Re: For John Clark
On 02 Mar 2014, at 01:56, LizR wrote: I like the frog and bird metaphors, though! At least I prefer the idea of the bird looking down on the mathematical landscape than worrying about the eye of god. I prefer the inner god to be a bird than a frog, but may be that's personal : The eye of god is the 0-person view. It alludes to the outer God, which is just arithmetical truth, here. But also, the bird/frog makes that opposition to much physicalist, when with comp it is will be a purely distinction on the type of self- reference, and is actually closer to the QM entanglement. Tegmark is less wrong than other physicalist physicists, still not yet close to comp's consequences, though. He got the references wrong also. Bruno In the beginning was the Bird, to quote The Unpleasant Profession of Jonathan Hoag. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
I like the frog and bird metaphors, though! At least I prefer the idea of the bird looking down on the mathematical landscape than worrying about the eye of god. In the beginning was the Bird, to quote The Unpleasant Profession of Jonathan Hoag. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 26 Oct 2013, at 19:09, Jason Resch wrote: John, I came across this today, which you might find of interest: http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9709032v1.pdf In particular section 3 goes to great pains to describe the importance of the first person / third person distinction. From the paper: A. It doesn't explain why we perceive randomness Everett's brilliant insight was that the MWI does explain why we perceive randomness even though the Schrodinger equation itself is completely causal. To avoid linguistic confusion, it is crucial that we distinguish between * the outside view of the world (the way a mathematical thinks of it, i.e., as an evolving wavefunction), and * the inside view, the way it is perceived from the subjective frog perspective of an observer in it. Therefore, the 1st / 3rd person views are not just some obscure aspect of Bruno's theory that is unknown or unused in any other part of science, it is critical in other theories of science too. You dismiss it as pee pee and that is what prevents you from arriving at the correct conclusion, I think. If you take into account the first person inside view or frog perspective, you get a different result than when you use only the third person outside view or bird perspective. Your confusion regarding the third step has nothing to do with pronouns or personal identity, it is purely due to a focus on only the objective perspective when the experiment calls for use of the subjective perspective. Exactly. Now, to nitpick a little bit, I would not conflate bird/frog and 3p/ 1p, as bird/frog gives a feeling that it is a question of scaling, where in fact it is, arguably in both QM and computationalism, a question of entanglement or isolation. In comp, entanglement being simply defined by entering, or not, in the telebox. Both in UDA and in AUDA, the 1p/3p distinction is precisely defined. Bruno Jason On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 1:59 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 12:27 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who you is because however many copies of you there may or may not be they will never meet What does it have to do with prediction and probability ? In the MWI if John Clark is asked for a prediction or a probability or anything for that matter about you further clarification is not needed, in a thought experiment involving people duplicating machines it is. you refuse to let work your brain while you doesn't do *as you should* You doesn't well speak. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 03 Nov 2013, at 19:46, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: So you sees both Moscow AND Washington. No, anyone of the two see only one city. So what is the one and only one city that the 2 you see. W for tham in W. And M for the guy in M. The point is that both of them refute the W and M prediction, and confirms the P = 1/2 prediction. you are both of them, Yes, but both see only one city. Yes, and if both are you and both see a different city the obviously you see both cities. In the third person view of what you see. But after the duplication, you have only access to one view, and so W and M is refuted. But w or M is not refute, and is confirmed. Just look at all diaries. You persist in forgetting the distinction between the 3-1 view, And you persist if forgetting that unless Solipsism turns out to be true EVERYBODY has the 1 view so just mindlessly chanting the 1 view means nothing unless specified who's the 1 view Of the guy in Helsinki. A different diary?? Both the Washington Man and the Helsinki Man remember writing the exact same identical diary and the last line says I Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki am now walking into the duplication chamber, and now I see the operator starting to push the on butto. So it's true that you wrote the diary, but which one is you? Both. Yes. Bruno, you're a expert on logic so given the above tell me, how many cities did you see? And please don't start blabing about the 1-view unless it's clear who's 1-view. It is clear for the resulting person. The one in W knows that he is the one in W. Same for the guy in W. And the confirmation or refutation of the prediction is asked to all of them. We have agreed on this, We agreed on this when Bruno Marchal said you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki; but that didn't last long then you sees both cities and you insist you doesn't. Because, 1-you never see two cities. So now I don't know what in hell you means when Bruno Marchal uses that weasel pronoun. You always means all the examplars appearing in the experience. But to grasp the indeterminacy, you need to understand that the question is concerned with the future 1p experience, which the computationalist know will be unique. John, do you agree that if we promise you to give a cup of coffee in both W and M, you can predict in Helsinki that P(I ill drink coffee) = 1. ? Yes. But if we promise you to give a cup of coffee to W and a cup of tea to M, and it's predicted in Helsinki that the probability I will drink coffee is 1 then after it was all over there would be no way to determine if the prediction was correct or not with Bruno Marchal's inconsistent meanings of pronouns like I and you. If we keep the old very good and clear definition, you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki then it would be easy to tell if the prediction was correct or not, but Bruno Marchal must backpedal away from that or all the other ideas will fall apart. What you call backpedaling is only that we take the first person into account, of all copies, because you are all of them in the 3p sense, but only one of them (each of them) after, in the first person pov. You seem to ignore that the first person events Who's first person events? And please, no pronouns. The one unique, first person view of all copies. seeing W and seeing M are incompatible. Explain why that is incompatible. because all the 1-you, after the duplication cannot see both city at once. They all see one city, and they could not have any certainty of which one. The guy in W can be very well perturbed, asking himself why am I the guy in W?. he will not find any reason, as any reason would be infirmed for the M guy, and we have admitted the two copies are the helsinki person, in the 3p description. Although I can't prove solipsism is wrong I believe lots of people see W and lots of people see M. And they see it from their first person view. You make my point. At no moment will one person ever say I see both city Yes. Explain why that is incompatible with you will see both cities. you will see both cities is correct in the 3p description of yourself, and incorrect for the 1p experience of each of them. unless they talk about the first person view in a third person description, I have no idea what that even means. It means looking at the experience from outside, where you see your body and behavior, and 1p views, reinstanciated in both city. That is different from what is written in all diaries, which contains the statement I see only one city, and I could not have predicted which one. You continue to avoid the fact that the question concerns your future and unique 1-view. You have
Re: For John Clark
On 03 Nov 2013, at 18:51, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 2:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 03 Nov 2013, at 09:17, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 1:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 Nov 2013, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote: Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you have. Are you referring to Quantum Mechanics and Experience (1992)? I do not have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the same). It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing in his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett. Bruno, I have just finished reading this book. I thank you for recommending it as it helped me get some familiarity with the math and the notation. I found the first 120 or so pages quite infuriating, for he would seeming get so close to the idea of observers being in superpositions, (teasing and dangling the idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical. Without any argument, I agree. It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed make sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following a handwavy dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until page 130 when he introduces the many-minds theory. Strangely, he claims that he (Albert) and Barry Loewer introduced the theory, with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh. While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers locality, he never explains how many-minds is any better (or different than) many-worlds. Also, I found it strange that he considered many-minds and Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm requires additional assumptions beyond the four quantum postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is incompatible with special relativity. It introduces very well QM and the measurement problem, but he is still, like everybody, believing implicitly in some strong mind- body thesis, and get irrational, somehow, I agree, in his defense of Bohm. I would have also attributed the many-minds to Loewer. I know Zeh mainly for his indexical analysis of time, which I think is correct, and certainly close to both Many World and Many Mind. If you have some references on Zeh and Many Mind ... I found this paper by Zeh from 1970: On the interpretation of measurement in quantum theory, 1970, Foundations of Physics, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 69–76 In particular, he describes the essential idea of many minds and macroscopic superposition on page 74: http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.png but he also references Everett, so it isn't entirely clear to me if he is introducing anything new. From what I remember, Zeh is, in that paper, much closer to Everett than to the Albert-Loewer many mind theory. Note that the many-mind theory is very specific, and assumes a unique universe. But didn't they assume reality of the superposition? If the superposition is real how can their only be one unique universe? They assume the reality of the superposition, but consider that it applies only to the subjectivity of the person, not to anything physical. Yes, it is a dualism, and a very bizarre one. t does not make much sense to me. Observers' mind get mutiplied with probabilities which have to be postulated again, so it lost completely the appeal we can have for Everett. It transform other people into zombies, also. Is this a necessary consequence of many-minds or only inAlbert and Loewer's formulation of it? may-mind always refers to Albert Loewer's theory. I don't know any other many-mind QM theory. It has nothing to do with the arithmetical many-dreams, where the computations are relatively entirely duplicated in extenso. Bruno Jason Albert-Loewer many-minds theory seems to me less sensical than Bohm or even Copenhagen. It unites all the defects of all QM- interpretations in one theory, imo, and this without mentioning that it needs non-comp. Bruno Jason They all miss, of course, the many dreams internal interpretation of ... elementary arithmetic. It will take time before people awaken from the Aristotelian naturalism. Most scientists are not even aware of its conjectural status. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you
Re: For John Clark
On 03 Nov 2013, at 22:43, meekerdb wrote: On 11/3/2013 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Nov 2013, at 21:47, meekerdb wrote: On 11/2/2013 10:53 AM, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:22 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and they both remember writing the diary, so which one is Bruno Marchal talking about? Anyone of the two So you sees both Moscow AND Washington. each will have a different diary A different diary?? Both the Washington Man and the Helsinki Man remember writing the exact same identical diary and the last line says I Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki am now walking into the duplication chamber, and now I see the operator starting to push the on butto. So it's true that you wrote the diary, but which one is you? As I see it, the question is whether the duplication experiment provides a good model of randomness. If we imagine doing the experiment four times, sending the subject(s) through repeatedly at the end there will be 16 diaries and they will contain the entries: , WMMM, MWMM, WWMM, MMWM, WMWM, MWWM, WWWM, MMMW, WMMW, MWMW, WWMW, MMWW, WMWW, MWWW, and so the participants might compare diaries and conclude that going to Moscow or Washington is a random event with probability 1/2 - or at least in limit of large numbers of repetitions. Actually, if they count themselves, one duplication is enough. Karl Popper already suggested this model of randomness in The Logic of Scientific Discovery and he probably wasn't the first. That would be astonishing for someone suggesting interactionist dualism (with Eccles), and missing Everett QM (cf his propensity theory). Can you give a quote or elaborate? It is the first time I hear this. It wasn't in the context quantum mechanics. Popper was proposing a theory of probability and he defined n-free to be a sequence in which the next value was independent of the previous n values (chapter 8, section 56). OK. That has nothing to do with the objective indeterminacy due to mechanist self-multiplication. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Nov 4, 2013, at 2:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 03 Nov 2013, at 18:51, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 2:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 03 Nov 2013, at 09:17, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 1:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 Nov 2013, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote: Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you have. Are you referring to Quantum Mechanics and Experience (1992)? I do not have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the same). It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing in his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett. Bruno, I have just finished reading this book. I thank you for recommending it as it helped me get some familiarity with the math and the notation. I found the first 120 or so pages quite infuriating, for he would seeming get so close to the idea of observers being in superpositions, (teasing and dangling the idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical. Without any argument, I agree. It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed make sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following a handwavy dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until page 130 when he introduces the many-minds theory. Strangely, he claims that he (Albert) and Barry Loewer introduced the theory, with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh. While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers locality, he never explains how many-minds is any better (or different than) many-worlds. Also, I found it strange that he considered many-minds and Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm requires additional assumptions beyond the four quantum postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is incompatible with special relativity. It introduces very well QM and the measurement problem, but he is still, like everybody, believing implicitly in some strong mind- body thesis, and get irrational, somehow, I agree, in his defense of Bohm. I would have also attributed the many-minds to Loewer. I know Zeh mainly for his indexical analysis of time, which I think is correct, and certainly close to both Many World and Many Mind. If you have some references on Zeh and Many Mind ... I found this paper by Zeh from 1970: On the interpretation of measurement in quantum theory, 1970, Foundations of Physics, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 69–76 In particular, he describes the essential idea of many minds and macroscopic superposition on page 74: http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.png but he also references Everett, so it isn't entirely clear to me if he is introducing anything new. From what I remember, Zeh is, in that paper, much closer to Everett than to the Albert-Loewer many mind theory. Note that the many-mind theory is very specific, and assumes a unique universe. But didn't they assume reality of the superposition? If the superposition is real how can their only be one unique universe? They assume the reality of the superposition, but consider that it applies only to the subjectivity of the person, not to anything physical. Yes, it is a dualism, and a very bizarre one. t does not make much sense to me. I see. That makes very little sense. What do they suppose happens when an observer acts on their measurement in one of two ways? Observers' mind get mutiplied with probabilities which have to be postulated again, so it lost completely the appeal we can have for Everett. It transform other people into zombies, also. Is this a necessary consequence of many-minds or only inAlbert and Loewer's formulation of it? may-mind always refers to Albert Loewer's theory. I don't know any other many-mind QM theory. It has nothing to do with the arithmetical many-dreams, where the computations are relatively entirely duplicated in extenso. Oh. I had always thought of many minds as like a many worlds where instead of splits there are supposed to be infinite minds which differentiate upon measurement; this is how other sites seen to describe it. I see from your description it is quite unlike the many dreams imof arithmetic. Jason Bruno Jason Albert-Loewer many-minds theory seems to me less sensical than Bohm or even Copenhagen. It unites all the defects of all QM- interpretations in one theory, imo, and this without mentioning that it needs non-comp. Bruno Jason They all miss, of course, the many dreams internal interpretation of ... elementary arithmetic. It will take time before people awaken from the Aristotelian naturalism. Most scientists are not even aware of its conjectural status. Bruno
Re: For John Clark
On 04 Nov 2013, at 15:57, Jason Resch wrote: On Nov 4, 2013, at 2:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 03 Nov 2013, at 18:51, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 2:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 03 Nov 2013, at 09:17, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 1:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 Nov 2013, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote: Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you have. Are you referring to Quantum Mechanics and Experience (1992)? I do not have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the same). It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing in his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett. Bruno, I have just finished reading this book. I thank you for recommending it as it helped me get some familiarity with the math and the notation. I found the first 120 or so pages quite infuriating, for he would seeming get so close to the idea of observers being in superpositions, (teasing and dangling the idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical. Without any argument, I agree. It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed make sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following a handwavy dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until page 130 when he introduces the many-minds theory. Strangely, he claims that he (Albert) and Barry Loewer introduced the theory, with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh. While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers locality, he never explains how many-minds is any better (or different than) many-worlds. Also, I found it strange that he considered many-minds and Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm requires additional assumptions beyond the four quantum postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is incompatible with special relativity. It introduces very well QM and the measurement problem, but he is still, like everybody, believing implicitly in some strong mind- body thesis, and get irrational, somehow, I agree, in his defense of Bohm. I would have also attributed the many-minds to Loewer. I know Zeh mainly for his indexical analysis of time, which I think is correct, and certainly close to both Many World and Many Mind. If you have some references on Zeh and Many Mind ... I found this paper by Zeh from 1970: On the interpretation of measurement in quantum theory, 1970, Foundations of Physics, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 69–76 In particular, he describes the essential idea of many minds and macroscopic superposition on page 74: http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.png but he also references Everett, so it isn't entirely clear to me if he is introducing anything new. From what I remember, Zeh is, in that paper, much closer to Everett than to the Albert-Loewer many mind theory. Note that the many-mind theory is very specific, and assumes a unique universe. But didn't they assume reality of the superposition? If the superposition is real how can their only be one unique universe? They assume the reality of the superposition, but consider that it applies only to the subjectivity of the person, not to anything physical. Yes, it is a dualism, and a very bizarre one. t does not make much sense to me. I see. That makes very little sense. What do they suppose happens when an observer acts on their measurement in one of two ways? The observer will live an experience among many, with a probability given by QM. The other minds still exist, and with comp, should be conscious, but seem to lost any body to act on. Also, if you and someone else measure independent spin repetitively, your fellow becomes a zombie, his bodies still give a part of the universal wave needed for the interference terms, but the probability rule, as used here, guaranties that minds of the others are no more correlated with your mind. So, with comp, the QM Many Minds of Albert and Loewer entails both the seemingly existence of souls lacking bodies and of bodies lacking soul (zombie). I remember vaguely that they are more or less aware of the difficulties. Observers' mind get mutiplied with probabilities which have to be postulated again, so it lost completely the appeal we can have for Everett. It transform other people into zombies, also. Is this a necessary consequence of many-minds or only inAlbert and Loewer's formulation of it? may-mind always refers to Albert Loewer's theory. I don't know any other many-mind QM theory. It has nothing to do with the arithmetical many-dreams, where the computations are relatively entirely duplicated in extenso. Oh. I had always thought of many minds
Re: For John Clark
On Mon, Nov 4, 2013 at 10:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Nov 2013, at 15:57, Jason Resch wrote: On Nov 4, 2013, at 2:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 03 Nov 2013, at 18:51, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 2:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 03 Nov 2013, at 09:17, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 1:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 Nov 2013, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote: Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you have. Are you referring to Quantum Mechanics and Experience (1992)? I do not have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the same). It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing in his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett. Bruno, I have just finished reading this book. I thank you for recommending it as it helped me get some familiarity with the math and the notation. I found the first 120 or so pages quite infuriating, for he would seeming get so close to the idea of observers being in superpositions, (teasing and dangling the idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical. Without any argument, I agree. It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed make sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following a handwavy dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until page 130 when he introduces the many-minds theory. Strangely, he claims that he (Albert) and Barry Loewer introduced the theory, with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh. While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers locality, he never explains how many-minds is any better (or different than) many-worlds. Also, I found it strange that he considered many-minds and Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm requires additional assumptions beyond the four quantum postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is incompatible with special relativity. It introduces very well QM and the measurement problem, but he is still, like everybody, believing implicitly in some strong mind-body thesis, and get irrational, somehow, I agree, in his defense of Bohm. I would have also attributed the many-minds to Loewer. I know Zeh mainly for his indexical analysis of time, which I think is correct, and certainly close to both Many World and Many Mind. If you have some references on Zeh and Many Mind ... I found this paper by Zeh from 1970: On the interpretation of measurement in quantum theory, 1970, Foundations of Physics, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 69–76 In particular, he describes the essential idea of many minds and macroscopic superposition on page 74: http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.png http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.pngbut he also references Everett, so it isn't entirely clear to me if he is introducing anything new. From what I remember, Zeh is, in that paper, much closer to Everett than to the Albert-Loewer many mind theory. Note that the many-mind theory is very specific, and assumes a unique universe. But didn't they assume reality of the superposition? If the superposition is real how can their only be one unique universe? They assume the reality of the superposition, but consider that it applies only to the subjectivity of the person, not to anything physical. Yes, it is a dualism, and a very bizarre one. t does not make much sense to me. I see. That makes very little sense. What do they suppose happens when an observer acts on their measurement in one of two ways? The observer will live an experience among many, with a probability given by QM. The other minds still exist, and with comp, should be conscious, but seem to lost any body to act on. Also, if you and someone else measure independent spin repetitively, your fellow becomes a zombie, his bodies still give a part of the universal wave needed for the interference terms, but the probability rule, as used here, guaranties that minds of the others are no more correlated with your mind. So, with comp, the QM Many Minds of Albert and Loewer entails both the seemingly existence of souls lacking bodies and of bodies lacking soul (zombie). I remember vaguely that they are more or less aware of the difficulties. Observers' mind get mutiplied with probabilities which have to be postulated again, so it lost completely the appeal we can have for Everett. It transform other people into zombies, also. Is this a necessary consequence of many-minds or only inAlbert and Loewer's formulation of it? may-mind always refers to Albert Loewer's theory. I don't know any other many-mind QM
Re: For John Clark
On 04 Nov 2013, at 18:53, Jason Resch wrote: It looks like Zeh had more to say in 1999, this theory seems much closer to many dreams: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-minds_interpretation #Continuous_infinity_of_minds and http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9908084 Continuous infinity of minds [edit] In Everett's conception the mind of an observer is split by the measuring process as a consequence of the decoherence induced by measurement. In many-minds each physical observer has a postulated associated continuous infinity of minds. The decoherence of the measuring event (observation) causes the infinity of minds associated with each observer to become categorized into distinct yet infinite subsets, each subset associated with each distinct outcome of the observation. No minds are split, in the many-minds view, because it is assumed that they are all already always distinct. The choice between multiplication and differentiation remains free in the many-worlds too. The idea of many-minds was suggested early on by Zeh in 1995. He argues that in a decohering no-collapse universe one can avoid the necessity of distinct macrorealms (parallel worlds in MWIterminology) by introducing a new psycho-physical parallelism, in which individual minds supervene on each non-interfering component in the physical state. Zeh indeed suggests that, given decoherence, this is the most natural interpretation of quantum mechanics. I agree with Zeh. I have interpreted the Everett relative states in that way. The problem is that the notion of world is very fuzzy in the physical literature (and *very large* in the analytical philosophy). The main difference between the many-minds and many-worlds interpretations then lies in the definition of the preferred quantity. The many-minds interpretation suggests that to solve the measurement problem, there is no need to secure a definite macrorealm: the only thing that's required is appearance of such. OK. With comp, we don't have much choice in that matter. A bit more precisely: the idea is that the preferred quantity is whatever physical quantity, defined on brains (or brains and parts of their environments), has definite-valued states (eigenstates) that underpin such appearances, i.e. underpin the states of belief in, or sensory experience of, the familiar macroscopic realm. It sounds like under Zeh's many-minds, the difference between it and Everett is a world would be any/all the systems that are psychologically indistinguishable from each other, from the view of some mind. For some first person plural, which is assured in Everett+Gleason (but ad hoc in Albert-Loewer), and I can't say for Zeh, except that it looks like Everett, but without taking he idea of definite physical world too much seriously. Zeh has an interesting indexical view of time, and his many-minds seems close to the indexical view of physicalness we have with computationalism. So Zeh many minds, like Everett many-worlds, and unlike Bohm or Albert-Loewer, might be the measure one part of the arithmetical many dream matrix or UD*. That makes sense. OK. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 02 Nov 2013, at 18:53, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:22 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and they both remember writing the diary, so which one is Bruno Marchal talking about? Anyone of the two So you sees both Moscow AND Washington. No, anyone of the two see only one city. you are both of them, but both see only one city. You persist in forgetting the distinction between the 3-1 view, as explained in preceding post, and the 1-views. each will have a different diary A different diary?? Both the Washington Man and the Helsinki Man remember writing the exact same identical diary and the last line says I Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki am now walking into the duplication chamber, and now I see the operator starting to push the on butto. So it's true that you wrote the diary, but which one is you? Both. We have agreed on this, and the FPI comes exactly from that fact. Both copies are you, and both copies see only one city, and because both are you, and both see only one city, they could not have predicted which one. John, do you agree that if we promise you to give a cup of coffee in both W and M, you can predict in Helsinki that P(I ill drink coffee) = 1. ? Then, if you are OK with this, you can understand that in Helsinki, the probability to see only one city is one. You seem to ignore that the first person events seeing W and seeing M are incompatible. At no moment will one person ever say I see both city, unless they talk about the first person view in a third person description, which is not what the question is about. The question is about the first person incompatible events of seeing (in some direct way) which city. You seem again stopping doing the thought experiment before putting yourself at the place of *any* survivor. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 02 Nov 2013, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote: Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you have. Are you referring to Quantum Mechanics and Experience (1992)? I do not have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the same). It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing in his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett. Bruno, I have just finished reading this book. I thank you for recommending it as it helped me get some familiarity with the math and the notation. I found the first 120 or so pages quite infuriating, for he would seeming get so close to the idea of observers being in superpositions, (teasing and dangling the idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical. Without any argument, I agree. It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed make sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following a handwavy dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until page 130 when he introduces the many-minds theory. Strangely, he claims that he (Albert) and Barry Loewer introduced the theory, with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh. While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers locality, he never explains how many-minds is any better (or different than) many-worlds. Also, I found it strange that he considered many-minds and Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm requires additional assumptions beyond the four quantum postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is incompatible with special relativity. It introduces very well QM and the measurement problem, but he is still, like everybody, believing implicitly in some strong mind-body thesis, and get irrational, somehow, I agree, in his defense of Bohm. I would have also attributed the many-minds to Loewer. I know Zeh mainly for his indexical analysis of time, which I think is correct, and certainly close to both Many World and Many Mind. If you have some references on Zeh and Many Mind ... They all miss, of course, the many dreams internal interpretation of ... elementary arithmetic. It will take time before people awaken from the Aristotelian naturalism. Most scientists are not even aware of its conjectural status. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 02 Nov 2013, at 21:47, meekerdb wrote: On 11/2/2013 10:53 AM, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:22 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and they both remember writing the diary, so which one is Bruno Marchal talking about? Anyone of the two So you sees both Moscow AND Washington. each will have a different diary A different diary?? Both the Washington Man and the Helsinki Man remember writing the exact same identical diary and the last line says I Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki am now walking into the duplication chamber, and now I see the operator starting to push the on butto. So it's true that you wrote the diary, but which one is you? As I see it, the question is whether the duplication experiment provides a good model of randomness. If we imagine doing the experiment four times, sending the subject(s) through repeatedly at the end there will be 16 diaries and they will contain the entries: , WMMM, MWMM, WWMM, MMWM, WMWM, MWWM, WWWM, MMMW, WMMW, MWMW, WWMW, MMWW, WMWW, MWWW, and so the participants might compare diaries and conclude that going to Moscow or Washington is a random event with probability 1/2 - or at least in limit of large numbers of repetitions. Actually, if they count themselves, one duplication is enough. Karl Popper already suggested this model of randomness in The Logic of Scientific Discovery and he probably wasn't the first. That would be astonishing for someone suggesting interactionist dualism (with Eccles), and missing Everett QM (cf his propensity theory). Can you give a quote or elaborate? It is the first time I hear this. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 1:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 Nov 2013, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote: Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you have. Are you referring to Quantum Mechanics and Experience (1992)? I do not have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the same). It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing in his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett. Bruno, I have just finished reading this book. I thank you for recommending it as it helped me get some familiarity with the math and the notation. I found the first 120 or so pages quite infuriating, for he would seeming get so close to the idea of observers being in superpositions, (teasing and dangling the idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical. Without any argument, I agree. It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed make sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following a handwavy dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until page 130 when he introduces the many-minds theory. Strangely, he claims that he (Albert) and Barry Loewer introduced the theory, with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh. While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers locality, he never explains how many-minds is any better (or different than) many-worlds. Also, I found it strange that he considered many-minds and Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm requires additional assumptions beyond the four quantum postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is incompatible with special relativity. It introduces very well QM and the measurement problem, but he is still, like everybody, believing implicitly in some strong mind-body thesis, and get irrational, somehow, I agree, in his defense of Bohm. I would have also attributed the many-minds to Loewer. I know Zeh mainly for his indexical analysis of time, which I think is correct, and certainly close to both Many World and Many Mind. If you have some references on Zeh and Many Mind ... I found this paper by Zeh from 1970: On the interpretation of measurement in quantum theory, 1970, Foundations of Physics, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 69–76 In particular, he describes the essential idea of many minds and macroscopic superposition on page 74: http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.pngbut he also references Everett, so it isn't entirely clear to me if he is introducing anything new. Jason They all miss, of course, the many dreams internal interpretation of ... elementary arithmetic. It will take time before people awaken from the Aristotelian naturalism. Most scientists are not even aware of its conjectural status. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 03 Nov 2013, at 09:17, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 1:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 Nov 2013, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote: Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you have. Are you referring to Quantum Mechanics and Experience (1992)? I do not have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the same). It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing in his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett. Bruno, I have just finished reading this book. I thank you for recommending it as it helped me get some familiarity with the math and the notation. I found the first 120 or so pages quite infuriating, for he would seeming get so close to the idea of observers being in superpositions, (teasing and dangling the idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical. Without any argument, I agree. It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed make sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following a handwavy dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until page 130 when he introduces the many-minds theory. Strangely, he claims that he (Albert) and Barry Loewer introduced the theory, with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh. While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers locality, he never explains how many-minds is any better (or different than) many-worlds. Also, I found it strange that he considered many-minds and Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm requires additional assumptions beyond the four quantum postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is incompatible with special relativity. It introduces very well QM and the measurement problem, but he is still, like everybody, believing implicitly in some strong mind-body thesis, and get irrational, somehow, I agree, in his defense of Bohm. I would have also attributed the many-minds to Loewer. I know Zeh mainly for his indexical analysis of time, which I think is correct, and certainly close to both Many World and Many Mind. If you have some references on Zeh and Many Mind ... I found this paper by Zeh from 1970: On the interpretation of measurement in quantum theory, 1970, Foundations of Physics, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 69–76 In particular, he describes the essential idea of many minds and macroscopic superposition on page 74: http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.png but he also references Everett, so it isn't entirely clear to me if he is introducing anything new. From what I remember, Zeh is, in that paper, much closer to Everett than to the Albert-Loewer many mind theory. Note that the many- mind theory is very specific, and assumes a unique universe. Observers' mind get mutiplied with probabilities which have to be postulated again, so it lost completely the appeal we can have for Everett. It transform other people into zombies, also. Albert-Loewer many-minds theory seems to me less sensical than Bohm or even Copenhagen. It unites all the defects of all QM- interpretations in one theory, imo, and this without mentioning that it needs non-comp. Bruno Jason They all miss, of course, the many dreams internal interpretation of ... elementary arithmetic. It will take time before people awaken from the Aristotelian naturalism. Most scientists are not even aware of its conjectural status. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: For John Clark
John, You seemed convinced that observers within duplicated but divergent simulations cannot distinguish their observations from a single course that evolves randomly. Why not proceed to the next step? Jason On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 9:22 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 12:57 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The prediction, asked in Helsinki, concerned the 1-views, And John Clark asks the prediction concerns the first person view of who? and Bruno answers the first person view of you and John Clark asks who is you? and Bruno answers the guy with the first person view. And around and around we go. Everybody has a 1P view, so just saying from the 1P view tells me nothing unless I know the 1P view of who. the 1-you's experience admits a very simple definition: it is the story written in the diary that *you take with you, in Helsinki, in the teleportation box. And the diary was written by you, no doubt about it, but the trouble is after the teleportation there is a fellow in Moscow and a fellow in Washington that are both holding identical diaries that they both vividly remember having written. So how in hell can I now determine if a prediction made in Helsinki before anybody stepped into a teleportation box about what city you will see was correct or not? And just chanting for the 99'th time you confuse the 1P and the 3P will not help on iota in making that determination. All I want is a way to figure out who you is so I can figure out if the prediction about what city you will see was correct or not. Obviously Bruno Marchal's old definition of you, the one that actually made sense (you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki) simply won't do because it would render vast stretches of Bruno Marchal's theory wrong. So what new definition is there that I can use to figure out if predictions concerning you turned out to be true or not? why am I the one with the experience (described in the diary): MMWWMWWMMM Why this one? You are the Moscow man because you are the man who saw Moscow, and you are the MMWWMWWMMM man because you are the man who saw MMWWMWWMMM. And iterating silly questions will not bring clarity. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 2:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 03 Nov 2013, at 09:17, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 1:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 Nov 2013, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote: Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you have. Are you referring to Quantum Mechanics and Experience (1992)? I do not have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the same). It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing in his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett. Bruno, I have just finished reading this book. I thank you for recommending it as it helped me get some familiarity with the math and the notation. I found the first 120 or so pages quite infuriating, for he would seeming get so close to the idea of observers being in superpositions, (teasing and dangling the idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical. Without any argument, I agree. It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed make sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following a handwavy dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until page 130 when he introduces the many-minds theory. Strangely, he claims that he (Albert) and Barry Loewer introduced the theory, with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh. While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers locality, he never explains how many-minds is any better (or different than) many-worlds. Also, I found it strange that he considered many-minds and Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm requires additional assumptions beyond the four quantum postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is incompatible with special relativity. It introduces very well QM and the measurement problem, but he is still, like everybody, believing implicitly in some strong mind-body thesis, and get irrational, somehow, I agree, in his defense of Bohm. I would have also attributed the many-minds to Loewer. I know Zeh mainly for his indexical analysis of time, which I think is correct, and certainly close to both Many World and Many Mind. If you have some references on Zeh and Many Mind ... I found this paper by Zeh from 1970: On the interpretation of measurement in quantum theory, 1970, Foundations of Physics, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 69–76 In particular, he describes the essential idea of many minds and macroscopic superposition on page 74: http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.pngbut he also references Everett, so it isn't entirely clear to me if he is introducing anything new. From what I remember, Zeh is, in that paper, much closer to Everett than to the Albert-Loewer many mind theory. Note that the many-mind theory is very specific, and assumes a unique universe. But didn't they assume reality of the superposition? If the superposition is real how can their only be one unique universe? Observers' mind get mutiplied with probabilities which have to be postulated again, so it lost completely the appeal we can have for Everett. It transform other people into zombies, also. Is this a necessary consequence of many-minds or only inAlbert and Loewer's formulation of it? Jason Albert-Loewer many-minds theory seems to me less sensical than Bohm or even Copenhagen. It unites all the defects of all QM-interpretations in one theory, imo, and this without mentioning that it needs non-comp. Bruno Jason They all miss, of course, the many dreams internal interpretation of ... elementary arithmetic. It will take time before people awaken from the Aristotelian naturalism. Most scientists are not even aware of its conjectural status. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from
Re: For John Clark
Hi John, On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 4:13 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: John, you are the guy who explained Bell's inequality in a very compelling way. You're obviously smart I’m blushing. so why are you only engaging in personal attacks? If I think somebody's ideas are gibberish I'm going to say their gibberish without apology because there is nothing personal about it. And are you prepared to make the case that my attacks were wrong? Do you really think Bruno can continue to say that you will see only one city and also say that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki? Of course he can't! He'll just say you confuse the 1P and the 3P as if that makes everything better. Why don't you instead address the issues that have been pointed about your position, namely: that it renders the probability of a coin toss to either 0 or 1 - that if you refuse to accept the 1p/3p distinction, then you also have to refuse the MWI? I confess this is getting really frustrating for me, again and again I point out the difference and people neither agree nor disagree but just continue making the same accusation that I'm being inconsistent. But OK I'll do it, again. If a coin is flipped and a prediction is made about whether you will see heads or tails it's easy to tell after the flip if the prediction was correct or not because there is no ambiguity regarding the identity of you, the pronoun refers to the only guy we see and we just ask him what he saw. Even if it's a quantum event and not a coin flip and the Many Worlds Theory is used to calculate if you will see a electron spin up or spin down we can still tell after the measurement if the prediction was correct or not because it's still perfectly clear what the pronoun you refers to, namely the only fellow we see. Ok, let's assume that on spin up a light turns red, on spin down it turns green. Assuming the MWI, there is a set of worlds were the fellow will see red and another set were he will see green. There was already a multiplication of hims. The only difference here is that the hims exist in separate worlds that we cannot travel between, so we will never be confronted with two of them. If you use the duplication machine, you can create two rooms that look exactly the same, one with a green light, one with a red light. The subject will not be able to tell if he's doing the electron spin experiment or the duplication experiment. The only difference here is from 3p, where you can actually look at some monitors and see two copies of the same person looking at lights. If you allow the copies to interact things get more surreal, but so what? So the statistics that the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum mechanics generates actually mean something useful. But now consider Bruno's thought experiment. We predict that you will see X, after the experiment is over can we say if the prediction was correct or not? No we can not because we no longer know exactly what the pronoun you refers to. You has been duplicated (and that means the first person point of view has been duplicated too) and so you standing on my right insists that you did see X, but you standing on my left, who has every bit as much reason to call himself you as the other one, insists that you did NOT see X. So was the prediction about you seeing X correct or incorrect? There is no way to answer that because the meaning of the pronoun you is ambiguous in these circumstances. The only distinction between the MWI and Bruno's thought experiment is that in the former the copies are all in separate worlds while in the latter they coexist in the same world. Of course the worlds are all part of reality, so the question boils down to the copies being able to interact with each other or not. There are still yous being copied in both cases. You still know which you you are from your perspective. So can you agree that your objection has to solely rest on the possibility of interaction between copies? How does this possibility of interaction change anything? And please don't just repeat the mantra you confuse the 1P and the 3P, That is a rhetorical trick. The valid question remains: if you claim that unique personal identity has lost meaning through the duplication, how can it not lose meaning through forks in the multiverse? How can you reject Bruno's experiment but accept the MWI? I am not at all confused by the difference between objective and subjective nor do I think objective is the more important; in fact it is precisely because I know the difference that I know Bruno's ideas regarding prediction and probability mean nothing. And there is a even more fundamental reason I'm frustrated, predictions, both good and bad and meaningless, and probabilities, and statistics, have NOTHING to do with the continuous feeling of identity or sense of self,
Re: For John Clark
On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: So you sees both Moscow AND Washington. No, anyone of the two see only one city. So what is the one and only one city that the 2 you see. you are both of them, Yes, but both see only one city. Yes, and if both are you and both see a different city the obviously you see both cities. You persist in forgetting the distinction between the 3-1 view, And you persist if forgetting that unless Solipsism turns out to be true EVERYBODY has the 1 view so just mindlessly chanting the 1 view means nothing unless specified who's the 1 view A different diary?? Both the Washington Man and the Helsinki Man remember writing the exact same identical diary and the last line says I Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki am now walking into the duplication chamber, and now I see the operator starting to push the on butto. So it's true that you wrote the diary, but which one is you? Both. Yes. Bruno, you're a expert on logic so given the above tell me, how many cities did you see? And please don't start blabing about the 1-view unless it's clear who's 1-view. We have agreed on this, We agreed on this when Bruno Marchal said you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki; but that didn't last long then you sees both cities and you insist you doesn't. So now I don't know what in hell you means when Bruno Marchal uses that weasel pronoun. John, do you agree that if we promise you to give a cup of coffee in both W and M, you can predict in Helsinki that P(I ill drink coffee) = 1. ? Yes. But if we promise you to give a cup of coffee to W and a cup of tea to M, and it's predicted in Helsinki that the probability I will drink coffee is 1 then after it was all over there would be no way to determine if the prediction was correct or not with Bruno Marchal's inconsistent meanings of pronouns like I and you. If we keep the old very good and clear definition, you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki then it would be easy to tell if the prediction was correct or not, but Bruno Marchal must backpedal away from that or all the other ideas will fall apart. You seem to ignore that the first person events Who's first person events? And please, no pronouns. seeing W and seeing M are incompatible. Explain why that is incompatible. Although I can't prove solipsism is wrong I believe lots of people see W and lots of people see M. And they see it from their first person view. At no moment will one person ever say I see both city Yes. Explain why that is incompatible with you will see both cities. unless they talk about the first person view in a third person description, I have no idea what that even means. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 11/3/2013 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Nov 2013, at 21:47, meekerdb wrote: On 11/2/2013 10:53 AM, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:22 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote: You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and they both remember writing the diary, so which one is Bruno Marchal talking about? Anyone of the two So you sees both Moscow AND Washington. each will have a different diary A different diary?? Both the Washington Man and the Helsinki Man remember writing the exact same identical diary and the last line says I Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki am now walking into the duplication chamber, and now I see the operator starting to push the on butto. So it's true that you wrote the diary, but which one is you? As I see it, the question is whether the duplication experiment provides a good model of randomness. If we imagine doing the experiment four times, sending the subject(s) through repeatedly at the end there will be 16 diaries and they will contain the entries: , WMMM, MWMM, WWMM, MMWM, WMWM, MWWM, WWWM, MMMW, WMMW, MWMW, WWMW, MMWW, WMWW, MWWW, and so the participants might compare diaries and conclude that going to Moscow or Washington is a random event with probability 1/2 - or at least in limit of large numbers of repetitions. Actually, if they count themselves, one duplication is enough. Karl Popper already suggested this model of randomness in The Logic of Scientific Discovery and he probably wasn't the first. That would be astonishing for someone suggesting interactionist dualism (with Eccles), and missing Everett QM (cf his propensity theory). Can you give a quote or elaborate? It is the first time I hear this. It wasn't in the context quantum mechanics. Popper was proposing a theory of probability and he defined n-free to be a sequence in which the next value was independent of the previous n values (chapter 8, section 56). Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 03 Nov 2013, at 16:22, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 12:57 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The prediction, asked in Helsinki, concerned the 1-views, And John Clark asks the prediction concerns the first person view of who? and Bruno answers the first person view of you No. The Helsinki Guy. He is the one asked to make a prediction, and to write it in his diary in Helsinki. It is made precise that the prediction concern where he will fell to be, indeed. But the you in the unique guy in Helsinki. and John Clark asks who is you? and Bruno answers the guy with the first person view. See above. Could comment my answer, and not your own deformation of them? And around and around we go. Everybody has a 1P view, so just saying from the 1P view tells me nothing unless I know the 1P view of who. the 1-you's experience admits a very simple definition: it is the story written in the diary that *you take with you, in Helsinki, in the teleportation box. And the diary was written by you, no doubt about it, but the trouble is after the teleportation there is a fellow in Moscow and a fellow in Washington that are both holding identical diaries that they both vividly remember having written. So how in hell can I now determine if a prediction made in Helsinki before anybody stepped into a teleportation box about what city you will see was correct or not? And just chanting for the 99'th time you confuse the 1P and the 3P will not help on iota in making that determination. It is very simple. W and M is always wrong. W is wrong in half the case, like M. W or M is always confirmed. You have to look at all the resulting diaries. All I want is a way to figure out who you is so I can figure out if the prediction about what city you will see was correct or not. Obviously Bruno Marchal's old definition of you, the one that actually made sense (you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki) simply won't do because it would render vast stretches of Bruno Marchal's theory wrong. U have not shown that. It works in all cases, once you remind that the question is about the 1-you. Yes, there are two such 1-you, in the 3- view, but each feel unique, and knew this in advance. So what new definition is there There is no new definition. You make this up. There is only the 1/3 distinction, that you mock without ever using. That explains why you are stuck. But, you do use it in the MWI, so you are just inconsistent. that I can use to figure out if predictions concerning you turned out to be true or not? You have to take all 1-you into account. They are logically exclusive, and that explains the indeterminacy. See my preceding posts and comment the answer with quote. why am I the one with the experience (described in the diary): MMWWMWWMMM Why this one? You are the Moscow man because you are the man who saw Moscow, and you are the MMWWMWWMMM man because you are the man who saw MMWWMWWMMM. And iterating silly questions will not bring clarity. So you just evade the question. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 6:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Nov 2013, at 15:17, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: When some bully oversteps the line of decency, then by default any discussion ceases to be rational. Then we are left with the choice to let it be or denounce the crossing of our personalized line. With regards to this infinite back and forth, all the insults and cul-de-sac arguments, with zero progress on this exchange with Julius Caesar, I believe Quentin has every right to say spammer and troll. Quentin's reaction and tone in this regard are more plausible to me than the posts of JC. Increasingly so, in fact. PGC I can't agree more. I don't understand why Quentin get nervous (once) on Richard, who was just slow to see some point, and that happens to any of us, when tired, or something (to be nervous, or to be slow). Keep in mind people in this list lives under different amount of sun! But it is a sort of relief for me that you, and Quentin (and some others) got also the feeling that JC might act as a bullyer or troll-like,. That's clear, to *me* with his insulting tone when trying to deride any attempt to study something. I am not too well placed to say that to Clark, so I think that you and Quentin are ... rather courageous to witness this. That can help everybody. I think JC must have realised at some point that his initial objections were not valid but, by that point, he was too invested in proving you wrong. His more recent objections are more suspicious, because it's hard to believe that a smart guy who understands and explains complex ideas cannot see the problem with arguing in a way that goes against the usual meaning of probabilities. He's also insisting that you said things that we all can see that you have not (like the infamous back-paddling on definitions accusation). On the bright side, Bruno, people have been discussing your ideas for years and keep doing so. This is a huge victory, as any scientist knows. Trolling comes with exposure. There's no reason for you to be sad, really. Many of us are very happy that you and your ideas exist in this world, and it's even better that we get to discuss them with you. Best, Telmo. About Roger Clough, his comment are in the topics, yet a bit aside the conversations and thread, and a bit self-advertizing and repetitive, but I would not qualify him as spam, although he is very near. Also, we get his posts in double exemplars! Stephen Lin was definitely a spam, and, as someone (Telmo?) suggested, possibly a bot. Bruno On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Telmo, Do you think Quentin should be banned for bullying? On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 9:39 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/11/1 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively suggests rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However, your insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited. And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying. It's also true, but these people did everything to deserve that sort of bullying, nobody forced these two individuals to spam the list. I would be ok with banning them for spamming, but I don't think that anyone deserves bullying. Quentin On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I respect intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument. Quentin 2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Intuition On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit : John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or stephen lin. Richard What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang? Quentin On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy
Re: For John Clark
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Since more than one or two years, John Clark oscillates between obvious non sense to obvious, period. We might hope than in his obvious, period phase, he might go to the next step, John Clark doesn't do that because John Clark knows that the lifetime of the true but trivial phase can be measured in hours, or perhaps even minutes, and then turn back into the gibberish phase. For example, Bruno Marchal simply can not allow Bruno Marchal's previous statement you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki to stand as is because it would render false other statements of Bruno Marchal, such as you will see only one city. Thus at this very instant Bruno Marchal is probably adding lots of pee pee and circular caveats to his statement ( such as you is what is seen from the 1P view and what is seen from the 1P view is you) and the transition from trivial to gibberish will have completed yet another cycle. John K Clark On 1 November 2013 17:31, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 7:51 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.comwrote: A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball changing color Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked until there is something different about them, such as one remembering seeing a red ball and the other remember seeing a green ball, only then do they fork. It was the decision made by somebody or something outside the simulation to make sure all 256 saw a difference sequence of colored balls that created 256 distinct minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision made outside the simulation would be indistinguishable from being random, that is to say the simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure out what that decision would be. B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times* Then *the AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred first. Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted thought experiments are not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that in A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but as the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original or the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true. So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no difference. Thank you for answering. I think we are in agreement. I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all, and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from all the views, the conclusion is the same. Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually. Well there is one difference: the entire protocol is explained to the AI, it knows exactly what will happen in each of the 256 possibilities, but from inside the simulation, it is no different than had the sequence of colors been chosen completely randomly. Also, you are mistaken if you think this is the grand conclusion of the UDA, it is only one small (but necessary) step in the reasoning. If you want to get to the grand conclusion you need only continue on to the next steps. It seems you have grasped the point of step 3 and are in agreement that subjective indeterminacy can arise in a fully understood and deterministic process. I'll re-post the link for your convenience. You are less than 2-3 pages away from finishing reading the UDA: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List
Re: For John Clark
On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 5:13 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Since more than one or two years, John Clark oscillates between obvious non sense to obvious, period. We might hope than in his obvious, period phase, he might go to the next step, John Clark doesn't do that because John Clark knows that the lifetime of the true but trivial phase can be measured in hours, or perhaps even minutes, and then turn back into the gibberish phase. For example, Bruno Marchal simply can not allow Bruno Marchal's previous statement you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki to stand as is because it would render false other statements of Bruno Marchal, such as you will see only one city. Thus at this very instant Bruno Marchal is probably adding lots of pee pee and circular caveats to his statement ( such as you is what is seen from the 1P view and what is seen from the 1P view is you) and the transition from trivial to gibberish will have completed yet another cycle. John, you are the guy who explained Bell's inequality in a very compelling way. You're obviously smart, so why are you only engaging in personal attacks? I could understand that if personal attack were the only thing left in the discussion, but this is not the case at all. Why don't you instead address the issues that have been pointed about your position, namely: - that it renders the probability of a coin toss to either 0 or 1 - that if you refuse to accept the 1p/3p distinction, then you also have to refuse the MWI ? Telmo. John K Clark On 1 November 2013 17:31, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 7:51 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball changing color Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked until there is something different about them, such as one remembering seeing a red ball and the other remember seeing a green ball, only then do they fork. It was the decision made by somebody or something outside the simulation to make sure all 256 saw a difference sequence of colored balls that created 256 distinct minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision made outside the simulation would be indistinguishable from being random, that is to say the simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure out what that decision would be. B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times Then the AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred first. Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted thought experiments are not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that in A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but as the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original or the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true. So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no difference. Thank you for answering. I think we are in agreement. I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all, and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from all the views, the conclusion is the same. Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually. Well there is one difference: the entire protocol is explained to the AI, it knows exactly what will happen in each of the 256 possibilities, but from inside the simulation, it is no different than had the sequence of colors been chosen completely randomly. Also, you are mistaken if you think this is the grand conclusion of the UDA, it is only one small (but necessary) step in the reasoning. If you want to get to the grand conclusion you need only continue on to the next steps. It seems you have grasped the point of step 3 and are in agreement that subjective indeterminacy can arise in a fully understood and deterministic process. I'll re-post the link for your convenience. You are less than 2-3 pages away from
Re: For John Clark
Hi, I comment on Quentin, and then on John, to help anyone interested. On 01 Nov 2013, at 22:22, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/11/1 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 3:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you ... ..., but now there are 2 (or more) people IN THE THIRD PERSON POV, And there are also 2 people IN THE FIRST PERSON POV and one of them does not have a stronger claim to having a subjective existence than the other. but the question concern the FIRST PERSON POV. You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and they both remember writing the diary, so which one is Bruno Marchal talking about? Anyone of the two... Exact. each will have a different diary, and by repeating the experience they will notice the frequency goes to 0.5, like when you do a coin toss... oh but wait... JC does not want to look at that, oh wait... JC said that probability is 0 or 1 yes JC knows all. Exact. The prediction, asked in Helsinki, concerned the 1-views, and by comp we know that the 1-view is felt as unique, from the 1-view point. It looks like John Clark's Strategy consists in describing only the 3- views. He is aware of the existence of the 1-view, and agreed that they are unique---from their own 1-view, but keeps giving the 3-view on the 1-views. And in Helsinki, you knew this in advance. You know that you will survive Yes, assuming that the pronoun you means what a fellow by the name of Bruno Marchal says it means , namely you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki. John, In most (all?) natural languages we use the same pronouns for the 1- view, and the 3-view, and this for the probable reason that by reproducing by sex, and by dying, we hide that we are all the same amoeba, at least in the sense of the you in Washington is the same person than the you in Moscow. We don't really recognize our children, somehow. here the 1-you's experience admits a very simple definition: it is the story written in the diary that *you take with you, in Helsinki, in the teleportation box. Assuming you believe in comp, and assuming comp, you know that 1-you will live (write in the diary) a unique experience, and you are asked to evaluate the chance of which one. You know intellectually that the 1-you will live all experience, but you know that they all will live only one from their point of view, and so will have the right to ask to themselves question like why am I the one with the experience (described in the diary): MMWWMWWMMM Why this one? And how to evaluate if the next one is W or M? Oh! but that's PI in binary, so it looks like my story is PI in binary (*), so I can predict that the next experience will be W! Is that rational with respect to comp? The fact is that the prediction will be refuted by one of the continuation, and we have already agree that they are both consistent extension with the right to identify themselves with the person before duplication, and so we have to listen to BOTH of them. In the worlds of the iterated self-duplication, prediction like PI, always W, are confirmed by a set of experience which get measure 0 among all (infinite) experiences. Fortunately, if in the arithmetical reality there is some amount of randomness, there is much more structure than that, and with comp, the points of view (always self-referential with respect to some universal number(s)), get structured by the logics of self-reference (the infinity of them). (*) pi, in binary, is 11.001001110110101010001000110110100011... and experience being in only one place. No, assuming that the pronoun you means what a fellow by the name of Bruno Marchal says it means , namely you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki. And now ladies and gentleman let the backpedaling begin! If we backpedal hard enough soon we will leave the kingdom of the true but trivial and enter the land of gibberish. and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. False. It is very easy. In both city the diary is the one [you] have with where [you] have found to be, ^ ^^ ^^^ There we go again with that damn weasel pronoun! But it won't get Bruno Marchal off the hook this time, Bruno Marchal stated what it means, you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki, therefore the fellow named you has found himself to be in BOTH Washington and Moscow. and it is the diary containing the prediction written in Helsinki. And it was written by you and you now resides
Re: For John Clark
On 02 Nov 2013, at 11:13, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 6:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Nov 2013, at 15:17, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: When some bully oversteps the line of decency, then by default any discussion ceases to be rational. Then we are left with the choice to let it be or denounce the crossing of our personalized line. With regards to this infinite back and forth, all the insults and cul-de-sac arguments, with zero progress on this exchange with Julius Caesar, I believe Quentin has every right to say spammer and troll. Quentin's reaction and tone in this regard are more plausible to me than the posts of JC. Increasingly so, in fact. PGC I can't agree more. I don't understand why Quentin get nervous (once) on Richard, who was just slow to see some point, and that happens to any of us, when tired, or something (to be nervous, or to be slow). Keep in mind people in this list lives under different amount of sun! But it is a sort of relief for me that you, and Quentin (and some others) got also the feeling that JC might act as a bullyer or troll-like,. That's clear, to *me* with his insulting tone when trying to deride any attempt to study something. I am not too well placed to say that to Clark, so I think that you and Quentin are ... rather courageous to witness this. That can help everybody. I think JC must have realised at some point that his initial objections were not valid but, by that point, he was too invested in proving you wrong. OK. That's the pride theory, and making it explicit will not help John. I guess. But there are other theories. May be he believes that from step 3 everything follows correctly, and he finds the conclusion too much startling. Or something like that. His more recent objections are more suspicious, because it's hard to believe that a smart guy who understands and explains complex ideas cannot see the problem with arguing in a way that goes against the usual meaning of probabilities. He's also insisting that you said things that we all can see that you have not (like the infamous back-paddling on definitions accusation). Glad you saw that. Why does John Clark do this publicly? Why not in private circles like my usual opponents. There is an amount of rare braveness in John Clark that I appreciate. Enough brave to go to step 4? That's the question. On the bright side, Bruno, people have been discussing your ideas for years and keep doing so. This is a huge victory, as any scientist knows. Trolling comes with exposure. There's no reason for you to be sad, really. Many of us are very happy that you and your ideas exist in this world, and it's even better that we get to discuss them with you. Thanks for the warm remarks, Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:22 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and they both remember writing the diary, so which one is Bruno Marchal talking about? Anyone of the two So you sees both Moscow AND Washington. each will have a different diary A different diary?? Both the Washington Man and the Helsinki Man remember writing the exact same identical diary and the last line says I Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki am now walking into the duplication chamber, and now I see the operator starting to push the on butto. So it's true that you wrote the diary, but which one is you? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote: Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you have. Are you referring to Quantum Mechanics and Experience (1992)? I do not have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the same). It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing in his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett. Bruno, I have just finished reading this book. I thank you for recommending it as it helped me get some familiarity with the math and the notation. I found the first 120 or so pages quite infuriating, for he would seeming get so close to the idea of observers being in superpositions, (teasing and dangling the idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical. It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed make sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following a handwavy dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until page 130 when he introduces the many-minds theory. Strangely, he claims that he (Albert) and Barry Loewer introduced the theory, with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh. While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers locality, he never explains how many-minds is any better (or different than) many-worlds. Also, I found it strange that he considered many-minds and Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm requires additional assumptions beyond the four quantum postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is incompatible with special relativity. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 11/2/2013 10:53 AM, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:22 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote: You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and they both remember writing the diary, so which one is Bruno Marchal talking about? Anyone of the two So you sees both Moscow AND Washington. each will have a different diary A different diary?? Both the Washington Man and the Helsinki Man remember writing the exact same identical diary and the last line says I Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki am now walking into the duplication chamber, and now I see the operator starting to push the on butto. So it's true that you wrote the diary, but which one is you? As I see it, the question is whether the duplication experiment provides a good model of randomness. If we imagine doing the experiment four times, sending the subject(s) through repeatedly at the end there will be 16 diaries and they will contain the entries: , WMMM, MWMM, WWMM, MMWM, WMWM, MWWM, WWWM, MMMW, WMMW, MWMW, WWMW, MMWW, WMWW, MWWW, and so the participants might compare diaries and conclude that going to Moscow or Washington is a random event with probability 1/2 - or at least in limit of large numbers of repetitions. Karl Popper already suggested this model of randomness in The Logic of Scientific Discovery and he probably wasn't the first. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 6:54 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: this distracts from the question asked, which concerns the first person pov, from the first person pov. That is the first person experience. [...] Comp accepts that both copies are equivalent (with respect to identity) continuations of the original, but the prediction bears on the first person experience. It is a mystery that Marchal can not get it through his head that copying a person means there are now 2 identical first person experiences because YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED, and the 2 will remain identical until one sees something that the other has not. This has never been disputed by Bruno or anyone else, as far as I've seen. Please describe what you believe your experience will be after duplication. Describe it from your point of view. If you do not accept to do this you are just refusing to consider the thought experiment, nor arguing against it. If 100% was true, for P(W), we would have, in the iterated version, the history WWW... having a 100% probability, yet, all diaries but one, will contradict that prediction. If you predicted that you will see Washington and you does see Washington then the prediction that there was a 100% chance that you will see Washington This a posteriori thinking is against the very concept of probability. You can use it to refute the claim that if I throw a coin, the probability that I see heads is 0.5. It becomes either 0 or 1. was correct and it doesn't matter how many people who also lay claim to the title you don't see Washington. The proba concerns the first person experience that you will live, and recall in the next instants, by writing it in the diary. The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions. You can use the same argument to refute all of medical research. The antibiotic either cures you or doesn't. By this reasoning, one might as well take a tic tac to cure cancer. Telmo. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 31 Oct 2013, at 18:54, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: this distracts from the question asked, which concerns the first person pov, from the first person pov. That is the first person experience. [...] Comp accepts that both copies are equivalent (with respect to identity) continuations of the original, but the prediction bears on the first person experience. It is a mystery that Marchal can not get it through his head that copying a person means there are now 2 identical first person experiences because YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED, and the 2 will remain identical until one sees something that the other has not. Which is the time he has to confirmed his previous prediction. If 100% was true, for P(W), we would have, in the iterated version, the history WWW... having a 100% probability, yet, all diaries but one, will contradict that prediction. If you predicted that you will see Washington and you does see Washington then the prediction that there was a 100% chance that you will see Washington was correct and it doesn't matter how many people who also lay claim to the title you don't see Washington. The same can be said for a coin throwing. the guy who predict tail, and got tail can says that his prediction was correct. So if your argument can be used against the FPI, it works for MWI and for coin throwing. You are mocking any notion of probability. The proba concerns the first person experience that you will live, and recall in the next instants, by writing it in the diary. The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you ... ..., but now there are 2 (or more) people IN THE THIRD PERSON POV, but the question concern the FIRST PERSON POV. And in Helsinki, you knew this in advance. You know that you will survive and experience being in only one place. ... and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. False. It is very easy. In both city the diary is the one you have with where you have found to be, and it is the diary containing the prediction written in Helsinki. And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions. Exactly. So if you wrote W M, both copies know that the prediction is wrong. With W v M, both copies know that the prediction was correct. You continue to ignore that the question concerns the 1-you, as seen by the 1-you, and not any 3-view of the situation. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 31 Oct 2013, at 20:49, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. [...] In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?. [...] The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions. So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are not consistent The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally different. Everett uses as much the simple notion of self on which we have already agree. Throwing a coin too. You could not predict what you will see (head or tail) if you don't survive the coin throwing. All your argument to refute the FPI works without change in the MWI, and in any random experience. Bruno Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's points. Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at John Clark. Step 5: GOTO step 1. John k Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 01 Nov 2013, at 02:51, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball changing color Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked until there is something different about them, such as one remembering seeing a red ball and the other remember seeing a green ball, only then do they fork. It was the decision made by somebody or something outside the simulation to make sure all 256 saw a difference sequence of colored balls that created 256 distinct minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision made outside the simulation would be indistinguishable from being random, that is to say the simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure out what that decision would be. B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times Then the AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred first. Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted thought experiments are not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that in A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but as the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original or the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true. So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no difference. I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all, and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from all the views, the conclusion is the same. Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually. If step 3 is that easy, then you can surely proceed to step 4. So what about step 4? Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 01 Nov 2013, at 07:04, LizR wrote: So, has step 3 gone from that's absurd to everyone knows that ?! Since more than one or two years, John Clark oscillates between obvious non sense to obvious, period. We might hope than in his obvious, period phase, he might go to the next step, but that has never happened. I don't like that, but I'm afraid that Quentin is right, and that John's behavior is akin to trolling. I can hope that he can change his mind, because some people have already denied the FPI for many years, and then suddenly grasp and acknowledge the point. This happens when they get the 1/3 pov distinction (which seems indeed hard for some people, and quite easy for others). But usually, people answering with lies and deformation of questions (like John Clark does all the time) remain stuck in deby, and I think their agenda is more in a sort of defamation, than in trying to grasp, or genuinely refute, a statement. I am not sure it makes sense to answer him anymore, as he uses this to spread its bad faith, and lies. Bruno On 1 November 2013 17:31, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 7:51 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball changing color Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked until there is something different about them, such as one remembering seeing a red ball and the other remember seeing a green ball, only then do they fork. It was the decision made by somebody or something outside the simulation to make sure all 256 saw a difference sequence of colored balls that created 256 distinct minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision made outside the simulation would be indistinguishable from being random, that is to say the simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure out what that decision would be. B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times Then the AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred first. Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted thought experiments are not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that in A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but as the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original or the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true. So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no difference. Thank you for answering. I think we are in agreement. I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all, and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from all the views, the conclusion is the same. Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually. Well there is one difference: the entire protocol is explained to the AI, it knows exactly what will happen in each of the 256 possibilities, but from inside the simulation, it is no different than had the sequence of colors been chosen completely randomly. Also, you are mistaken if you think this is the grand conclusion of the UDA, it is only one small (but necessary) step in the reasoning. If you want to get to the grand conclusion you need only continue on to the next steps. It seems you have grasped the point of step 3 and are in agreement that subjective indeterminacy can arise in a fully understood and deterministic process. I'll re-post the link for your convenience. You are less than 2-3 pages away from finishing reading the UDA: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You
Re: For John Clark
Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit : John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or stephen lin. Richard What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang? Quentin On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. [...] In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?. [...] The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions. So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are not consistent The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps... Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're just a troll. Quentin Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally different. Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's points. Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at John Clark. Step 5: GOTO step 1. John k Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
Intuition On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit : John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or stephen lin. Richard What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang? Quentin On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. [...] In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?. [...] The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions. So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are not consistent The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps... Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're just a troll. Quentin Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally different. Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's points. Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at John Clark. Step 5: GOTO step 1. John k Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit
Re: For John Clark
OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I respect intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument. Quentin 2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Intuition On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit : John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or stephen lin. Richard What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang? Quentin On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. [...] In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?. [...] The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions. So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are not consistent The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps... Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're just a troll. Quentin Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally different. Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's points. Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at John Clark. Step 5: GOTO step 1. John k Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from
Re: For John Clark
2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively suggests rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However, your insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited. Yes. On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I respect intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument. Quentin 2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Intuition On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit : John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or stephen lin. Richard What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang? Quentin On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. [...] In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?. [...] The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions. So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are not consistent The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps... Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're just a troll. Quentin Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally different. Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's points. Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at John Clark. Step 5: GOTO step 1. John k Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
Re: For John Clark
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively suggests rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However, your insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited. And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying. On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I respect intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument. Quentin 2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Intuition On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit : John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or stephen lin. Richard What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang? Quentin On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. [...] In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?. [...] The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions. So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are not consistent The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps... Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're just a troll. Quentin Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally different. Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's points. Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at John Clark. Step 5: GOTO step 1. John k Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this
Re: For John Clark
2013/11/1 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively suggests rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However, your insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited. And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying. It's also true, but these people did everything to deserve that sort of bullying, nobody forced these two individuals to spam the list. Quentin On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I respect intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument. Quentin 2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Intuition On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit : John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or stephen lin. Richard What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang? Quentin On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. [...] In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?. [...] The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions. So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are not consistent The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps... Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're just a troll. Quentin Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally different. Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's points. Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at John Clark. Step 5: GOTO step 1. John k Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list . For more options, visit
Re: For John Clark
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/11/1 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively suggests rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However, your insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited. And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying. It's also true, but these people did everything to deserve that sort of bullying, nobody forced these two individuals to spam the list. I would be ok with banning them for spamming, but I don't think that anyone deserves bullying. Quentin On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I respect intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument. Quentin 2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Intuition On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit : John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or stephen lin. Richard What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang? Quentin On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. [...] In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?. [...] The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions. So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are not consistent The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps... Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're just a troll. Quentin Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally different. Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's points. Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at John Clark. Step 5: GOTO step 1. John k Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
Re: For John Clark
Telmo, Do you think Quentin should be banned for bullying? On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 9:39 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/11/1 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively suggests rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However, your insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited. And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying. It's also true, but these people did everything to deserve that sort of bullying, nobody forced these two individuals to spam the list. I would be ok with banning them for spamming, but I don't think that anyone deserves bullying. Quentin On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I respect intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument. Quentin 2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Intuition On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit : John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or stephen lin. Richard What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang? Quentin On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. [...] In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?. [...] The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions. So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are not consistent The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps... Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're just a troll. Quentin Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally different. Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's points. Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at John Clark. Step 5: GOTO step 1. John k Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: For John Clark
2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Telmo, Do you think Quentin should be banned for bullying? I did not bully you, I asked several times the same question, firstly gently, and you mocked me, secondly, you mocked the proves/suggest, then you said fuck you (I said for fuck sake before, not fuck you), then you dismissed it you never answered (at that time)... No you say it's an intuition, intuition is not an argument (and that proves you did not have one at the time you said that). Concerning John Clark, he is definitelly a troll, he will never acknowledge anything, he doesn't discuss, he listen to himself. Quentin On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 9:39 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/11/1 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively suggests rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However, your insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited. And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying. It's also true, but these people did everything to deserve that sort of bullying, nobody forced these two individuals to spam the list. I would be ok with banning them for spamming, but I don't think that anyone deserves bullying. Quentin On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I respect intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument. Quentin 2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Intuition On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit : John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or stephen lin. Richard What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang? Quentin On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. [...] In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?. [...] The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions. So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are not consistent The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps... Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're just a troll. Quentin Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally different. Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's points. Step 4: Quentin
Re: For John Clark
When some bully oversteps the line of decency, then by default any discussion ceases to be rational. Then we are left with the choice to let it be or denounce the crossing of our personalized line. With regards to this infinite back and forth, all the insults and cul-de-sac arguments, with zero progress on this exchange with Julius Caesar, I believe Quentin has every right to say spammer and troll. Quentin's reaction and tone in this regard are more plausible to me than the posts of JC. Increasingly so, in fact. PGC On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Telmo, Do you think Quentin should be banned for bullying? On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 9:39 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/11/1 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively suggests rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However, your insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited. And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying. It's also true, but these people did everything to deserve that sort of bullying, nobody forced these two individuals to spam the list. I would be ok with banning them for spamming, but I don't think that anyone deserves bullying. Quentin On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I respect intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument. Quentin 2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Intuition On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit : John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or stephen lin. Richard What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang? Quentin On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. [...] In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?. [...] The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions. So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are not consistent The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps... Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're just a troll. Quentin Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally different. Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's points.
Re: For John Clark
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Telmo, Do you think Quentin should be banned for bullying? I don't think that anyone should be banned. We are all grown ups and it's not that hard to set up an email filter. I do think that it's depressing when people start referring to other people in the third person as archetypes of low status. On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 9:39 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/11/1 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively suggests rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However, your insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited. And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying. It's also true, but these people did everything to deserve that sort of bullying, nobody forced these two individuals to spam the list. I would be ok with banning them for spamming, but I don't think that anyone deserves bullying. Quentin On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I respect intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument. Quentin 2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Intuition On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit : John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or stephen lin. Richard What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang? Quentin On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. [...] In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?. [...] The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions. So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are not consistent The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps... Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're just a troll. Quentin Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally different. Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's points. Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at John Clark. Step 5: GOTO step 1. John k Clark -- You received this message because you are
Re: For John Clark
On 01 Nov 2013, at 08:06, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 6:54 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: this distracts from the question asked, which concerns the first person pov, from the first person pov. That is the first person experience. [...] Comp accepts that both copies are equivalent (with respect to identity) continuations of the original, but the prediction bears on the first person experience. It is a mystery that Marchal can not get it through his head that copying a person means there are now 2 identical first person experiences because YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED, and the 2 will remain identical until one sees something that the other has not. This has never been disputed by Bruno or anyone else, as far as I've seen. Please describe what you believe your experience will be after duplication. Describe it from your point of view. If you do not accept to do this you are just refusing to consider the thought experiment, nor arguing against it. If 100% was true, for P(W), we would have, in the iterated version, the history WWW... having a 100% probability, yet, all diaries but one, will contradict that prediction. If you predicted that you will see Washington and you does see Washington then the prediction that there was a 100% chance that you will see Washington This a posteriori thinking is against the very concept of probability. You can use it to refute the claim that if I throw a coin, the probability that I see heads is 0.5. It becomes either 0 or 1. Exactly what I said, before discovering your post, Telmo. Most argument by Clark contradicts Everett, or even, like here, the classical use of probability in statistics. A long time ago, someone made the same critics, and conclude that the very notion of probability should be abandoned. Schmidhuber also get a similar conclusion, on this list, mainly that all finite strings are predictable (but refused to answer when I asked him the winning Lottery Ticket of the month). Why people acts like that remains a mystery to me, although I have many theories on this. One explains this behavior by the fear to be shown having been wrong by influence. I have exactly that same problem with the cannabis field. Even serious scientists can become irrational about cannabis, and it is, it seems to me, because they can't accept the idea that they might have been brainwashed. It is probably easier to accept having done an error than to admit having been somehow manipulated into doing that error, especially for rationalists. Quentin is probably right, it might be just a question of pride. Rationalists' pride, when they are not just shown wrong, but shown influenced by authoritative arguments, or mundane gossips. Bruno I hate spinach, and I will not try to taste it, as I might like it, and I hate even more the idea that I might like spinach (Bruno, in Sylvie Bruno, Lewis Carroll, (not the exact quote probably)). was correct and it doesn't matter how many people who also lay claim to the title you don't see Washington. The proba concerns the first person experience that you will live, and recall in the next instants, by writing it in the diary. The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions. You can use the same argument to refute all of medical research. The antibiotic either cures you or doesn't. By this reasoning, one might as well take a tic tac to cure cancer. Telmo. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails
Re: For John Clark
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:04 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: So, has step 3 gone from that's absurd to everyone knows that ?! Yes that is the situation right now, but with backpedaling and additional caveats and restrictions made by Bruno and other members of this list that I expect to hear about very soon, I imagine we will be back in the absurd column shortly. At least that's whats has happened in the past around here, when something is not absurd it is also not original, and when it is original it is also absurd. And by absurd I don't mean too strange to be true, I mean self contradictory. Backpedaling is essential because as things stand right now you clearly sees BOTH Moscow and Washington, and Bruno simply can't have that. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 11:40 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:04 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: So, has step 3 gone from that's absurd to everyone knows that ?! Yes that is the situation right now, but with backpedaling and additional caveats and restrictions made by Bruno and other members of this list that I expect to hear about very soon, I imagine we will be back in the absurd column shortly. At least that's whats has happened in the past around here, when something is not absurd it is also not original, and when it is original it is also absurd. And by absurd I don't mean too strange to be true, I mean self contradictory. Backpedaling is essential because as things stand right now you clearly sees BOTH Moscow and Washington, and Bruno simply can't have that. Instead of back pedaling, I propose we start pedaling forward (on to the next steps) so we don't argue about step 3 for the next five years. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
2013/11/1 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:04 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: So, has step 3 gone from that's absurd to everyone knows that ?! Yes that is the situation right now, but with backpedaling and additional caveats and restrictions made by Bruno and other members of this list that I expect to hear about very soon, I imagine we will be back in the absurd column shortly. At least that's whats has happened in the past around here, when something is not absurd it is also not original, and when it is original it is also absurd. And by absurd I don't mean too strange to be true, I mean self contradictory. Backpedaling is essential because as things stand right now you clearly In your head only sees BOTH Moscow and Washington, and Bruno simply can't have that. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 01 Nov 2013, at 15:17, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: When some bully oversteps the line of decency, then by default any discussion ceases to be rational. Then we are left with the choice to let it be or denounce the crossing of our personalized line. With regards to this infinite back and forth, all the insults and cul-de-sac arguments, with zero progress on this exchange with Julius Caesar, I believe Quentin has every right to say spammer and troll. Quentin's reaction and tone in this regard are more plausible to me than the posts of JC. Increasingly so, in fact. PGC I can't agree more. I don't understand why Quentin get nervous (once) on Richard, who was just slow to see some point, and that happens to any of us, when tired, or something (to be nervous, or to be slow). Keep in mind people in this list lives under different amount of sun! But it is a sort of relief for me that you, and Quentin (and some others) got also the feeling that JC might act as a bullyer or troll- like,. That's clear, to *me* with his insulting tone when trying to deride any attempt to study something. I am not too well placed to say that to Clark, so I think that you and Quentin are ... rather courageous to witness this. That can help everybody. About Roger Clough, his comment are in the topics, yet a bit aside the conversations and thread, and a bit self-advertizing and repetitive, but I would not qualify him as spam, although he is very near. Also, we get his posts in double exemplars! Stephen Lin was definitely a spam, and, as someone (Telmo?) suggested, possibly a bot. Bruno On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Telmo, Do you think Quentin should be banned for bullying? On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 9:39 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/11/1 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively suggests rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However, your insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited. And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying. It's also true, but these people did everything to deserve that sort of bullying, nobody forced these two individuals to spam the list. I would be ok with banning them for spamming, but I don't think that anyone deserves bullying. Quentin On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I respect intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument. Quentin 2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Intuition On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit : John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or stephen lin. Richard What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang? Quentin On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. [...] In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?. [...] The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way
Re: For John Clark
Liz, On 01 Nov 2013, at 17:40, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:04 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: So, has step 3 gone from that's absurd to everyone knows that ?! Yes that is the situation right now, but with backpedaling and additional caveats and restrictions made by Bruno and other members of this list that I expect to hear about very soon, I imagine we will be back in the absurd column shortly. At least that's whats has happened in the past around here, when something is not absurd it is also not original, and when it is original it is also absurd. And by absurd I don't mean too strange to be true, I mean self contradictory. Backpedaling is essential because as things stand right now you clearly sees BOTH Moscow and Washington, and Bruno simply can't have that. Liz, that one should be easy to answer. It is a good exercise. Hint: introducing the 1p and 3p distinction. (That does not mean John Clark will not succeed in faking some non understanding after, but that's almost another topic). Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
I am definitely slow compared to most of the members of this list. Although I have a 1966 PhD in physics from Harvard, my major was in electromagnetic theory, and after graduation, studied radar scattering and laser propagation, which are 19th century subjects even though the technology is 20th century. My only claim to fame is as a whistleblower who in 1987-1988 released the secret information that Reagan's missile shield was inherently vulnerable; after which I was black-balled out of military research. My interest in string theory is subsequent to that event and my approach is that of a systems analyst. Not being capable of original work in any field I merely cobble together various theories without truly understanding any of them. Richard On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 1:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Nov 2013, at 15:17, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: When some bully oversteps the line of decency, then by default any discussion ceases to be rational. Then we are left with the choice to let it be or denounce the crossing of our personalized line. With regards to this infinite back and forth, all the insults and cul-de-sac arguments, with zero progress on this exchange with Julius Caesar, I believe Quentin has every right to say spammer and troll. Quentin's reaction and tone in this regard are more plausible to me than the posts of JC. Increasingly so, in fact. PGC I can't agree more. I don't understand why Quentin get nervous (once) on Richard, who was just slow to see some point, and that happens to any of us, when tired, or something (to be nervous, or to be slow). Keep in mind people in this list lives under different amount of sun! But it is a sort of relief for me that you, and Quentin (and some others) got also the feeling that JC might act as a bullyer or troll-like,. That's clear, to *me* with his insulting tone when trying to deride any attempt to study something. I am not too well placed to say that to Clark, so I think that you and Quentin are ... rather courageous to witness this. That can help everybody. About Roger Clough, his comment are in the topics, yet a bit aside the conversations and thread, and a bit self-advertizing and repetitive, but I would not qualify him as spam, although he is very near. Also, we get his posts in double exemplars! Stephen Lin was definitely a spam, and, as someone (Telmo?) suggested, possibly a bot. Bruno On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Telmo, Do you think Quentin should be banned for bullying? On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 9:39 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote: On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 2:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/11/1 Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: OK. I should have said suggests intuitively: or intuitively suggests rather than merely suggests that the universe is finite. However, your insult of categorizing me with roger and stephen lin is unmerited. And now you propagate the violence to people who have nothing to do with this discussion. As much as I typically disagree with what Roger says (and don't understand what Stephan Lin says), I don't like this sort of reference. This is just good old-fashioned bullying. It's also true, but these people did everything to deserve that sort of bullying, nobody forced these two individuals to spam the list. I would be ok with banning them for spamming, but I don't think that anyone deserves bullying. Quentin On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 7:01 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: OK... but then you shouldn't have use that as an argument... I respect intuition, I don't respect using that as an argument. Quentin 2013/11/1 Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com Intuition On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 5:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Le 1 nov. 2013 00:39, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit : John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or stephen lin. Richard What does suggest that the universe is finite in the fact that we've found a fully formed galaxy 700 millions years after the big bang? Quentin On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly
Re: For John Clark
On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 3:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you ... ..., but now there are 2 (or more) people IN THE THIRD PERSON POV, And there are also 2 people IN THE FIRST PERSON POV and one of them does not have a stronger claim to having a subjective existence than the other. but the question concern the FIRST PERSON POV. You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and they both remember writing the diary, so which one is Bruno Marchal talking about? And in Helsinki, you knew this in advance. You know that you will survive Yes, assuming that the pronoun you means what a fellow by the name of Bruno Marchal says it means , namely you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki. and experience being in only one place. No, assuming that the pronoun you means what a fellow by the name of Bruno Marchal says it means , namely you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki. And now ladies and gentleman let the backpedaling begin! If we backpedal hard enough soon we will leave the kingdom of the true but trivial and enter the land of gibberish. and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. False. It is very easy. In both city the diary is the one [you] have with where [you] have found to be, ^^^ ^^^ There we go again with that damn weasel pronoun! But it won't get Bruno Marchal off the hook this time, Bruno Marchal stated what it means, you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki, therefore the fellow named you has found himself to be in BOTH Washington and Moscow. and it is the diary containing the prediction written in Helsinki. And it was written by you and you now resides in Washington AND Moscow. You continue to ignore that the question concerns the 1-you, as seen by [the 1-you] , and not any 3-view of the situation. ^ In the thought experiment there is no the 1-you there is only a 1-you because YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED! That's what it means to be duplicated! John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
2013/11/1 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 3:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you ... ..., but now there are 2 (or more) people IN THE THIRD PERSON POV, And there are also 2 people IN THE FIRST PERSON POV and one of them does not have a stronger claim to having a subjective existence than the other. but the question concern the FIRST PERSON POV. You have been duplicated so there are TWO FIRST PERSON POV and they both remember writing the diary, so which one is Bruno Marchal talking about? Anyone of the two... each will have a different diary, and by repeating the experience they will notice the frequency goes to 0.5, like when you do a coin toss... oh but wait... JC does not want to look at that, oh wait... JC said that probability is 0 or 1 yes JC knows all. And in Helsinki, you knew this in advance. You know that you will survive Yes, assuming that the pronoun you means what a fellow by the name of Bruno Marchal says it means , namely you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki. and experience being in only one place. No, assuming that the pronoun you means what a fellow by the name of Bruno Marchal says it means , namely you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki. And now ladies and gentleman let the backpedaling begin! If we backpedal hard enough soon we will leave the kingdom of the true but trivial and enter the land of gibberish. and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. False. It is very easy. In both city the diary is the one [you] have with where [you] have found to be, ^^^ ^^^ There we go again with that damn weasel pronoun! But it won't get Bruno Marchal off the hook this time, Bruno Marchal stated what it means, you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki, therefore the fellow named you has found himself to be in BOTH Washington and Moscow. and it is the diary containing the prediction written in Helsinki. And it was written by you and you now resides in Washington AND Moscow. You continue to ignore that the question concerns the 1-you, as seen by [the 1-you] , and not any 3-view of the situation. ^ In the thought experiment there is no the 1-you there is only a 1-you because YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED! That's what it means to be duplicated! John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 2 November 2013 15:57, Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com wrote: By the way, personally, I thank you for – at substantial personal cost -- blowing the whistle on this 1980s MIC gravy train. A world without whistleblowers is – IMO the kind of place Torquemada would feel right at home in. ** Seconded. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 30 Oct 2013, at 18:21, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/10/30 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 2:05 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Bruno asked me Do you think that you die in a self-duplication experience? and I said that depends on what the meaning of you is. Bruno responded with We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki, and that was fine with me because that is the meaning of the personal pronoun you that I like best. So I answered Bruno's question in a clear no nonsense way, I said no, I don't think you die in a self- duplication experience. In those circumstances and given Bruno's definition of the pronoun what answer would you give? That I don't die. Then we agree. Then Bruno started putting all sorts of additional caveats and restrictions on the meaning of you that were very unclear. He did not... So apparently we HAVEN'T already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki. That has *always* been the definition. If that is the definition of you then why in hell doesn't Bruno agree that you will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington? Ah! Quentin, you miss that lie by Clark. I do agree that you will see both Moscow AND Washington, in the third person sense. You can apply the 3-view on the two copies, and keeping comp, they both are genuine survivor of the experiencer. I say this explicitly very often, like you can join me in W and M. Of course, this distracts from the question asked, which concerns the first person pov, from the first person pov. That is the first person experience. That is, the city-content of the personal diary. In non case at all, will any diary contains: Oh I see M and I see W. P(I will see only one city) = 1. This shows also that the personal identity concerns is a red herring. Comp accepts that both copies are equivalent (with respect to identity) continuations of the original, but the prediction bears on the first person experience. Comp predicts that the first person experience will feel to be unique, trivially. It is the classical equivalent of Everett's remark that the quantum observer can't feel the split/superposition. It was at this point that I said Bruno was backpedaling and you started screaming personal insults. He never did. Given Bruno's previous definition to now insist that you only sees one city is very vigorous backpedaling. And it's true Bruno never screamed personal insults, but you did. same thing in MWI. In MWI, you'll see from 1st POV *one* definite result, No. If MWI is correct then there are TWO 1st POV and you sees *two* definite results, No *each you* sees only *one* result. Correct, *each you* sees only *one* result, and that is precisely HALF the amount of information that would be needed to disprove the proposition that you will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington, and in the MWI it is precisely HALF the amount of information that would be needed to disprove the proposition that you will see BOTH spin up and spin down. And don't blame me if the language seems convoluted, English was developed long before Everett was born, and we still don't have duplicating chambers; when we do the English language will need major revisions. There is the 1-p and 3-p, but we can have a 3-view on 1-views = 3-1, and 1-view on 3-views, or 1-3. We can have a 1-3-3-1-1-1-1-3-1 view on p, and in the math part if B = Gödel predicate, and []p = Bp p. It will be given by a (multi) modal formula []-B-B-[]-[]-[]-[]-B-[] p, which is an arithmetical formula, at the propositional level, for specific arithmetical propositions p. (But it cannot be a predicate, like B, due to the presence of p). The only question ask is the probability you see moscow Will the Moscow Man be one of the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki? Yes. Therefore according to Bruno's definition of the pronoun (and mine too incidentally) you sees Moscow. (resp. washington) Will the Washington Man be one of the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki? Yes. Therefore according to Bruno's definition of the pronoun you sees Washington. And although that sounds ungrammatical it is logically correct, its just that the English language was never made with this sort of thing in mind. Answering 100% is simply false No it isn't. It is from 1st POV... each individual sees one and only one city (resp. each individual under MWI sees one and only one result, ie: spin up or down). It is a mystery that Clark does not remember that the question concerns what will be written in the personal diary. If 100% was true, for P(W), we would have, in the iterated version, the history WWW... having a 100% probability, yet, all diaries but one, will contradict that prediction. P(I will see one city) = 1. And
Re: For John Clark
On Wed, Oct 30, 2013 at 1:21 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: I think this entire matter could be clarified if you could reformulate the following question in such a way that a simple yes or no answer can be given: Do you die if two exact copies of Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in Washington and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed? This is not what is asked It's the question I asked! I don't give a damn if I see Moscow or Washington, I care if I live or die and I suspect you are more interested in that question too. And if you could reformulate that question (never mind the answer) so that it was clear to you i might understand what you're talking about. what is asked is the probability to see moscow, likewise when you measure the spin of the electron, the question is the probability you measure spin up As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. both question are *valid* and have simple answer which is 0.5. No, only one question is valid. In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?. Not that predictions, good bad or meaningless, have anything to do with a sense of self. Does the fellow who remembers being in Helsinki die if two exact copies of the fellow in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in Washington, and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed? I would answer the question with a simple no without the need for further explanations or caveats, That is still not the question asked. The question is about probability. The easiest way to rephrase it, is [...] Stop telling me how simple it is to rephrase the question and actually rephrase it. Rephrase that question into a sentence so that the question is clear to you (we'll worry about the answer another time) and then maybe what you're talking about will be clear to me. simply to look at the diary, and simply by repeating the experience and looking at the result of the diary you can infer the frequency of 0.5 and the correct probability. A diary is of absolutely no value in this matter because the diary was written by you yesterday and today I'm looking at 2 people who have a equal right to be called you because they both remember being the Helsinki Man yesterday. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Wed, Oct 30, 2013 at 1:21 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: I think this entire matter could be clarified if you could reformulate the following question in such a way that a simple yes or no answer can be given: Do you die if two exact copies of Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in Washington and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed? This is not what is asked It's the question I asked! You do not have to choose the question to attack bruno's one... you either answer his and proceed, or you do not and abandon MWI for the same reason. I don't give a damn if I see Moscow or Washington, I care if I live or die The point is about step 3 and for you to proceed to step 4 or not... I don't give a damn about what you give a damn. and I suspect you are more interested in that question too. And if you could reformulate that question (never mind the answer) so that it was clear to you i might understand what you're talking about. what is asked is the probability to see moscow, likewise when you measure the spin of the electron, the question is the probability you measure spin up As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person No, in everett experiment like in the duplication experiment after the experiment there are two you, if you deny this, you deny *MW*I (as in *multiple world*) is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you The experience as nothing to do about who is you *simply look at the goddamn diary* is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. both question are *valid* and have simple answer which is 0.5. No, only one question is valid. In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?. Not that predictions, good bad or meaningless, have anything to do with a sense of self. Does the fellow who remembers being in Helsinki die if two exact copies of the fellow in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in Washington, and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed? I would answer the question with a simple no without the need for further explanations or caveats, That is still not the question asked. The question is about probability. The easiest way to rephrase it, is [...] Stop telling me how simple it is to rephrase the question and actually rephrase it. Rephrase that question into a sentence so that the question is clear to you (we'll worry about the answer another time) and then maybe what you're talking about will be clear to me. simply to look at the diary, and simply by repeating the experience and looking at the result of the diary you can infer the frequency of 0.5 and the correct probability. A diary is of absolutely no value in this matter because the diary was written by you yesterday and today I'm looking at 2 people who have a equal right to be called you because they both remember being the Helsinki Man yesterday. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 10/31/2013 10:18 AM, John Clark wrote: what is asked is the probability to see moscow, likewise when you measure the spin of the electron, the question is the probability you measure spin up As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will see are useless. This seems like an inessential detail. Instead of Moscow and Washington, suppose the teleportation is to Moscow and Anchorhead on Tatooine. There is no third person who will see both. And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. Bruno is also asking about probability, which from a frequentist viewpoint can be inferred from the diary entries of the subjects. both question are *valid* and have simple answer which is 0.5. No, only one question is valid. In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?. The more basic question is whether some kind of duplication is a possible model that can replace probabilisitic uncertainty in QM with deterministic evolution that still produces uncertainty. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: this distracts from the question asked, which concerns the first person pov, from the first person pov. That is the first person experience. [...] Comp accepts that both copies are equivalent (with respect to identity) continuations of the original, but the prediction bears on the first person experience. It is a mystery that Marchal can not get it through his head that copying a person means there are now 2 identical first person experiences because YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED, and the 2 will remain identical until one sees something that the other has not. If 100% was true, for P(W), we would have, in the iterated version, the history WWW... having a 100% probability, yet, all diaries but one, will contradict that prediction. If you predicted that you will see Washington and you does see Washington then the prediction that there was a 100% chance that you will see Washington was correct and it doesn't matter how many people who also lay claim to the title you don't see Washington. The proba concerns the first person experience that you will live, and recall in the next instants, by writing it in the diary. The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
John, I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all, and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from all the views, the conclusion is the same. Perhaps you wouldn't mind commenting on whether or not you agree with my conclusion. I will re-post it here in a single post for your convenience: *First, consider this experiment:* Imagine there is a conscious AI (or uploaded mind) inside a virtual environment (an open field) Inside that virtual environment is a ball, which the AI is looking at and next to the ball is a note which reads: At noon (when the virtual sun is directly overhead) the protocol will begin. In the protocol, the process containing this simulation will fork (split in two), after the fork, the color of the ball will change to red for the parent process and it will change to blue in the child process (forking duplicates a process into two identical copies, with one called the parent and the other the child). A second after the color of the ball is set, another fork will happen. This will happen 8 times leading to 256 processes, after which the simulation will end. * * *Now, with the understanding of that experiment, consider the following:* *If* the AI (or all of them) went through two tests, test A, and test B A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball changing color B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times *Then *the AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred first. Do you agree that it is impossible *for any entity within the simulation*to determine whether test A was executed first, or whether test B was executed first, with higher than a 50% probability? (Assuming the order in which the tests are administered is determined completely randomly from outside of the simulation)? No where above did I use you, personal identity, predicting who you will be, etc. All I ask is whether or not any entity at any time has access to information that can distinguish between iterated forking or randomized switching. Therefore, there should be no language barriers in this reasoning and you should be able to provide an answer. Thanks, Jason On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 11:18 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Oct 30, 2013 at 1:21 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: I think this entire matter could be clarified if you could reformulate the following question in such a way that a simple yes or no answer can be given: Do you die if two exact copies of Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in Washington and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed? This is not what is asked It's the question I asked! I don't give a damn if I see Moscow or Washington, I care if I live or die and I suspect you are more interested in that question too. And if you could reformulate that question (never mind the answer) so that it was clear to you i might understand what you're talking about. what is asked is the probability to see moscow, likewise when you measure the spin of the electron, the question is the probability you measure spin up As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. both question are *valid* and have simple answer which is 0.5. No, only one question is valid. In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?. Not that predictions, good bad or meaningless, have anything to do with a sense of self. Does the fellow who remembers being in Helsinki die if two exact copies of the fellow in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in Washington, and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed? I would answer the question with a simple no without the need for further explanations or caveats, That is still not the question asked. The question is about probability. The easiest way to rephrase it, is [...] Stop telling me how simple it is to rephrase the question and actually rephrase it.
Re: For John Clark
2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 1:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: this distracts from the question asked, which concerns the first person pov, from the first person pov. That is the first person experience. [...] Comp accepts that both copies are equivalent (with respect to identity) continuations of the original, but the prediction bears on the first person experience. It is a mystery that Marchal can not get it through his head that copying a person means there are now 2 identical first person experiences because YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED, and the 2 will remain identical until one sees something that the other has not. If 100% was true, for P(W), we would have, in the iterated version, the history WWW... having a 100% probability, yet, all diaries but one, will contradict that prediction. If you predicted that you will see Washington and you does see Washington then the prediction that there was a 100% chance that you will see Washington was correct and it doesn't matter how many people who also lay claim to the title you don't see Washington. The proba concerns the first person experience that you will live, and recall in the next instants, by writing it in the diary. The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions. So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are not consistent in your declaration and don't want to discuss just trolling (as you do this for years, my question is rethorical, you are a troll). Quentin John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. [...] In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?. [...] The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions. So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are not consistent The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps... Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're just a troll. Quentin Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally different. Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's points. Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at John Clark. Step 5: GOTO step 1. John k Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
John, you are not the first that Quentin has categorized as a roger or stephen lin. Richard On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2013/10/31 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who you is and easy to determine if predictions about what you will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right to the title you which means that the predictions about what you will see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. [...] In Everett's case we know who you is, it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people clear as a bell and both are called you and both saw different things, and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday what is the probability you will see X?. [...] The diary is useless because the diary was written by you and contains predictions about the further adventures of you, but now there are 2 (or more) people with the title you and no way to determine which one the diary was referring to. And the diary is useless because good predictions have no more to do with identity or a sense of self than bad predictions. So are you at last ready to reject MWI...? if you don't, you are not consistent The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: No you got it wrong, see previous message for the real steps... Anyway, if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger and stephen li... you'll never acknowledge you're wrong, because you're just a troll. Quentin Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally different. Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's points. Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at John Clark. Step 5: GOTO step 1. John k Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball changing color Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked until there is something different about them, such as one remembering seeing a red ball and the other remember seeing a green ball, only then do they fork. It was the decision made by somebody or something outside the simulation to make sure all 256 saw a difference sequence of colored balls that created 256 distinct minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision made outside the simulation would be indistinguishable from being random, that is to say the simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure out what that decision would be. B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times* Then *the AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred first. Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted thought experiments are not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that in A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but as the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original or the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true. So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no difference. I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all, and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from all the views, the conclusion is the same. Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 5:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: if 've waited too much to put you in the boitakon, meet roger and stephen li I'm guessing that's an insult of some sort but my Quentinspeak is a little rusty so I'm not sure. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 7:51 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball changing color Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked until there is something different about them, such as one remembering seeing a red ball and the other remember seeing a green ball, only then do they fork. It was the decision made by somebody or something outside the simulation to make sure all 256 saw a difference sequence of colored balls that created 256 distinct minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision made outside the simulation would be indistinguishable from being random, that is to say the simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure out what that decision would be. B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times* Then *the AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred first. Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted thought experiments are not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that in A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but as the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original or the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true. So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no difference. Thank you for answering. I think we are in agreement. I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all, and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from all the views, the conclusion is the same. Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually. Well there is one difference: the entire protocol is explained to the AI, it knows exactly what will happen in each of the 256 possibilities, but from inside the simulation, it is no different than had the sequence of colors been chosen completely randomly. Also, you are mistaken if you think this is the grand conclusion of the UDA, it is only one small (but necessary) step in the reasoning. If you want to get to the grand conclusion you need only continue on to the next steps. It seems you have grasped the point of step 3 and are in agreement that subjective indeterminacy can arise in a fully understood and deterministic process. I'll re-post the link for your convenience. You are less than 2-3 pages away from finishing reading the UDA: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 2:05 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Bruno asked me Do you think that you die in a self-duplication experience? and I said that depends on what the meaning of you is. Bruno responded with We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki, and that was fine with me because that is the meaning of the personal pronoun you that I like best. So I answered Bruno's question in a clear no nonsense way, I said no, I don't think you die in a self-duplication experience. In those circumstances and given Bruno's definition of the pronoun what answer would you give? That I don't die. Then we agree. Then Bruno started putting all sorts of additional caveats and restrictions on the meaning of you that were very unclear. He did not... So apparently we HAVEN'T already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki. That has *always* been the definition. If that is the definition of you then why in hell doesn't Bruno agree that you will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington? It was at this point that I said Bruno was backpedaling and you started screaming personal insults. He never did. Given Bruno's previous definition to now insist that you only sees one city is very vigorous backpedaling. And it's true Bruno never screamed personal insults, but you did. same thing in MWI. In MWI, you'll see from 1st POV *one* definite result, No. If MWI is correct then there are TWO 1st POV and you sees *two* definite results, No *each you* sees only *one* result. Correct, *each you* sees only *one* result, and that is precisely HALF the amount of information that would be needed to disprove the proposition that you will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington, and in the MWI it is precisely HALF the amount of information that would be needed to disprove the proposition that you will see BOTH spin up and spin down. And don't blame me if the language seems convoluted, English was developed long before Everett was born, and we still don't have duplicating chambers; when we do the English language will need major revisions. The only question ask is the probability you see moscow Will the Moscow Man be one of the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki? Yes. Therefore according to Bruno's definition of the pronoun (and mine too incidentally) you sees Moscow. (resp. washington) Will the Washington Man be one of the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki? Yes. Therefore according to Bruno's definition of the pronoun you sees Washington. And although that sounds ungrammatical it is logically correct, its just that the English language was never made with this sort of thing in mind. Answering 100% is simply false No it isn't. from 1st POV It isn't unless you start backpedaling away from Bruno's original definition of the pronoun you. I think this entire matter could be clarified if you could reformulate the following question in such a way that a simple yes or no answer can be given: Do you die if two exact copies of Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in Washington and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed? For the time being lets not argue about what the answer is, all I want is the question expressed so clearly that one doesn't have to ask follow up questions about points of view or probabilities to give a simple yes or no answer. I'd really like to know how you'd rephrase it. I'll go first: Does the fellow who remembers being in Helsinki die if two exact copies of the fellow in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in Washington, and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed? I would answer the question with a simple no without the need for further explanations or caveats, but right now I'm more interested in how you would phrase the question such that it was clear and unambiguous rather than what your answer would be. John K Clark as can be seen by lookint at the diary. True you see only spin up but if MWI is correct you has been duplicated and we haven't heard what that other fellow saw yet. We don't care, if you accept probability with MWI so should you in the self-duplication thought experiment, and that's the only of step 3 and always have been. Quentin John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To
Re: For John Clark
2013/10/30 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 2:05 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: Bruno asked me Do you think that you die in a self-duplication experience? and I said that depends on what the meaning of you is. Bruno responded with We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki, and that was fine with me because that is the meaning of the personal pronoun you that I like best. So I answered Bruno's question in a clear no nonsense way, I said no, I don't think you die in a self-duplication experience. In those circumstances and given Bruno's definition of the pronoun what answer would you give? That I don't die. Then we agree. Then Bruno started putting all sorts of additional caveats and restrictions on the meaning of you that were very unclear. He did not... So apparently we HAVEN'T already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki. That has *always* been the definition. If that is the definition of you then why in hell doesn't Bruno agree that you will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington? It was at this point that I said Bruno was backpedaling and you started screaming personal insults. He never did. Given Bruno's previous definition to now insist that you only sees one city is very vigorous backpedaling. And it's true Bruno never screamed personal insults, but you did. same thing in MWI. In MWI, you'll see from 1st POV *one* definite result, No. If MWI is correct then there are TWO 1st POV and you sees *two* definite results, No *each you* sees only *one* result. Correct, *each you* sees only *one* result, and that is precisely HALF the amount of information that would be needed to disprove the proposition that you will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington, and in the MWI it is precisely HALF the amount of information that would be needed to disprove the proposition that you will see BOTH spin up and spin down. And don't blame me if the language seems convoluted, English was developed long before Everett was born, and we still don't have duplicating chambers; when we do the English language will need major revisions. The only question ask is the probability you see moscow Will the Moscow Man be one of the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki? Yes. Therefore according to Bruno's definition of the pronoun (and mine too incidentally) you sees Moscow. (resp. washington) Will the Washington Man be one of the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki? Yes. Therefore according to Bruno's definition of the pronoun you sees Washington. And although that sounds ungrammatical it is logically correct, its just that the English language was never made with this sort of thing in mind. Answering 100% is simply false No it isn't. It is from 1st POV... each individual sees one and only one city (resp. each individual under MWI sees one and only one result, ie: spin up or down). from 1st POV It isn't unless you start backpedaling away The only backpedaling here is from you. from Bruno's original definition of the pronoun you. I think this entire matter could be clarified if you could reformulate the following question in such a way that a simple yes or no answer can be given: Do you die if two exact copies of Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in Washington and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed? This is not what is asked... what is asked is the probability to see moscow, likewise when you measure the spin of the electron, the question is the probability you measure spin up... both question are *valid* and have simple answer which is 0.5. For the time being lets not argue about what the answer is, all I want is the question expressed so clearly The question is as clear as it can be both for the duplication thought experiment and the measurement of the spin, both have valid answer. that one doesn't have to ask follow up questions about points of view It is linked with POV, in MWI and in duplication experiment. or probabilities to give a simple yes or no answer. I'd really like to know how you'd rephrase it. I'll go first: No need to. Does the fellow who remembers being in Helsinki die if two exact copies of the fellow in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in Washington, and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed? I would answer the question with a simple no without the need for further explanations or caveats, That is still not the question asked. The question is about probability. The easiest way to rephrase it, is simply to look at the diary, and simply by repeating the experience and looking at the result of the diary you can infer the frequency of 0.5 and the correct probability. Quentin but right now I'm more interested in how you would phrase the question such that it was clear and
Re: For John Clark
On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: If John Clark was lying and Bruno has not changed his mind and you is still the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki then it is beyond dispute that YOU will see BOTH Moscow AND Helsinki. It is correct from 3rd POV, Yes. not from 1st POV... Bruno asked me Do you think that you die in a self-duplication experience? and I said that depends on what the meaning of you is. Bruno responded with We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki, and that was fine with me because that is the meaning of the personal pronoun you that I like best. So I answered Bruno's question in a clear no nonsense way, I said no, I don't think you die in a self-duplication experience. In those circumstances and given Bruno's definition of the pronoun what answer would you give? Then Bruno started putting all sorts of additional caveats and restrictions on the meaning of you that were very unclear. So apparently we HAVEN'T already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki. It was at this point that I said Bruno was backpedaling and you started screaming personal insults. same thing in MWI. In MWI, you'll see from 1st POV *one* definite result, No. If MWI is correct then there are TWO 1st POV and you sees *two* definite results, and every experiment ever performed has only produced half the amount of information needed to disprove it. True you see only spin up but if MWI is correct you has been duplicated and we haven't heard what that other fellow saw yet. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
2013/10/29 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: If John Clark was lying and Bruno has not changed his mind and you is still the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki then it is beyond dispute that YOU will see BOTH Moscow AND Helsinki. It is correct from 3rd POV, Yes. not from 1st POV... Bruno asked me Do you think that you die in a self-duplication experience? and I said that depends on what the meaning of you is. Bruno responded with We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki, and that was fine with me because that is the meaning of the personal pronoun you that I like best. So I answered Bruno's question in a clear no nonsense way, I said no, I don't think you die in a self-duplication experience. In those circumstances and given Bruno's definition of the pronoun what answer would you give? That I don't die. Then Bruno started putting all sorts of additional caveats and restrictions on the meaning of you that were very unclear. He did not... So apparently we HAVEN'T already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki. That has *always* been the definition. It was at this point that I said Bruno was backpedaling and you started screaming personal insults. He never did. same thing in MWI. In MWI, you'll see from 1st POV *one* definite result, No. If MWI is correct then there are TWO 1st POV and you sees *two* definite results, No *each you* sees only *one* result. and every experiment ever performed has only produced half the amount of information needed to disprove it. The only question ask is the probability you see moscow (resp. washington) likewise in MWI the question ask is the probality you see spin up... Answering 100% is simply false from 1st POV as can be seen by lookint at the diary. True you see only spin up but if MWI is correct you has been duplicated and we haven't heard what that other fellow saw yet. We don't care, if you accept probability with MWI so should you in the self-duplication thought experiment, and that's the only of step 3 and always have been. Quentin John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
2013/10/29 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com 2013/10/29 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:47 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: If John Clark was lying and Bruno has not changed his mind and you is still the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki then it is beyond dispute that YOU will see BOTH Moscow AND Helsinki. It is correct from 3rd POV, Yes. not from 1st POV... Bruno asked me Do you think that you die in a self-duplication experience? and I said that depends on what the meaning of you is. Bruno responded with We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki, and that was fine with me because that is the meaning of the personal pronoun you that I like best. So I answered Bruno's question in a clear no nonsense way, I said no, I don't think you die in a self-duplication experience. In those circumstances and given Bruno's definition of the pronoun what answer would you give? That I don't die. Then Bruno started putting all sorts of additional caveats and restrictions on the meaning of you that were very unclear. He did not... So apparently we HAVEN'T already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki. That has *always* been the definition. It was at this point that I said Bruno was backpedaling and you started screaming personal insults. He never did. same thing in MWI. In MWI, you'll see from 1st POV *one* definite result, No. If MWI is correct then there are TWO 1st POV and you sees *two* definite results, No *each you* sees only *one* result. and every experiment ever performed has only produced half the amount of information needed to disprove it. The only question ask is the probability you see moscow (resp. washington) likewise in MWI the question ask is the probality you see spin up... Answering 100% is simply false from 1st POV as can be seen by looking at the diary. True you see only spin up but if MWI is correct you has been duplicated and we haven't heard what that other fellow saw yet. We don't care, if you accept probability with MWI so should you in the self-duplication thought experiment, and that's the only point of step 3 and always has been. Quentin John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 1:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I give the two definition of the pronouns used in the reasoning, and often confused by the use of an identical term in natural language, but clearly distinguishes in UDA step 2, and the next one. The 1-you, basically your definition, or simply the content of the diary taken by the experiencer with him, and the 3-view, the content of the diary of an external (not entering in the teleportation box). Bruno Marchal said We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki . Remember those were Bruno Marchal's words not John Clark's. Then Bruno Marchal asked point blank Do you think that you die in a self-duplication experience? and John Clark gave a unequivocal answer, no. But then apparently Bruno Marchal changed his mind about what the meaning of the pronoun you is; so please make clear what this new meaning is and ask again Do you think that you die in a self-duplication experience?. Perhaps with this new meaning John Clark's answer will be different and maybe then John Clark will understand what Bruno Marchal is talking about. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
2013/10/28 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 1:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I give the two definition of the pronouns used in the reasoning, and often confused by the use of an identical term in natural language, but clearly distinguishes in UDA step 2, and the next one. The 1-you, basically your definition, or simply the content of the diary taken by the experiencer with him, and the 3-view, the content of the diary of an external (not entering in the teleportation box). Bruno Marchal said We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki . Remember those were Bruno Marchal's words not John Clark's. Then Bruno Marchal asked point blank Do you think that you die in a self-duplication experience? and John Clark gave a unequivocal answer, no. But then apparently Bruno Marchal changed his mind about what the meaning of the pronoun you is; Another lie... so please make clear what this new meaning is and ask again Do you think that you die in a self-duplication experience?. Perhaps with this new meaning John Clark's answer will be different and maybe then John Clark will understand what Bruno Marchal is talking about. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 1:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: I give the two definition of the pronouns used in the reasoning, and often confused by the use of an identical term in natural language, but clearly distinguishes in UDA step 2, and the next one. The 1-you, basically your definition, or simply the content of the diary taken by the experiencer with him, and the 3-view, the content of the diary of an external (not entering in the teleportation box). Bruno Marchal said We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki . Remember those were Bruno Marchal's words not John Clark's. Then Bruno Marchal asked point blank Do you think that you die in a self-duplication experience? and John Clark gave a unequivocal answer, no. But then apparently Bruno Marchal changed his mind about what the meaning of the pronoun you is; Another lie... If John Clark was lying and Bruno has not changed his mind and you is still the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki then it is beyond dispute that YOU will see BOTH Moscow AND Helsinki. And if John Clark was not lying then what is the new meaning of the personal pronoun you? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: For John Clark
the question is asked, you are not about to see (Washington or Moscow), you are about to see (Washington and Moscow), because there is only one of you at this point, and critically -- and heres the bit which makes it genuinely 1-p -- you are certain of all this. Your subjective view, your 'what is it like to be', your phenomenological state, your whateveryouwantocallit, is saturated with the conviction that you are going to end up in both washington and moscow. There will be no room for doubt until you open your eyes at the terminal. At which point the game has changed radically. Now you know that you have been annihilated and duplicated but do not know which duplicate you are. Here you would predict 50/50 but not before. Certainly not when the question is asked in step 3. Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say in truth there is only one I, but this does not remove the appearance of randomness as seen from the first person views Its my contention that there would be no appearance of randomness. Our perceptions are coloured by our beliefs. If we are genuine MWIers for example, we would not experience a feeling of randomness at all. We would percieve things as wholly determined. I am curious, have you heard of the sleeping beauty problem? I wonder what answer you would agree with: I have. I studied Philosophy at UCL and watched Malcolm Budd and Ted Honderich tear Arnold Zuboff to shreds on a regular basis at departmental seminars. The thing is sleeping beauty is in a state of maximal ignorance so I don't see how it relates. Yes, but the question is if you were not told the protocol, whether the machine would send you to one with 50% probability, or send you to both locations, can you, (from the first person/subjective point of view), distinguish these two cases? Again, where there is ignorance there can be doubt. But it isn't the doubt you want which is doubt in state of maximal knowledge. Okay, that is fair. I'm beginning to think Bruno defines 'self' in terms of self reference within certain modal logics; provability logic etc. Its a circular definition which I imagine will be problematic. but again my modal logic is very rusty so I won't argue the point ... Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 02:18:48 -0500 Subject: Re: For John Clark From: jasonre...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 9:04 PM, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: Hi Jason Subject refers to the I, the indexical first-person. The word 'I' is indexical, like 'now' and 'here'. The experience isn't indexical, its just me. Right but when you refer to the experience or chris peck's experiences, that is speaking in the third person. This page offers some examples of the distinction ( http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/indexicals/#PurIndTruDem ). Thanks. Im still confused as to how my use of 'subjective certainty' According to your usage, how is the meaning of subjective certainty different from just certainty? does not imply the certainty applies to the indexical 'I'ity of me. It certainly does in my head. When I say I am uncertain/certain of things I am definately saying I am having the 1-p experience of certainty/uncertainty. Sure. Knowing that she becomes all does not allow her (prior to the splitting, or prior to the duplication) to know where the photon will be observed (or what city she finds herself in). This is the subjective uncertainty. Certainty only exists when talking about the experiences of others from the standpoint of some external impartial observer. You're begging the question here. You're just reasserting your conclusion about what is infact up for grabs. You're effectively arguing that unless I agree that there is subjective uncertainty then I am confusing 1-p for 3-p. After the duplication there are two experiencers. Each is confronted with the impossibility of being able to reliably predict which experience they would next have following the duplication. The knowledge that all experiences will be had does not eliminate this uncertainty. Interestingly, Everett was allegedly certain of his own immortality. One of the reasons he specified in his will that his ashes should be ditched alongside the trash. I can't imagine a more morbid yet expressive demonstration of subjective certainty about MWI and all outcomes obtaining. I mean subjective in a stronger sense than just that it is experienced by someone, rather that it is experienced by the I. Without begging the question, in what way is that a stronger sense than the one I have used? It seems identical to me. According to your usage, in which you have no uncertainty because you know future chris pecks, following duplication, will individually experience all possible outcomes, such certainty ignores the personal feelings of the original Chris peck stepping into the duplicator and experiencing
Re: For John Clark
On 26 Oct 2013, at 23:53, meekerdb wrote: On 10/26/2013 1:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You betray your feeling here. Some people, like you apparently, indeed find the FPI and the reversal as a work of genius. They think: if you were right you should have the Nobel Prize, but you don't, so something must be wrong, and so I don't need to study it. But of course this does not help as it makes people dismissing it indeed. It seems to me that there is no disagreement about any fact in the duplication experiment - only arguments about what uncertainty John understood what I meant. He compared it himself with coin throwing. He miss the originality and/or importance, but that is not used in the reasoning. and you mean. John has proposed itself a definition, which is indeed the definition needed to say that we survive drinking, coffee, getting an artificial brain, using teletransportation, or living a self-duplication. He just stops doing the thought experiment just at the moment we interview each copies to see if the prediction written in the diary in Helsinki is or not fulfilled. So why don't you explain to John what proceeds from the facts of the thought experiment? I think he knows it. Comp implies (at step seven) that if there is a UD running in the universe, then physics is reduced to the FPI on arithmetic. Step 8 eliminates the assumption that there is a universe. I am the one, like many, who does not understand John's point, so I think you should ask him to clarify his point. It seems originate from not taking the 1P/3P distinction into account, despite he showed to understand it in some post. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 27 Oct 2013, at 00:05, meekerdb wrote: On 10/26/2013 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Oct 2013, at 23:33, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote: ... It is: 3) Bruno has yet to develop the mathematical tools to do practical computations. Not at all. That would be the case if the goal was doing physics, but the goal was only to formulate the mind body problem. Then, despite this, the math part (AUDA, the machine's interview) does provide the mathematical tools to do practical computations. The arithmetical quantization is fully given and has been compared with quantum logic. That we are at light years from getting anything like the standard model is not really relevant, as the standard model does not address the mind-body problem. A physicist can complain that comp is a long way to be able to use as physics, but I insist: the goal is to show that the mind-body problem is not solved, and that with comp, we have to derive physics from arithmetic, and I got already the propositional part of physics. What do you mean by that last? Whether you think it is necessary or not, it would certainly lend credence to your theory if it made more contact with physics. Comp has enough credence. It is believed by almost all scientists since almost always. The reasoning I propose has never met any problem, except in the lack of interest for reason which eludes me, but related to the fact that some scientist does not want to even heard words like consciousness, mind-body, or even QM and quantum mechanics. And they don't play the academic game. My work has been peer reviewed many times, has been defended as a PhD thesis, etc. Non credence comes from people not trying to read it, like Bill and John Clark illustrates on this list (and/or FOAR). Here's a blog post that might suggest a point of contact: http://blog.sigfpe.com/2013/10/distributed-computing-with-alien.html Don't hesitate to elaborate, but this assumes QM, and does not bear on the mind-body or 1p/3p relation. Bruno Brent The subject is the mind-body problem, not physics per se. Technically, the problem is that physicists don't know mathematical logic (as Penrose illustrated to the logicians). Very few physicists understand the X1* and Z1* logic, which gives the needed arithmetical quantizations. That's another problem: only logicians knows logic. They have no problem with AUDA. But many just dislike the mind-body problem and applications of logic. My work reminds that logic per se does not solve philosophical problem, which annoy them as they are still under the spell of Vienna positivism, where logic is used to replace metaphysics, and comp shows that this is not enough. I think. Bruno Suppose that you could derive the Standard Model from deeper principles, then it doesn't matter what the philosophical objections against these principles are. No one cares that Einstein's arguments leading to Special Relativity were not rigorous. Obviously, you can't derive special relativity rigorously from electrodynamics, because relativity is more fundamental than electrodynamics. At best you can present heuristic arguments. Some philosophers do make a problem out of that, but in physics no one really cares. Most modern textbooks do this correctly by discussing Lorentz invariance and only then deriving the Maxwell equations as the correct generalization of Coulomb's law. Saibal -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 1:09 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: I came across this today, which you might find of interest: http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9709032v1.pdf In particular section 3 goes to great pains to describe the importance of the first person / third person distinction. Of course it's important, but I didn't need Bruno's help to figure that out. And I especially agree when is says To avoid linguistic confusion it is crucial that we distinguish between the outside view of the world [from ] the inside view. Yes, we must avoid linguistic confusion! It's true that in everyday usage there is no linguistic confusion and it would be silly to keep asking what do you mean by the pronoun you?, but this is very far from everyday usage. This is a thought experiment involving identity duplicating machines and is a vital part of a proof that is trying to find something new about the very thing that is being duplicated, identity. Under those very very exotic circumstances the meaning of the personal pronoun you is far from obvious. And if the meaning of you is vague then the difference between 1p and 3p is vague too, and that is not acceptable in a proof that claims to be mathematically precise. So when Bruno asks will you in Helsinki survive the duplication? or what city will you see? it depends entirely on what you means. To me, and to Bruno too before he panicked and backpedaled, you is the guy(s) who remembers being the Helsinki Man; thus I would answer that yes you will survive and you will see both Moscow and Washington. And if the ASCII sequence y-o-u means something different in another language then John Clark would answer the questions differently. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 5:20 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: So, you still find nothing to say about many-worlds interpretation of QM where you are duplicated billions of time a picosecond, but you are able to babble for years about a simple duplication experiment ? The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally different. Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's points. Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at John Clark. Step 5: GOTO step 1. PS: 9 question marks following 9 rhetorical questions in a row is too much. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
You're just lying... You are the one treating things inconsistently, it's a shame your pride so high you can't even recognize it. Believe what you want to believe. Quentin 2013/10/27 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 5:20 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: So, you still find nothing to say about many-worlds interpretation of QM where you are duplicated billions of time a picosecond, but you are able to babble for years about a simple duplication experiment ? The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally different. Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's points. Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at John Clark. Step 5: GOTO step 1. PS: 9 question marks following 9 rhetorical questions in a row is too much. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 4:24 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: probability implies prediction and prediction has nothing to do with a sense of self, and that is what Bruno's proof is all about. Absolutely not. Absolutely not what? Absolutely not that probability implies prediction or that prediction has nothing to do with a sense of self or that your proof is about investigating the nature of self? That is no more than what you need to say yes to a comp doctor. I would say yes to the comp doctor because I would survive to tomorrow if I did, provided that I means something that remembers being John Clark today. And if the personal pronoun I means something other than that in your language then John Clark does not care if that fellow by the name of I survives or not. And neither probabilities nor the accuracy of predictions of what city will be seen nor the content of diaries would play any part in my decision to say yes. None whatsoever. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 11:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: You're just lying... You are the one treating things inconsistently, it's a shame your pride so high you can't even recognize it. Believe what you want to believe. The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally different. Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's points. Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at John Clark. Step 5: GOTO step 1. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: 1) Point John Clarck mistakes. 2) John Clark ignores it. Repeat the same mistake ad nauseam. 3) goto 1 Quentin 2013/10/27 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 11:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: You're just lying... You are the one treating things inconsistently, it's a shame your pride so high you can't even recognize it. Believe what you want to believe. The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally different. Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's points. Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at John Clark. Step 5: GOTO step 1. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
2013/10/27 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 1:09 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: I came across this today, which you might find of interest: http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9709032v1.pdf In particular section 3 goes to great pains to describe the importance of the first person / third person distinction. Of course it's important, but I didn't need Bruno's help to figure that out. And I especially agree when is says To avoid linguistic confusion it is crucial that we distinguish between the outside view of the world [from ] the inside view. Yes, we must avoid linguistic confusion! It's true that in everyday usage there is no linguistic confusion and it would be silly to keep asking what do you mean by the pronoun you?, but this is very far from everyday usage. This is a thought experiment involving identity duplicating machines and is a vital part of a proof that is trying to find something new about the very thing that is being duplicated, identity. Under those very very exotic circumstances the meaning of the personal pronoun you is far from obvious. And if the meaning of you is vague then the difference between 1p and 3p is vague too, and that is not acceptable in a proof that claims to be mathematically precise. So when Bruno asks will you in Helsinki survive the duplication? or what city will you see? it depends entirely on what you means. To me, and to Bruno too before he panicked and backpedaled, This is a blatant proof of lies that John Clark likes to do. you is the guy(s) who remembers being the Helsinki Man; thus I would answer that yes you will survive and you will see both Moscow and Washington. And if the ASCII sequence y-o-u means something different in another language then John Clark would answer the questions differently. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 27 Oct 2013, at 15:54, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 1:09 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: I came across this today, which you might find of interest: http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9709032v1.pdf In particular section 3 goes to great pains to describe the importance of the first person / third person distinction. Of course it's important, but I didn't need Bruno's help to figure that out. And I especially agree when is says To avoid linguistic confusion it is crucial that we distinguish between the outside view of the world [from ] the inside view. Yes, we must avoid linguistic confusion! It's true that in everyday usage there is no linguistic confusion and it would be silly to keep asking what do you mean by the pronoun you?, but this is very far from everyday usage. This is a thought experiment involving identity duplicating machines and is a vital part of a proof that is trying to find something new about the very thing that is being duplicated, identity. Under those very very exotic circumstances the meaning of the personal pronoun you is far from obvious. And if the meaning of you is vague then the difference between 1p and 3p is vague too, and that is not acceptable in a proof that claims to be mathematically precise. So when Bruno asks will you in Helsinki survive the duplication? or what city will you see? it depends entirely on what you means. To me, and to Bruno too before he panicked and backpedaled, you is the guy(s) who remembers being the Helsinki Man; thus I would answer that yes you will survive and you will see both Moscow and Washington. And if the ASCII sequence y-o-u means something different in another language then John Clark would answer the questions differently. I give the two definition of the pronouns used in the reasoning, and often confused by the use of an identical term in natural language, but clearly distinguishes in UDA step 2, and the next one. The 1-you, basically your definition, or simply the content of the diary taken by the experiencer with him, and the 3-view, the content of the diary of an external (not entering in the teleportation box). But you stop the thinking before taking that distinction further into account, and I don't know why. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 27 Oct 2013, at 16:47, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 4:24 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: probability implies prediction and prediction has nothing to do with a sense of self, and that is what Bruno's proof is all about. Absolutely not. Absolutely not what? that your proof is about investigating the nature of self? Absolutely not that probability implies prediction or that prediction has nothing to do with a sense of self or that your proof is about investigating the nature of self? The self has a big role, and that is obvious in the arithmetical translation which is based on the self-reference logics, but those are tools (even if key concepts) in the UDA proof. Comp asks only the idea that consciousness is invaraint for a kind of digital substitution, and shows that it makes physics necessarily into a branche of arithmetic, or computer science, or machine's theology. That is no more than what you need to say yes to a comp doctor. I would say yes to the comp doctor because I would survive to tomorrow if I did, provided that I means something that remembers being John Clark today. And if the personal pronoun I means something other than that in your language then John Clark does not care if that fellow by the name of I survives or not. And neither probabilities nor the accuracy of predictions of what city will be seen nor the content of diaries would play any part in my decision to say yes. None whatsoever. Of course. Saying yes = step zero. Then we reason from that. And? Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 27 Oct 2013, at 17:27, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/10/27 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 1:09 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: I came across this today, which you might find of interest: http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9709032v1.pdf In particular section 3 goes to great pains to describe the importance of the first person / third person distinction. Of course it's important, but I didn't need Bruno's help to figure that out. And I especially agree when is says To avoid linguistic confusion it is crucial that we distinguish between the outside view of the world [from ] the inside view. Yes, we must avoid linguistic confusion! It's true that in everyday usage there is no linguistic confusion and it would be silly to keep asking what do you mean by the pronoun you?, but this is very far from everyday usage. This is a thought experiment involving identity duplicating machines and is a vital part of a proof that is trying to find something new about the very thing that is being duplicated, identity. Under those very very exotic circumstances the meaning of the personal pronoun you is far from obvious. And if the meaning of you is vague then the difference between 1p and 3p is vague too, and that is not acceptable in a proof that claims to be mathematically precise. So when Bruno asks will you in Helsinki survive the duplication? or what city will you see? it depends entirely on what you means. To me, and to Bruno too before he panicked and backpedaled, This is a blatant proof of lies that John Clark likes to do. Thanks for helping me to reread this, and you are right. It is a lie. I miss this, or hide it to myself. That definitively proves that John Clark has an agenda unrelated with the topic. I will probably no more answer to him. Anyone else believing that John Clark has tried to say something sensical, by which I mean, have provided a reason to not go from step 3 to step 4, is free to explain. My feeling was that he just avoided the question by neglecting the 1p/3p distinction opportunistically, but here he lied plain and simple, entering in the club of my real persistent opponents who use both lies and authoritative arguments. To do it not under my back makes it not so much less grave. Thanks Quentin, that was not obvious for me, and a bit sad to acknowledge. Case close. Bruno you is the guy(s) who remembers being the Helsinki Man; thus I would answer that yes you will survive and you will see both Moscow and Washington. And if the ASCII sequence y-o-u means something different in another language then John Clark would answer the questions differently. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 7:47 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 1:24 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote: Unlike you, I fortunately do not have the time to dig up your ad hominems. Well, I sure didn't have to dig very far to find your ad hominems! In just one short post you say: I'm a bigot. I'm a obscurantists. I have excessive pride. I am crude. I am distasteful. I am loopy. I am full of nonsense. I don't really care about pronouns or entertaining alternate hypothesis, implying that I am a hypocrite. And I am a ass. Shocker: the man who regards it as his perogative to pedantically call it as it is (i.e. insult people whenever he wants) is the victim of somebody calling him names. You have got to be kidding! So cry us another river, drama queen. In CAPS, of course. PGC In fact there was virtually nothing in that post that was not a ad hominem, but that's OK I'm a big boy and have been called worse. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
John, Do you have any comment on the article I posted? Jason On Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 10:52 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 11:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: You're just lying... You are the one treating things inconsistently, it's a shame your pride so high you can't even recognize it. Believe what you want to believe. The following is a flow diagram of the conversation we've been having on this thread: Step 1: Quentin Anciaux states that John Clark treats Everett's ideas and Bruno's ideas inconsistently. Step 2: John Clark points out the ways Everett's ideas about probability and prediction and Bruno's ideas about the nature of self are fundamentally different. Step 3: Quentin Anciaux neither agrees nor disagrees with John Clark's points. Step 4: Quentin Anciaux inserts one or more personal insults directed at John Clark. Step 5: GOTO step 1. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 10/27/2013 1:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Here's a blog post that might suggest a point of contact: http://blog.sigfpe.com/2013/10/distributed-computing-with-alien.html Don't hesitate to elaborate, but this assumes QM, and does not bear on the mind-body or 1p/3p relation. No it doesn't assume quantum mechanics. It shows that it non-local correlations were just a little bit 'stronger' then the world would be much more trivial, which reminded me of you remark that we live on a kind of fractal border. I don't understand how you propose to get an inside view of arithmetic from which physics must appear, but I thought your theory might be able to say why the world has QM that has 'just enough' non-local correlation to make it interesting. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
John, Sorry, I missed your reply. Some comment's in-line below: On Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 1:09 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: I came across this today, which you might find of interest: http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9709032v1.pdf In particular section 3 goes to great pains to describe the importance of the first person / third person distinction. Of course it's important, but I didn't need Bruno's help to figure that out. And I especially agree when is says To avoid linguistic confusion it is crucial that we distinguish between the outside view of the world [from ] the inside view. Yes, we must avoid linguistic confusion! But in all your responses to Bruno's question you use only the objective viewpoint, not the subjective viewpoint, as the thought experiment demands. It's true that in everyday usage there is no linguistic confusion and it would be silly to keep asking what do you mean by the pronoun you?, but this is very far from everyday usage. This is a thought experiment involving identity duplicating machines and is a vital part of a proof that is trying to find something new about the very thing that is being duplicated, identity. Under those very very exotic circumstances the meaning of the personal pronoun you is far from obvious. And if the meaning of you is vague then the difference between 1p and 3p is vague too, and that is not acceptable in a proof that claims to be mathematically precise. You refers to any survivor according to the assumption of the computational theory of mind. Guessing your next subjective experience is a prediction made from the first person, subjective, inside, frog view, and verification of that prediction, done following the duplication, is also performed from the subjective, inside, frog view. Of course there are two such entities called John Clark after the duplication, but that is the objective view, not the subjective. Subjectively, neither can (immediately) be sure of the existence of the other, the only thing they know for certain is that they arrived in one of the cities. So when Bruno asks will you in Helsinki survive the duplication? or what city will you see? it depends entirely on what you means. That question isn't asked, what is asked is to make a prediction regarding the subjective, first person, inside frog view, and then to evaluate that prediction from the subjective, first person, inside frog view. To me, and to Bruno too before he panicked and backpedaled, you is the guy(s) who remembers being the Helsinki Man; thus I would answer that yes you will survive and you will see both Moscow and Washington. Objectively, yes. Subjectively you have no idea whether you were duplicated or transported to one of the two locations at random. Jason And if the ASCII sequence y-o-u means something different in another language then John Clark would answer the questions differently. Try answering it from the subjective viewpoint(s). Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 25 Oct 2013, at 17:30, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 9:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Do you think that [you] die in a self-duplication experience? ^^^ We've been through this, it depends on who the hell you is. Is you the guy who remembers being John Clark yesterday, We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki. Fine, then obviously You will survive and equally obvious you will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington. In the third person view on the 1-views, yes. But the question is about the future first person point if view, that you can have, and you know in advance (assuming comp) that you (in the same sense) will see only Moscow, or Washington, as you will certainly not feel in both place at once. You are the one keeping an ambiguity by never distinguishing the 1p and 3p view, each time this ambiguity helps to make your point, but hen you fail to address the question. or the guy who is seeing Helsinki right now You can take this one, as we know that such a guy will survive the duplication (assuming comp). or the guy that will see Washington tomorrow, Yes, it concerns also that guy, given that he has survived and he remembers being the H-guy. or the guy that will see Moscow tomorrow? Same. Fine, then obviously You will survive and equally obvious you will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington. Not in the first person pov, on which bear the question. And don't come back and repeat the irrelevant fact that each copy will see only one city because, if as Bruno Marchal said, you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki then it is beyond dispute that you will see both cities. True, but only from a third pov stance looking from outside to the two copies, but that is not what has been asked. Indeed; if you use your reasoning to predict that you will see both cities, both copies will refute it, as they see that they see only one city. The H-guy can reason from comp to predict that P(he will see only once city) is one. And don't come back with a bunch of pee pee stuff unless the ideas can be expressed without indeterminate pronouns to hide behind. The reasoning concerns person and the pronouns does not lead to any problem when make clear the difference between first and third person, that you avoid, apparently to evade the simple conclusion. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 25 Oct 2013, at 18:08, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 5:00 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Be consistent, reject MWI, or ask *the same question* about the probability of *you* (who is you ? pinocchio maybe ?) In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who you is because however many copies of you there may or may not be they will never meet and John Clark will never see more than one copy of Quentin Anciaux. But in Bruno's thought experiment that is no longer true, so to continue to blithely babble on about you causes nothing but confusion. This is really not relevant, as the W-guy cannot perceive immediately the M-guy, and the question bears on what you see when opening the reconstitution box. Also, if QM is discovered to be slightly non linear, the probability would vanish? (if QM is slightly non linear, we can interact with the parallel universes, and met the doppelganger). measuring spin up while measuring the spin of an electron And probability implies prediction and prediction has nothing to do with a sense of self, and that is what Bruno's proof is all about. Absolutely not. That is no more than what you need to say yes to a comp doctor. You keep bringing non relevant points. If when you pressed the button you were 99% certain, in fact even if you were 100% certain and there was not the tiniest particle of doubt in your mind that you would end up in Washington, and one second later you found yourself in Moscow your sense of self would not be diminished one iota, you'd just figure that you made a bad prediction, and it wouldn't be for the first time. And you would change your theory asserting W and M, for example, which is guarantied to be violated in all your possible futures. Your agenda is not to try to comprehend something, it is just to bash someone with no reason except misplaced pride. Ask yourself this question, why aren't Bruno's ideas universally recognized by the scientific community as a work of genius? There are 2 possibilities: 1) Due to the same misplaced pride that I have the entire scientific community is jealous of Bruno and would rather destroy a stunning new advancement in human knowledge than admit they didn't find it first. 2) The entire scientific community has run into the exact same logical stumbling block in Bruno's ideas that I did. Then they would have meet me, or discuss by mail, at least once, like you do. That never happened. But you can easily imagine other reasons than 1) and 2), like the fact that I could be a witness of some scandal, or something. Or perhaps not so much people understand really Everett, which took times also to be listened, the idea to be multiplied all the time is hard to be accepted by many people. Look at Boltzmann, he eventually kill himself due to the mockery of his idea that statistics can play a key role in classical physics. Today we cannot imagine that such statistics can't play a role. You betray your feeling here. Some people, like you apparently, indeed find the FPI and the reversal as a work of genius. They think: if you were right you should have the Nobel Prize, but you don't, so something must be wrong, and so I don't need to study it. But of course this does not help as it makes people dismissing it indeed. I don't know. I am at the center of some academical scandal indeed. I got a prize for my thesis, and I have been asked to relate the scandalous behavior, but apparently this did not help. Some academies acts like some clergy. That's all. It is the very common human corporatist defense reflex. Hardly new in the human history. The fact that I do not publish, unless asked with some insistence, does not help. Of course. In this list, I focus only on the ideas. And this very post explains why you don't try to study the ideas, just try to prove (like some) that I am a crackpot, but this will not help you to get the idea if there is one. I suggest sincerely to come back on the scientific point, letting the reason why the academical world is so slow to the historians and sociologists. So I am a genius, right? You are pushing my little ego too far. I might have been lucky reading James Watson book and Gödel at the right moment. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from
Re: For John Clark
On 25 Oct 2013, at 18:24, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 11:35 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: We have already agree that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki. Fine, then obviously You will survive and equally obvious you will see BOTH Moscow AND Washington. Fine, then obviously You will survive and equally obvious you will see BOTH spin up AND spin down. Fine, if the MWI is true and if the same definition of you is used as Bruno's definition, namely that you concerns the guy(s) who will remember having been in Helsinki, then it is beyond dispute that you will see BOTH spin up AND spin down. And don't come back and say that can be proven wrong because I see only spin up, because that is only half the amount of data that would be needed to prove it wrong. I am sure Quentin answers this, but obviously you forget the data that you have been duplicated, and that each copy can access only to half the amount of third person data, from the first person data they can only access to. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
On 25 Oct 2013, at 22:28, meekerdb wrote: On 10/25/2013 9:08 AM, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 5:00 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Be consistent, reject MWI, or ask *the same question* about the probability of *you* (who is you ? pinocchio maybe ?) In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who you is because however many copies of you there may or may not be they will never meet and John Clark will never see more than one copy of Quentin Anciaux. But in Bruno's thought experiment that is no longer true, so to continue to blithely babble on about you causes nothing but confusion. I don't see why that is determinative. Suppose the M-man never meets the W-man and in fact neither of them even knows whether the other one exists? measuring spin up while measuring the spin of an electron And probability implies prediction and prediction has nothing to do with a sense of self, and that is what Bruno's proof is all about. If when you pressed the button you were 99% certain, in fact even if you were 100% certain and there was not the tiniest particle of doubt in your mind that you would end up in Washington, and one second later you found yourself in Moscow your sense of self would not be diminished one iota, you'd just figure that you made a bad prediction, and it wouldn't be for the first time. Sure, and if the experiment were repeated N times then most of the 2^N participants would find, consulting their diaries, that they were right about half the time and wrong the half - and, even after comparing notes with one another, they would decide that Bernoulli trials are a good model of what happens when being teleported via Bruno's duplicator. Your agenda is not to try to comprehend something, it is just to bash someone with no reason except misplaced pride. Ask yourself this question, why aren't Bruno's ideas universally recognized by the scientific community as a work of genius? There are 2 possibilities: 1) Due to the same misplaced pride that I have the entire scientific community is jealous of Bruno and would rather destroy a stunning new advancement in human knowledge than admit they didn't find it first. 2) The entire scientific community has run into the exact same logical stumbling block in Bruno's ideas that I did. Or they consider this particular idea, uncertainty via duplication, to be a commonplace and uncontroversial. Most people (including me) find the last two steps of Bruno's argument more suspect in which he argues that all possible computation is the fundamental basis of the material world. Some people, knowing rather well Church thesis and computer science find those part non controversial, and so feels that they have to stop early in the reasoning, like step 3 (John Clark, or even step 0, like Bill Taylor). My real opponents does not want to admit that anything could be controversial, as this would already lead to some recognizance, and they want me to be ignored at all price, for reason unrelated to anything on the topics. My real opponents tended to consider AI and even QM as crackpot, in fact they even fight against the whole of computer science. Some pure mathematicians are like that. They hate applied mathematics, especially when you suggest that some part of pure mathematics can have applications. But it is worst than that. Some scandal are hidden with the goal of hiding worst scandal. Humans can be very grave sometimes. Bruno Brent John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2014.0.4158 / Virus Database: 3614/6772 - Release Date: 10/22/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: For John Clark
On 25 Oct 2013, at 23:33, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote: Citeren meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net: On 10/25/2013 9:08 AM, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 5:00 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote: Be consistent, reject MWI, or ask *the same question* about the probability of *you* (who is you ? pinocchio maybe ?) In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who you is because however many copies of you there may or may not be they will never meet and John Clark will never see more than one copy of Quentin Anciaux. But in Bruno's thought experiment that is no longer true, so to continue to blithely babble on about you causes nothing but confusion. I don't see why that is determinative. Suppose the M-man never meets the W-man and in fact neither of them even knows whether the other one exists? measuring spin up while measuring the spin of an electron And probability implies prediction and prediction has nothing to do with a sense of self, and that is what Bruno's proof is all about. If when you pressed the button you were 99% certain, in fact even if you were 100% certain and there was not the tiniest particle of doubt in your mind that you would end up in Washington, and one second later you found yourself in Moscow your sense of self would not be diminished one iota, you'd just figure that you made a bad prediction, and it wouldn't be for the first time. Sure, and if the experiment were repeated N times then most of the 2^N participants would find, consulting their diaries, that they were right about half the time and wrong the half - and, even after comparing notes with one another, they would decide that Bernoulli trials are a good model of what happens when being teleported via Bruno's duplicator. Your agenda is not to try to comprehend something, it is just to bash someone with no reason except misplaced pride. Ask yourself this question, why aren't Bruno's ideas universally recognized by the scientific community as a work of genius? There are 2 possibilities: 1) Due to the same misplaced pride that I have the entire scientific community is jealous of Bruno and would rather destroy a stunning new advancement in human knowledge than admit they didn't find it first. 2) The entire scientific community has run into the exact same logical stumbling block in Bruno's ideas that I did. Or they consider this particular idea, uncertainty via duplication, to be a commonplace and uncontroversial. Most people (including me) find the last two steps of Bruno's argument more suspect in which he argues that all possible computation is the fundamental basis of the material world. Brent It is: 3) Bruno has yet to develop the mathematical tools to do practical computations. Not at all. That would be the case if the goal was doing physics, but the goal was only to formulate the mind body problem. Then, despite this, the math part (AUDA, the machine's interview) does provide the mathematical tools to do practical computations. The arithmetical quantization is fully given and has been compared with quantum logic. That we are at light years from getting anything like the standard model is not really relevant, as the standard model does not address the mind-body problem. A physicist can complain that comp is a long way to be able to use as physics, but I insist: the goal is to show that the mind-body problem is not solved, and that with comp, we have to derive physics from arithmetic, and I got already the propositional part of physics. The subject is the mind-body problem, not physics per se. Technically, the problem is that physicists don't know mathematical logic (as Penrose illustrated to the logicians). Very few physicists understand the X1* and Z1* logic, which gives the needed arithmetical quantizations. That's another problem: only logicians knows logic. They have no problem with AUDA. But many just dislike the mind-body problem and applications of logic. My work reminds that logic per se does not solve philosophical problem, which annoy them as they are still under the spell of Vienna positivism, where logic is used to replace metaphysics, and comp shows that this is not enough. I think. Bruno Suppose that you could derive the Standard Model from deeper principles, then it doesn't matter what the philosophical objections against these principles are. No one cares that Einstein's arguments leading to Special Relativity were not rigorous. Obviously, you can't derive special relativity rigorously from electrodynamics, because relativity is more fundamental than electrodynamics. At best you can present heuristic arguments. Some philosophers do make a problem out of that, but in physics no one really cares. Most modern textbooks do this correctly by discussing Lorentz invariance and only then
Re: For John Clark
On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 3:36 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote: Well, you could always reciprocate Quentin's courtesy and [...] Courtesy? This is the fellow who said: Your agenda is not to try to comprehend something, it is just to bash someone with no reason except misplaced pride. and you're not a fool, you're an ass. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
John, I came across this today, which you might find of interest: http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9709032v1.pdf In particular section 3 goes to great pains to describe the importance of the first person / third person distinction. From the paper: A. “It doesn’t explain why we perceive randomness” Everett’s brilliant insight was that the MWI does explain why we perceive randomness even though the Schrodinger equation itself is completely causal. To avoid linguistic confusion, it is crucial that we distinguish between • the outside view of the world (the way a mathematical thinks of it, i.e., as an evolving wavefunction), and • the inside view, the way it is perceived from the subjective frog perspective of an observer in it. Therefore, the 1st / 3rd person views are not just some obscure aspect of Bruno's theory that is unknown or unused in any other part of science, it is critical in other theories of science too. You dismiss it as pee pee and that is what prevents you from arriving at the correct conclusion, I think. If you take into account the first person inside view or frog perspective, you get a different result than when you use only the third person outside view or bird perspective. Your confusion regarding the third step has nothing to do with pronouns or personal identity, it is purely due to a focus on only the objective perspective when the experiment calls for use of the subjective perspective. Jason On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 1:59 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 12:27 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who you is because however many copies of you there may or may not be they will never meet What does it have to do with prediction and probability ? In the MWI if John Clark is asked for a prediction or a probability or anything for that matter about you further clarification is not needed, in a thought experiment involving people duplicating machines it is. you refuse to let work your brain while you doesn't do *as you should* You doesn't well speak. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: For John Clark
Brent, Section 3b of ( http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9709032v1.pdf ) seems to also answer some of the questions you posed recently regarding superposition in MWI: B. “It doesn’t explain why we don’t perceive weird superpositions” That’s right! The Everett postulate doesn’t! Since the state corresponding to a superposition of a pencil lying in two macroscopically different positions on a table-top is a perfectly permissible quantum state in the MWI, why do we never perceive such states? The inability to answer this question was originally a serious weakness of the MWI, which can equivalently be phrased as follows: why is the position representation so special? Why do we perceive macroscopic objects in approximate eigenstates of the position operator r and the momentum operator p but never in approximate eigenstates of other Hermitian operators such as r + p? The answer to this important question was provided by the realization that environment-induced decoherence rapidly destroys macrosuperpositions as far as the inside view is concerned, but this was explicitly pointed out only in the 70’s [12] and 80’s [13], more than a decade after Everett’s original work. This elegant mechanism is now well-understood and rather uncontroversial [14], and the interested reader is referred to [15] and a recent book on decoherence [16] for details. Essentially, the position basis gets singled out by the dynamics because the field equations of physics are local in this basis, not in any other basis. If you do not find this answer satisfying, I would be interested to know why. Thanks. Jason On Sat, Oct 26, 2013 at 12:09 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: John, I came across this today, which you might find of interest: http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9709032v1.pdf In particular section 3 goes to great pains to describe the importance of the first person / third person distinction. From the paper: A. “It doesn’t explain why we perceive randomness” Everett’s brilliant insight was that the MWI does explain why we perceive randomness even though the Schrodinger equation itself is completely causal. To avoid linguistic confusion, it is crucial that we distinguish between • the outside view of the world (the way a mathematical thinks of it, i.e., as an evolving wavefunction), and • the inside view, the way it is perceived from the subjective frog perspective of an observer in it. Therefore, the 1st / 3rd person views are not just some obscure aspect of Bruno's theory that is unknown or unused in any other part of science, it is critical in other theories of science too. You dismiss it as pee pee and that is what prevents you from arriving at the correct conclusion, I think. If you take into account the first person inside view or frog perspective, you get a different result than when you use only the third person outside view or bird perspective. Your confusion regarding the third step has nothing to do with pronouns or personal identity, it is purely due to a focus on only the objective perspective when the experiment calls for use of the subjective perspective. Jason On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 1:59 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 12:27 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who you is because however many copies of you there may or may not be they will never meet What does it have to do with prediction and probability ? In the MWI if John Clark is asked for a prediction or a probability or anything for that matter about you further clarification is not needed, in a thought experiment involving people duplicating machines it is. you refuse to let work your brain while you doesn't do *as you should* You doesn't well speak. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.