Hi Roger,
On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:26, Roger wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Well, I feel like Daniel must have felt when before the Giant.
And I can't even find a rock to sling.
Nevertheless, as I see it, computers are imprisoned by language
(computer code).
Like our social selves. But like Kierkegaard, I believe that
ultimate truth
is subjective (can, like meaning, only be experienced). Life
cannot truly be expressed or experienced in code.
No problem for comp here. We have discovered that machine, when
looking inward tend to perceive, or experience many truth which are
beyond words. There is a logic (S4Grz) which formalize at the meta-
level that non-formalizable (at the ontological level) informal
process of though. I wrote (and published) recently a paper on this,
(the mystical machine, in french) but it is what I try to explain here
since a long time. Machines have already a non formalizable (by
themselves) intuition. Indeed self-referentally correct machine have a
rich, neoplatonist-like, theology. On my url front page, you can
download my paper on an arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus, made
possible (and necessary in some sense) by computer science.
Bruno
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-12, 05:13:01
Subject: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model
On 11 Aug 2012, at 12:47, Roger wrote:
Hi Alberto G. Corona
Agreed. Computers are quantitative instruments and so cannot have a
self or
feelings, which are qualitative. And intution is non-computable IMHO.
Computer have a notion of self. I can explain someday (I already
have, and it is the base of all I am working on).
Better, they can already prove that their self has a qualitative
components. They can prove to herself and to us, that their
qualitative self, which is the knower, is not nameable. Machines,
like PA or ZF, can already prove that intuition is non-computable
by themselves.
You confuse the notion of machine before and after G del, I'm
afraid. You might study some good book on theoretical computer
science. Today we have progressed a lot in the sense that we are
open to the idea that we don't know what machine are capable of, and
we can prove this if we bet we are machine (comp).
Bruno
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/11/2012
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-11, 04:08:29
Subject: Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is
aware of stuff ?
The Dennet conception is made to avoid an agent in the first place
because i so, it whould be legitimate to question what is the agent
made of an thus going trough an infinite regression.
The question of the agent is the vivid intuition for which there
are ingenious evolutionary explanations which i may subscribe. But
a robot would implement such computations and still I deeply doubt
about his internal notion oof self, his quialia etc. The best
response to many questions for the shake of avooiding premature
dogmatic closeness is to say "we don't know"
El 11/08/2012 07:57, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net>
escribi :
>
> Hi Roger,
>
> 牋 I have noticed and read your posts. Might you write some
remarks about Leibniz' concept of pre-established harmony?
>
>
>
> On 8/10/2012 8:53 AM, Roger wrote:
>>
>> Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say
>> contradictory. That agent or soul or self you have is your
>> monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling
>> agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and
>> neurophilosophy.
>
>
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
> "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
> ~ Francis Bacon
>
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