithmetic (modulo N?) - not Peano's. :-) Because everything is finite, you can conclude that the space-time is discrete. That doesn't follow. The universe could be finite and closed, like the interval [0,1] and space could still be a continuum. But these ideas illustrate a problem with everything-exists. Everything conceivable, i.e. not self-contradictory is so ill defined it seems impossible to assign any measure to it, and without a measure, something to pick out this rather than that, the theory is empty. It just says what is possible is possible. But if there a measure, something picks out this rather than that, we can ask why THAT measure? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On 3/15/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Torgny Tholerus wrote: Stathis Papaioannou skrev: On 3/14/07, *Torgny Tholerus* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou skrev: How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete. Yes, space (and time) is discrete. Everything in the universe is finite, and the universe itself is finite. Infinity is a logically impossible concept. I don't see that discrete and finite necessarily go together. The integers are discrete, but not finite. No, the integers are finite. There exists only a finite numer of integers. There exists a biggest integer N. It is true that you can construct the integer N+1, but this integer is not a member of the set of all integers. This must be computer arithmetic (modulo N?) - not Peano's. :-) Because everything is finite, you can conclude that the space-time is discrete. That doesn't follow. The universe could be finite and closed, like the interval [0,1] and space could still be a continuum. But these ideas illustrate a problem with everything-exists. Everything conceivable, i.e. not self-contradictory is so ill defined it seems impossible to assign any measure to it, and without a measure, something to pick out this rather than that, the theory is empty. It just says what is possible is possible. But if there a measure, something picks out this rather than that, we can ask why THAT measure? Isn't that like arguing that there can be no number 17 because there is no way to assign it a measure and it would get lost among all the other objects in Platonia? Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/15/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Torgny Tholerus wrote: Stathis Papaioannou skrev: On 3/14/07, *Torgny Tholerus* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis Papaioannou skrev: How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete. Yes, space (and time) is discrete. Everything in the universe is finite, and the universe itself is finite. Infinity is a logically impossible concept. I don't see that discrete and finite necessarily go together. The integers are discrete, but not finite. No, the integers are finite. There exists only a finite numer of integers. There exists a biggest integer N. It is true that you can construct the integer N+1, but this integer is not a member of the set of all integers. This must be computer arithmetic (modulo N?) - not Peano's. :-) Because everything is finite, you can conclude that the space-time is discrete. That doesn't follow. The universe could be finite and closed, like the interval [0,1] and space could still be a continuum. But these ideas illustrate a problem with everything-exists. Everything conceivable, i.e. not self-contradictory is so ill defined it seems impossible to assign any measure to it, and without a measure, something to pick out this rather than that, the theory is empty. It just says what is possible is possible. But if there a measure, something picks out this rather than that, we can ask why THAT measure? Isn't that like arguing that there can be no number 17 because there is no way to assign it a measure and it would get lost among all the other objects in Platonia? Stathis Papaioannou I think it's more like asking why are we aware of 17 and other small numbers but no integers greater that say 10^10^20 - i.e. almost all of them. A theory that just says all integers exist doesn't help answer that. But if the integers are something we make up (or are hardwired by evolution) then it makes sense that we are only acquainted with small ones. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

*Why? Mathematical means nothing but not self-contradictory. Sherlock Holmes stories are mathematical. That doesn't mean Sherlock Holmes exists in some Platonic realm. * Brent, What do you mean by that? I do not get your point. Anyway I do not insist that it should be realizable. But I have examples in which we need them! Consider the use of Pythagoras theorem in nature. There are many cases in which the distance between two points should be irrational. -- Mohsen Ravanbakhsh, --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On 3/13/07, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: *Why? Mathematical means nothing but not self-contradictory. Sherlock Holmes stories are mathematical. That doesn't mean Sherlock Holmes exists in some Platonic realm. * Brent, What do you mean by that? I do not get your point. Anyway I do not insist that it should be realizable. But I have examples in which we need them! Consider the use of Pythagoras theorem in nature. There are many cases in which the distance between two points should be irrational. Not necessarily. If you draw a diagonal on a square on a computer screen, it will be made up of a discrete number of pixels despite what Pythagoras' theorem calculates. Irrational in the real world may just be an illusion. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

Le 12-mars-07, à 12:37, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : OK, but it seems that we are using reductionism differently. Perhaps. I am not so sure. You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron + proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its components; Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton, but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction. or you could say that it can be reduced to an electron + proton because these two components appropriately juxtaposed are necessary and sufficient to give rise to the hydrogen atom. In general this is not the case. And if the atom is just a part of UD*, well, that's just another, more impressive reduction. But just comp, without the quantum, makes it implausible that an atom can be individuated so much that it makes sense to say it is just a part of the UD. And QM confirms this too. To compute the EXACT (all decimal) position of an electron in an hydrogen atom, soon or later you have to take into account of white rabbit path, where the electron will, for going from position x to the position y you are computing, follow the path x too earth, reacts locally and transforms itself into a white rabbit running for the democrat election in the US, loose the election and come back to y. Same with the UD, the object atom of hydrogen is only defined relatively to an infinity of first person plural expectation dependong on the WHOLE UD*. There is no sense to say an atom is part of the UD. It is part of the necessary discourse of self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's psychology/theology. As for knots, can't any particular physical knot be described in a 3D coordinate system? This is similar to describing a particular physical circle or triangle. Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description. People can look here for a cute knot table: http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html Only if God issues everyone with immaterial souls at birth, so that reproducing the material or functional structure of the brain fails to reproduce consciousness, would I say that reductionism does not work... OK, but then you identify reductionism with comp. I identify reductionism with the idea that something is entirely explainable in some finitary theory. From this I can explain that comp can be used to refute all reductionist theory of both matter and mind (and their relation). I am aware it is a subtle point, but if you understand the Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA) from step 1 to 8, in the version: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm then you should, I think, understand that the idea that there is anything made of something, although locally true and useful for many practical purpose, is just wrong, globally. Even with just comp, but this is also entailed by the quantum empirical facts (even with the many-worlds view: if not they would not interfere). People can ask if they are not yet convinced by this. I have refer this by saying that if comp is true, physics is a branch of bio-psycho-theo-logy. matter emerges (logico-arithmetically, not temporally) from mind and number. You can attach a mind to a body, like children does with dolls, but you cannot attach a body to a mind, you can and must attach an infinity of relative bodies to a mind. relative bodies are only defined by infinity of arithmetical relationships, not by sub-bodies. (I know this contradicts Aristotle notion of Matter, but see Plotinus for old platonist reasons, a priori independent of comp and QM, to already suspect that Aristotle was wrong). unless you add the soul as an element in the reduction. Of course, but *that* would make any explanation a reductionism. Bruno Stathis Papaioannou On 3/12/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 11-mars-07, à 17:56, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Reductionism means breaking something up into simpler parts to explain it. What's wrong with that? Because, assuming comp, neither matter nor mind (including perception) can be break up into simpler parts to be explained. That is what UDA is all about. First person expection (both on mind and matter) are already global notion

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

*Not necessarily. If you draw a diagonal on a square on a computer screen, it will be made up of a discrete number of pixels despite what Pythagoras' theorem calculates. Irrational in the real world may just be an illusion.* I was trying to mark a distance in real world which is irrational according to a rational unit(Width of pixels), and for such diagonal the distance is an irrational number, although it might be made up of rational numbers of another irrational unit (diagonal pixels) I mean there's some irrational distance out there! -- Mohsen Ravanbakhsh. On 3/13/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 3/13/07, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: *Why? Mathematical means nothing but not self-contradictory. Sherlock Holmes stories are mathematical. That doesn't mean Sherlock Holmes exists in some Platonic realm. * Brent, What do you mean by that? I do not get your point. Anyway I do not insist that it should be realizable. But I have examples in which we need them! Consider the use of Pythagoras theorem in nature. There are many cases in which the distance between two points should be irrational. Not necessarily. If you draw a diagonal on a square on a computer screen, it will be made up of a discrete number of pixels despite what Pythagoras' theorem calculates. Irrational in the real world may just be an illusion. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Tangentially: Brent: 'doesn't mean Sherlock Holmes exists in some Platonic realm ...' MP: For those who occasionally like a clever and entertaining read unencumbered by deep social comment can I recommend the adventures of Ms Thursday Next in 'The Eyre Affair' a novel by Jasper FForde, and in the sequels, the names of which I have forgotten at the moment. The author shows what could happen if Platonia started really getting out of hand. Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ Brent Meeker wrote: Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote: /All actual measurements yield rational values. Using real numbers in the equations of physics is probably merely a convenience (since calculus is easier than finite differences). There is no evidence that defining an instantaneous state requires uncountable information. / What about the realizability of mathematical concepts. Real numbers are mathematical, so they should have a counterpart in real world. Why? Mathematical means nothing but not self-contradictory. Sherlock Holmes stories are mathematical. That doesn't mean Sherlock Holmes exists in some Platonic realm. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote: /Why? Mathematical means nothing but not self-contradictory. Sherlock Holmes stories are mathematical. That doesn't mean Sherlock Holmes exists in some Platonic realm. / Brent, What do you mean by that? Mathematics is just assuming some axioms and rules of inference and then proving theorems that follow from those. There's no restriction except that it should be consistent, i.e. not every statement should be a theorem. So you can regard a game of chess as a mathematical theorem or even a Sherlock Holmes story. You may suppose these things exist in some sense, but clearly they don't exist in the same sense as your computer. I do not get your point. Anyway I do not insist that it should be realizable. But I have examples in which we need them! Consider the use of Pythagoras theorem in nature. There are many cases in which the distance between two points should be irrational. Only under the assumption that space has a Euclidean metric - which is begging the question. From the operational viewpoint, all measurements yield integers (in some units). Real numbers are introduced in the Platonic realm to insure that some integer equations have solutions. Similarly imaginary numbers are introduced to complete the algebra. They are all our inventions - except some people think the integers are not. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 12-mars-07, à 12:37, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : OK, but it seems that we are using reductionism differently. Perhaps. I am not so sure. You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron + proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its components; Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton, but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction. Not only that, but QM admits of negative information, so some of the information you get from observing the parts may be cancelled out in a more comprehensive measurement. or you could say that it can be reduced to an electron + proton because these two components appropriately juxtaposed are necessary and sufficient to give rise to the hydrogen atom. In general this is not the case. And if the atom is just a part of UD*, well, that's just another, more impressive reduction. But just comp, without the quantum, makes it implausible that an atom can be individuated so much that it makes sense to say it is just a part of the UD. And QM confirms this too. To compute the EXACT (all decimal) position of an electron in an hydrogen atom, soon or later you have to take into account of white rabbit path, where the electron will, for going from position x to the position y you are computing, follow the path x too earth, reacts locally and transforms itself into a white rabbit running for the democrat election in the US, loose the election and come back to y. Of course this is assuming that QM (which was discovered by applying reductionist methods) is the correct EXACT theory - which is extremely doubtful given its incompatibility with general relativity. Brent Meeker Same with the UD, the object atom of hydrogen is only defined relatively to an infinity of first person plural expectation dependong on the WHOLE UD*. There is no sense to say an atom is part of the UD. It is part of the necessary discourse of self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's psychology/theology. As for knots, can't any particular physical knot be described in a 3D coordinate system? This is similar to describing a particular physical circle or triangle. Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description. People can look here for a cute knot table: http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html Only if God issues everyone with immaterial souls at birth, so that reproducing the material or functional structure of the brain fails to reproduce consciousness, would I say that reductionism does not work... OK, but then you identify reductionism with comp. I identify reductionism with the idea that something is entirely explainable in some finitary theory. From this I can explain that comp can be used to refute all reductionist theory of both matter and mind (and their relation). I am aware it is a subtle point, but if you understand the Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA) from step 1 to 8, in the version: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm then you should, I think, understand that the idea that there is anything made of something, although locally true and useful for many practical purpose, is just wrong, globally. Even with just comp, but this is also entailed by the quantum empirical facts (even with the many-worlds view: if not they would not interfere). People can ask if they are not yet convinced by this. I have refer this by saying that if comp is true, physics is a branch of bio-psycho-theo-logy. matter emerges (logico-arithmetically, not temporally) from mind and number. You can attach a mind to a body, like children does with dolls, but you cannot attach a body to a mind, you can and must attach an infinity of relative bodies to a mind. relative bodies are only defined by infinity of arithmetical relationships, not by sub-bodies. (I know this contradicts Aristotle notion of Matter, but see Plotinus for old platonist reasons, a priori independent of comp and QM, to already suspect that Aristotle was wrong). unless you add the soul as an

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Mathematics is just assuming some axioms and rules of inference and then proving theorems that follow from those. There's no restriction except that it should be consistent, i.e. not every statement should be a theorem. So you can regard a game of chess as a mathematical theorem or even a Sherlock Holmes story. You may suppose these things exist in some sense, but clearly they don't exist in the same sense as your computer. Now I got it. Only under the* *assumption that space has a Euclidean metric (*You are assuming the same to oppose*)- which is begging the question. From the operational viewpoint (There are other viewpoints as you know), all measurements yield integers (in some units (If you want to keep the same unit for two measurements as I said you'd encounter the irrational numbers)). Real numbers are introduced in the Platonic realm to insure that some integer equations have solutions(At least sometimes those equations have some real counterparts). Similarly imaginary numbers are introduced to complete the algebra. They are all our inventions - except some people think the integers are not. You're right to some extends, but my point still is a point! Mohsen Ravanbakhsh. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote: Mathematics is just assuming some axioms and rules of inference and then proving theorems that follow from those. There's no restriction except that it should be consistent, i.e. not every statement should be a theorem. So you can regard a game of chess as a mathematical theorem or even a Sherlock Holmes story. You may suppose these things exist in some sense, but clearly they don't exist in the same sense as your computer. Now I got it. Only under the* *assumption that space has a Euclidean metric (/You are assuming the same to oppose/)- which is begging the question. From the operational viewpoint (There are other viewpoints as you know), Yes, but if they are not operational it is not clear how they relate to our world of experience. Generally they are taken to be idealized models. all measurements yield integers (in some units (If you want to keep the same unit for two measurements as I said you'd encounter the irrational numbers)). No. For example the most accurate measurement to confirm Pythogora's theorem now possible would be to use ultraviolet light and count the number of wavelengths along each side and the diagonal. Those counts would all be integers. At present this is a practical experimental limit and so one can imagine using shorter wavelengths and making more accurate measurements - which will still come out as integers. But according to current theories of general relativity and quantum mechanics there is also a limit to how short the wave length can be; an in-principle limit. Measurements never yield numbers that are not integers (or ratios of integers). Brent Meeker Real numbers are introduced in the Platonic realm to insure that some integer equations have solutions(At least sometimes those equations have some real counterparts). Similarly imaginary numbers are introduced to complete the algebra. They are all our inventions - except some people think the integers are not. You're right to some extends, but my point still is a point! Mohsen Ravanbakhsh. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On 3/13/07, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: *Not necessarily. If you draw a diagonal on a square on a computer screen, it will be made up of a discrete number of pixels despite what Pythagoras' theorem calculates. Irrational in the real world may just be an illusion. * I was trying to mark a distance in real world which is irrational according to a rational unit(Width of pixels), and for such diagonal the distance is an irrational number, although it might be made up of rational numbers of another irrational unit (diagonal pixels) I mean there's some irrational distance out there! How can you be sure? Maybe space is discrete. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

On 3/13/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron + proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its components; Nor by any juxtaposition of its components in case of some prior entanglement. In that case I can expect some bits of information from looking only the electron, and some bits from looking only the proton, but an observation of the whole atom would makes those bits not genuine. It is weird but the quantum facts confirms this QM prediction. Quantum weirdness is an observed fact. We assume that it is, somehow, an intrinsic property of subatomic particles; but perhaps there is a hidden factor or as yet undiscovered theory which may explain it further. or you could say that it can be reduced to an electron + proton because these two components appropriately juxtaposed are necessary and sufficient to give rise to the hydrogen atom. In general this is not the case. You could get a neutron at high enough energies, I suppose, but I don't think that is what you mean. Is it possible to bring a proton and an electron appropriately together and have them just sit there next to each other? And if the atom is just a part of UD*, well, that's just another, more impressive reduction. But just comp, without the quantum, makes it implausible that an atom can be individuated so much that it makes sense to say it is just a part of the UD. And QM confirms this too. To compute the EXACT (all decimal) position of an electron in an hydrogen atom, soon or later you have to take into account of white rabbit path, where the electron will, for going from position x to the position y you are computing, follow the path x too earth, reacts locally and transforms itself into a white rabbit running for the democrat election in the US, loose the election and come back to y. Same with the UD, the object atom of hydrogen is only defined relatively to an infinity of first person plural expectation dependong on the WHOLE UD*. There is no sense to say an atom is part of the UD. It is part of the necessary discourse of self-observing machine. Recall comp makes physics branch of machine's psychology/theology. Isn't that the *ultimate* reduction of everything? As for knots, can't any particular physical knot be described in a 3D coordinate system? This is similar to describing a particular physical circle or triangle. Not really because the knot is a topological object. Its identity is defined by the class of equivalence for some topological transformation from your 3D description. If you put the knot in your pocket so that it changes its 3D shape (but is not broken) then it conserve its knot identity which is only locally equivalent with the 3D shape. To see the global equivalence will be tricky, and there is no algorithm telling for sure you can identify a knot from a 3D description. People can look here for a cute knot table: http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html I was thinking of a physical knot, which is not the same as the Platonic ideal, even if there is no such thing as a separate physical reality. Only if God issues everyone with immaterial souls at birth, so that reproducing the material or functional structure of the brain fails to reproduce consciousness, would I say that reductionism does not work... OK, but then you identify reductionism with comp. I identify reductionism with the idea that something is entirely explainable in some finitary theory. From this I can explain that comp can be used to refute all reductionist theory of both matter and mind (and their relation). I am aware it is a subtle point, but if you understand the Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA) from step 1 to 8, in the version: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm then you should, I think, understand that the idea that there is anything made of something, although locally true and useful for many practical purpose, is just wrong, globally. Even with just comp, but this is also entailed by the quantum empirical facts (even with the many-worlds view: if not they would not interfere). People can ask if they are not yet convinced by this. I have refer this by saying that if comp is true, physics is a branch of bio-psycho-theo-logy. matter emerges (logico-arithmetically, not temporally) from mind and number. You can attach a mind to a body, like children does with dolls, but you cannot attach a body to a mind, you can and must attach an infinity of relative bodies to a mind. relative bodies are only defined by infinity of arithmetical relationships, not by sub-bodies. (I know this contradicts Aristotle notion of Matter, but see Plotinus for old platonist reasons, a priori independent of comp and QM, to already suspect that Aristotle was wrong). unless you add the soul as an element in the reduction. Of course, but

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

Le 11-mars-07, à 17:56, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Reductionism means breaking something up into simpler parts to explain it. What's wrong with that? Because, assuming comp, neither matter nor mind (including perception) can be break up into simpler parts to be explained. That is what UDA is all about. First person expection (both on mind and matter) are already global notion relying on the whole UD*. And empirical physics, currently quantum mechanics, confirms that indeed, we cannot explain matter by breaking it into parts. That is what violation of bell's inequality or more generally quantum information is all about. This has been my first confirmation of comp by nature: non-locality is the easiest consequence of comp. A good (and actually very deep) analogy is provided by the structure of knots (see the table of knots: http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html A knot is closed in its mathematical definition (unlike shoe tangle). You cannot break a knot in smaller parts, so that the whole structure is explained by the parts. Knots, like many topological structure, contains irreductible global information. The same for the notion of computations (and indeed those notions have deep relationship, see the following two impressive papers: http://web.comlab.ox.ac.uk/oucl/work/samson.abramsky/tambook.pdf http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0606114 I know that Derek Parfit call comp the reductionist view. this is a very misleading use of vocabulary. Comp is the simplest destroyer of any reductionist attempt to understand anything, not just humans. Bruno On 3/12/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 10-mars-07, à 18:42, John M a écrit : I don't deny the usefulness of science (even if it is reductionist) ... How could science be reductionist? Science is the art of making hypotheses enough clear so as to make them doubtable and eventually testable. No scientist will ever say there is a primitive physical universe or an ultimate God, or anything like that. All theories are hypothetical, including grandmother's one when asserting that the sun will rise tomorrow. The roots of our confidence in such or such theories are complex matter. Don't confuse science with the human approximation of it. Something quite interesting per se, also, but which develops itself. Lobian approximations of it are also rich of surprise, about oneself. Science or better, the scientific attitude, invites us to listen to what the machine can say and dream of, nowadays. How could such an invitation be reductionist? I would say science is modesty. It is what makes faith necessary and possible. With comp, when science or reason grows polynomially (in a trip from G to G* for example), then faith has to grow super-exponentially. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

OK, but it seems that we are using reductionism differently. You could say that a hydrogen atom cannot be reduced to an electron + proton because it exhibits behaviour not exhibited in any of its components; or you could say that it can be reduced to an electron + proton because these two components appropriately juxtaposed are necessary and sufficient to give rise to the hydrogen atom. And if the atom is just a part of UD*, well, that's just another, more impressive reduction. As for knots, can't any particular physical knot be described in a 3D coordinate system? This is similar to describing a particular physical circle or triangle. Only if God issues everyone with immaterial souls at birth, so that reproducing the material or functional structure of the brain fails to reproduce consciousness, would I say that reductionism does not work... unless you add the soul as an element in the reduction. Stathis Papaioannou On 3/12/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 11-mars-07, à 17:56, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Reductionism means breaking something up into simpler parts to explain it. What's wrong with that? Because, assuming comp, neither matter nor mind (including perception) can be break up into simpler parts to be explained. That is what UDA is all about. First person expection (both on mind and matter) are already global notion relying on the whole UD*. And empirical physics, currently quantum mechanics, confirms that indeed, we cannot explain matter by breaking it into parts. That is what violation of bell's inequality or more generally quantum information is all about. This has been my first confirmation of comp by nature: non-locality is the easiest consequence of comp. A good (and actually very deep) analogy is provided by the structure of knots (see the table of knots: http://www.math.utoronto.ca/~drorbn/KAtlas/Knots/index.html A knot is closed in its mathematical definition (unlike shoe tangle). You cannot break a knot in smaller parts, so that the whole structure is explained by the parts. Knots, like many topological structure, contains irreductible global information. The same for the notion of computations (and indeed those notions have deep relationship, see the following two impressive papers: http://web.comlab.ox.ac.uk/oucl/work/samson.abramsky/tambook.pdf http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0606114 I know that Derek Parfit call comp the reductionist view. this is a very misleading use of vocabulary. Comp is the simplest destroyer of any reductionist attempt to understand anything, not just humans. Bruno On 3/12/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 10-mars-07, à 18:42, John M a écrit : I don't deny the usefulness of science (even if it is reductionist) ... How could science be reductionist? Science is the art of making hypotheses enough clear so as to make them doubtable and eventually testable. No scientist will ever say there is a primitive physical universe or an ultimate God, or anything like that. All theories are hypothetical, including grandmother's one when asserting that the sun will rise tomorrow. The roots of our confidence in such or such theories are complex matter. Don't confuse science with the human approximation of it. Something quite interesting per se, also, but which develops itself. Lobian approximations of it are also rich of surprise, about oneself. Science or better, the scientific attitude, invites us to listen to what the machine can say and dream of, nowadays. How could such an invitation be reductionist? I would say science is modesty. It is what makes faith necessary and possible. With comp, when science or reason grows polynomially (in a trip from G to G* for example), then faith has to grow super-exponentially. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote: /All actual measurements yield rational values. Using real numbers in the equations of physics is probably merely a convenience (since calculus is easier than finite differences). There is no evidence that defining an instantaneous state requires uncountable information. / What about the realizability of mathematical concepts. Real numbers are mathematical, so they should have a counterpart in real world. Why? Mathematical means nothing but not self-contradictory. Sherlock Holmes stories are mathematical. That doesn't mean Sherlock Holmes exists in some Platonic realm. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

On 3/11/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: SP: ' ... it could take a long time to get there ... ' MP: But is that according to the time frame of the laughing devil who threw me in there and who remains safely out of reach of acceleration-induced time dilation, or my wailing ghost which/who's mind and sensoria will be ever more wonderfully concentrated on 'what it is like to be' a piece of spaghetti, unable to see anything except *the destination*? I'm not the best person on this list to answser, but I think the tidal forces as you pass the event horizon of a very massive black hole would not be enough to destroy you, since tidal forces are proportional to M/r^3 while the Schwarzschild radius is proportional to M. Tidal forces will increase as you approach the singularity, which is inevitable once you pass the event horizon, but the time for this to happen is proportional to M. This refers to your time frame: for the devil who threw you in, it would appear that you never reach the event horizon. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

Le 10-mars-07, à 18:42, John M a écrit : I don't deny the usefulness of science (even if it is reductionist) ... How could science be reductionist? Science is the art of making hypotheses enough clear so as to make them doubtable and eventually testable. No scientist will ever say there is a primitive physical universe or an ultimate God, or anything like that. All theories are hypothetical, including grandmother's one when asserting that the sun will rise tomorrow. The roots of our confidence in such or such theories are complex matter. Don't confuse science with the human approximation of it. Something quite interesting per se, also, but which develops itself. Lobian approximations of it are also rich of surprise, about oneself. Science or better, the scientific attitude, invites us to listen to what the machine can say and dream of, nowadays. How could such an invitation be reductionist? I would say science is modesty. It is what makes faith necessary and possible. With comp, when science or reason grows polynomially (in a trip from G to G* for example), then faith has to grow super-exponentially. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

Bruno, please read my italic comments between your lines. Thanks for Stathis to rush to my rescue (reductionsm), Stathis wrote: Reductionism means breaking something up into simpler parts to explain it. What's wrong with that? I will try to write my own version, a bit (not much) different. John - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, March 11, 2007 10:45 AM Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question. Le 10-mars-07, à 18:42, John M a écrit : I don't deny the usefulness of science (even if it is reductionist) ... How could science be reductionist? Science is the art of making hypotheses enough clear so as to make them doubtable and eventually testable. My take on reductionist is to 'reduce' the observation to a boundary-enclosed model as our choice. It is a necessity for us, because we are not capable to encompass the totality and all its ramifications into our mind's work at once. Reduced (reductionist ) view is the way how humanity gathered our knowledge of the world. (Probably other animals do the same thing at their mind-level). What I see here - and thank you, Bruno, for it, - you are using a more advanced view of science than what I referred to as the conventional - historic, topically fragmented sciences of old. Where e.g. physics is based on the 'primitive' physical (material) worldview and biology is what Darwin visualized. Reductionist sciences established our technology. You use it, I use it. We just start to 'think' beyond it. * No scientist will ever say there is a primitive physical universe or an ultimate God, or anything like that. All theories are hypothetical, including grandmother's one when asserting that the sun will rise tomorrow. The roots of our confidence in such or such theories are complex matter. I wish we had more of your scientists. Academia as a general establishment is not so advanced yet. Don't confuse science with the human approximation of it. Something quite interesting per se, also, but which develops itself. Lobian approximations of it are also rich of surprise, about oneself. Now this is exactly what I mean. I would like to read a definition of 'science' as you formulate it. Then again: how many 'scientists' have ever heard of a Lobian m? We are living here (list) in a vacuum and I was talking non-vacuum. * Science or better, the scientific attitude, invites us to listen to what the machine can say and dream of, nowadays. How could such an invitation be reductionist? Here we go again: is the 'machine' superhuman? does it tell us things beyond our comprehension? How? We (Loeb etc.) invented and outlined it and its functionality. How can it be beyond those limits? * I would say science is modesty. It is what makes faith necessary and possible. Faith in what? Not in 'hearsay', not in Alice-land, not in (really) reduced models of age-old worldviews. The 'supernatural' is a cop-out for the modesty to say: I know not . * With comp, when science or reason grows polynomially (in a trip from G to G* for example), then faith has to grow super-exponentially. I hope you have (Mark's) PLAIN ENGLISH TRANSLATION to that in non-mathematico lingo. * Bruno regards John http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

On 3/10/07, John Mikes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: i ENVY YOU, guys, to know so much about BHs to speak of a singularity. I would not go further than according to what is said about them, they may wash off whatever got into and turn into - sort of - a singularity. Galaxies, whatever, fall into those hypothetical BHs and who knows how much Dark Matter (the assumed), we just don't know - it all may be neatly stuffed in and escape from the habitual description of the 'singularity' as an indiscernible structural view, - or - as seemingly you assume: they homogenize (paste?) it all into a - well - singularity-content. Whoever KNOWS more about singularities, BHs, Dark Matter, should speak up - please: NO assumptions ('it got to be's) or deductions of such! We don't know. We only guess on the basis of our best evidence and theories. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

Cher Quentin, let me paraphrase (big): so someone had an assumption: BH. OK, everybody has the right to fantasize. Especially if it sounds helpful.Then some mathematically loaded minds calculated within this assumption with quantities taken from other assumptions (pardon me: quantizing within other models in science). Then someone takes the results for real and examines if it gives infinity - a good game in the assumed topic. Then Olala: there it is. So: call it singularity. What? the 3+th level of an assumption, already taken as a fact in science. Careful analysis can show similar 'evolution' of other fiction into scientific facts. I don't deny the usefulness of science (even if it is reductionist) I happily use the results and even DID contribute to it, but when it comes to understanding - or at least evaluate reasonability, I use Occam's COMB to remove the added conclusions upon assumptions. No hard feelings, it is MY opinion, and I am absolutely no missionary. John M - Original Message - From: Quentin Anciaux To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Friday, March 09, 2007 6:03 PM Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question. Hi John, Singularity is just a name that means that the solutions of the equations describing the BH gives infinity... It's what is a singularity. Does the infinity is real (we must still be in accordance about what it means) is another question, but accepting GR as a true approximation of reality, singularity existence is a real question. Quentin On Friday 09 March 2007 23:37:49 John Mikes wrote: i ENVY YOU, guys, to know so much about BHs to speak of a singularity. I would not go further than according to what is said about them, they may wash off whatever got into and turn into - sort of - a singularity. Galaxies, whatever, fall into those hypothetical BHs and who knows how much Dark Matter (the assumed), we just don't know - it all may be neatly stuffed in and escape from the habitual description of the 'singularity' as an indiscernible structural view, - or - as seemingly you assume: they homogenize (paste?) it all into a - well - singularity-content. Whoever KNOWS more about singularities, BHs, Dark Matter, should speak up - please: NO assumptions ('it got to be's) or deductions of such! John M On 3/8/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 3/9/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: MP: Two thoughts come to my suspicious mind. 1/ [Not far from the post-Freudian speculation :-] ... Attendance within the event horizon of a common or garden galactic variety black hole would seem to incorporate a one-way ticket *to* the singularity, would it not? Yes, but it could take a very long time to get there in a massive enough black hole. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

John M: Cher Quentin, let me paraphrase (big): so someone had an assumption: BH. OK, everybody has the right to fantasize. Especially if it sounds helpful. Well, the basic assumption was more broad than that: it was that general relativity is a trustworthy theory of gravity. There's plenty of evidence that supports various predictions of GR which differ from Newtonian gravity, like the precession of the perihelion of Mercury's orbit, the gravitational lensing of light near stars and galaxies, and gravitational time dilation which can be measured at different altitudes on Earth (and it also needs to be taken into account when programming the clocks on board the orbiting GPS satellites). One of GR's predictions is that a sufficiently large collapsing star will form a black hole (another is that the universe must be either expanding or contracting, which lead to the Big Bang theory once redshift was observed). Black holes were theorized for a while, then in the last two decades they found observational evidence for a large number of likely black holes with telescopes. Most physicists believe general relativity's predictions will cease to be accurate at the Planck scale of very short distances and times and very high energy densities, and that at these scales it will need to be replaced by a quantum theory of gravity. So although they are fairly confident that GR is correct about large collapsing stars forming a black hole with an event horizon and a size proportional to its mass (given by the 'Swarzschild radius'), they think that the prediction of a singularity of infinite density at the center could be wrong, and that we'll need a theory of quantum gravity to understand what's really going on there. Jesse _ The average US Credit Score is 675. The cost to see yours: $0 by Experian. http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=660600bcd=EMAILFOOTERAVERAGE --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

Dear Jesse, thanks for the cool and objective words. I take it back (not what I said: I mean the topic) further. Our edifice of physical science is a wonderful mental construct, balanced by applied math, all on quantities fitting the reduced models of historical observations from the hand-ax on. Explanations grew out from all consecutive levels of our epistemic enrichment and served as indisputable basis for later explanations (even if they 'corrected' them, like the more than a dozen entropies and still counting). Assumptions make good basis for thousands of level in consecutive build-up we still use 'atoms', 'molecules' 'gravity' 'electricity', 'photon' etc. etc. as our basis. Then comes your judgement that one theory in this building looks finer than another. The learned (brainwashed) scientist-mind finds them as natural as fish the nonexistence of water. The huge amount of knowledge blocks any naive (elementary) scrutiny of the basics. I do not argue with your learned examples; within the system matches are found especially quantitative ones, visualizing our select domain and scale-restrictions. 'Observational evidence' is a belief in our up-to-date instrumental readings explained INTO the theoretical faith as evidence. Wilson found the background radiation because he had readings they were fitable and he new about the idea of such possibility in view of the Big Bang (- assumption - as we believe it today in our present cosmology). Eric Lerner's book (90s?) presented some doubts (The Big Bang Never Was (title approximate) -) I added some more upon my feeble thinking. How many ethers and phlogista do we still have? We got rid of elan vitale - but did we really? I do not start a crusade against conventional science and understand the reluctance of the practitioners to accept the endangerment of their wisdom. Reductionist thinking (science) is the only one our mind is capable of exercising (mine included), but I feel it is time to take a breath and a wider view to elevate from the age-old concepts to the acceptance of something else, without paradoxes, givens, axioms, in interconnection of them all and ready for a change. Human science went through changes over the millennia, even fundamental ones at times, there are more to come. I remember the time when tachyon-observation was denied as false, because they seemed FTL and this was prohibited. Theory over observed. I do not claim that 'my views' are the call for a future, I did not invent them, just picked up changing views (not so few on this list) and opened my mind to let them in. Since I was not committed to the 'old' I had no problem. I allow myself to be wrong and argue cautiously: you may be right, I may be wrong, but I have to see that in a view broader than the conventional physical teaching. I don't believe today my own 'macromolecules' I made and got patented, they are good within the old theory. I saw 'effects' and applied the 'wisdom' to explain them without scrutiny. They worked. Not perfectly, as all we have has flaws (e.g. airplanes fall out from the sky, medicines fail, buildings collapse, etc.,) but we are very confident in our science. Well, I am not without scrutiny. I love assumptions: they push forward our advancement. Just do not allow them to become facts and basis for many levels of consecutive conclusions without a grain of salt. Your expressions (Most physicists believe, they are fairly confident, or: general relativity is a trustworthy theory of gravity and I do not go into 'gravity'. nor into the words of curvature of spacetime) are carefully chosen. Religious people talk more straightforward in their religious argumentation. Excuse my lengthy reply, I enjoyed your argument. Regards John M On 3/10/07, Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John M: Cher Quentin, let me paraphrase (big): so someone had an assumption: BH. OK, everybody has the right to fantasize. Especially if it sounds helpful. Well, the basic assumption was more broad than that: it was that general relativity is a trustworthy theory of gravity. There's plenty of evidence that supports various predictions of GR which differ from Newtonian gravity, like the precession of the perihelion of Mercury's orbit, the gravitational lensing of light near stars and galaxies, and gravitational time dilation which can be measured at different altitudes on Earth (and it also needs to be taken into account when programming the clocks on board the orbiting GPS satellites). One of GR's predictions is that a sufficiently large collapsing star will form a black hole (another is that the universe must be either expanding or contracting, which lead to the Big Bang theory once redshift was observed). Black holes were theorized for a while, then in the last two decades they found observational evidence for a large number of likely black holes with telescopes. Most physicists believe general relativity's predictions will cease to be

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

SP: ' ... it could take a long time to get there ... ' MP: But is that according to the time frame of the laughing devil who threw me in there and who remains safely out of reach of acceleration-induced time dilation, or my wailing ghost which/who's mind and sensoria will be ever more wonderfully concentrated on 'what it is like to be' a piece of spaghetti, unable to see anything except *the destination*? Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/9/07, *Mark Peaty* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: MP: Two thoughts come to my suspicious mind. 1/ [Not far from the post-Freudian speculation :-] ... Attendance within the event horizon of a common or garden galactic variety black hole would seem to incorporate a one-way ticket *to* the singularity, would it not? Yes, but it could take a very long time to get there in a massive enough black hole. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

i ENVY YOU, guys, to know so much about BHs to speak of a singularity. I would not go further than according to what is said about them, they may wash off whatever got into and turn into - sort of - a singularity. Galaxies, whatever, fall into those hypothetical BHs and who knows how much Dark Matter (the assumed), we just don't know - it all may be neatly stuffed in and escape from the habitual description of the 'singularity' as an indiscernible structural view, - or - as seemingly you assume: they homogenize (paste?) it all into a - well - singularity-content. Whoever KNOWS more about singularities, BHs, Dark Matter, should speak up - please: NO assumptions ('it got to be's) or deductions of such! John M On 3/8/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 3/9/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: MP: Two thoughts come to my suspicious mind. 1/ [Not far from the post-Freudian speculation :-] ... Attendance within the event horizon of a common or garden galactic variety black hole would seem to incorporate a one-way ticket *to* the singularity, would it not? Yes, but it could take a very long time to get there in a massive enough black hole. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

Hi John, Singularity is just a name that means that the solutions of the equations describing the BH gives infinity... It's what is a singularity. Does the infinity is real (we must still be in accordance about what it means) is another question, but accepting GR as a true approximation of reality, singularity existence is a real question. Quentin On Friday 09 March 2007 23:37:49 John Mikes wrote: i ENVY YOU, guys, to know so much about BHs to speak of a singularity. I would not go further than according to what is said about them, they may wash off whatever got into and turn into - sort of - a singularity. Galaxies, whatever, fall into those hypothetical BHs and who knows how much Dark Matter (the assumed), we just don't know - it all may be neatly stuffed in and escape from the habitual description of the 'singularity' as an indiscernible structural view, - or - as seemingly you assume: they homogenize (paste?) it all into a - well - singularity-content. Whoever KNOWS more about singularities, BHs, Dark Matter, should speak up - please: NO assumptions ('it got to be's) or deductions of such! John M On 3/8/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 3/9/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: MP: Two thoughts come to my suspicious mind. 1/ [Not far from the post-Freudian speculation :-] ... Attendance within the event horizon of a common or garden galactic variety black hole would seem to incorporate a one-way ticket *to* the singularity, would it not? Yes, but it could take a very long time to get there in a massive enough black hole. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

SP:' You wouldn't necessarily be squashed if you were inside the event horizon of a black hole provided that it was massive enough. Being inside the event horizon is not the same as being inside the singularity.' MP: Two thoughts come to my suspicious mind. 1/ [Not far from the post-Freudian speculation :-] ... Attendance within the event horizon of a common or garden galactic variety black hole would seem to incorporate a one-way ticket *to* the singularity, would it not? 2/ I once heard someone on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's Radio National Science Show [on every Saturday after the midday news] describing our universe in these terms. His point was that whatever we might think about what was 'beyond' the bounds of 'our' universe, nothing from here can escape to 'there'. As I understand it this is in line with Einstein's concept of the universe being closed in upon itself, the key cause of which is gravity, the curvature of space-time. MP: Going off at a tangent, I have a question which is quite possibly a dumb question that just needs to be asked because it CAN be asked. Preamble: The expansion of the universe, characterised by the Hubble Constant I believe, is usually explained non-mathematically by analogy with the stretching of the surface of a balloon as the balloon is inflated. The balloon surface is stretched uniformly, pretty much, by its having everywhere the same tensile strength and elasticity and by the force which causes the deformation being applied equally all over because it is the averaged effect of all the gas particles within the contained volume. That much makes sense, and the overall effect is to cause point locations on the surface of the balloon to recede from one another at a rate which is proportional at any given moment to the distance between the points, measured along the surface. Question: Would it be mathematically equivalent, or significantly different, to consider the measured change in size and in distances as a uniform *contraction* of the metric, ie the measuring system, rather than an expansion of the location, so to speak. In particular, why is it not feasible to consider the Big Bang and subsequent Inflationary epoch as being in effect a collapse? Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/8/07, *Mark Peaty* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: NB: I hope that my imaginary destination in your speculation of possible post mortem exploits for my erstwhile sceptical soul is not a post-Freudian slip. I know that many of my contributions to this and other lists have lacked the erudite succinctness of those with greater talents; failure of concentration [AKA 'ADD'] has been a characteristic of life for me, but I think that 'awaking' to the innards of a black whole would do more than wonderfully concentrate the mind: concentration itself would become the major problem even for a ghost! =-O You wouldn't necessarily be squashed if you were inside the event horizon of a black hole provided that it was massive enough. Being inside the event horizon is not the same as being inside the singularity. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Stathis: your starting the argument: IF the M-W-I(dea) is valid, it it seems to imply...which is a bit shaky (what if not?) - the law-like is a breakable compromise between confro nting arguments. Do I read some denigration of the White Rabbit? (coming from a wide interpretation of all possible) Now to the meat of it: have you ever tried to outline the 'mind' of the early hiominid to survive? Before Immanuel Kant and even the Mother Goddess? Maybe with some notion of the most advanced and best weaponry 'ever': the hand--ax? or the 'mind' of an amoeba? Just asking questions in extension of ourselves. John - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2007 8:46 PM Subject: Re: Evidence for the simulation argument SP wrote to BM: How so? The Many Worlds idea seems to imply that you survive no matter what. The consequences of natural selection obtain only within worlds which are law-like - and we're back to the white rabbit problem. You survive if a sufficiently close analogue of your mind survives. This can theoretically happen in many ways other than the obvious one (survival of your physical body): in parallel worlds, in a distant part of our own world if it is infinite in extent, in the Turing machine at the end of time. The white rabbit universes are a problem: since we don't observe them, maybe these theories are wrong, or maybe there is some other reason why we don't observe them. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks and a dumb question.

On 3/9/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: MP: Two thoughts come to my suspicious mind. 1/ [Not far from the post-Freudian speculation :-] ... Attendance within the event horizon of a common or garden galactic variety black hole would seem to incorporate a one-way ticket *to* the singularity, would it not? Yes, but it could take a very long time to get there in a massive enough black hole. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On 3/9/07, John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Stathis: your starting the argument: IF the M-W-I(dea) is valid, it it seems to imply...which is a bit shaky (what if not?) - the law-like is a breakable compromise between confro nting arguments. Do I read some denigration of the White Rabbit? (coming from a wide interpretation of all possible) I was merely pointing out that it is a problem to be explained, and Russell has provided one explanation. As for the if, well, we wouldn't want to get too dogmatic about the things we discuss here, would we? Now to the meat of it: have you ever tried to outline the 'mind' of the early hiominid to survive? Before Immanuel Kant and even the Mother Goddess? Maybe with some notion of the most advanced and best weaponry 'ever': the hand--ax? or the 'mind' of an amoeba? Just asking questions in extension of ourselves. You are perhaps asking about paleopsychology, a field I don't know anything about, if anyone does. However, I was talking about what it means to survive rather than the process whereby survival might be ensured. Stathis Papaioannou - Original Message - *From:* Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com *Sent:* Tuesday, March 06, 2007 8:46 PM *Subject:* Re: Evidence for the simulation argument SP wrote to BM: How so? The Many Worlds idea seems to imply that you survive no matter what. The consequences of natural selection obtain only within worlds which are law-like - and we're back to the white rabbit problem. You survive if a sufficiently close analogue of your mind survives. This can theoretically happen in many ways other than the obvious one (survival of your physical body): in parallel worlds, in a distant part of our own world if it is infinite in extent, in the Turing machine at the end of time. The white rabbit universes are a problem: since we don't observe them, maybe these theories are wrong, or maybe there is some other reason why we don't observe them. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

So are sets of cardinality \aleph_2 or sets of cardinality \aleph_{\aleph_0}. On the other hand, one set of cardinality 2^\aleph_0 appears to be big enough to explain all of observed reality. Maybe Tegmarkism is going too far... On Wed, Mar 07, 2007 at 11:19:03AM +0330, Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote: *All actual measurements yield rational values. Using real numbers in the equations of physics is probably merely a convenience (since calculus is easier than finite differences). There is no evidence that defining an instantaneous state requires uncountable information.* What about the realizability of mathematical concepts. Real numbers are mathematical, so they should have a counterpart in real world. What ever that counterpart is, it's toils the problem of uncountability. But I think your answer is the best shot. Mohsen Ravanbakhsh. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks to Russell and Stathis

Firstly a big thank you to Russell Standish for providing that incredibly succinct 'bit stream' summary of universal-dovetailer ontology. [Though only a vocational mathematician would seriously call it 'very simple' even if it does have less than 1% of Bruno's word count for his essay on the subject.] Having the two approaches to the problem at hand has allowed me to get a bit of purchase on the beasty. Thanks also to Stathis for that simple and lovely, 'obvious', question from left-field. I am now convinced that, no matter what others might say, each number is in fact a process. Bruno referred to some kind of Platonia, some unspeakably not-anywhere place as the source of numbers and other mathematical objects or relationships. That is all well and good but as far as I can see - still - the numbers and other mathematical objects that people use are words in the strictest sense. They arise in human minds through inter-subjective induction, empathic copying [mirror neurons], interaction with the world, etc. But they are created anew in each brain that learns them, same as all other constructs. Their fantastic power comes about because they reflect - emulate and simulate - emergent properties of the rest of the universe. That this happens so successfully in so many people leads me to infer that the underlying principle organising the human mind, just as that organising the Great IT, the Multiverse, what ever, is harmonic resonance. ** Meanwhile - SP: 'How do you know that you are the same person from moment to moment in ordinary life? The physical processes in your brain create psychological continuity; that is, you know you are the same person today as yesterday because you have the same sense of personal identity, the same memories, woke up in the same environment, and so on. It is necessary and sufficient for survival that these psychological factors are generated, but it doesn't matter how this is achieved.' MP: Yep! I am a story! I am not like a story, I *am* a story. It is *my* story and I'm sticking to it, except when I find there are aspects of it I don't like. The problem [or a problem] is that this does not take away any of the intrinsic paradox of our experience. As I have said many times our experience is what it is like to be the portrayal of self in the world created within one's brain. The rendition in its details is effectively *about* being a person in his/her world, moment by moment. The experience we argue about, and other, possibly less benighted, persons write poetry and songs about, is simply what it is like to be this rendition. The primary practical paradox for each of us is that unless this distinction is pointed out repeatedly, we mistake the rendition, the story, for the world itself. We are doomed to live ever like this. From the recesses of my dark corner it looks as if Bruno can show us conclusively that this subjective-objective distinction is an inherent feature of any kind of universe that we humans have any real hope of understanding. and as per the first part above, I think that the answer to the binding question in each domain is harmonic resonance. As far as I can see it accounts for why the pure gasses like to form molecular pairs; there have been reports recently that our sense of smell relies on inter and intra molecular vibrations as the fundamental [pun unintended] mechanism for detection and recognition of minuscule amounts of thousands of different airborne molecules; Steven Lehar has been banging his head against the wall for many years trying to point out to people how harmonic resonance can easily explain a huge range of Gestalt type capabilities clearly effected within the brain; correlations of brain wave frequencies have been discovered marking temporally related activities of the hippocampus and cortical regions shown through MR imaging to be involved in the creation or activation of memories. And the list goes on. NB: I hope that my imaginary destination in your speculation of possible post mortem exploits for my erstwhile sceptical soul is not a post-Freudian slip. I know that many of my contributions to this and other lists have lacked the erudite succinctness of those with greater talents; failure of concentration [AKA 'ADD'] has been a characteristic of life for me, but I think that 'awaking' to the innards of a black whole would do more than wonderfully concentrate the mind: concentration itself would become the major problem even for a ghost! =-O Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/6/07, *Mark Peaty* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n [infinity^infinity]

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument - and Thanks to Russell and Stathis

On 3/8/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: NB: I hope that my imaginary destination in your speculation of possible post mortem exploits for my erstwhile sceptical soul is not a post-Freudian slip. I know that many of my contributions to this and other lists have lacked the erudite succinctness of those with greater talents; failure of concentration [AKA 'ADD'] has been a characteristic of life for me, but I think that 'awaking' to the innards of a black whole would do more than wonderfully concentrate the mind: concentration itself would become the major problem even for a ghost! =-O You wouldn't necessarily be squashed if you were inside the event horizon of a black hole provided that it was massive enough. Being inside the event horizon is not the same as being inside the singularity. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Thank you Bruno! You and Russell between you have managed to strike some sparks of illumination from the rocky inside of my skull. There is no beacon fire to report but I start to get a glimmering of why you want to *assume* comp and see where it leads. It seems that self-reference and recursion are fundamental properties of anything that is interesting in all this, which rather seems to be the flavour of the new millennium. Just in thinking superficially about the Many Worlds though, it seems to pose a 'binding problem'. Now, I know that might sound like a leakage of concept from objections to identity theory in brain and mind theory. But what I am thinking about is this bit: 6) this means that if I take the comp hyp seriously, then, to predict the results of any experiment/experience, I have to localize all the infinitely many instantiations of my current state in the UD, look at the uncountable comp histories going through that states, and compute the statistics bearing on all consistent first person self-continuation. A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n [infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know' that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled. What holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another infinite regression. ** A quick aside, hopefully not totally unrelated: Am I right that a valid explanation of the zero point energy is that it is impossible *in principle* to measure the state of something and therefore *we* must acknowledge the indeterminacy and so must everything else which exists because we are nothing special, except we think we know we are here, and if we are bound by quantum indeterminacy, so is everything else [unless it can come up with a good excuse!]? [Perhaps this is more on Stathis's question to Russell: Is a real number an infinite process?] ** Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 05-mars-07, à 15:03, Mark Peaty a écrit : Nobody here has yet explained in plain-English why we have entropy. Oh well, surely, in the Many Worlds, that's just one of the universes that can happen! Not really. That would make the comp hyp or the everything idea trivial, and both the everything hyp and the comp hyp would loose any explicative power. (It *is* the problem with Schmidhuber's comp, *and* with Tegmark's form of mathematicalism: see older posts for that). Except that, for plain-English reasons stated above, there are *and always have been* infinity x infinity x infinity of entropic universes. It doesn't make sense. Call me a heretic if you like, but I will 'stick to my guns' here: If it can't be put into plain-English then it probably isn't true! I will try. I will, by the same token, answer Mohsen question here: Mohsen: I don't know if in the hypothesis of simulation, the conflict of Countable and Uncountable has been considered. 1) I assume the comp hyp, if only for the sake of the reasoning. The comp hyp is NOT the hypothesis of simulation, but it is the hypothesis that we are in principle self-simulable by a digital machine. 2) Then we have to distinguish the first person points of view (1-pov) from third person points of view (3-pov), and eventually we will have to distinguish all Plotinus' hypostases. With comp, we are duplicable. I can be read and cut (copy) in Brussels, and be pasted in Washington and Moscow simultaneously. This gives a simple example where: a) from the third point of view, there is no indeterminacy. An external (3-pov) observer can predict Bruno will be in Washington AND in Moscow. b) from a first person point of view, there is an indeterminacy, I will feel myself in washington OR in Moscow, not in the two places at once. 3) Whatever means I use to quantify the first person indeterminacy, the result will not depend on possible large delays between the reconstitutions, nor of the virtual/material/purely-mathematical character of the reconstitution. 4) There exist a universal dovetailer (consequence of Church thesis, but we could drop Church thesis and define comp in term of turing machine instead). 5) Never underestimate the dumbness of the universal dovetailer: not only it generates all computational histories, but it generates them all infinitely often, + all variations, + all real oracles (and those oracles are uncountable). 6) this means that if I take the comp hyp seriously, then, to predict the results of any experiment/experience, I have to localize all the infinitely many instantiations of my current state in the UD, look at the uncountable comp histories going through that states,

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On 3/6/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n [infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know' that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled. What holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another infinite regression. How do you know that you are the same person from moment to moment in ordinary life? The physical processes in your brain create psychological continuity; that is, you know you are the same person today as yesterday because you have the same sense of personal identity, the same memories, woke up in the same environment, and so on. It is necessary and sufficient for survival that these psychological factors are generated, but it doesn't matter how this is achieved. If you suddenly die today and are miraculously recreated inside the event horizon of a black hole, no-one will ever be able to find you again but you will be able to find yourself. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/6/07, *Mark Peaty* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: A human life must be a compilation of all these including the creation of internal [synaptic change, etc] structure/record which endow the ability to *be* the story. But when looking at this as a/n [infinity^infinity] Many Worlds affair, none of the worlds could 'know' that they are like or identical to others, surely? So I am puzzled. What holds 'my lot' together? We seem always to be confronted by yet another infinite regression. How do you know that you are the same person from moment to moment in ordinary life? The physical processes in your brain create psychological continuity; that is, you know you are the same person today as yesterday because you have the same sense of personal identity, the same memories, woke up in the same environment, and so on. It is necessary and sufficient for survival that these psychological factors are generated, but it doesn't matter how this is achieved. How so? The Many Worlds idea seems to imply that you survive no matter what. The consequences of natural selection obtain only within worlds which are law-like - and we're back to the white rabbit problem. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On Wed, Mar 07, 2007 at 12:46:32PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/7/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: How do you know that you are the same person from moment to moment in ordinary life? The physical processes in your brain create psychological continuity; that is, you know you are the same person today as yesterday because you have the same sense of personal identity, the same memories, woke up in the same environment, and so on. It is necessary and sufficient for survival that these psychological factors are generated, but it doesn't matter how this is achieved. How so? The Many Worlds idea seems to imply that you survive no matter what. The consequences of natural selection obtain only within worlds which are law-like - and we're back to the white rabbit problem. You survive if a sufficiently close analogue of your mind survives. This can theoretically happen in many ways other than the obvious one (survival of your physical body): in parallel worlds, in a distant part of our own world if it is infinite in extent, in the Turing machine at the end of time. The white rabbit universes are a problem: since we don't observe them, maybe these theories are wrong, or maybe there is some other reason why we don't observe them. Stathis Papaioannou Well there is a reason we don't observe them, due to observational selection effects tied to Occam's razor. This is written up in my Why Occams Razor paper. Nobody has shot down the argument yet, in spite of it being around on this list since 1999, and in spite of it being published since 2004. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Russell Standish wrote: Well there is a reason we don't observe them, due to observational selection effects tied to Occam's razor. This is written up in my Why Occams Razor paper. Nobody has shot down the argument yet, in spite of it being around on this list since 1999, and in spite of it being published since 2004. The basic problem I have with this proposal is the starting assumption, where you say that the natural measure induced on the ensemble of bitstring is the uniform one. This sort of assumption is made by a number of TOEs including Schidhuber's, but it always seemed fairly arbitrary to me, not much different in principle from assuming that the measure produced by the laws of physics in our universe (which, under the MWI, will probably include some instances of every possible finite computation in some branch or another) should be taken as a starting point. I posted on this issue in one of my first posts on this list: http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/0d5915764b7f3e08/fc56caf79ce58750?#fc56caf79ce58750 Jesse _ Play Flexicon: the crossword game that feeds your brain. PLAY now for FREE. http://zone.msn.com/en/flexicon/default.htm?icid=flexicon_hmtagline --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On 3/7/07, Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell Standish wrote: Well there is a reason we don't observe them, due to observational selection effects tied to Occam's razor. This is written up in my Why Occams Razor paper. Nobody has shot down the argument yet, in spite of it being around on this list since 1999, and in spite of it being published since 2004. The basic problem I have with this proposal is the starting assumption, where you say that the natural measure induced on the ensemble of bitstring is the uniform one. This sort of assumption is made by a number of TOEs including Schidhuber's, but it always seemed fairly arbitrary to me, not much different in principle from assuming that the measure produced by the laws of physics in our universe (which, under the MWI, will probably include some instances of every possible finite computation in some branch or another) should be taken as a starting point. I posted on this issue in one of my first posts on this list: http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/0d5915764b7f3e08/fc56caf79ce58750?#fc56caf79ce58750 If a uniform measure leads to the world we see, isn't that empirical evidence that it is the correct one? A uniform measure, or no measure at all (which seems to me equivalent), isn't really as arbitrary as some specific measure from physics, which as you imply is what the whole everything idea is trying to avoid. Could the question in theory be settled by experiment, running the UD and counting the relative number of structures? Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On Wed, Mar 07, 2007 at 04:30:57PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/7/07, Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell Standish wrote: Well there is a reason we don't observe them, due to observational selection effects tied to Occam's razor. This is written up in my Why Occams Razor paper. Nobody has shot down the argument yet, in spite of it being around on this list since 1999, and in spite of it being published since 2004. The basic problem I have with this proposal is the starting assumption, where you say that the natural measure induced on the ensemble of bitstring is the uniform one. This sort of assumption is made by a number of TOEs including Schidhuber's, but it always seemed fairly arbitrary to me, not much different in principle from assuming that the measure produced by the laws of physics in our universe (which, under the MWI, will probably include some instances of every possible finite computation in some branch or another) should be taken as a starting point. I posted on this issue in one of my first posts on this list: http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/0d5915764b7f3e08/fc56caf79ce58750?#fc56caf79ce58750 If a uniform measure leads to the world we see, isn't that empirical evidence that it is the correct one? A uniform measure, or no measure at all (which seems to me equivalent), isn't really as arbitrary as some specific measure from physics, which as you imply is what the whole everything idea is trying to avoid. Could the question in theory be settled by experiment, running the UD and counting the relative number of structures? Stathis Papaioannou True, and this was the sense in which I adopted it for the paper. However, I think there is an even better argument. By interposing another suitable onto function (f:{0,1}*-{0,1}* say) between the observer and the ensemble of strings, one can make the ensemble of bitstrings have any measure one likes. So by composing the observer function O(x) with f(x), we can perform the treatment for an arbitrary measure as though the we had an observer O(f(x)) observing strings selected from a uniform measure. In short terms, one can write Without loss of generality, assume a uniform measure over the strings. Whichever way you cut it, structure is still in the eye of the observer :) -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

*All actual measurements yield rational values. Using real numbers in the equations of physics is probably merely a convenience (since calculus is easier than finite differences). There is no evidence that defining an instantaneous state requires uncountable information.* What about the realizability of mathematical concepts. Real numbers are mathematical, so they should have a counterpart in real world. What ever that counterpart is, it's toils the problem of uncountability. But I think your answer is the best shot. Mohsen Ravanbakhsh. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

I don't know if in the hypothesis of simulation, the conflict of Countable and Uncountable has been considered. When we're talking about a machine with an infinite power of computation, we're considering a TM which has a countable number of states, even if it's running an undecidable problem to produce the infinite possible outputs and even we're considering time to be infinitely compressed to allow for the infinity of the power of our machine, at the end the possible states of a TM is Countably infinite. But as one might notice we have some continuous and therefore Uncountable parameters in our universe, like the measures of distance which are not reducible to countable ones even considering the concept of precision. They are naturally Uncountable. Now the question is: can that kind of infinitely powerful machine simulate this infinite reality? Am I missing a point? -- Mohsen Ravanbakhsh, --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Hello Moshen and welcome. I think it is a very good question, and succinctly put. I have been trying to ask the same question and get a plain-English answer, but without success. Of course, I could be missing 'the point' too, and it wouldn't be the first time by a long shot. :-) If there was simply nothing, utterly and absolutely nothing, well that would be the end of it: 'No problemas!' as the cool dudes say. But there seems to be something, because I seem to be here, at the moment anyway, and I have this distinct belief that I was here yesterday living in this same house with all these recalcitrantly individualistic people who all play along with a story about being my wife and children. Appeals to solipsism degenerate into incoherent babbling; I really am here, even though my grasp of the facts about my existence gets shaken loose every so often. And you are here too, except you are over there. In short there IS a universe and it seems to be remarkably self-consistent. I, like you, am confronted by the manifest existence of an objective reality. Being educated and impressed by the successes of the application of scientific method we are quite well equipped to accept certain problematic statements about the parts of the world we normally take for granted as 'real'. We have learned that the *appearances* of solidity, power, enduring nature, and so forth, which we experience as *qualities* of those things, are not the full story; that in fact the '*true* nature of things is that if you try and find absolute objective boundaries to things you can't and if you try to make any other kind of measurement, you have to make do with an approximation. Indeed, the more you wish to precisely specify anything about the location or motion of anything then the more you must accept a complex statistical description about the rest of its characteristics. Well and good; normally we don't have to worry about this too much. It is only when we start persistently asking *How does it all work?* that the seemingly intractable problems begin. And for each of us there is some kind of recursive process: we read and interact with others [indeed some lucky people can apparently just wander into the next room and straight away *talk* on the topic with someone who is interested!], and then we cogitate and imagine things and some of you scribble arcane arithmetic and run mathematical 'what-ifs' on computers; finally we reach some kind of internal stability of viewpoint that allows a reassessment of things previously held to be clear, or problematic perhaps. But after some time, doubt sets in, we think something far enough through and see a problem or, more likely, we read of some new viewpoint which challenges what we believe and we feel we must take it seriously because of its apparent validity, consistency, etc, or it is presented by someone we respect. Either way we have to work to either assimilate it or uncover valid reasons for rejecting it. The mathematicians who contribute here seemingly have no problems with a totally 'insubstantial' existence of numbers. Unlike me who has *ultimate* problems wrapping my head around the idea. I have not yet succeeded. You asked about 'assumptions' in you 'Joining' thread, but here by definition the only one is the existence of Many Worlds, which is hugely problematic because nobody really knows what it means. In my case it is obvious why, but in the case of those who *espouse* the Many-Worlds hypothesis, I have absolutely know idea how they can account for the purely logical - and therefore mathematically necessary, yes? - consequence of the problem you have so succinctly put. As I reason it, this 'continuous' aspect of location, even if it is only 'virtual' guarantees that the Many Worlds are always proliferating at a rate which must effectively be an infinity times an infinity of infinities. [I fear I might have underestimated the speed there, but as I say, my maths is not all that good!] In other words it seems to make no sense at all! Why? [Grin!] well because *my* world seems to be just one story. What keeps it together? It can't be any inherent smartness on my part! [Grin again; no false modesty there mate!] So *IT*, what I call 'The Great IT', is just doing IT'S thing. Nobody here has yet explained in plain-English why we have entropy. Oh well, surely, in the Many Worlds, that's just one of the universes that can happen! Except that, for plain-English reasons stated above, there are *and always have been* infinity x infinity x infinity of entropic universes. It doesn't make sense. Call me a heretic if you like, but I will 'stick to my guns' here: If it can't be put into plain-English then it probably isn't true! :-) Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote: I don't know if in the hypothesis of simulation, the conflict of Countable and

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Le 05-mars-07, à 15:03, Mark Peaty a écrit : Nobody here has yet explained in plain-English why we have entropy. Oh well, surely, in the Many Worlds, that's just one of the universes that can happen! Not really. That would make the comp hyp or the everything idea trivial, and both the everything hyp and the comp hyp would loose any explicative power. (It *is* the problem with Schmidhuber's comp, *and* with Tegmark's form of mathematicalism: see older posts for that). Except that, for plain-English reasons stated above, there are *and always have been* infinity x infinity x infinity of entropic universes. It doesn't make sense. Call me a heretic if you like, but I will 'stick to my guns' here: If it can't be put into plain-English then it probably isn't true! I will try. I will, by the same token, answer Mohsen question here: Mohsen: I don't know if in the hypothesis of simulation, the conflict of Countable and Uncountable has been considered. 1) I assume the comp hyp, if only for the sake of the reasoning. The comp hyp is NOT the hypothesis of simulation, but it is the hypothesis that we are in principle self-simulable by a digital machine. 2) Then we have to distinguish the first person points of view (1-pov) from third person points of view (3-pov), and eventually we will have to distinguish all Plotinus' hypostases. With comp, we are duplicable. I can be read and cut (copy) in Brussels, and be pasted in Washington and Moscow simultaneously. This gives a simple example where: a) from the third point of view, there is no indeterminacy. An external (3-pov) observer can predict Bruno will be in Washington AND in Moscow. b) from a first person point of view, there is an indeterminacy, I will feel myself in washington OR in Moscow, not in the two places at once. 3) Whatever means I use to quantify the first person indeterminacy, the result will not depend on possible large delays between the reconstitutions, nor of the virtual/material/purely-mathematical character of the reconstitution. 4) There exist a universal dovetailer (consequence of Church thesis, but we could drop Church thesis and define comp in term of turing machine instead). 5) Never underestimate the dumbness of the universal dovetailer: not only it generates all computational histories, but it generates them all infinitely often, + all variations, + all real oracles (and those oracles are uncountable). 6) this means that if I take the comp hyp seriously, then, to predict the results of any experiment/experience, I have to localize all the infinitely many instantiations of my current state in the UD, look at the uncountable comp histories going through that states, and compute the statistics bearing on all consistent first person self-continuation. 7) A naive reading of this leads to predict white rabbits (indeed the lewis Carroll one) and perhaps white noise, that is too much entropy ... This leads to a cheap refutation of comp, ... 8) ... except that the math shows this is a bit too cheap. Now if comp is correct, AND if the physical laws are (approximately) correct, then we have to extract the physical laws a) without assuming the existence of a physical universe, b) from the comp statistics. My (more technical) result is that computer science and mathematical logics gives already clues that indeed we can recover the physical laws from computer science, once we get the relevant description of the different points of view. In particular, for Mohsen's question, the conflict between countable and uncountable appears to be an unavoidable conflict between first and third person points of view. The first person is bound up to interact with uncountable physical apparent reality. But all self-referentially correct universal machine introspecting herself can discover the unavoidability of that conflict, and somehow meta-solve it, indeed by distinguishing explicitly those points of view again. When she does this, she discover a more subtle tension between recursively countable and non recursively countable. This tension is creative and can be proposed as a beginning of explanation of life and local neguentropy. All this makes comp, and its related theology (theory of everything including persons, say), empirically testable: derive the comp-physics and compare with empirical nature. Must go. Hope this helps, (see papers in my url for more, or just ask) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Mark Peaty wrote: Hello Moshen and welcome. I think it is a very good question, and succinctly put. I have been trying to ask the same question and get a plain-English answer, but without success. Of course, I could be missing 'the point' too, and it wouldn't be the first time by a long shot. :-) If there was simply nothing, utterly and absolutely nothing, well that would be the end of it: 'No problemas!' as the cool dudes say. But there seems to be something, because I seem to be here, at the moment anyway, and I have this distinct belief that I was here yesterday living in this same house with all these recalcitrantly individualistic people who all play along with a story about being my wife and children. Appeals to solipsism degenerate into incoherent babbling; I really am here, even though my grasp of the facts about my existence gets shaken loose every so often. And you are here too, except you are over there. In short there IS a universe and it seems to be remarkably self-consistent. I, like you, am confronted by the manifest existence of an objective reality. Being educated and impressed by the successes of the application of scientific method we are quite well equipped to accept certain problematic statements about the parts of the world we normally take for granted as 'real'. We have learned that the *appearances* of solidity, power, enduring nature, and so forth, which we experience as *qualities* of those things, are not the full story; that in fact the '*true* nature of things is that if you try and find absolute objective boundaries to things you can't and if you try to make any other kind of measurement, you have to make do with an approximation. Indeed, the more you wish to precisely specify anything about the location or motion of anything then the more you must accept a complex statistical description about the rest of its characteristics. Well and good; normally we don't have to worry about this too much. It is only when we start persistently asking *How does it all work?* that the seemingly intractable problems begin. And for each of us there is some kind of recursive process: we read and interact with others [indeed some lucky people can apparently just wander into the next room and straight away *talk* on the topic with someone who is interested!], and then we cogitate and imagine things and some of you scribble arcane arithmetic and run mathematical 'what-ifs' on computers; finally we reach some kind of internal stability of viewpoint that allows a reassessment of things previously held to be clear, or problematic perhaps. But after some time, doubt sets in, we think something far enough through and see a problem or, more likely, we read of some new viewpoint which challenges what we believe and we feel we must take it seriously because of its apparent validity, consistency, etc, or it is presented by someone we respect. Either way we have to work to either assimilate it or uncover valid reasons for rejecting it. The mathematicians who contribute here seemingly have no problems with a totally 'insubstantial' existence of numbers. Unlike me who has *ultimate* problems wrapping my head around the idea. I have not yet succeeded. You asked about 'assumptions' in you 'Joining' thread, but here by definition the only one is the existence of Many Worlds, which is hugely problematic because nobody really knows what it means. In my case it is obvious why, but in the case of those who *espouse* the Many-Worlds hypothesis, I have absolutely know idea how they can account for the purely logical - and therefore mathematically necessary, yes? - consequence of the problem you have so succinctly put. As I reason it, this 'continuous' aspect of location, even if it is only 'virtual' guarantees that the Many Worlds are always proliferating at a rate which must effectively be an infinity times an infinity of infinities. [I fear I might have underestimated the speed there, but as I say, my maths is not all that good!] In other words it seems to make no sense at all! Why? [Grin!] well because *my* world seems to be just one story. What keeps it together? It can't be any inherent smartness on my part! [Grin again; no false modesty there mate!] So *IT*, what I call 'The Great IT', is just doing IT'S thing. Nobody here has yet explained in plain-English why we have entropy. I quite agree with you about Many Worlds - it's not even an hypothesis; it's a whole class of hypotheses. And I don't think numbers exist either in the way that I exist, though I'm open to defining different kinds of existence. But I think I can explain why we have entropy. The short answer is that we have entropy for the same reason we have number and distance and duration and energy and temperature, etc. We invented them. They are variables in our model of the world. Usually in our model

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Jason, after Danny's very interesting treatise your reply gave me a clue I completely misunderstood so far. As i wrote to Brent, my vocabulary is not your vocabulary and the meanings mix up. Simulation emerged to me as 'copying', while you lit up the little lamp to consider it as 'forming a simulacron' (sort of), a way to make - what I call - a model including those characteristics which we might find relevant. Which is a way of examining our topic in ' certain' detailing. Thanks, it is interesting. John M On 3/4/07, Jason [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Mar 4, 12:09 pm, Danny Mayes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Why some intelligent beings in some other part of the multiverse may want to simulate or emulate our part of the multiverse is interesting as well, but is entirely unrelated to the logic of whether the entire entity is at least in part a simulation as set forth above. Danny Mayes I think such simulation will be the ultimate goal of technology for any intelligent and curious species. Simulation is the ultimate form of exploration as it allows connections to be made between otherwise unreachable universes. If every possible universe exists and each is non-interacting, the only way to explore the other possibilities for existance would be simulation. Any universes where a Turing machine can be built can discover all Turing emulable universes. New universes are not being created when a simulation is conducted, rather a connection is made to a possible existance which has always been there. Douglas Jones wrote a very interesting hypothetical conversation between a human and a highly advanced alien who lives in cyberspace where not only can any imaginable environment or universebe be simulated, but all beings like him had thier minds uploaded and are also simulated. It is available at http://www.station1.net/douglasjones/aconvers.htm and is well worth the read. Mind uploading and simulation I think would be desirable to any intelligent and sufficently advanced race. It offers unlimited freedom, immortality (or at least greatly extended existance), and the ability to participate in fully immersive game worlds which are subjectively indistingushable from any other reality. I believe there may even be a statistical argument for our existance in such a game world now. Consider that in human history, about 60 billion humans have ever lived. If humanity reaches a technological singularity in the near future, and the majority of the human race uploaded their minds into computers, it would only take each person on average playing 10 lifetimes (600-700 years) worth of these immersive games before the bulk of human experience has been simulated as opposed to physical. Considering such a civilization could last many billions of years if not longer, the simulated human experiences would greatly outweigh the physics-based ones. Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On Mon, Mar 05, 2007 at 04:31:23PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: I will try. I will, by the same token, answer Mohsen question here: Mohsen: I don't know if in the hypothesis of simulation, the conflict of Countable and Uncountable has been considered. ... In particular, for Mohsen's question, the conflict between countable and uncountable appears to be an unavoidable conflict between first and third person points of view. Bruno's answer is right, but not necessarily the easiest to understand. A very simple way of putting it is to consider sampling a random bitstream. Every time a bit is sampled, the Multiverse branches with the observed bit being 0 or 1 depending on your branch. If you were to continue for an infinite amount of time, each observer will have observed a real number. However after any finite amount of time, all the observers have are rational approximations to real numbers. Just so in our real world. You can either think of each of us as sampling multiple random bitstream, or alternatively weaving together all of the data streaming into our senses into a single bitstream. Its mathematically equivalent, of course. All of our physical measurements are rational approximations, and are continually refined as we continue our measurements. Cheers -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On 3/6/07, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Bruno's answer is right, but not necessarily the easiest to understand. A very simple way of putting it is to consider sampling a random bitstream. Every time a bit is sampled, the Multiverse branches with the observed bit being 0 or 1 depending on your branch. If you were to continue for an infinite amount of time, each observer will have observed a real number. However after any finite amount of time, all the observers have are rational approximations to real numbers. Is that saying a real number has a contable infinity of decimal places? Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

On Tue, Mar 06, 2007 at 12:48:40PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3/6/07, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Bruno's answer is right, but not necessarily the easiest to understand. A very simple way of putting it is to consider sampling a random bitstream. Every time a bit is sampled, the Multiverse branches with the observed bit being 0 or 1 depending on your branch. If you were to continue for an infinite amount of time, each observer will have observed a real number. However after any finite amount of time, all the observers have are rational approximations to real numbers. Is that saying a real number has a contable infinity of decimal places? Stathis Papaioannou Yes, of course. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Thank you for welcoming me Mark, I agree with you about the problem with the concept of entropy, but not all your points. Actually I like this hypothesis, and as Bruno put it we might be able to describe the Why question about physical laws, which is very interesting. 4) There exist a universal dovetailer (consequence of Church thesis, but we could drop Church thesis and define comp in term of turing machine instead). 5) Never underestimate the dumbness of the universal dovetailer: not only it generates all computational histories, but it generates them all infinitely often, + all variations, + all real oracles (and those oracles are uncountable). Let me know where's my mistake: 1.We are referring to one (actually an infinitely long sub-sequence of that) history of such universal dovetailer, as some state of our world. 2.Because that machine is a TM, a history has to be countable, regardless of compression or expansion of time to allow infinite power. 3.So we're referring to some state of our universe as a countable one. 4.A universal state is not countable. Every time a bit is sampled, the Multiverse branches with the observed bit being 0 or 1 depending on your branch. If you were to continue for an infinite amount of time, each observer will have observed a real number. However after any finite amount of time, all the observers have are rational approximations to real numbers. But we're talking about uncountability of information necessary to represent instantaneous state of a universe, not about the uncountability of possible universes. (Maybe I didn't get your point) What you are saying just proves that we have uncountable number of universes. -- Mohsen Ravanbakhsh, --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### Re: Evidence for the simulation argument

Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote: Thank you for welcoming me Mark, I agree with you about the problem with the concept of entropy, but not all your points. Actually I like this hypothesis, and as Bruno put it we might be able to describe the Why question about physical laws, which is very interesting. 4) There exist a universal dovetailer (consequence of Church thesis, but we could drop Church thesis and define comp in term of turing machine instead). 5) Never underestimate the dumbness of the universal dovetailer: not only it generates all computational histories, but it generates them all infinitely often, + all variations, + all real oracles (and those oracles are uncountable). Let me know where's my mistake: 1.We are referring to one (actually an infinitely long sub-sequence of that) history of such universal dovetailer, as some state of our world. 2.Because that machine is a TM, a history has to be countable, regardless of compression or expansion of time to allow infinite power. 3.So we're referring to some state of our universe as a countable one. 4.A universal state is not countable. Every time a bit is sampled, the Multiverse branches with the observed bit being 0 or 1 depending on your branch. If you were to continue for an infinite amount of time, each observer will have observed a real number. However after any finite amount of time, all the observers have are rational approximations to real numbers. But we're talking about uncountability of information necessary to represent instantaneous state of a universe, not about the uncountability of possible universes. (Maybe I didn't get your point) What you are saying just proves that we have uncountable number of universes. All actual measurements yield rational values. Using real numbers in the equations of physics is probably merely a convenience (since calculus is easier than finite differences). There is no evidence that defining an instantaneous state requires uncountable information. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---

### RE: Evidence for the simulation argument

I've no idea why we might be being simulated if we are being simulated. It is actually very arrogant to assume that we are somehow the centre of the simulation at all, like bacteria in my gut assuming that the universe, the solar sysstem, humans were made for their benefit. Stathis Papaioannou I have a problem with the very premise of asking why we are being simulated. Having been a member of this list for years, I have seen objections to the simulation argument raised repeatedly that are along the lines of it is presumptuous to assume anyone would want to simulate us, or it is entirely speculative and not based in science, etc. I have also seen a fair amount of discussion about how the simulation could be done. To me, the logical chain is straightforward. If you accept a MWI interpretation or some other ensemble theory, then everything that can happen does happen. There is maybe a little wiggle room here, as perhaps you can have a MWI with an enormous number of universes versus and infinite number, depending on the nature of the underlying implementation, but as I understand it from earlier discussions and from my reading, most interpret MWI as requiring an actual infinity. Now, after you have the MWI as the underlying foundation, there is really only one additional question that needs to be answered. Is there something fundamentally primitively physical and non-reproducible about my existence that would forever prohibit any attempt at reproduction? When I say my existence you have to include two possibilities. First, if you want to hold onto the primitive physical viewpoint you have to assume that there is something about the nature of our apparent reality in the third person that is simply not capable of emulation or simulation. Second, you ALSO have to assume there is something about our first person experience that is also not capable of emulation or simulation. This is where the primitive physical proponents lose me. I have thought about this a great deal, and just can't figure out why I should assume there is something so special about my experiences, memories, and thought process that it under no circumstances could ever be capable of reproduction anywhere else in existence (other than the naturally occurring copies of myself in other parts of the multiverse, which are of course under this line of thinking occurring at a primitive physical level). I am an attorney, so I guess I look at this at a little different perspective than most on here with science related backgrounds. I think once you get to a certain level, whether it be with MWI, or string theory or any other concept that can not be directly tested or observed, science loses its ability to take you further and you have to look into other areas such as logic and philosophy to finish the journey. However, there is a circumstantial case to be made for things even beyond strict science. For instance, I believe the circumstantial case for our universe being emulable or simulable is strong given what we know about how our universe works so far. The reasons for this have probably been discussed around here extensively, for instance the close relationship between math and physics, and our ability to describe the things we observe in mathematical terms. To my way of thinking, the opponents to a simulation viewpoint are basically left arguing a concept that there is something magical or spiritual about human thought. That it is a supernatural function that is forever beyond the realm of science. Either that or they do not accept an ensemble theory.I could not disagree more with your statement that it is arrogant to assume that we are somehow the center of the simulation. On the contrary, what is arrogant is to assume that in a universe in which it is possible to simulate environments and universes (and this we know, just check out a Playstation 3 game I will say only partially tongue in cheek), is that we occupy a special location at the very top (or bottom depending on how you look at it) of this hierarchy of natural and artificial creations. I think one thing that hangs a lot of people up on this concept is the idea that somewhere there IS a primitive, physical universe, and that we are just a digital simulation being run in that more real universe. This is NOT necessary nor is it part of my thinking on the subject. Maybe there is some more real or primitive physical reality out there that is simulating our entire quantum mechanical multiverse, but this is entirely speculative and presumably beyond the realm of any potential scientific discussion. When I refer to our being simulated, I am assuming the simulation is occurring in every way that is logically and physically possible in the multiverse, just as every other part of the multiverse is being likewise simulated in every way that is logically and physically possible in some other part. This is required, in fact is logically necessary