Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
Hi John, On 24 Mar 2012, at 21:05, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, I did not branch out into the 1st line of my 1st quote of your sentence. Not that 2^16 is 'a' number, but parallel gives the idea of identicity (at least in main qualia) which are (both) human talk. (Of course that's what we can do). Parallel world means only quantum superposition. It emphasizes the fact that superposition is contagious through interaction. I am glad that you agreed with my (generalized!) remark. Now: to your question: - Which logics? Classical logic? - Any one you may call 'logic(s?)' in today's HUMAN thinking. Why humans? Why not mammals, or machines, or divine entities? Humans are not the only one entities suffering from limitations. It is beyond our capabilities to even imagine (more sophisticated) ways of thinking, which does not mean an exclusion of such. But this is too vague. It seems to apply to all theories. I did not visualize a change in logic, simply assumed the possibility of thinking differently (not necessarily using OUR math terms). (Cf: Cohen-Stewart's Zarathustrans - a fictional reference). But may be it is a human limitation to believe that their logic is human. By the way we define machine, they are machine when viewed by human or by non-human, so with comp we can grasp better the human limitations by studying the machine's limitations. - we have to take our theories seriously, - Not in my agnosticism. You know it is hard to be more agnostic than me :) But it is because I am agnostic that I remind that theories are temporary belief, and that we can progress only by taking them seriously (which does NOT mean true!!!), so we can at least one day change our mind on them. In conventional sciences a 'theory' is taken seriously upon assumptions based on other (accepted?) theories (calculations?). To let your ideas wander and look for yes/no consequences (within today's knowledge) is a game of creativity, not established science. What do you mean by established science? I don't believe that make sense. Actually I don't believe in Science, only in scientific attitude, which, basically is only modesty. This is how I ended up with many of my patents. For the same reason do I NOT call my 'Plenitude-story' of generating universes a NARRATIVE, not a theory. I don't see the problem with the word theory, but you can call that a narrative if you prefer. You are right that the popular media confuse theory and knowledge, but for me it is a reason to use the right word in the correct way. If not, it is like with the religious notion, you encourage the use of the word by those who missed the idea. I think. Bruno On Sat, Mar 24, 2012 at 5:12 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 23 Mar 2012, at 17:34, John Mikes wrote: Bruno: thanks for the considerate reply. Let me pick some of your sentences: 2^16 parallel universes needed to implement the quantum superposition - used in Shor's quantum algorithm to find the prime factors of numbers. I would not limit the numbers and fix the quality of future development. Me neither. Nor do I take it for granted that today's logic in math (arithmetics) will hold. Which logics? Classical logic? In which logic will you describe the change of logics. Not sure that I can give meaning to your sentence here, John. You seem to believe in some absolute logic to make sense of change in logic. I have few doubts that quantum computers will appear, but I am quite uncertain if it is for this century of for the next millennium. Ihave more faith in 'the new': maybe that will be something better than today's uncertainty-riding quantum idea. We can only *assume* theories, and then we can hope we will see them to be refuted. That's how we learn. But this means we have to take our theories seriously, which does not mean true. Bruno John M On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 1:41 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Mar 2012, at 21:41, John Mikes wrote: Brent and Bruno: you both have statements in this endless discussion about processing ideas of quantum computers. I would be happy to read about ONE that works, not a s a potentiality, but as a real tool, the function of which is understood and APPLIED. (Here, on Earth). It is an *immense* technical challenge. Up to now, a quantum circuit has only succeeded in showing that 15 is equal to 3*5, which might seems ridiculous for todays applied computing domains, but which is still an extraordinary technical prowess as it involves handling of the 2^16 parallel universes needed to implement the quantum superposition used in Shor's quantum algorithm to find the prime factors of numbers. The amazing thing is that all the arguments of unfeasibility of quantum computers have been overcome by quantum software, like the quantum
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 23 Mar 2012, at 17:34, John Mikes wrote: Bruno: thanks for the considerate reply. Let me pick some of your sentences: 2^16 parallel universes needed to implement the quantum superposition - used in Shor's quantum algorithm to find the prime factors of numbers. I would not limit the numbers and fix the quality of future development. Me neither. Nor do I take it for granted that today's logic in math (arithmetics) will hold. Which logics? Classical logic? In which logic will you describe the change of logics. Not sure that I can give meaning to your sentence here, John. You seem to believe in some absolute logic to make sense of change in logic. I have few doubts that quantum computers will appear, but I am quite uncertain if it is for this century of for the next millennium. Ihave more faith in 'the new': maybe that will be something better than today's uncertainty-riding quantum idea. We can only *assume* theories, and then we can hope we will see them to be refuted. That's how we learn. But this means we have to take our theories seriously, which does not mean true. Bruno John M On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 1:41 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Mar 2012, at 21:41, John Mikes wrote: Brent and Bruno: you both have statements in this endless discussion about processing ideas of quantum computers. I would be happy to read about ONE that works, not a s a potentiality, but as a real tool, the function of which is understood and APPLIED. (Here, on Earth). It is an *immense* technical challenge. Up to now, a quantum circuit has only succeeded in showing that 15 is equal to 3*5, which might seems ridiculous for todays applied computing domains, but which is still an extraordinary technical prowess as it involves handling of the 2^16 parallel universes needed to implement the quantum superposition used in Shor's quantum algorithm to find the prime factors of numbers. The amazing thing is that all the arguments of unfeasibility of quantum computers have been overcome by quantum software, like the quantum error corrections, and the topological fault tolerant quantum machinery. I have few doubts that quantum computers will appear, but I am quite uncertain if it is for this century of for the next millennium. But bigger quantum circuits will emerge this century, and quantum cryptographic technic might already exist, but that's a military secret, and a banker secret :). There is also some prospect to discover quantum machinery operating in nature. I read some times ago, that a super-heavy object has been discovered which structure seemed to have to be unstable for much physicists and some have elaborated models in which quarks are exploiting a quantum-computational game to attain stability. And then, to make happy Stephen, the not very plausible yet not entirely excluded despite what Tegmark argues possibility that life exploits quantum algorithm. See for example the two following papers referred to in my today's mail: 1) Clark, K.B. (2010). Bose-Einstein condensates form in heuristics learned by ciliates deciding to signal 'social' commitments. BioSystems, 99(3), 167-178. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19883726 2) Clark, K.B. (2010). Arrhenius-kinetics evidence for quantum tunneling in microbial social decision rates. Communicative Integtrative Biology, 3(6), 540-544. http://www.landesbioscience.com/journals/cib/article/12842 I am skeptical to be franc. Not too much time to dig on this for now. The second is freely available. if someone want to comment on it, please do. Bruno On Mon, Mar 12, 2012 at 10:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/12/2012 7:16 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/12/2012 10:00 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 11:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: An Evil Wizard could pop into my vicinity and banish me to the Nether plane! A magical act, if real and just part of a story, is an event that violates some conservation law. I don't see what else would constitute magic... My point is that Harry Potterisms would introduce cul-de-sacs that would totally screw up the statistics and measures, so they have to be banished. Because otherwise things would be screwed up? Chain-wise consistency and concurrency rules would prevent these pathologies, but to get them we have to consider multiple and disjoint observers and not just shared 1p as such implicitly assume an absolute frame of reference. Basically we need both conservation laws and general covariance. Do we obtain that naturally from COMP? That's an open question. You seem to be begging the question: We need regularity, otherwise things wouldn't be regular. No, you are dodging the real question: How is the measure defined? The obvious way is that all non-self-contradictory events are equally likely. But
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
Bruno, I did not branch out into the 1st line of my 1st quote of your sentence. Not that 2^16 is 'a' number, but parallel gives the idea of identicity (at least in main qualia) which are (both) human talk. (Of course that's what we can do). I am glad that you agreed with my (generalized!) remark. Now: to your question: * - Which logics? Classical logic? -* Any one you may call 'logic(s?)' in today's HUMAN thinking.* *It is beyond our capabilities to even imagine (more sophisticated) ways of thinking, which does not mean an exclusion of such. I did not visualize a change in logic, simply assumed the possibility of thinking differently (not necessarily using OUR math terms). (Cf: Cohen-Stewart's Zarathustrans - a fictional reference). *- we have to take our theories seriously, -* Not in my agnosticism. In conventional sciences a 'theory' is taken seriously upon assumptions based on other (accepted?) theories (calculations?). To let your ideas wander and look for yes/no consequences (within today's knowledge) is a game of creativity, not established science. This is how I ended up with many of my patents. For the same reason do I NOT call my 'Plenitude-story' of generating universes a * NARRATIVE*, not a theory. JohnM On Sat, Mar 24, 2012 at 5:12 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 23 Mar 2012, at 17:34, John Mikes wrote: Bruno: thanks for the considerate reply. Let me pick some of your sentences: *2^16 parallel universes needed to implement the quantum superposition** - used in Shor's quantum algorithm to find the prime factors of numbers*. I would not limit the numbers and fix the quality of future development. Me neither. Nor do I take it for granted that today's logic in math (arithmetics) will hold. Which logics? Classical logic? In which logic will you describe the change of logics. Not sure that I can give meaning to your sentence here, John. You seem to believe in some absolute logic to make sense of change in logic. *I have few doubts that quantum computers will appear, but I am quite uncertain if it is for this century of for the next millennium *. Ihave more faith in 'the new': maybe that will be something better than today's uncertainty-riding quantum idea. We can only *assume* theories, and then we can hope we will see them to be refuted. That's how we learn. But this means we have to take our theories seriously, which does not mean true. Bruno John M On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 1:41 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Mar 2012, at 21:41, John Mikes wrote: Brent and Bruno: you both have statements in this endless discussion about processing ideas of quantum computers. I would be happy to read about ONE that works, not a s a potentiality, but as a real tool, the function of which is understood and APPLIED. (Here, on Earth). It is an *immense* technical challenge. Up to now, a quantum circuit has only succeeded in showing that 15 is equal to 3*5, which might seems ridiculous for todays applied computing domains, but which is still an extraordinary technical prowess as it involves handling of the 2^16 parallel universes needed to implement the quantum superposition used in Shor's quantum algorithm to find the prime factors of numbers. The amazing thing is that all the arguments of unfeasibility of quantum computers have been overcome by quantum software, like the quantum error corrections, and the topological fault tolerant quantum machinery. I have few doubts that quantum computers will appear, but I am quite uncertain if it is for this century of for the next millennium. But bigger quantum circuits will emerge this century, and quantum cryptographic technic might already exist, but that's a military secret, and a banker secret :). There is also some prospect to discover quantum machinery operating in nature. I read some times ago, that a super-heavy object has been discovered which structure seemed to have to be unstable for much physicists and some have elaborated models in which quarks are exploiting a quantum-computational game to attain stability. And then, to make happy Stephen, the not very plausible yet not entirely excluded despite what Tegmark argues possibility that life exploits quantum algorithm. See for example the two following papers referred to in my today's mail: 1) Clark, K.B. (2010). Bose-Einstein condensates form in heuristics learned by ciliates deciding to signal 'social' commitments. BioSystems, 99(3), 167-178. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19883726 2) Clark, K.B. (2010). Arrhenius-kinetics evidence for quantum tunneling in microbial social decision rates. Communicative Integtrative Biology, 3(6), 540-544. http://www.landesbioscience.com/journals/cib/article/12842 I am skeptical to be franc. Not too much time to dig on this for now. The second is freely available. if someone want to
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
Bruno: thanks for the considerate reply. Let me pick some of your sentences: *2^16 parallel universes needed to implement the quantum superposition** - used in Shor's quantum algorithm to find the prime factors of numbers*. I would not limit the numbers and fix the quality of future development. Nor do I take it for granted that today's logic in math (arithmetics) will hold. *I have few doubts that quantum computers will appear, but I am quite uncertain if it is for this century of for the next millennium *. Ihave more faith in 'the new': maybe that will be something better than today's uncertainty-riding quantum idea. John M On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 1:41 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Mar 2012, at 21:41, John Mikes wrote: Brent and Bruno: you both have statements in this endless discussion about processing ideas of quantum computers. I would be happy to read about ONE that works, not a s a potentiality, but as a real tool, the function of which is understood and APPLIED. (Here, on Earth). It is an *immense* technical challenge. Up to now, a quantum circuit has only succeeded in showing that 15 is equal to 3*5, which might seems ridiculous for todays applied computing domains, but which is still an extraordinary technical prowess as it involves handling of the 2^16 parallel universes needed to implement the quantum superposition used in Shor's quantum algorithm to find the prime factors of numbers. The amazing thing is that all the arguments of unfeasibility of quantum computers have been overcome by quantum software, like the quantum error corrections, and the topological fault tolerant quantum machinery. I have few doubts that quantum computers will appear, but I am quite uncertain if it is for this century of for the next millennium. But bigger quantum circuits will emerge this century, and quantum cryptographic technic might already exist, but that's a military secret, and a banker secret :). There is also some prospect to discover quantum machinery operating in nature. I read some times ago, that a super-heavy object has been discovered which structure seemed to have to be unstable for much physicists and some have elaborated models in which quarks are exploiting a quantum-computational game to attain stability. And then, to make happy Stephen, the not very plausible yet not entirely excluded despite what Tegmark argues possibility that life exploits quantum algorithm. See for example the two following papers referred to in my today's mail: 1) Clark, K.B. (2010). Bose-Einstein condensates form in heuristics learned by ciliates deciding to signal 'social' commitments. BioSystems, 99(3), 167-178. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19883726 2) Clark, K.B. (2010). Arrhenius-kinetics evidence for quantum tunneling in microbial social decision rates. Communicative Integtrative Biology, 3(6), 540-544. http://www.landesbioscience.com/journals/cib/article/12842 I am skeptical to be franc. Not too much time to dig on this for now. The second is freely available. if someone want to comment on it, please do. Bruno On Mon, Mar 12, 2012 at 10:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/12/2012 7:16 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/12/2012 10:00 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 11:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: An Evil Wizard could pop into my vicinity and banish me to the Nether plane! A magical act, if real and just part of a story, is an event that violates some conservation law. I don't see what else would constitute magic... My point is that Harry Potterisms would introduce cul-de-sacs that would totally screw up the statistics and measures, so they have to be banished. Because otherwise things would be screwed up? Chain-wise consistency and concurrency rules would prevent these pathologies, but to get them we have to consider multiple and disjoint observers and not just shared 1p as such implicitly assume an absolute frame of reference. Basically we need both conservation laws and general covariance. Do we obtain that naturally from COMP? That's an open question. You seem to be begging the question: We need regularity, otherwise things wouldn't be regular. No, you are dodging the real question: How is the measure defined? The obvious way is that all non-self-contradictory events are equally likely. But that's hypothesized, not defined. I'm not sure why you are asking how it's defined. The usual definition is an assignment of a number in [0,1] to every member of a Borel set such that they satisfies Kolmogorov's axioms. If it is imposed by fiat, say so and defend the claim. Why is it so hard to get you to consider multiple observers and consider the question as to how exactly do they interact? Al of the discussion that I have seen so far considers a single observer and abstractions about other people. The most I am getting is the word
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/23/2012 12:34 PM, John Mikes wrote: Bruno: thanks for the considerate reply. Let me pick some of your sentences: /2^16 parallel universes needed to implement the quantum superposition// - used in Shor's quantum algorithm to find the prime factors of numbers/. I would not limit the numbers and fix the quality of future development. Nor do I take it for granted that today's logic in math (arithmetics) will hold. Hi John, Did you note that nowhere was it mentioned in Bruno's comment that the 2^16 unverses had an upper limit of the time that it would take to perform the implementation! This is the escape clause for his claim. What is interesting about this multiple parallel universe idea is that it seems to me that we could make the time and qubit limit of any _one_ typical universe could be made arbitrarily small by putting a large quantum computer on a very fast star-ship and travelling at velocities that approach c. Since the Q-computer on the Enterprise would have an arbitrarily long time to implement its side of the Qubit's unitary evolution as some from an observer that is watchign the Enterprise on its long range scanners. The neat thing is that for Spock the computation would output its answer in no time at all IF and Only IF it was able to remain coupled to all those other parallel universes. This scenario, set on the bridge of the Starship Enterprise, seems likely until you look into what acceleration does to quantum entanglement.it is well known that any acceleration spoils entanglement in an interesting way. I apologize for my wandering off topic but I strange idea occurred to me as I was reading your post... Onward! Stephen /I have few doubts that quantum computers will appear, but I am quite uncertain if it is for this century of for the next millennium/. Ihave more faith in 'the new': maybe that will be something better than today's uncertainty-riding quantum idea. John M On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 1:41 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Mar 2012, at 21:41, John Mikes wrote: Brent and Bruno: you both have statements in this endless discussion about processing ideas of quantum computers. I would be happy to read about ONE that works, not a s a potentiality, but as a real tool, the function of which is understood and APPLIED. (Here, on Earth). It is an *immense* technical challenge. Up to now, a quantum circuit has only succeeded in showing that 15 is equal to 3*5, which might seems ridiculous for todays applied computing domains, but which is still an extraordinary technical prowess as it involves handling of the 2^16 parallel universes needed to implement the quantum superposition used in Shor's quantum algorithm to find the prime factors of numbers. The amazing thing is that all the arguments of unfeasibility of quantum computers have been overcome by quantum software, like the quantum error corrections, and the topological fault tolerant quantum machinery. I have few doubts that quantum computers will appear, but I am quite uncertain if it is for this century of for the next millennium. But bigger quantum circuits will emerge this century, and quantum cryptographic technic might already exist, but that's a military secret, and a banker secret :). There is also some prospect to discover quantum machinery operating in nature. I read some times ago, that a super-heavy object has been discovered which structure seemed to have to be unstable for much physicists and some have elaborated models in which quarks are exploiting a quantum-computational game to attain stability. And then, to make happy Stephen, the not very plausible yet not entirely excluded despite what Tegmark argues possibility that life exploits quantum algorithm. See for example the two following papers referred to in my today's mail: 1) Clark, K.B. (2010). Bose-Einstein condensates form in heuristics learned by ciliates deciding to signal 'social' commitments. BioSystems, 99(3), 167-178. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19883726 2) Clark, K.B. (2010). Arrhenius-kinetics evidence for quantum tunneling in microbial social decision rates. Communicative Integtrative Biology, 3(6), 540-544. http://www.landesbioscience.com/journals/cib/article/12842 I am skeptical to be franc. Not too much time to dig on this for now. The second is freely available. if someone want to comment on it, please do. Bruno On Mon, Mar 12, 2012 at 10:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/12/2012 7:16 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/12/2012 10:00 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 11:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: An Evil Wizard could pop into my vicinity and banish
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 14 Mar 2012, at 21:41, John Mikes wrote: Brent and Bruno: you both have statements in this endless discussion about processing ideas of quantum computers. I would be happy to read about ONE that works, not a s a potentiality, but as a real tool, the function of which is understood and APPLIED. (Here, on Earth). It is an *immense* technical challenge. Up to now, a quantum circuit has only succeeded in showing that 15 is equal to 3*5, which might seems ridiculous for todays applied computing domains, but which is still an extraordinary technical prowess as it involves handling of the 2^16 parallel universes needed to implement the quantum superposition used in Shor's quantum algorithm to find the prime factors of numbers. The amazing thing is that all the arguments of unfeasibility of quantum computers have been overcome by quantum software, like the quantum error corrections, and the topological fault tolerant quantum machinery. I have few doubts that quantum computers will appear, but I am quite uncertain if it is for this century of for the next millennium. But bigger quantum circuits will emerge this century, and quantum cryptographic technic might already exist, but that's a military secret, and a banker secret :). There is also some prospect to discover quantum machinery operating in nature. I read some times ago, that a super-heavy object has been discovered which structure seemed to have to be unstable for much physicists and some have elaborated models in which quarks are exploiting a quantum-computational game to attain stability. And then, to make happy Stephen, the not very plausible yet not entirely excluded despite what Tegmark argues possibility that life exploits quantum algorithm. See for example the two following papers referred to in my today's mail: 1) Clark, K.B. (2010). Bose-Einstein condensates form in heuristics learned by ciliates deciding to signal 'social' commitments. BioSystems, 99(3), 167-178. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19883726 2) Clark, K.B. (2010). Arrhenius-kinetics evidence for quantum tunneling in microbial social decision rates. Communicative Integtrative Biology, 3(6), 540-544. http://www.landesbioscience.com/journals/cib/article/12842 I am skeptical to be franc. Not too much time to dig on this for now. The second is freely available. if someone want to comment on it, please do. Bruno On Mon, Mar 12, 2012 at 10:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/12/2012 7:16 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/12/2012 10:00 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 11:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: An Evil Wizard could pop into my vicinity and banish me to the Nether plane! A magical act, if real and just part of a story, is an event that violates some conservation law. I don't see what else would constitute magic... My point is that Harry Potterisms would introduce cul-de-sacs that would totally screw up the statistics and measures, so they have to be banished. Because otherwise things would be screwed up? Chain-wise consistency and concurrency rules would prevent these pathologies, but to get them we have to consider multiple and disjoint observers and not just shared 1p as such implicitly assume an absolute frame of reference. Basically we need both conservation laws and general covariance. Do we obtain that naturally from COMP? That's an open question. You seem to be begging the question: We need regularity, otherwise things wouldn't be regular. No, you are dodging the real question: How is the measure defined? The obvious way is that all non-self-contradictory events are equally likely. But that's hypothesized, not defined. I'm not sure why you are asking how it's defined. The usual definition is an assignment of a number in [0,1] to every member of a Borel set such that they satisfies Kolmogorov's axioms. If it is imposed by fiat, say so and defend the claim. Why is it so hard to get you to consider multiple observers and consider the question as to how exactly do they interact? Al of the discussion that I have seen so far considers a single observer and abstractions about other people. The most I am getting is the word plurality. Is this difficult? Really? It's difficult because people are trying to explain 'other people' and taking only their own consciousness as given. If you're going to assume other people, why not assume physics too? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 12 Mar 2012, at 08:04, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/12/2012 2:53 AM, acw wrote: On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, Could it be that we are tacitly assuming that our notion of Virtual is such that there always exists a standard what is the Real version? If it is not possible to tell if a given object of experience is real or virtual, why do we default to it being virtual, as if it was somehow possible to compare the object in question with an unassailably real version? As I see it, if we can somehow show that a given object of experience is the _best possible_ simulation (modulo available resources) then it is real, as a better or more real simulation of it is impossible to generate. Our physical world is 'real' simply because there does not exist a better simulation of it. Sure, given a mathematical ontology, real is just the structure you exist in - an indexical. This real might be limited in some way (for example in COMP, you cannot help but get some indeterminacy like MW)- a newtonian physics simulation might be real for those living in it and which are embedded in it, although if this would really work without any indeterminacy, I'm skeptical of. I should have been more precise, when I said VR, I didn't merely mean a good digital physics simulation where the observer's entire body+brain is contained within, I meant something more high-level, think of Second Life or Blocks World or some other similar simulation done 1000 years from now with much more computational resources. The main difference between VR and physical-real is that one contains a body+brain embedded in that physical-real world (as matter), thus physical-real is also a self-contained consistent mathematical structure, while VR has some external component which prevents a form of physical self-awareness (you can't have brain surgery in a VR, at least not in the sense we do have in the real world). The main difference here is that the VR can be influenced by a higher level at which the VR itself runs, while a physical- real structure is completely self-contained. Hi! I am mot exactly sure of what you mean by indexical. As to brain surgery in VR, why not? All that is needed is rules in the program that control the 1p experience of content to some states in game structures. The point is that if we are considering brains-in- vasts problems we need to also consider the other minds problems. We should not be analyzing this from a strict one person situation. You and I have different experiences up to and including the something that is like being Stephen as different from something that is like to being ACW. If we where internally identical minds then why would be even be having this conversation? We would literally know each others thought by merely having them. This is why I argue that plural shared 1p is a weakness in COMP. We have to have disjointness at least. Comp is the problem, and the conceptual tool to formulate the problem, not the solution. Comp reduces the mind-body problem to a body problem. That's the main point. Comp gives only the general shape of the solution, in the form of a MW interpretation by numbers of arithmetic, and its measure problem on the first person plural indeterminacy. Then if you accept the classical theory of knowledge, you can already derived the propositional physics, and see the hints for the other minds problem solution, and that solution is close to Girard's linear logic, or some work of Abramski. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 12 Mar 2012, at 09:49, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/3/12 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 3/12/2012 3:49 AM, acw wrote: On 3/12/2012 08:04, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/12/2012 2:53 AM, acw wrote: On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, Could it be that we are tacitly assuming that our notion of Virtual is such that there always exists a standard what is the Real version? If it is not possible to tell if a given object of experience is real or virtual, why do we default to it being virtual, as if it was somehow possible to compare the object in question with an unassailably real version? As I see it, if we can somehow show that a given object of experience is the _best possible_ simulation (modulo available resources) then it is real, as a better or more real simulation of it is impossible to generate. Our physical world is 'real' simply because there does not exist a better simulation of it. Sure, given a mathematical ontology, real is just the structure you exist in - an indexical. This real might be limited in some way (for example in COMP, you cannot help but get some indeterminacy like MW)- a newtonian physics simulation might be real for those living in it and which are embedded in it, although if this would really work without any indeterminacy, I'm skeptical of. I should have been more precise, when I said VR, I didn't merely mean a good digital physics simulation where the observer's entire body+brain is contained within, I meant something more high-level, think of Second Life or Blocks World or some other similar simulation done 1000 years from now with much more computational resources. The main difference between VR and physical-real is that one contains a body+brain embedded in that physical-real world (as matter), thus physical-real is also a self-contained consistent mathematical structure, while VR has some external component which prevents a form of physical self-awareness (you can't have brain surgery in a VR, at least not in the sense we do have in the real world). The main difference here is that the VR can be influenced by a higher level at which the VR itself runs, while a physical-real structure is completely self-contained. Hi! I am mot exactly sure of what you mean by indexical. Your current state, time, location, birth place, brain state, etc are indexicals. The (observed) laws of physics are also indexicals, unless you can show that either only one possible set of laws of physics is possible or you just assume that (for example, in a primary matter hypothesis). As to brain surgery in VR, why not? All that is needed is rules in the program that control the 1p experience of content to some states in game structures. Our brains are made of matter and if we change them, our experience changes. In a VR, the brain's implementation is assumed external to the VR, if not, it would be a digital physics simulation, which is a bit different (self-contained). It might be possible to change your brain within the VR if the right APIs and protocols are implemented, but the brain's computations are done externally to the VR physics simulation (at a different layer, for example, brain program is ran separately from physics simulation program) . There's some subtle details here - if the brain was computed entirely through the VR's physics, UDA would apply and you would get the VR's physics simulation's indeterminacy (no longer a simulation, but something existing on its own in the UD*), otherwise, the brain's implementation depends on the indeterminacy present at the upper layer and not of the VR's physics simulation. This is a subtle point, but there would be a difference in measure and experience between simulating the brain from a digital physics simulation and external to it. In our world, we have the very high confidence belief that our brains are made of matter and thus implemented at the same level as our reality. In a VR, we may assume the implementation of our brains as external to the VR's physics - experienced reality being different from mind's body (brain) reality. Hi, Umm, this looks like you are making a difference between a situation where your P.o.V. os stuck 'in one's head and a P.o.V. where it is free to move about. Have you ever played a MMORPG game? These two situations are just a matter of the programs parameters... Again, what makes the virtual reality virtual? I claim that it is only because there is some other point of view or stance that is taken as real such that the virtual version is has fewer detail and degrees of freedom. If a sufficiently powerful computer can generate a simulation of a physical world, why can it not simulate brains in it as well? Some people think that minds are just something that the brain does, so why not have a single program generating all of it - brains and minds included? My problem is that I fail to see how the UD and
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 12 Mar 2012, at 21:21, meekerdb wrote (to Stepehen King): Stephen King: One thing that I have found in the last few days is that it is impossible to define the computational operations of deleting, copying and pasting onto/into topological manifolds unless one is willing to give up the invariance of genus and Betti numbering. Cutting and pasting seem to be absolutely necessary operations of computation Why do you say that? Quantum computers don't duplicate and don't erase. Well, quantum computer can still duplicate classical information. I could say more if your remember the combinators. They can be used to show that without duplication and erasing you lost Turing universality. You can recover it by allowing a minimal amount of duplication, which does not mean that you can duplicate anything. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/14/2012 7:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Mar 2012, at 21:21, meekerdb wrote (to Stepehen King): Stephen King: One thing that I have found in the last few days is that it is impossible to define the computational operations of deleting, copying and pasting onto/into topological manifolds unless one is willing to give up the invariance of genus and Betti numbering. Cutting and pasting seem to be absolutely necessary operations of computation Why do you say that? Quantum computers don't duplicate and don't erase. Well, quantum computer can still duplicate classical information. Since the world in quantum classical information is only a statistical approximation. I could say more if your remember the combinators. They can be used to show that without duplication and erasing you lost Turing universality. You can recover it by allowing a minimal amount of duplication, which does not mean that you can duplicate anything. Hmm. I thought quantum systems could be emulated by a UT. How does the no-cloning theorem apply to the emulation? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 14 Mar 2012, at 17:30, meekerdb wrote: On 3/14/2012 7:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Mar 2012, at 21:21, meekerdb wrote (to Stepehen King): Stephen King: One thing that I have found in the last few days is that it is impossible to define the computational operations of deleting, copying and pasting onto/into topological manifolds unless one is willing to give up the invariance of genus and Betti numbering. Cutting and pasting seem to be absolutely necessary operations of computation Why do you say that? Quantum computers don't duplicate and don't erase. Well, quantum computer can still duplicate classical information. Since the world in quantum classical information is only a statistical approximation. I don't think so. I think a quantum reality has the potential to manipulate relative classical data, basically when the quantum state is known relatively to the choice of some base. If not quantum computer would not been Turing universal. This has been shown by Benioff. The quantum computer is authentically turing universal. I could say more if your remember the combinators. They can be used to show that without duplication and erasing you lost Turing universality. You can recover it by allowing a minimal amount of duplication, which does not mean that you can duplicate anything. Hmm. I thought quantum systems could be emulated by a UT. They can. No problem, except a dramatic relative slow down. In comp too, to emulate a piece of matter, you have to dovetail on the whole UD* to get all decimals exact. in QM, you have to evaluate the universal wave. How does the no-cloning theorem apply to the emulation? Good question. If you emulate a piece of matter with a UT you have to emulate the many superpositions, and the observers, and the contagion of the superposition to the observers, and you will get that the emulated observers will realize that they cannot duplicate an arbitrary quantum state. Indeed, they cannot be aware of the entire quantum state they are part from. In The MWI, the non cloning is due to the fact that quantum states contain non accessible information of how the piece of matter behaves in parallel realities, or branch of the universal wave. Likewise, with comp, the apparent primitive matter *is* the result of the 1-indeterminacy relative to your actual state, and this involves the whole UD*-infinite indeterminacy domain (like in step 7). That's not duplicable. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
Brent and Bruno: you both have statements in this endless discussion about processing ideas of quantum computers. I would be happy to read about ONE that works, not a s a potentiality, but as a real tool, the function of which is understood and APPLIED. (Here, on Earth). John Mikes On Mon, Mar 12, 2012 at 10:51 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/12/2012 7:16 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/12/2012 10:00 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 11:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: An Evil Wizard could pop into my vicinity and banish me to the Nether plane! A magical act, if real and just part of a story, is an event that violates some conservation law. I don't see what else would constitute magic... My point is that Harry Potterisms would introduce cul-de-sacs that would totally screw up the statistics and measures, so they have to be banished. Because otherwise things would be screwed up? Chain-wise consistency and concurrency rules would prevent these pathologies, but to get them we have to consider multiple and disjoint observers and not just shared 1p as such implicitly assume an absolute frame of reference. Basically we need both conservation laws and general covariance. Do we obtain that naturally from COMP? That's an open question. You seem to be begging the question: We need regularity, otherwise things wouldn't be regular. No, you are dodging the real question: How is the measure defined? The obvious way is that all non-self-contradictory events are equally likely. But that's hypothesized, not defined. I'm not sure why you are asking how it's defined. The usual definition is an assignment of a number in [0,1] to every member of a Borel set such that they satisfies Kolmogorov's axioms. If it is imposed by fiat, say so and defend the claim. Why is it so hard to get you to consider multiple observers and consider the question as to how exactly do they interact? Al of the discussion that I have seen so far considers a single observer and abstractions about other people. The most I am getting is the word plurality. Is this difficult? Really? It's difficult because people are trying to explain 'other people' and taking only their own consciousness as given. If you're going to assume other people, why not assume physics too? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/11/2012 11:47 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 8:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/11/2012 7:39 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 2:43 PM, acw wrote: On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote: This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the whole point of the exercise. I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might seem to entail 100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct? 3p indeterminacy in the form of the UD*, 1p determinacy from the perspective of those minds relative to bodies in the UD*. However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be anything at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that comp is false? You're basically presenting the White Rabbit problem here. I used to wonder if that is indeed the case, but after considering it further, it doesn't seem to be: your 1p is identified with some particular abstract machine - that part is mostly determinate and deterministic (or quasi-deterministic if you allow some leeway as to what constitutes persona identity) in its behavior, but below that substitution level, anything can change, as long as that machine is implemented correctly/consistently. If the level is low enough and most of the machines implementing the lower layers that eventually implement our mind correspond to one world (such as ours), that would imply reasonably stable experience and some MWI-like laws of physics - not white noise experiences. That is to say that if we don't experience white noise, statistically our experiences will be stable - this does not mean that we won't have really unusual jumps or changes in laws-of-physics or experience when our measure is greatly reduced (such as the current statistically winning machines no longer being able to implement your mind - 3p death from the point of view of others). This implies that our measure is strongly correlated with the regularity of physics. I'm not sure you can show that, but if it's true it means that physics is fundamental to our existence, even if physics can be explained by the UD. Only worlds with extremely consistent physics can support consciousness (which seems unlikely to me). Brent Hi Brent, I do not understand how you think that only worlds with extremely consistent physics can support consciousness is unlikely. Are you only considering a single momentary instance of consciousness? It is quite easy to prove that if there exist multiple conscious entities that can communicate coherently with each other (in the sense that they can understand each other) then the physics of their common world will necessarily be maximally consistent as it if where not then pathological Harry Potterisms will occur that would prevent the arbitrary extension of their experience. I don't know what you mean by 'the arbitrary extension of their experience'. Hi Brent, Oh, let's see. If we could upload ourselves into artificial hardware then we are by definition arbitrarily extending our experiences... If we go with the reincarnation theories we get arbitrary extensions as well... How would magical events prevent anything. An Evil Wizard could pop into my vicinity and banish me to the Nether plane! A magical act, if real and just part of a story, is an event that violates some conservation law. I don't see what else would constitute magic... My point is that Harry Potterisms would introduce cul-de-sacs that would totally screw up the statistics and measures, so they have to be banished. Chain-wise consistency and concurrency rules would prevent these pathologies, but to get them we have to consider multiple and disjoint observers and not just shared 1p as such implicitly assume an absolute frame of reference. Basically we need both conservation laws and general covariance. Do we obtain that naturally from COMP? That's an open question. We have reports of miracles all the time from less scientific places and times and they don't seem to prevent anything. We tend to not believe them because they violate the physics which we suppose to be consistent in time and place - but you can't invoke that as evidence that physics is consistent on pain of vicious circularity. That is my point. We do not see such violations, not ever! Additionally, it would be extremely difficult for such worlds to have conservation laws. But the symmetry principles that result in conservation laws are arguably human selections. We pay attention to and build 'laws' on what does not depend on particular time/place/orientation; so may conservation of momentum and energy are (at least approximately) inevitable. How so? It is one thing to have symbolic representations of experiences and so forth, it is another to have
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/11/2012 8:30 PM, acw wrote: On 3/12/2012 00:39, meekerdb wrote: This implies that our measure is strongly correlated with the regularity of physics. I'm not sure you can show that, but if it's true it means that physics is fundamental to our existence, even if physics can be explained by the UD. Only worlds with extremely consistent physics can support consciousness (which seems unlikely to me). Maybe, it's more of a conjecture, I don't posses the theoretical tools to make some headway on the issue for now. As for physics being essential, I'm not 100% sure, it might be for us, humans with physical brains and bodies, but I don't see why it would be for a SIM, or for a detailed emulation of a human body/brain: consider the case of such a SIMs living in a VR(Virtual Reality) simulation - they wouldn't really care what the underlying substrate would be, but then, they would know they are in a simulation (to some degree). A more interesting question might be not about SIMs living in VRs, but those beings which live in a physical world and have bodies and are self-aware of those bodies and their own embedding in such a physical world - what possible statistically stable laws of physics would be required for such beings (I think Tegmark called them Self-Aware Substructures)? Since we know we're in such a situation, what laws of physics are possible that have conscious self-aware observers with 'physical' bodies? Hi, Could it be that we are tacitly assuming that our notion of Virtual is such that there always exists a standard what is the Real version? If it is not possible to tell if a given object of experience is real or virtual, why do we default to it being virtual, as if it was somehow possible to compare the object in question with an unassailably real version? As I see it, if we can somehow show that a given object of experience is the _best possible_ simulation (modulo available resources) then it is real, as a better or more real simulation of it is impossible to generate. Our physical world is 'real' simply because there does not exist a better simulation of it. Sure, given a mathematical ontology, real is just the structure you exist in - an indexical. This real might be limited in some way (for example in COMP, you cannot help but get some indeterminacy like MW)- a newtonian physics simulation might be real for those living in it and which are embedded in it, although if this would really work without any indeterminacy, I'm skeptical of. I should have been more precise, when I said VR, I didn't merely mean a good digital physics simulation where the observer's entire body+brain is contained within, I meant something more high-level, think of Second Life or Blocks World or some other similar simulation done 1000 years from now with much more computational resources. The main difference between VR and physical-real is that one contains a body+brain embedded in that physical-real world (as matter), thus physical-real is also a self-contained consistent mathematical structure, while VR has some external component which prevents a form of physical self-awareness (you can't have brain surgery in a VR, at least not in the sense we do have in the real world). The main difference here is that the VR can be influenced by a higher level at which the VR itself runs, while a physical-real structure is completely self-contained. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/12/2012 2:53 AM, acw wrote: On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, Could it be that we are tacitly assuming that our notion of Virtual is such that there always exists a standard what is the Real version? If it is not possible to tell if a given object of experience is real or virtual, why do we default to it being virtual, as if it was somehow possible to compare the object in question with an unassailably real version? As I see it, if we can somehow show that a given object of experience is the _best possible_ simulation (modulo available resources) then it is real, as a better or more real simulation of it is impossible to generate. Our physical world is 'real' simply because there does not exist a better simulation of it. Sure, given a mathematical ontology, real is just the structure you exist in - an indexical. This real might be limited in some way (for example in COMP, you cannot help but get some indeterminacy like MW)- a newtonian physics simulation might be real for those living in it and which are embedded in it, although if this would really work without any indeterminacy, I'm skeptical of. I should have been more precise, when I said VR, I didn't merely mean a good digital physics simulation where the observer's entire body+brain is contained within, I meant something more high-level, think of Second Life or Blocks World or some other similar simulation done 1000 years from now with much more computational resources. The main difference between VR and physical-real is that one contains a body+brain embedded in that physical-real world (as matter), thus physical-real is also a self-contained consistent mathematical structure, while VR has some external component which prevents a form of physical self-awareness (you can't have brain surgery in a VR, at least not in the sense we do have in the real world). The main difference here is that the VR can be influenced by a higher level at which the VR itself runs, while a physical-real structure is completely self-contained. Hi! I am mot exactly sure of what you mean by indexical. As to brain surgery in VR, why not? All that is needed is rules in the program that control the 1p experience of content to some states in game structures. The point is that if we are considering brains-in-vasts problems we need to also consider the other minds problems. We should not be analyzing this from a strict one person situation. You and I have different experiences up to and including the something that is like being Stephen as different from something that is like to being ACW. If we where internally identical minds then why would be even be having this conversation? We would literally know each others thought by merely having them. This is why I argue that plural shared 1p is a weakness in COMP. We have to have disjointness at least. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/12/2012 08:04, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/12/2012 2:53 AM, acw wrote: On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, Could it be that we are tacitly assuming that our notion of Virtual is such that there always exists a standard what is the Real version? If it is not possible to tell if a given object of experience is real or virtual, why do we default to it being virtual, as if it was somehow possible to compare the object in question with an unassailably real version? As I see it, if we can somehow show that a given object of experience is the _best possible_ simulation (modulo available resources) then it is real, as a better or more real simulation of it is impossible to generate. Our physical world is 'real' simply because there does not exist a better simulation of it. Sure, given a mathematical ontology, real is just the structure you exist in - an indexical. This real might be limited in some way (for example in COMP, you cannot help but get some indeterminacy like MW)- a newtonian physics simulation might be real for those living in it and which are embedded in it, although if this would really work without any indeterminacy, I'm skeptical of. I should have been more precise, when I said VR, I didn't merely mean a good digital physics simulation where the observer's entire body+brain is contained within, I meant something more high-level, think of Second Life or Blocks World or some other similar simulation done 1000 years from now with much more computational resources. The main difference between VR and physical-real is that one contains a body+brain embedded in that physical-real world (as matter), thus physical-real is also a self-contained consistent mathematical structure, while VR has some external component which prevents a form of physical self-awareness (you can't have brain surgery in a VR, at least not in the sense we do have in the real world). The main difference here is that the VR can be influenced by a higher level at which the VR itself runs, while a physical-real structure is completely self-contained. Hi! I am mot exactly sure of what you mean by indexical. Your current state, time, location, birth place, brain state, etc are indexicals. The (observed) laws of physics are also indexicals, unless you can show that either only one possible set of laws of physics is possible or you just assume that (for example, in a primary matter hypothesis). As to brain surgery in VR, why not? All that is needed is rules in the program that control the 1p experience of content to some states in game structures. Our brains are made of matter and if we change them, our experience changes. In a VR, the brain's implementation is assumed external to the VR, if not, it would be a digital physics simulation, which is a bit different (self-contained). It might be possible to change your brain within the VR if the right APIs and protocols are implemented, but the brain's computations are done externally to the VR physics simulation (at a different layer, for example, brain program is ran separately from physics simulation program) . There's some subtle details here - if the brain was computed entirely through the VR's physics, UDA would apply and you would get the VR's physics simulation's indeterminacy (no longer a simulation, but something existing on its own in the UD*), otherwise, the brain's implementation depends on the indeterminacy present at the upper layer and not of the VR's physics simulation. This is a subtle point, but there would be a difference in measure and experience between simulating the brain from a digital physics simulation and external to it. In our world, we have the very high confidence belief that our brains are made of matter and thus implemented at the same level as our reality. In a VR, we may assume the implementation of our brains as external to the VR's physics - experienced reality being different from mind's body (brain) reality. The point is that if we are considering brains-in-vasts problems we need to also consider the other minds problems. We should not be analyzing this from a strict one person situation. You and I have different experiences up to and including the something that is like being Stephen as different from something that is like to being ACW. If we where internally identical minds then why would be even be having this conversation? We would literally know each others thought by merely having them. This is why I argue that plural shared 1p is a weakness in COMP. We have to have disjointness at least. We have different mind-states thus we have different experiences. I'm not entirely sure why would we share a mind if we didn't share a brain - it doesn't make much sense to me. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/12/2012 3:49 AM, acw wrote: On 3/12/2012 08:04, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/12/2012 2:53 AM, acw wrote: On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, Could it be that we are tacitly assuming that our notion of Virtual is such that there always exists a standard what is the Real version? If it is not possible to tell if a given object of experience is real or virtual, why do we default to it being virtual, as if it was somehow possible to compare the object in question with an unassailably real version? As I see it, if we can somehow show that a given object of experience is the _best possible_ simulation (modulo available resources) then it is real, as a better or more real simulation of it is impossible to generate. Our physical world is 'real' simply because there does not exist a better simulation of it. Sure, given a mathematical ontology, real is just the structure you exist in - an indexical. This real might be limited in some way (for example in COMP, you cannot help but get some indeterminacy like MW)- a newtonian physics simulation might be real for those living in it and which are embedded in it, although if this would really work without any indeterminacy, I'm skeptical of. I should have been more precise, when I said VR, I didn't merely mean a good digital physics simulation where the observer's entire body+brain is contained within, I meant something more high-level, think of Second Life or Blocks World or some other similar simulation done 1000 years from now with much more computational resources. The main difference between VR and physical-real is that one contains a body+brain embedded in that physical-real world (as matter), thus physical-real is also a self-contained consistent mathematical structure, while VR has some external component which prevents a form of physical self-awareness (you can't have brain surgery in a VR, at least not in the sense we do have in the real world). The main difference here is that the VR can be influenced by a higher level at which the VR itself runs, while a physical-real structure is completely self-contained. Hi! I am mot exactly sure of what you mean by indexical. Your current state, time, location, birth place, brain state, etc are indexicals. The (observed) laws of physics are also indexicals, unless you can show that either only one possible set of laws of physics is possible or you just assume that (for example, in a primary matter hypothesis). As to brain surgery in VR, why not? All that is needed is rules in the program that control the 1p experience of content to some states in game structures. Our brains are made of matter and if we change them, our experience changes. In a VR, the brain's implementation is assumed external to the VR, if not, it would be a digital physics simulation, which is a bit different (self-contained). It might be possible to change your brain within the VR if the right APIs and protocols are implemented, but the brain's computations are done externally to the VR physics simulation (at a different layer, for example, brain program is ran separately from physics simulation program) . There's some subtle details here - if the brain was computed entirely through the VR's physics, UDA would apply and you would get the VR's physics simulation's indeterminacy (no longer a simulation, but something existing on its own in the UD*), otherwise, the brain's implementation depends on the indeterminacy present at the upper layer and not of the VR's physics simulation. This is a subtle point, but there would be a difference in measure and experience between simulating the brain from a digital physics simulation and external to it. In our world, we have the very high confidence belief that our brains are made of matter and thus implemented at the same level as our reality. In a VR, we may assume the implementation of our brains as external to the VR's physics - experienced reality being different from mind's body (brain) reality. Hi, Umm, this looks like you are making a difference between a situation where your P.o.V. os stuck 'in one's head and a P.o.V. where it is free to move about. Have you ever played a MMORPG game? These two situations are just a matter of the programs parameters... Again, what makes the virtual reality virtual? I claim that it is only because there is some other point of view or stance that is taken as real such that the virtual version is has fewer detail and degrees of freedom. If a sufficiently powerful computer can generate a simulation of a physical world, why can it not simulate brains in it as well? Some people think that minds are just something that the brain does, so why not have a single program generating all of it - brains and minds included? My problem is that I fail to see how the UD and indeterminacy given copy and paste operations is involved in this question. The point is that if we are considering brains-in-vasts
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
2012/3/12 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 3/12/2012 3:49 AM, acw wrote: On 3/12/2012 08:04, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/12/2012 2:53 AM, acw wrote: On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, Could it be that we are tacitly assuming that our notion of Virtual is such that there always exists a standard what is the Real version? If it is not possible to tell if a given object of experience is real or virtual, why do we default to it being virtual, as if it was somehow possible to compare the object in question with an unassailably real version? As I see it, if we can somehow show that a given object of experience is the _best possible_ simulation (modulo available resources) then it is real, as a better or more real simulation of it is impossible to generate. Our physical world is 'real' simply because there does not exist a better simulation of it. Sure, given a mathematical ontology, real is just the structure you exist in - an indexical. This real might be limited in some way (for example in COMP, you cannot help but get some indeterminacy like MW)- a newtonian physics simulation might be real for those living in it and which are embedded in it, although if this would really work without any indeterminacy, I'm skeptical of. I should have been more precise, when I said VR, I didn't merely mean a good digital physics simulation where the observer's entire body+brain is contained within, I meant something more high-level, think of Second Life or Blocks World or some other similar simulation done 1000 years from now with much more computational resources. The main difference between VR and physical-real is that one contains a body+brain embedded in that physical-real world (as matter), thus physical-real is also a self-contained consistent mathematical structure, while VR has some external component which prevents a form of physical self-awareness (you can't have brain surgery in a VR, at least not in the sense we do have in the real world). The main difference here is that the VR can be influenced by a higher level at which the VR itself runs, while a physical-real structure is completely self-contained. Hi! I am mot exactly sure of what you mean by indexical. Your current state, time, location, birth place, brain state, etc are indexicals. The (observed) laws of physics are also indexicals, unless you can show that either only one possible set of laws of physics is possible or you just assume that (for example, in a primary matter hypothesis). As to brain surgery in VR, why not? All that is needed is rules in the program that control the 1p experience of content to some states in game structures. Our brains are made of matter and if we change them, our experience changes. In a VR, the brain's implementation is assumed external to the VR, if not, it would be a digital physics simulation, which is a bit different (self-contained). It might be possible to change your brain within the VR if the right APIs and protocols are implemented, but the brain's computations are done externally to the VR physics simulation (at a different layer, for example, brain program is ran separately from physics simulation program) . There's some subtle details here - if the brain was computed entirely through the VR's physics, UDA would apply and you would get the VR's physics simulation's indeterminacy (no longer a simulation, but something existing on its own in the UD*), otherwise, the brain's implementation depends on the indeterminacy present at the upper layer and not of the VR's physics simulation. This is a subtle point, but there would be a difference in measure and experience between simulating the brain from a digital physics simulation and external to it. In our world, we have the very high confidence belief that our brains are made of matter and thus implemented at the same level as our reality. In a VR, we may assume the implementation of our brains as external to the VR's physics - experienced reality being different from mind's body (brain) reality. Hi, Umm, this looks like you are making a difference between a situation where your P.o.V. os stuck 'in one's head and a P.o.V. where it is free to move about. Have you ever played a MMORPG game? These two situations are just a matter of the programs parameters... Again, what makes the virtual reality virtual? I claim that it is only because there is some other point of view or stance that is taken as real such that the virtual version is has fewer detail and degrees of freedom. If a sufficiently powerful computer can generate a simulation of a physical world, why can it not simulate brains in it as well? Some people think that minds are just something that the brain does, so why not have a single program generating all of it - brains and minds included? My problem is that I fail to see how the UD and indeterminacy given copy and paste operations is
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/12/2012 09:41, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/12/2012 3:49 AM, acw wrote: On 3/12/2012 08:04, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/12/2012 2:53 AM, acw wrote: On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, Could it be that we are tacitly assuming that our notion of Virtual is such that there always exists a standard what is the Real version? If it is not possible to tell if a given object of experience is real or virtual, why do we default to it being virtual, as if it was somehow possible to compare the object in question with an unassailably real version? As I see it, if we can somehow show that a given object of experience is the _best possible_ simulation (modulo available resources) then it is real, as a better or more real simulation of it is impossible to generate. Our physical world is 'real' simply because there does not exist a better simulation of it. Sure, given a mathematical ontology, real is just the structure you exist in - an indexical. This real might be limited in some way (for example in COMP, you cannot help but get some indeterminacy like MW)- a newtonian physics simulation might be real for those living in it and which are embedded in it, although if this would really work without any indeterminacy, I'm skeptical of. I should have been more precise, when I said VR, I didn't merely mean a good digital physics simulation where the observer's entire body+brain is contained within, I meant something more high-level, think of Second Life or Blocks World or some other similar simulation done 1000 years from now with much more computational resources. The main difference between VR and physical-real is that one contains a body+brain embedded in that physical-real world (as matter), thus physical-real is also a self-contained consistent mathematical structure, while VR has some external component which prevents a form of physical self-awareness (you can't have brain surgery in a VR, at least not in the sense we do have in the real world). The main difference here is that the VR can be influenced by a higher level at which the VR itself runs, while a physical-real structure is completely self-contained. Hi! I am mot exactly sure of what you mean by indexical. Your current state, time, location, birth place, brain state, etc are indexicals. The (observed) laws of physics are also indexicals, unless you can show that either only one possible set of laws of physics is possible or you just assume that (for example, in a primary matter hypothesis). As to brain surgery in VR, why not? All that is needed is rules in the program that control the 1p experience of content to some states in game structures. Our brains are made of matter and if we change them, our experience changes. In a VR, the brain's implementation is assumed external to the VR, if not, it would be a digital physics simulation, which is a bit different (self-contained). It might be possible to change your brain within the VR if the right APIs and protocols are implemented, but the brain's computations are done externally to the VR physics simulation (at a different layer, for example, brain program is ran separately from physics simulation program) . There's some subtle details here - if the brain was computed entirely through the VR's physics, UDA would apply and you would get the VR's physics simulation's indeterminacy (no longer a simulation, but something existing on its own in the UD*), otherwise, the brain's implementation depends on the indeterminacy present at the upper layer and not of the VR's physics simulation. This is a subtle point, but there would be a difference in measure and experience between simulating the brain from a digital physics simulation and external to it. In our world, we have the very high confidence belief that our brains are made of matter and thus implemented at the same level as our reality. In a VR, we may assume the implementation of our brains as external to the VR's physics - experienced reality being different from mind's body (brain) reality. Hi, Umm, this looks like you are making a difference between a situation where your P.o.V. os stuck 'in one's head and a P.o.V. where it is free to move about. The difference that I'm trying to illustrate is about how the brain is implemented and with what it's entangled with, or what is required for its implementation. In the reality implementation case, a real brain is implemented by random machines below the substitution level. The experiences are also given by those machines if the brain/body are one and the same. The problem with VRs is that the physics, thus the generated sensory input (and output from player) is separated from actual mind's implementation - they run at different layers, thus we cannot use experienced sensory information to predict much about our mind's implementation (or what would happen next) without a specially designed VR which is made to facilitate just that (a special case VR). The measure differences
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On Sun, Mar 11, 2012 at 10:43 PM, acw a...@lavabit.com wrote: On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote: However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be anything at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that comp is false? You're basically presenting the White Rabbit problem here. I used to wonder if that is indeed the case, but after considering it further, it doesn't seem to be: your 1p is identified with some particular abstract machine - that part is mostly determinate and deterministic (or quasi-deterministic if you allow some leeway as to what constitutes persona identity) in its behavior, but below that substitution level, anything can change, as long as that machine is implemented correctly/consistently. Not sure if I understand you ... I was thinking of something like this: if comp is true, then we can upload the mind into a computer and simulate the environment. The simulator could be constructed so that the stimuli given to the mind is a sequence of arbitrary white rabbits. Is there somehing in comp that makes the existence of such evil simulators unlikely? Ricardo. If the level is low enough and most of the machines implementing the lower layers that eventually implement our mind correspond to one world (such as ours), that would imply reasonably stable experience and some MWI-like laws of physics - not white noise experiences. That is to say that if we don't experience white noise, statistically our experiences will be stable - this does not mean that we won't have really unusual jumps or changes in laws-of-physics or experience when our measure is greatly reduced (such as the current statistically winning machines no longer being able to implement your mind - 3p death from the point of view of others). Also, one possible way of showing COMP false is to show that such stable implementations are impossible, however this seems not obvious to me. A more practical concern would be to consider the case of what would happen if the substitution level is chosen slightly wrong or too high - would it lead to too unstable 1p or merely just allow the SIM(Substrate Independent Mind) to more easily pick which lower-level machines implement it (there's another thought experiment which shows how this could be done, if a machine can find one of its own Godel-number). Ricardo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ **googlegroups.com everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
Hi John, On 11 Mar 2012, at 20:36, John Mikes wrote: John, 'te bartender cuts in...' - I believe David indeed has no idea what the real point in issue may be - he would have been addressing it. There is NO real point. In those thought experiments (euphemism for phantasm to justify points of non-existence) certain prerequisites are also needed (additional phantasms) and justification for them, too. Then there are 'conclusions' imaginary and the consequences of such - built in. I admire the patience of Bruno replying to all those (circular? fantasy-related?) posts (I am not relating to your posts) - I lost the endurance to follow all of them lately. I read a lot of David's posts and think your expressed ...belie(f)ve your (i.e. David's) thinking is naive simplistic and commonplace. is wrong. Can't agree more. It is a shame, because you seem to be a well-thinking and well- educated guy who works with well-crafted logical argumentation. I cannot raise my voice for/against indeterminacy because of my agnostic worldview that postulates lots of unknown/unknowable factors influencing our decisions - together with factors we know of and acknowledge - so uncertainty may be ignorance-based, not only haphazardous. A 'deterministic' totality, however, is a matter of belief for me - unjustified as well - because of the partial 'order' we detect in the so far knowable nature (negating 'random' occurrences that would screw-up any order, even the limited local ones). My worldview is my 'faith' - not subject to discussion. Best, Bruno On Sun, Mar 11, 2012 at 1:00 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Mar 11, 2012 David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: John, I hope you will not think me impertinent, but you're expending a great deal of time and energy arguing with an elaborate series of straw men. No doubt this is great fun and highly entertaining, but would you consider the alternative of requesting clarification of the real point at issue? It's painful to see you repeatedly arguing past it. If your thinking were clear and you understood what the real point at issue was and you knew of a key question I have not answered you would have certainly asked it somewhere in the above; but you did not I think because you could not, and that fact makes me believe your thinking is naive simplistic and commonplace. Prove me wrong. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 11 Mar 2012, at 21:44, R AM wrote: This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the whole point of the exercise. To explain that if we are machine then the mind-bpdy problem reduces partially into a justification of the laws of physics from computer science/arithmetic. I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of subjective experience is indeterminated? It depends of the protocols, but eventually if comp is true then some first plural indeterminacy exists and can be shared, like QM illustrates. But if comp is correct QM has to be a theorem of arithmetic concerning the relations between a machine and its possible universal neighbors. Although comp might seem to entail 100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct? I guess acw have answered all this. Comp entails third person determinacy (cf the working of a computer) and some local and global indeterminacy due to self-duplication. You have to do the thought experiments by yourself to grasp the meaning of this. However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be anything at all. Prove this, and you refute comp. The UD Argument might leads to that, but actually it leads more to QM than to a contradiction. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that comp is false? That would be rather premature. There is a measure problem, but it is an interesting one. It put light on a possible origin of both consciousness and the appearance of matter and laws. We discuss that measure problem since the beginning of this list. All everything- type of theories have a measure problem. It is akin to the modal inflation in logical realism. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 12 Mar 2012, at 04:47, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 8:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/11/2012 7:39 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 2:43 PM, acw wrote: On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote: This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the whole point of the exercise. I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might seem to entail 100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct? 3p indeterminacy in the form of the UD*, 1p determinacy from the perspective of those minds relative to bodies in the UD*. However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be anything at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that comp is false? You're basically presenting the White Rabbit problem here. I used to wonder if that is indeed the case, but after considering it further, it doesn't seem to be: your 1p is identified with some particular abstract machine - that part is mostly determinate and deterministic (or quasi-deterministic if you allow some leeway as to what constitutes persona identity) in its behavior, but below that substitution level, anything can change, as long as that machine is implemented correctly/consistently. If the level is low enough and most of the machines implementing the lower layers that eventually implement our mind correspond to one world (such as ours), that would imply reasonably stable experience and some MWI-like laws of physics - not white noise experiences. That is to say that if we don't experience white noise, statistically our experiences will be stable - this does not mean that we won't have really unusual jumps or changes in laws-of-physics or experience when our measure is greatly reduced (such as the current statistically winning machines no longer being able to implement your mind - 3p death from the point of view of others). This implies that our measure is strongly correlated with the regularity of physics. I'm not sure you can show that, but if it's true it means that physics is fundamental to our existence, even if physics can be explained by the UD. Only worlds with extremely consistent physics can support consciousness (which seems unlikely to me). Brent Hi Brent, I do not understand how you think that only worlds with extremely consistent physics can support consciousness is unlikely. Are you only considering a single momentary instance of consciousness? It is quite easy to prove that if there exist multiple conscious entities that can communicate coherently with each other (in the sense that they can understand each other) then the physics of their common world will necessarily be maximally consistent as it if where not then pathological Harry Potterisms will occur that would prevent the arbitrary extension of their experience. I don't know what you mean by 'the arbitrary extension of their experience'. How would magical events prevent anything. We have reports of miracles all the time from less scientific places and times and they don't seem to prevent anything. We tend to not believe them because they violate the physics which we suppose to be consistent in time and place - but you can't invoke that as evidence that physics is consistent on pain of vicious circularity. Additionally, it would be extremely difficult for such worlds to have conservation laws. But the symmetry principles that result in conservation laws are arguably human selections. We pay attention to and build 'laws' on what does not depend on particular time/place/orientation; so may conservation of momentum and energy are (at least approximately) inevitable. There is also the problem that according to current theories are many possible kinds of physics even if you limit them to just those consistent with string theory, much less Classical physics. But my main point was conditional. IF consciousness is strongly dependent on physics then Bruno's program of replacing physics with arithmetic isn't going anywhere because arithmetic will produce too many kinds of worlds and only by studying physics will we be able to learn about our world. OK, but my logical point here is that in such a case comp has to be wrong. It is not so much a program than an logical obligation for staying rational *and* betting on comp, whatever the level is, if it exists. It is because of this line of reasoning that I resist the Platonic interpretation of COMP as it puts pathological universes on the same level of likelihood as non-pathological ones. That's the question. Is there some canonical measure that makes the non-pathological ones overwhelmingly likely? It exists or comp is false. There are evidences that it exists, like the variants
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/11/2012 11:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/11/2012 11:47 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 8:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/11/2012 7:39 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 2:43 PM, acw wrote: On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote: This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the whole point of the exercise. I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might seem to entail 100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct? 3p indeterminacy in the form of the UD*, 1p determinacy from the perspective of those minds relative to bodies in the UD*. However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be anything at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that comp is false? You're basically presenting the White Rabbit problem here. I used to wonder if that is indeed the case, but after considering it further, it doesn't seem to be: your 1p is identified with some particular abstract machine - that part is mostly determinate and deterministic (or quasi-deterministic if you allow some leeway as to what constitutes persona identity) in its behavior, but below that substitution level, anything can change, as long as that machine is implemented correctly/consistently. If the level is low enough and most of the machines implementing the lower layers that eventually implement our mind correspond to one world (such as ours), that would imply reasonably stable experience and some MWI-like laws of physics - not white noise experiences. That is to say that if we don't experience white noise, statistically our experiences will be stable - this does not mean that we won't have really unusual jumps or changes in laws-of-physics or experience when our measure is greatly reduced (such as the current statistically winning machines no longer being able to implement your mind - 3p death from the point of view of others). This implies that our measure is strongly correlated with the regularity of physics. I'm not sure you can show that, but if it's true it means that physics is fundamental to our existence, even if physics can be explained by the UD. Only worlds with extremely consistent physics can support consciousness (which seems unlikely to me). Brent Hi Brent, I do not understand how you think that only worlds with extremely consistent physics can support consciousness is unlikely. Are you only considering a single momentary instance of consciousness? It is quite easy to prove that if there exist multiple conscious entities that can communicate coherently with each other (in the sense that they can understand each other) then the physics of their common world will necessarily be maximally consistent as it if where not then pathological Harry Potterisms will occur that would prevent the arbitrary extension of their experience. I don't know what you mean by 'the arbitrary extension of their experience'. Hi Brent, Oh, let's see. If we could upload ourselves into artificial hardware then we are by definition arbitrarily extending our experiences... If we go with the reincarnation theories we get arbitrary extensions as well... How would magical events prevent anything. An Evil Wizard could pop into my vicinity and banish me to the Nether plane! A magical act, if real and just part of a story, is an event that violates some conservation law. I don't see what else would constitute magic... My point is that Harry Potterisms would introduce cul-de-sacs that would totally screw up the statistics and measures, so they have to be banished. Have to be? To satisfy you...or what? Chain-wise consistency and concurrency rules would prevent these pathologies, but to get them we have to consider multiple and disjoint observers and not just shared 1p as such implicitly assume an absolute frame of reference. Basically we need both conservation laws and general covariance. Do we obtain that naturally from COMP? That's an open question. We have reports of miracles all the time from less scientific places and times and they don't seem to prevent anything. We tend to not believe them because they violate the physics which we suppose to be consistent in time and place - but you can't invoke that as evidence that physics is consistent on pain of vicious circularity. That is my point. We do not see such violations, not ever! Additionally, it would be extremely difficult for such worlds to have conservation laws. But the symmetry principles that result in conservation laws are arguably human selections. We pay attention to and build 'laws' on what does not depend on particular time/place/orientation; so may conservation of momentum and energy are (at least approximately) inevitable. How so? It is one thing to have symbolic
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/12/2012 4:21 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 11:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/11/2012 11:47 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 8:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/11/2012 7:39 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 2:43 PM, acw wrote: On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote: This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the whole point of the exercise. I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might seem to entail 100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct? 3p indeterminacy in the form of the UD*, 1p determinacy from the perspective of those minds relative to bodies in the UD*. However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be anything at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that comp is false? You're basically presenting the White Rabbit problem here. I used to wonder if that is indeed the case, but after considering it further, it doesn't seem to be: your 1p is identified with some particular abstract machine - that part is mostly determinate and deterministic (or quasi-deterministic if you allow some leeway as to what constitutes persona identity) in its behavior, but below that substitution level, anything can change, as long as that machine is implemented correctly/consistently. If the level is low enough and most of the machines implementing the lower layers that eventually implement our mind correspond to one world (such as ours), that would imply reasonably stable experience and some MWI-like laws of physics - not white noise experiences. That is to say that if we don't experience white noise, statistically our experiences will be stable - this does not mean that we won't have really unusual jumps or changes in laws-of-physics or experience when our measure is greatly reduced (such as the current statistically winning machines no longer being able to implement your mind - 3p death from the point of view of others). This implies that our measure is strongly correlated with the regularity of physics. I'm not sure you can show that, but if it's true it means that physics is fundamental to our existence, even if physics can be explained by the UD. Only worlds with extremely consistent physics can support consciousness (which seems unlikely to me). Brent Hi Brent, I do not understand how you think that only worlds with extremely consistent physics can support consciousness is unlikely. Are you only considering a single momentary instance of consciousness? It is quite easy to prove that if there exist multiple conscious entities that can communicate coherently with each other (in the sense that they can understand each other) then the physics of their common world will necessarily be maximally consistent as it if where not then pathological Harry Potterisms will occur that would prevent the arbitrary extension of their experience. I don't know what you mean by 'the arbitrary extension of their experience'. Hi Brent, Oh, let's see. If we could upload ourselves into artificial hardware then we are by definition arbitrarily extending our experiences... If we go with the reincarnation theories we get arbitrary extensions as well... How would magical events prevent anything. An Evil Wizard could pop into my vicinity and banish me to the Nether plane! A magical act, if real and just part of a story, is an event that violates some conservation law. I don't see what else would constitute magic... My point is that Harry Potterisms would introduce cul-de-sacs that would totally screw up the statistics and measures, so they have to be banished. Have to be? To satisfy you...or what? To satisfy the requirements of arbitrarily long extensions. My point is that Harry Potterisms are pathological because they can introduce arbitrary cul-de-sacs, therefore, they are a serious problem. Chain-wise consistency and concurrency rules would prevent these pathologies, but to get them we have to consider multiple and disjoint observers and not just shared 1p as such implicitly assume an absolute frame of reference. Basically we need both conservation laws and general covariance. Do we obtain that naturally from COMP? That's an open question. We have reports of miracles all the time from less scientific places and times and they don't seem to prevent anything. We tend to not believe them because they violate the physics which we suppose to be consistent in time and place - but you can't invoke that as evidence that physics is consistent on pain of vicious circularity. That is my point. We do not see such violations, not ever! Additionally, it would be extremely difficult for such worlds to have conservation laws. But the symmetry principles that result in conservation laws
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/12/2012 10:00 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 11:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: An Evil Wizard could pop into my vicinity and banish me to the Nether plane! A magical act, if real and just part of a story, is an event that violates some conservation law. I don't see what else would constitute magic... My point is that Harry Potterisms would introduce cul-de-sacs that would totally screw up the statistics and measures, so they have to be banished. Because otherwise things would be screwed up? Chain-wise consistency and concurrency rules would prevent these pathologies, but to get them we have to consider multiple and disjoint observers and not just shared 1p as such implicitly assume an absolute frame of reference. Basically we need both conservation laws and general covariance. Do we obtain that naturally from COMP? That's an open question. You seem to be begging the question: We need regularity, otherwise things wouldn't be regular. No, you are dodging the real question: How is the measure defined? If it is imposed by fiat, say so and defend the claim. Why is it so hard to get you to consider multiple observers and consider the question as to how exactly do they interact? Al of the discussion that I have seen so far considers a single observer and abstractions about other people. The most I am getting is the word plurality. Is this difficult? Really? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/12/2012 7:16 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/12/2012 10:00 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 11:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: An Evil Wizard could pop into my vicinity and banish me to the Nether plane! A magical act, if real and just part of a story, is an event that violates some conservation law. I don't see what else would constitute magic... My point is that Harry Potterisms would introduce cul-de-sacs that would totally screw up the statistics and measures, so they have to be banished. Because otherwise things would be screwed up? Chain-wise consistency and concurrency rules would prevent these pathologies, but to get them we have to consider multiple and disjoint observers and not just shared 1p as such implicitly assume an absolute frame of reference. Basically we need both conservation laws and general covariance. Do we obtain that naturally from COMP? That's an open question. You seem to be begging the question: We need regularity, otherwise things wouldn't be regular. No, you are dodging the real question: How is the measure defined? The obvious way is that all non-self-contradictory events are equally likely. But that's hypothesized, not defined. I'm not sure why you are asking how it's defined. The usual definition is an assignment of a number in [0,1] to every member of a Borel set such that they satisfies Kolmogorov's axioms. If it is imposed by fiat, say so and defend the claim. Why is it so hard to get you to consider multiple observers and consider the question as to how exactly do they interact? Al of the discussion that I have seen so far considers a single observer and abstractions about other people. The most I am getting is the word plurality. Is this difficult? Really? It's difficult because people are trying to explain 'other people' and taking only their own consciousness as given. If you're going to assume other people, why not assume physics too? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
John, I hope you will not think me impertinent, but you're expending a great deal of time and energy arguing with an elaborate series of straw men. No doubt this is great fun and highly entertaining, but would you consider the alternative of requesting clarification of the real point at issue? It's painful to see you repeatedly arguing past it. David On 11 March 2012 05:33, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Mar 10, 2012 at 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: and it is just very simple, for all people up to now, that the 1-views on their own 1-view is not duplicated. Well, if you haven't before considered the possibility that this obvious common sense assumption could be dead wrong it is certainly high time you did! Yes, the assumption that the 1-views on their own 1-view can not be duplicated is indeed simple, very very very simple, but not simple in a good way. Theories should be as simple as possible, but not simpler, because then they just become stupid. I insist that in my symmetrical room experiment there can be (or at least should not be) any doubt that the person's 1-views on their own 1-view HAS IN FACT BEEN DUPLICATED. but they feel like not having been duplicated Yes that is the entire point, you could be a copy of Bruno Marchal, you could be only 5 minutes old, I could have used generic atoms and information on how to assemble them from the original Bruno Marchal, so now you feel just like Bruno Marchal and your memories of being a child are just as vivid as the memories the original Bruno Marchal has. they know only intellectually the possible existence of the other That is quite untrue, both you (the copy) and you (the original Bruno Marchal) are in that symmetrical room and can see each other plain as day, and until random quantum fluctuations become significant it will be as if you're looking in a mirror for both of you, the two of you will both see somebody who looks just like Bruno Marchal who is moving and speaking in synchronization with the way you move and speak. and in my symmetrical room thought experiment I make it crystal clear that the first person personal subjective perspective CAN be duplicated just like everything else can be. Crystal clear? Yes crystal clear, as clear as the azure sky of deepest summer. It only shows that the 1-view is duplicated from a 3-view pov, not from the 1-view perspective. Explain to me how the 1-view perspective of anybody has changed from any perspective you care to name, any at all. Before the switch you, from your first person perspective, consciously feel like you are looking at somebody who looks, moves, acts, and speaks exactly like you do, it's as if you're looking into a mirror; and after the switch you, from your first person perspective consciously feel like you are looking at somebody who looks, moves, acts, and speaks exactly like you do, it's as if you're looking into a mirror. What has changed from the original's point of view, what has changed from the copy's point of view, what has changed from a third person observer's point of view, what has changed from the universe's point of view? Absolutely positively nothing. To win this argument all you have to do is explain to me how instantly changing the position of 2 identical objects changes anything from anyone's or anything's point of view. You can't. The 1-view attributed by an outsider, not the 1-view from its own pov. You continue to talk like if that was the same thing. That's because it IS the same thing, you are no better at determining when you and your double exchange positions than a outside third party observer is. Objectively or subjectively and first second third or ANY point of view, no person, no God, no thing, NOTHING can tell that anything has happened when 2 identical things instantly exchange positions. A person's 1-views on their own 1-view CAN IN FACT BE DUPLICATED. And why should this fact really be so surprising, information can be duplicated and there is no difference between one hydrogen atom and another, so where's the problem? But of course I know what the problem is, the conclusion is odd, not illogical, not self contradictory, just odd. Well there is no law of physics or logic that says reality can't be odd. Information was not annihilated, matter was not annihilated, energy was not annihilated, so just what was annihilated in Helsinki? Its body. But the Helsinki man's body still exists, only now it's in Moscow and Washington, but people travel all the time without apparent loss of personal identity. If your prefer, the local information which was available in Helsinki is erased after having been read and sent to W and to M. No it has not, both the Washington and Moscow man remember being the Helsinki man just fine, no information has been lost; true neither of them continues to receive sensory information
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On Sun, Mar 11, 2012 David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: John, I hope you will not think me impertinent, but you're expending a great deal of time and energy arguing with an elaborate series of straw men. No doubt this is great fun and highly entertaining, but would you consider the alternative of requesting clarification of the real point at issue? It's painful to see you repeatedly arguing past it. If your thinking were clear and you understood what the real point at issue was and you knew of a key question I have not answered you would have certainly asked it somewhere in the above; but you did not I think because you could not, and that fact makes me believe your thinking is naive simplistic and commonplace. Prove me wrong. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 11 Mar 2012, at 06:33, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Mar 10, 2012 at 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: and it is just very simple, for all people up to now, that the 1- views on their own 1-view is not duplicated. Well, if you haven't before considered the possibility that this obvious common sense assumption could be dead wrong it is certainly high time you did! It simply cannot. Comp would be violated in case the diary contains a feeling split experience. The guy can believe he is split, because he knows the protocol and trust the machinery and the people handling it. At no point he can know, by personal experience, that he is split. That information will not appear in any diary. We use the same common sense as the one used to grasp addition and multiplication. Yes, the assumption that the 1-views on their own 1-view can not be duplicated is indeed simple, very very very simple, but not simple in a good way. Theories should be as simple as possible, but not simpler, because then they just become stupid. Sure. But here, the theory is comp. The fact that the 1-view are not duplicated, from their own 1-view pov, can be justified by the fact that the read-cut-reconstitution are not part of the experience. Like the reconstitution delay in step 2, those events does not impact on the brain processing (given that by assumption we reconstitute the person at the right substitution level from the relevant instantaneous state description of the brain. It is literally trivial. I insist that in my symmetrical room experiment there can be (or at least should not be) any doubt that the person's 1-views on their own 1-view HAS IN FACT BEEN DUPLICATED. 1) You said yourself there is only one consciousness in that case. 2) you confuse the 1-view on the 1-view on the 1-view with the 3-view on the 1-view on the 1-view. You really avoid putting yourself in the place of one of those reconstituted person. But you have to be able to do that for any of them. When we consider the 1-view pov, we have to stick with it, and not get out in any 3p view, which miss the point of the initial question. With any 3p view, there are no indeterminacy, we already know that, with comp, but the question bears on the next 1-view, which feels to be unique by the trivial argument above. 3) Let us come back to the original thought experience. The indeterminacy appears when they open the door of the reconstitution boxes, which is a deterministic event from the 3p view, but can't be deterministic from the 1p-views. but they feel like not having been duplicated Yes that is the entire point, you could be a copy of Bruno Marchal, you could be only 5 minutes old, I could have used generic atoms and information on how to assemble them from the original Bruno Marchal, so now you feel just like Bruno Marchal and your memories of being a child are just as vivid as the memories the original Bruno Marchal has. Yes. they know only intellectually the possible existence of the other That is quite untrue, both you (the copy) and you (the original Bruno Marchal) are in that symmetrical room and can see each other plain as day, and until random quantum fluctuations become significant it will be as if you're looking in a mirror for both of you, the two of you will both see somebody who looks just like Bruno Marchal who is moving and speaking in synchronization with the way you move and speak. I don't assume QM. The point is that when opening the door (in the initial thought experiment), they break the symmetry and have each a personal different experiences, which they were unable to predict before opening the door. and in my symmetrical room thought experiment I make it crystal clear that the first person personal subjective perspective CAN be duplicated just like everything else can be. Crystal clear? Yes crystal clear, as clear as the azure sky of deepest summer. If the 1-views have been duplicated, then their are identical, (before they open the door this makes sense). But then there is only one 1- view, as you said yourself. But then this means that the 3-duplication has not entailed a duplication of the 1-views. And this is confirmed when they open the door, the 1-views are entire and unique in front of an non expectable location. It only shows that the 1-view is duplicated from a 3-view pov, not from the 1-view perspective. Explain to me how the 1-view perspective of anybody has changed from any perspective you care to name, any at all. Before the switch you, from your first person perspective, consciously feel like you are looking at somebody who looks, moves, acts, and speaks exactly like you do, it's as if you're looking into a mirror; Without the vertical symmetry. If my face is not symmetrical, I might not recognize myself (like in the novel despair by Nabokov). But this
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
John, 'te bartender cuts in...' - I believe David indeed has no idea what the real point in issue may be - he would have been addressing it. There is *NO *real point. In those thought experiments (euphemism for phantasm to justify points of non-existence) certain prerequisites are also needed (additional phantasms) and justification for them, too. Then there are 'conclusions' imaginary and the consequences of such - built in. I admire the patience of Bruno replying to all those (circular? fantasy-related?) posts (I am not relating to your posts) - I lost the endurance to follow all of them lately. I read a lot of David's posts and think your expressed ...belie(f)ve your (i.e. David's) thinking is naive simplistic and commonplace. is wrong. It is a shame, because you seem to be a well-thinking and well-educated guy who works with well-crafted logical argumentation. I cannot raise my voice for/against indeterminacy because of my agnostic worldview that postulates lots of unknown/unknowable factors influencing our decisions - together with factors we know of and acknowledge - so uncertainty may be ignorance-based, not only haphazardous. A 'deterministic' totality, however, is a matter of belief for me - unjustified as well - because of the partial 'order' we detect in the so far knowable nature (negating 'random' occurrences that would screw-up any order, even the limited local ones). My worldview is my 'faith' - not subject to discussion. Regards John Mikes On Sun, Mar 11, 2012 at 1:00 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Mar 11, 2012 David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: John, I hope you will not think me impertinent, but you're expending a great deal of time and energy arguing with an elaborate series of straw men. No doubt this is great fun and highly entertaining, but would you consider the alternative of requesting clarification of the real point at issue? It's painful to see you repeatedly arguing past it. If your thinking were clear and you understood what the real point at issue was and you knew of a key question I have not answered you would have certainly asked it somewhere in the above; but you did not I think because you could not, and that fact makes me believe your thinking is naive simplistic and commonplace. Prove me wrong. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the whole point of the exercise. I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might seem to entail 100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct? However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be anything at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that comp is false? Ricardo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/11/2012 4:44 PM, R AM wrote: This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the whole point of the exercise. I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might seem to entail 100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct? However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be anything at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that comp is false? Ricardo. Hi Ricardo, I think that you are considering the White Rabbit and Harry Potter problems, these are the possible pathologies of COMP. Unless there is a natural way to prevent their occurance, then yes, COMP is falsified. One problem with your question is that it seems to assume that the phrase future experience has a meaning the same way that past experience has a meaning. onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote: This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the whole point of the exercise. I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might seem to entail 100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct? 3p indeterminacy in the form of the UD*, 1p determinacy from the perspective of those minds relative to bodies in the UD*. However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be anything at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that comp is false? You're basically presenting the White Rabbit problem here. I used to wonder if that is indeed the case, but after considering it further, it doesn't seem to be: your 1p is identified with some particular abstract machine - that part is mostly determinate and deterministic (or quasi-deterministic if you allow some leeway as to what constitutes persona identity) in its behavior, but below that substitution level, anything can change, as long as that machine is implemented correctly/consistently. If the level is low enough and most of the machines implementing the lower layers that eventually implement our mind correspond to one world (such as ours), that would imply reasonably stable experience and some MWI-like laws of physics - not white noise experiences. That is to say that if we don't experience white noise, statistically our experiences will be stable - this does not mean that we won't have really unusual jumps or changes in laws-of-physics or experience when our measure is greatly reduced (such as the current statistically winning machines no longer being able to implement your mind - 3p death from the point of view of others). Also, one possible way of showing COMP false is to show that such stable implementations are impossible, however this seems not obvious to me. A more practical concern would be to consider the case of what would happen if the substitution level is chosen slightly wrong or too high - would it lead to too unstable 1p or merely just allow the SIM(Substrate Independent Mind) to more easily pick which lower-level machines implement it (there's another thought experiment which shows how this could be done, if a machine can find one of its own Godel-number). Ricardo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
I'm surprised by John's apparent failure to grasp the point too. I'm used to John's self-certainty, but I'm not accustomed to him being dumb. John, you seem hung up on the point about duplicating the 1-p perspective and whether or not this is possible, but it all seems to be a matter of semantics. In your symmetrical room, you've essentially created fungible instances of a consciousness - identical in all respects, but with *possibility* to diverge at any moment. Before the duplication, no possibility of divergence existed. Such a scenario is not a contradiction of comp or even relevant to the UDA at all really, as far as I can tell. You've merely delayed the moment at which the diaries diverge. You agree that the two identical consciousnesses do not experience themselves in two places at once, neither before they diverge from fungibility nor after, so you agree with Bruno. That's the only point that matters. You're stuck on arguing about whether 1p can be duplicated while missing the point that all Bruno is really saying when he claims that 1p can't be plural is that the subjective experience of 1-p cannot be plural, i.e., you can't feel yourself to be in two places at once. Your comments indicate you see this. You seem to be trying to read something more into this step of the UDA than there is. It's a trivial step. I'm sure if we reduce it to computers you'll agree. Let's take a computer that receives external input and records it in memory - attached cam. Take that computer, stop it, dismantle it and duplicate it in two different locations. The new computers are switched on. Now their memory traces (diaries) show a discontinuity, switching, as per teleportation, to their new locations. If their new locations were visualIy identical, sure, their memory states won't diverge yet, but that's not the point. Now f comp is true, then these machines might be conscious machines, so the memory trace will correspond to two separate subjectivities. If you agree with all this, you agree with Bruno and there's nothing more to argue about. On Mar 12, 6:36 am, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: John, 'te bartender cuts in...' - I believe David indeed has no idea what the real point in issue may be - he would have been addressing it. There is *NO *real point. In those thought experiments (euphemism for phantasm to justify points of non-existence) certain prerequisites are also needed (additional phantasms) and justification for them, too. Then there are 'conclusions' imaginary and the consequences of such - built in. I admire the patience of Bruno replying to all those (circular? fantasy-related?) posts (I am not relating to your posts) - I lost the endurance to follow all of them lately. I read a lot of David's posts and think your expressed ...belie(f)ve your (i.e. David's) thinking is naive simplistic and commonplace. is wrong. It is a shame, because you seem to be a well-thinking and well-educated guy who works with well-crafted logical argumentation. I cannot raise my voice for/against indeterminacy because of my agnostic worldview that postulates lots of unknown/unknowable factors influencing our decisions - together with factors we know of and acknowledge - so uncertainty may be ignorance-based, not only haphazardous. A 'deterministic' totality, however, is a matter of belief for me - unjustified as well - because of the partial 'order' we detect in the so far knowable nature (negating 'random' occurrences that would screw-up any order, even the limited local ones). My worldview is my 'faith' - not subject to discussion. Regards John Mikes On Sun, Mar 11, 2012 at 1:00 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Mar 11, 2012 David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: John, I hope you will not think me impertinent, but you're expending a great deal of time and energy arguing with an elaborate series of straw men. No doubt this is great fun and highly entertaining, but would you consider the alternative of requesting clarification of the real point at issue? It's painful to see you repeatedly arguing past it. If your thinking were clear and you understood what the real point at issue was and you knew of a key question I have not answered you would have certainly asked it somewhere in the above; but you did not I think because you could not, and that fact makes me believe your thinking is naive simplistic and commonplace. Prove me wrong. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group,
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/11/2012 2:43 PM, acw wrote: On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote: This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the whole point of the exercise. I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might seem to entail 100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct? 3p indeterminacy in the form of the UD*, 1p determinacy from the perspective of those minds relative to bodies in the UD*. However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be anything at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that comp is false? You're basically presenting the White Rabbit problem here. I used to wonder if that is indeed the case, but after considering it further, it doesn't seem to be: your 1p is identified with some particular abstract machine - that part is mostly determinate and deterministic (or quasi-deterministic if you allow some leeway as to what constitutes persona identity) in its behavior, but below that substitution level, anything can change, as long as that machine is implemented correctly/consistently. If the level is low enough and most of the machines implementing the lower layers that eventually implement our mind correspond to one world (such as ours), that would imply reasonably stable experience and some MWI-like laws of physics - not white noise experiences. That is to say that if we don't experience white noise, statistically our experiences will be stable - this does not mean that we won't have really unusual jumps or changes in laws-of-physics or experience when our measure is greatly reduced (such as the current statistically winning machines no longer being able to implement your mind - 3p death from the point of view of others). This implies that our measure is strongly correlated with the regularity of physics. I'm not sure you can show that, but if it's true it means that physics is fundamental to our existence, even if physics can be explained by the UD. Only worlds with extremely consistent physics can support consciousness (which seems unlikely to me). Brent Also, one possible way of showing COMP false is to show that such stable implementations are impossible, however this seems not obvious to me. A more practical concern would be to consider the case of what would happen if the substitution level is chosen slightly wrong or too high - would it lead to too unstable 1p or merely just allow the SIM(Substrate Independent Mind) to more easily pick which lower-level machines implement it (there's another thought experiment which shows how this could be done, if a machine can find one of its own Godel-number). Ricardo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/12/2012 00:39, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 2:43 PM, acw wrote: On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote: This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the whole point of the exercise. I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might seem to entail 100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct? 3p indeterminacy in the form of the UD*, 1p determinacy from the perspective of those minds relative to bodies in the UD*. I did make a mistake when typing that up: 3p indeterminacy in the form of the UD*, 1p determinacy from the perspective of those minds relative to bodies in the UD* was supposed to be 3p determinacy in the form of the UD*, 1p indeterminacy from the perspective of those minds relative to bodies in the UD*. However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be anything at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that comp is false? You're basically presenting the White Rabbit problem here. I used to wonder if that is indeed the case, but after considering it further, it doesn't seem to be: your 1p is identified with some particular abstract machine - that part is mostly determinate and deterministic (or quasi-deterministic if you allow some leeway as to what constitutes persona identity) in its behavior, but below that substitution level, anything can change, as long as that machine is implemented correctly/consistently. If the level is low enough and most of the machines implementing the lower layers that eventually implement our mind correspond to one world (such as ours), that would imply reasonably stable experience and some MWI-like laws of physics - not white noise experiences. That is to say that if we don't experience white noise, statistically our experiences will be stable - this does not mean that we won't have really unusual jumps or changes in laws-of-physics or experience when our measure is greatly reduced (such as the current statistically winning machines no longer being able to implement your mind - 3p death from the point of view of others). This implies that our measure is strongly correlated with the regularity of physics. I'm not sure you can show that, but if it's true it means that physics is fundamental to our existence, even if physics can be explained by the UD. Only worlds with extremely consistent physics can support consciousness (which seems unlikely to me). Maybe, it's more of a conjecture, I don't posses the theoretical tools to make some headway on the issue for now. As for physics being essential, I'm not 100% sure, it might be for us, humans with physical brains and bodies, but I don't see why it would be for a SIM, or for a detailed emulation of a human body/brain: consider the case of such a SIMs living in a VR(Virtual Reality) simulation - they wouldn't really care what the underlying substrate would be, but then, they would know they are in a simulation (to some degree). A more interesting question might be not about SIMs living in VRs, but those beings which live in a physical world and have bodies and are self-aware of those bodies and their own embedding in such a physical world - what possible statistically stable laws of physics would be required for such beings (I think Tegmark called them Self-Aware Substructures)? Since we know we're in such a situation, what laws of physics are possible that have conscious self-aware observers with 'physical' bodies? Brent Also, one possible way of showing COMP false is to show that such stable implementations are impossible, however this seems not obvious to me. A more practical concern would be to consider the case of what would happen if the substitution level is chosen slightly wrong or too high - would it lead to too unstable 1p or merely just allow the SIM(Substrate Independent Mind) to more easily pick which lower-level machines implement it (there's another thought experiment which shows how this could be done, if a machine can find one of its own Godel-number). Ricardo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/11/2012 7:39 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 2:43 PM, acw wrote: On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote: This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the whole point of the exercise. I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might seem to entail 100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct? 3p indeterminacy in the form of the UD*, 1p determinacy from the perspective of those minds relative to bodies in the UD*. However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be anything at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that comp is false? You're basically presenting the White Rabbit problem here. I used to wonder if that is indeed the case, but after considering it further, it doesn't seem to be: your 1p is identified with some particular abstract machine - that part is mostly determinate and deterministic (or quasi-deterministic if you allow some leeway as to what constitutes persona identity) in its behavior, but below that substitution level, anything can change, as long as that machine is implemented correctly/consistently. If the level is low enough and most of the machines implementing the lower layers that eventually implement our mind correspond to one world (such as ours), that would imply reasonably stable experience and some MWI-like laws of physics - not white noise experiences. That is to say that if we don't experience white noise, statistically our experiences will be stable - this does not mean that we won't have really unusual jumps or changes in laws-of-physics or experience when our measure is greatly reduced (such as the current statistically winning machines no longer being able to implement your mind - 3p death from the point of view of others). This implies that our measure is strongly correlated with the regularity of physics. I'm not sure you can show that, but if it's true it means that physics is fundamental to our existence, even if physics can be explained by the UD. Only worlds with extremely consistent physics can support consciousness (which seems unlikely to me). Brent Hi Brent, I do not understand how you think that only worlds with extremely consistent physics can support consciousness is unlikely. Are you only considering a single momentary instance of consciousness? It is quite easy to prove that if there exist multiple conscious entities that can communicate coherently with each other (in the sense that they can understand each other) then the physics of their common world will necessarily be maximally consistent as it if where not then pathological Harry Potterisms will occur that would prevent the arbitrary extension of their experience. Additionally, it would be extremely difficult for such worlds to have conservation laws. It is because of this line of reasoning that I resist the Platonic interpretation of COMP as it puts pathological universes on the same level of likelihood as non-pathological ones. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/11/2012 8:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/11/2012 7:39 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 2:43 PM, acw wrote: On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote: This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the whole point of the exercise. I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might seem to entail 100% determinacy, just the contrary is the case. Is that correct? 3p indeterminacy in the form of the UD*, 1p determinacy from the perspective of those minds relative to bodies in the UD*. However, I think that if comp is true, future experience is not only indeterminate, but also arbitrary: our future experience could be anything at all. But given that this is not the case, shouldn't we conclude that comp is false? You're basically presenting the White Rabbit problem here. I used to wonder if that is indeed the case, but after considering it further, it doesn't seem to be: your 1p is identified with some particular abstract machine - that part is mostly determinate and deterministic (or quasi-deterministic if you allow some leeway as to what constitutes persona identity) in its behavior, but below that substitution level, anything can change, as long as that machine is implemented correctly/consistently. If the level is low enough and most of the machines implementing the lower layers that eventually implement our mind correspond to one world (such as ours), that would imply reasonably stable experience and some MWI-like laws of physics - not white noise experiences. That is to say that if we don't experience white noise, statistically our experiences will be stable - this does not mean that we won't have really unusual jumps or changes in laws-of-physics or experience when our measure is greatly reduced (such as the current statistically winning machines no longer being able to implement your mind - 3p death from the point of view of others). This implies that our measure is strongly correlated with the regularity of physics. I'm not sure you can show that, but if it's true it means that physics is fundamental to our existence, even if physics can be explained by the UD. Only worlds with extremely consistent physics can support consciousness (which seems unlikely to me). Brent Hi Brent, I do not understand how you think that only worlds with extremely consistent physics can support consciousness is unlikely. Are you only considering a single momentary instance of consciousness? It is quite easy to prove that if there exist multiple conscious entities that can communicate coherently with each other (in the sense that they can understand each other) then the physics of their common world will necessarily be maximally consistent as it if where not then pathological Harry Potterisms will occur that would prevent the arbitrary extension of their experience. I don't know what you mean by 'the arbitrary extension of their experience'. How would magical events prevent anything. We have reports of miracles all the time from less scientific places and times and they don't seem to prevent anything. We tend to not believe them because they violate the physics which we suppose to be consistent in time and place - but you can't invoke that as evidence that physics is consistent on pain of vicious circularity. Additionally, it would be extremely difficult for such worlds to have conservation laws. But the symmetry principles that result in conservation laws are arguably human selections. We pay attention to and build 'laws' on what does not depend on particular time/place/orientation; so may conservation of momentum and energy are (at least approximately) inevitable. There is also the problem that according to current theories are many possible kinds of physics even if you limit them to just those consistent with string theory, much less Classical physics. But my main point was conditional. IF consciousness is strongly dependent on physics then Bruno's program of replacing physics with arithmetic isn't going anywhere because arithmetic will produce too many kinds of worlds and only by studying physics will we be able to learn about our world. It is because of this line of reasoning that I resist the Platonic interpretation of COMP as it puts pathological universes on the same level of likelihood as non-pathological ones. That's the question. Is there some canonical measure that makes the non-pathological ones overwhelmingly likely? Brent Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/11/2012 8:30 PM, acw wrote: On 3/12/2012 00:39, meekerdb wrote: This implies that our measure is strongly correlated with the regularity of physics. I'm not sure you can show that, but if it's true it means that physics is fundamental to our existence, even if physics can be explained by the UD. Only worlds with extremely consistent physics can support consciousness (which seems unlikely to me). Maybe, it's more of a conjecture, I don't posses the theoretical tools to make some headway on the issue for now. As for physics being essential, I'm not 100% sure, it might be for us, humans with physical brains and bodies, but I don't see why it would be for a SIM, or for a detailed emulation of a human body/brain: consider the case of such a SIMs living in a VR(Virtual Reality) simulation - they wouldn't really care what the underlying substrate would be, but then, they would know they are in a simulation (to some degree). A more interesting question might be not about SIMs living in VRs, but those beings which live in a physical world and have bodies and are self-aware of those bodies and their own embedding in such a physical world - what possible statistically stable laws of physics would be required for such beings (I think Tegmark called them Self-Aware Substructures)? Since we know we're in such a situation, what laws of physics are possible that have conscious self-aware observers with 'physical' bodies? Hi, Could it be that we are tacitly assuming that our notion of Virtual is such that there always exists a standard what is the Real version? If it is not possible to tell if a given object of experience is real or virtual, why do we default to it being virtual, as if it was somehow possible to compare the object in question with an unassailably real version? As I see it, if we can somehow show that a given object of experience is the _best possible_ simulation (modulo available resources) then it is real, as a better or more real simulation of it is impossible to generate. Our physical world is 'real' simply because there does not exist a better simulation of it. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 10 Mar 2012, at 06:22, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Mar 8, 2012 at 1:47 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You persist in ignoring the difference between the 1-view from the 1-view pov, which is what I usually mean by 1-views, and the 1-views that an outsider can attribute to other people So after you have been duplicated there is still a difference between 1-view pov and 1-views that an outsider can attribute to other people. However you never make clear exactly why it can not be duplicated, You are supposed to do the thought experiment, and this by assuming comp, and it is just very simple, for all people up to now, that the 1- views on their own 1-view is not duplicated. If the 3p description are numerically identical, like in your symmetrical room thought experiment, then there is only one 1-view, and once they differentiate, there are two different 1-view, but they feel like not having been duplicated (they know only intellectually the possible existence of the other), and that feeling is the 1-view. and in my symmetrical room thought experiment I make it crystal clear that the first person personal subjective perspective CAN be duplicated just like everything else can be. Crystal clear? It only shows that the 1-view is duplicated from a 3- view pov, not from the 1-view perspective. I think there is a thought experiment that can resolve this issue: You are a copy of Bruno Marshal made as precisely as Heisenberg's law allows and you are now facing the original Bruno Marshal in a symmetrical room, thus the two of you are receiving identical sensory input and thus act identically. I now use a Star Trek brand transporter to instantly exchange your position with the original, or if you prefer I leave your bodies alone and just exchange the two brains. There is no way subjectively you or the original Bruno Marshal would notice that anything had happened, and objective outside observers would not notice anything had happened either. There would not even be a way to tell if the machine was actually working, I could even be lying about having a transporter. Who knows who cares? OK. And? And I'm delighted you said OK, so you agree that subjectively it makes no difference which one is the copy and which one is the original, and objectively it makes no difference which one is the copy and which one is the original; and being a man of logic you must therefore conclude that there is simply no difference between the two in any way whatsoever, including the point of view. Yes, and that is why before the differentiation, there is only one 1- view-on-the 1-view. This just means that the duplication/ differentiation did not yet occur. But the probability/uncertainty question bears on the output of the self--localization experience after the differentiation has occurred from a 3p view. Of course if there were a unsymmetrical change in the environment or there was a random quantum fluctuation that made the people different then things would evolve, well, differently, but at the instant of duplication they would still be identical. So if subjectively it makes no difference and objectively it makes no difference and even the very universe itself isn't sure if a switch had actually been made or not then I make the very reasonable assumption that it just makes no difference, and although there are two bodies and two brains in that symmetrical room there is only one intelligence and only one consciousness and only one point of view. OK. And? No and is necessary this time because that pretty much covers it all. I'm delighted you said OK, so you agree the point of view can be duplicated just like anything else, The 1-view attributed by an outsider, not the 1-view from its own pov. You continue to talk like if that was the same thing. you agree that it does not matter how many bodies or brains there are in that symmetrical room because there is only one mind, ... which mean there have not been duplicated. So you contradict what you say yourself above. there is only one intelligence and only one consciousness and only one point of view. If we agree on all that I don't see why more needs to be said, but apparently you do. It is just the beginning of a long reasoning. You have to come back to the original thought experiment. You tell me you are duplicated without precising if you talk on the 1-view, 3-view, 3-view of 1-view. Yes, if subjectively and objectively there is no difference between various points of view then I refuse to pretend that there is a distinction. But there will be a difference after the copies diverge, and the probability question bears on the future 1-views once they have differentiated. That would be like aa duplication W W, or M M, not W, M. Bruno, tell the truth, when you wrote the above cryptic sentence did you
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On Sat, Mar 10, 2012 at 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: and it is just very simple, for all people up to now, that the 1-views on their own 1-view is not duplicated. Well, if you haven't before considered the possibility that this obvious common sense assumption could be dead wrong it is certainly high time you did! Yes, the assumption that the 1-views on their own 1-view can not be duplicated is indeed simple, very very very simple, but not simple in a good way. Theories should be as simple as possible, but not simpler, because then they just become stupid. I insist that in my symmetrical room experiment there can be (or at least should not be) any doubt that the person's 1-views on their own 1-view HAS IN FACT BEEN DUPLICATED. but they feel like not having been duplicated Yes that is the entire point, you could be a copy of Bruno Marchal, you could be only 5 minutes old, I could have used generic atoms and information on how to assemble them from the original Bruno Marchal, so now you feel just like Bruno Marchal and your memories of being a child are just as vivid as the memories the original Bruno Marchal has. they know only intellectually the possible existence of the other That is quite untrue, both you (the copy) and you (the original Bruno Marchal) are in that symmetrical room and can see each other plain as day, and until random quantum fluctuations become significant it will be as if you're looking in a mirror for both of you, the two of you will both see somebody who looks just like Bruno Marchal who is moving and speaking in synchronization with the way you move and speak. and in my symmetrical room thought experiment I make it crystal clear that the first person personal subjective perspective CAN be duplicated just like everything else can be. Crystal clear? Yes crystal clear, as clear as the azure sky of deepest summer. It only shows that the 1-view is duplicated from a 3-view pov, not from the 1-view perspective. Explain to me how the 1-view perspective of anybody has changed from any perspective you care to name, any at all. Before the switch you, from your first person perspective, consciously feel like you are looking at somebody who looks, moves, acts, and speaks exactly like you do, it's as if you're looking into a mirror; and after the switch you, from your first person perspective consciously feel like you are looking at somebody who looks, moves, acts, and speaks exactly like you do, it's as if you're looking into a mirror. What has changed from the original's point of view, what has changed from the copy's point of view, what has changed from a third person observer's point of view, what has changed from the universe's point of view? Absolutely positively nothing. To win this argument all you have to do is explain to me how instantly changing the position of 2 identical objects changes anything from anyone's or anything's point of view. You can't. The 1-view attributed by an outsider, not the 1-view from its own pov. You continue to talk like if that was the same thing. That's because it IS the same thing, you are no better at determining when you and your double exchange positions than a outside third party observer is. Objectively or subjectively and first second third or ANY point of view, no person, no God, no thing, NOTHING can tell that anything has happened when 2 identical things instantly exchange positions. A person's 1-views on their own 1-view CAN IN FACT BE DUPLICATED. And why should this fact really be so surprising, information can be duplicated and there is no difference between one hydrogen atom and another, so where's the problem? But of course I know what the problem is, the conclusion is odd, not illogical, not self contradictory, just odd. Well there is no law of physics or logic that says reality can't be odd. Information was not annihilated, matter was not annihilated, energy was not annihilated, so just what was annihilated in Helsinki? Its body. But the Helsinki man's body still exists, only now it's in Moscow and Washington, but people travel all the time without apparent loss of personal identity. If your prefer, the local information which was available in Helsinki is erased after having been read and sent to W and to M. No it has not, both the Washington and Moscow man remember being the Helsinki man just fine, no information has been lost; true neither of them continues to receive sensory information from Helsinki, but the same would be true if the Helsinki man had just gotten on a jet for Moscow. you don't need elaborate thought experiments involving duplicating chambers to realize that you can never know for sure what you will see when you open a door, surprises are always possible. We are in the course of a reasoning. As you illustrate, nothing is obvious Agreed. so in this case we have to explain why this particular form of surprise is guarantied by the comp hypothesis.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On Thu, Mar 8, 2012 at 7:10 PM, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: After duplication and reconstitution in W and M the two copies cannot possibly have identical perspectives. Why not? They are not in a symmetrical room It's my thought experiment and if I say they are in a symmetrical room room then they are in a symmetrical room room if you stuck a pin in the one in W, surely you wouldn't expect the one in M to flinch? No the other one would not flinch, but then their environments were different, something happened to one and not the other so they are no longer identical and have diverged. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 9 March 2012 18:47, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: No the other one would not flinch, but then their environments were different, something happened to one and not the other so they are no longer identical and have diverged. We appear to have been at cross-purposes. Let us return to the original scenario. Someone is copied and annihilated at H and reconstituted at W and M (i.e. two different environments). Let's also say, for the sake of clarity, that it is known in advance that on arrival a pin will be stuck in the copy at W, and a cup of tea handed to the copy at M. Now consider this in terms of the 1-view from its own perspective: two mutually-exclusive experiences - i.e. a nasty jab at W and a refreshing drink at M. In both cases there will be a memory of originating at H and being unsure of being abused or refreshed on arrival. In neither case will there be any remaining doubt about the upshot. Any problem with this? David On Thu, Mar 8, 2012 at 7:10 PM, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: After duplication and reconstitution in W and M the two copies cannot possibly have identical perspectives. Why not? They are not in a symmetrical room It's my thought experiment and if I say they are in a symmetrical room room then they are in a symmetrical room room if you stuck a pin in the one in W, surely you wouldn't expect the one in M to flinch? No the other one would not flinch, but then their environments were different, something happened to one and not the other so they are no longer identical and have diverged. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On Thu, Mar 8, 2012 at 1:47 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You persist in ignoring the difference between the 1-view from the 1-view pov, which is what I usually mean by 1-views, and the 1-views that an outsider can attribute to other people So after you have been duplicated there is still a difference between 1-view pov and 1-views that an outsider can attribute to other people. However you never make clear exactly why it can not be duplicated, and in my symmetrical room thought experiment I make it crystal clear that the first person personal subjective perspective CAN be duplicated just like everything else can be. I think there is a thought experiment that can resolve this issue: You are a copy of Bruno Marshal made as precisely as Heisenberg's law allows and you are now facing the original Bruno Marshal in a symmetrical room, thus the two of you are receiving identical sensory input and thus act identically. I now use a Star Trek brand transporter to instantly exchange your position with the original, or if you prefer I leave your bodies alone and just exchange the two brains. There is no way subjectively you or the original Bruno Marshal would notice that anything had happened, and objective outside observers would not notice anything had happened either. There would not even be a way to tell if the machine was actually working, I could even be lying about having a transporter. Who knows who cares? OK. And? And I'm delighted you said OK, so you agree that subjectively it makes no difference which one is the copy and which one is the original, and objectively it makes no difference which one is the copy and which one is the original; and being a man of logic you must therefore conclude that there is simply no difference between the two in any way whatsoever, including the point of view. Of course if there were a unsymmetrical change in the environment or there was a random quantum fluctuation that made the people different then things would evolve, well, differently, but at the instant of duplication they would still be identical. So if subjectively it makes no difference and objectively it makes no difference and even the very universe itself isn't sure if a switch had actually been made or not then I make the very reasonable assumption that it just makes no difference, and although there are two bodies and two brains in that symmetrical room there is only one intelligence and only one consciousness and only one point of view. OK. And? No and is necessary this time because that pretty much covers it all. I'm delighted you said OK, so you agree the point of view can be duplicated just like anything else, you agree that it does not matter how many bodies or brains there are in that symmetrical room because there is only one mind, there is only one intelligence and only one consciousness and only one point of view. If we agree on all that I don't see why more needs to be said, but apparently you do. You tell me you are duplicated without precising if you talk on the 1-view, 3-view, 3-view of 1-view. Yes, if subjectively and objectively there is no difference between various points of view then I refuse to pretend that there is a distinction. That would be like aa duplication W W, or M M, not W, M. Bruno, tell the truth, when you wrote the above cryptic sentence did you honestly think it would make anything clear to any conscious entity on this planet? Do you agree with this principle: if today I can be sure that tomorrow I will be uncertain about the outcome of some experience, then I am today uncertain about the outcome of that future experience. Obviously I agree. The future is not predictable in theory and even less so in practice, but I don't think that fact tells us much about personal identity. Let consider again the guy in Helsinki. He will be read and annihilate [...] I'm sorry but before I can get any further in your thought experiment, you're going to have to explain just what you mean by annihilated. I'm confused because you go on to say that just before he was annihilated the information on the position and momentum of all the atoms in his body was measured and that information and generic atoms were used to make the bodies and brains of the Helsinki man in Washington and in Moscow; but all that is just equivalent to saying that the source of his external stimuli was switched from Helsinki to Washington and Moscow. Information was not annihilated, matter was not annihilated, energy was not annihilated, so just what was annihilated in Helsinki? The guy in Helsinky knew this in advance, and can apply the principle above to say that he is uncertain today, before the split, what he will see when opening Yeah but you don't need elaborate thought experiments involving duplicating chambers to realize that you can never know for sure what you will see when you open a door, surprises are always possible. when both
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On Wed, Mar 7, 2012 at 1:11 PM, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: The 1-view from its own perspective can NEVER be plural. Why? After duplication there are two people, One person. each of whom must possess a singular perspective. Yes, both brains have a single identical perspective. Both of these persons would recall being unsure in Helsinki where he would end up Yes, both would recall identical things. Do you dissent from this?. Only the part about there are two people, there are two bodies but only one conscious person in that symmetrical room because if you swap their positions subjectively there is no difference and objectively there is no difference so it's not much of a jump to conclude there is no difference between them. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
2012/3/8 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Wed, Mar 7, 2012 at 1:11 PM, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: The 1-view from its own perspective can NEVER be plural. Why? After duplication there are two people, One person. each of whom must possess a singular perspective. Yes, both brains have a single identical perspective. Both of these persons would recall being unsure in Helsinki where he would end up Yes, both would recall identical things. Do you dissent from this?. Only the part about there are two people, there are two bodies but only one conscious person ?? From their own POV, they're not one person, each has a singular experience, even if identical, they do not feel both bodies. in that symmetrical room because if you swap their positions subjectively there is no difference and objectively there is no difference so it's not much of a jump to conclude there is no difference between them. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 07 Mar 2012, at 18:40, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: In particular, how will you explain to the Bruno in the other city? You told him that he will find himself in M with 100% chance. He will tell you that you were wrong. I was not wrong. When discussing the nature of identity care must be taken when using personal pronouns or confusion will run riot; I did not tell him that he will find himself in Moscow with a 100% chance, I said there is a 100% chance Bruno Marchal will be in Moscow and events proved I was 100% correct. The experiment proves nothing about the 1-views. It proves (confirmed, actually) only the presence of Bruno Marchal's body. The fact that Bruno Marchal is in Washington and knows nothing about Moscow is irrelevant and makes no difference to Bruno in Moscow whatsoever. Why do I say this? Because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. You persist in ignoring the difference between the 1-view from the 1- view pov, which is what I usually mean by 1-views, and the 1-views that an outsider can attribute to other people. Which means that the body has been duplicated, and the 1-view has been duplicated in the 3-view perspective. But the 1-view from the 1- view perspective has not been duplicated. Then when I said you have been duplicated there is something very important about you, the most important part in fact, that is missing because for unknown reasons it has not been duplicated. Indeed. What can it be, what is lacking in the copy that the original has? let's think, it can't be information because that can certainly be duplicated and it can't be matter because atoms are generic and we constantly replace our atoms with new ones anyway; so I think we both know the only remaining thing it can be, but I'm not yet ready to believe in the soul, abandon logic, and embrace irrationality. Why? What is lacking is simply the first person personal subjective perspective. But I am OK to call that a soul. Good idea. It fits with the arithmetical lexicon I gave for arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus. The soul's logic is given by Bp p and obeys a logic of knowledge (S4). You confirm my feeling that you are confusing science (G) and knowledge (S4Grz). I think there is a thought experiment that can resolve this issue: You are a copy of Bruno Marchal made as precisely as Heisenberg's law allows and you are now facing the original Bruno Marchal in a symmetrical room, thus the two of you are receiving identical sensory input and thus act identically. I now use a Star Trek brand transporter to instantly exchange your position with the original, or if you prefer I leave your bodies alone and just exchange the two brains. There is no way subjectively you or the original Bruno Marchal would notice that anything had happened, and objective outside observers would not notice anything had happened either. There would not even be a way to tell if the machine was actually working, I could even be lying about having a transporter. Who knows who cares? OK. And? Of course if there were a unsymmetrical change in the environment or there was a random quantum fluctuation that made the people different then things would evolve, well, differently, but at the instant of duplication they would still be identical. So if subjectively it makes no difference and objectively it makes no difference and even the very universe itself isn't sure if a switch had actually been made or not then I make the very reasonable assumption that it just makes no difference, and although there are two bodies and two brains in that symmetrical room there is only one intelligence and only one consciousness and only one point of view. OK. And? That would be like aa duplication W W, or M M, not W, M. Do you agree with this principle: if today I can be sure that tomorrow I will be uncertain about the outcome of some experience, then I am today uncertain about the outcome of that future experience. Let consider again the guy in Helsinki. He will be read and annihilate. the information will be sent in W and M, but here, I make precise that they will be reconstituted in exactly similar environment, so as to match your test. So in the boxes, they behave identically. They know that they have been reconstituted, because this is information is given by the style of the reconstitution boxes. Of course they don't know yet if it is in W and M. They can muse that they are at the two places at once, and there is certainly only one consciousness,. But they know they will differentiate when opening the door and getting outside the boxes. They don't know what will be the outcome of the experience opening the door. The guy in Helsinky knew this in advance, and can apply the principle above to say that he is uncertain today, before the split, what he will see when
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/8/2012 10:37 AM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Mar 7, 2012 at 1:11 PM, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com mailto:da...@davidnyman.com wrote: The 1-view from its own perspective can NEVER be plural. Why? After duplication there are two people, One person. each of whom must possess a singular perspective. Yes, both brains have a single identical perspective. Both of these persons would recall being unsure in Helsinki where he would end up Yes, both would recall identical things. Do you dissent from this?. Only the part about there are two people, there are two bodies but only one conscious person in that symmetrical room because if you swap their positions subjectively there is no difference and objectively there is no difference so it's not much of a jump to conclude there is no difference between them. But then there's only one room and one body, per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. This is similar to Feynman's idea of why all electrons are identical: there is only one electron which appears multiple because it zig zags back and forth in time as well as space. Unfortunately we don't know what statistics consciousness obeys. Brent John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2012.0.1913 / Virus Database: 2114/4858 - Release Date: 03/08/12 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On Mar 8, 1:24 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Mar 7, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Can you transplant a particular flame from one candle to another? Can a particular flame exist from one nanosecond to the next? I think that it can 'insist'. The continuity is figurative but real, both through time and literally across space as 'energy'. The flame is not an object but rather a relatively (to us) objective facet of an intersubjective process which is experienced locally by the molecules of wick, wax, and air surrounding them, the retinal cells of the eye and brain of the observer, etc. Can you cut a spark down the middle lengthwise and put half here and half there? Certainly, a spark is made of matter, plasma to be specific, so put half the plasma here and the other half there. The spark is a momentary fragmentation of matter sublimating across space. You can't put half of 'it' somewhere because it is mostly motion. It's like cutting a curveball in half and expecting to get a perfect half of the curve. I think there is a thought experiment that can resolve this issue: You are a copy of Bruno Marchal made as precisely as Heisenberg's law allows and you are now facing the original Bruno Marchal in a symmetrical room, thus the two of you are receiving identical sensory input That's an assumption. A compass duplicated in this way would not be receiving identical sensory input. That could only happen if the magnetic field in that room favored one direction over another, and in my thought experiment I'm talking about a room with a infinite number of symmetries, like a sphere. By isolating it that way though, you are excluding the possibility of consciousness being anchored to the temporal narrative of the cosmos rather than a phenomenon of objects in space. To duplicate even a compass this way requires now that the entire universe contain only symmetrical objects (otherwise won't the compass will point to the asymmetry?). Of course magnetism is only an example. There may be many ways to access factual external orientation. A GPS. A radiotelescope, etc. Consciousness may have sense built into it along those lines. Someone with an exact copy of my brain might not be able to read English because they haven't had any history reading it. The brain may not encode in English or Chinese but in neurotransmitters which don't know the difference. The only difference between a native English speaker and a native Chinese speaker is the position and momentum of the atoms in their brain; as a matter of fact that's also the only difference between you and me. That's an assumption. Since we don't see English or Chinese characters arranged within the tissues of the brain being shuttled around from region to region, and we see no homunculus or translator running i/o between the optical form and the perceived meaning, we really have no idea that the arrangement of the atoms is the cause. I think it's much more likely is that it is the instantaneous and meaningless shadow of a long-term meaningful experience. The poker game is not inside the cards or their arrangement. My thought experiments start with if something is real, then it cannot ever be truly identical to anything else in the cosmos Then your thought experiment starts out as Bullshit right out of the box Ah, a scientific opinion if ever I heard one. because science tells us there is no difference between one electron and another, there are no scratches on electrons to tell one from another. Just because we can't tell one electron from another doesn't mean that there is no difference. You are applying macro-scaled presumptions about matter onto the microcosm. Electrons don't have scratches because they don't have surfaces. They are more primitive than that. Electrons cause objects to have scratches, they don't scratch themselves. We can tell the difference between photons in the reflection on the surface of a glass and photons passing through a glass. How do you think that works exactly? And this is not just vague philosophy, the identical nature of things when they get very small is behind the idea of exchange forces one of the pillars of modern physics, and from that you can deduce that there must be two classes of particles, bosons like photons and fermions like electrons, and from there you can deduce The Pauli Exclusion Principle, and that is the basis of the periodic table of elements, and that is the basis of chemistry, and that is the basis of life. From just the fact that electrons are identical and a little high school algebra you can derive The Pauli Exclusion Principle and that principle is not only responsible for life it is the very reason matter is solid, it is the only reason your feet don't sink into the ground and you fall to the center of the earth. So don't tell me nothing can be identical! All of that can still be just as true
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 8 March 2012 18:37, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: each of whom must possess a singular perspective. Yes, both brains have a single identical perspective. I'm sorry, but your recent comments strongly suggest you have not fully grasped the premise of the experiment. After duplication and reconstitution in W and M the two copies cannot possibly have identical perspectives. They are not in a symmetrical room - they are reconstituted in two different environments and consequently their personal histories will immediately begin to diverge. As to their still being one person, if you stuck a pin in the one in W, surely you wouldn't expect the one in M to flinch? You seem to be pursuing a separate argument about the definition of person, which is not the point at issue. Sure, if we could routinely duplicate bodies, we would need a more sophisticated book-keeping method to keep track of them. But the copies in question could be in no doubt as to their possession of separate and mutually-insulated perspectives after duplication, even if they might be apt argue fruitlessly about which was the true heir. David On Wed, Mar 7, 2012 at 1:11 PM, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: The 1-view from its own perspective can NEVER be plural. Why? After duplication there are two people, One person. each of whom must possess a singular perspective. Yes, both brains have a single identical perspective. Both of these persons would recall being unsure in Helsinki where he would end up Yes, both would recall identical things. Do you dissent from this?. Only the part about there are two people, there are two bodies but only one conscious person in that symmetrical room because if you swap their positions subjectively there is no difference and objectively there is no difference so it's not much of a jump to conclude there is no difference between them. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/8/2012 4:24 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 3/8/2012 10:37 AM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Mar 7, 2012 at 1:11 PM, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com mailto:da...@davidnyman.com wrote: The 1-view from its own perspective can NEVER be plural. Why? After duplication there are two people, One person. each of whom must possess a singular perspective. Yes, both brains have a single identical perspective. Both of these persons would recall being unsure in Helsinki where he would end up Yes, both would recall identical things. Do you dissent from this?. Only the part about there are two people, there are two bodies but only one conscious person in that symmetrical room because if you swap their positions subjectively there is no difference and objectively there is no difference so it's not much of a jump to conclude there is no difference between them. But then there's only one room and one body, per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. This is similar to Feynman's idea of why all electrons are identical: there is only one electron which appears multiple because it zig zags back and forth in time as well as space. Unfortunately we don't know what statistics consciousness obeys. Hi Brent, Is there any reason why it would be any different? Just consider that the electron is conscious and has a 1p... The same measures should result. Why is consciousness so mysterious? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 7 March 2012 17:40, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: You persistently confuse the 1-view from its own perspective (on which the probability/uncertainty bears), and the 1-view than an outsider can attribute to each reconstituted person. And you persistently ignore that YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED and thus the 1-view from its own perspective is no longer singular but has become plural. The 1-view from its own perspective can NEVER be plural. After duplication there are two people, each of whom must possess a singular perspective. Both of these persons would recall being unsure in Helsinki where he would end up after duplication in Washington and Moscow. Do you dissent from this?. David On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: In particular, how will you explain to the Bruno in the other city? You told him that he will find himself in M with 100% chance. He will tell you that you were wrong. I was not wrong. When discussing the nature of identity care must be taken when using personal pronouns or confusion will run riot; I did not tell him that he will find himself in Moscow with a 100% chance, I said there is a 100% chance Bruno Marchal will be in Moscow and events proved I was 100% correct. The fact that Bruno Marchal is in Washington and knows nothing about Moscow is irrelevant and makes no difference to Bruno in Moscow whatsoever. Why do I say this? Because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. Which means that the body has been duplicated, and the 1-view has been duplicated in the 3-view perspective. But the 1-view from the 1-view perspective has not been duplicated. Then when I said you have been duplicated there is something very important about you, the most important part in fact, that is missing because for unknown reasons it has not been duplicated. What can it be, what is lacking in the copy that the original has? let's think, it can't be information because that can certainly be duplicated and it can't be matter because atoms are generic and we constantly replace our atoms with new ones anyway; so I think we both know the only remaining thing it can be, but I'm not yet ready to believe in the soul, abandon logic, and embrace irrationality. I think there is a thought experiment that can resolve this issue: You are a copy of Bruno Marchal made as precisely as Heisenberg's law allows and you are now facing the original Bruno Marchal in a symmetrical room, thus the two of you are receiving identical sensory input and thus act identically. I now use a Star Trek brand transporter to instantly exchange your position with the original, or if you prefer I leave your bodies alone and just exchange the two brains. There is no way subjectively you or the original Bruno Marchal would notice that anything had happened, and objective outside observers would not notice anything had happened either. There would not even be a way to tell if the machine was actually working, I could even be lying about having a transporter. Who knows who cares? Of course if there were a unsymmetrical change in the environment or there was a random quantum fluctuation that made the people different then things would evolve, well, differently, but at the instant of duplication they would still be identical. So if subjectively it makes no difference and objectively it makes no difference and even the very universe itself isn't sure if a switch had actually been made or not then I make the very reasonable assumption that it just makes no difference, and although there are two bodies and two brains in that symmetrical room there is only one intelligence and only one consciousness and only one point of view. Like Everett said, the observer does not feel the split. It's against my better judgment but I know you like the word so yes, subjectively you do not feel a Everett style split, but God sees it; but in my example above if the 2 are really identical and if the exchange is really instantaneous then even God Himself doesn't know (or care) if things really got swapped or not. You persistently confuse the 1-view from its own perspective (on which the probability/uncertainty bears), and the 1-view than an outsider can attribute to each reconstituted person. And you persistently ignore that YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED and thus the 1-view from its own perspective is no longer singular but has become plural. In Helsinki he does not know where he will feel to be after pushing the reading/annihilating button. So after pushing the button the Helsinki man knows his sensory information will no longer come from Helsinki, fine I have no trouble with that, and for the sake of argument let's say that after he pushes that button the Helsinki man does not know if his external stimuli will now come from Washington or Moscow (he does know of course, he always knows but never mind). And now what? There are after all lots of things
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On Mar 7, 12:40 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: Then when I said you have been duplicated there is something very important about you, the most important part in fact, that is missing because for unknown reasons it has not been duplicated. What can it be, what is lacking in the copy that the original has? let's think, it can't be information because that can certainly be duplicated and it can't be matter because atoms are generic and we constantly replace our atoms with new ones anyway; so I think we both know the only remaining thing it can be, but I'm not yet ready to believe in the soul, abandon logic, and embrace irrationality. What is it that is deciding what to abandon or embrace? Why does it have to be something other than what it is: private personal experience. Meaning. Sense. Can you transplant a particular flame from one candle to another? Can you cut a spark down the middle lengthwise and put half here and half there? I think there is a thought experiment that can resolve this issue: You are a copy of Bruno Marchal made as precisely as Heisenberg's law allows and you are now facing the original Bruno Marchal in a symmetrical room, thus the two of you are receiving identical sensory input That's an assumption. A compass duplicated in this way would not be receiving identical sensory input. We don't consciously use magnetic sense for navigation like other organisms do, but we can't assume that our awareness is not influenced by subtle conditions that extend beyond the immediate area of our body. We don't know that it is possible to actually duplicate anything, only that we can make things that seem like they are the same to us. Someone with an exact copy of my brain might not be able to read English because they haven't had any history reading it. The brain may not encode in English or Chinese but in neurotransmitters which don't know the difference. If we don't see it in a microscope, there is no reason to assume that our copy made through microscopic analysis will contain it. Experience may be real, and non-transferable. Of course if there were a unsymmetrical change in the environment or there was a random quantum fluctuation that made the people different then things would evolve, well, differently, but at the instant of duplication they would still be identical. So if subjectively it makes no difference and objectively it makes no difference and even the very universe itself isn't sure if a switch had actually been made or not then I make the very reasonable assumption that it just makes no difference, and although there are two bodies and two brains in that symmetrical room there is only one intelligence and only one consciousness and only one point of view. Like Everett said, the observer does not feel the split. It's against my better judgment but I know you like the word so yes, subjectively you do not feel a Everett style split, but God sees it; but in my example above if the 2 are really identical and if the exchange is really instantaneous then even God Himself doesn't know (or care) if things really got swapped or not. You persistently confuse the 1-view from its own perspective (on which the probability/uncertainty bears), and the 1-view than an outsider can attribute to each reconstituted person. And you persistently ignore that YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED and thus the 1-view from its own perspective is no longer singular but has become plural. By plural, do you mean telepathic unity between physically separate bodies? Do I feel like I have four arms and four legs on two bodies in two places? This is plainly false because BRUNO MARCHAL HAS BEEN DUPLICATED, Bruno Marchal's perspective has been duplicated his memory has been duplicated his personality has been duplicated his intelligence has been duplicated his consciousness has been duplicated, EVERYTHING about Bruno Marchal has been duplicated, and yet you continue to insist that I is singular when very clearly it is not. After the experiment Bruno Marchal will say Bruno Marchal feels like Bruno Marchal is in Washington and only Washington and after the experiment Bruno Marchal will say Bruno Marchal feels like Bruno Marchal is in Moscow and only Moscow, and Bruno Marchal is correct because Bruno Marchal has been duplicated. Then Moscow Bruno can change his name and is no longer a duplicate. By extension, since he was the one who changed his name, it could be said that he never was a duplicate as he was destined for Moscow. In fact my body has been duplicated, and for an outsider my 1-view have been duplicated, but the Nagel-Everett subjective view on the 1-view are not. You confuse 3p discourses on 1-views with 1-p discourse on its 1-view. I believe it is you that is confused and that is not surprising considering that your implicit or explicit assumption at the start of all your thought experiments is everything about you is duplicated and
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 05 Mar 2012, at 22:30, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: What is the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from Moscow turning him into the Moscow man? 100%. That's ambiguous. There is nothing ambiguous about it! Granted this thought experiment is odd but everything is crystal clear. According to the thought experiment you have been teleported to Moscow which means you will now be receiving sights and sounds and smells and tastes and feeling textures from Moscow instead of Helsinki. I say the probability of that happening is 100%, how can I tell if my prediction is correct? If after the experiment I can find something that says he is Bruno Marchal and that he feels like he is in one and only one place and that one place is Moscow then my prediction has been confirmed as being correct. So it is not ambiguous because you take for granted that we were talking on the 1p, from your outsider perspective. So you are still talking about the 3-view on the 1-view. In particular, how will you explain to the Bruno in the other city? You told him that he will find himself in M with 100% chance. He will tell you that you were wrong. After the experiment I CAN find such a thing so my prediction was correct. The fact that there is also a Bruno Marchal in Washington is irrelevant, it does not reduce the feeling that Bruno Marchal has that he is in one and only one place and that one place is Moscow by even a infinitesimal amount. Well, if you don't listen to the BM in W, then you are right, but why would you not listen to him? If you say 100%, it means that you are talking on the first person that you can attribute to different people. Of course the first person can be attributed to different people because according to the thought experiment *YOU* have been duplicated, let me repeat that, YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. Although perfectly logical that is certainly a unusual situation, I've never been duplicated before and you probably haven't either, so it shouldn't be surprising that the results of such a unusual situation are odd, not illogical not self contradictory just odd. Assuming comp, we can say that we practice duplication, and even more complex self-transformation; since the time of the first amoeba. It is not unusual. If QM is true, we are multiplied (or differentiated) all the times. we get a paradox if you say that it is 100% for both Moscow and Washington. There is not the slightest thing paradoxical about it, in fact if I had said anything else then that WOULD have been paradoxical. Why? Because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED, that means your first person perspective has been duplicated and will remain identical until differing environmental factors cause the two of YOU to diverge; and even then they would both be Bruno Marchal they just wouldn't be each other. Which means that the body has been duplicated, and the 1-view has been duplicated in the 3-view perspective. But the 1-view from the 1-view perspective has not been duplicated. Like Everett said, the observer does not feel the split. You persistently confuse the 1-view from its own perspective (on which the probability/uncertainty bears), and the 1-view than an outsider can attribute to each reconstituted person. What is the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from neither Washington nor Moscow and thus leaving him as the Helsinki man? 100%. In the protocol considered the Helsinki guy is annihilated. Fine, if that's the thought experiment then the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from either Washington or Moscow is 100% so the probability he will remain the Helsinki man is 0%. Annihilate or don't, either way the results are deterministic. From the 3-view perspective. Not from the 1-view of the participants. In Helsinki he does not know where he will feel to be after pushing the reading/annihilating button. And after the experience the one in W cannot know why he is the one in W, and the same for the guy in M. This is even clearer with the iteration of that experience, where most person write long strings of W and M in their diary, like WWWMWMMWWMMWMWMMWWMWW, and are unable to find any algorithm justifying that past which looks random to them. What is the probability the Helsinki man will feel like the Moscow man? 0% because if he felt like the Moscow man he wouldn't be the Helsinki man anymore. In that case, the probability to survive, in the usual clinical sense, a teleportation experience is 0 But the usual clinical sense is totally useless in this case because this case is about as far from usual as you can get and still remain logical. Why do I say that? Because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. Nothing unusual, with comp we do that all the time since the first amoeba (and before, to be
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 06 Mar 2012, at 00:14, acw wrote: John Clark, it seems to me that you're intentionally ignoring the 1p (first person) point of view (qualia or subjective experience) and one's expectations from that point of view. I think that John Clark does not miss the 1p and 3p distinction, but he misses the expectations from that point of view *about* that point of view. To follow UDA and get COMP's conclusions you need these assumptions: Mind (1p), Mechanism (surviving a digital substitution), Church Turing Thesis(CTT) and an interpretation of arithmetic to give CTT sense (such as the existence of the standard model of arithmetic). If you take a eliminative materialist position, that is, saying the mind doesn't exist and thus also no subjective experience, you cannot even begin to follow the UDA - you've already assumed that the mind doesn't exist and only the physical universe does. Of course that's a bit problematic because you've only learned of this physical universe through your own subjective experiences. But John is more subtle than most materialist eliminativist. He is willing to ascribe consciousness, even to the two reconstituted persons after a duplication, but he does not take their account into account. He does not listen to the guy with the sequence WWWMWWWMMMW who does acknowledge that this particular string was not precisely expected, and that he has no clue of what comes next for its next feeling in the duplication experience. If you take 1p seriously, UDA asks you to predict what your *experiences* will be in a variety of situations. By neglecting each particular account, and identifying himself (intellectually) with all the copies, he will claim that he can easily makes the prediction: he will experience all the situations. This might be true from some God pov, or from a complete outsider view, but of course that is not what we were asking. You can look at the 3p bodies/brains and assign/correlate certain 1p's to them, but one can consider duplication scenarios which don't disturb continuity at all - if the mind survived a digital substitution it is already a program that can be duplicated/merged/ instantiated/... in a variety of ways - that program could even change substrates or be computed in all kinds of fragmented and strange ways and still maintain internal continuity. This may seem strange to you, so you might try to resolve it by only looking at the bodies instead of asking what *is experienced*, but that's a mistake and you will miss the point of the UDA that way because you're making the negation of the mind assumption or merely ignoring it. He ignores only the 1-views on the 1-views, but does not ignore the existence of the 1-views. This makes possible for him to accept the existence of the mind, but also to trivialize its possible role, and to block at the start the reasoning. Also in QM MWI, you have the same splitting/duplication all the time as you do with COMP, and the splitting time is likely much shorter (at plank time or less), while subjective experience is at much slower scales relative to that (likely a variable rate of 1-120Hz due to neuron spiking times, although hard to confirm this practically). So I repeat again: UDA is about what is experienced from the first person of a conscious SIM(Substrate Independent Mind)/AGI and its implications for the ontology and physics and mostly about what would such a mind experience. Looking only at the body of such a SIM is completely missing the point or just assuming physicalism with hidden assumption that subjective experience does not exist and is a delusion. He probably want to save physicalism, but he is not eliminativist. He just ignore the 1-view of the 1-view, he attribute mind to body, but fails to see that the mind, from the point of view of the mind, does not feel nor live any split in the duplication experience, and feel always to be a singular person, living what is an undoubtable personal random experience. I'm afraid I will have to explain the betting approach, or the optimization of the life of the reconstituted person. This is enough to get the reversal physics/arithmetic, but is more tedious and long to show. Let me try to explain this first to someone who seem to be rather lucid on all this (you). Let us take again the multiplication-movie experience. But instead of multiplying only John Clark, into the 2^((16180 x 1) x (60 x 90) x 24, we have to multiply the couple [John Clark + a banker], and John, at the start, when still unique, is asked to choose the between the following bet: I bet a billion$ that I will see the movie Monty Python Flying circus or I bet a billion$ that I will see white noise. The bet is done with the banker, which is multiplied together with John. (it is the comp first person plural case). In this case it is
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 5 March 2012 23:50, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: It's unclear as to whom you and your refers to. Let me suggest a heuristic. Assume that any given instance of experience (by which I mean just whatever is necessary to permit some sort of determination to be made) is selected at random from the class of all such moments. All personal-indexical references can then be taken as referring to the conjunction of this instance and whatever personal history is implied by its content and structure. This heuristic serves to justify the expectation, from the perspective of any such instance, of its substitution by other such instances. Insofar as such substitutions imply continuations of the present moment, they can be considered as constituting part of the future of a particular personal history. If this heuristic is applied consistently to the various thought experiments, (with the usual allowance for measure) it should be obvious that diary entries recoverable within any given experiential instance will typically record precisely the sort of prior uncertainty or indeterminacy, with respect to the present instance, that Bruno is talking about. David On 3/5/2012 3:23 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 5 March 2012 21:30, John Clarkjohnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: Yes. I John K Clark just saw a 90 minutes documentary on the history of asphalt, and as that is certainly one of the large but finite number of 90 minute movies I can see on that screen it is entirely consistent with my prediction that John K Clark will see every 90 minute movie that screen can show. For some reason that really puzzles me, you are systematically failing to answer the question as posed. It is equivalent to asking: if you knew that the entire stock of tickets in a lottery would be distributed among multiple 3-Johns, what is the probability that your future experience would be of poverty or wealth? Of course, you know in advance that one copy will end up rich, but the 3-situation is not at issue. The issue is only whether your next 1-experience will be of sudden wealth, or not. It can only be one or the other, not both, and which it will be is indeterminate in the usual sense of any lottery. The point being demonstrated is that, regardless of the 3-situation, you can never sum 1-experiences - they are always mutually exclusive. Isn't that clear? It's unclear as to whom you and your refers to. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 06 Mar 2012, at 17:12, David Nyman wrote: On 5 March 2012 23:50, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: It's unclear as to whom you and your refers to. Let me suggest a heuristic. Assume that any given instance of experience (by which I mean just whatever is necessary to permit some sort of determination to be made) is selected at random from the class of all such moments. All personal-indexical references can then be taken as referring to the conjunction of this instance and whatever personal history is implied by its content and structure. OK. This heuristic serves to justify the expectation, from the perspective of any such instance, of its substitution by other such instances. Insofar as such substitutions imply continuations of the present moment, they can be considered as constituting part of the future of a particular personal history. OK. And with comp such substitutions imply continuations when there is a universal number/machine u running the the continuation in the UD (or the sigma_1 complete part of arithmetic). That's why comp predicts that if we look below our substitution level, the computations multiply effectively, because there are an infinity of such universal u. QM-without collapse/Everett witnesses the first person plural, which is just the contagion of the duplications from observers to observers. Bruno If this heuristic is applied consistently to the various thought experiments, (with the usual allowance for measure) it should be obvious that diary entries recoverable within any given experiential instance will typically record precisely the sort of prior uncertainty or indeterminacy, with respect to the present instance, that Bruno is talking about. David On 3/5/2012 3:23 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 5 March 2012 21:30, John Clarkjohnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: Yes. I John K Clark just saw a 90 minutes documentary on the history of asphalt, and as that is certainly one of the large but finite number of 90 minute movies I can see on that screen it is entirely consistent with my prediction that John K Clark will see every 90 minute movie that screen can show. For some reason that really puzzles me, you are systematically failing to answer the question as posed. It is equivalent to asking: if you knew that the entire stock of tickets in a lottery would be distributed among multiple 3-Johns, what is the probability that your future experience would be of poverty or wealth? Of course, you know in advance that one copy will end up rich, but the 3-situation is not at issue. The issue is only whether your next 1-experience will be of sudden wealth, or not. It can only be one or the other, not both, and which it will be is indeterminate in the usual sense of any lottery. The point being demonstrated is that, regardless of the 3-situation, you can never sum 1-experiences - they are always mutually exclusive. Isn't that clear? It's unclear as to whom you and your refers to. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/6/2012 8:12 AM, David Nyman wrote: On 5 March 2012 23:50, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: It's unclear as to whom you and your refers to. Let me suggest a heuristic. Assume that any given instance of experience (by which I mean just whatever is necessary to permit some sort of determination to be made) is selected at random from the class of all such moments. All personal-indexical references can then be taken as referring to the conjunction of this instance and whatever personal history is implied by its content and structure. This heuristic serves to justify the expectation, from the perspective of any such instance, of its substitution by other such instances. Insofar as such substitutions imply continuations of the present moment, they can be considered as constituting part of the future of a particular personal history. If this heuristic is applied consistently to the various thought experiments, (with the usual allowance for measure) it should be obvious that diary entries recoverable within any given experiential instance will typically record precisely the sort of prior uncertainty or indeterminacy, with respect to the present instance, that Bruno is talking about. David I don't think I have a problem with the indeterminacy. Consider in your scenario that we duplicated a video camera instead of a person. When look at what the cameras in M and W have recorded in one we see pictures of Helsinki followed by pictures of Moscow and from the other we see pictures of Helsinki followed by pictures of Washington. The ambiguity comes when, before the duplication, we ask, What will this camera record?. This is ambiguous just as he is ambiguous. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
2012/3/6 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net On 3/6/2012 8:12 AM, David Nyman wrote: On 5 March 2012 23:50, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: It's unclear as to whom you and your refers to. Let me suggest a heuristic. Assume that any given instance of experience (by which I mean just whatever is necessary to permit some sort of determination to be made) is selected at random from the class of all such moments. All personal-indexical references can then be taken as referring to the conjunction of this instance and whatever personal history is implied by its content and structure. This heuristic serves to justify the expectation, from the perspective of any such instance, of its substitution by other such instances. Insofar as such substitutions imply continuations of the present moment, they can be considered as constituting part of the future of a particular personal history. If this heuristic is applied consistently to the various thought experiments, (with the usual allowance for measure) it should be obvious that diary entries recoverable within any given experiential instance will typically record precisely the sort of prior uncertainty or indeterminacy, with respect to the present instance, that Bruno is talking about. David I don't think I have a problem with the indeterminacy. Consider in your scenario that we duplicated a video camera instead of a person. When look at what the cameras in M and W have recorded in one we see pictures of Helsinki followed by pictures of Moscow and from the other we see pictures of Helsinki followed by pictures of Washington. The ambiguity comes when, before the duplication, we ask, What will this camera record?. This is ambiguous just as he is ambiguous. The question is indexical... it it not he but I... in the thought experiment *you* are the one duplicated, and you ask yourself your own expectation for your next moment. Maybe what is you is not well defined for something outside of you (us ;) ) but I expect you know what you are, and feel... and hence you is well defined for yourself from your POV. Quentin Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ **googlegroups.com everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/6/2012 9:27 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/3/6 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net On 3/6/2012 8:12 AM, David Nyman wrote: On 5 March 2012 23:50, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: It's unclear as to whom you and your refers to. Let me suggest a heuristic. Assume that any given instance of experience (by which I mean just whatever is necessary to permit some sort of determination to be made) is selected at random from the class of all such moments. All personal-indexical references can then be taken as referring to the conjunction of this instance and whatever personal history is implied by its content and structure. This heuristic serves to justify the expectation, from the perspective of any such instance, of its substitution by other such instances. Insofar as such substitutions imply continuations of the present moment, they can be considered as constituting part of the future of a particular personal history. If this heuristic is applied consistently to the various thought experiments, (with the usual allowance for measure) it should be obvious that diary entries recoverable within any given experiential instance will typically record precisely the sort of prior uncertainty or indeterminacy, with respect to the present instance, that Bruno is talking about. David I don't think I have a problem with the indeterminacy. Consider in your scenario that we duplicated a video camera instead of a person. When look at what the cameras in M and W have recorded in one we see pictures of Helsinki followed by pictures of Moscow and from the other we see pictures of Helsinki followed by pictures of Washington. The ambiguity comes when, before the duplication, we ask, What will this camera record?. This is ambiguous just as he is ambiguous. The question is indexical... it it not he but I... in the thought experiment *you* are the one duplicated, and you ask yourself your own expectation for your next moment. Maybe what is you is not well defined for something outside of you (us ;) ) but I expect you know what you are, and feel... At any given moment. But when you ask about my future, and under the hypothesis I may be duplicated, then that future I is not longer indicial, it is ambiguous...which is the source of the indeterminacy. Brent and hence you is well defined for yourself from your POV. Quentin Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2012.0.1913 / Virus Database: 2114/4853 - Release Date: 03/05/12 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
2012/3/6 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net On 3/6/2012 9:27 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/3/6 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net On 3/6/2012 8:12 AM, David Nyman wrote: On 5 March 2012 23:50, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: It's unclear as to whom you and your refers to. Let me suggest a heuristic. Assume that any given instance of experience (by which I mean just whatever is necessary to permit some sort of determination to be made) is selected at random from the class of all such moments. All personal-indexical references can then be taken as referring to the conjunction of this instance and whatever personal history is implied by its content and structure. This heuristic serves to justify the expectation, from the perspective of any such instance, of its substitution by other such instances. Insofar as such substitutions imply continuations of the present moment, they can be considered as constituting part of the future of a particular personal history. If this heuristic is applied consistently to the various thought experiments, (with the usual allowance for measure) it should be obvious that diary entries recoverable within any given experiential instance will typically record precisely the sort of prior uncertainty or indeterminacy, with respect to the present instance, that Bruno is talking about. David I don't think I have a problem with the indeterminacy. Consider in your scenario that we duplicated a video camera instead of a person. When look at what the cameras in M and W have recorded in one we see pictures of Helsinki followed by pictures of Moscow and from the other we see pictures of Helsinki followed by pictures of Washington. The ambiguity comes when, before the duplication, we ask, What will this camera record?. This is ambiguous just as he is ambiguous. The question is indexical... it it not he but I... in the thought experiment *you* are the one duplicated, and you ask yourself your own expectation for your next moment. Maybe what is you is not well defined for something outside of you (us ;) ) but I expect you know what you are, and feel... At any given moment. But when you ask about my future, and under the hypothesis I may be duplicated, then that future I is not longer indicial, it is ambiguous...which is the source of the indeterminacy. It is the source of inderteminacy... but from your POV it is not ambiguous... after the duplication, each copy will not feel any ambiguity about the past... and before the experience, you won't feel any ambiguity about yourself, only an inability to predict your next expectation... which is the 1p-indeterminacy. Quentin Brent and hence you is well defined for yourself from your POV. Quentin Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2012.0.1913 / Virus Database: 2114/4853 - Release Date: 03/05/12 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: What is the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from Moscow turning him into the Moscow man? 100%. That's ambiguous. There is nothing ambiguous about it! Granted this thought experiment is odd but everything is crystal clear. According to the thought experiment you have been teleported to Moscow which means you will now be receiving sights and sounds and smells and tastes and feeling textures from Moscow instead of Helsinki. I say the probability of that happening is 100%, how can I tell if my prediction is correct? If after the experiment I can find something that says he is Bruno Marchal and that he feels like he is in one and only one place and that one place is Moscow then my prediction has been confirmed as being correct. After the experiment I CAN find such a thing so my prediction was correct. The fact that there is also a Bruno Marchal in Washington is irrelevant, it does not reduce the feeling that Bruno Marchal has that he is in one and only one place and that one place is Moscow by even a infinitesimal amount. If you say 100%, it means that you are talking on the first person that you can attribute to different people. Of course the first person can be attributed to different people because according to the thought experiment *YOU* have been duplicated, let me repeat that, YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. Although perfectly logical that is certainly a unusual situation, I've never been duplicated before and you probably haven't either, so it shouldn't be surprising that the results of such a unusual situation are odd, not illogical not self contradictory just odd. we get a paradox if you say that it is 100% for both Moscow and Washington. There is not the slightest thing paradoxical about it, in fact if I had said anything else then that WOULD have been paradoxical. Why? Because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED, that means your first person perspective has been duplicated and will remain identical until differing environmental factors cause the two of YOU to diverge; and even then they would both be Bruno Marchal they just wouldn't be each other. What is the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from neither Washington nor Moscow and thus leaving him as the Helsinki man? 100%. In the protocol considered the Helsinki guy is annihilated. Fine, if that's the thought experiment then the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from either Washington or Moscow is 100% so the probability he will remain the Helsinki man is 0%. Annihilate or don't, either way the results are deterministic. What is the probability the Helsinki man will feel like the Moscow man? 0% because if he felt like the Moscow man he wouldn't be the Helsinki man anymore. In that case, the probability to survive, in the usual clinical sense, a teleportation experience is 0 But the usual clinical sense is totally useless in this case because this case is about as far from usual as you can get and still remain logical. Why do I say that? Because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. What is the probability the Moscow man will feel like the Washington man? 0% because if he felt like the Washington man he wouldn't be the Moscow man anymore. I guess the last Moscow should be replaced by Helsinki. You can if you want to, either way its still true. What is the probability that a third party in all this will see a person in Helsinki and Washington and Moscow with all 3 having a exactly equal right to call themselves John K Clark? 100%. The guy in Helsinki is annihilated Then 2 have a exactly equal right to call themselves John K Clark, and although annihilated the guy in Helsinki didn't die because dying means having a last thought and he didn't have one, he continued to feel sensations only now they originated in Moscow and Washington not Helsinki. Helsinki where the third party will see only ashes after the experiment I don't care if a third party thinks I'm dead as long as I think I'm not. You have avoided the question, asked in Helsinki to you: where can you expect to be from a personal, first person point of view, after the duplication is done?. I have not avoided the question at all, the answer is that the one and only one place you will feel to be after the experiment is Moscow and Washington and there is nothing paradoxical about that. I think your difficulty is that when you blithely say you have been duplicated you don't really understand that it means YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. You cannot answer in W and in M, because you will not write, after the experience, in your diary I feel to be W and I feel to be in M In Washington you will write in your diary I feel like I am in Washington and only in Washington and in Moscow you will write in your diary I feel like I am in Moscow and only in Moscow because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. The question is just hard, if not impossible, for the bat,
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
John Clark, it seems to me that you're intentionally ignoring the 1p (first person) point of view (qualia or subjective experience) and one's expectations from that point of view. To follow UDA and get COMP's conclusions you need these assumptions: Mind (1p), Mechanism (surviving a digital substitution), Church Turing Thesis(CTT) and an interpretation of arithmetic to give CTT sense (such as the existence of the standard model of arithmetic). If you take a eliminative materialist position, that is, saying the mind doesn't exist and thus also no subjective experience, you cannot even begin to follow the UDA - you've already assumed that the mind doesn't exist and only the physical universe does. Of course that's a bit problematic because you've only learned of this physical universe through your own subjective experiences. If you take 1p seriously, UDA asks you to predict what your *experiences* will be in a variety of situations. You can look at the 3p bodies/brains and assign/correlate certain 1p's to them, but one can consider duplication scenarios which don't disturb continuity at all - if the mind survived a digital substitution it is already a program that can be duplicated/merged/instantiated/... in a variety of ways - that program could even change substrates or be computed in all kinds of fragmented and strange ways and still maintain internal continuity. This may seem strange to you, so you might try to resolve it by only looking at the bodies instead of asking what *is experienced*, but that's a mistake and you will miss the point of the UDA that way because you're making the negation of the mind assumption or merely ignoring it. Also in QM MWI, you have the same splitting/duplication all the time as you do with COMP, and the splitting time is likely much shorter (at plank time or less), while subjective experience is at much slower scales relative to that (likely a variable rate of 1-120Hz due to neuron spiking times, although hard to confirm this practically). So I repeat again: UDA is about what is experienced from the first person of a conscious SIM(Substrate Independent Mind)/AGI and its implications for the ontology and physics and mostly about what would such a mind experience. Looking only at the body of such a SIM is completely missing the point or just assuming physicalism with hidden assumption that subjective experience does not exist and is a delusion. On 3/5/2012 21:30, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: What is the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from Moscow turning him into the Moscow man? 100%. That's ambiguous. There is nothing ambiguous about it! Granted this thought experiment is odd but everything is crystal clear. According to the thought experiment you have been teleported to Moscow which means you will now be receiving sights and sounds and smells and tastes and feeling textures from Moscow instead of Helsinki. I say the probability of that happening is 100%, how can I tell if my prediction is correct? If after the experiment I can find something that says he is Bruno Marchal and that he feels like he is in one and only one place and that one place is Moscow then my prediction has been confirmed as being correct. After the experiment I CAN find such a thing so my prediction was correct. The fact that there is also a Bruno Marchal in Washington is irrelevant, it does not reduce the feeling that Bruno Marchal has that he is in one and only one place and that one place is Moscow by even a infinitesimal amount. If you say 100%, it means that you are talking on the first person that you can attribute to different people. Of course the first person can be attributed to different people because according to the thought experiment *YOU* have been duplicated, let me repeat that, YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. Although perfectly logical that is certainly a unusual situation, I've never been duplicated before and you probably haven't either, so it shouldn't be surprising that the results of such a unusual situation are odd, not illogical not self contradictory just odd. we get a paradox if you say that it is 100% for both Moscow and Washington. There is not the slightest thing paradoxical about it, in fact if I had said anything else then that WOULD have been paradoxical. Why? Because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED, that means your first person perspective has been duplicated and will remain identical until differing environmental factors cause the two of YOU to diverge; and even then they would both be Bruno Marchal they just wouldn't be each other. What is the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from neither Washington nor Moscow and thus leaving him as the Helsinki man? 100%. In the protocol considered the Helsinki guy is annihilated. Fine, if that's the thought experiment then the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from either
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 5 March 2012 21:30, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: Yes. I John K Clark just saw a 90 minutes documentary on the history of asphalt, and as that is certainly one of the large but finite number of 90 minute movies I can see on that screen it is entirely consistent with my prediction that John K Clark will see every 90 minute movie that screen can show. For some reason that really puzzles me, you are systematically failing to answer the question as posed. It is equivalent to asking: if you knew that the entire stock of tickets in a lottery would be distributed among multiple 3-Johns, what is the probability that your future experience would be of poverty or wealth? Of course, you know in advance that one copy will end up rich, but the 3-situation is not at issue. The issue is only whether your next 1-experience will be of sudden wealth, or not. It can only be one or the other, not both, and which it will be is indeterminate in the usual sense of any lottery. The point being demonstrated is that, regardless of the 3-situation, you can never sum 1-experiences - they are always mutually exclusive. Isn't that clear? David On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: What is the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from Moscow turning him into the Moscow man? 100%. That's ambiguous. There is nothing ambiguous about it! Granted this thought experiment is odd but everything is crystal clear. According to the thought experiment you have been teleported to Moscow which means you will now be receiving sights and sounds and smells and tastes and feeling textures from Moscow instead of Helsinki. I say the probability of that happening is 100%, how can I tell if my prediction is correct? If after the experiment I can find something that says he is Bruno Marchal and that he feels like he is in one and only one place and that one place is Moscow then my prediction has been confirmed as being correct. After the experiment I CAN find such a thing so my prediction was correct. The fact that there is also a Bruno Marchal in Washington is irrelevant, it does not reduce the feeling that Bruno Marchal has that he is in one and only one place and that one place is Moscow by even a infinitesimal amount. If you say 100%, it means that you are talking on the first person that you can attribute to different people. Of course the first person can be attributed to different people because according to the thought experiment *YOU* have been duplicated, let me repeat that, YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. Although perfectly logical that is certainly a unusual situation, I've never been duplicated before and you probably haven't either, so it shouldn't be surprising that the results of such a unusual situation are odd, not illogical not self contradictory just odd. we get a paradox if you say that it is 100% for both Moscow and Washington. There is not the slightest thing paradoxical about it, in fact if I had said anything else then that WOULD have been paradoxical. Why? Because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED, that means your first person perspective has been duplicated and will remain identical until differing environmental factors cause the two of YOU to diverge; and even then they would both be Bruno Marchal they just wouldn't be each other. What is the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from neither Washington nor Moscow and thus leaving him as the Helsinki man? 100%. In the protocol considered the Helsinki guy is annihilated. Fine, if that's the thought experiment then the probability the Helsinki man will receive signals from either Washington or Moscow is 100% so the probability he will remain the Helsinki man is 0%. Annihilate or don't, either way the results are deterministic. What is the probability the Helsinki man will feel like the Moscow man? 0% because if he felt like the Moscow man he wouldn't be the Helsinki man anymore. In that case, the probability to survive, in the usual clinical sense, a teleportation experience is 0 But the usual clinical sense is totally useless in this case because this case is about as far from usual as you can get and still remain logical. Why do I say that? Because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED. What is the probability the Moscow man will feel like the Washington man? 0% because if he felt like the Washington man he wouldn't be the Moscow man anymore. I guess the last Moscow should be replaced by Helsinki. You can if you want to, either way its still true. What is the probability that a third party in all this will see a person in Helsinki and Washington and Moscow with all 3 having a exactly equal right to call themselves John K Clark? 100%. The guy in Helsinki is annihilated Then 2 have a exactly equal right to call themselves John K Clark, and although annihilated the guy in Helsinki didn't die because dying means
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/5/2012 3:23 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 5 March 2012 21:30, John Clarkjohnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: Yes. I John K Clark just saw a 90 minutes documentary on the history of asphalt, and as that is certainly one of the large but finite number of 90 minute movies I can see on that screen it is entirely consistent with my prediction that John K Clark will see every 90 minute movie that screen can show. For some reason that really puzzles me, you are systematically failing to answer the question as posed. It is equivalent to asking: if you knew that the entire stock of tickets in a lottery would be distributed among multiple 3-Johns, what is the probability that your future experience would be of poverty or wealth? Of course, you know in advance that one copy will end up rich, but the 3-situation is not at issue. The issue is only whether your next 1-experience will be of sudden wealth, or not. It can only be one or the other, not both, and which it will be is indeterminate in the usual sense of any lottery. The point being demonstrated is that, regardless of the 3-situation, you can never sum 1-experiences - they are always mutually exclusive. Isn't that clear? It's unclear as to whom you and your refers to. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)
On 3/5/2012 1:30 PM, John Clark wrote: Yes. I John K Clark just saw a 90 minutes documentary on the history of asphalt, and as that is certainly one of the large but finite number of 90 minute movies I can see on that screen it is entirely consistent with my prediction that John K Clark will see every 90 minute movie that screen can show. John K Clark I generally agree with your view of this hypothetical duplication. But I don't think the ambiguity of you after the duplication is corrosive of Bruno's general argument. He's just taking Everett's interpretation of QM. Do you, John, consider that a reasonable theory of quantum uncertainty. If so, then they problem boils down to whether the Everett's interpretation is consistent with *digital* duplication. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
