RE: Immortality

2001-10-11 Thread Marchal

Charles Goodwin wrote:

 -Original Message-
 From: Brent Meeker [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
 Sent: Wednesday, 10 October 2001 2:23 a.m.

 But then why do you say that a duplicate of your brain processes in a
 computer would not be conscious.  You seem to be
 discriminating between
 a biological duplicate and a silicon duplicate.

The use of the word 'duplicate' seems contentious to me. The question is 
whether you *can* duplicate the processes in the brain at a
suitable level of abstraction, and whether (if you can) such a duplicate 
would be conscious. I don't think anyone knows the answer
to this (yet) !


To answer yes to that question is exactly what I mean by the 
comp *hypothesis*.

The comp hypothesis is the hypothesis that there exist a level of
digital functional description of myself such that I can survive through
a substitution made at that level.
The practitionners of comp are those who say yes to their 
digital-specialist doctor.

It is an hypothesis that has the curious property of entailing its
own necessarily hypothetical character. Comp entails no one will *never*
know it to be necessarily true. 

It comp is true, no consistent machines will ever prove it.

The honest doctor does never assure the succes, and confesses betting
on a level (+ probable other more technical bets for sure).

If you meet someone pretending knowing he/she or you are machine,
you better run!

The real question is: will the consistent machines remains consistent
by betting on it?

Suggestion: derive the physics from comp, compare with
empirical physics. Judge. 

If comp is true there is a danger for the practicionners: having 
survive so many times, having said and resaid yes to their digital 
brain specialist surgeon, and having gone literaly through so much
digital nets that they begin to believe they know comp true. (Then they 
became inconsistent).

Comp entails some trip *near* inconsistencies. Actually I guess
that's life. The miracle occurs at each instant. (Not only at
the mechanist hospital). Well with comp the fall into inconsistency
*can* occur at each instant too.

Bruno


PS The reasoning I propose does not depend on the level of
substitution. Only that it exists. You can choose the universal
wave function as a description of your brain (low level), or
approximation of concentration of chemicals (high level), 
or disposition of neural dynamics (higher level)
...
...
... or the bible (very very high level). By the bible I mean
Boolos 1993 of course :-). My thesis in a nutshell is that FOR is
a missing chapter of that book. FOR and other everything efforts.

The book bears about what self-referentially correct machines can 
say, and cannot say, about themselves and about their (necessarily 
hypothetical) consistent extensions.It's The manual of machine's 
psychology (my term, sure). If you don't know logic, here is
a shortcut: 
Jeffrey: Logic, its scope and limit.
Boolos and Jeffrey: Computability and Logic
Boolos 1993.

Or Boolos 1979, it is lighter and easier to digest.

And recall Smullyan's Forever Undecided.
You told me Smullyan is your favorite philosopher, 
or was I dreaming?






RE: Immortality

2001-10-11 Thread Charles Goodwin



Quick 
reply as usual 'cos I'm at work! :-)

But 
surely the level of substitution would be non-fundamental, i.e. above the level 
of matter (Whatever that is or isn't) and hence would be a *simulation* of a 
person? I don't understand how one survives through the substitution (or perhaps 
I've misunderstood how the substitution is done) ?

Does 
this have anything to do with the multiverse being thought of as a the output of 
a huge (but simple) computation?

I 
guess I'm revealingmy fundamental ignorance here...

Charles

PS no 
you're not dreaming, I did say that (perhaps more on the basis of "The Tao is 
Silent" and "5000BC" than "Forever Undecided")


  -Original Message-From: Marchal 
  [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]Sent: Friday, 12 October 2001 8:20 
  a.m.To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; 
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: RE: 
  ImmortalityCharles Goodwin wrote: 
  -Original Message- From: Brent Meeker 
  [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Wednesday, 10 October 2001 2:23 
  a.m. But then why do you say that a duplicate of your 
  brain processes in a computer would not be conscious. You 
  seem to be discriminating between a biological 
  duplicate and a silicon duplicate.The use of the word 
  'duplicate' seems contentious to me. The question is whether you *can* 
  duplicate the processes in the brain at asuitable level of 
  abstraction, and whether (if you can) such a duplicate would be 
  conscious. I don't think anyone knows the answerto this (yet) 
  !To answer "yes" to that question is exactly what I mean by the 
  comp *hypothesis*.The comp hypothesis is the hypothesis that there 
  exist a level ofdigital functional description of myself such that I can 
  survive througha substitution made at that level.The practitionners of 
  comp are those who say yes to their digital-specialist doctor.It 
  is an hypothesis that has the curious property of entailing itsown 
  necessarily hypothetical character. Comp entails no one will *never*know 
  it to be necessarily true. It comp is true, no consistent machines 
  will ever prove it.The honest doctor does never assure the succes, and 
  confesses bettingon a level (+ probable other more technical bets for 
  sure).If you meet someone pretending knowing he/she or you are 
  machine,you better run!The real question is: will the consistent 
  machines remains consistentby betting on it?Suggestion: derive 
  "the" physics from comp, compare withempirical physics. Judge. If 
  comp is true there is a danger for the practicionners: having survive so 
  many times, having said and resaid yes to their digital brain specialist 
  surgeon, and having gone "literaly" through so muchdigital nets that they 
  begin to believe they know comp true. (Then they became 
  inconsistent).Comp entails some trip *near* inconsistencies. Actually 
  I guessthat's life. The miracle occurs at each instant. (Not only 
  atthe mechanist hospital). Well with comp the fall into 
  inconsistency*can* occur at each instant too.BrunoPS 
  The reasoning I propose does not depend on the level ofsubstitution. Only 
  that it exists. You can choose the universalwave function as a description 
  of your brain (low level), orapproximation of concentration of chemicals 
  (high level), or disposition of neural dynamics (higher 
  level). or the bible (very very high level). By the bible 
  I meanBoolos 1993 of course :-). My thesis in a nutshell is that FOR 
  isa missing chapter of that book. FOR and other everything 
  efforts.The book bears about what self-referentially correct machines 
  can say, and cannot say, about themselves and about their (necessarily 
  hypothetical) consistent extensions.It's The manual of machine's 
  psychology (my term, sure). If you don't know logic, here isa 
  shortcut: Jeffrey: Logic, its scope and limit.Boolos and Jeffrey: 
  Computability and LogicBoolos 1993.Or Boolos 1979, it is lighter 
  and easier to digest.And recall Smullyan's "Forever Undecided".You 
  told me Smullyan is your favorite philosopher, or was I 
dreaming?


Re: Immortality

2001-10-10 Thread Marchal

Brent Meeker wrote:

But then why do you say that a duplicate of your brain processes in a
computer would not be conscious.  You seem to be discriminating between
a biological duplicate and a silicon duplicate. 

I have never say that. A duplicate of me (at the right level which exists
with the comp hyp) would be as conscious as me.

What I do have said somewhere (and I guess the misunderstanding comes
from that) is that a computer cannot be conscious, nor can a brain, nor
can any piece of matter (if that exists at all). Only a person, which
by comp is immaterial, can be conscious. I was (in some context) 
preventing
the Searle error consisting in believing that I am a brain, instead
of the more correct I have a brain which follows by comp.
Only latter in the reasoning will substancial matter disappear too, so
that the brain itself will appear somehow immaterial.

I suggest you reread the UDA where I explicitely use the fact that
not only a duplicate of me in a computer would be conscious, but even
the many duplicate of me in arithmetic are conscious. That is why
my next future depend on all computations existing in the arithmetical
plato heaven.

I'm glad you ask question. Don't hesitate, I am aware that some
answer to some post can put doubt on some other answer to other
post (either by lack of pedagogy from my part, or just because
some question are very contextual).

But of course with comp a duplicate of me with silicon, or even
with pebbles and toilet paper or with the people of China or
whatever could make me conscious, and this even if it take
one billion year for each instruction; I cannot be aware of the
delays ...

Bruno




Re: Immortality

2001-10-10 Thread Brent Meeker

Hello Marchal

On 10-Oct-01, Marchal wrote:
 Brent Meeker wrote:
 
 But then why do you say that a duplicate of your brain processes in a
 computer would not be conscious. You seem to be discriminating
 between a biological duplicate and a silicon duplicate.
 
 I have never say that. A duplicate of me (at the right level which
 exists with the comp hyp) would be as conscious as me.
 
 What I do have said somewhere (and I guess the misunderstanding comes
 from that) is that a computer cannot be conscious, nor can a brain,
 nor can any piece of matter (if that exists at all). Only a person,
 which by comp is immaterial, can be conscious. 

OK, I understand - I think.  But as I understand your ontology,
everything is immaterial - even matter.  So the question is, are there
consciousness' that are not associated with material things.  Can there
be disembodied consciousness as supposed by mystics and people who have
OBE's (out of body experiences)?

I was (in some context)
 preventing
 the Searle error consisting in believing that I am a brain,
 instead of the more correct I have a brain which follows by comp.
 Only latter in the reasoning will substancial matter disappear too,
 so that the brain itself will appear somehow immaterial.
 
 I suggest you reread the UDA where I explicitely use the fact that
 not only a duplicate of me in a computer would be conscious, but even
 the many duplicate of me in arithmetic are conscious. That is why
 my next future depend on all computations existing in the arithmetical
 plato heaven.

I'm not sure I grasp the concept of duplicates in arithmetic. 
Arithmetic is abstract and immaterial.  There can be duplicate
representations of 2+2=4 but I don't see how there can be duplicate
facts in Platonia corresponding to 2+2=4. As an immaterial fact of
logic it can't be duplicated because there can be no distinction
between two instances of it.

Brent Meeker
 The human mind did not evolve in order to create a race of
  philosophers or scientists   
  --- Bainbridge




Re: Immortality

2001-10-09 Thread Marchal

Brent Meeker wrote:


OK, I think I understand this.  You are making the point that
duplication of consciousness entails the inability to predict the
sequence of conscious experience.


Exactly.


The indeterminism comes from the fact that
  1) You can 3-duplicate a 3-person (with comp).
  2) you cannot 3-duplicate a 1-person, that is, from the point of
 view of the person, that person feels like staying one and unique, in
 front of ZERO *or* in front of ONE.
 
 OK?

No, (2) seems a cheat to me.  ...from the point of view of the person,
that person feels.. already assumes there is only one person; ...


After the duplication there are two persons. I should have written

  2) you cannot 3-duplicate a 1-person, that is, from the point of
 view of *each* person, they feels like staying one and unique, in
 front of ZERO *or* in front of ONE.


 ...so it
cannot be used as an argument that the person is not duplicated ( that
you cannot 3-duplicate a 1-person) on pain of circularity. 

What I say is just the trivial (with comp!) fact that if you 3-duplicate
me, my feeling of integrity and uniqueness will remain intact. My
1-person has not been duplicated or divided, although I will, like my
doppelganger, face a 3-version of myself. My term were perhaps not
adequate.

 That the
...person feels like staying one and unique... is ambiguous and
irrelevant.  It's ambiguous because it is not clear whether you are
asserting it of the person before duplication or of the persons after
the duplication. 

It was after the duplication. I ask the question where you will 
to be (between the 0-room or the 1-room) *before* the duplication, but the
question bear on the feeling *after* the duplication.
It is the same with a quantum superposition state. If you look at a
cat state like (Idead  + Ialive), you *will* feel like seeing a
cat dead or seing a cat alive, altough from a 3-schroedinger-equation
point of view you will be both. With the MWI, the probabilities arises
in a similar way.


It's irrelevant because whatever the person(s) feel
is consistent with the 1-persons being 3-duplicated (if I understand
this 1- 3- terminology).


You can say that. Sorry for the ambiguous expression duplication of the
1-person. It is perhaps preferable to say that a duplication is always
a 3-duplication (a duplication of the body). The 1-person can be
considered as duplicated, from a third person POV when interroging the
duplicated people, but what is important here is to realise that *from the
point of view of the two duplicated people* they does not feel has having
been duplicated. 


OK, as I understand your ontology it is something like:

   mathematics-computation-consciousness-material


Yes. Although I would say comp (or even QM) does not give choice
here (cf UDA or movie graph).


But this seems to still leave the problems of dualism because it allows
that a consciousness (e.g. mine) can be generated without any
associated material (e.g. a brain) and also that consciousnesses can
generate another brain (e.g. duplicate of mine) with no associated
consciousness.  


Not at all. The other brain will be able to manifest consciousness
like the original one.


I take it that this is the 'indeterminism' you
illustrate by the Washington/Moscom duplication experiment.  I had
never been able to understand what indeterminism you referred to until
now.  


This astonish me because in some older post you have come to
the conclusion that, from the 1-person point of view, self-duplication
was equivalent to throwing a (perfect) coin.


Now I see that you suppose that the original consciousness will
go into one of the duplicates and the other will be void of
consciousness.  Is this correct?


No. Both will be conscious (with comp). But both will feel like
the consciousness has gone into one of the duplicates (himself)
and not the other. You (one of the YOUs) will feel the consciousness
in some private way and only be able to attribute consciousness to 
the 

I will try to no more use the expression 1-person duplication
which is indeed misleading. To sum up, if you ask me before
my duplication if I will feel, after the duplication, being
in room-zero or in room-one, I will answer (before the dup) that
I don't know, that I am maximally ignorant about that.
After the duplication, one of me will say I am in room-zero but
aknowledges this as one bit of information, and the other will
say I am in room-one and aknowledges also that event gives him
one bit of information. OK?

Bruno





RE: Immortality

2001-10-09 Thread Charles Goodwin

 -Original Message-
 From: Brent Meeker [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
 Sent: Wednesday, 10 October 2001 2:23 a.m.

 But then why do you say that a duplicate of your brain processes in a
 computer would not be conscious.  You seem to be
 discriminating between
 a biological duplicate and a silicon duplicate.

The use of the word 'duplicate' seems contentious to me. The question is whether you 
*can* duplicate the processes in the brain at a
suitable level of abstraction, and whether (if you can) such a duplicate would be 
conscious. I don't think anyone knows the answer
to this (yet) !

Charles




Re: Immortality

2001-10-09 Thread Brent Meeker

Hello Marchal

On 09-Oct-01, Marchal wrote:
 Brent Meeker wrote:
...
 But this seems to still leave the problems of dualism because it
 allows that a consciousness (e.g. mine) can be generated without any
 associated material (e.g. a brain) and also that consciousnesses can
 generate another brain (e.g. duplicate of mine) with no associated
 consciousness.
 
 
 Not at all. The other brain will be able to manifest consciousness
 like the original one.

But then why do you say that a duplicate of your brain processes in a
computer would not be conscious.  You seem to be discriminating between
a biological duplicate and a silicon duplicate. 

Brent Meeker
  Poverty prevented me from believing that all is well in history and in
the world.  The sun taught me that history is not everything. 
  --- Albert Camus




RE: Immortality

2001-10-09 Thread Charles Goodwin

 -Original Message-
 From: Brent Meeker [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
 Sent: Wednesday, 10 October 2001 4:06 a.m.

 It was a hypothetical that Bruno used.  It's pretty certain nobody knows
 how to do it now and it might never be practical.  But if the
 processes, including the sensory ones, were duplicated I have
 no reason to think that it would not be conscious.  The contrary
 conclusion would seem to imply vitalism and magic.

The question is more whether there *is* a level of abstraction that can be skimmed off 
the biological substrate. Although I suppose
it would be possible (in theory) to simulate the behaviour of all the cells in the 
brain to arbitrary accuracy - if necessary at the
level of molecules, or atoms (I can't see you having to go any lower than that). And 
leaving aside any problems with speed and
memory, at *that* point it seems unlikely that you'd be able to argue the thing wasn't 
conscious.

Charles




Re: Immortality

2001-10-09 Thread steven porritt


Does this list have a moderator?

From: rwas [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Immortality
Date: Mon, 8 Oct 2001 22:08:37 -0700 (PDT)

  a few weeks ago. One of the interesting things I learned was that the
  reason many Christians can't accept the theory of evolution is that
  they
  have to believe all of mankind descended from Adam and Eve,
Adam is the mind, Eve is the soul.

This is a symbolic story of the descent of humanity.

The garden of eden is a place on the invisible. The fall was about
getting stuck in self and descending into such a vibrationally low
place (physical existence) the eating of the apple was about assuming
separation of god in consciousness.


  because
  that's why we share in the original sin,

We share in it cause we all signed up for the same crap.


  which explains why Jesus had
  to
  sacrifice himself for us.

No, it doesn't. Humanity was to in do course correct it's mistakes.
Because of unfortunate acceptance of council we accepted from some
unfortunate people, we continued to bury ourselves in misconceptions,
lies, and self judgment.

It is important to note that all the power that jesus-the-christ
demonstrated, we possess. The difference we use our power to keep
our consciousness buried and barely eek out an existence on the
fraction or power remaining.


  Yet there are also Christians who do accept
  the
  theory of evolution (the program didn't explain how they got around
  this
  problem)

Easy, god creates through evolution.


 so clearly Christianity is changing and adapting.

Christianity existed long long long before the coming of christ
in the form of Jesus the Christ.

YOu'd be very very suprised at what christians knew then and accepted
back in then.


Robert W.


__
Do You Yahoo!?
NEW from Yahoo! GeoCities - quick and easy web site hosting, just 
$8.95/month.
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_
Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp




Re: Immortality

2001-10-08 Thread rwas

 a few weeks ago. One of the interesting things I learned was that the
 reason many Christians can't accept the theory of evolution is that
 they
 have to believe all of mankind descended from Adam and Eve, 
Adam is the mind, Eve is the soul.

This is a symbolic story of the descent of humanity.

The garden of eden is a place on the invisible. The fall was about
getting stuck in self and descending into such a vibrationally low
place (physical existence) the eating of the apple was about assuming
separation of god in consciousness.


 because
 that's why we share in the original sin,

We share in it cause we all signed up for the same crap.


 which explains why Jesus had
 to
 sacrifice himself for us.

No, it doesn't. Humanity was to in do course correct it's mistakes.
Because of unfortunate acceptance of council we accepted from some
unfortunate people, we continued to bury ourselves in misconceptions,
lies, and self judgment.

It is important to note that all the power that jesus-the-christ
demonstrated, we possess. The difference we use our power to keep 
our consciousness buried and barely eek out an existence on the 
fraction or power remaining.


 Yet there are also Christians who do accept
 the
 theory of evolution (the program didn't explain how they got around
 this
 problem)

Easy, god creates through evolution.


so clearly Christianity is changing and adapting.

Christianity existed long long long before the coming of christ
in the form of Jesus the Christ.

YOu'd be very very suprised at what christians knew then and accepted
back in then.


Robert W.


__
Do You Yahoo!?
NEW from Yahoo! GeoCities - quick and easy web site hosting, just $8.95/month.
http://geocities.yahoo.com/ps/info1




Re: Immortality

2001-10-08 Thread Marchal

Brent Meeker wrote (out-of-line), about the comp indeterminism
(cf my last post to Juergen Schmidhuber):


You are wrong in asking for a single answer from two people. Ignore the
duplication.  Suppose I put Alice in one room and Bob in the other. 
Can I then ask, do 'you' see ONE or ZERO and get a sensible answer? ... 


No. You cannot answer a single 1-person question to two peoples at
once. I agree with that remark.


 ... Not unless I make it clear whether 'you' refers to Alice or to Bob. 


Of course.


Returning to the duplication experiment, as soon as you are duplicated
there is you-1 and you-2 and it no longer makes sense to address
questions to 'you'.


Yes, but I ask the question *before* the duplication. So I do ask the
1-person question to a single person, about its *future* experience.
 The comp ignorance is that that
person cannot be sure if he/she will feel being in front of ZERO or ONE
in his/her next future. Before the duplication you1 = you2, if you want.
Before the duplication you are in a state of maximal ignorance about
your personal future. Of course after the duplication, just looking
at the wall and seeing ZERO (or ONE) give you one bit of information
making it possible to distinguish yourself from your double.
The indeterminism is really a prediction-indeterminism. It is not
a form of identity-indeterminateness.
The indeterminism comes from the fact that 
  1) You can 3-duplicate a 3-person (with comp).
  2) you cannot 3-duplicate a 1-person, that is, from the point of view
of the person, that person feels like staying one and unique, in front
of ZERO *or* in front of ONE.

OK?

Bruno





Re: Immortality

2001-10-08 Thread juergen



Wei, of course you should not take it too seriously - 
e.g., some of the Great Programmers
in the nested universes are quite dumb devices indeed :-)

Juergen

http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/
http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/everything/html.html
http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/toesv2/

 From [EMAIL PROTECTED]  Mon Oct  8 01:48:39 2001
 Resent-Date: Sun, 7 Oct 2001 16:46:57 -0700
 Date: Sun, 7 Oct 2001 16:46:55 -0700
 From: Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Subject: Re: Immortality
 Mime-Version: 1.0
 Resent-Message-ID: z4VW03.0.ld1.mbEmx@mx1
 Resent-From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 X-Mailing-List: [EMAIL PROTECTED] archive/latest/3299
 X-Loop: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Resent-Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 
 On Fri, Sep 28, 2001 at 05:57:18PM +0200, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  But there _is_ a modern religion based on universal principles.
  More precisely, on universal computers.
  
  According to the Great Programmer Religion, the Great Programmer wrote a
  very short program that computes all computable universes.  One of them
  is ours.
 
 Juergen, are you really serious about this religion? I always thought the
 Great Programmer was just a pedagogical device to explain your theory.




Re: Immortality

2001-10-07 Thread Wei Dai

On Fri, Sep 28, 2001 at 05:57:18PM +0200, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 But there _is_ a modern religion based on universal principles.
 More precisely, on universal computers.
 
 According to the Great Programmer Religion, the Great Programmer wrote a
 very short program that computes all computable universes.  One of them
 is ours.

Juergen, are you really serious about this religion? I always thought the
Great Programmer was just a pedagogical device to explain your theory.




Re: Immortality

2001-10-07 Thread Wei Dai

On Fri, Sep 28, 2001 at 03:15:45PM +, K. S. Ryan wrote:
 Old school religions are losing market share to the modern world.
 But the modern world does not offer a unified system of beleif describing 
 our place in the universe. Contemporary truths are not packaged as a whole, 
 as a spiritual intellectual-emotional raison d'etre. Thus, while educated 
 modern worlders may not be convinced by old school religious beliefs, there 
 is not a modern unified system to replace them. Because we are human, we 
 think a lot, and need to know what the individual means to the whole. What 
 is our place in the cosmos? That is the question. And there is turbulance.

Our raison d'etre is that we have low algorithmic complexity. Not very
spiritual or emotional is it? That may not be the right answer, but
whatever answer science eventually arrives at is unlikely to be
emotionally satisfying. Trying to compete with established religions on an
emotional basis is completely hopeless. Of course on an intellectual basis
it'll be very sucessful, but only among a small group of people who are
capable of understanding it. 

Old school religions are not losing market share to the modern world,
they're losing market share to new school religions that are better
adapted in the new environment. I was watching the PBS program Evolution
a few weeks ago. One of the interesting things I learned was that the
reason many Christians can't accept the theory of evolution is that they
have to believe all of mankind descended from Adam and Eve, because
that's why we share in the original sin, which explains why Jesus had to
sacrifice himself for us. Yet there are also Christians who do accept the
theory of evolution (the program didn't explain how they got around this
problem) so clearly Christianity is changing and adapting.




Re: Immortality

2001-10-05 Thread Marchal

I wrote (to Juergen Schmidhuber):

Before going into such technics it would help us if you told
us what is wrong with the comp 1-person indeterminism
in the simple self-duplication experiment.
We discuss that before, but I am still not sure to
be able to make sense of your critics.

Rereading some of your post I know you do the 1/3 distinction.
But you don't believe in the comp-indeterminism.
Actually, from your second papers it seems you don't believe
in any form of indeterminism (neither physical nor psychological).

I really don't understand.

Let us try to be specific.
With comp you agree you survive annihilation and reconstitution.
(with probability one *relatively* to comp and a correct bet
on the substitution level, and a unique reconstitution).

So I cut you and paste you in *two* rooms, now, one with a ZERO 
painted on the wall, the other with a ONE painted on the wall.

I ask you to predict what will you be feeling immediately after
the pasting.

You cannot communicate you will see ONE on the wall. Because you
know the one of you who will see ZERO will accept the prediction
has been wrong (and I ask that communication with determinism should
convince ANY one).

You cannot communicate you will see ZERO on the wall. Same reason.

You cannot communicate you will see ZERO and you will see ONE.
Because neither of the two YOUs will see both the zero and one,
if the duplication has been done at the right level.

You cannot communicate you will see neither ZERO nor ONE, because in
that case you can no more accept comp, which says that you survive
self-cut and self pasting (independently in case of 
self-multiplication).

You cannot say the question is meaningless. With comp, you say
yes to the doctor, and it is meaningful to worried about possible
copy.

So, how is it that you talk like if you do have an algorithm
capable of telling you in advance what will be your personal
experience in a self-duplication experience.

I apologise insisting making precise the point
where we disagree, but we are both making the comp hypothesis,
and you are using it to defend determinism, and I try hard to
explain comp leads to an amazingly strong form of indeterminism.

My hypothesis is that although you do the 1/3 distinction, you
don't take into account that distinction in your TOE, and then you
are using implicitely a magical psycho-physico-parallelism for 
attaching first person experience to a single third person unique
computation.

Where am I wrong? 

Bruno




Re: Immortality

2001-10-04 Thread Marchal

Juergen Schmidhuber wrote

But there _is_ a modern religion based on universal principles.
More precisely, on universal computers.

I can give sense to that. I cannot give 3-sense to the word 
modern though, it is a typical (plural) first person expression,
which add nothing to a scientific or axiomatic  or 3-defensible
debate.


According to the Great Programmer Religion, the Great Programmer wrote a
very short program that computes all computable universes.  One of them
is ours.


So the Great Programmer is not even the UD. The UD, with Church Thesis,
wrote all programs and execute all programs. The problem consists in
explaining appearance of beliefs like our universe from possible
(consistent) inside point of views scattered in UD* (UD's work).


Some disciples of this religion find it plausible because the short
program is the simplest explanation of all observations. 


The UD is the shortest explanation then. Although a shallow one 
which only permits a (re)formulation of the mind body problem.
With comp the appearance of big bang and cosmos must be explained.
If you make the distinction between 1-person and 3-person you get
an absolute form of indeterminism (the self-duplication) making it
possible to define a measure on the consistent extensions, which,
I repeat are scattered in UD*.

You have still not explain to me how you predict your reasonably next
experience in the simple WM duplication. Nor, a fortiori, how the
1-person can take into account the delay of reconstitution
accessed by the UD (which is necessary to do if you want single out 
one program in UD* and one computation. With comp we must take all 
computations into consideration.
See http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3044.html for links to
more explanations.


Others find it increasingly plausible because our own, currently
quite primitive virtual realities are getting more sophisticated all
the time. We observe a speed-up factor of 10^6 every 20 years, possibly
10^30 in the ongoing century.  More and more people, especially kids, are
in regular contact with virtual realities, and to them the new religion
may seem just like a natural extrapolation.


Good argument, corresponding to a new version of the old
dream argument. Good argument for comp, but nocturnal dream
recall us also that certainty of being awake relatively to a
neighborhood does not entails that neighborhood is our true
neighborhood. Remembering dreams (especially the common non lucid
one) can help to anticipate the possibility of inconsistency ([]f,
A theorem of G* which is not a theorem of G, although G
proves t - []f). I mean []f is a typical true and anticipable
but non provable proposition by self-observing sound machines.
Both the thought experiences and their arithmetical
translations illustrates our necessary ignorance about which
sheaf of coherent computations we belong to.

Comp, without QM, entails strong form of non trivial 
indeterminacy and non-locality.

Look at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2855
for a purely arithmetical interpretation of Bell original
inequality (cf [] = godel provability predicate,
 = -[]-, p represent \Sigma_1 sentence (= UD accessible).
Is that inequality violated in the UTM mindscape? Open
question (although there are argument showing that it
would be quite astonishing that those inequalities are
not violated.

Before going into such technics it would help us if you told
us what is wrong with the comp 1-person indeterminism
in the simple self-duplication experiment.
We discuss that before, but I am still not sure to
be able to make sense of your critics.


Bruno




Re: Immortality

2001-09-28 Thread K. S. Ryan


Hello-

K. S. Ryan wrote:
  Religion is a system of beliefs describing our place in the cosmos.

RW:
Better go back and look up the word religion again.

KSR:
I'm pretty comfortable with the English language, but I looked it up anyway. 
I stand by my definition.

I've never found a spiritual system that did not proffess to tell the truth 
about existance from the macro to the micro. The role of religion is to 
explain universal truths, and ask that we act accordingly.

Prophets describe our place in the cosmos by explaining universal
principles. Fundamentalists of all sorts are in conflict with the modern 
world because universal principles are increasingly scientific, secular, and 
physically practical. Old school religions are losing market share to the 
modern world. But the modern world does not offer a unified system of belief 
describing our place in the universe.

RW:
I think this is an uneducated conclusion. That is if you continue to 
misusethe term religion in a consistent fashion.

KSR:
Uneducated? Au contraire! These are carefull observations, and commonly 
reflected by others. If you study this topic at all, you will have noticed 
consistant repetitions across many disciplines, i'e anthropology, political 
science, sociology, demographics...

RW:
The creation of old-world dogma was for the benefit of the young souls
that by virtue of their own mis-expression, demanded a harsh dogma and
religious expression to find their way back to god.

KSR:
No. Harsh dogma is originally a survival strategy. Ethics is the economics 
of self preservation. Jews and Moslems forbid eating pig because of 
parasites in the meat. The Golden Rule, do unto others as you would like to 
be done, is basic self preservation. Years later, original reasons for 
dogma become obsolete through sanitation or cultural evolution. 
Simultaneously, over time the prophets' messages ossify into rote ritual. 
Fundamentalists have lost the meaning behind the message. The wisdom of a 
prophet's words are in the background, not the surface. It is analogy. But 
the symbolism used to make the original point gets buried by lost context or 
archaic metaphores. And so fools cling to what is in their hand, which is 
the bald statement, bleached of symbolic truth.

RW:
The spiritual principles that these old school religions as you put it 
arebasedon are just as valid today as they were then. Similar in concept 
tosaying: electromagnetism wasjust as valid back then as it is today.

KSR:
Yes. Spiritual principles are eternal, if they are true in the first place.

RW:
-Those that cooperate and spontaneously express spiritual law out of love of 
others

KSR:
Agreed. Some people, probably most people, are unable to expand their self 
concept to include much of the world beyond themselves. The message of the 
prophets is that it is all you.

RW:
mostof these modern worlders are rebelling against the spiritual in favor 
of theself in theworld.

KSR:
Intelligent modern worlders don't rebell against the spiritual in favor of 
the self (though they will lapse, like anyone). But they may rebel against 
what doesnt make sense to them. It is hard to sell a 5,000 year old God to 
someone who knows rudimentary physics. Physicists who understand vast 
swathes of contemporary physics are sometimes so awed by the scale that they 
start to believe again in higher power. But it is rarely the same God that 
they left.

-Kevin


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Re: Immortality

2001-09-28 Thread K. S. Ryan


Hello-

Religion is a system of beliefs describing our place in the cosmos.

Tha basic premise of all religions is that we are best when we act in 
accordance with universal principles.

Prophets describe our place in the cosmos by explaining universal 
principles.

Fundamentalists of all sorts are in conflict with the modern world because 
universal principles are increasingly scientific, secular, and physically 
practical.

Old school religions are losing market share to the modern world.
But the modern world does not offer a unified system of beleif describing 
our place in the universe. Contemporary truths are not packaged as a whole, 
as a spiritual intellectual-emotional raison d'etre. Thus, while educated 
modern worlders may not be convinced by old school religious beliefs, there 
is not a modern unified system to replace them. Because we are human, we 
think a lot, and need to know what the individual means to the whole. What 
is our place in the cosmos? That is the question. And there is turbulance.

-Kevin

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Re: Immortality

2001-09-28 Thread juergen




But there _is_ a modern religion based on universal principles.
More precisely, on universal computers.

According to the Great Programmer Religion, the Great Programmer wrote a
very short program that computes all computable universes.  One of them
is ours.

Some disciples of this religion find it plausible because the short
program is the simplest explanation of all observations. 

Others find it increasingly plausible because our own, currently
quite primitive virtual realities are getting more sophisticated all
the time. We observe a speed-up factor of 10^6 every 20 years, possibly
10^30 in the ongoing century.  More and more people, especially kids, are
in regular contact with virtual realities, and to them the new religion
may seem just like a natural extrapolation.

Juergen Schmidhuber

http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/
http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/toesv2/
http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/everything/html.html



 From: K. S. Ryan [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2001 15:15:45

 Religion is a system of beliefs describing our place in the cosmos.
 
 Tha basic premise of all religions is that we are best when we act in 
 accordance with universal principles.
 
 Prophets describe our place in the cosmos by explaining universal 
 principles.
 
 Fundamentalists of all sorts are in conflict with the modern world because 
 universal principles are increasingly scientific, secular, and physically 
 practical.
 
 Old school religions are losing market share to the modern world.
 But the modern world does not offer a unified system of beleif describing 
 our place in the universe. Contemporary truths are not packaged as a whole, 
 as a spiritual intellectual-emotional raison d'etre. Thus, while educated 
 modern worlders may not be convinced by old school religious beliefs, there 
 is not a modern unified system to replace them. Because we are human, we 
 think a lot, and need to know what the individual means to the whole. What 
 is our place in the cosmos? That is the question. And there is turbulance.






Re: Immortality

2001-09-27 Thread rwas

 Also the personal religion question: what is religion? 

What man does to hide himself from himself.

definitely
 not the
 fable with the old bearded gentleman in the nightgown. 

Some alternate concepts on god in terms of observations (made by me)

-when a man wants his way with a beautiful woman, he wants the god in
 her. 

-the opposite sex is a physical shape for something that has no shape.

-when you are having sex with your partner, you are having sex with god

-all things embody the trinity principle in some form: mother, father,
  son principle/s. For anything to live, there must be a balance of all
  three in some expression. For humanity, it is seen externally as
  man, woman, and child. 

-when you feel pleasure or ecstasy, your consciousness is operating in
 heaven (while on earth)

-Jesus The Christ could raise the dead, because his consciousness
became
 one with the principles behind physical life (among other things)

-We are all the christ, we just don't know it. If we did, we could
 raise the dead and walk on water as well. We would no longer be 
 separate from the things around us (in consciousness)

-The spirit christ is consciousness.

-God is omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent

-The spirit Christ is god manifest in his creation



It's not my intent to be preachy, I just can't stand seeing people
embrace the old man in the white gown thing as the only explanation
of god and christ.

Robert W.





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RE: Immortality

2001-09-20 Thread rwas


--- Charles Goodwin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  -Original Message-
  From: rwas [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
  Sent: Saturday, 15 September 2001 3:08 p.m.
 
  Sequential, temporal,
  in-the-box thinking is not how to transcend the physical in my
 view.
 
 I think some of the people here would argue that you *can't*
 transcend the physical (or possibly the computational). I appreciate
 that that sounds very in-the-box, but if you look at the sort of
 thing physicists (who *tend* to be materialists - not always) have
 come up with in last 20-30 years, I'd say there has definitely been
 *some* jumping out of the box... including quite a lot by David
 Deutsch.
 
  In addition, if there is anything my own personal journey has
 taught me
  is that to breach boundaries in understanding, must discard
  preconceived notions. It would seem that if one were interested in
  truth, one adopt a realm of purely abstract thinking to find
 answers to
  such an esoteric question as consciousness. But what I feel is
  happening here is an attempt to force understanding to fit an
 almost
  certainly flawed initial assumption about existence.
 
 I agree. Every breakthrough in human thought has been at the expense
 of preconceived notions. Are you saying we *should* adopt a
 realm of purely abstract thinking to find answers to such an esoteric
 question as consciousness ? (If so I think a lot of the
 people here would agree - the approach using computationalism is VERY
 abstract).
 
 However - what I'm most interested to know is, what is the almost
 certainly flawed initial assumption about existence ?
 
 Charles
 

 That time is the fundamental basis for expression or state change:
   I've gone at length about my theories of timeless consciousness.
if you are interested, I can repost.

 Dimention: that a body must be the locus of computation, or the place 
   that consciousness resides,

 That the body is not simply a shape for an N-dimentional object that  
   intersects with 4-space, 

 That an observer is seperate from what he observes,

 cause-and-efect: that fliping a lightswitch causes the light to come  
   on..,  (sure, it looks that way, but are our observations flawed by
   by nature of being immersed in the system observed?)

 states of consciousness: for one, through my investigations I have
   found that a person dreams constantly, and typically can only recall
such events after having been asleep.

 There was a comment about discounting observations that cannot
  be duplicated in a common forum: ie., what one dreams cannot be
  proved or theorized upon because it cannot be analyized in the   
   physical...

   Since consciousness is an undefined quagmire in which everybody
includes whatever one's digestive tract dictates, I deny the use
of such in serious discussions. We can talk about the single
concepts of ideation  which  may or may not be included into
one's private consciousness concept. Neither am I impressed 
by the marvels of the psychology of the machine, especially
if it may include mystical fantasies (OOOPS: experiences).
Somewhere I seek a line between things to be taken seriously 
and the fantasy-fables. So, not wanting to open the door to the
Brothers Grimm or to Andersen,
I rest my case. Sorry, rwas, about your experiences.
  ...John Mikes

  At least that is my take on this opinion. I'd have to say that
this apears to be a defense of a personal religion than the defense
of an investigative method that discounts data for which has direct
bearing on the subject investigated. I'm appauled that one could
allow himself to attempt to develop a serious theory of consciouness
while aparently having no respect for the only source of information
and data on the phenomenon, which is the people that claim to posses
it.



There are documented cases of mystics altering their physiology through
concentration and providing outstanding exceptions to conclusions of
those bodily functions previously ruled to be impossible to manipulate
consciously.

If we claim to be lovers of truth by claiming to be scientists, we
should readily embrace truth and all roads to it and cast away all that
would seperate us from it.



Robert W.


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Re: immortality

2001-09-18 Thread jamikes


 But I'm still curious to know what you mean by I
 rest my case.

 Charles

In my post I was denying the experiences after death, knowable while still
living. Rwas was upset because of his alleged after death experiences. If
it turns out that they are imaginary - i.e. mystical - fantasies, I rest my
case because I am a sci-fi writer myself. One 'dreams' about past
knowledge, received e.g. in religion classes.

Bruno wrote:
About mystic experiences I tend to believe awareness or consciousness
 is sort of degree 1 mystic experiences, and  I would not be astonished
that the psychology of machine entails a vast number of variate possible
mystical experiences, but all belongs to G* minus G and would be
uncommunicable/unprovable (like consciousness).

Since consciousness is an undefined quagmire in which everybody includes
whatever one's digestive tract dictates, I deny the use of such in serious
discussions. We can talk about the single concepts of ideation  which may or
may not be included into one's private consciousness concept. Neither am I
impressed by the marvels of the psychology of the machine, especially if
it may include mystical fantasies (OOOPS: experiences). Somewhere I seek a
line between things to be taken seriously and the fantasy-fables.
So, not wanting to open the door to the Brothers Grimm or to Andersen,
I rest my case. Sorry, rwas, about your experiences.

John Mikes




re: immortality

2001-09-17 Thread Marchal

John Mikes wrote:

Somehow I missed rwas's reply detailing those 'experiences. Could anybody 
supply them to me? Or perhaps C. Goodwin himself who now wrote:

Mystic experiences of course. Experiences which have rendered
understanding which makes participating in the predominate discourse
found on this list very painful to endure. Sequential, temporal,
in-the-box thinking is not how to transcend the physical in my view.

Maybe this paragraph is the answer. In which case I rest my case.


It was not Goodwin's answer you quoted, but rwas's one.
So indeed that paragraph is the answer or part of the answer 
you seek.

About mystic experiences I tend to believe awareness or consciousness
 is sort of degree 1 mystic experiences, and  I would not be astonished
that the psychology of machine entails a vast number of variate possible
mystical experiences, but all belongs to G* minus G and would be
uncommunicable/unprovable (like consciousness).

But I am skeptical about *direct* use of mystic experiences *against*
attempts of third person communications among searchers.
(Note that there could be  positive inspirations from *any* personal
experience, mystic or not).


Bruno




RE: Immortality

2001-09-16 Thread Charles Goodwin

 -Original Message-
 From: rwas [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
 Sent: Saturday, 15 September 2001 3:08 p.m.

 Sequential, temporal,
 in-the-box thinking is not how to transcend the physical in my view.

I think some of the people here would argue that you *can't* transcend the physical 
(or possibly the computational). I appreciate
that that sounds very in-the-box, but if you look at the sort of thing physicists (who 
*tend* to be materialists - not always) have
come up with in last 20-30 years, I'd say there has definitely been *some* jumping out 
of the box... including quite a lot by David
Deutsch.

 In addition, if there is anything my own personal journey has taught me
 is that to breach boundaries in understanding, must discard
 preconceived notions. It would seem that if one were interested in
 truth, one adopt a realm of purely abstract thinking to find answers to
 such an esoteric question as consciousness. But what I feel is
 happening here is an attempt to force understanding to fit an almost
 certainly flawed initial assumption about existence.

I agree. Every breakthrough in human thought has been at the expense of preconceived 
notions. Are you saying we *should* adopt a
realm of purely abstract thinking to find answers to such an esoteric question as 
consciousness ? (If so I think a lot of the
people here would agree - the approach using computationalism is VERY abstract).

However - what I'm most interested to know is, what is the almost certainly flawed 
initial assumption about existence ?

Charles




RE: Immortality

2001-09-15 Thread Marchal

Charles Goodwin wrote:


 -Original Message-
 From: Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]

 Perhaps. But if you do that move, everyone is resurrected in
 everyone, and
 there is only one person in the multiverse. I don't know. James Higgo
 was more radical on this, he defended the idea of zero person.
 With just comp this issue is probably undecidable. I guess
 comp (perhaps
 QM too) can lead to a vast variety of incompatible but
 consistent point of
 view on those matter. Comp is compatible whith a lot of personal
 possible interpretations of what is identity. What is
 possible to prove
 with comp is the non normative principle according to which personal
 identity is *in part* necessarily a matter of personal opinion.
 What remains to do is to compute the real probabilities to
 backtrack with
 amnesia compare to the probability to quantum/comp-survive
 big injuries.
 I doubt we have currently the tools to do those computations.


I will be interested to know the results when you do!


The only result I get is that the measure 1 obeys sort of quantum
logic (like measure 1 in QM obeys Birkhof-von Neumann QL).


Of course the doctrine of reincarnation (it always seemed to me) 
only requires one soul - a bit like Feynman's one-electron
universe, it just zip-zags back and forth...

Yes. That is why comp could make altruism an egoist necessity.

Bruno




RE: Immortality

2001-09-14 Thread rwas

--- Charles Goodwin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  -Original Message-
  From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of rwas
  
  Eh? If I understood this statement then I must object. I have quite
 clear
  memories of before-death, during-death, and after-death. I realize 
  that within the context of the narrow communication style
 prevailent here that this 
  claim means nothing. But your statement  would seem to attempt
 rewrite my 
  experiences as false by default.
  
  I resent that.
 

Mystic experiences of course. Experiences which have rendered
understanding which makes participating in the predominate discourse
found on this list very painful to endure. Sequential, temporal,
in-the-box thinking is not how to transcend the physical in my view.

Further more, I notice that despite the ability for the participants
in these dialogs to be aware of different clinically demonstrated
states of conscious that no attempt to address any but the most
simplistic, limited views on consciousness.

In addition, if there is anything my own personal journey has taught me
is that to breach boundaries in understanding, must discard
preconceived notions. It would seem that if one were interested in
truth, one adopt a realm of purely abstract thinking to find answers to
such an esoteric question as consciousness. But what I feel is
happening here is an attempt to force understanding to fit an almost
certainly flawed initial assumption about existence.

One could easily discard any preconsceived notion about spirituality as
well and adopt a purely abstract playground for developing theories. It
is a simple matter then to test for fitness of a theory to observable
data. I say observable data, not conclusions derived from observable
data.


 That's very interesting. What experiences are you refering to?
 
 Charles
 


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Re: Immortality

2001-09-10 Thread rwas

Hello,

jamikes wrote:

 As much as I enjoyed last years's discussions in worldview speculations, I
 get frustrated by the lately emerged word-playing about concepts used in
 just different contents from the conventional.

  May I submit a (trivial) proof for immortality in this sense:

 Death (of others, meaning not only persons) is a 3rd person (fantasy?),
 either true or imagined. NOBODY ever experienced his/her own death and the
 time after such, so immortality is the only thing in consciousness.

Eh? If I understood this statement then I must object. I have quite clear
memories
of before-death, during-death, and after-death. I realize that within the
context
of the narrow communication style prevailant here that this claim means
nothing.
But your statement  would seem to attempt rewrite my experiences as false by
default.

I resent that.



 The
 world (experienceable worldview) does not include otherwise.

 To the forgotten things existing in another (branch of?) world:
 If I 'forgot' something: that dose not necessarily build another world of
 those things I forgot. Alzheimer patients are not the most efficient
 Creators.
 And please do not 'rationalize' about 'near death' and similar fantasies in
 this respect.

These statements *ignore* alternate forms of consciousness. It (in my opinion)
arogantly assumes that the consciousness emphasized for sequential thinking and

logic is the only perspective worth analyzying and building understanding upon.





 Excuse my out-of-topic remark to the topic.

 John Mikes

 - Original Message -
 From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Sunday, September 09, 2001 6:30 AM
 Subject: Re: Conventional QTI = False

 Hal Finney wrote:
  Saibal writes:
   According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you can
   also never forget anything. I don't believe  this because I know for a
   fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a
   long time ago.

The consciousness you are aware of cannot access the information. It does not
mean it's gone. This is a wreckless assumption.



 
  Right, but to make the same argument against QTI you'd have to say,
  you don't believe this because you have died.  But this is not possible.
  So the analogy is not as good as it looks.  You do exist in branches where
  you have forgotten things, as well as in branches where you remember them.

Sounds more like the spiritual model for consciousness. One simply assumes a
vehicle
for conscious expression and can express (remember etc) based on the
capabilites of
the vehicle while traveling along the landscape of conscious-all if you will.



 That is true, but I want to make the point that branches where I survive
 with memory loss have to be taken into account.

 In the case of a person suffering from a terminal disease, it is much more
 likely that he will survive in a branch where he was not diagnosed with the
 disease, than in a branch where the disease is magically cured. The latter
 possibility (conventional qti) can't be favoured above the first just
 because the surviving person is more similar to the original person.

 You could object that in the first case your consciousness is somehow
 transferred to a different person (you ``jump´´ to a different branch that
 separated from the dying branch before you were diagnosed), but I would say
 that the surviving person has the same consciousness  the original person
 would have if you cured his disease and erased all memory of having the
 disease.

Or you could stop assuming consciousness is sequential and limited to
simplistic
concepts of identity like: My name is joe and I'm the only expression of
awareness
of me there is since I'm not aware of anything else

Another blatently wreckless assumption.



 Saibal

Robert W.


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Re: Immortality

2001-09-10 Thread Marchal

Saibal Mitra wrote:

You could object that in the first case your consciousness is somehow
transferred to a different person (you ``jump´´ to a different branch that
separated from the dying branch before you were diagnosed), but I would say
that the surviving person has the same consciousness  the original person
would have if you cured his disease and erased all memory of having the
disease.

Perhaps. But if you do that move, everyone is resurrected in everyone, and
there is only one person in the multiverse. I don't know. James Higgo
was more radical on this, he defended the idea of zero person.
With just comp this issue is probably undecidable. I guess comp (perhaps
QM too) can lead to a vast variety of incompatible but consistent point of 
view on those matter. Comp is compatible whith a lot of personal
possible interpretations of what is identity. What is possible to prove
with comp is the non normative principle according to which personal
identity is *in part* necessarily a matter of personal opinion.
What remains to do is to compute the real probabilities to backtrack with
amnesia compare to the probability to quantum/comp-survive big injuries.
I doubt we have currently the tools to do those computations.

Bruno




RE: Immortality

2001-09-10 Thread Charles Goodwin

 -Original Message-
 From: Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]

 Perhaps. But if you do that move, everyone is resurrected in
 everyone, and
 there is only one person in the multiverse. I don't know. James Higgo
 was more radical on this, he defended the idea of zero person.
 With just comp this issue is probably undecidable. I guess
 comp (perhaps
 QM too) can lead to a vast variety of incompatible but
 consistent point of
 view on those matter. Comp is compatible whith a lot of personal
 possible interpretations of what is identity. What is
 possible to prove
 with comp is the non normative principle according to which personal
 identity is *in part* necessarily a matter of personal opinion.
 What remains to do is to compute the real probabilities to
 backtrack with
 amnesia compare to the probability to quantum/comp-survive
 big injuries.
 I doubt we have currently the tools to do those computations.

I will be interested to know the results when you do!

Of course the doctrine of reincarnation (it always seemed to me) only requires one 
soul - a bit like Feynman's one-electron
universe, it just zip-zags back and forth...

Charles




Re: Immortality

2001-09-09 Thread Saibal Mitra

I see that according to you Hal Ruhl qualifies as a copy of Hal Finney.

- Oorspronkelijk bericht -
Van: jamikes [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Aan: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
CC: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Verzonden: zondag 9 september 2001 15:06
Onderwerp: Immortality


 As much as I enjoyed last years's discussions in worldview speculations, I
 get frustrated by the lately emerged word-playing about concepts used in
 just different contents from the conventional.

  May I submit a (trivial) proof for immortality in this sense:

 Death (of others, meaning not only persons) is a 3rd person (fantasy?),
 either true or imagined. NOBODY ever experienced his/her own death and the
 time after such, so immortality is the only thing in consciousness.
The
 world (experienceable worldview) does not include otherwise.

 To the forgotten things existing in another (branch of?) world:
 If I 'forgot' something: that dose not necessarily build another world of
 those things I forgot. Alzheimer patients are not the most efficient
 Creators.
 And please do not 'rationalize' about 'near death' and similar fantasies
in
 this respect.

 Excuse my out-of-topic remark to the topic.

 John Mikes



 - Original Message -
 From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Sunday, September 09, 2001 6:30 AM
 Subject: Re: Conventional QTI = False



 Hal Finney wrote:
  Saibal writes:
   According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you
can
   also never forget anything. I don't believe  this because I know for a
   fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a
   long time ago.
 
  Right, but to make the same argument against QTI you'd have to say,
  you don't believe this because you have died.  But this is not possible.
  So the analogy is not as good as it looks.  You do exist in branches
where
  you have forgotten things, as well as in branches where you remember
them.

 That is true, but I want to make the point that branches where I survive
 with memory loss have to be taken into account.

 In the case of a person suffering from a terminal disease, it is much more
 likely that he will survive in a branch where he was not diagnosed with
the
 disease, than in a branch where the disease is magically cured. The latter
 possibility (conventional qti) can't be favoured above the first just
 because the surviving person is more similar to the original person.

 You could object that in the first case your consciousness is somehow
 transferred to a different person (you ``jump´´ to a different branch that
 separated from the dying branch before you were diagnosed), but I would
say
 that the surviving person has the same consciousness  the original person
 would have if you cured his disease and erased all memory of having the
 disease.

 Saibal