Re: For John Clark

2014-03-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 02 Mar 2014, at 01:56, LizR wrote:

I like the frog and bird metaphors, though! At least I prefer the  
idea of the bird looking down on the mathematical landscape than  
worrying about the eye of god.



I prefer the inner god to be a bird than a frog, but may be that's  
personal :


The eye of god is the 0-person view. It alludes to the outer God,  
which is just arithmetical truth, here.


But also, the bird/frog makes that opposition to much physicalist,  
when with comp it is will be a purely distinction on the type of self- 
reference, and is actually closer to the QM entanglement.


Tegmark is less wrong than other physicalist physicists, still not yet  
close to comp's consequences, though. He got the references wrong also.


Bruno






In the beginning was the Bird, to quote The Unpleasant Profession  
of Jonathan Hoag.



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Re: For John Clark

2014-03-01 Thread LizR
I like the frog and bird metaphors, though! At least I prefer the idea of
the bird looking down on the mathematical landscape than worrying about
the eye of god.

In the beginning was the Bird, to quote The Unpleasant Profession of
Jonathan Hoag.

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Re: For John Clark

2014-02-28 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 26 Oct 2013, at 19:09, Jason Resch wrote:


John,

I came across this today, which you might find of interest: 
http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9709032v1.pdf

In particular section 3 goes to great pains to describe the  
importance of the first person / third person distinction.  From the  
paper:


A. It doesn't explain why we perceive randomness

Everett's brilliant insight was that the MWI does
explain why we perceive randomness even though the
Schrodinger equation itself is completely causal. To avoid
linguistic confusion, it is crucial that we distinguish between

* the outside view of the world (the way a mathematical
thinks of it, i.e., as an evolving wavefunction),
and

* the inside view, the way it is perceived from the
subjective frog perspective of an observer in it.

Therefore, the 1st / 3rd person views are not just some obscure  
aspect of Bruno's theory that is unknown or unused in any other part  
of science, it is critical in other theories of science too.  You  
dismiss it as pee pee and that is what prevents you from arriving  
at the correct conclusion, I think. If you take into account the  
first person inside view or frog perspective, you get a  
different result than when you use only the third person outside  
view or bird perspective.


Your confusion regarding the third step has nothing to do with  
pronouns or personal identity, it is purely due to a focus on only  
the objective perspective when the experiment calls for use of the  
subjective perspective.



Exactly.

Now, to nitpick a little bit, I would not conflate bird/frog and 3p/ 
1p, as bird/frog gives a feeling that it is a question of scaling,  
where in fact it is, arguably in both QM and computationalism, a  
question of entanglement or isolation. In comp, entanglement being  
simply defined by entering, or not, in the telebox. Both in UDA and in  
AUDA, the 1p/3p distinction is precisely defined.


Bruno




Jason


On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 1:59 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com  
wrote:
On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 12:27 PM, Quentin Anciaux  
allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who you is  
because however many copies of you there may or may not be they  
will never meet


 What does it have to do with prediction and probability ?

In the MWI if John Clark is asked for a prediction or a probability  
or anything for that matter about you further clarification is not  
needed, in a thought experiment involving people duplicating  
machines it is.


 you refuse to let work your brain while you doesn't do *as you  
should*


You doesn't well speak.

   John K Clark


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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 03 Nov 2013, at 19:46, John Clark wrote:





On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:





So you sees both Moscow AND Washington.


No, anyone of the two see only one city.

So what is the one and only one city that the 2 you see.



W for tham in W. And M for the guy in M. The point is that both of  
them refute the W and M prediction, and confirms the P = 1/2  
prediction.









 you are both of them,

Yes,

but both see only one city.

Yes, and if both are you and both see a different city the  
obviously you see both cities.



In the third person view of what you see. But after the duplication,  
you have only access to one view, and so W and M is refuted. But w  
or M is not refute, and is confirmed. Just look at all diaries.










 You persist in forgetting the distinction between the 3-1 view,

And you persist if forgetting that unless Solipsism turns out to be  
true EVERYBODY has the 1 view so just mindlessly chanting the 1  
view means nothing unless specified who's the 1 view


Of the guy in Helsinki.







A different diary?? Both the Washington Man and the Helsinki Man  
remember writing the exact same identical diary and the last line  
says  I Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki am now walking into the  
duplication chamber, and now I see the operator starting to push the  
on butto.

So it's true that you wrote the diary, but which one is you?

Both.

Yes. Bruno, you're a expert on logic so given the above tell me, how  
many cities did you see? And please don't start blabing about the  
1-view unless it's clear who's 1-view.


It is clear for the resulting person. The one in W knows that he is  
the one in W. Same for the guy in W. And the confirmation or  
refutation of the prediction is asked to all of them.










We have agreed on this,


We agreed on this when Bruno Marchal said  you concerns the  
guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki; but that didn't  
last long then you sees both cities and you insist you doesn't.


Because, 1-you never see two cities.






So now I don't know what in hell you means when Bruno Marchal uses  
that weasel pronoun.


You always means all the examplars appearing in the experience. But to  
grasp the indeterminacy, you need to understand that the question is  
concerned with the future 1p experience, which the computationalist  
know will be unique.








 John, do you agree that if we promise you to give a cup of coffee  
in both W and M, you can predict in Helsinki that P(I ill drink  
coffee) = 1. ?


Yes. But if we promise you to give a cup of coffee to W and a cup  
of tea to M, and it's predicted in Helsinki that the probability I  
will drink coffee is 1 then after it was all over  there would be no  
way to determine if the prediction was correct or not with Bruno  
Marchal's inconsistent meanings of pronouns like I and you.  If  
we keep the old very good and clear definition,  you concerns the  
guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki  then it would be  
easy to tell if the prediction was correct or not,  but  Bruno  
Marchal must backpedal away from that or all the other ideas will  
fall apart.


What you call backpedaling is only that we take the first person into  
account, of all copies, because you are all of them in the 3p sense,  
but only one of them (each of them) after, in the first person pov.






 You seem to ignore that the first person events

Who's first person events? And please, no pronouns.


The one unique, first person view of all copies.





 seeing W and seeing M are incompatible.

Explain why that is incompatible.


because all the 1-you, after the duplication cannot see both city at  
once. They all see one city, and they could not have any certainty of  
which one.
The guy in W can be very well perturbed, asking himself why am I the  
guy in W?. he will not find any reason, as any reason would be  
infirmed for the M guy, and we have admitted the two copies are the  
helsinki person, in the 3p description.






Although I can't prove solipsism is wrong I believe lots of people  
see W and lots of people see M. And they see it from their first  
person view.


You make my point.





 At no moment will one person ever say I see both city

Yes. Explain why that is incompatible with you will see both cities.


you will see both cities is correct in the 3p description of  
yourself, and incorrect for the 1p experience of each of them.








 unless they talk about the first person view in a third person  
description,


I have no idea what that even means.


It means looking at the experience from outside, where you see your  
body and behavior, and 1p views,  reinstanciated in both city.


That is different from what is written in all diaries, which contains  
the statement I see only one city, and I could not have predicted  
which one.


You continue to avoid the fact that the question concerns your future  
and unique 1-view.


You have 

Re: For John Clark

2013-11-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 03 Nov 2013, at 18:51, Jason Resch wrote:





On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 2:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 03 Nov 2013, at 09:17, Jason Resch wrote:





On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 1:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 02 Nov 2013, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote:





On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal  
marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote:





Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you  
have.


Are you referring to Quantum Mechanics and Experience (1992)?   
I do not have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the  
same).




It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing  
in his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett.





Bruno,

I have just finished reading this book.  I thank you for  
recommending it as it helped me get some familiarity with the math  
and the notation.  I found the first 120 or so pages quite  
infuriating, for he would seeming get so close to the idea of  
observers being in superpositions, (teasing and dangling the  
idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical.


Without any argument, I agree.


It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed  
make sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following a  
handwavy dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until page  
130 when he introduces the many-minds theory.  Strangely, he  
claims that he (Albert) and Barry Loewer introduced the theory,  
with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh.


While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers  
locality, he never explains how many-minds is any better (or  
different than) many-worlds.  Also, I found it strange that he  
considered many-minds and Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm  
requires additional assumptions beyond the four quantum  
postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is incompatible with  
special relativity.



It introduces very well QM and the measurement problem, but he is  
still, like everybody, believing implicitly in some strong mind- 
body thesis, and get irrational, somehow, I agree, in his defense  
of Bohm.
I would have also attributed the many-minds to Loewer. I know Zeh  
mainly for his indexical analysis of time, which I think is  
correct, and certainly close to both Many World and Many Mind. If  
you have some references on Zeh and Many Mind ...



I found this paper by Zeh from 1970:

On the interpretation of measurement in quantum theory, 1970,  
Foundations of Physics, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 69–76


In particular, he describes the essential idea of many minds and  
macroscopic superposition on page 74: http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.png 
 but he also references Everett, so it isn't entirely clear to me  
if he is introducing anything new.



From what I remember, Zeh is, in that paper,  much closer to   
Everett than to the Albert-Loewer many mind theory. Note that the  
many-mind theory is very specific, and assumes a unique universe.


But didn't they assume reality of the superposition?  If the  
superposition is real how can their only be one unique universe?


They assume the reality of the superposition, but consider that it  
applies only to the subjectivity of the person, not to anything  
physical. Yes, it is a dualism, and a very bizarre one. t does not  
make much sense to me.







Observers' mind get mutiplied with probabilities which have to be  
postulated again, so it lost completely the appeal we can have for  
Everett. It transform other people into zombies, also.


Is this a necessary consequence of many-minds or only  inAlbert and  
Loewer's formulation of it?


may-mind always refers to Albert Loewer's theory. I don't know any  
other many-mind QM theory. It has nothing to do with the  
arithmetical many-dreams, where the computations are relatively  
entirely duplicated in extenso.


Bruno






Jason

Albert-Loewer many-minds theory seems to me less sensical than  
Bohm or even Copenhagen. It unites all the defects of all QM- 
interpretations in one theory, imo,  and this without mentioning  
that it needs non-comp.


Bruno






Jason


They all miss, of course, the many dreams internal interpretation  
of ... elementary arithmetic. It will take time before people  
awaken from the Aristotelian naturalism. Most scientists are not  
even aware of its conjectural status.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 03 Nov 2013, at 22:43, meekerdb wrote:


On 11/3/2013 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 02 Nov 2013, at 21:47, meekerdb wrote:


On 11/2/2013 10:53 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:22 PM, Quentin Anciaux  
allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and  
they both remember writing the diary, so which one is Bruno  
Marchal talking about?


 Anyone of the two

So you sees both Moscow AND Washington.

 each will have a different diary

 A different diary?? Both the Washington Man and the Helsinki Man  
remember writing the exact same  identical  
diary and the last line says  I Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki am  
now walking into the duplication chamber, and now I see the  
operator starting to push the on butto.


So it's true that you wrote the diary, but which one is you?


As I see it, the question is whether the duplication experiment  
provides a good model of randomness.  If we imagine doing the  
experiment four times, sending the subject(s) through repeatedly  
at the end there will be 16 diaries and they will contain the  
entries:


, WMMM, MWMM, WWMM, MMWM, WMWM, MWWM, WWWM, MMMW, WMMW, MWMW,  
WWMW, MMWW, WMWW, MWWW, 


and so the participants might compare diaries and conclude that  
going to Moscow or Washington is a random event with probability  
1/2 - or at least in limit of large numbers of repetitions.


Actually, if they count themselves, one duplication is enough.



Karl Popper already suggested this model of randomness in The  
Logic of Scientific Discovery and he probably wasn't the first.


That would be astonishing for someone suggesting interactionist  
dualism (with Eccles), and missing Everett QM (cf his propensity  
theory). Can you give a quote or elaborate? It is the first time I  
hear this.


It wasn't in the context quantum mechanics.  Popper was proposing a  
theory of probability and he defined n-free to be a sequence in  
which the next value was independent of the previous n values  
(chapter 8, section 56).


OK. That has nothing to do with the objective indeterminacy due to  
mechanist self-multiplication.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-04 Thread Jason Resch



On Nov 4, 2013, at 2:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



On 03 Nov 2013, at 18:51, Jason Resch wrote:





On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 2:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 03 Nov 2013, at 09:17, Jason Resch wrote:





On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 1:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 02 Nov 2013, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote:





On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal  
marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote:





Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you  
have.


Are you referring to Quantum Mechanics and  
Experience (1992)?  I do not have this book but will add it to  
my list (if it is the same).




It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite  
unconvincing in his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett.





Bruno,

I have just finished reading this book.  I thank you for  
recommending it as it helped me get some familiarity with the  
math and the notation.  I found the first 120 or so pages quite  
infuriating, for he would seeming get so close to the idea of  
observers being in superpositions, (teasing and dangling the  
idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical.


Without any argument, I agree.


It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed  
make sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following  
a handwavy dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until  
page 130 when he introduces the many-minds theory.  Strangely, he  
claims that he (Albert) and Barry Loewer introduced the theory,  
with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh.


While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers  
locality, he never explains how many-minds is any better (or  
different than) many-worlds.  Also, I found it strange that he  
considered many-minds and Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm  
requires additional assumptions beyond the four quantum  
postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is incompatible with  
special relativity.



It introduces very well QM and the measurement problem, but he is  
still, like everybody, believing implicitly in some strong mind- 
body thesis, and get irrational, somehow, I agree, in his defense  
of Bohm.
I would have also attributed the many-minds to Loewer. I know Zeh  
mainly for his indexical analysis of time, which I think is  
correct, and certainly close to both Many World and Many Mind. If  
you have some references on Zeh and Many Mind ...



I found this paper by Zeh from 1970:

On the interpretation of measurement in quantum theory, 1970,  
Foundations of Physics, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 69–76


In particular, he describes the essential idea of many minds and  
macroscopic superposition on page 74: http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.png 
 but he also references Everett, so it isn't entirely clear to me  
if he is introducing anything new.



From what I remember, Zeh is, in that paper,  much closer to   
Everett than to the Albert-Loewer many mind theory. Note that the  
many-mind theory is very specific, and assumes a unique universe.


But didn't they assume reality of the superposition?  If the  
superposition is real how can their only be one unique universe?


They assume the reality of the superposition, but consider that it  
applies only to the subjectivity of the person, not to anything  
physical. Yes, it is a dualism, and a very bizarre one. t does not  
make much sense to me.



I see.  That makes very little sense.  What do they suppose happens  
when an observer acts on their measurement in one of two ways?









Observers' mind get mutiplied with probabilities which have to be  
postulated again, so it lost completely the appeal we can have for  
Everett. It transform other people into zombies, also.


Is this a necessary consequence of many-minds or only  inAlbert and  
Loewer's formulation of it?


may-mind always refers to Albert Loewer's theory. I don't know any  
other many-mind QM theory. It has nothing to do with the  
arithmetical many-dreams, where the computations are relatively  
entirely duplicated in extenso.


Oh.  I had always thought of many minds as like a many worlds where  
instead of splits there are supposed to be infinite minds which  
differentiate upon measurement; this is how other sites seen to  
describe it.  I see from your description it is quite unlike the many  
dreams imof arithmetic.


Jason



Bruno






Jason

Albert-Loewer many-minds theory seems to me less sensical than  
Bohm or even Copenhagen. It unites all the defects of all QM- 
interpretations in one theory, imo,  and this without mentioning  
that it needs non-comp.


Bruno






Jason


They all miss, of course, the many dreams internal  
interpretation of ... elementary arithmetic. It will take time  
before people awaken from the Aristotelian naturalism. Most  
scientists are not even aware of its conjectural status.


Bruno



Re: For John Clark

2013-11-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 04 Nov 2013, at 15:57, Jason Resch wrote:




On Nov 4, 2013, at 2:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



On 03 Nov 2013, at 18:51, Jason Resch wrote:





On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 2:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 03 Nov 2013, at 09:17, Jason Resch wrote:





On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 1:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 02 Nov 2013, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote:





On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal  
marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote:





Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you  
have.


Are you referring to Quantum Mechanics and  
Experience (1992)?  I do not have this book but will add it  
to my list (if it is the same).




It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite  
unconvincing in his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett.





Bruno,

I have just finished reading this book.  I thank you for  
recommending it as it helped me get some familiarity with the  
math and the notation.  I found the first 120 or so pages quite  
infuriating, for he would seeming get so close to the idea of  
observers being in superpositions, (teasing and dangling the  
idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical.


Without any argument, I agree.


It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed  
make sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following  
a handwavy dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until  
page 130 when he introduces the many-minds theory.  Strangely,  
he claims that he (Albert) and Barry Loewer introduced the  
theory, with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh.


While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers  
locality, he never explains how many-minds is any better (or  
different than) many-worlds.  Also, I found it strange that he  
considered many-minds and Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm  
requires additional assumptions beyond the four quantum  
postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is incompatible with  
special relativity.



It introduces very well QM and the measurement problem, but he is  
still, like everybody, believing implicitly in some strong mind- 
body thesis, and get irrational, somehow, I agree, in his defense  
of Bohm.
I would have also attributed the many-minds to Loewer. I know Zeh  
mainly for his indexical analysis of time, which I think is  
correct, and certainly close to both Many World and Many Mind. If  
you have some references on Zeh and Many Mind ...



I found this paper by Zeh from 1970:

On the interpretation of measurement in quantum theory, 1970,  
Foundations of Physics, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 69–76


In particular, he describes the essential idea of many minds and  
macroscopic superposition on page 74: http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.png 
 but he also references Everett, so it isn't entirely clear to me  
if he is introducing anything new.



From what I remember, Zeh is, in that paper,  much closer to   
Everett than to the Albert-Loewer many mind theory. Note that  
the many-mind theory is very specific, and assumes a unique  
universe.


But didn't they assume reality of the superposition?  If the  
superposition is real how can their only be one unique universe?


They assume the reality of the superposition, but consider that it  
applies only to the subjectivity of the person, not to anything  
physical. Yes, it is a dualism, and a very bizarre one. t does not  
make much sense to me.



I see.  That makes very little sense.  What do they suppose happens  
when an observer acts on their measurement in one of two ways?


The observer will live an experience among many, with a probability  
given by QM.


The other minds still exist, and with comp, should be conscious, but  
seem to lost any body to act on. Also, if you and someone else measure  
independent spin repetitively, your fellow becomes a zombie, his  
bodies still give a part of the universal wave needed for the  
interference terms, but the probability rule, as used here, guaranties  
that minds of the others are no more correlated with your mind. So,  
with comp, the QM Many Minds of Albert and Loewer entails both the  
seemingly existence of souls lacking bodies and of bodies lacking soul  
(zombie).

I remember vaguely that they are more or less aware of the difficulties.











Observers' mind get mutiplied with probabilities which have to be  
postulated again, so it lost completely the appeal we can have for  
Everett. It transform other people into zombies, also.


Is this a necessary consequence of many-minds or only  inAlbert  
and Loewer's formulation of it?


may-mind always refers to Albert Loewer's theory. I don't know  
any other many-mind QM theory. It has nothing to do with the  
arithmetical many-dreams, where the computations are relatively  
entirely duplicated in extenso.


Oh.  I had always thought of many minds 

Re: For John Clark

2013-11-04 Thread Jason Resch
On Mon, Nov 4, 2013 at 10:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 04 Nov 2013, at 15:57, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Nov 4, 2013, at 2:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 03 Nov 2013, at 18:51, Jason Resch wrote:




 On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 2:30 AM, Bruno Marchal  marc...@ulb.ac.be
 marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 03 Nov 2013, at 09:17, Jason Resch wrote:




 On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 1:27 AM, Bruno Marchal  marc...@ulb.ac.be
 marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 02 Nov 2013, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote:




 On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal  marc...@ulb.ac.be
 marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote:




 Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you have.


 Are you referring to Quantum Mechanics and Experience (1992)?  I do
 not have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the same).


 It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing in
 his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett.




 Bruno,

 I have just finished reading this book.  I thank you for recommending it
 as it helped me get some familiarity with the math and the notation.  I
 found the first 120 or so pages quite infuriating, for he would seeming get
 so close to the idea of observers being in superpositions, (teasing and
 dangling the idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical.


 Without any argument, I agree.


 It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed make
 sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following a handwavy
 dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until page 130 when he
 introduces the many-minds theory.  Strangely, he claims that he (Albert)
 and Barry Loewer introduced the theory, with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh.

 While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers locality, he
 never explains how many-minds is any better (or different than)
 many-worlds.  Also, I found it strange that he considered many-minds and
 Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm requires additional assumptions beyond
 the four quantum postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is
 incompatible with special relativity.



 It introduces very well QM and the measurement problem, but he is still,
 like everybody, believing implicitly in some strong mind-body thesis, and
 get irrational, somehow, I agree, in his defense of Bohm.
 I would have also attributed the many-minds to Loewer. I know Zeh mainly
 for his indexical analysis of time, which I think is correct, and certainly
 close to both Many World and Many Mind. If you have some references on Zeh
 and Many Mind ...



 I found this paper by Zeh from 1970:

 On the interpretation of measurement in quantum theory, 1970,
 Foundations of Physics, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 69–76

 In particular, he describes the essential idea of many minds and
 macroscopic superposition on page 74:
 http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.png
 http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.pngbut
  he also references Everett, so it isn't entirely clear to me if he is
 introducing anything new.



 From what I remember, Zeh is, in that paper,  much closer to  Everett
 than to the Albert-Loewer many mind theory. Note that the many-mind
 theory is very specific, and assumes a unique universe.


 But didn't they assume reality of the superposition?  If the superposition
 is real how can their only be one unique universe?


 They assume the reality of the superposition, but consider that it applies
 only to the subjectivity of the person, not to anything physical. Yes, it
 is a dualism, and a very bizarre one. t does not make much sense to me.



 I see.  That makes very little sense.  What do they suppose happens when
 an observer acts on their measurement in one of two ways?


 The observer will live an experience among many, with a probability given
 by QM.

 The other minds still exist, and with comp, should be conscious, but seem
 to lost any body to act on. Also, if you and someone else measure
 independent spin repetitively, your fellow becomes a zombie, his bodies
 still give a part of the universal wave needed for the interference
 terms, but the probability rule, as used here, guaranties that minds of the
 others are no more correlated with your mind. So, with comp, the QM Many
 Minds of Albert and Loewer entails both the seemingly existence of souls
 lacking bodies and of bodies lacking soul (zombie).
 I remember vaguely that they are more or less aware of the difficulties.









 Observers' mind get mutiplied with probabilities which have to be
 postulated again, so it lost completely the appeal we can have for Everett.
 It transform other people into zombies, also.


 Is this a necessary consequence of many-minds or only  inAlbert and
 Loewer's formulation of it?


 may-mind always refers to Albert Loewer's theory. I don't know any other
 many-mind QM 

Re: For John Clark

2013-11-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 04 Nov 2013, at 18:53, Jason Resch wrote:








It looks like Zeh had more to say in 1999, this theory seems much  
closer to many dreams: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-minds_interpretation 
#Continuous_infinity_of_minds   and http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9908084


Continuous infinity of minds
[edit]
In Everett's conception the mind of an observer is split by the  
measuring process as a consequence of the decoherence induced by  
measurement. In many-minds each physical observer has a postulated  
associated continuous infinity of minds. The decoherence of the  
measuring event (observation) causes the infinity of minds  
associated with each observer to become categorized into distinct  
yet infinite subsets, each subset associated with each distinct  
outcome of the observation. No minds are split, in the many-minds  
view, because it is assumed that they are all already always distinct.


The choice between multiplication and differentiation remains free in  
the many-worlds too.




The idea of many-minds was suggested early on by Zeh in 1995. He  
argues that in a decohering no-collapse universe one can avoid the  
necessity of distinct macrorealms (parallel worlds in  
MWIterminology) by introducing a new psycho-physical parallelism, in  
which individual minds supervene on each non-interfering component  
in the physical state. Zeh indeed suggests that, given decoherence,  
this is the most natural interpretation of quantum mechanics.


I agree with Zeh. I have interpreted the Everett relative states in  
that way. The problem is that the notion of world is very fuzzy in  
the physical literature (and *very large* in the analytical philosophy).




The main difference between the many-minds and many-worlds  
interpretations then lies in the definition of the preferred  
quantity. The many-minds interpretation suggests that to solve the  
measurement problem, there is no need to secure a definite  
macrorealm: the only thing that's required is appearance of such.


OK. With comp, we don't have much choice in that matter.




A bit more precisely: the idea is that the preferred quantity is  
whatever physical quantity, defined on brains (or brains and parts  
of their environments), has definite-valued states (eigenstates)  
that underpin such appearances, i.e. underpin the states of belief  
in, or sensory experience of, the familiar macroscopic realm.



It sounds like under Zeh's many-minds, the difference between it and  
Everett is a world would be any/all the systems that are  
psychologically indistinguishable from each other, from the view of  
some mind.


For some first person plural, which is assured in Everett+Gleason (but  
ad hoc in Albert-Loewer), and I can't say for Zeh, except that it  
looks like Everett, but without taking he idea of definite physical  
world too much seriously.
Zeh has an interesting indexical view of time, and his many-minds  
seems close to the indexical view of physicalness we have with  
computationalism. So Zeh many minds, like Everett many-worlds, and  
unlike Bohm or Albert-Loewer, might be the measure one part of the  
arithmetical many dream matrix or UD*. That makes sense.  OK.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-03 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 02 Nov 2013, at 18:53, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:22 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com  
wrote:


 You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and  
they both remember writing the diary, so which one is Bruno Marchal  
talking about?


 Anyone of the two

So you sees both Moscow AND Washington.


No, anyone of the two see only one city. you are both of them, but  
both see only one city.


You persist in forgetting the distinction between the 3-1 view, as  
explained in preceding post, and the 1-views.







 each will have a different diary

 A different diary?? Both the Washington Man and the Helsinki Man  
remember writing the exact same identical diary and the last line  
says  I Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki am now walking into the  
duplication chamber, and now I see the operator starting to push the  
on butto.


So it's true that you wrote the diary, but which one is you?


Both. We have agreed on this, and the FPI comes exactly from that  
fact. Both copies are you, and both copies see only one city, and  
because both are you, and both see only one city, they could not have  
predicted which one.


John, do you agree that if we promise you to give a cup of coffee in  
both W and M, you can predict in Helsinki that P(I ill drink coffee)  
= 1. ?


Then, if you are OK with this, you can understand that in Helsinki,  
the probability to see only one city is one.


You seem to ignore that the first person events seeing W and seeing  
M are incompatible. At no moment will one person ever say I see both  
city, unless they talk about the first person view in a third person  
description, which is not what the question is about. The question is  
about the first person incompatible events of seeing (in some direct  
way) which city.


You seem again stopping doing the thought experiment before putting  
yourself at the place of *any* survivor.


Bruno









  John K Clark



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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-03 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 02 Nov 2013, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote:





On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote:





Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you have.

Are you referring to Quantum Mechanics and Experience (1992)?  I  
do not have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the  
same).




It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing  
in his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett.





Bruno,

I have just finished reading this book.  I thank you for  
recommending it as it helped me get some familiarity with the math  
and the notation.  I found the first 120 or so pages quite  
infuriating, for he would seeming get so close to the idea of  
observers being in superpositions, (teasing and dangling the idea),  
while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical.


Without any argument, I agree.


It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed make  
sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following a  
handwavy dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until page  
130 when he introduces the many-minds theory.  Strangely, he claims  
that he (Albert) and Barry Loewer introduced the theory, with no  
mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh.


While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers locality,  
he never explains how many-minds is any better (or different than)  
many-worlds.  Also, I found it strange that he considered many-minds  
and Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm requires additional  
assumptions beyond the four quantum postulates, and also Bohm  
(lacing locality) is incompatible with special relativity.



It introduces very well QM and the measurement problem, but he is  
still, like everybody, believing implicitly in some strong mind-body  
thesis, and get irrational, somehow, I agree, in his defense of Bohm.
I would have also attributed the many-minds to Loewer. I know Zeh  
mainly for his indexical analysis of time, which I think is correct,  
and certainly close to both Many World and Many Mind. If you have some  
references on Zeh and Many Mind ...
They all miss, of course, the many dreams internal interpretation  
of ... elementary arithmetic. It will take time before people awaken  
from the Aristotelian naturalism. Most scientists are not even aware  
of its conjectural status.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-03 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 02 Nov 2013, at 21:47, meekerdb wrote:


On 11/2/2013 10:53 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:22 PM, Quentin Anciaux  
allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and  
they both remember writing the diary, so which one is Bruno Marchal  
talking about?


 Anyone of the two

So you sees both Moscow AND Washington.

 each will have a different diary

 A different diary?? Both the Washington Man and the Helsinki Man  
remember writing the exact same identical diary and the last line  
says  I Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki am now walking into the  
duplication chamber, and now I see the operator starting to push  
the on butto.


So it's true that you wrote the diary, but which one is you?


As I see it, the question is whether the duplication experiment  
provides a good model of randomness.  If we imagine doing the  
experiment four times, sending the subject(s) through repeatedly at  
the end there will be 16 diaries and they will contain the entries:


, WMMM, MWMM, WWMM, MMWM, WMWM, MWWM, WWWM, MMMW, WMMW, MWMW,  
WWMW, MMWW, WMWW, MWWW, 


and so the participants might compare diaries and conclude that  
going to Moscow or Washington is a random event with probability 1/2  
- or at least in limit of large numbers of repetitions.


Actually, if they count themselves, one duplication is enough.



Karl Popper already suggested this model of randomness in The Logic  
of Scientific Discovery and he probably wasn't the first.


That would be astonishing for someone suggesting interactionist  
dualism (with Eccles), and missing Everett QM (cf his propensity  
theory). Can you give a quote or elaborate? It is the first time I  
hear this.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-03 Thread Jason Resch
On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 1:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 02 Nov 2013, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote:




 On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote:




 Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you have.


 Are you referring to Quantum Mechanics and Experience (1992)?  I do not
 have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the same).


 It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing in his
 defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett.




 Bruno,

 I have just finished reading this book.  I thank you for recommending it
 as it helped me get some familiarity with the math and the notation.  I
 found the first 120 or so pages quite infuriating, for he would seeming get
 so close to the idea of observers being in superpositions, (teasing and
 dangling the idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical.


 Without any argument, I agree.


 It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed make sense,
 but almost immediately after page 123, and following a handwavy dismissal
 of Everett returns to irrationality, until page 130 when he introduces the
 many-minds theory.  Strangely, he claims that he (Albert) and Barry Loewer
 introduced the theory, with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh.

 While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers locality, he
 never explains how many-minds is any better (or different than)
 many-worlds.  Also, I found it strange that he considered many-minds and
 Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm requires additional assumptions beyond
 the four quantum postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is
 incompatible with special relativity.



 It introduces very well QM and the measurement problem, but he is still,
 like everybody, believing implicitly in some strong mind-body thesis, and
 get irrational, somehow, I agree, in his defense of Bohm.
 I would have also attributed the many-minds to Loewer. I know Zeh mainly
 for his indexical analysis of time, which I think is correct, and certainly
 close to both Many World and Many Mind. If you have some references on Zeh
 and Many Mind ...



I found this paper by Zeh from 1970:

On the interpretation of measurement in quantum theory, 1970, Foundations
of Physics, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 69–76

In particular, he describes the essential idea of many minds and
macroscopic superposition on page 74:
http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.pngbut
he also references Everett, so it isn't entirely clear to me if he is
introducing anything new.

Jason



 They all miss, of course, the many dreams internal interpretation of ...
 elementary arithmetic. It will take time before people awaken from the
 Aristotelian naturalism. Most scientists are not even aware of its
 conjectural status.

 Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-03 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 03 Nov 2013, at 09:17, Jason Resch wrote:





On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 1:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 02 Nov 2013, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote:





On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote:





Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you  
have.


Are you referring to Quantum Mechanics and Experience (1992)?   
I do not have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the  
same).




It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing  
in his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett.





Bruno,

I have just finished reading this book.  I thank you for  
recommending it as it helped me get some familiarity with the math  
and the notation.  I found the first 120 or so pages quite  
infuriating, for he would seeming get so close to the idea of  
observers being in superpositions, (teasing and dangling the idea),  
while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical.


Without any argument, I agree.


It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed make  
sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following a  
handwavy dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until page  
130 when he introduces the many-minds theory.  Strangely, he claims  
that he (Albert) and Barry Loewer introduced the theory, with no  
mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh.


While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers  
locality, he never explains how many-minds is any better (or  
different than) many-worlds.  Also, I found it strange that he  
considered many-minds and Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm  
requires additional assumptions beyond the four quantum postulates,  
and also Bohm (lacing locality) is incompatible with special  
relativity.



It introduces very well QM and the measurement problem, but he is  
still, like everybody, believing implicitly in some strong mind-body  
thesis, and get irrational, somehow, I agree, in his defense of Bohm.
I would have also attributed the many-minds to Loewer. I know Zeh  
mainly for his indexical analysis of time, which I think is correct,  
and certainly close to both Many World and Many Mind. If you have  
some references on Zeh and Many Mind ...



I found this paper by Zeh from 1970:

On the interpretation of measurement in quantum theory, 1970,  
Foundations of Physics, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 69–76


In particular, he describes the essential idea of many minds and  
macroscopic superposition on page 74: http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.png 
 but he also references Everett, so it isn't entirely clear to me if  
he is introducing anything new.



From what I remember, Zeh is, in that paper,  much closer to  Everett  
than to the Albert-Loewer many mind theory. Note that the many- 
mind theory is very specific, and assumes a unique universe.  
Observers' mind get mutiplied with probabilities which have to be  
postulated again, so it lost completely the appeal we can have for  
Everett. It transform other people into zombies, also.
Albert-Loewer many-minds theory seems to me less sensical than Bohm  
or even Copenhagen. It unites all the defects of all QM- 
interpretations in one theory, imo,  and this without mentioning that  
it needs non-comp.


Bruno






Jason


They all miss, of course, the many dreams internal interpretation  
of ... elementary arithmetic. It will take time before people awaken  
from the Aristotelian naturalism. Most scientists are not even aware  
of its conjectural status.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-03 Thread Jason Resch
John,

You seemed convinced that observers within duplicated but divergent
simulations cannot distinguish their observations from a single course that
evolves randomly.  Why not proceed to the next step?

Jason


On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 9:22 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 12:57 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  The prediction, asked in Helsinki, concerned the 1-views,


 And John Clark asks the prediction concerns the first person view of
 who? and Bruno answers the first person view of you  and John Clark asks
 who is you? and Bruno answers the guy with the first person view. And
 around and around we go. Everybody has a 1P view, so just saying from the
 1P view tells me nothing unless I know the 1P view of who.



   the 1-you's experience admits a very simple definition: it is the
 story written in the diary that *you take with you, in Helsinki, in the
 teleportation box.


 And the diary was written by you, no doubt about it, but the trouble is
 after the teleportation there is a fellow in Moscow and a fellow in
 Washington that are both holding identical diaries that they both vividly
 remember having written. So how in hell can I now determine if a prediction
 made in Helsinki before anybody stepped into a teleportation box about what
 city you will see was correct or not? And just chanting for the 99'th
 time you confuse the 1P and the 3P will not help on iota in making that
 determination.

 All I want is a way to figure out who you is so I can figure out if the
 prediction about what city you will see was correct or not. Obviously
 Bruno Marchal's old definition of you, the one that actually made sense
 (you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki)
 simply won't do because it would render vast stretches of Bruno Marchal's
 theory wrong. So what new definition is there that I can use to figure out
 if predictions concerning you turned out to be true or not?



 why am I the one with the experience (described in the diary):
 MMWWMWWMMM
 Why this one?


 You are the Moscow man because you are the man who saw Moscow, and you are
 the MMWWMWWMMM man because you are the man who saw
 MMWWMWWMMM. And iterating silly questions will not bring clarity.

   John K Clark








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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-03 Thread Jason Resch
On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 2:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 03 Nov 2013, at 09:17, Jason Resch wrote:




 On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 1:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 02 Nov 2013, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote:




 On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote:


 On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote:




 Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you have.


 Are you referring to Quantum Mechanics and Experience (1992)?  I do
 not have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the same).


 It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing in
 his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett.




 Bruno,

 I have just finished reading this book.  I thank you for recommending it
 as it helped me get some familiarity with the math and the notation.  I
 found the first 120 or so pages quite infuriating, for he would seeming get
 so close to the idea of observers being in superpositions, (teasing and
 dangling the idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical.


 Without any argument, I agree.


 It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed make
 sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following a handwavy
 dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until page 130 when he
 introduces the many-minds theory.  Strangely, he claims that he (Albert)
 and Barry Loewer introduced the theory, with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh.

 While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers locality, he
 never explains how many-minds is any better (or different than)
 many-worlds.  Also, I found it strange that he considered many-minds and
 Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm requires additional assumptions beyond
 the four quantum postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is
 incompatible with special relativity.



 It introduces very well QM and the measurement problem, but he is still,
 like everybody, believing implicitly in some strong mind-body thesis, and
 get irrational, somehow, I agree, in his defense of Bohm.
 I would have also attributed the many-minds to Loewer. I know Zeh mainly
 for his indexical analysis of time, which I think is correct, and certainly
 close to both Many World and Many Mind. If you have some references on Zeh
 and Many Mind ...



 I found this paper by Zeh from 1970:

 On the interpretation of measurement in quantum theory, 1970, Foundations
 of Physics, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 69–76

 In particular, he describes the essential idea of many minds and
 macroscopic superposition on page 74:
 http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.pngbut
  he also references Everett, so it isn't entirely clear to me if he is
 introducing anything new.



 From what I remember, Zeh is, in that paper,  much closer to  Everett than
 to the Albert-Loewer many mind theory. Note that the many-mind theory
 is very specific, and assumes a unique universe.


But didn't they assume reality of the superposition?  If the superposition
is real how can their only be one unique universe?



 Observers' mind get mutiplied with probabilities which have to be
 postulated again, so it lost completely the appeal we can have for Everett.
 It transform other people into zombies, also.


Is this a necessary consequence of many-minds or only  inAlbert and
Loewer's formulation of it?

Jason


 Albert-Loewer many-minds theory seems to me less sensical than Bohm or
 even Copenhagen. It unites all the defects of all QM-interpretations in one
 theory, imo,  and this without mentioning that it needs non-comp.

 Bruno





 Jason



 They all miss, of course, the many dreams internal interpretation of
 ... elementary arithmetic. It will take time before people awaken from the
 Aristotelian naturalism. Most scientists are not even aware of its
 conjectural status.

 Bruno


  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-03 Thread Telmo Menezes
Hi John,

On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 4:13 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Sat, Nov 2, 2013  Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:

  John, you are the guy who explained Bell's inequality in a very
  compelling way. You're obviously smart


 I’m blushing.



  so why are you only engaging in personal attacks?


 If I think somebody's ideas are gibberish I'm going to say their gibberish
 without apology because there is nothing personal about it. And are you
 prepared to make the case that my attacks were wrong? Do you really think
 Bruno can continue to say that you will see only one city and also say
 that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki?
 Of course he can't! He'll just say you confuse the 1P and the 3P as if
 that makes everything better.

  Why don't you instead address the issues that have been pointed about
  your position, namely:  that it renders the probability of a coin toss to
  either 0 or 1 - that if you refuse to accept the 1p/3p distinction, then 
  you
  also have to refuse the MWI?


 I confess this is getting really frustrating for me, again and again I point
 out the difference and people neither agree nor disagree but just continue
 making the same accusation that I'm being inconsistent. But OK I'll do it,
 again.

 If a coin is flipped and a prediction is made about whether you will see
 heads or tails it's easy to tell after the flip if the prediction was
 correct or not because there is no ambiguity regarding the identity of
 you, the pronoun refers to the only guy we see and we just ask him what he
 saw. Even if it's a quantum event and not a coin flip and the Many Worlds
 Theory is used to calculate if you will see a electron spin up or spin down
 we can still tell after the measurement if the prediction was correct or not
 because it's still perfectly clear what the pronoun you refers to, namely
 the only fellow we see.

Ok, let's assume that on spin up a light turns red, on spin down it
turns green. Assuming the MWI, there is a set of worlds were the
fellow will see red and another set were he will see green. There was
already a multiplication of hims. The only difference here is that
the hims exist in separate worlds that we cannot travel between, so
we will never be confronted with two of them. If you use the
duplication machine, you can create two rooms that look exactly the
same, one with a green light, one with a red light. The subject will
not be able to tell if he's doing the electron spin experiment or the
duplication experiment. The only difference here is from 3p, where you
can actually look at some monitors and see two copies of the same
person looking at lights. If you allow the copies to interact things
get more surreal, but so what?

 So the statistics that the Many Worlds
 Interpretation of Quantum mechanics generates actually mean something
 useful.

 But now consider Bruno's thought experiment. We predict that you will see X,
 after the experiment is over can we say if the prediction was correct or
 not? No we can not because we no longer know exactly what the pronoun you
 refers to. You has been duplicated (and that means the first person point of
 view has been duplicated too) and so you standing on my right insists that
 you did see X, but you standing on my left, who has every bit as much reason
 to call himself you as the other one, insists that you did NOT see X. So
 was the prediction about you seeing X correct or incorrect? There is no way
 to answer that because the meaning of the pronoun you is ambiguous in
 these circumstances.

The only distinction between the MWI and Bruno's thought experiment is
that in the former the copies are all in separate worlds while in the
latter they coexist in the same world. Of course the worlds are all
part of reality, so the question boils down to the copies being able
to interact with each other or not. There are still yous being
copied in both cases. You still know which you you are from your
perspective.

So can you agree that your objection has to solely rest on the
possibility of interaction between copies? How does this possibility
of interaction change anything?

 And please don't just repeat the mantra you confuse the 1P and the 3P,

That is a rhetorical trick. The valid question remains: if you claim
that unique personal identity has lost meaning through the
duplication, how can it not lose meaning through forks in the
multiverse? How can you reject Bruno's experiment but accept the MWI?

 I
 am not at all confused by the difference between objective and subjective
 nor do I think objective is the more important; in fact it is precisely
 because I know the difference that I know Bruno's ideas regarding prediction
 and probability mean nothing.
 And there is a even more fundamental reason I'm frustrated, predictions,
 both good and bad and meaningless, and probabilities, and statistics, have
 NOTHING to do with the continuous feeling of identity or sense of self, 

Re: For John Clark

2013-11-03 Thread John Clark
On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:




 So you sees both Moscow AND Washington.


 No, anyone of the two see only one city.


So what is the one and only one city that the 2 you see.






  you are both of them,


Yes,

but both see only one city.


Yes, and if both are you and both see a different city the obviously
you see both cities.






  You persist in forgetting the distinction between the 3-1 view,


And you persist if forgetting that unless Solipsism turns out to be true
EVERYBODY has the 1 view so just mindlessly chanting the 1 view means
nothing unless specified who's the 1 view




 A different diary?? Both the Washington Man and the Helsinki Man remember
 writing the exact same identical diary and the last line says  I Quentin
 Anciaux in Helsinki am now walking into the duplication chamber, and now I
 see the operator starting to push the on butto.
 So it's true that you wrote the diary, but which one is you?


 Both.


Yes. Bruno, you're a expert on logic so given the above tell me, how many
cities did you see? And please don't start blabing about the 1-view
unless it's clear who's 1-view.





 We have agreed on this,



We agreed on this when Bruno Marchal said  you concerns the guy(s) who
will remember having been in Helsinki; but that didn't last long then
you sees both cities and you insist you doesn't. So now I don't know
what in hell you means when Bruno Marchal uses that weasel pronoun.


  John, do you agree that if we promise you to give a cup of coffee in
 both W and M, you can predict in Helsinki that P(I ill drink coffee) = 1. ?


Yes. But if we promise you to give a cup of coffee to W and a cup of tea
to M, and it's predicted in Helsinki that the probability I will drink
coffee is 1 then after it was all over  there would be no way to determine
if the prediction was correct or not with Bruno Marchal's inconsistent
meanings of pronouns like I and you.  If we keep the old very good and
clear definition,  you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been
in Helsinki  then it would be easy to tell if the prediction was correct
or not,  but  Bruno Marchal must backpedal away from that or all the other
ideas will fall apart.

 You seem to ignore that the first person events


Who's first person events? And please, no pronouns.

 seeing W and seeing M are incompatible.


Explain why that is incompatible. Although I can't prove solipsism is wrong
I believe lots of people see W and lots of people see M. And they see it
from their first person view.

 At no moment will one person ever say I see both city


Yes. Explain why that is incompatible with you will see both cities.

 unless they talk about the first person view in a third person
 description,


I have no idea what that even means.

  John K Clark

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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-03 Thread meekerdb

On 11/3/2013 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 02 Nov 2013, at 21:47, meekerdb wrote:


On 11/2/2013 10:53 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:22 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com 
mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and they 
both
remember writing the diary, so which one is Bruno Marchal talking about?


 Anyone of the two


So you sees both Moscow AND Washington.

 each will have a different diary


 A different diary?? Both the Washington Man and the Helsinki Man remember writing the 
exact same identical diary and the last line says  I Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki am 
now walking into the duplication chamber, and now I see the operator starting to push 
the on butto.


So it's true that you wrote the diary, but which one is you?


As I see it, the question is whether the duplication experiment provides a good model 
of randomness.  If we imagine doing the experiment four times, sending the subject(s) 
through repeatedly at the end there will be 16 diaries and they will contain the entries:


, WMMM, MWMM, WWMM, MMWM, WMWM, MWWM, WWWM, MMMW, WMMW, MWMW, WWMW, MMWW, WMWW, 
MWWW, 


and so the participants might compare diaries and conclude that going to Moscow or 
Washington is a random event with probability 1/2 - or at least in limit of large 
numbers of repetitions.


Actually, if they count themselves, one duplication is enough.



Karl Popper already suggested this model of randomness in The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery and he probably wasn't the first.


That would be astonishing for someone suggesting interactionist dualism (with Eccles), 
and missing Everett QM (cf his propensity theory). Can you give a quote or elaborate? It 
is the first time I hear this.


It wasn't in the context quantum mechanics.  Popper was proposing a theory of probability 
and he defined n-free to be a sequence in which the next value was independent of the 
previous n values (chapter 8, section 56).


Brent

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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-03 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 03 Nov 2013, at 16:22, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 12:57 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 The prediction, asked in Helsinki, concerned the 1-views,

And John Clark asks the prediction concerns the first person view  
of who? and Bruno answers the first person view of you


No. The Helsinki Guy. He is the one asked to make a prediction, and to  
write it in his diary in Helsinki. It is made precise that the  
prediction concern where he will fell to be, indeed. But the you in  
the unique guy in Helsinki.




and John Clark asks who is you? and Bruno answers the guy with  
the first person view.



See above. Could comment my answer, and not your own deformation of  
them?




And around and around we go. Everybody has a 1P view, so just saying  
from the 1P view tells me nothing unless I know the 1P view of who.


  the 1-you's experience admits a very simple definition: it is the  
story written in the diary that *you take with you, in Helsinki, in  
the teleportation box.


And the diary was written by you, no doubt about it, but the trouble  
is after the teleportation there is a fellow in Moscow and a fellow  
in Washington that are both holding identical diaries that they both  
vividly remember having written. So how in hell can I now determine  
if a prediction made in Helsinki before anybody stepped into a  
teleportation box about what city you will see was correct or not?  
And just chanting for the 99'th time you confuse the 1P and the 3P  
will not help on iota in making that determination.


It is very simple. W and M is always wrong. W is wrong in half the  
case, like M. W or M is always confirmed. You have to look at all  
the resulting diaries.







All I want is a way to figure out who you is so I can figure out  
if the prediction about what city you will see was correct or not.  
Obviously Bruno Marchal's old definition of you, the one that  
actually made sense (you concerns the guy(s) who will remember  
having been in Helsinki) simply won't do because it would render  
vast stretches of Bruno Marchal's theory wrong.


U have not shown that. It works in all cases, once you remind that the  
question is about the 1-you. Yes, there are two such 1-you, in the 3- 
view, but each feel unique, and knew this in advance.






So what new definition is there


There is no new definition. You make this up. There is only the 1/3  
distinction, that you mock without ever using. That explains why you  
are stuck. But, you do use it in the MWI, so you are just inconsistent.




that I can use to figure out if predictions concerning you turned  
out to be true or not?


You have to take all 1-you into account. They are logically exclusive,  
and that explains the indeterminacy. See my preceding posts and  
comment the answer with quote.






why am I the one with the experience (described in the diary):
MMWWMWWMMM
Why this one?

You are the Moscow man because you are the man who saw Moscow, and  
you are the MMWWMWWMMM man because you are the man who saw  
MMWWMWWMMM. And iterating silly questions will not bring  
clarity.


So you just evade the question.

Bruno





  John K Clark









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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-02 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 6:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 On 01 Nov 2013, at 15:17, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

 When some bully oversteps the line of decency, then by default any
 discussion ceases to be rational. Then we are left with the choice to let it
 be or denounce the crossing of our personalized line.

 With regards to this infinite back and forth, all the insults and cul-de-sac
 arguments, with zero progress on this exchange with Julius Caesar, I believe
 Quentin has every right to say spammer and troll.

 Quentin's reaction and tone in this regard are more plausible to me than the
 posts of JC. Increasingly so, in fact. PGC


 I can't agree more.

 I don't understand why Quentin get nervous (once) on Richard, who was just
 slow to see some point, and that happens to any of us, when tired, or
 something (to be nervous, or to be slow).
 Keep in mind people in this list lives under different amount of sun!

 But it is a sort of relief for me that you, and Quentin (and some others)
 got also the feeling that JC might act as a bullyer or troll-like,. That's
 clear, to *me* with his insulting tone when trying to deride any attempt to
 study something. I am not too well placed to say that to Clark, so I think
 that you and Quentin are ... rather courageous to witness this. That can
 help everybody.

I think JC must have realised at some point that his initial
objections were not valid but, by that point, he was too invested in
proving you wrong. His more recent objections are more suspicious,
because it's hard to believe that a smart guy who understands and
explains complex ideas cannot see the problem with arguing in a way
that goes against the usual meaning of probabilities. He's also
insisting that you said things that we all can see that you have not
(like the infamous back-paddling on definitions accusation).

On the bright side, Bruno, people have been discussing your ideas for
years and keep doing so. This is a huge victory, as any scientist
knows. Trolling comes with exposure. There's no reason for you to be
sad, really. Many of us are very happy that you and your ideas exist
in this world, and it's even better that we get to discuss them with
you.

Best,
Telmo.

 About Roger Clough, his comment are in the topics, yet a bit aside the
 conversations and thread, and a bit self-advertizing and repetitive, but I
 would not qualify him as spam, although he is very near. Also, we get his
 posts in double exemplars!

 Stephen Lin was definitely a spam, and, as someone (Telmo?) suggested,
 possibly a bot.

 Bruno





 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:

 Telmo, Do you think Quentin should be banned for bullying?


 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 9:39 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
 wrote:

 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 wrote:
 
 
 
  2013/11/1 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
 
  On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
  wrote:
   OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively
   suggests
   rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However,
   your
   insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited.
 
  And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do
  with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger
  says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this
  sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying.
 
 
  It's also true, but these people did everything to deserve that sort of
  bullying, nobody forced these two individuals to spam the list.

 I would be ok with banning them for spamming, but I don't think that
 anyone deserves bullying.

  Quentin
 
 
  
   On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
   wrote:
  
   OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I
   respect
   intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument.
  
   Quentin
  
  
   2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
  
   Intuition
  
  
   On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux
   allco...@gmail.com
   wrote:
  
  
   Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a
   écrit :
   
John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a
roger
or
stephen lin. Richard
  
   What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that
   we've
   found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big
   bang?
   Quentin
   
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux
allco...@gmail.com
wrote:
  
  
   
   
   
   
2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
   
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux
allco...@gmail.com wrote:
   
 As I said before there is a profound difference between
 the
 two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE
 person is seen by a
 third party so it's easy to determine who you is and
 easy
 

Re: For John Clark

2013-11-02 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Since more than one or two years, John Clark oscillates between obvious
 non sense to obvious, period. We might hope than in his obvious,
 period phase, he might go to the next step,


John Clark doesn't do that because John Clark knows that the lifetime of
the true but trivial phase can be measured in hours, or perhaps even
minutes, and then turn back into the gibberish phase. For example, Bruno
Marchal simply can not allow  Bruno Marchal's previous statement  you
concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki  to stand as
is because it would render false other statements of Bruno Marchal, such as
you will see only one city.

Thus at this very instant Bruno Marchal is probably adding lots of pee pee
and circular caveats to his statement ( such as you is what is seen from
the 1P view and what is seen from the 1P view is you) and the transition
from trivial to gibberish will have completed yet another cycle.

  John K Clark











On 1 November 2013 17:31, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:




 On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 7:51 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.comwrote:

  A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and
 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball
 changing color


 Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked until
 there is something different about them, such as one remembering seeing a
 red ball and the other remember seeing a green ball, only then do they
 fork. It was the decision made by somebody or something outside the
 simulation to make sure all 256 saw a difference sequence of colored balls
 that created 256 distinct minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision
 made outside the simulation would be indistinguishable from being random,
 that is to say the simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure
 out what that decision would be.

  B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number
 generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether
 the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times* Then *the
 AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred
 first.

 Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it
 is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted  thought experiments are
 not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that
 in A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but
 as the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of
 itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original
 or the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true.

 So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A
 was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no
 difference.


 Thank you for answering. I think we are in agreement.



  I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all,
 and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from
 all the views, the conclusion is the same.


 Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound
 conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's
 grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as
 dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big
 buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually.


 Well there is one difference: the entire protocol is explained to the AI,
 it knows exactly what will happen in each of the 256 possibilities, but
 from inside the simulation, it is no different than had the sequence of
 colors been chosen completely randomly.

 Also, you are mistaken if you think this is the grand conclusion of the
 UDA, it is only one small (but necessary) step in the reasoning.  If you
 want to get to the grand conclusion you need only continue on to the next
 steps.  It seems you have grasped the point of step 3 and are in agreement
 that subjective indeterminacy can arise in a fully understood and
 deterministic process.

 I'll re-post the link for your convenience.  You are less than 2-3 pages
 away from finishing reading the UDA:
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm

 Jason



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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-02 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 5:13 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  Since more than one or two years, John Clark oscillates between obvious
  non sense to obvious, period. We might hope than in his obvious, 
  period
  phase, he might go to the next step,


 John Clark doesn't do that because John Clark knows that the lifetime of
 the true but trivial phase can be measured in hours, or perhaps even
 minutes, and then turn back into the gibberish phase. For example, Bruno
 Marchal simply can not allow  Bruno Marchal's previous statement  you
 concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki  to stand as
 is because it would render false other statements of Bruno Marchal, such as
 you will see only one city.

 Thus at this very instant Bruno Marchal is probably adding lots of pee pee
 and circular caveats to his statement ( such as you is what is seen from
 the 1P view and what is seen from the 1P view is you) and the transition
 from trivial to gibberish will have completed yet another cycle.

John, you are the guy who explained Bell's inequality in a very
compelling way. You're obviously smart, so why are you only engaging
in personal attacks? I could understand that if personal attack were
the only thing left in the discussion, but this is not the case at
all.

Why don't you instead address the issues that have been pointed about
your position, namely:

- that it renders the probability of a coin toss to either 0 or 1
- that if you refuse to accept the 1p/3p distinction, then you also
have to refuse the MWI

?

Telmo.

   John K Clark











 On 1 November 2013 17:31, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:




 On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 7:51 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
 wrote:

  A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and
  256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball
  changing color


 Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked until
 there is something different about them, such as one remembering seeing a
 red ball and the other remember seeing a green ball, only then do they fork.
 It was the decision made by somebody or something outside the simulation to
 make sure all 256 saw a difference sequence of colored balls that created
 256 distinct minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision made outside the
 simulation would be indistinguishable from being random, that is to say the
 simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure out what that decision
 would be.

  B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number
  generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether
  the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times Then the AI 
  (or
  AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred 
  first.

 Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it
 is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted  thought experiments are
 not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that in
 A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but as
 the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of
 itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original or
 the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true.

 So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A
 was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no
 difference.


 Thank you for answering. I think we are in agreement.



  I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all,
  and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from 
  all
  the views, the conclusion is the same.


 Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound
 conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's
 grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as
 dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big
 buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually.


 Well there is one difference: the entire protocol is explained to the AI,
 it knows exactly what will happen in each of the 256 possibilities, but from
 inside the simulation, it is no different than had the sequence of colors
 been chosen completely randomly.

 Also, you are mistaken if you think this is the grand conclusion of the
 UDA, it is only one small (but necessary) step in the reasoning.  If you
 want to get to the grand conclusion you need only continue on to the next
 steps.  It seems you have grasped the point of step 3 and are in agreement
 that subjective indeterminacy can arise in a fully understood and
 deterministic process.

 I'll re-post the link for your convenience.  You are less than 2-3 pages
 away from 

Re: For John Clark

2013-11-02 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi,

I comment on Quentin, and then on John, to help anyone interested.


On 01 Nov 2013, at 22:22, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2013/11/1 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com

On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 3:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote


 The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and  
contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now  
there are 2 (or more) people with the title you ...


 ..., but now there are 2 (or more) people IN THE THIRD PERSON POV,

And there are also 2 people IN THE FIRST PERSON POV and one of them  
does not have a stronger claim to having a subjective existence than  
the other.


 but the question concern the FIRST PERSON POV.

You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and they  
both remember writing the diary, so which one is

 Bruno Marchal talking about?

Anyone of the two...


Exact.


each will have a different diary, and by repeating the experience  
they will notice the frequency goes to 0.5, like when you do a coin  
toss... oh but wait... JC does not want to look at that, oh wait...  
JC said that probability is 0 or 1 yes JC knows all.


Exact. The prediction, asked in Helsinki, concerned the 1-views, and  
by comp we know that the 1-view is felt as unique, from the 1-view  
point.
It looks like John Clark's Strategy consists in describing only the 3- 
views.  He is aware of the existence of the 1-view, and agreed that  
they are unique---from their own 1-view, but keeps giving the 3-view  
on the 1-views.









 And in Helsinki, you knew this in advance. You know that you will  
survive


Yes, assuming that the pronoun you means what a fellow by the name  
of  Bruno Marchal  says it means , namely   you concerns the  
guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki.



John,
In most (all?) natural languages we use the same pronouns for the 1- 
view, and the 3-view, and this for the probable reason that by  
reproducing by sex, and by dying, we hide that we are all the same  
amoeba, at least in the sense of the you in Washington is the same  
person than the you in Moscow. We don't really recognize our children,  
somehow.
here the 1-you's experience admits a very simple definition: it is the  
story written in the diary that *you take with you, in Helsinki, in  
the teleportation box.


Assuming you believe in comp, and assuming comp, you know that 1-you  
will live  (write in the diary) a unique experience, and you are  
asked to evaluate the chance of which one. You know intellectually  
that the 1-you will live all experience, but you know that they all  
will live only one from their point of view, and so will have the  
right to ask to themselves question like why am I the one with the  
experience (described in the diary):


MMWWMWWMMM

Why this one? And how to evaluate if the next one is W or M?  Oh! but  
that's PI in binary, so it looks like my story is PI in binary (*), so  
I can predict that the next experience will be W! Is that rational  
with respect to comp? The fact is that the prediction will be refuted  
by one of the continuation, and we have already agree that they are  
both consistent extension with the right to identify themselves with  
the person before duplication, and so we have to listen to BOTH of them.
In the worlds of the iterated self-duplication, prediction like PI,  
always W, are confirmed by a set of experience which get measure 0  
among all (infinite) experiences.


Fortunately, if in the arithmetical reality there is some amount of  
randomness, there is much more structure than that, and with comp, the  
points of view (always self-referential with respect to some universal  
number(s)), get structured by the logics of self-reference (the  
infinity of them).



(*) pi, in binary, is  
11.001001110110101010001000110110100011...










 and experience being in only one place.

No, assuming that the pronoun you means what a fellow by the name  
of  Bruno Marchal says it means , namely  you concerns the guy(s)  
who will remember having been in Helsinki. And now ladies and  
gentleman let the backpedaling begin! If we backpedal hard enough  
soon we will leave the kingdom of the true but trivial and enter the  
land of gibberish.


 and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to.

 False. It is very easy. In both city the diary is the one [you]  
have with where [you] have found to be,
^ 
^^   ^^^
There we go again with that damn weasel pronoun! But it won't get  
Bruno Marchal off the hook this time, Bruno Marchal stated what it  
means,  you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in  
Helsinki, therefore the fellow named you has found himself to be  
in BOTH Washington and Moscow.


 and it is the diary containing the prediction written in Helsinki.

And it was written by you and you now resides 

Re: For John Clark

2013-11-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 02 Nov 2013, at 11:13, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 6:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 01 Nov 2013, at 15:17, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

When some bully oversteps the line of decency, then by default any
discussion ceases to be rational. Then we are left with the choice  
to let it

be or denounce the crossing of our personalized line.

With regards to this infinite back and forth, all the insults and  
cul-de-sac
arguments, with zero progress on this exchange with Julius Caesar,  
I believe

Quentin has every right to say spammer and troll.

Quentin's reaction and tone in this regard are more plausible to me  
than the

posts of JC. Increasingly so, in fact. PGC


I can't agree more.

I don't understand why Quentin get nervous (once) on Richard, who  
was just

slow to see some point, and that happens to any of us, when tired, or
something (to be nervous, or to be slow).
Keep in mind people in this list lives under different amount of sun!

But it is a sort of relief for me that you, and Quentin (and some  
others)
got also the feeling that JC might act as a bullyer or troll-like,.  
That's
clear, to *me* with his insulting tone when trying to deride any  
attempt to
study something. I am not too well placed to say that to Clark, so  
I think
that you and Quentin are ... rather courageous to witness this.  
That can

help everybody.


I think JC must have realised at some point that his initial
objections were not valid but, by that point, he was too invested in
proving you wrong.


OK. That's the pride theory, and making it explicit will not help  
John. I guess.
But there are other theories. May be he believes that from step 3  
everything follows correctly, and he finds the conclusion too much  
startling. Or something like that.






His more recent objections are more suspicious,
because it's hard to believe that a smart guy who understands and
explains complex ideas cannot see the problem with arguing in a way
that goes against the usual meaning of probabilities. He's also
insisting that you said things that we all can see that you have not
(like the infamous back-paddling on definitions accusation).


Glad you saw that.

Why does John Clark do this publicly? Why not in private circles like  
my usual opponents.

There is an amount of rare braveness in John Clark that I appreciate.

Enough brave to go to step 4? That's the question.




On the bright side, Bruno, people have been discussing your ideas for
years and keep doing so. This is a huge victory, as any scientist
knows. Trolling comes with exposure. There's no reason for you to be
sad, really. Many of us are very happy that you and your ideas exist
in this world, and it's even better that we get to discuss them with
you.


Thanks for the warm remarks,

Best,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-02 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:22 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

 You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and they both
 remember writing the diary, so which one is Bruno Marchal talking about?


  Anyone of the two


So you sees both Moscow AND Washington.

 each will have a different diary


 A different diary?? Both the Washington Man and the Helsinki Man remember
writing the exact same identical diary and the last line says  I Quentin
Anciaux in Helsinki am now walking into the duplication chamber, and now I
see the operator starting to push the on butto.

So it's true that you wrote the diary, but which one is you?

  John K Clark

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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-02 Thread Jason Resch
On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote:




 Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you have.


 Are you referring to Quantum Mechanics and Experience (1992)?  I do not
 have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the same).


 It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing in his
 defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett.




Bruno,

I have just finished reading this book.  I thank you for recommending it as
it helped me get some familiarity with the math and the notation.  I found
the first 120 or so pages quite infuriating, for he would seeming get so
close to the idea of observers being in superpositions, (teasing and
dangling the idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical.  It
was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed make sense, but
almost immediately after page 123, and following a handwavy dismissal of
Everett returns to irrationality, until page 130 when he introduces the
many-minds theory.  Strangely, he claims that he (Albert) and Barry Loewer
introduced the theory, with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh.

While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers locality, he
never explains how many-minds is any better (or different than)
many-worlds.  Also, I found it strange that he considered many-minds and
Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm requires additional assumptions beyond
the four quantum postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is
incompatible with special relativity.

Jason

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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-02 Thread meekerdb

On 11/2/2013 10:53 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:22 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com 
mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and they 
both
remember writing the diary, so which one is Bruno Marchal talking about?


 Anyone of the two


So you sees both Moscow AND Washington.

 each will have a different diary


 A different diary?? Both the Washington Man and the Helsinki Man remember writing the 
exact same identical diary and the last line says  I Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki am now 
walking into the duplication chamber, and now I see the operator starting to push the on 
butto.


So it's true that you wrote the diary, but which one is you?


As I see it, the question is whether the duplication experiment provides a good model of 
randomness.  If we imagine doing the experiment four times, sending the subject(s) through 
repeatedly at the end there will be 16 diaries and they will contain the entries:


, WMMM, MWMM, WWMM, MMWM, WMWM, MWWM, WWWM, MMMW, WMMW, MWMW, WWMW, MMWW, 
WMWW, MWWW, 

and so the participants might compare diaries and conclude that going to Moscow or 
Washington is a random event with probability 1/2 - or at least in limit of large numbers 
of repetitions.  Karl Popper already suggested this model of randomness in The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery and he probably wasn't the first.


Brent

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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 6:54 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  this distracts from the question asked, which concerns the first person
  pov, from the first person pov. That is the first person experience. [...]
  Comp accepts that both copies are equivalent (with respect to identity)
  continuations of the original, but the prediction bears on the first person
  experience.


 It is a mystery that Marchal can not get it through his head that copying a
 person means there are now 2 identical first person experiences because YOU
 HAS BEEN DUPLICATED, and the 2 will remain identical until one sees
 something that the other has not.

This has never been disputed by Bruno or anyone else, as far as I've seen.
Please describe what you believe your experience will be after
duplication. Describe it from your point of view. If you do not accept
to do this you are just refusing to consider the thought experiment,
nor arguing against it.

  If 100% was true, for P(W), we would have, in the iterated version,  the
  history WWW... having a 100% probability, yet, all diaries but one, 
  will
  contradict that prediction.

 If you predicted that you will see Washington and you does see
 Washington then the prediction that there was a 100% chance that you will
 see Washington

This a posteriori thinking is against the very concept of probability.
You can use it to refute the claim that if I throw a coin, the
probability that I see heads is 0.5. It becomes either 0 or 1.

 was correct and it doesn't matter how many people who also
 lay claim to the title you don't see Washington.

  The proba concerns the first person experience that you will live, and
  recall in the next instants, by writing it in the diary.


 The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains
 predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or
 more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the
 diary was referring to.  And the diary is useless because good predictions
 have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions.

You can use the same argument to refute all of medical research. The
antibiotic either cures you or doesn't. By this reasoning, one might
as well take a tic tac to cure cancer.

Telmo.

   John K Clark


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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 31 Oct 2013, at 18:54, John Clark wrote:



On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


 this distracts from the question asked, which concerns the first  
person pov, from the first person pov. That is the first person  
experience. [...] Comp accepts that both copies are equivalent (with  
respect to identity) continuations of the original, but the  
prediction bears on the first person experience.


It is a mystery that Marchal can not get it through his head that  
copying a person means there are now 2 identical first person  
experiences because YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED, and the 2 will remain  
identical until one sees something that the other has not.


Which is the time he has to confirmed his previous prediction.




 If 100% was true, for P(W), we would have, in the iterated  
version,  the history WWW... having a 100% probability, yet, all  
diaries but one, will contradict that prediction.


If you predicted that you will see Washington and you does see  
Washington then the prediction that there was a 100% chance that  
you will see Washington was correct and it doesn't matter how many  
people who also lay claim to the title you don't see Washington.


The same can be said for a coin throwing. the guy who predict tail,  
and got tail can says that his prediction was correct. So if your  
argument can be used against the FPI, it works for MWI and for coin  
throwing. You are mocking any notion of probability.






 The proba concerns the first person experience that you will live,  
and recall in the next instants, by writing it in the diary.


The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and  
contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now  
there are 2 (or more) people with the title you ...



..., but now there are 2 (or more) people IN THE THIRD PERSON POV, but  
the question concern the FIRST PERSON POV. And in Helsinki, you knew  
this in advance. You know that you will survive and experience being  
in only one place.



... and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to.


False. It is very easy. In both city the diary is the one you have  
with where you have found to be, and it is the diary containing the  
prediction written in Helsinki.




And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do  
with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions.


Exactly. So if you wrote W  M, both copies know that the prediction  
is wrong. With W v M, both copies know that the prediction was  
correct.


You continue to ignore that the question concerns the 1-you, as seen  
by the 1-you, and not any 3-view of the situation.


Bruno






  John K Clark



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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 31 Oct 2013, at 20:49, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux  
allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 As I said before there is a profound difference between the two.  
After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen  
by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to  
determine if predictions about what you will see were right or  
wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly  
seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the  
predictions about what you will see are useless. And another  
difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and  
probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense  
of self. [...]  In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the  
only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear  
as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things,  
and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the  
probability you will see X?.  [...]  The diary is useless because  
the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the  
further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people  
with the title you and no way to determine which one the diary was  
referring to.  And the diary is useless because good predictions  
have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad  
predictions.


 So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are  
not consistent


The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been  
having on this thread:


Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's  
ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently.


Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about  
probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of  
self are fundamentally different.


Everett uses as much the simple notion of self on which we have  
already agree. Throwing a coin too. You could not predict what you  
will see (head or tail) if you don't survive the coin throwing. All  
your argument to refute the FPI works without change in the MWI, and  
in any random experience.


Bruno




Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John  
Clark's points.


Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults  
directed at John Clark.


Step 5: GOTO step 1.

   John k Clark





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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Nov 2013, at 02:51, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com  
wrote:


 A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times  
and 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of  
the ball changing color


Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked  
until there is something different about them, such as one  
remembering seeing a red ball and the other remember seeing a green  
ball, only then do they fork. It was the decision made by somebody  
or something outside the simulation to make sure all 256 saw a  
difference sequence of colored balls that created 256 distinct  
minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision made outside the  
simulation would be indistinguishable from being random, that is to  
say the simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure out  
what that decision would be.


 B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random  
number generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation)  
determines whether the ball changes to red or blue with 50%  
probability 8 times Then the AI (or AIs) could not say whether test  
A occurred first or test B occurred first.


Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know  
what it is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted  thought  
experiments are not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The  
only difference is that in A lots of copies are made of the  
intelligence and in B they are not; but as the intelligence would  
have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of itself or not nor  
would it have any way of knowing if it was the original or the copy,  
subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true.


So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing  
if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would  
make no difference.


 I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at  
all, and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one  
view or from all the views, the conclusion is the same.


Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound  
conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and  
Bruno's grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just  
regular old dull as dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og  
the caveman. After the big buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually.


If step 3 is that easy, then you can surely proceed to step 4.
So what about step 4?

Bruno





  John K Clark



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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Nov 2013, at 07:04, LizR wrote:


So, has step 3 gone from that's absurd to everyone knows that ?!


Since more than one or two years, John Clark oscillates between  
obvious non sense to obvious, period.


We might hope than in his obvious, period phase, he might go to the  
next step, but that has never happened.


I don't like that, but I'm afraid that Quentin is right, and that  
John's behavior is akin to trolling.


I can hope that he can change his mind, because some people have  
already denied the FPI for many years, and then suddenly grasp and  
acknowledge the point. This happens when they get the 1/3 pov  
distinction (which seems indeed hard for some people, and quite easy  
for others).
But usually, people answering with lies and deformation of questions  
(like John Clark does all the time) remain stuck in deby, and I think  
their agenda is more in a sort of defamation, than in trying to grasp,  
or genuinely refute, a statement.


I am not sure it makes sense to answer him anymore, as he uses this to  
spread its bad faith, and lies.


Bruno









On 1 November 2013 17:31, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:



On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 7:51 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com  
wrote:
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com  
wrote:


 A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times  
and 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of  
the ball changing color


Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked  
until there is something different about them, such as one  
remembering seeing a red ball and the other remember seeing a green  
ball, only then do they fork. It was the decision made by somebody  
or something outside the simulation to make sure all 256 saw a  
difference sequence of colored balls that created 256 distinct  
minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision made outside the  
simulation would be indistinguishable from being random, that is to  
say the simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure out  
what that decision would be.


 B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random  
number generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation)  
determines whether the ball changes to red or blue with 50%  
probability 8 times Then the AI (or AIs) could not say whether test  
A occurred first or test B occurred first.


Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know  
what it is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted  thought  
experiments are not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The  
only difference is that in A lots of copies are made of the  
intelligence and in B they are not; but as the intelligence would  
have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of itself or not nor  
would it have any way of knowing if it was the original or the copy,  
subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true.


So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing  
if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would  
make no difference.


Thank you for answering. I think we are in agreement.


 I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at  
all, and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one  
view or from all the views, the conclusion is the same.


Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound  
conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and  
Bruno's grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just  
regular old dull as dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og  
the caveman. After the big buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually.


Well there is one difference: the entire protocol is explained to  
the AI, it knows exactly what will happen in each of the 256  
possibilities, but from inside the simulation, it is no different  
than had the sequence of colors been chosen completely randomly.


Also, you are mistaken if you think this is the grand conclusion of  
the UDA, it is only one small (but necessary) step in the  
reasoning.  If you want to get to the grand conclusion you need only  
continue on to the next steps.  It seems you have grasped the point  
of step 3 and are in agreement that subjective indeterminacy can  
arise in a fully understood and deterministic process.


I'll re-post the link for your convenience.  You are less than 2-3  
pages away from finishing reading the UDA: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm


Jason



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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit :

 John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or
stephen lin. Richard

What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've found
a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang?
Quentin

 On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
wrote:




 2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com

 On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
wrote:

  As I said before there is a profound difference between the two.
After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a
third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if
predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's
thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right
to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will
see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about
prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or
a sense of self. [...]  In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the
only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a
bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that
makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability
you will see X?.  [...]  The diary is useless because the diary was
written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of
you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way
to determine which one the diary was referring to.  And the diary is
useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a
sense of self than bad predictions.


  So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are not
consistent


 The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having
on this thread:


 No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps...

 Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger
and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're
just a troll.

 Quentin


 Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas
and Bruno's ideas inconsistently.

 Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about
probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are
fundamentally different.

 Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's
points.

 Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed
at John Clark.

 Step 5: GOTO step 1.

John k Clark




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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Richard Ruquist
Intuition


On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit :
 
  John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or
 stephen lin. Richard

 What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've found
 a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang?
 Quentin
 
  On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 wrote:

 
 
 
 
  2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
 
  On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 wrote:
 
   As I said before there is a profound difference between the two.
 After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a
 third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if
 predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's
 thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right
 to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will
 see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about
 prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or
 a sense of self. [...]  In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the
 only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a
 bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that
 makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability
 you will see X?.  [...]  The diary is useless because the diary was
 written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of
 you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way
 to determine which one the diary was referring to.  And the diary is
 useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a
 sense of self than bad predictions.
 
 
   So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are
 not consistent
 
 
  The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having
 on this thread:
 
 
  No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps...
 
  Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger
 and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're
 just a troll.
 
  Quentin

 
 
  Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas
 and Bruno's ideas inconsistently.
 
  Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about
 probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are
 fundamentally different.
 
  Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's
 points.
 
  Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed
 at John Clark.
 
  Step 5: GOTO step 1.
 
 John k Clark
 
 
 
 
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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Quentin Anciaux
OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I respect
intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument.

Quentin


2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com

 Intuition


 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:


 Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit :
 
  John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or
 stephen lin. Richard

 What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've
 found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang?
 Quentin
 
  On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 wrote:

 
 
 
 
  2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
 
  On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 wrote:
 
   As I said before there is a profound difference between the two.
 After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a
 third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if
 predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's
 thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right
 to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will
 see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about
 prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or
 a sense of self. [...]  In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the
 only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a
 bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that
 makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability
 you will see X?.  [...]  The diary is useless because the diary was
 written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of
 you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way
 to determine which one the diary was referring to.  And the diary is
 useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a
 sense of self than bad predictions.
 
 
   So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are
 not consistent
 
 
  The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having
 on this thread:
 
 
  No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps...
 
  Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger
 and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're
 just a troll.
 
  Quentin

 
 
  Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas
 and Bruno's ideas inconsistently.
 
  Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about
 probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are
 fundamentally different.
 
  Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John
 Clark's points.
 
  Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed
 at John Clark.
 
  Step 5: GOTO step 1.
 
 John k Clark
 
 
 
 
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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com

 OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively suggests
 rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However, your
 insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited.


Yes.




 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:

 OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I respect
 intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument.

 Quentin


 2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com

 Intuition


 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:


 Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit :
 
  John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger
 or stephen lin. Richard

 What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've
 found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang?
 Quentin
 
  On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 wrote:

 
 
 
 
  2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
 
  On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux 
 allco...@gmail.com wrote:
 
   As I said before there is a profound difference between the
 two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by
 a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine
 if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with
 Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal
 right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you
 will see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking
 about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with
 identity or a sense of self. [...]  In Everett's case we know who you is,
 it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people
 clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things,
 and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the
 probability you will see X?.  [...]  The diary is useless because the
 diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further
 adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title
 you and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to.  And
 the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with
 identity or a sense of self than bad predictions.
 
 
   So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are
 not consistent
 
 
  The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been
 having on this thread:
 
 
  No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps...
 
  Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet
 roger and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because
 you're just a troll.
 
  Quentin

 
 
  Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's
 ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently.
 
  Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about
 probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are
 fundamentally different.
 
  Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John
 Clark's points.
 
  Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults
 directed at John Clark.
 
  Step 5: GOTO step 1.
 
 John k Clark
 
 
 
 
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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
 OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively suggests
 rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However, your
 insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited.

And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do
with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger
says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this
sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying.


 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

 OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I respect
 intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument.

 Quentin


 2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com

 Intuition


 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 wrote:


 Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit :
 
  John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or
  stephen lin. Richard

 What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've
 found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang?
 Quentin
 
  On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
  wrote:


 
 
 
 
  2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
 
  On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux
  allco...@gmail.com wrote:
 
   As I said before there is a profound difference between the
   two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person 
   is seen by a
   third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to 
   determine if
   predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but 
   with Bruno's
   thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a 
   equal right to
   the title you which means that the predictions about what you 
   will see
   are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking 
   about
   prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with 
   identity or
   a sense of self. [...]  In Everett's case we know who you is, 
   it's the
   only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people 
   clear as a
   bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and 
   that makes
   meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability 
   you will
   see X?.  [...]  The diary is useless because the diary was 
   written by you
   and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, 
   but now
   there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way to 
   determine
   which one the diary was referring to.  And the diary is useless 
   because good
   predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self 
   than bad
   predictions.
 
 
   So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are
   not consistent
 
 
  The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been
  having on this thread:
 
 
  No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps...
 
  Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger
  and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're 
  just
  a troll.
 
  Quentin

 
 
  Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's
  ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently.
 
  Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about
  probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self 
  are
  fundamentally different.
 
  Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John
  Clark's points.
 
  Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults
  directed at John Clark.
 
  Step 5: GOTO step 1.
 
 John k Clark
 
 
 
 
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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/11/1 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com

 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
 wrote:
  OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively suggests
  rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However, your
  insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited.

 And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do
 with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger
 says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this
 sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying.


It's also true, but these people did everything to deserve that sort of
bullying, nobody forced these two individuals to spam the list.

Quentin


 
  On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 wrote:
 
  OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I respect
  intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument.
 
  Quentin
 
 
  2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
 
  Intuition
 
 
  On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
  wrote:
 
 
  Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit :
  
   John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger
 or
   stephen lin. Richard
 
  What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've
  found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang?
  Quentin
  
   On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux 
 allco...@gmail.com
   wrote:
 
 
  
  
  
  
   2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
  
   On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux
   allco...@gmail.com wrote:
  
As I said before there is a profound difference between the
two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE
 person is seen by a
third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy
 to determine if
predictions about what you will see were right or wrong,
 but with Bruno's
thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have
 a equal right to
the title you which means that the predictions about what
 you will see
are useless. And another difference is that Everett was
 talking about
prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do
 with identity or
a sense of self. [...]  In Everett's case we know who you
 is, it's the
only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2
 people clear as a
bell and both are called you and both saw different
 things, and that makes
meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the
 probability you will
see X?.  [...]  The diary is useless because the diary was
 written by you
and contains predictions about the further adventures of
 you, but now
there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way
 to determine
which one the diary was referring to.  And the diary is
 useless because good
predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of
 self than bad
predictions.
  
  
So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you
 are
not consistent
  
  
   The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been
   having on this thread:
  
  
   No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps...
  
   Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet
 roger
   and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because
 you're just
   a troll.
  
   Quentin
 
  
  
   Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's
   ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently.
  
   Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about
   probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of
 self are
   fundamentally different.
  
   Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John
   Clark's points.
  
   Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults
   directed at John Clark.
  
   Step 5: GOTO step 1.
  
  John k Clark
  
  
  
  
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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:



 2013/11/1 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com

 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
 wrote:
  OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively suggests
  rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However, your
  insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited.

 And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do
 with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger
 says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this
 sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying.


 It's also true, but these people did everything to deserve that sort of
 bullying, nobody forced these two individuals to spam the list.

I would be ok with banning them for spamming, but I don't think that
anyone deserves bullying.

 Quentin


 
  On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
  wrote:
 
  OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I respect
  intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument.
 
  Quentin
 
 
  2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
 
  Intuition
 
 
  On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
  wrote:
 
 
  Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit :
  
   John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger
   or
   stephen lin. Richard
 
  What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've
  found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang?
  Quentin
  
   On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux
   allco...@gmail.com
   wrote:
 
 
  
  
  
  
   2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
  
   On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux
   allco...@gmail.com wrote:
  
As I said before there is a profound difference between the
two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE
person is seen by a
third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy
to determine if
predictions about what you will see were right or wrong,
but with Bruno's
thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have
a equal right to
the title you which means that the predictions about what
you will see
are useless. And another difference is that Everett was
talking about
prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do
with identity or
a sense of self. [...]  In Everett's case we know who you
is, it's the
only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2
people clear as a
bell and both are called you and both saw different
things, and that makes
meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the
probability you will
see X?.  [...]  The diary is useless because the diary was
written by you
and contains predictions about the further adventures of
you, but now
there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way
to determine
which one the diary was referring to.  And the diary is
useless because good
predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of
self than bad
predictions.
  
  
So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you
are
not consistent
  
  
   The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been
   having on this thread:
  
  
   No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps...
  
   Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet
   roger
   and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because
   you're just
   a troll.
  
   Quentin
 
  
  
   Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's
   ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently.
  
   Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about
   probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of
   self are
   fundamentally different.
  
   Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John
   Clark's points.
  
   Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults
   directed at John Clark.
  
   Step 5: GOTO step 1.
  
  John k Clark
  
  
  
  
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   Groups Everything List group.
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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Richard Ruquist
Telmo, Do you think Quentin should be banned for bullying?


On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 9:39 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote:

 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 wrote:
 
 
 
  2013/11/1 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
 
  On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
  wrote:
   OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively
 suggests
   rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However,
 your
   insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited.
 
  And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do
  with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger
  says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this
  sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying.
 
 
  It's also true, but these people did everything to deserve that sort of
  bullying, nobody forced these two individuals to spam the list.

 I would be ok with banning them for spamming, but I don't think that
 anyone deserves bullying.

  Quentin
 
 
  
   On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
   wrote:
  
   OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I
 respect
   intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument.
  
   Quentin
  
  
   2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
  
   Intuition
  
  
   On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 
   wrote:
  
  
   Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a
 écrit :
   
John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a
 roger
or
stephen lin. Richard
  
   What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that
 we've
   found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang?
   Quentin
   
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux
allco...@gmail.com
wrote:
  
  
   
   
   
   
2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
   
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux
allco...@gmail.com wrote:
   
 As I said before there is a profound difference between
 the
 two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE
 person is seen by a
 third party so it's easy to determine who you is and
 easy
 to determine if
 predictions about what you will see were right or wrong,
 but with Bruno's
 thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that
 have
 a equal right to
 the title you which means that the predictions about
 what
 you will see
 are useless. And another difference is that Everett was
 talking about
 prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do
 with identity or
 a sense of self. [...]  In Everett's case we know who
 you
 is, it's the
 only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2
 people clear as a
 bell and both are called you and both saw different
 things, and that makes
 meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the
 probability you will
 see X?.  [...]  The diary is useless because the diary
 was
 written by you
 and contains predictions about the further adventures of
 you, but now
 there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no
 way
 to determine
 which one the diary was referring to.  And the diary is
 useless because good
 predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of
 self than bad
 predictions.
   
   
 So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you
 are
 not consistent
   
   
The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been
having on this thread:
   
   
No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps...
   
Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet
roger
and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because
you're just
a troll.
   
Quentin
  
   
   
Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's
ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently.
   
Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about
probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature
 of
self are
fundamentally different.
   
Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John
Clark's points.
   
Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults
directed at John Clark.
   
Step 5: GOTO step 1.
   
   John k Clark
   
   
   
   
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 it,
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For more options, visit
 

Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com

 Telmo, Do you think Quentin should be banned for bullying?


I did not bully you, I asked several times the same question, firstly
gently, and you mocked me, secondly, you mocked the proves/suggest, then
you said fuck you (I said for fuck sake before, not fuck you), then you
dismissed it you never answered (at that time)... No you say it's an
intuition, intuition is not an argument (and that proves you did not have
one at the time you said that).

Concerning John Clark, he is definitelly a troll, he will never acknowledge
anything, he doesn't discuss, he listen to himself.

Quentin






 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 9:39 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote:

 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 wrote:
 
 
 
  2013/11/1 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
 
  On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
  wrote:
   OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively
 suggests
   rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However,
 your
   insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited.
 
  And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do
  with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger
  says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this
  sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying.
 
 
  It's also true, but these people did everything to deserve that sort of
  bullying, nobody forced these two individuals to spam the list.

 I would be ok with banning them for spamming, but I don't think that
 anyone deserves bullying.

  Quentin
 
 
  
   On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
   wrote:
  
   OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I
 respect
   intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument.
  
   Quentin
  
  
   2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
  
   Intuition
  
  
   On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux 
 allco...@gmail.com
   wrote:
  
  
   Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a
 écrit :
   
John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a
 roger
or
stephen lin. Richard
  
   What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that
 we've
   found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang?
   Quentin
   
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux
allco...@gmail.com
wrote:
  
  
   
   
   
   
2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
   
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux
allco...@gmail.com wrote:
   
 As I said before there is a profound difference between
 the
 two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE
 person is seen by a
 third party so it's easy to determine who you is and
 easy
 to determine if
 predictions about what you will see were right or
 wrong,
 but with Bruno's
 thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that
 have
 a equal right to
 the title you which means that the predictions about
 what
 you will see
 are useless. And another difference is that Everett was
 talking about
 prediction and probability, and neither has anything to
 do
 with identity or
 a sense of self. [...]  In Everett's case we know who
 you
 is, it's the
 only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2
 people clear as a
 bell and both are called you and both saw different
 things, and that makes
 meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the
 probability you will
 see X?.  [...]  The diary is useless because the diary
 was
 written by you
 and contains predictions about the further adventures of
 you, but now
 there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no
 way
 to determine
 which one the diary was referring to.  And the diary is
 useless because good
 predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense
 of
 self than bad
 predictions.
   
   
 So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't,
 you
 are
 not consistent
   
   
The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been
having on this thread:
   
   
No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps...
   
Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet
roger
and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong,
 because
you're just
a troll.
   
Quentin
  
   
   
Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats
 Everett's
ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently.
   
Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about
probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature
 of
self are
fundamentally different.
   
Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John
Clark's points.
   
Step 4: Quentin 

Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy
When some bully oversteps the line of decency, then by default any
discussion ceases to be rational. Then we are left with the choice to let
it be or denounce the crossing of our personalized line.

With regards to this infinite back and forth, all the insults and
cul-de-sac arguments, with zero progress on this exchange with Julius
Caesar, I believe Quentin has every right to say spammer and troll.

Quentin's reaction and tone in this regard are more plausible to me than
the posts of JC. Increasingly so, in fact. PGC


On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:

 Telmo, Do you think Quentin should be banned for bullying?


 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 9:39 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote:

 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 wrote:
 
 
 
  2013/11/1 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
 
  On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
  wrote:
   OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively
 suggests
   rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However,
 your
   insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited.
 
  And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do
  with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger
  says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this
  sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying.
 
 
  It's also true, but these people did everything to deserve that sort of
  bullying, nobody forced these two individuals to spam the list.

 I would be ok with banning them for spamming, but I don't think that
 anyone deserves bullying.

  Quentin
 
 
  
   On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
   wrote:
  
   OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I
 respect
   intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument.
  
   Quentin
  
  
   2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
  
   Intuition
  
  
   On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux 
 allco...@gmail.com
   wrote:
  
  
   Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a
 écrit :
   
John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a
 roger
or
stephen lin. Richard
  
   What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that
 we've
   found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang?
   Quentin
   
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux
allco...@gmail.com
wrote:
  
  
   
   
   
   
2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
   
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux
allco...@gmail.com wrote:
   
 As I said before there is a profound difference between
 the
 two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE
 person is seen by a
 third party so it's easy to determine who you is and
 easy
 to determine if
 predictions about what you will see were right or
 wrong,
 but with Bruno's
 thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that
 have
 a equal right to
 the title you which means that the predictions about
 what
 you will see
 are useless. And another difference is that Everett was
 talking about
 prediction and probability, and neither has anything to
 do
 with identity or
 a sense of self. [...]  In Everett's case we know who
 you
 is, it's the
 only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2
 people clear as a
 bell and both are called you and both saw different
 things, and that makes
 meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the
 probability you will
 see X?.  [...]  The diary is useless because the diary
 was
 written by you
 and contains predictions about the further adventures of
 you, but now
 there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no
 way
 to determine
 which one the diary was referring to.  And the diary is
 useless because good
 predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense
 of
 self than bad
 predictions.
   
   
 So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't,
 you
 are
 not consistent
   
   
The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been
having on this thread:
   
   
No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps...
   
Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet
roger
and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong,
 because
you're just
a troll.
   
Quentin
  
   
   
Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats
 Everett's
ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently.
   
Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about
probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature
 of
self are
fundamentally different.
   
Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John
Clark's points.
   

Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Telmo Menezes
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
 Telmo, Do you think Quentin should be banned for bullying?

I don't think that anyone should be banned. We are all grown ups and
it's not that hard to set up an email filter.
I do think that it's depressing when people start referring to other
people in the third person as archetypes of low status.

 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 9:39 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
 wrote:

 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 wrote:
 
 
 
  2013/11/1 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
 
  On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
  wrote:
   OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively
   suggests
   rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However,
   your
   insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited.
 
  And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do
  with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger
  says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this
  sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying.
 
 
  It's also true, but these people did everything to deserve that sort of
  bullying, nobody forced these two individuals to spam the list.

 I would be ok with banning them for spamming, but I don't think that
 anyone deserves bullying.

  Quentin
 
 
  
   On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
   wrote:
  
   OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I
   respect
   intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument.
  
   Quentin
  
  
   2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
  
   Intuition
  
  
   On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux
   allco...@gmail.com
   wrote:
  
  
   Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a
   écrit :
   
John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a
roger
or
stephen lin. Richard
  
   What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that
   we've
   found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang?
   Quentin
   
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux
allco...@gmail.com
wrote:
  
  
   
   
   
   
2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
   
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux
allco...@gmail.com wrote:
   
 As I said before there is a profound difference between
 the
 two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE
 person is seen by a
 third party so it's easy to determine who you is and
 easy
 to determine if
 predictions about what you will see were right or
 wrong,
 but with Bruno's
 thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that
 have
 a equal right to
 the title you which means that the predictions about
 what
 you will see
 are useless. And another difference is that Everett was
 talking about
 prediction and probability, and neither has anything to
 do
 with identity or
 a sense of self. [...]  In Everett's case we know who
 you
 is, it's the
 only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2
 people clear as a
 bell and both are called you and both saw different
 things, and that makes
 meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the
 probability you will
 see X?.  [...]  The diary is useless because the diary
 was
 written by you
 and contains predictions about the further adventures of
 you, but now
 there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no
 way
 to determine
 which one the diary was referring to.  And the diary is
 useless because good
 predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense
 of
 self than bad
 predictions.
   
   
 So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't,
 you
 are
 not consistent
   
   
The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been
having on this thread:
   
   
No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps...
   
Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet
roger
and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong,
because
you're just
a troll.
   
Quentin
  
   
   
Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats
Everett's
ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently.
   
Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about
probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature
of
self are
fundamentally different.
   
Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John
Clark's points.
   
Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults
directed at John Clark.
   
Step 5: GOTO step 1.
   
   John k Clark
   
   
   
   
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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Nov 2013, at 08:06, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 6:54 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com  
wrote:


On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


this distracts from the question asked, which concerns the first  
person
pov, from the first person pov. That is the first person  
experience. [...]
Comp accepts that both copies are equivalent (with respect to  
identity)
continuations of the original, but the prediction bears on the  
first person

experience.



It is a mystery that Marchal can not get it through his head that  
copying a
person means there are now 2 identical first person experiences  
because YOU

HAS BEEN DUPLICATED, and the 2 will remain identical until one sees
something that the other has not.


This has never been disputed by Bruno or anyone else, as far as I've  
seen.

Please describe what you believe your experience will be after
duplication. Describe it from your point of view. If you do not accept
to do this you are just refusing to consider the thought experiment,
nor arguing against it.

If 100% was true, for P(W), we would have, in the iterated  
version,  the
history WWW... having a 100% probability, yet, all diaries  
but one, will

contradict that prediction.



If you predicted that you will see Washington and you does see
Washington then the prediction that there was a 100% chance that  
you will

see Washington


This a posteriori thinking is against the very concept of probability.
You can use it to refute the claim that if I throw a coin, the
probability that I see heads is 0.5. It becomes either 0 or 1.




Exactly what I said, before discovering your post, Telmo. Most  
argument by Clark contradicts Everett, or even, like here, the  
classical use of probability in statistics.


A long time ago, someone made the same critics, and conclude that the  
very notion of probability should be abandoned.
Schmidhuber also get a similar conclusion, on this list, mainly that  
all finite strings are predictable (but refused to answer when I asked  
him the winning Lottery Ticket of the month).


Why people acts like that remains a mystery to me, although I have  
many theories on this. One explains this behavior by the fear to be  
shown having been wrong by influence. I have exactly that same problem  
with the cannabis field. Even serious scientists can become irrational  
about cannabis, and it is, it seems to me, because they can't accept  
the idea that they might have been brainwashed. It is probably easier  
to accept having done an error than to admit having been somehow  
manipulated into doing that error, especially for rationalists.


Quentin is probably right, it might be just a question of pride.  
Rationalists' pride, when they are not just shown wrong, but shown  
influenced by authoritative arguments, or mundane gossips.


Bruno

I hate spinach, and I will not try to taste it, as I might like it,  
and I hate even more the idea that I might like spinach (Bruno, in  
Sylvie  Bruno, Lewis Carroll, (not the exact quote probably)).









was correct and it doesn't matter how many people who also
lay claim to the title you don't see Washington.

The proba concerns the first person experience that you will  
live, and

recall in the next instants, by writing it in the diary.



The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and  
contains
predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there  
are 2 (or
more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one  
the
diary was referring to.  And the diary is useless because good  
predictions
have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad  
predictions.


You can use the same argument to refute all of medical research. The
antibiotic either cures you or doesn't. By this reasoning, one might
as well take a tic tac to cure cancer.

Telmo.


 John K Clark


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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:04 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 So, has step 3 gone from that's absurd to everyone knows that ?!


Yes that is the situation right now, but with backpedaling and additional
caveats and restrictions made by Bruno and other members of this list that
I expect to hear about very soon, I imagine we will be back in the absurd
column shortly. At least that's whats has happened in the past around here,
when something is not absurd it is also not original, and when it is
original it is also absurd. And by absurd I don't mean too strange to be
true, I mean self contradictory.

Backpedaling is essential because as things stand right now you clearly
sees BOTH Moscow and Washington, and Bruno simply can't have that.

  John K Clark

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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Jason Resch
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 11:40 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:04 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

  So, has step 3 gone from that's absurd to everyone knows that ?!


 Yes that is the situation right now, but with backpedaling and additional
 caveats and restrictions made by Bruno and other members of this list that
 I expect to hear about very soon, I imagine we will be back in the absurd
 column shortly. At least that's whats has happened in the past around here,
 when something is not absurd it is also not original, and when it is
 original it is also absurd. And by absurd I don't mean too strange to be
 true, I mean self contradictory.

 Backpedaling is essential because as things stand right now you clearly
 sees BOTH Moscow and Washington, and Bruno simply can't have that.


Instead of back pedaling, I propose we start pedaling forward (on to the
next steps) so we don't argue about step 3 for the next five years.

Jason

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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/11/1 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com

 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:04 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

  So, has step 3 gone from that's absurd to everyone knows that ?!


 Yes that is the situation right now, but with backpedaling and additional
 caveats and restrictions made by Bruno and other members of this list that
 I expect to hear about very soon, I imagine we will be back in the absurd
 column shortly. At least that's whats has happened in the past around here,
 when something is not absurd it is also not original, and when it is
 original it is also absurd. And by absurd I don't mean too strange to be
 true, I mean self contradictory.

 Backpedaling is essential because as things stand right now you clearly


In your head only


 sees BOTH Moscow and Washington, and Bruno simply can't have that.

   John K Clark




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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Nov 2013, at 15:17, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

When some bully oversteps the line of decency, then by default any  
discussion ceases to be rational. Then we are left with the choice  
to let it be or denounce the crossing of our personalized line.


With regards to this infinite back and forth, all the insults and  
cul-de-sac arguments, with zero progress on this exchange with  
Julius Caesar, I believe Quentin has every right to say spammer  
and troll.


Quentin's reaction and tone in this regard are more plausible to me  
than the posts of JC. Increasingly so, in fact. PGC


I can't agree more.

I don't understand why Quentin get nervous (once) on Richard, who was  
just slow to see some point, and that happens to any of us, when  
tired, or something (to be nervous, or to be slow).

Keep in mind people in this list lives under different amount of sun!

But it is a sort of relief for me that you, and Quentin (and some  
others) got also the feeling that JC might act as a bullyer or troll- 
like,. That's clear, to *me* with his insulting tone when trying to  
deride any attempt to study something. I am not too well placed to say  
that to Clark, so I think that you and Quentin are ... rather  
courageous to witness this. That can help everybody.


About Roger Clough, his comment are in the topics, yet a bit aside the  
conversations and thread, and a bit self-advertizing and repetitive,  
but I would not qualify him as spam, although he is very near. Also,  
we get his posts in double exemplars!


Stephen Lin was definitely a spam, and, as someone (Telmo?) suggested,  
possibly a bot.


Bruno






On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com  
wrote:

Telmo, Do you think Quentin should be banned for bullying?


On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 9:39 AM, Telmo Menezes  
te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com  
wrote:




 2013/11/1 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com

 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist  
yann...@gmail.com

 wrote:
  OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively  
suggests
  rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite.  
However, your
  insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is  
unmerited.


 And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do
 with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what  
Roger
 says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like  
this

 sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying.


 It's also true, but these people did everything to deserve that  
sort of

 bullying, nobody forced these two individuals to spam the list.

I would be ok with banning them for spamming, but I don't think that
anyone deserves bullying.

 Quentin


 
  On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com 


  wrote:
 
  OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I  
respect

  intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument.
 
  Quentin
 
 
  2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
 
  Intuition
 
 
  On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com 


  wrote:
 
 
  Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com  
a écrit :

  
   John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized  
as a roger

   or
   stephen lin. Richard
 
  What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact  
that we've
  found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big  
bang?

  Quentin
  
   On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux
   allco...@gmail.com
   wrote:
 
 
  
  
  
  
   2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
  
   On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux
   allco...@gmail.com wrote:
  
As I said before there is a profound difference  
between the
two. After Everett's thought experiment is over  
only ONE

person is seen by a
third party so it's easy to determine who you is  
and easy

to determine if
predictions about what you will see were right or  
wrong,

but with Bruno's
thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen  
that have

a equal right to
the title you which means that the predictions  
about what

you will see
are useless. And another difference is that Everett  
was

talking about
prediction and probability, and neither has  
anything to do

with identity or
a sense of self. [...]  In Everett's case we know  
who you

is, it's the
only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we  
see 2

people clear as a
bell and both are called you and both saw different
things, and that makes
meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the
probability you will
see X?.  [...]  The diary is useless because the  
diary was

written by you
and contains predictions about the further  
adventures of

you, but now
there are 2 (or more) people with the title you  
and no way


Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Bruno Marchal

Liz,


On 01 Nov 2013, at 17:40, John Clark wrote:


On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:04 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 So, has step 3 gone from that's absurd to everyone knows that ?!

Yes that is the situation right now, but with backpedaling and  
additional caveats and restrictions made by Bruno and other members  
of this list that I expect to hear about very soon, I imagine we  
will be back in the absurd column shortly. At least that's whats has  
happened in the past around here, when something is not absurd it is  
also not original, and when it is original it is also absurd. And by  
absurd I don't mean too strange to be true, I mean self  
contradictory.


Backpedaling is essential because as things stand right now you  
clearly sees BOTH Moscow and Washington, and Bruno simply can't have  
that.


Liz, that one should be easy to answer. It is a good exercise. Hint:  
introducing the 1p and 3p distinction.


(That does not mean John Clark will not succeed in faking some non  
understanding after, but that's almost another topic).


Bruno



  John K Clark




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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Richard Ruquist
I am definitely slow compared to most of the members of this list.
Although I have a 1966 PhD in physics from Harvard,
my major was in electromagnetic theory,
and after graduation, studied radar scattering and laser propagation,
which are 19th century subjects even though the technology is 20th century.

My only claim to fame is as a whistleblower
who in 1987-1988 released the secret information
that Reagan's missile shield was inherently vulnerable;
after which I was black-balled out of military research.

My interest in string theory is subsequent to that event
and my approach is that of a systems analyst.
Not being capable of original work in any field
I merely cobble together various theories
without truly understanding any of them.
Richard





On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 1:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 01 Nov 2013, at 15:17, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

 When some bully oversteps the line of decency, then by default any
 discussion ceases to be rational. Then we are left with the choice to let
 it be or denounce the crossing of our personalized line.

 With regards to this infinite back and forth, all the insults and
 cul-de-sac arguments, with zero progress on this exchange with Julius
 Caesar, I believe Quentin has every right to say spammer and troll.

 Quentin's reaction and tone in this regard are more plausible to me than
 the posts of JC. Increasingly so, in fact. PGC


 I can't agree more.

 I don't understand why Quentin get nervous (once) on Richard, who was just
 slow to see some point, and that happens to any of us, when tired, or
 something (to be nervous, or to be slow).
 Keep in mind people in this list lives under different amount of sun!

 But it is a sort of relief for me that you, and Quentin (and some others)
 got also the feeling that JC might act as a bullyer or troll-like,. That's
 clear, to *me* with his insulting tone when trying to deride any attempt to
 study something. I am not too well placed to say that to Clark, so I think
 that you and Quentin are ... rather courageous to witness this. That can
 help everybody.

 About Roger Clough, his comment are in the topics, yet a bit aside the
 conversations and thread, and a bit self-advertizing and repetitive, but I
 would not qualify him as spam, although he is very near. Also, we get his
 posts in double exemplars!

 Stephen Lin was definitely a spam, and, as someone (Telmo?) suggested,
 possibly a bot.

 Bruno





 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:

 Telmo, Do you think Quentin should be banned for bullying?


 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 9:39 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote:

 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 wrote:
 
 
 
  2013/11/1 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
 
  On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
  wrote:
   OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively
 suggests
   rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However,
 your
   insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited.
 
  And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do
  with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger
  says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this
  sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying.
 
 
  It's also true, but these people did everything to deserve that sort of
  bullying, nobody forced these two individuals to spam the list.

 I would be ok with banning them for spamming, but I don't think that
 anyone deserves bullying.

  Quentin
 
 
  
   On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 
   wrote:
  
   OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I
 respect
   intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument.
  
   Quentin
  
  
   2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com
  
   Intuition
  
  
   On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux 
 allco...@gmail.com
   wrote:
  
  
   Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a
 écrit :
   
John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a
 roger
or
stephen lin. Richard
  
   What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that
 we've
   found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big
 bang?
   Quentin
   
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux
allco...@gmail.com
wrote:
  
  
   
   
   
   
2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
   
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux
allco...@gmail.com wrote:
   
 As I said before there is a profound difference between
 the
 two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE
 person is seen by a
 third party so it's easy to determine who you is and
 easy
 to determine if
 predictions about what you will see were right or
 wrong,
 but with Bruno's
 thought experiment TWO people can be clearly 

Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 3:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote

 The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains
 predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or
 more) people with the title you ...


  ..., but now there are 2 (or more) people IN THE THIRD PERSON POV,


And there are also 2 people IN THE FIRST PERSON POV and one of them does
not have a stronger claim to having a subjective existence than the other.

 but the question concern the FIRST PERSON POV.


You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and they both
remember writing the diary, so which one is
 Bruno Marchal talking about?

 And in Helsinki, you knew this in advance. You know that you will survive


Yes, assuming that the pronoun you means what a fellow by the name of
Bruno Marchal  says it means , namely   you concerns the guy(s) who will
remember having been in Helsinki.

 and experience being in only one place.


No, assuming that the pronoun you means what a fellow by the name of
Bruno Marchal says it means , namely  you concerns the guy(s) who will
remember having been in Helsinki. And now ladies and gentleman let the
backpedaling begin! If we backpedal hard enough soon we will leave the
kingdom of the true but trivial and enter the land of gibberish.

 and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to.


  False. It is very easy. In both city the diary is the one [you] have
 with where [you] have found to be,


^^^   ^^^
There we go again with that damn weasel pronoun! But it won't get Bruno
Marchal off the hook this time, Bruno Marchal stated what it means,  you
concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki, therefore
the fellow named you has found himself to be in BOTH Washington and
Moscow.

 and it is the diary containing the prediction written in Helsinki.


And it was written by you and you now resides in Washington AND Moscow.

 You continue to ignore that the question concerns the 1-you, as seen by
 [the 1-you] , and not any 3-view of the
 situation.
 ^


In the thought experiment there is no the 1-you there is only a 1-you
because YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED! That's what it means to be duplicated!

  John K Clark

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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/11/1 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com


 On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 3:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote

   The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and
 contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there
 are 2 (or more) people with the title you ...


  ..., but now there are 2 (or more) people IN THE THIRD PERSON POV,


 And there are also 2 people IN THE FIRST PERSON POV and one of them does
 not have a stronger claim to having a subjective existence than the other.

   but the question concern the FIRST PERSON POV.


 You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and they both
 remember writing the diary, so which one is
  Bruno Marchal talking about?


Anyone of the two... each will have a different diary, and by repeating the
experience they will notice the frequency goes to 0.5, like when you do a
coin toss... oh but wait... JC does not want to look at that, oh wait... JC
said that probability is 0 or 1 yes JC knows all.




   And in Helsinki, you knew this in advance. You know that you will
 survive


 Yes, assuming that the pronoun you means what a fellow by the name of
 Bruno Marchal  says it means , namely   you concerns the guy(s) who will
 remember having been in Helsinki.

  and experience being in only one place.


 No, assuming that the pronoun you means what a fellow by the name of
 Bruno Marchal says it means , namely  you concerns the guy(s) who will
 remember having been in Helsinki. And now ladies and gentleman let the
 backpedaling begin! If we backpedal hard enough soon we will leave the
 kingdom of the true but trivial and enter the land of gibberish.

  and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to.


  False. It is very easy. In both city the diary is the one [you] have
 with where [you] have found to be,


   ^^^   ^^^
 There we go again with that damn weasel pronoun! But it won't get Bruno
 Marchal off the hook this time, Bruno Marchal stated what it means,  you
 concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki, therefore
 the fellow named you has found himself to be in BOTH Washington and
 Moscow.

  and it is the diary containing the prediction written in Helsinki.


 And it was written by you and you now resides in Washington AND Moscow.

  You continue to ignore that the question concerns the 1-you, as seen by
 [the 1-you] , and not any 3-view of the
 situation.
 ^


 In the thought experiment there is no the 1-you there is only a 1-you
 because YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED! That's what it means to be duplicated!

   John K Clark

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Re: For John Clark

2013-11-01 Thread LizR
On 2 November 2013 15:57, Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com wrote:


 By the way, personally, I thank you for – at substantial personal cost --
 blowing the whistle on this 1980s MIC gravy train. A world without
 whistleblowers is – IMO the kind of place Torquemada would feel right at
 home in. 

 **

Seconded.

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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-31 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 30 Oct 2013, at 18:21, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2013/10/30 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 2:05 PM, Quentin Anciaux  
allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 Bruno asked me Do you think that you die in a self-duplication  
experience? and I said that depends on what the meaning of you  
is. Bruno responded with We have already agree that you concerns  
the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki, and that was  
fine with me because that is the meaning of the personal pronoun  
you that I like best. So I answered Bruno's question  in a clear  
no nonsense way, I said no, I don't think you die in a self- 
duplication experience. In those circumstances and given Bruno's  
definition of the pronoun what answer would you give?


 That I don't die.

Then we agree.

 Then Bruno started putting all sorts of additional caveats and  
restrictions on the meaning of you that were very unclear.


 He did not...

 So apparently we HAVEN'T already agree that you concerns the  
guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki.


 That has *always* been the definition.

If that is the definition of you then why in hell doesn't Bruno  
agree that you will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington?



Ah! Quentin, you miss that lie by Clark. I do agree that you will  
see both Moscow AND Washington, in the third person sense. You can  
apply the 3-view on the two copies, and keeping comp, they both are  
genuine survivor of the experiencer. I say this explicitly very often,  
like you can join me in W and M.


Of course, this distracts from the question asked, which concerns the  
first person pov, from the first person pov. That is the first person  
experience. That is, the city-content of the personal diary. In non  
case at all, will any diary contains: Oh I see M and I see W.  P(I  
will see only one city) = 1.


This shows also that the personal identity concerns is a red herring.  
Comp accepts that both copies are equivalent (with respect to  
identity) continuations of the original, but the prediction bears on  
the first person experience. Comp predicts that the first person  
experience will feel to be unique, trivially. It is the classical  
equivalent of Everett's remark that the quantum observer can't feel  
the split/superposition.









 It was at this point that I said Bruno was backpedaling and you  
started screaming personal insults.


 He never did.

Given Bruno's previous definition to now insist that you only sees  
one city is very vigorous backpedaling. And it's true Bruno never  
screamed personal insults, but you did.


 same thing in MWI. In MWI, you'll see from 1st POV *one*  
definite result,


 No. If MWI is correct then there are TWO 1st POV and you sees  
*two* definite results,


 No *each you* sees only *one* result.

Correct, *each you* sees only *one* result, and that is precisely  
HALF the amount of information that would be needed to disprove the  
proposition that you will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington, and in  
the MWI it is precisely HALF the amount of information that would be  
needed to disprove the proposition that you will see BOTH spin up  
and spin down. And don't blame me if the language seems convoluted,  
English was developed long before Everett was born, and we still  
don't have duplicating chambers; when we do the English language  
will need major revisions.



There is the 1-p and 3-p, but we can have a 3-view on 1-views = 3-1,  
and 1-view on 3-views, or 1-3.


We can have a 1-3-3-1-1-1-1-3-1 view on p, and in the math part if B =  
Gödel predicate, and []p = Bp  p.


It will be given by a (multi) modal formula []-B-B-[]-[]-[]-[]-B-[] p,  
which is an arithmetical formula, at the propositional level, for  
specific arithmetical propositions p. (But it cannot be a predicate,  
like B, due to the presence of  p).








 The only question ask is the probability you see moscow

Will the Moscow Man be one of the guy(s) who will remember having  
been in Helsinki? Yes. Therefore according to Bruno's definition of  
the pronoun (and mine too incidentally) you sees Moscow.


 (resp. washington)

Will the Washington Man be one of the guy(s) who will remember  
having been in Helsinki? Yes. Therefore according to Bruno's  
definition of the pronoun you sees Washington. And although that  
sounds ungrammatical it is logically correct, its just that the  
English language was never made with this sort of thing in mind.


 Answering 100% is simply false

No it isn't.

It is from 1st POV... each individual sees one and only one city  
(resp. each individual under MWI sees one and only one result, ie:  
spin up or down).



It is a mystery that Clark does not remember that the question  
concerns what will be written in the personal diary.


If 100% was true, for P(W), we would have, in the iterated version,   
the history WWW... having a 100% probability, yet, all diaries but  
one, will contradict that prediction.


P(I will see one city) = 1. And 

Re: For John Clark

2013-10-31 Thread John Clark
On Wed, Oct 30, 2013 at 1:21 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

 I think this entire matter could be clarified if you could reformulate
 the following question in such a way that a simple yes or no answer can be
 given:



   Do you die if two exact copies of Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki are made,
 one in Moscow and one in Washington and then the Helsinki body instantly
 destroyed?


  This is not what is asked


It's the question I asked!  I don't give a damn if I see Moscow or
Washington, I care if I live or die and I suspect you are more interested
in that question too. And if you could reformulate that question (never
mind the answer) so that it was clear to you i might understand what you're
talking about.

 what is asked is the probability to see moscow, likewise when you measure
 the spin of the electron, the question is the probability you measure spin
 up


As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After
Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third
party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if
predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's
thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right
to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will
see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about
prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or
a sense of self.

 both question are *valid* and have simple answer which is 0.5.


No, only one question is valid. In Everett's case we know who you is,
it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people
clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things,
and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the
probability you will see X?.

Not that predictions, good bad or meaningless, have anything to do with a
sense of self.

  Does the fellow who remembers being in Helsinki die if two exact copies
 of the fellow in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in Washington,
 and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed?
 I would answer the question with a simple no without the need for
 further explanations or caveats,


  That is still not the question asked. The question is about probability.
 The easiest way to rephrase it, is [...]


Stop telling me how simple it is to rephrase the question and actually
rephrase it. Rephrase that question into a sentence so that the question is
clear to you (we'll worry about the answer another time) and then maybe
what you're talking about will be clear to me.

 simply to look at the diary, and simply by repeating the experience and
 looking at the result of the diary you can infer the frequency of 0.5 and
 the correct probability.


A diary is of absolutely no value in this matter because the diary was
written by you yesterday and today I'm looking at 2 people who have a
equal right to be called you because they both remember being the
Helsinki Man yesterday.

  John K Clark

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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-31 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com

 On Wed, Oct 30, 2013 at 1:21 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:

  I think this entire matter could be clarified if you could reformulate
 the following question in such a way that a simple yes or no answer can be
 given:



   Do you die if two exact copies of Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki are
 made, one in Moscow and one in Washington and then the Helsinki body
 instantly destroyed?


  This is not what is asked


 It's the question I asked!


You do not have to choose the question to attack bruno's one... you either
answer his and proceed, or you do not and abandon MWI for the same reason.


  I don't give a damn if I see Moscow or Washington, I care if I live or
 die


The point is about step 3 and for you to proceed to step 4 or not... I
don't give a damn about what you give a damn.


 and I suspect you are more interested in that question too. And if you
 could reformulate that question (never mind the answer) so that it was
 clear to you i might understand what you're talking about.

  what is asked is the probability to see moscow, likewise when you
 measure the spin of the electron, the question is the probability you
 measure spin up


 As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After
 Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person


No, in everett experiment like in the duplication experiment after the
experiment there are two you, if you deny this, you deny *MW*I (as in
*multiple world*)


 is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you


The experience as nothing to do about who is you *simply look at the
goddamn diary*


 is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were
 right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be
 clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that
 the predictions about what you will see are useless. And another
 difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability,
 and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self.

  both question are *valid* and have simple answer which is 0.5.


 No, only one question is valid. In Everett's case we know who you is,
 it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people
 clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things,
 and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the
 probability you will see X?.

 Not that predictions, good bad or meaningless, have anything to do with a
 sense of self.

   Does the fellow who remembers being in Helsinki die if two exact
 copies of the fellow in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in
 Washington, and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed?
  I would answer the question with a simple no without the need for
 further explanations or caveats,


  That is still not the question asked. The question is about
 probability. The easiest way to rephrase it, is [...]


 Stop telling me how simple it is to rephrase the question and actually
 rephrase it. Rephrase that question into a sentence so that the question is
 clear to you (we'll worry about the answer another time) and then maybe
 what you're talking about will be clear to me.

  simply to look at the diary, and simply by repeating the experience and
 looking at the result of the diary you can infer the frequency of 0.5 and
 the correct probability.


 A diary is of absolutely no value in this matter because the diary was
 written by you yesterday and today I'm looking at 2 people who have a
 equal right to be called you because they both remember being the
 Helsinki Man yesterday.

   John K Clark


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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-31 Thread meekerdb

On 10/31/2013 10:18 AM, John Clark wrote:


 what is asked is the probability to see moscow, likewise when you measure 
the spin
of the electron, the question is the probability you measure spin up


As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought 
experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine 
who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right 
or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a 
equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will 
see are useless.



This seems like an inessential detail.  Instead of Moscow and Washington, suppose the 
teleportation is to Moscow and Anchorhead on Tatooine.  There is no third person who will 
see both.



And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and 
neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self.


Bruno is also asking about probability, which from a frequentist viewpoint can be inferred 
from the diary entries of the subjects.




 both question are *valid* and have simple answer which is 0.5.


No, only one question is valid. In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only 
fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are 
called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question 
asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?.


The more basic question is whether some kind of duplication is a possible model that can 
replace probabilisitic uncertainty in QM with deterministic evolution that still produces 
uncertainty.


Brent

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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-31 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 this distracts from the question asked, which concerns the first person
 pov, from the first person pov. That is the first person experience. [...]
 Comp accepts that both copies are equivalent (with respect to identity)
 continuations of the original, but the prediction bears on the first person
 experience.


It is a mystery that Marchal can not get it through his head that copying a
person means there are now 2 identical first person experiences because YOU
HAS BEEN DUPLICATED, and the 2 will remain identical until one sees
something that the other has not.

 If 100% was true, for P(W), we would have, in the iterated version,  the
 history WWW... having a 100% probability, yet, all diaries but one,
 will contradict that prediction.

 If you predicted that you will see Washington and you does see
Washington then the prediction that there was a 100% chance that you will
see Washington was correct and it doesn't matter how many people who also
lay claim to the title you don't see Washington.

 The proba concerns the first person experience that you will live, and
 recall in the next instants, by writing it in the diary.


The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains
predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or
more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the
diary was referring to.  And the diary is useless because good predictions
have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions.

  John K Clark

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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-31 Thread Jason Resch
John,

I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all, and
it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from all
the views, the conclusion is the same.  Perhaps you wouldn't mind
commenting on whether or not you agree with my conclusion.  I will re-post
it here in a single post for your convenience:

*First, consider this experiment:*

Imagine there is a conscious AI (or uploaded mind) inside a virtual
environment (an open field)
Inside that virtual environment is a ball, which the AI is looking at and
next to the ball is a note which reads:

At noon (when the virtual sun is directly overhead) the protocol will
begin.  In the protocol, the process containing this simulation will fork
(split in two), after the fork, the color of the ball will change to red
for the parent process and it will change to blue in the child process
(forking duplicates a process into two identical copies, with one called
the parent and the other the child). A second after the color of the ball
is set, another fork will happen.  This will happen 8 times leading to 256
processes, after which the simulation will end.

*
*
*Now, with the understanding of that experiment, consider the following:*

*If* the AI (or all of them) went through two tests, test A, and test B
A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and 256
copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball
changing color
B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number
generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether
the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times
*Then *the AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test
B occurred first.

Do you agree that it is impossible *for any entity within the
simulation*to determine whether test A was executed first, or whether
test B was
executed first, with higher than a 50% probability? (Assuming the order in
which the tests are administered is determined completely randomly from
outside of the simulation)?

No where above did I use you, personal identity, predicting who you
will be, etc.  All I ask is whether or not any entity at any time has
access to information that can distinguish between iterated forking or
randomized switching.  Therefore, there should be no language barriers in
this reasoning and you should be able to provide an answer.

Thanks,

Jason


On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 11:18 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Wed, Oct 30, 2013 at 1:21 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:

  I think this entire matter could be clarified if you could reformulate
 the following question in such a way that a simple yes or no answer can be
 given:



   Do you die if two exact copies of Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki are
 made, one in Moscow and one in Washington and then the Helsinki body
 instantly destroyed?


  This is not what is asked


 It's the question I asked!  I don't give a damn if I see Moscow or
 Washington, I care if I live or die and I suspect you are more interested
 in that question too. And if you could reformulate that question (never
 mind the answer) so that it was clear to you i might understand what you're
 talking about.

  what is asked is the probability to see moscow, likewise when you
 measure the spin of the electron, the question is the probability you
 measure spin up


 As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After
 Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third
 party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if
 predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's
 thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right
 to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will
 see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about
 prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or
 a sense of self.

  both question are *valid* and have simple answer which is 0.5.


 No, only one question is valid. In Everett's case we know who you is,
 it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people
 clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things,
 and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the
 probability you will see X?.

 Not that predictions, good bad or meaningless, have anything to do with a
 sense of self.

   Does the fellow who remembers being in Helsinki die if two exact
 copies of the fellow in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in
 Washington, and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed?
  I would answer the question with a simple no without the need for
 further explanations or caveats,


  That is still not the question asked. The question is about
 probability. The easiest way to rephrase it, is [...]


 Stop telling me how simple it is to rephrase the question and actually
 rephrase it. 

Re: For John Clark

2013-10-31 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com


 On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  this distracts from the question asked, which concerns the first person
 pov, from the first person pov. That is the first person experience. [...]
 Comp accepts that both copies are equivalent (with respect to identity)
 continuations of the original, but the prediction bears on the first person
 experience.


 It is a mystery that Marchal can not get it through his head that copying
 a person means there are now 2 identical first person experiences because
 YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED, and the 2 will remain identical until one sees
 something that the other has not.

  If 100% was true, for P(W), we would have, in the iterated version,  the
 history WWW... having a 100% probability, yet, all diaries but one,
 will contradict that prediction.

 If you predicted that you will see Washington and you does see
 Washington then the prediction that there was a 100% chance that you will
 see Washington was correct and it doesn't matter how many people who also
 lay claim to the title you don't see Washington.

  The proba concerns the first person experience that you will live, and
 recall in the next instants, by writing it in the diary.


 The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains
 predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or
 more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the
 diary was referring to.  And the diary is useless because good predictions
 have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions.


So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are not
consistent in your declaration and don't want to discuss just trolling (as
you do this for years, my question is rethorical, you are a troll).

Quentin



   John K Clark


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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-31 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com

 On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:

  As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After
 Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third
 party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if
 predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's
 thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right
 to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will
 see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about
 prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or
 a sense of self. [...]  In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the
 only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a
 bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that
 makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability
 you will see X?.  [...]  The diary is useless because the diary was
 written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of
 you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way
 to determine which one the diary was referring to.  And the diary is
 useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a
 sense of self than bad predictions.


  So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are not
 consistent


 The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on
 this thread:


No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps...

Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger and
stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're just a
troll.

Quentin


 Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and
 Bruno's ideas inconsistently.

 Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability
 and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally
 different.

 Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's
 points.

 Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at
 John Clark.

 Step 5: GOTO step 1.

 John k Clark




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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-31 Thread Richard Ruquist
John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or
stephen lin. Richard


On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:




 2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com

 On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:

  As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After
 Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third
 party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if
 predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's
 thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right
 to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will
 see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about
 prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or
 a sense of self. [...]  In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the
 only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a
 bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that
 makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability
 you will see X?.  [...]  The diary is useless because the diary was
 written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of
 you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way
 to determine which one the diary was referring to.  And the diary is
 useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a
 sense of self than bad predictions.


  So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are not
 consistent


 The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on
 this thread:


 No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps...

 Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger and
 stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're just a
 troll.

 Quentin


 Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and
 Bruno's ideas inconsistently.

 Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability
 and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally
 different.

 Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's
 points.

 Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at
 John Clark.

 Step 5: GOTO step 1.

 John k Clark




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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-31 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

 A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and 256
 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball
 changing color


Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked until
there is something different about them, such as one remembering seeing a
red ball and the other remember seeing a green ball, only then do they
fork. It was the decision made by somebody or something outside the
simulation to make sure all 256 saw a difference sequence of colored balls
that created 256 distinct minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision
made outside the simulation would be indistinguishable from being random,
that is to say the simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure
out what that decision would be.

 B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number
 generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether
 the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times* Then *the
 AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred
 first.

 Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it
is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted  thought experiments are
not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that
in A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but
as the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of
itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original
or the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true.

So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A was
true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no
difference.

 I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all,
 and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from
 all the views, the conclusion is the same.


Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound
conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's
grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as
dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big
buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually.

  John K Clark

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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-31 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:


  if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger and
 stephen li


I'm guessing that's an insult of some sort but my Quentinspeak is a little
rusty so I'm not sure.

  John K Clark

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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-31 Thread Jason Resch
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 7:51 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

  A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and 256
 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball
 changing color


 Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked until
 there is something different about them, such as one remembering seeing a
 red ball and the other remember seeing a green ball, only then do they
 fork. It was the decision made by somebody or something outside the
 simulation to make sure all 256 saw a difference sequence of colored balls
 that created 256 distinct minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision
 made outside the simulation would be indistinguishable from being random,
 that is to say the simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure
 out what that decision would be.

  B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number
 generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether
 the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times* Then *the
 AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred
 first.

 Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it
 is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted  thought experiments are
 not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that
 in A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but
 as the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of
 itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original
 or the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true.

 So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A
 was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no
 difference.


Thank you for answering. I think we are in agreement.



  I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all,
 and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from
 all the views, the conclusion is the same.


 Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound
 conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's
 grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as
 dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big
 buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually.


Well there is one difference: the entire protocol is explained to the AI,
it knows exactly what will happen in each of the 256 possibilities, but
from inside the simulation, it is no different than had the sequence of
colors been chosen completely randomly.

Also, you are mistaken if you think this is the grand conclusion of the
UDA, it is only one small (but necessary) step in the reasoning.  If you
want to get to the grand conclusion you need only continue on to the next
steps.  It seems you have grasped the point of step 3 and are in agreement
that subjective indeterminacy can arise in a fully understood and
deterministic process.

I'll re-post the link for your convenience.  You are less than 2-3 pages
away from finishing reading the UDA:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm

Jason

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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-30 Thread John Clark
On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 2:05 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

 Bruno asked me Do you think that you die in a self-duplication
 experience? and I said that depends on what the meaning of you is. Bruno
 responded with We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who
 will remember having been in Helsinki, and that was fine with me because
 that is the meaning of the personal pronoun you that I like best. So I
 answered Bruno's question  in a clear no nonsense way, I said no, I don't
 think you die in a self-duplication experience. In those circumstances and
 given Bruno's definition of the pronoun what answer would you give?


  That I don't die.


Then we agree.

 Then Bruno started putting all sorts of additional caveats and
 restrictions on the meaning of you that were very unclear.


  He did not...


  So apparently we HAVEN'T already agree that you concerns the guy(s)
 who will remember having been in Helsinki.


  That has *always* been the definition.


If that is the definition of you then why in hell doesn't Bruno agree
that you will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington?

 It was at this point that I said Bruno was backpedaling and you started
 screaming personal insults.


  He never did.


Given Bruno's previous definition to now insist that you only sees one city
is very vigorous backpedaling. And it's true Bruno never screamed personal
insults, but you did.

 same thing in MWI. In MWI, you'll see from 1st POV *one* definite
 result,


  No. If MWI is correct then there are TWO 1st POV and you sees *two*
 definite results,


  No *each you* sees only *one* result.


Correct, *each you* sees only *one* result, and that is precisely HALF the
amount of information that would be needed to disprove the proposition that
you will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington, and in the MWI it is precisely
HALF the amount of information that would be needed to disprove the
proposition that you will see BOTH spin up and spin down. And don't blame
me if the language seems convoluted, English was developed long before
Everett was born, and we still don't have duplicating chambers; when we do
the English language will need major revisions.

 The only question ask is the probability you see moscow


Will the Moscow Man be one of the guy(s) who will remember having been in
Helsinki? Yes. Therefore according to Bruno's definition of the pronoun
(and mine too incidentally) you sees Moscow.

 (resp. washington)


Will the Washington Man be one of the guy(s) who will remember having been
in Helsinki? Yes. Therefore according to Bruno's definition of the pronoun
you sees Washington. And although that sounds ungrammatical it is logically
correct, its just that the English language was never made with this sort
of thing in mind.


  Answering 100% is simply false


No it isn't.

 from 1st POV


It isn't unless you start backpedaling away from Bruno's original
definition of the pronoun you.

I think this entire matter could be clarified if you could reformulate the
following question in such a way that a simple yes or no answer can be
given:

Do you die if two exact copies of Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki are made,
one in Moscow and one in Washington and then the Helsinki body instantly
destroyed?

For the time being lets not argue about what the answer is, all I want is
the question expressed so clearly that one doesn't have to ask follow up
questions about points of view or probabilities to give a simple yes or no
answer. I'd really like to know how you'd rephrase it. I'll go first:

Does the fellow who remembers being in Helsinki die if two exact copies of
the fellow in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in Washington, and
then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed?

I would answer the question with a simple no without the need for further
explanations or caveats, but right now I'm more interested in how you would
phrase the question such that it was clear and unambiguous rather than what
your answer would be.

  John K Clark









 as can be seen by lookint at the diary.


 True you see only spin up but if MWI is correct you has been duplicated
 and we haven't heard what that other fellow saw yet.


 We don't care, if you accept probability with MWI so should you in the
 self-duplication thought experiment, and that's the only of step 3 and
 always have been.

 Quentin


   John K Clark

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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/10/30 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com

 On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 2:05 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:

  Bruno asked me Do you think that you die in a self-duplication
 experience? and I said that depends on what the meaning of you is. Bruno
 responded with We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who
 will remember having been in Helsinki, and that was fine with me because
 that is the meaning of the personal pronoun you that I like best. So I
 answered Bruno's question  in a clear no nonsense way, I said no, I don't
 think you die in a self-duplication experience. In those circumstances and
 given Bruno's definition of the pronoun what answer would you give?


  That I don't die.


 Then we agree.

   Then Bruno started putting all sorts of additional caveats and
 restrictions on the meaning of you that were very unclear.


  He did not...


  So apparently we HAVEN'T already agree that you concerns the guy(s)
 who will remember having been in Helsinki.


  That has *always* been the definition.


 If that is the definition of you then why in hell doesn't Bruno agree
 that you will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington?

   It was at this point that I said Bruno was backpedaling and you
 started screaming personal insults.


  He never did.


 Given Bruno's previous definition to now insist that you only sees one
 city is very vigorous backpedaling. And it's true Bruno never screamed
 personal insults, but you did.

   same thing in MWI. In MWI, you'll see from 1st POV *one* definite
 result,


  No. If MWI is correct then there are TWO 1st POV and you sees *two*
 definite results,


  No *each you* sees only *one* result.


 Correct, *each you* sees only *one* result, and that is precisely HALF the
 amount of information that would be needed to disprove the proposition that
 you will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington, and in the MWI it is precisely
 HALF the amount of information that would be needed to disprove the
 proposition that you will see BOTH spin up and spin down. And don't blame
 me if the language seems convoluted, English was developed long before
 Everett was born, and we still don't have duplicating chambers; when we do
 the English language will need major revisions.

   The only question ask is the probability you see moscow


 Will the Moscow Man be one of the guy(s) who will remember having been in
 Helsinki? Yes. Therefore according to Bruno's definition of the pronoun
 (and mine too incidentally) you sees Moscow.

  (resp. washington)


 Will the Washington Man be one of the guy(s) who will remember having been
 in Helsinki? Yes. Therefore according to Bruno's definition of the pronoun
 you sees Washington. And although that sounds ungrammatical it is logically
 correct, its just that the English language was never made with this sort
 of thing in mind.


  Answering 100% is simply false


 No it isn't.


It is from 1st POV... each individual sees one and only one city (resp.
each individual under MWI sees one and only one result, ie: spin up or
down).


   from 1st POV


 It isn't unless you start backpedaling away


The only backpedaling here is from you.


 from Bruno's original definition of the pronoun you.

 I think this entire matter could be clarified if you could reformulate the
 following question in such a way that a simple yes or no answer can be
 given:

 Do you die if two exact copies of Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki are made,
 one in Moscow and one in Washington and then the Helsinki body instantly
 destroyed?


This is not what is asked... what is asked is the probability to see
moscow, likewise when you measure the spin of the electron, the question is
the probability you measure spin up... both question are *valid* and have
simple answer which is 0.5.


 For the time being lets not argue about what the answer is, all I want is
 the question expressed so clearly

The question is as clear as it can be both for the duplication thought
experiment and the measurement of the spin, both have valid answer.


 that one doesn't have to ask follow up questions about points of view


It is linked with POV, in MWI and in duplication experiment.


 or probabilities to give a simple yes or no answer. I'd really like to
 know how you'd rephrase it. I'll go first:


No need to.



 Does the fellow who remembers being in Helsinki die if two exact copies of
 the fellow in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in Washington, and
 then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed?

 I would answer the question with a simple no without the need for
 further explanations or caveats,


That is still not the question asked. The question is about probability.
The easiest way to rephrase it, is simply to look at the diary, and simply
by repeating the experience and looking at the result of the diary you can
infer the frequency of 0.5 and the correct probability.

Quentin


 but right now I'm more interested in how you would phrase the question
 such that it was clear and 

Re: For John Clark

2013-10-29 Thread John Clark
On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

 If John Clark was lying and Bruno  has not changed his mind and you is
 still the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki then it is
 beyond dispute that YOU will see BOTH Moscow AND Helsinki.


  It is correct from 3rd POV,


Yes.

 not from 1st POV...


Bruno asked me Do you think that you die in a self-duplication
experience? and I said that depends on what the meaning of you is. Bruno
responded with We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who
will remember having been in Helsinki, and that was fine with me because
that is the meaning of the personal pronoun you that I like best. So I
answered Bruno's question  in a clear no nonsense way, I said no, I don't
think you die in a self-duplication experience. In those circumstances and
given Bruno's definition of the pronoun what answer would you give?

Then Bruno started putting all sorts of additional caveats and restrictions
on the meaning of you that were very unclear. So apparently we HAVEN'T
already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been
in Helsinki. It was at this point that I said Bruno was backpedaling and
you started screaming personal insults.

 same thing in MWI. In MWI, you'll see from 1st POV *one* definite result,


No. If MWI is correct then there are TWO 1st POV and you sees *two*
definite results, and every experiment ever performed has only produced
half the amount of information needed to disprove it. True you see only
spin up but if MWI is correct you has been duplicated and we haven't heard
what that other fellow saw yet.

  John K Clark

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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-29 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/10/29 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com




 On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:

  If John Clark was lying and Bruno  has not changed his mind and you
 is still the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki then it is
 beyond dispute that YOU will see BOTH Moscow AND Helsinki.


  It is correct from 3rd POV,


 Yes.

  not from 1st POV...


 Bruno asked me Do you think that you die in a self-duplication
 experience? and I said that depends on what the meaning of you is. Bruno
 responded with We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who
 will remember having been in Helsinki, and that was fine with me because
 that is the meaning of the personal pronoun you that I like best. So I
 answered Bruno's question  in a clear no nonsense way, I said no, I don't
 think you die in a self-duplication experience. In those circumstances and
 given Bruno's definition of the pronoun what answer would you give?


That I don't die.



 Then Bruno started putting all sorts of additional caveats and
 restrictions on the meaning of you that were very unclear.


He did not...


 So apparently we HAVEN'T already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who
 will remember having been in Helsinki.


That has *always* been the definition.


 It was at this point that I said Bruno was backpedaling and you started
 screaming personal insults.


He never did.



  same thing in MWI. In MWI, you'll see from 1st POV *one* definite result,


 No. If MWI is correct then there are TWO 1st POV and you sees *two*
 definite results,


No *each you* sees only *one* result.


 and every experiment ever performed has only produced half the amount of
 information needed to disprove it.


The only question ask is the probability you see moscow (resp. washington)
likewise in MWI the question ask is the probality you see spin up...
Answering 100% is simply false from 1st POV as can be seen by lookint at
the diary.


 True you see only spin up but if MWI is correct you has been duplicated
 and we haven't heard what that other fellow saw yet.


We don't care, if you accept probability with MWI so should you in the
self-duplication thought experiment, and that's the only of step 3 and
always have been.

Quentin


   John K Clark

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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-29 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/10/29 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com




 2013/10/29 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com




 On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:

  If John Clark was lying and Bruno  has not changed his mind and you
 is still the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki then it is
 beyond dispute that YOU will see BOTH Moscow AND Helsinki.


  It is correct from 3rd POV,


 Yes.

  not from 1st POV...


 Bruno asked me Do you think that you die in a self-duplication
 experience? and I said that depends on what the meaning of you is. Bruno
 responded with We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who
 will remember having been in Helsinki, and that was fine with me because
 that is the meaning of the personal pronoun you that I like best. So I
 answered Bruno's question  in a clear no nonsense way, I said no, I don't
 think you die in a self-duplication experience. In those circumstances and
 given Bruno's definition of the pronoun what answer would you give?


 That I don't die.



 Then Bruno started putting all sorts of additional caveats and
 restrictions on the meaning of you that were very unclear.


 He did not...


 So apparently we HAVEN'T already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who
 will remember having been in Helsinki.


 That has *always* been the definition.


  It was at this point that I said Bruno was backpedaling and you started
 screaming personal insults.


 He never did.



  same thing in MWI. In MWI, you'll see from 1st POV *one* definite
 result,


 No. If MWI is correct then there are TWO 1st POV and you sees *two*
 definite results,


 No *each you* sees only *one* result.


 and every experiment ever performed has only produced half the amount of
 information needed to disprove it.


 The only question ask is the probability you see moscow (resp. washington)
 likewise in MWI the question ask is the probality you see spin up...
 Answering 100% is simply false from 1st POV as can be seen by


looking


   at the diary.


 True you see only spin up but if MWI is correct you has been duplicated
 and we haven't heard what that other fellow saw yet.


 We don't care, if you accept probability with MWI so should you in the
 self-duplication thought experiment, and that's the only


point


 of step 3 and always


has


 been.

 Quentin


   John K Clark

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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-28 Thread John Clark
On Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 1:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 I give the two definition of the pronouns used in the reasoning, and
 often confused by the use of an identical term in natural language, but
 clearly distinguishes in UDA step 2, and the next one. The 1-you, basically
 your definition, or simply the content of the diary taken by the
 experiencer with him, and the 3-view, the content of the diary of an
 external (not entering in the teleportation box).


Bruno Marchal said  We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s)
who will remember having been in Helsinki . Remember those were Bruno
Marchal's words not John Clark's. Then Bruno Marchal asked point blank Do
you think that you die in a self-duplication experience? and John Clark
gave a unequivocal answer, no.

But then apparently Bruno Marchal changed his mind about what the meaning
of the pronoun you is;  so please make clear what this new meaning is and
ask again Do you think that you die in a self-duplication experience?.
Perhaps with this new meaning John Clark's answer will be different and
maybe then John Clark will understand what Bruno Marchal is talking about.

  John K Clark





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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-28 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/10/28 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com



 On Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 1:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  I give the two definition of the pronouns used in the reasoning, and
 often confused by the use of an identical term in natural language, but
 clearly distinguishes in UDA step 2, and the next one. The 1-you, basically
 your definition, or simply the content of the diary taken by the
 experiencer with him, and the 3-view, the content of the diary of an
 external (not entering in the teleportation box).


 Bruno Marchal said  We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s)
 who will remember having been in Helsinki . Remember those were Bruno
 Marchal's words not John Clark's. Then Bruno Marchal asked point blank Do
 you think that you die in a self-duplication experience? and John Clark
 gave a unequivocal answer, no.

 But then apparently Bruno Marchal changed his mind about what the meaning
 of the pronoun you is;


Another lie...


 so please make clear what this new meaning is and ask again Do you think
 that you die in a self-duplication experience?. Perhaps with this new
 meaning John Clark's answer will be different and maybe then John Clark
 will understand what Bruno Marchal is talking about.

   John K Clark




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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-28 Thread John Clark
On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:



  I give the two definition of the pronouns used in the reasoning, and
 often confused by the use of an identical term in natural language, but
 clearly distinguishes in UDA step 2, and the next one. The 1-you, basically
 your definition, or simply the content of the diary taken by the
 experiencer with him, and the 3-view, the content of the diary of an
 external (not entering in the teleportation box).


  Bruno Marchal said  We have already agree that you concerns the
 guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki . Remember those were
 Bruno Marchal's words not John Clark's. Then Bruno Marchal asked point
 blank Do you think that you die in a self-duplication experience? and
 John Clark gave a unequivocal answer, no. But then apparently Bruno
 Marchal changed his mind about what the meaning of the pronoun you is;


  Another lie...


If John Clark was lying and Bruno has not changed his mind and you is
still the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki then it is
beyond dispute that YOU will see BOTH Moscow AND Helsinki. And if John
Clark was not lying then what is the new meaning of the personal pronoun
you?

 John K Clark

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RE: For John Clark

2013-10-28 Thread chris peck
 the question is asked, you are not about to see 
(Washington or Moscow), you are about to see (Washington and Moscow), because 
there is only one of you at this point, and critically -- and heres the bit 
which makes it genuinely 1-p -- you are certain of all this. Your subjective 
view, your 'what is it like to be', your phenomenological state, your 
whateveryouwantocallit, is saturated with the conviction that you are going to 
end up in both washington and moscow. There will be no room for doubt until you 
open your eyes at the terminal. At which point the game has changed radically. 
Now you know that you have been annihilated and duplicated but do not know 
which duplicate you are. Here you would predict 50/50 but not before. Certainly 
not when the question is asked in step 3.


 Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say 
 in truth there is only one I, but this does not remove the appearance of 
 randomness as seen from the first person views

Its my contention that there would be no appearance of randomness. Our 
perceptions are coloured by our beliefs. If we are genuine MWIers for example, 
we would not experience a feeling of randomness at all. We would percieve 
things as wholly determined.


 I am curious, have you heard of the sleeping beauty problem?  I wonder what 
 answer you would agree with:

I have. I studied Philosophy at UCL and watched Malcolm Budd and Ted Honderich 
tear Arnold Zuboff to shreds on a regular basis at departmental seminars. The 
thing is sleeping beauty is in a state of maximal ignorance so I don't see how 
it relates.

 Yes, but the question is if you were not told the protocol, whether the 
 machine would send you to one with 50% probability, or send you to both 
 locations, can you, (from the first person/subjective point of view), 
 distinguish these two cases?

Again, where there is ignorance there can be doubt. But it isn't the doubt you 
want which is doubt in state of maximal knowledge. 

 Okay, that is fair.

I'm beginning to think Bruno defines 'self' in terms of self reference within 
certain modal logics; provability logic etc. Its a circular definition which I 
imagine will be problematic. but again my modal logic is very rusty so I won't 
argue the point ...



Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 02:18:48 -0500
Subject: Re: For John Clark
From: jasonre...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com




On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 9:04 PM, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:




Hi Jason

 Subject refers to the I, the indexical first-person. 

The word 'I' is indexical, like 'now' and 'here'. The experience isn't 
indexical, its just me.


Right but when you refer to the experience or chris peck's experiences, 
that is speaking in the third person. 

  This page offers some examples of the distinction ( 
 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/#PurIndTruDem ). 


Thanks. Im still confused as to how my use of 'subjective certainty' 
According to your usage, how is the meaning of subjective certainty different 
from just certainty?
 does not imply the certainty applies to the indexical 'I'ity of me. It 
certainly does in my head. When I say I am uncertain/certain of things I am 
definately saying I am having the 1-p experience of certainty/uncertainty.

Sure. 


 Knowing that she becomes all does not allow her (prior to the splitting, or 
 prior to the duplication) to know where the photon will be observed (or what 
 city she finds herself in). This is the subjective uncertainty.  Certainty 
 only exists when talking about the experiences of others from the standpoint 
 of some external impartial observer.


 You're begging the question here. You're just reasserting your conclusion 
about what is infact up for grabs. You're effectively arguing that unless I 
agree that there is subjective uncertainty then I am confusing 1-p for 3-p.


After the duplication there are two experiencers. Each is confronted with the 
impossibility of being able to reliably predict which experience they would 
next have following the duplication.  The knowledge that all experiences will 
be had does not eliminate this uncertainty.
 
 Interestingly, Everett was allegedly certain of his own immortality. One of 
the reasons he specified in his will that his ashes should be ditched alongside 
the trash. I can't imagine a more morbid yet expressive demonstration of 
subjective certainty about MWI and all outcomes obtaining.


  I mean subjective in a stronger sense than just that it is experienced by 
  someone, rather that it is experienced by the I. 

 Without begging the question, in what way is that a stronger sense than the 
one I have used? It seems identical to me.


According to your usage, in which you have no uncertainty because you know 
future chris pecks, following duplication, will individually experience all 
possible outcomes, such certainty ignores the personal feelings of the original 
Chris peck stepping into the duplicator and experiencing

Re: For John Clark

2013-10-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 26 Oct 2013, at 23:53, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/26/2013 1:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You betray your feeling here. Some people, like you apparently,  
indeed find the FPI and the reversal as a work of genius. They  
think: if you were right you should have the Nobel Prize, but you  
don't, so something must be wrong, and so I don't need to study  
it. But of course this does not help as it makes people dismissing  
it indeed.


It seems to me that there is no disagreement about any fact in the  
duplication experiment - only arguments about what uncertainty



John understood what I meant. He compared it himself with coin  
throwing. He miss the originality and/or importance, but that is not  
used in the reasoning.





and you mean.


John has proposed itself a definition, which is indeed the definition  
needed to say that we survive drinking, coffee, getting an artificial  
brain, using teletransportation, or living a self-duplication.
He just stops doing the thought experiment just at the moment we  
interview each copies to see if the prediction written in the diary in  
Helsinki is or not fulfilled.




So why don't you explain to John what proceeds from the facts of the  
thought experiment?


I think he knows it. Comp implies (at step seven) that if there is a  
UD running in the universe, then physics is reduced to the FPI on  
arithmetic. Step 8 eliminates the assumption that there is a universe.


I am the one, like many, who does not understand John's point, so I  
think you should ask him to clarify his point. It seems originate from  
not taking the 1P/3P distinction into account, despite he showed to  
understand it in some post.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 27 Oct 2013, at 00:05, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/26/2013 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 25 Oct 2013, at 23:33, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
...

It is:

3) Bruno has yet to develop the mathematical tools to do practical  
computations.



Not at all. That would be the case if the goal was doing physics,  
but the goal was only to formulate the mind body problem.
Then, despite this, the math part (AUDA, the machine's interview)  
does provide the mathematical tools to do practical computations.  
The arithmetical quantization is fully given and has been compared  
with quantum logic.
That we are at light years from getting anything like the standard  
model is not really relevant, as the standard model does not  
address the mind-body problem.
A physicist can complain that comp is a long way to be able to use  
as physics, but I insist: the goal is to show that the mind-body  
problem is not solved, and that with comp, we have to derive  
physics from arithmetic, and I got already the propositional part  
of physics.


What do you mean by that last?  Whether you think it is necessary or  
not, it would certainly lend credence to your theory if it made more  
contact with physics.


Comp has enough credence. It is believed by almost all scientists  
since almost always.
The reasoning I propose has never met any problem, except in the lack  
of interest for reason which eludes me, but related to the fact that  
some scientist does not want to even heard words like consciousness,  
mind-body, or even QM and quantum mechanics. And they don't play the  
academic game. My work has been peer reviewed many times, has been  
defended as a PhD thesis, etc.
Non credence comes from people not trying to read it, like Bill and  
John Clark illustrates on this list (and/or FOAR).




 Here's a blog post that might suggest a point of contact:

http://blog.sigfpe.com/2013/10/distributed-computing-with-alien.html



Don't hesitate to elaborate, but this assumes QM, and does not bear on  
the mind-body or 1p/3p relation.


Bruno




Brent



The subject is the mind-body problem, not physics per se.

Technically, the problem is that physicists don't know mathematical  
logic (as Penrose illustrated to the logicians). Very few  
physicists understand the X1* and Z1* logic, which gives the needed  
arithmetical quantizations.


That's another problem: only logicians knows logic. They have no  
problem with AUDA. But many just dislike the mind-body problem and  
applications of logic. My work reminds that logic per se does not  
solve philosophical problem, which annoy them as they are still  
under the spell of Vienna positivism, where logic is used to  
replace metaphysics, and comp shows that this is not enough.


I think.


Bruno



Suppose that you could derive the Standard Model from deeper  
principles, then it doesn't matter what the philosophical  
objections against these principles are.


No one cares that Einstein's arguments leading to Special  
Relativity were not rigorous. Obviously, you can't derive special  
relativity rigorously from electrodynamics, because relativity is  
more fundamental than electrodynamics. At best you can present  
heuristic arguments. Some philosophers do make a problem out of  
that, but in physics no one really cares. Most modern textbooks do  
this correctly by discussing Lorentz invariance and only then  
deriving the Maxwell equations as the correct generalization of  
Coulomb's law.


Saibal


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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-27 Thread John Clark
On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 1:09 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:


  I came across this today, which you might find of interest:
 http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9709032v1.pdf In particular section 3 goes
 to great pains to describe the importance of the first person / third
 person distinction.


Of course it's important, but I didn't need Bruno's help to figure that
out. And I especially agree when is says To avoid linguistic confusion it
is crucial that we distinguish between the outside view of the world [from
] the inside view.  Yes, we must avoid linguistic confusion!

It's true that in everyday usage there is no linguistic confusion and it
would be silly to keep asking what do you mean by the pronoun you?, but
this is very far from everyday usage. This is a thought experiment
involving identity duplicating machines and is a vital part of a proof that
is trying to find something new about the very thing that is being
duplicated, identity. Under those very very exotic circumstances the
meaning of the personal pronoun you is far from obvious. And if the
meaning of you is vague then the difference between 1p and 3p is vague
too, and that is not acceptable in a proof that claims to be mathematically
precise.

So when Bruno asks will you in Helsinki survive the duplication? or what
city will you see? it depends entirely on what you means. To me, and to
Bruno too before he panicked and backpedaled, you is the guy(s) who
remembers being the Helsinki Man;  thus I would answer that yes you will
survive and you will see both Moscow and Washington. And if the ASCII
sequence y-o-u means something different in another language then John
Clark would answer the questions differently.

 John K Clark

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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-27 Thread John Clark
On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 5:20 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

 So, you still find nothing to say about many-worlds interpretation of QM
 where you are duplicated billions of time a picosecond, but you are able to
 babble for years about a simple duplication experiment ?


The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on
this thread:

Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and
Bruno's ideas inconsistently.

Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability
and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally
different.

Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's
points.

Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at
John Clark.

Step 5: GOTO step 1.


PS: 9 question marks following 9 rhetorical questions in a row is too much.

  John K Clark

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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
You're just lying... You are the one treating things inconsistently, it's a
shame your pride so high you can't even recognize it.

Believe what you want to believe.

Quentin


2013/10/27 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com

 On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 5:20 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:

   So, you still find nothing to say about many-worlds interpretation of
 QM where you are duplicated billions of time a picosecond, but you are able
 to babble for years about a simple duplication experiment ?


 The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on
 this thread:

 Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and
 Bruno's ideas inconsistently.

 Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability
 and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally
 different.

 Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's
 points.

 Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at
 John Clark.

 Step 5: GOTO step 1.


 PS: 9 question marks following 9 rhetorical questions in a row is too much.

   John K Clark



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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-27 Thread John Clark
On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 4:24 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  probability implies prediction and prediction has nothing to do with a
 sense of self, and that is what Bruno's proof is all about.


  Absolutely not.


Absolutely not what? Absolutely not that probability implies prediction or
that prediction has nothing to do with a sense of self or that your proof
is about investigating the nature of self?


  That is no more than what you need to say yes to a comp doctor.


I would say yes to the comp doctor because I would survive to tomorrow if
I did,  provided that I means something that remembers being John Clark
today. And if the personal pronoun I means something other than that in
your language then John Clark does not care if that fellow by the name of
I survives or not. And neither probabilities nor the accuracy of
predictions of what city will be seen nor the content of diaries would play
any part in my decision to say yes.  None whatsoever.

  John K Clark











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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-27 Thread John Clark
On Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 11:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:

 You're just lying... You are the one treating things inconsistently, it's
 a shame your pride so high you can't even recognize it. Believe what you
 want to believe.


The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on
this thread:

Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and
Bruno's ideas inconsistently.

Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability
and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally
different.

Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's
points.

Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at
John Clark.

Step 5: GOTO step 1.

  John K Clark

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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on
this thread:

1) Point John Clarck mistakes.

2) John Clark ignores it. Repeat the same mistake ad nauseam.

3) goto 1

Quentin


2013/10/27 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com

 On Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 11:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:

  You're just lying... You are the one treating things inconsistently,
 it's a shame your pride so high you can't even recognize it. Believe what
 you want to believe.


 The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on
 this thread:

 Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and
 Bruno's ideas inconsistently.

 Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability
 and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally
 different.

 Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's
 points.

 Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at
 John Clark.

 Step 5: GOTO step 1.

   John K Clark









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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2013/10/27 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com



 On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 1:09 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:


  I came across this today, which you might find of interest:
 http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9709032v1.pdf In particular section 3 goes
 to great pains to describe the importance of the first person / third
 person distinction.


 Of course it's important, but I didn't need Bruno's help to figure that
 out. And I especially agree when is says To avoid linguistic confusion it
 is crucial that we distinguish between the outside view of the world [from
 ] the inside view.  Yes, we must avoid linguistic confusion!

 It's true that in everyday usage there is no linguistic confusion and it
 would be silly to keep asking what do you mean by the pronoun you?, but
 this is very far from everyday usage. This is a thought experiment
 involving identity duplicating machines and is a vital part of a proof that
 is trying to find something new about the very thing that is being
 duplicated, identity. Under those very very exotic circumstances the
 meaning of the personal pronoun you is far from obvious. And if the
 meaning of you is vague then the difference between 1p and 3p is vague
 too, and that is not acceptable in a proof that claims to be mathematically
 precise.

 So when Bruno asks will you in Helsinki survive the duplication? or
 what city will you see? it depends entirely on what you means. To me,
 and to Bruno too before he panicked and backpedaled,


This is a blatant proof of lies that John Clark likes to do.



 you is the guy(s) who remembers being the Helsinki Man;  thus I would
 answer that yes you will survive and you will see both Moscow and
 Washington. And if the ASCII sequence y-o-u means something different in
 another language then John Clark would answer the questions differently.

  John K Clark





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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 27 Oct 2013, at 15:54, John Clark wrote:




On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 1:09 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com  
wrote:


 I came across this today, which you might find of interest: http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9709032v1.pdf 
 In particular section 3 goes to great pains to describe the  
importance of the first person / third person distinction.


Of course it's important, but I didn't need Bruno's help to figure  
that out. And I especially agree when is says To avoid linguistic  
confusion it is crucial that we distinguish between the outside view  
of the world [from ] the inside view.  Yes, we must avoid  
linguistic confusion!


It's true that in everyday usage there is no linguistic confusion  
and it would be silly to keep asking what do you mean by the  
pronoun you?, but this is very far from everyday usage. This is a  
thought experiment involving identity duplicating machines and is a  
vital part of a proof that is trying to find something new about the  
very thing that is being duplicated, identity. Under those very very  
exotic circumstances the meaning of the personal pronoun you is  
far from obvious. And if the meaning of you is vague then the  
difference between 1p and 3p is vague too, and that is not  
acceptable in a proof that claims to be mathematically precise.


So when Bruno asks will you in Helsinki survive the duplication?  
or what city will you see? it depends entirely on what you  
means. To me, and to Bruno too before he panicked and backpedaled,  
you is the guy(s) who remembers being the Helsinki Man;  thus I  
would answer that yes you will survive and you will see both  
Moscow and Washington. And if the ASCII sequence y-o-u means  
something different in another language then John Clark would answer  
the questions differently.


I give the two definition of the pronouns used in the reasoning, and  
often confused by the use of an identical term in natural language,  
but clearly distinguishes in UDA step 2, and the next one. The 1-you,  
basically your definition, or simply the content of the diary taken  
by the experiencer with him, and the 3-view, the content of the diary  
of an external (not entering in the teleportation box).


But you stop the thinking before taking that distinction further into  
account, and I don't know why.


Bruno







 John K Clark






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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 27 Oct 2013, at 16:47, John Clark wrote:





On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 4:24 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


  probability implies prediction and prediction has nothing to do  
with a sense of self, and that is what Bruno's proof is all about.


 Absolutely not.

Absolutely not what?


that your proof is about investigating the nature of self?

Absolutely not that probability implies prediction or that  
prediction has nothing to do with a sense of self or that your  
proof is about investigating the nature of self?



The self has a big role, and that is obvious in the arithmetical  
translation which is based on the self-reference logics, but those are  
tools (even if key concepts) in the  UDA proof.
Comp asks only the idea that consciousness is invaraint for a kind of  
digital substitution, and shows that it makes physics necessarily into  
a branche of arithmetic, or computer science, or machine's theology.





 That is no more than what you need to say yes to a comp doctor.

I would say yes to the comp doctor because I would survive to  
tomorrow if I did,  provided that I means something that remembers  
being John Clark today. And if the personal pronoun I means  
something other than that in your language then John Clark does not  
care if that fellow by the name of I survives or not. And neither  
probabilities nor the accuracy of predictions of what city will be  
seen nor the content of diaries would play any part in my decision  
to say yes.  None whatsoever.



Of course.
Saying yes = step zero. Then we reason from that.

And?

Bruno




  John K Clark










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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 27 Oct 2013, at 17:27, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





2013/10/27 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com


On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 1:09 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com  
wrote:


 I came across this today, which you might find of interest: http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9709032v1.pdf 
 In particular section 3 goes to great pains to describe the  
importance of the first person / third person distinction.


Of course it's important, but I didn't need Bruno's help to figure  
that out. And I especially agree when is says To avoid linguistic  
confusion it is crucial that we distinguish between the outside view  
of the world [from ] the inside view.  Yes, we must avoid  
linguistic confusion!


It's true that in everyday usage there is no linguistic confusion  
and it would be silly to keep asking what do you mean by the  
pronoun you?, but this is very far from everyday usage. This is a  
thought experiment involving identity duplicating machines and is a  
vital part of a proof that is trying to find something new about the  
very thing that is being duplicated, identity. Under those very very  
exotic circumstances the meaning of the personal pronoun you is  
far from obvious. And if the meaning of you is vague then the  
difference between 1p and 3p is vague too, and that is not  
acceptable in a proof that claims to be mathematically precise.


So when Bruno asks will you in Helsinki survive the duplication?  
or what city will you see? it depends entirely on what you  
means. To me, and to Bruno too before he panicked and backpedaled,


This is a blatant proof of lies that John Clark likes to do.



Thanks for helping me to reread this, and you are right. It is a lie.  
I miss this, or hide it to myself.


That definitively proves that John Clark has an agenda unrelated with  
the topic.


I will probably no more answer to him.

Anyone else believing that John Clark has tried to say something  
sensical, by which I  mean, have provided a reason to not go from step  
3 to step 4, is free to explain. My feeling was that he just avoided  
the question by neglecting the 1p/3p distinction opportunistically,  
but here he lied plain and simple, entering in the club of my real  
persistent opponents who use both lies and authoritative arguments. To  
do it not under my back makes it not so much less grave.


Thanks Quentin, that was not obvious for me, and a bit sad to  
acknowledge.


Case close.

Bruno











you is the guy(s) who remembers being the Helsinki Man;  thus I  
would answer that yes you will survive and you will see both  
Moscow and Washington. And if the ASCII sequence y-o-u means  
something different in another language then John Clark would answer  
the questions differently.


 John K Clark






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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-27 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy
On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 7:47 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 1:24 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy 
 multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote:

  Unlike you, I fortunately do not have the time to dig up your ad
 hominems.


 Well, I sure didn't have to dig very far to find your ad hominems! In just
 one short post you say: I'm a bigot. I'm a obscurantists. I have  excessive
 pride. I am crude. I am distasteful. I am loopy. I am full of nonsense. I
 don't really care about pronouns or entertaining alternate hypothesis,
 implying that I am a hypocrite. And I am a ass.


Shocker: the man who regards it as his perogative to pedantically  call it
as it is (i.e. insult people whenever he wants) is the victim of somebody
calling him names.

You have got to be kidding!

So cry us another river, drama queen. In CAPS, of course. PGC




 In fact there was virtually nothing in that post that was not a ad
 hominem, but that's OK I'm a big boy and have been called worse.

   John K Clark



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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-27 Thread Jason Resch
John,

Do you have any comment on the article I posted?

Jason


On Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 10:52 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 11:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:

  You're just lying... You are the one treating things inconsistently,
 it's a shame your pride so high you can't even recognize it. Believe what
 you want to believe.


 The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on
 this thread:

 Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and
 Bruno's ideas inconsistently.

 Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability
 and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally
 different.

 Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's
 points.

 Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at
 John Clark.

 Step 5: GOTO step 1.

   John K Clark









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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-27 Thread meekerdb

On 10/27/2013 1:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Here's a blog post that might suggest a point of contact:

http://blog.sigfpe.com/2013/10/distributed-computing-with-alien.html



Don't hesitate to elaborate, but this assumes QM, and does not bear on the mind-body or 
1p/3p relation. 


No it doesn't assume quantum mechanics.  It shows that it non-local correlations were just 
a little bit 'stronger' then the world would be much more trivial, which reminded me of 
you remark that we live on a kind of fractal border.  I don't understand how you propose 
to get an inside view of arithmetic from which physics must appear, but I thought your 
theory might be able to say why the world has QM that has 'just enough' non-local 
correlation to make it interesting.


Brent

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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-27 Thread Jason Resch
John,

Sorry, I missed your reply.  Some comment's in-line below:


On Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 1:09 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:


  I came across this today, which you might find of interest:
 http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9709032v1.pdf In particular section 3 goes
 to great pains to describe the importance of the first person / third
 person distinction.


 Of course it's important, but I didn't need Bruno's help to figure that
 out. And I especially agree when is says To avoid linguistic confusion it
 is crucial that we distinguish between the outside view of the world [from
 ] the inside view.  Yes, we must avoid linguistic confusion!


But in all your responses to Bruno's question you use only the objective
viewpoint, not the subjective viewpoint, as the thought experiment demands.



 It's true that in everyday usage there is no linguistic confusion and it
 would be silly to keep asking what do you mean by the pronoun you?, but
 this is very far from everyday usage. This is a thought experiment
 involving identity duplicating machines and is a vital part of a proof that
 is trying to find something new about the very thing that is being
 duplicated, identity. Under those very very exotic circumstances the
 meaning of the personal pronoun you is far from obvious. And if the
 meaning of you is vague then the difference between 1p and 3p is vague
 too, and that is not acceptable in a proof that claims to be mathematically
 precise.


You refers to any survivor according to the assumption of the
computational theory of mind.  Guessing your next subjective experience is
a prediction made from the first person, subjective, inside, frog view, and
verification of that prediction, done following the duplication, is also
performed from the subjective, inside, frog view.  Of course there are two
such entities called John Clark after the duplication, but that is the
objective view, not the subjective.  Subjectively, neither can
(immediately) be sure of the existence of the other, the only thing they
know for certain is that they arrived in one of the cities.




 So when Bruno asks will you in Helsinki survive the duplication? or
 what city will you see? it depends entirely on what you means.


That question isn't asked, what is asked is to make a prediction regarding
the subjective, first person, inside frog view, and then to evaluate that
prediction from the subjective, first person, inside frog view.


 To me, and to Bruno too before he panicked and backpedaled, you is the
 guy(s) who remembers being the Helsinki Man;  thus I would answer that yes
 you will survive and you will see both Moscow and Washington.


Objectively, yes. Subjectively you have no idea whether you were duplicated
or transported to one of the two locations at random.

Jason


 And if the ASCII sequence y-o-u means something different in another
 language then John Clark would answer the questions differently.


Try answering it from the subjective viewpoint(s).

Jason







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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 25 Oct 2013, at 17:30, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 9:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


Do you think that [you] die in a self-duplication experience?
   ^^^
 We've been  through this, it depends on who the hell you is. Is  
you the guy who remembers being John Clark yesterday,


 We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will  
remember having been in Helsinki.


Fine, then obviously You will survive and equally obvious you  
will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington.


In the third person view on the 1-views, yes. But the question is  
about the future first person point if view, that you can have, and  
you know in advance (assuming comp) that you (in the same sense)  
will see only Moscow, or Washington, as you will certainly not feel in  
both place at once.
You are the one keeping an ambiguity by never distinguishing the 1p  
and 3p view, each time this ambiguity helps to make your point, but  
hen you fail to address the question.







  or the guy who is seeing Helsinki right now

 You can take this one, as we know that such a guy will survive the  
duplication (assuming comp).


 or the guy that will see Washington tomorrow,

 Yes, it concerns also that guy, given that he has survived and he  
remembers being the H-guy.


 or the guy that will see Moscow tomorrow?

 Same.

Fine, then obviously You will survive and equally obvious you  
will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington.


Not in the first person pov, on which bear the question.



And don't come back and repeat the irrelevant fact that each copy  
will see only one city because, if as Bruno Marchal said,   you  
concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki then  
it is beyond dispute that you will see both cities.


True, but only from a third pov stance looking from outside to the two  
copies, but that is not what has been asked. Indeed; if you use your  
reasoning to predict that you will see both cities, both copies will  
refute it, as they see that they see only one city. The H-guy can  
reason from comp to predict that P(he will see only once city) is one.




And don't come back with a bunch of pee pee stuff unless the ideas  
can be expressed without indeterminate pronouns to hide behind.


The reasoning concerns person and the pronouns does not lead to any  
problem when make clear the difference between first and third person,  
that you avoid, apparently to evade the simple conclusion.


Bruno





 John K Clark





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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 25 Oct 2013, at 18:08, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 5:00 PM, Quentin Anciaux  
allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 Be consistent, reject MWI, or ask *the same question* about the  
probability of *you* (who is you ? pinocchio maybe ?)


In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who you is  
because however many copies of you there may or may not be they  
will never meet and John Clark will never see more than one copy of  
Quentin Anciaux. But in Bruno's thought experiment that is no longer  
true, so to continue to blithely babble on about you causes  
nothing but confusion.



This is really not relevant, as the W-guy cannot perceive immediately  
the M-guy, and the question bears on what you see when opening the  
reconstitution box.
Also, if QM is discovered to be slightly non linear, the probability  
would vanish? (if QM is slightly non linear, we can interact with the  
parallel universes, and met the doppelganger).




 measuring spin up while measuring the spin of an electron

And probability implies prediction and prediction has nothing to do  
with a sense of self, and that is what Bruno's proof is all about.


Absolutely not. That is no more than what you need to say yes to a  
comp doctor. You keep bringing non relevant points.




If when you pressed the button you were 99% certain, in fact even if  
you were 100% certain and there was not the tiniest particle of  
doubt in your mind that you would end up in Washington, and one  
second later you found yourself in Moscow your sense of self would  
not be diminished one iota, you'd just figure that you made a bad  
prediction, and it wouldn't be for the first time.


And you would change your theory asserting W and M, for example,  
which is guarantied to be violated in all your possible futures.





 Your agenda is not to try to comprehend something, it is just to  
bash someone with no reason except misplaced pride.


Ask yourself this question, why aren't Bruno's ideas universally  
recognized by the scientific community as a work of genius? There  
are 2 possibilities:


1) Due to the same misplaced pride that I have the entire scientific  
community is jealous of Bruno and would rather destroy a stunning  
new advancement in human knowledge than admit they didn't find it  
first.


2) The entire scientific community has run into the exact same  
logical stumbling block in Bruno's ideas that I did.


Then they would have meet me, or discuss by mail, at least once, like  
you do. That never happened.


But you can easily imagine other reasons than 1) and 2),  like the  
fact that I could be a witness of some scandal, or something.


Or perhaps not so much people understand really Everett, which took  
times also to be listened, the idea to be multiplied all the time is  
hard to be accepted by many people.


Look at Boltzmann, he eventually kill himself due to the mockery of  
his idea that statistics can play a key role in classical physics.  
Today we cannot imagine that such statistics can't play a role.


You betray your feeling here. Some people, like you apparently, indeed  
find the FPI and the reversal as a work of genius. They think: if  
you were right you should have the Nobel Prize, but you don't, so  
something must be wrong, and so I don't need to study it. But of  
course this does not help as it makes people dismissing it indeed.


I don't know. I am at the center of some academical scandal indeed. I  
got a prize for my thesis, and I have been asked to relate the  
scandalous behavior, but apparently this did not help. Some academies  
acts like some clergy. That's all. It is the very common human  
corporatist defense reflex. Hardly new in the human history.


The fact that I do not publish, unless asked with some insistence,  
does not help. Of course.


In this list, I focus only on the ideas. And this very post explains  
why you don't try to study the ideas, just try to prove (like some)  
that I am a crackpot, but this will not help you to get the idea if  
there is one.


I suggest sincerely to come back on the scientific point, letting the  
reason why the academical world is so slow to the historians and  
sociologists.


So I am a genius, right? You are pushing my little ego too far. I  
might have been lucky reading James Watson book and Gödel at the right  
moment.


Bruno







  John K Clark








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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 25 Oct 2013, at 18:24, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 11:35 AM, Quentin Anciaux  
allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will  
remember having been in Helsinki.


 Fine, then obviously You will survive and equally obvious you  
will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington.


 Fine, then  obviously You will survive and equally obvious you  
will see BOTH spin up AND spin down.


Fine, if the MWI is true and if the same definition of you is used  
as Bruno's definition, namely that  you concerns the guy(s) who  
will remember having been in Helsinki, then it is beyond dispute  
that you will see BOTH spin up AND spin down. And don't come back  
and say that can be proven wrong because I see only spin up,  
because that is only half the amount of data that would be needed to  
prove it wrong.


I am sure Quentin answers this, but obviously you forget the data that  
you have been duplicated, and that each copy can access only to half  
the amount of third person data, from the first person data they can  
only access to.


Bruno





   John K Clark


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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 25 Oct 2013, at 20:44, John Clark wrote:





On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 12:35 PM, Quentin Anciaux  
allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 Fine, if the MWI is true and if the same definition of you is  
used as Bruno's definition, namely that  you concerns the guy(s)  
who will remember having been in Helsinki, then it is beyond  
dispute that you will see BOTH spin up AND spin down. And don't  
come back and say that can be proven wrong because I see only spin  
up, because that is only half the amount of data that would be  
needed to prove it wrong.


 Fine and you'll be wrong,

No, according to Bruno's meaning of the word you will see BOTH  
spin up and spin down.


 because MWI predicts like QM 50%.

MWI like QM predicts 50% of what will do what?

 And yes, one of you will see up, and one of you will see down.

Correct, so you will see spin up and spin down acceding to Bruno's  
meaning of the word you. Obviously if the meaning of the word  
you, or the meaning of any other word in the preceding sentence is  
changed then it may no longer be true.


Both in MWI and comp, everything is clear by distinguishing 1p and 3p.

Perhaps that distinction, done in a 3p objective manner, is what is  
truly revolutionary, as science has stopped to even address the 1p  
issue when the subject has been abandoned to politics/authoritative- 
religion since 1500 years.


Bruno




  John K Clark


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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 25 Oct 2013, at 22:28, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/25/2013 9:08 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 5:00 PM, Quentin Anciaux  
allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 Be consistent, reject MWI, or ask *the same question* about the  
probability of *you* (who is you ? pinocchio maybe ?)


In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who you is  
because however many copies of you there may or may not be they  
will never meet and John Clark will never see more than one copy of  
Quentin Anciaux. But in Bruno's thought experiment that is no  
longer true, so to continue to blithely babble on about you  
causes nothing but confusion.


I don't see why that is determinative.  Suppose the M-man never  
meets the W-man and in fact neither of them even knows whether the  
other one exists?




 measuring spin up while measuring the spin of an electron

And probability implies prediction and prediction has nothing to do  
with a sense of self, and that is what Bruno's proof is all  
about. If when you pressed the button you were 99% certain, in fact  
even if you were 100% certain and there was not the tiniest  
particle of doubt in your mind that you would end up in Washington,  
and one second later you found yourself in Moscow your sense of  
self would not be diminished one iota, you'd just figure that you  
made a bad prediction, and it wouldn't be for the first time.


Sure, and if the experiment were repeated N times then most of the  
2^N participants would find, consulting their diaries, that they  
were right about half the time and wrong the half - and, even after  
comparing notes with one another, they would decide that Bernoulli  
trials are a good model of what happens when being teleported via  
Bruno's duplicator.





 Your agenda is not to try to comprehend something, it is just to  
bash someone with no reason except misplaced pride.


Ask yourself this question, why aren't Bruno's ideas universally  
recognized by the scientific community as a work of genius? There  
are 2 possibilities:


1) Due to the same misplaced pride that I have the entire  
scientific community is jealous of Bruno and would rather destroy a  
stunning new advancement in human knowledge than admit they didn't  
find it first.


2) The entire scientific community has run into the exact same  
logical stumbling block in Bruno's ideas that I did.


Or they consider this particular idea, uncertainty via duplication,  
to be a commonplace and uncontroversial.  Most people (including me)  
find the last two steps of Bruno's argument more suspect in which he  
argues that all possible computation is the fundamental basis of the  
material world.


Some people, knowing rather well Church thesis and computer science  
find those part non controversial, and so feels that they have to stop  
early in the reasoning, like step 3 (John Clark, or even step 0, like  
Bill Taylor).
My real opponents does not want to admit that anything could be  
controversial, as this would already lead to some recognizance, and  
they want me to be ignored at all price, for reason unrelated to  
anything on the topics. My real opponents tended to consider AI and  
even QM as crackpot, in fact they even fight against the whole of  
computer science. Some pure mathematicians are like that. They hate  
applied mathematics, especially when you suggest that some part of  
pure mathematics can have applications. But it is worst than that.  
Some scandal are hidden with the goal of hiding worst scandal. Humans  
can be very grave sometimes.


Bruno






Brent



  John K Clark







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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 25 Oct 2013, at 23:33, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:


Citeren meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:


On 10/25/2013 9:08 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 5:00 PM, Quentin Anciaux  
allco...@gmail.com mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote:


Be consistent, reject MWI, or ask *the same question* about  
the probability of

   *you* (who is you ? pinocchio maybe ?)


In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who you is  
because however many copies of you there may or may not be they  
will never meet and John Clark will never see more than one copy  
of Quentin Anciaux. But in Bruno's thought experiment that is no  
longer true, so to continue to blithely babble on about you  
causes nothing but confusion.


I don't see why that is determinative.  Suppose the M-man never  
meets the W-man and in fact neither of them even knows whether the  
other one exists?




measuring spin up while measuring the spin of an electron


And probability implies prediction and prediction has nothing to  
do with a sense of self, and that is what Bruno's proof is all  
about. If when you pressed the button you were 99% certain, in  
fact even if you were 100% certain and there was not the tiniest  
particle of doubt in your mind that you would end up in  
Washington, and one second later you found yourself in Moscow your  
sense of self would not be diminished one iota, you'd just figure  
that you made a bad prediction, and it wouldn't be for the first  
time.


Sure, and if the experiment were repeated N times then most of the  
2^N participants would find, consulting their diaries, that they  
were right about half the time and wrong the half - and, even after  
comparing notes with one another, they would decide that Bernoulli  
trials are a good model of what happens when being teleported via  
Bruno's duplicator.





Your agenda is not to try to comprehend something, it is just  
to bash someone with

   no reason except misplaced pride.


Ask yourself this question, why aren't Bruno's ideas universally  
recognized by the scientific community as a work of genius? There  
are 2 possibilities:


1) Due to the same misplaced pride that I have the entire  
scientific community is jealous of Bruno and would rather destroy  
a stunning new advancement in human knowledge than admit they  
didn't find it first.


2) The entire scientific community has run into the exact same  
logical stumbling block in Bruno's ideas that I did.


Or they consider this particular idea, uncertainty via duplication,  
to be a commonplace and uncontroversial.  Most people (including  
me) find the last two steps of Bruno's argument more suspect in  
which he argues that all possible computation is the fundamental  
basis of the material world.


Brent


It is:

3) Bruno has yet to develop the mathematical tools to do practical  
computations.



Not at all. That would be the case if the goal was doing physics, but  
the goal was only to formulate the mind body problem.
Then, despite this, the math part (AUDA, the machine's interview) does  
provide the mathematical tools to do practical computations. The  
arithmetical quantization is fully given and has been compared with  
quantum logic.
That we are at light years from getting anything like the standard  
model is not really relevant, as the standard model does not address  
the mind-body problem.
A physicist can complain that comp is a long way to be able to use as  
physics, but I insist: the goal is to show that the mind-body problem  
is not solved, and that with comp, we have to derive physics from  
arithmetic, and I got already the propositional part of physics.


The subject is the mind-body problem, not physics per se.

Technically, the problem is that physicists don't know mathematical  
logic (as Penrose illustrated to the logicians). Very few physicists  
understand the X1* and Z1* logic, which gives the needed arithmetical  
quantizations.


That's another problem: only logicians knows logic. They have no  
problem with AUDA. But many just dislike the mind-body problem and  
applications of logic. My work reminds that logic per se does not  
solve philosophical problem, which annoy them as they are still under  
the spell of Vienna positivism, where logic is used to replace  
metaphysics, and comp shows that this is not enough.


I think.


Bruno



Suppose that you could derive the Standard Model from deeper  
principles, then it doesn't matter what the philosophical objections  
against these principles are.


No one cares that Einstein's arguments leading to Special Relativity  
were not rigorous. Obviously, you can't derive special relativity  
rigorously from electrodynamics, because relativity is more  
fundamental than electrodynamics. At best you can present heuristic  
arguments. Some philosophers do make a problem out of that, but in  
physics no one really cares. Most modern textbooks do this correctly  
by discussing Lorentz invariance and only then 

Re: For John Clark

2013-10-26 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 3:36 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy 
multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote:

 Well, you could always reciprocate Quentin's courtesy and [...]


Courtesy? This is the fellow who said:

Your agenda is not to try to comprehend something, it is just to bash
someone with no reason except misplaced pride.
and

you're not a fool, you're an ass.

  John K Clark

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Re: For John Clark

2013-10-26 Thread Jason Resch
John,

I came across this today, which you might find of interest:
http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9709032v1.pdf

In particular section 3 goes to great pains to describe the importance of
the first person / third person distinction.  From the paper:

A. “It doesn’t explain why we perceive randomness”

Everett’s brilliant insight was that the MWI does
explain why we perceive randomness even though the
Schrodinger equation itself is completely causal. To avoid
linguistic confusion, it is crucial that we distinguish between

• the outside view of the world (the way a mathematical
thinks of it, i.e., as an evolving wavefunction),
and

• the inside view, the way it is perceived from the
subjective frog perspective of an observer in it.

Therefore, the 1st / 3rd person views are not just some obscure aspect of
Bruno's theory that is unknown or unused in any other part of science, it
is critical in other theories of science too.  You dismiss it as pee pee
and that is what prevents you from arriving at the correct conclusion, I
think. If you take into account the first person inside view or frog
perspective, you get a different result than when you use only the third
person outside view or bird perspective.

Your confusion regarding the third step has nothing to do with pronouns or
personal identity, it is purely due to a focus on only the objective
perspective when the experiment calls for use of the subjective perspective.

Jason


On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 1:59 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 12:27 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote:

  In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who you is because
 however many copies of you there may or may not be they will never meet


  What does it have to do with prediction and probability ?


 In the MWI if John Clark is asked for a prediction or a probability or
 anything for that matter about you further clarification is not needed,
 in a thought experiment involving people duplicating machines it is.

  you refuse to let work your brain while you doesn't do *as you should*


 You doesn't well speak.

John K Clark

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