Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-29 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 28-juin-07, à 17:56, David Nyman a écrit : On 28/06/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Bruno The remarks you comment on are certainly not the best-considered or most cogently expressed of my recent posts. However, I'll try to clarify if you have specific questions. As to

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-29 Thread David Nyman
On 29/06/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: BM: I am not sure that in case of disagreement (like our disagreement with Torgny), changing the vocabulary is a good idea. This will not make the problem going away, on the contrary there is a risk of introducing obscurity. DN: Yes. this

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-28 Thread Bruno Marchal
David, Le 17-juin-07, à 18:28, David Nyman a écrit : IMHO this semantic model gives you a knock-down argument against 'computationalism', *unless* one identifies (I'm hoping to hear from Bruno on this) the 'primitive' entities and operators with those of the number realm - i.e. you make

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-28 Thread David Nyman
On 28/06/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: BM: I agree completely. DN: A good beginning! BM: .but I am not yet convinced that you appreciate my methodological way of proceeding. DN: That may well be so. In that case it's interesting that we reached the same conclusion.

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-28 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 21-juin-07, à 01:07, David Nyman a écrit : On Jun 5, 3:12 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Personally I don' think we can be *personally* mistaken about our own consciousness even if we can be mistaken about anything that consciousness could be about. I agree with this, but

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-28 Thread David Nyman
On 28/06/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Bruno The remarks you comment on are certainly not the best-considered or most cogently expressed of my recent posts. However, I'll try to clarify if you have specific questions. As to why I said I'd rather not use the term

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-27 Thread Mark Peaty
en passant = one form of 'one size fits all' is shrink wrapping. Some food for thought wrapped up in there somewhere DN: 'MP: That is to say, all our knowledge _of_ the world is embodied in qualia which are _about_ the world. They are our brains' method of accounting for things. Naive

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-26 Thread Mark Peaty
I will try the 'interpolation method' below. Your second may shoot me if I waffle though :-) David Nyman wrote: Mark: Accepting broadly your summary up to this point... MP: But I have to *challenge you to clarify* whether what I write next really ties in completely with what

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-26 Thread John Mikes
On 6/23/07, David Nyman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi John (just your Italics par-s quoted in this reply. Then JM: means present text)): *DN: Since we agree to eliminate the 'obsolete noumenon', we can perhaps re-phrase this as just: 'how do you know x?' And then the answers are of the

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-26 Thread David Nyman
On 26/06/07, John Mikes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: JM: You mean a hallucination of x, when you * 'I just see x, hear x, feel x' and so forth' *. is included in your knowledge? or even substitutes for it? Maybe yes... DN: I am conscious of knowing x is distinguishable from I know x. The former

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-26 Thread Russell Standish
On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 10:17:57PM +0100, David Nyman wrote: Here's what's still not completely clear to me - perhaps you can assist me with this. We don't know *which* set of physical events is in effect selected by the functionalist account, even though it may be reasonable to believe

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-26 Thread Russell Standish
On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 01:36:56PM +0100, David Nyman wrote: DN: Now this seems to me crucial. When you say that self-awareness emerges from the physics, ISTM that this is what I was getting at in the bit you didn't comment on directly: My claim isthat if (machines) are (conscious),

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-26 Thread David Nyman
On 26/06/07, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: MP: Your second may shoot me if I waffle.. DN: No, he'll just tickle you until you become more coherent ;) MP: The main reason for the word 'challenge' above is due to the way you were using the word 'sensing' for physical and chemical

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-26 Thread David Nyman
On 26/06/07, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: RS: This sounds to me like you're paraphrasing Bruno's programme. DN: Yes, but I only realised this after I'd painfully thunk myself into it during my exchange with Brent. But I think I learned something in the process, even tho' I'm not

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-26 Thread David Nyman
On 26/06/07, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: RS: There is, in a sense, a certain arbitrariness in where one draws the boundaries. But I strongly support the notion that there can be no consciousness without an environment (aka appearance of a physical world to the conscious entity).

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-26 Thread Russell Standish
On Wed, Jun 27, 2007 at 03:03:35AM +0100, David Nyman wrote: RS: Furthermore, I would make the stronger claim that self-other boundary must be such that neither the self nor the environment can be computable, even if together they are. We've had this discussion before on this list. DN:

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-25 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Jun 24, 2007 at 08:20:49PM +0100, David Nyman wrote: RS: In some Platonic sense, all possible observers are already out there, but by physically instantiating it in our world, we are in effect opening up a communication channel between ourselves and the new consciousness. I think

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-25 Thread David Nyman
On 25/06/07, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: RS: Its more actually out there in the Multiverse, rather than the Plenitude, as the Multiverse is a necessary prerequisite of observation. Its at least one level of emergence up from the bitstring plenitude. DN: OK RS: Emergence is

Re: Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-25 Thread Mark Peaty
David, We have reached some understanding in the 'asifism' thread, and I would summarise that, tilted towards the context of this line of this thread, more or less as follows. Existence - * The irreducible primitive is existence per se; * that we can know about this implies

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-25 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: On 25/06/07, *Russell Standish* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ... RS: The conscious entity that the computer implements would know about it. It is not imaginary to itself. And by choosing to interpret the computer's program in that way, rather than

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-25 Thread David Nyman
On 25/06/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: BM: If I understand you, I would agree with the clarification that this convergence has been performed by evolution; so that for us it is in the most part hardwired at birth. And this hardwired interpretation of the world is something that

Re: Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-25 Thread David Nyman
Mark: Accepting broadly your summary up to this point... MP: But I have to *challenge you to clarify* whether what I write next really ties in completely with what you are thinking. DN: My seconds will call on you! MP: Consciousness is something we know personally, and through

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-24 Thread David Nyman
On 23/06/07, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: RS: Perhaps you are one of those rare souls with a foot in each camp. That could be be very productive! I hope so! Let's see... RS: This last post is perfectly lucid to me. Phew!! Well, that's a good start. RS: I hope I've answered

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-24 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: On 23/06/07, *Russell Standish* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: RS: Perhaps you are one of those rare souls with a foot in each camp. That could be be very productive! I hope so! Let's see... RS: This last post is perfectly lucid to me.

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-24 Thread Brent Meeker
OOPS! I accidentally hit the send button on the wrong copy. Here's what I intended to send below: David Nyman wrote: On 23/06/07, *Russell Standish* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: RS: Perhaps you are one of those rare souls with a foot in each camp. That could be be

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-24 Thread David Nyman
On 24/06/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: BM: I think I agree with your concern DN: Ah... BM: and I think the answer is that conscious implies conscious of something. For a computer or an animal to be conscious is really a relation to an environment. DN: Yes BM: So for a

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-23 Thread David Nyman
Hi John JM: You may ask about prejudice, shame (about goofed situations), humor (does a computer laugh?) boredom or preferential topics (you push for an astronomical calculation and the computer says: I rather play some Bach music now) Sexual preference (even disinterestedness is slanted), or

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-23 Thread Russell Standish
On Fri, Jun 22, 2007 at 02:06:14PM +0100, David Nyman wrote: RS: Terminology is terminology, it doesn't have a point of view. DN: This may be a nub of disagreement. I'd be interested if you could clarify. My characterisation of a narrative as '3-person' is when (ISTM) that it's an

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-23 Thread David Nyman
On 23/06/07, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: RS: I don't think I ever really found myself in disagreement with you. Rather, what is happening is symptomatic of us trying to reach across the divide of JP Snow's two cultures. You are obviously comfortable with the world of literary

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-23 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: On 23/06/07, *Brent Meeker* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: BM: But he could also switch from an account in terms of the machine level causality to an account in terms of the computed 'world'. In fact he could switch back and forth. Causality in

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-23 Thread David Nyman
On 23/06/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: BM: But he could also switch from an account in terms of the machine level causality to an account in terms of the computed 'world'. In fact he could switch back and forth. Causality in the computed 'world' would have it's corresponding

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-23 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: Hi John JM: You may ask about prejudice, shame (about goofed situations), humor (does a computer laugh?) boredom or preferential topics (you push for an astronomical calculation and the computer says: I rather play some Bach music now) Sexual preference (even

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-23 Thread David Nyman
On 23/06/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: BM: Changing the description would be analogous to changing the reference frame or the names on a map. DN: I agree. BM: The two processes would still be parallel, not orthogonal. DN: But the inference I draw from your points above is that

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-23 Thread Russell Standish
On Sat, Jun 23, 2007 at 03:58:39PM +0100, David Nyman wrote: On 23/06/07, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: RS: I don't think I ever really found myself in disagreement with you. Rather, what is happening is symptomatic of us trying to reach across the divide of JP Snow's two

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-22 Thread David Nyman
On 21/06/07, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: RS: It seems you've miscontrued my bashing, sorry about that. I was, perhaps somewhat colourfully, meaning extracting some meaning. Since your prose (and often Colin's for that matter) often sounds like gibberish to me, I have to work at it,

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-22 Thread John Mikes
Dear David. do not expect from me the theoretical level of technicality-talk er get from Bruno: I talk (and think) common sense (my own) and if the theoretical technicalities sound strange, I return to my thinking. That's what I got, that's what I use (plagiarized from the Hungarian commi joke:

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-21 Thread Russell Standish
On Thu, Jun 21, 2007 at 12:45:43PM +1000, Colin Hales wrote: OK, so by necessary primitive, you mean the syntactic or microscopic layer. But take this away, and you no longer have emergence. See endless discussions on emergence - my paper, or Jochen Fromm's book for instance. Does this

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-21 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 19, 12:31 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Interaction is in terms of fields - electromagnetic for most of our everyday examples. The fields themselves are emergent effects from virtual boson exchange. Now how is this related to sensing exactly? (Other than sensing being

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-21 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: On Jun 19, 12:31 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Interaction is in terms of fields - electromagnetic for most of our everyday examples. The fields themselves are emergent effects from virtual boson exchange. Now how is this related to sensing exactly?

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-21 Thread John Mikes
David wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Jun 21, 2007 2:31 PM David, you are still too mild IMO. You wrote: ... there is a mathematical formalism in which interaction is modelled in terms of 'fields'. I would say: we call 'fields' what seems to be callable 'interaction' upon the outcome of certain

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-21 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 21, 8:24 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Sounds like the sign is already up and it reads, Participatorily intuit the magic of the de-formalized ding an sich. I'd be happy with that sign, if you substituted a phrase like 'way of being' for 'magic'. There is no analogy between

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-21 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 21, 8:42 pm, John Mikes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: David, you are still too mild IMO. I try not to be churlish. I like your quest for de-formalized participants (like e.g. energy?) Not sure - can you say more? The 'matches' are considered WITHIN the aspects included into the model,

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-21 Thread Russell Standish
On Thu, Jun 21, 2007 at 08:44:54PM -, David Nyman wrote: There is no analogy between the two cases, because Russell seeks to pull the entire 1-person rabbit, complete with 'way of being', out of a hat that contains only 3-person formalisations. This is magic with a vengeance. You assume

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-21 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 21, 1:45 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You assume way too much about my motives here. I have only been trying to bash some meaning out of the all too flaccid prose that's being flung about at the moment. I will often employ counterexamples simply to illustrate points

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-21 Thread Russell Standish
On Fri, Jun 22, 2007 at 12:22:31AM -, David Nyman wrote: On Jun 21, 1:45 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You assume way too much about my motives here. I have only been trying to bash some meaning out of the all too flaccid prose that's being flung about at the

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-20 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 20, 3:35 am, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Methinks you 'get it'. You are far more eloquent than I am, but we talk of the same thing.. Thank you Colin. 'Eloquence' or 'gibberish'? Hmm...but let us proceed... where I identify ??? as a necessary primitive and comment that

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-20 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 5, 3:12 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Personally I don' think we can be *personally* mistaken about our own consciousness even if we can be mistaken about anything that consciousness could be about. I agree with this, but I would prefer to stop using the term

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-20 Thread Colin Hales
down a wys.. === Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Jun 17, 2007 at 03:47:19PM +1000, Colin Hales wrote: Hi, RUSSEL All I can say is that I don't understand your distinction. You have introduced a new term necessary primitive - what on earth is

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-19 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Jun 17, 2007 at 11:17:50PM -, David Nyman wrote: All this has massive implications for issues of will (free or otherwise), suffering, software uploading of minds, etc., etc. - which I've indicated in other posts. Consequently, I'd be really interested in your response, because

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-19 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 19, 5:09 am, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: David, I was unable to perceive a question in what you just wrote. I haven't a response, since (sadly) I was unable to understand what you were talking about. :( Really? I'm surprised, but words can indeed be very slippery in

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-19 Thread Russell Standish
On Tue, Jun 19, 2007 at 09:40:59AM -, David Nyman wrote: On Jun 19, 5:09 am, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: David, I was unable to perceive a question in what you just wrote. I haven't a response, since (sadly) I was unable to understand what you were talking about. :(

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-19 Thread Mark Peaty
matter. (NOTE: Please do not make the mistake that sensors - peripheral affect - are equivalent to qualia.) My original solution to Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious? stands. The computer must have a qualia-depiction of its external world

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious? - this looks best in fixed space font

2007-06-19 Thread Mark Peaty
my a/, b/, c/, look terrible in variable spaced font, they were prepared and sent in fixed font but the message I got back put them in variable spacing and so out of alignment. Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ Mark Peaty wrote: [Grin] I just

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-19 Thread John Mikes
configureed like it appears when we use qualia themselves to explore itcortical brain matter. (NOTE: Please do not make the mistake that sensors - peripheral affect - are equivalent to qualia.) My original solution to Re: How would a computer know if it were

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-19 Thread Colin Hales
Dear David, (see below.. I left your original text here... = 4) Belief in 'magical emergence' qualitative novelty of a kind utterly unrelated to the componentry. Hi Colin I think there's a link here with the dialogue in the 'Asifism'

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-18 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 14, 7:19 pm, David Nyman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Kant saw this clearly in terms of his 'windowless monads', but these, separated by the 'void', indeed had to be correlated by divine intervention, since (unaware of each other) they could not interact. Er, no he didn't. Leibniz did,

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-18 Thread John Mikes
it appears when we use qualia themselves to explore itcortical brain matter. (NOTE: Please do not make the mistake that sensors - peripheral affect - are equivalent to qualia.) My original solution to Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious? stands. The computer must have

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-17 Thread Brent Meeker
Colin Hales wrote: Hi, RUSSEL All I can say is that I don't understand your distinction. You have introduced a new term necessary primitive - what on earth is that? But I'll let this pass, it probably isn't important. COLIN Oh no you don't!! It matters. Bigtime... Take away the

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-17 Thread Colin Hales
Hi Quentin, What is the kind of universe we must live in if the electromagnetic field structure of the brain delivers qualia? A. It is NOT the universe depicted by the qualia (atoma, molecules, cells...). It is the universe whose innate capacity to deliver qualia is taken advantage of when

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-17 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 17, 6:47 am, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Magical emergence is when but claim Y exists but you can't identify an X. Such as: Take away the X: No qualia but thenyou claim qualia result from 'information complexity' or 'computation' or 'function' and you fail to say what

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-17 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 17, 2:33 am, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You're obviously suggesting single neurons have qualia. Forgive me for being a little sceptical of this suggestion... Russell, this is daft! Surely the argument is getting completely lost in the terminology here. What on earth

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-17 Thread Colin Hales
Dear Brent, If you had the most extravagent MRI machine in history, which trapped complete maps of all electrons, neuclei and any photons and then plotted them out - you would have a 100% complete, scientifically acquired publishable description and in that description would be absolutely no

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-17 Thread Brent Meeker
Colin Hales wrote: Dear Brent, If you had the most extravagent MRI machine in history, which trapped complete maps of all electrons, neuclei and any photons and then plotted them out - you would have a 100% complete, scientifically acquired publishable description and in that description

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-17 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Jun 17, 2007 at 03:47:19PM +1000, Colin Hales wrote: Hi, RUSSEL All I can say is that I don't understand your distinction. You have introduced a new term necessary primitive - what on earth is that? But I'll let this pass, it probably isn't important. COLIN Oh no you don't!!

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-16 Thread Colin Hales
advantage of when configureed like it appears when we use qualia themselves to explore itcortical brain matter. (NOTE: Please do not make the mistake that sensors - peripheral affect - are equivalent to qualia.) My original solution to Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-16 Thread Quentin Anciaux
On Sunday 17 June 2007 02:02:28 Colin Hales wrote: What is the kind of universe we must live in if the electromagnetic field structure of the brain delivers qualia? A. It is NOT the universe depicted by the qualia (atoma, molecules, cells...). It is the universe whose innate capacity to

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-16 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Jun 17, 2007 at 10:02:28AM +1000, Colin Hales wrote: Hi, I am going to have to be a bit targetted in my responses I am a TAD whelmed at the moment. COLIN 4) Belief in 'magical emergence' qualitative novelty of a kind utterly unrelated to the componentry. RUSSEL

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-16 Thread Colin Hales
Hi, RUSSEL All I can say is that I don't understand your distinction. You have introduced a new term necessary primitive - what on earth is that? But I'll let this pass, it probably isn't important. COLIN Oh no you don't!! It matters. Bigtime... Take away the necessary primitive: no

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-15 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 14-juin-07, à 18:13, John Mikes a écrit : I wonder about Bruno's (omniscient) Lob-machine, how it handles a novelty. Did you receive my last mail? I quote below the relevant part. To be sure, there is a technical sense, in logic, of omniscience in which the lobian machines are

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-15 Thread Bruno Marchal
David, Tom, Stephen, I keep your posts and I will comment them the week after the next one. I have also to finish a post for Stephen Paul King about bisimulation and identity. I'm out of my office the whole next week. I hope my mail-box will survive :) Best Regards, Bruno Le 15-juin-07, à

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-14 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 14, 3:47 am, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: 4) Belief in 'magical emergence' qualitative novelty of a kind utterly unrelated to the componentry. Hi Colin I think there's a link here with the dialogue in the 'Asifism' thread between Bruno and me. I've been reading Galen

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-14 Thread John Mikes
in the above sentence and it is the same old circularity that endlessly haunts discussions like this (see the dialog with Russel). In dealing with the thread Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious? my proposition was that successful _novel_ technology i.e. a entity

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-14 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 14, 4:46 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Of course all that is true, but it doesn't explain why neurons in the cortex are the ones giving rise to qualia rather than other neurons or indeed peripheral sense organs. Well, you might as well ask why the engine drives the

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-14 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 15/06/07, David Nyman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Jun 14, 4:46 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Of course all that is true, but it doesn't explain why neurons in the cortex are the ones giving rise to qualia rather than other neurons or indeed peripheral sense organs.

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-14 Thread David Nyman
On Jun 15, 1:13 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: What do we lose if we say that it is organisation which is intrinsically capable of sense-action, but it takes a substantial amount of organisation of the right sort to in order to give rise to consciousness? This drops the

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-13 Thread Colin Hales
biosphere' therefore 'The biosphere is conscious' RUSSEL Perhaps so, but not from me. To return to your original claim: COLIN Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious? Easy. The computer would be able to go head to head with a human in a competition. The competition? Do science

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-13 Thread Russell Standish
On Thu, Jun 14, 2007 at 10:23:38AM +1000, Colin Hales wrote: COLIN It may be technically OK then, but I would say the use of the word 'creativity' is unwise if you wish to unambiguously discuss evolution to a wide audience. As I said... COLIN I don't think we need a new wordI'll

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-13 Thread Colin Hales
Hi Stathis, Colin The bogus logic I detect in posts around this area... 'Humans are complex and are conscious' 'Humans were made by a complex biosphere' therefore 'The biosphere is conscious' Stathis That conclusion is spurious, but it is the case that non-conscious

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-13 Thread Colin Hales
Hi, COLIN I don't think we need a new wordI'll stick to the far less ambiguous term 'organisational complexity', I think. the word creativity is so loaded that its use in general discourse is bound to be prone to misconstrual, especially in any discussion which purports to be assessing

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 14/06/07, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Colin This point is poised on the cliff edge of loaded word meanings and their use with the words 'sufficient' and 'necessary'. By technology I mean novel artifacts resulting from the trajectory of causality including human scientists. By

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-13 Thread Russell Standish
On Thu, Jun 14, 2007 at 12:47:58PM +1000, Colin Hales wrote: RUSSEL What sort of misconstruals do you mean? I'm interested... 'organisational complexity' does not capture the concept I'm after. COLIN 1) Those associated with religious 'creation' myths - the creativity ascribed to an

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-13 Thread Colin Hales
haunts discussions like this (see the dialog with Russel). In dealing with the thread Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious? my proposition was that successful _novel_ technology i.e. a entity comprised of matter with a function not previously observed and that resulted

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 12/06/07, Colin Hales [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The bogus logic I detect in posts around this area... 'Humans are complex and are conscious' 'Humans were made by a complex biosphere' therefore 'The biosphere is conscious' That conclusion is spurious, but it is the case that non-coscious

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-12 Thread Russell Standish
' Perhaps so, but not from me. To return to your original claim: Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious? Easy. The computer would be able to go head to head with a human in a competition. The competition? Do science on exquisite novelty that neither party had encountered. (More

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-11 Thread Colin Hales
Hi again, Russel: I'm sorry, but you worked yourself up into an incomprehensible rant. Is evolution creative in your view or not? If it is, then there is little point debating definitions, as we're in agreement. If not, then we clearly use the word creative in different senses, and perhaps

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-10 Thread Russell Standish
On Fri, Jun 08, 2007 at 10:03:16AM +1000, Colin Hales wrote: Russel I gave a counter example, that of biological evolution. Either you should demonstrate why you think biological evolution is uncreative, or why it is conscious. Colin You have proven my point again. It is not a

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-08 Thread Mark Peaty
as hominem = With, em, respect, I have to say that this thread has not made a lot of sense. SP: 'This just confirms that there is no accounting for values or goals rationally.' MP: In other words _Evolution does not have goals._ Evolution is a conceptual framework we use to make sense of the

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-07 Thread marc . geddes
On Jun 7, 3:54 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Evolution has not had a chance to take into account modern reproductive technologies, so we can easily defeat the goal reproduce, and see the goal feed as only a means to the higher level goal survive. However, *that* goal is

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-07 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Hi, 2007/6/7, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]: On Jun 7, 3:54 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Evolution has not had a chance to take into account modern reproductive technologies, so we can easily defeat the goal reproduce, and see the goal feed as only a means

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-07 Thread marc . geddes
On Jun 7, 7:50 pm, Quentin Anciaux [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I have to disagree, if human goals were not tied to evolution goals then human should not have proliferated. Quentin- Hide quoted text - Well of course human goals are *tied to* evolution's goals, but that doesn't mean they're

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 07/06/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Evolution doesn't care about the survival of individual organisms directly, the actual goal of evolution is only to maximize reproductive fitness. If you want to eat a peice of chocolate cake, evolution explains why you like the taste,

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-07 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, 2007/6/7, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]: On Jun 7, 3:54 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Evolution has not had a chance to take into account modern reproductive technologies, so we can easily defeat the goal reproduce, and see the goal

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-07 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 07/06/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Evolution doesn't care about the survival of individual organisms directly, the actual goal of evolution is only to maximize reproductive

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-07 Thread Johnathan Corgan
Brent Meeker wrote: The top level goal implied by evolution would be to have as many children as you can raise through puberty. Avoiding death should only be a subgoal. It should go a little further than puberty--the accumulated wisdom of grandparents may significantly enhance the survival

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 08/06/07, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The top level goal implied by evolution would be to have as many children as you can raise through puberty. Avoiding death should only be a subgoal. Yes, but evolution doesn't have an overseeing intelligence which figures these things out,

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-07 Thread Colin Hales
Colin like the functionality of a scientist without involving ALL the functionality (especially qualia) of a scientist must be based on assumptions - assumptions I do not make. Russel I gave a counter example, that of biological evolution. Either you should demonstrate why you think

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-06 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 06/06/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Evolution could be described as a perpetuation of the basic program, survive, and this has maintained its coherence as the top level axiom of all biological systems over billions of years. Evolution thus seems to easily, and without

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-06 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 07/06/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Nope. You are confusing the goal of evolutions ('survive, feed, reproduce') with human goals. Our goals as individuals are not the goals of evolution. Evolution explains *why* we have the preferences we do, but this does not mean that

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-05 Thread Torgny Tholerus
Tom Caylor skrev: I think that IF a computer were conscious (I don't believe it is possible), then the way we could know it is conscious would not be by interviewing it with questions and looking for the right answers. We could know it is conscious if the computer, on its own, started

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-05 Thread marc . geddes
On Jun 5, 6:50 pm, Torgny Tholerus [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: public static void main(String[] a) { println(Sometimes I get this strange and wonderful feeling); println(that I am 'special' in some way.); println(I feel that what I am doing really is significant);

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