Re: Interactions between mind and brain
On 23 Oct 2012, at 08:03, meekerdb wrote: On 10/22/2012 11:35 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/22/2012 6:05 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: I don't understand why you're focusing on NP-hard problems... NP- hard problems are solvable algorithmically... but not efficiently. When I read you (I'm surely misinterpreting), it seems like you're saying you can't solve NP- hard problems... it's not the case,... but as your input grows, the time to solve the problem may be bigger than the time ellapsed since the bigbang. You could say that the NP-hard problems for most input are not technically/practically sovable but they are in theories (you have the algorithm) unlike undecidable problems like the halting problem. Quentin Hi Quentin, Yes, they are solved algorithmically. I am trying to get some focus on the requirement of resources for computations to be said to be solvable. This is my criticism of the Platonic treatment of computer theory, it completely ignores these considerations. The Big Bang theory (considered in classical terms) has a related problem in its stipulation of initial conditions, just as the Pre- Established Harmony of Leibniz' Monadology. Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard problem. We cannot consider the solution to be accessible prior to its actual computation! Why not? NP-hard problems have solutions ex hypothesi; it's part of their defintion. What would a prior computation mean? Are you supposing that there is a computation and *then* there is an implementation (in matter) that somehow realizes the computation that was formerly abstract. That would seem muddled. If the universe is to be explained as a computation then it must be realized by the computation - not by some later (in what time measure?) events. Good point. Bruno Brent The calculation of the minimum action configuration of the universe such that there is a universe that we observe now is in the state that it is and such is consistent with our existence in it must be explained either as being the result of some fortuitous accident or, as some claim, some intelligent design or some process working in some super-universe where our universe was somehow selected, if the prior computation idea is true. I am trying to find an alternative that does not require computations to occur prior to the universe's existence! Several people, such as Lee Smolin, Stuart Kaufmann and David Deutsch have advanced the idea that the universe is, literally, computing its next state in an ongoing fashion, so my conjecture is not new. The universe is computing solutions to NP-Hard problems, but not in any Platonic sense. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:48, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/25/2012 10:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Oct 2012, at 20:29, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/24/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Oct 2012, at 06:03, Stephen P. King wrote: What difference does what they refer to matter? Eventually there has to be some physical process or we would be incapable of even thinking about them! The resources to perform the computation are either available or they are not. Seriously, why are you over complicating the idea? Let us be clear. For humans to be able to think, not only you need a physical process, but you need a solar system, a planet, ... many things, including much resources. Dear Bruno, Sure, but that only is about explanations of the physical systems involved. But let me ask you, given that there is a 1p for each and every observer, does it not follow that there should be a bundle of computations for each and one? That's the case. Hi Bruno, OK, do you have something that acts as a primitive unit of action for the bundles or do you merely use the ordering of integers to imply an action? The ordering is not enough. I use the entire turing universal machinery, which happens to be given by addition and multiplication. There would be a great deal of overlap between them (as that would be equivalent to the commonality of the experienciable content of the observers). The point is that the computation is not of a single object in a world. We have to consider computational simulations of entire universes! If that makes sense, consider them as particular dreams. Sure, but note that this dream aspect makes them strictly 1p. Yes? Yes. But their reason can involves (and do involve) infinities of 3p relations. They are strictly 1p, but still supervening on 3p relations. If this is judged impossible, then there is no more reason to say yes to a digitalist doctor. Don't forget that computability, and computations, are the only epistemological, or factual notion admitting a very solid mathematical definition. universe for me is a very vague term, like God, we can't use it as an explanation. It is what I would like an explanation for. A universe is the same as is used in set theory, a total and complete collection that does not leave anything out that might need to be included. OK? But sets are conceptually richer than computation. Sets are, in comp, already mind constructs by number, to put some light on the complex relations. In fact here you are describing what is a model, and I am OK with the use of them, but not with the idea of putting them in the basic starting ontology. But, ... ... for the couple [thinking humans= Earth, solar-system- physical process-resource] you need onlyarithmetic. A bit like in Everett the couple [physician's sad consciousness in front of a collapsed wave= a dead Schroedinger cat] you need only the universal quantum wave. Just that once we assume comp enough consciously, if I can say, the universal wave itself, if correct for observation, has to be retrieved from a larger statistics, on all computations, going through our local computational states. Literally, the laws of physics are invariant from the choice of the physical basic laws, as long as they are at least Turing universal (synonym important for AUDA: Sigma_1 complete). I am not sure what this means: laws of physics are invariant from the choice of the physical basic laws. Could you explain this more? It means that the laws of physics does not depend on the choice of the theory for the primitive elements. You can take as ontology the digital plane, and as primitive element the GOL patterns, or just a universal one, or you can take the numbers with addition and multiplication, or you can take QM, or you can take the FORTRAN programs, etc. Does this not make the physical laws very vague? For example, should we expect some prediction of the type of transformation group that best represents our conservation laws? Are Lie groups predicted? Everything physical and lawful. I can bet on Lie Group, yes, and the elementary particles or strings, the quantum wave aspects, and the ultimate hamiltonian which might plasuibly describe a sort of vaccum, ding some quantum universal dovetaling. The worst is that the prime numbers seems to do already that, and I worry that the number theorists might find the correct theoretical physics before the theologian, as that could mean that we will have to wait for another millennium before getting serious on qualia and afterlife questions. With comp, in each case you will have to derive consciousness/ physics from all the relations those primitive elements have, and comp guaranty you will converge on the same reality from inside. If you want with comp, if you
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
On 10/25/2012 10:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Oct 2012, at 20:29, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/24/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Oct 2012, at 06:03, Stephen P. King wrote: What difference does what they refer to matter? Eventually there has to be some physical process or we would be incapable of even thinking about them! The resources to perform the computation are either available or they are not. Seriously, why are you over complicating the idea? Let us be clear. For humans to be able to think, not only you need a physical process, but you need a solar system, a planet, ... many things, including much resources. Dear Bruno, Sure, but that only is about explanations of the physical systems involved. But let me ask you, given that there is a 1p for each and every observer, does it not follow that there should be a bundle of computations for each and one? That's the case. Hi Bruno, OK, do you have something that acts as a primitive unit of action for the bundles or do you merely use the ordering of integers to imply an action? There would be a great deal of overlap between them (as that would be equivalent to the commonality of the experienciable content of the observers). The point is that the computation is not of a single object in a world. We have to consider computational simulations of entire universes! If that makes sense, consider them as particular dreams. Sure, but note that this dream aspect makes them strictly 1p. Yes? Don't forget that computability, and computations, are the only epistemological, or factual notion admitting a very solid mathematical definition. universe for me is a very vague term, like God, we can't use it as an explanation. It is what I would like an explanation for. A universe is the same as is used in set theory, a total and complete collection that does not leave anything out that might need to be included. But, ... ... for the couple [thinking humans= Earth, solar-system-physical process-resource] you need only arithmetic. A bit like in Everett the couple [physician's sad consciousness in front of a collapsed wave= a dead Schroedinger cat] you need only the universal quantum wave. Just that once we assume comp enough consciously, if I can say, the universal wave itself, if correct for observation, has to be retrieved from a larger statistics, on all computations, going through our local computational states. Literally, the laws of physics are invariant from the choice of the physical basic laws, as long as they are at least Turing universal (synonym important for AUDA: Sigma_1 complete). I am not sure what this means: laws of physics are invariant from the choice of the physical basic laws. Could you explain this more? It means that the laws of physics does not depend on the choice of the theory for the primitive elements. You can take as ontology the digital plane, and as primitive element the GOL patterns, or just a universal one, or you can take the numbers with addition and multiplication, or you can take QM, or you can take the FORTRAN programs, etc. Does this not make the physical laws very vague? For example, should we expect some prediction of the type of transformation group that best represents our conservation laws? Are Lie groups predicted? With comp, in each case you will have to derive consciousness/physics from all the relations those primitive elements have, and comp guaranty you will converge on the same reality from inside. If you want with comp, if you choose QM, you are just cheating, as you copy on the universe, so to speak. And then you lack the qualia. But comp says that the qunata and tha qualia are in your head, or in the head of any Universal machine, so that we can program a machine to look in its head and compare the universe and what the machine finds, to evaluate comp. Then just below I give you two choices of TOE: Literally: very elementary arithmetic is a good TOE: x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x It is in *that* theory, that we have now to define the notion of observers, believers, knowers, experiencers, experimentalists, and formulate a part of the measure problem. Mathematically, we can test the first person limiting observation by the person incarnated by the genuine computation in arithmetic. Another TOE: ((K, x), y) = x (((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z)) It operates on the combinators, and the combinators are K or S, or (x, y) with x and y combinators. So (K, K), (K, (K, S)), ((K, K) K), etc are combinators. What they do? They obeys the laws above. Those defines Turing universal realities, and they will emulate/define other universal realities, in the same relative proportions, which will be the observers-universe, a coupled universal machine (it is another way to view Löbianity (although technically it is a bit weaker)). Any
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
On 24 Oct 2012, at 20:29, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/24/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Oct 2012, at 06:03, Stephen P. King wrote: What difference does what they refer to matter? Eventually there has to be some physical process or we would be incapable of even thinking about them! The resources to perform the computation are either available or they are not. Seriously, why are you over complicating the idea? Let us be clear. For humans to be able to think, not only you need a physical process, but you need a solar system, a planet, ... many things, including much resources. Dear Bruno, Sure, but that only is about explanations of the physical systems involved. But let me ask you, given that there is a 1p for each and every observer, does it not follow that there should be a bundle of computations for each and one? That's the case. There would be a great deal of overlap between them (as that would be equivalent to the commonality of the experienciable content of the observers). The point is that the computation is not of a single object in a world. We have to consider computational simulations of entire universes! If that makes sense, consider them as particular dreams. Don't forget that computability, and computations, are the only epistemological, or factual notion admitting a very solid mathematical definition. universe for me is a very vague term, like God, we can't use it as an explanation. It is what I would like an explanation for. But, ... ... for the couple [thinking humans= Earth, solar-system- physical process-resource] you need only arithmetic. A bit like in Everett the couple [physician's sad consciousness in front of a collapsed wave= a dead Schroedinger cat] you need only the universal quantum wave. Just that once we assume comp enough consciously, if I can say, the universal wave itself, if correct for observation, has to be retrieved from a larger statistics, on all computations, going through our local computational states. Literally, the laws of physics are invariant from the choice of the physical basic laws, as long as they are at least Turing universal (synonym important for AUDA: Sigma_1 complete). I am not sure what this means: laws of physics are invariant from the choice of the physical basic laws. Could you explain this more? It means that the laws of physics does not depend on the choice of the theory for the primitive elements. You can take as ontology the digital plane, and as primitive element the GOL patterns, or just a universal one, or you can take the numbers with addition and multiplication, or you can take QM, or you can take the FORTRAN programs, etc. With comp, in each case you will have to derive consciousness/physics from all the relations those primitive elements have, and comp guaranty you will converge on the same reality from inside. If you want with comp, if you choose QM, you are just cheating, as you copy on the universe, so to speak. And then you lack the qualia. But comp says that the qunata and tha qualia are in your head, or in the head of any Universal machine, so that we can program a machine to look in its head and compare the universe and what the machine finds, to evaluate comp. Then just below I give you two choices of TOE: Literally: very elementary arithmetic is a good TOE: x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x It is in *that* theory, that we have now to define the notion of observers, believers, knowers, experiencers, experimentalists, and formulate a part of the measure problem. Mathematically, we can test the first person limiting observation by the person incarnated by the genuine computation in arithmetic. Another TOE: ((K, x), y) = x (((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z)) It operates on the combinators, and the combinators are K or S, or (x, y) with x and y combinators. So (K, K), (K, (K, S)), ((K, K) K), etc are combinators. What they do? They obeys the laws above. Those defines Turing universal realities, and they will emulate/ define other universal realities, in the same relative proportions, which will be the observers-universe, a coupled universal machine (it is another way to view Löbianity (although technically it is a bit weaker)). Any universal machine contains in itself a sort of war between *all* universal machines until they recognize themselves. Obviously some universal machines get more famous than other, apparently, like ... well arithmetic, combinators, but also, in relation with the observable reality, quantum computers. It makes comp testable, or at least the definition of observer, believer, knower used in the derivation of physics, and here I provide only the propositional physical theory (and even some choice as different quantum logics appears in S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*, the logic of the material
Re: Re: Interactions between mind and brain
Hi meekerdb Just because something has no extension in space (physical existence) doesn't mean it doesn't exist mentally, for example in Platonia. Mathematics has no extension in space, forms of art do not have extension in space, nor does truth nor does goodness. Materialism is a very limiting world, as thought has no extension in space. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-23, 19:16:29 Subject: Re: Interactions between mind and brain On 10/23/2012 3:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/23/2012 1:29 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/23/2012 3:40 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/23/2012 2:03 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/22/2012 11:35 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/22/2012 6:05 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: I don't understand why you're focusing on NP-hard problems... NP-hard problems are solvable algorithmically... but not efficiently. When I read you (I'm surely misinterpreting), it seems like you're saying you can't solve NP-hard problems... it's not the case,... but as your input grows, the time to solve the problem may be bigger than the time ellapsed since the bigbang. You could say that the NP-hard problems for most input are not technically/practically sovable but they are in theories (you have the algorithm) unlike undecidable problems like the halting problem. Quentin Hi Quentin, Yes, they are solved algorithmically. I am trying to get some focus on the requirement of resources for computations to be said to be solvable. This is my criticism of the Platonic treatment of computer theory, it completely ignores these considerations. The Big Bang theory (considered in classical terms) has a related problem in its stipulation of initial conditions, just as the Pre-Established Harmony of Leibniz' Monadology. Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard problem. We cannot consider the solution to be accessible prior to its actual computation! Why not? NP-hard problems have solutions ex hypothesi; it's part of their defintion. Having a solution in the abstract sense, is different from actual access to the solution. You cannot do any work with the abstract fact that a NP-Hard problem has a solution, you must actually compute a solution! The truth that there exists a minimum path for a traveling salesman to follow given N cities does not guide her anywhere. This should not be so unobvious! But you wrote, Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard problem. An existence that is guaranteed by the definition. Hi Brent, OH! Well, I thank you for helping me clean up my language! Let me try again. ;--) First I need to address the word existence. I have tried to argue that to exists is to be necessarily possible but that attempt has fallen on deaf ears, well, it has until now for you are using it exactly how I am arguing that it should be used, as in An existence that is guaranteed by the definition. DO you see that existence does nothing for the issue of properties? The existence of a pink unicorn and the existence of the 1234345465475766th prime number are the same kind of existence, I don't see that they are even similar. Existence of the aforesaid prime number just means it satisfies a certain formula within an axiom system. The pink unicorn fails existence of a quite different kind, namely an ability to locate it in spacetime. It may still satisfy some propositions, such as, The animal that is pink, has one horn, and loses it's power in the presence of a virgin is obviously metaphorical.; just not ones we think of as axiomatic. once we drop the pretense that existence is dependent or contingent on physicality. It's not a pretense; it's a rejection of Platonism, or at least a distinction between different meanings of 'exists'. Is it possible to define Physicality can be considered solely in terms of bundles of particular properties, kinda like Bruno's bundles of computations that define any given 1p. My thinking is that what is physical is exactly what some quantity of separable 1p have as mutually consistent But do the 1p have to exist? Can they be Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson? (or representable as a Boolean Algebra) but this consideration seems to run independent of anything physical. What could reasonably constrain the computations so that there is some thing real to a physical universe? That's already assuming the universe is just computation, which I think is begging the question. It's the same as saying, Why this and not that. There has to be something that cannot be changed merely by changing one's point of view. So long as you thing other 1p viewpoints exist
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
On 24 Oct 2012, at 06:03, Stephen P. King wrote: What difference does what they refer to matter? Eventually there has to be some physical process or we would be incapable of even thinking about them! The resources to perform the computation are either available or they are not. Seriously, why are you over complicating the idea? Let us be clear. For humans to be able to think, not only you need a physical process, but you need a solar system, a planet, ... many things, including much resources. But, ... ... for the couple [thinking humans= Earth, solar-system-physical process-resource] you need only arithmetic. A bit like in Everett the couple [physician's sad consciousness in front of a collapsed wave= a dead Schroedinger cat] you need only the universal quantum wave. Just that once we assume comp enough consciously, if I can say, the universal wave itself, if correct for observation, has to be retrieved from a larger statistics, on all computations, going through our local computational states. Literally, the laws of physics are invariant from the choice of the physical basic laws, as long as they are at least Turing universal (synonym important for AUDA: Sigma_1 complete). Literally: very elementary arithmetic is a good TOE: x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x It is in *that* theory, that we have now to define the notion of observers, believers, knowers, experiencers, experimentalists, and formulate a part of the measure problem. Mathematically, we can test the first person limiting observation by the person incarnated by the genuine computation in arithmetic. Another TOE: ((K, x), y) = x (((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z)) It operates on the combinators, and the combinators are K or S, or (x, y) with x and y combinators. So (K, K), (K, (K, S)), ((K, K) K), etc are combinators. What they do? They obeys the laws above. Those defines Turing universal realities, and they will emulate/define other universal realities, in the same relative proportions, which will be the observers-universe, a coupled universal machine (it is another way to view Löbianity (although technically it is a bit weaker)). Any universal machine contains in itself a sort of war between *all* universal machines until they recognize themselves. Obviously some universal machines get more famous than other, apparently, like ... well arithmetic, combinators, but also, in relation with the observable reality, quantum computers. It makes comp testable, or at least the definition of observer, believer, knower used in the derivation of physics, and here I provide only the propositional physical theory (and even some choice as different quantum logics appears in S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*, the logic of the material hypostases, in Plotinus terms). With comp, trying to singularize consciousness with a particular universal machine (a physical reality), is like a move to select a branch in a wave of realities, and can be seen as a form of cosmical solipsism negating consciousness for vast span of arithmetical truth, just because those realities are only indirectly accessible, by looking below ours substitution level. I have translated a part of the philosophical mind-body problem in mathematics (and partially solve it). I made a mistake as the mathematicians don't know about the mind body problem, and the philosophers don't know the math (here: computer science/mathematical logic). The physicists, at least those who don't believe in the collapse are closer to get the picture coherent with what can be like a physics from the persons supported by the combinators reduction (or by the numbers addition and multiplication), as it has to be the case if we assume comp. When I will have more time I will continue to explain the math needed for this. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
On 10/24/2012 4:56 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi meekerdb Just because something has no extension in space I wrote location not extension - don't misquote me. (physical existence) doesn't mean it doesn't exist mentally, for example in Platonia. But existing mentally isn't the same as existing (physically). Mathematics has no extension in space, forms of art do not have extension in space, nor does truth nor does goodness. Materialism is a very limiting world, So is arithmetic. But as Bruno points out, computation on arithmetic can look much bigger from the inside. So can materialism. Brent as thought has no extension in space. Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
On 10/24/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Oct 2012, at 06:03, Stephen P. King wrote: What difference does what they refer to matter? Eventually there has to be some physical process or we would be incapable of even thinking about them! The resources to perform the computation are either available or they are not. Seriously, why are you over complicating the idea? Let us be clear. For humans to be able to think, not only you need a physical process, but you need a solar system, a planet, ... many things, including much resources. Dear Bruno, Sure, but that only is about explanations of the physical systems involved. But let me ask you, given that there is a 1p for each and every observer, does it not follow that there should be a bundle of computations for each and one? There would be a great deal of overlap between them (as that would be equivalent to the commonality of the experienciable content of the observers). The point is that the computation is not of a single object in a world. We have to consider computational simulations of entire universes! But, ... ... for the couple [thinking humans= Earth, solar-system-physical process-resource] you need only arithmetic. A bit like in Everett the couple [physician's sad consciousness in front of a collapsed wave= a dead Schroedinger cat] you need only the universal quantum wave. Just that once we assume comp enough consciously, if I can say, the universal wave itself, if correct for observation, has to be retrieved from a larger statistics, on all computations, going through our local computational states. Literally, the laws of physics are invariant from the choice of the physical basic laws, as long as they are at least Turing universal (synonym important for AUDA: Sigma_1 complete). I am not sure what this means: laws of physics are invariant from the choice of the physical basic laws. Could you explain this more? Literally: very elementary arithmetic is a good TOE: x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x It is in *that* theory, that we have now to define the notion of observers, believers, knowers, experiencers, experimentalists, and formulate a part of the measure problem. Mathematically, we can test the first person limiting observation by the person incarnated by the genuine computation in arithmetic. Another TOE: ((K, x), y) = x (((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z)) It operates on the combinators, and the combinators are K or S, or (x, y) with x and y combinators. So (K, K), (K, (K, S)), ((K, K) K), etc are combinators. What they do? They obeys the laws above. Those defines Turing universal realities, and they will emulate/define other universal realities, in the same relative proportions, which will be the observers-universe, a coupled universal machine (it is another way to view Löbianity (although technically it is a bit weaker)). Any universal machine contains in itself a sort of war between *all* universal machines until they recognize themselves. Obviously some universal machines get more famous than other, apparently, like ... well arithmetic, combinators, but also, in relation with the observable reality, quantum computers. It makes comp testable, or at least the definition of observer, believer, knower used in the derivation of physics, and here I provide only the propositional physical theory (and even some choice as different quantum logics appears in S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*, the logic of the material hypostases, in Plotinus terms). All of that is a theoretical explanation, that supposes that since arithmetic is all that is needed to encode all of the information and representations, but this is just an explanation, nothing more. Until we can derive phenomenology that can be tested, we have only a hypothesis or conjecture. My proposal is that, following Pratt's suggestion, we consider the arithmetic to be equivalent to a Boolean algebra and its evolution is the computation of the UD. That way we do not have a body problem, since the dual of the Boolean algebra, the topological space, is the body whose evolution is physics. With comp, trying to singularize consciousness with a particular universal machine (a physical reality), is like a move to select a branch in a wave of realities, and can be seen as a form of cosmical solipsism negating consciousness for vast span of arithmetical truth, just because those realities are only indirectly accessible, by looking below ours substitution level. But solipsism is not the absence of consciousness, it is the inability of one 1p to bet on the existence of the possible content of other 1p. I have translated a part of the philosophical mind-body problem in mathematics (and partially solve it). Sure, but your claims of an immaterial monism worry me. It is as if you have resurected Berkeley's Idealism in a formal mathematical model and
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 11:43 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: A top-down effect of consciousness on matter could be inferred if miraculous events were observed in neurophysiology research. The consciousness itself cannot be directly observed. Hi Stathis, This would be true only if consciousness is separate from matter, such as in Descartes failed theory of substance dualism. In the dual aspect theory that I am arguing for, there would never be any miracles that would contradict physical law. At most there would be statistical deviations from classical predictions. Check out http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf for details. My support for this theory and not materialism follows from materialism demonstrated inability to account for 1p. Dual aspect monism has 1p built in from first principles. BTW, I don't use the term dualism any more as what I am advocating seems to be too easily confused with the failed version. If there is no causal influence of consciousness on matter and the matter just follows the laws of physics then, if the laws of physics are computable, computationalism is established; and even if the laws of physics are not computable functionalism can still be established. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
On 10/22/2012 11:35 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/22/2012 6:05 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: I don't understand why you're focusing on NP-hard problems... NP-hard problems are solvable algorithmically... but not efficiently. When I read you (I'm surely misinterpreting), it seems like you're saying you can't solve NP-hard problems... it's not the case,... but as your input grows, the time to solve the problem may be bigger than the time ellapsed since the bigbang. You could say that the NP-hard problems for most input are not technically/practically sovable but they are in theories (you have the algorithm) unlike undecidable problems like the halting problem. Quentin Hi Quentin, Yes, they are solved algorithmically. I am trying to get some focus on the requirement of resources for computations to be said to be solvable. This is my criticism of the Platonic treatment of computer theory, it completely ignores these considerations. The Big Bang theory (considered in classical terms) has a related problem in its stipulation of initial conditions, just as the Pre-Established Harmony of Leibniz' Monadology. Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard problem. We cannot consider the solution to be accessible prior to its actual computation! Why not? NP-hard problems have solutions ex hypothesi; it's part of their defintion. What would a prior computation mean? Are you supposing that there is a computation and *then* there is an implementation (in matter) that somehow realizes the computation that was formerly abstract. That would seem muddled. If the universe is to be explained as a computation then it must be realized by the computation - not by some later (in what time measure?) events. Brent The calculation of the minimum action configuration of the universe such that there is a universe that we observe now is in the state that it is and such is consistent with our existence in it must be explained either as being the result of some fortuitous accident or, as some claim, some intelligent design or some process working in some super-universe where our universe was somehow selected, if the prior computation idea is true. I am trying to find an alternative that does not require computations to occur prior to the universe's existence! Several people, such as Lee Smolin, Stuart Kaufmann and David Deutsch have advanced the idea that the universe is, literally, computing its next state in an ongoing fashion, so my conjecture is not new. The universe is computing solutions to NP-Hard problems, but not in any Platonic sense. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
On 10/23/2012 2:03 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/22/2012 11:35 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/22/2012 6:05 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: I don't understand why you're focusing on NP-hard problems... NP-hard problems are solvable algorithmically... but not efficiently. When I read you (I'm surely misinterpreting), it seems like you're saying you can't solve NP-hard problems... it's not the case,... but as your input grows, the time to solve the problem may be bigger than the time ellapsed since the bigbang. You could say that the NP-hard problems for most input are not technically/practically sovable but they are in theories (you have the algorithm) unlike undecidable problems like the halting problem. Quentin Hi Quentin, Yes, they are solved algorithmically. I am trying to get some focus on the requirement of resources for computations to be said to be solvable. This is my criticism of the Platonic treatment of computer theory, it completely ignores these considerations. The Big Bang theory (considered in classical terms) has a related problem in its stipulation of initial conditions, just as the Pre-Established Harmony of Leibniz' Monadology. Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard problem. We cannot consider the solution to be accessible prior to its actual computation! Why not? NP-hard problems have solutions ex hypothesi; it's part of their defintion. Having a solution in the abstract sense, is different from actual access to the solution. You cannot do any work with the abstract fact that a NP-Hard problem has a solution, you must actually compute a solution! The truth that there exists a minimum path for a traveling salesman to follow given N cities does not guide her anywhere. This should not be so unobvious! What would a prior computation mean? Where did you get that cluster of words? Are you supposing that there is a computation and *then* there is an implementation (in matter) that somehow realizes the computation that was formerly abstract. That would seem muddled. Right! It would be, at least, muddled. That is my point! If the universe is to be explained as a computation then it must be realized by the computation - not by some later (in what time measure?) events. Exactly. The computation cannot occur before the universe! Did you stop reading at this point? Brent The calculation of the minimum action configuration of the universe such that there is a universe that we observe now is in the state that it is and such is consistent with our existence in it must be explained either as being the result of some fortuitous accident or, as some claim, some intelligent design or some process working in some super-universe where our universe was somehow selected, if the prior computation idea is true. I am trying to find an alternative that does not require computations to occur prior to the universe's existence! Several people, such as Lee Smolin, Stuart Kaufmann and David Deutsch have advanced the idea that the universe is, literally, computing its next state in an ongoing fashion, so my conjecture is not new. The universe is computing solutions to NP-Hard problems, but not in any Platonic sense. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Interactions between mind and brain
Hi Stephen P. King I saw a paper once on the possibility of the universe inventing itself as it goes along. I forget the result or why, but it had to do with the amount of information in the universe, the amount needed to do such a calc, etc. Is some limnit exceeded ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/23/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-22, 14:35:15 Subject: Re: Interactions between mind and brain On 10/22/2012 6:05 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: I don't understand why you're focusing on NP-hard problems... NP-hard problems are solvable algorithmically... but not efficiently. When I read you (I'm surely misinterpreting), it seems like you're saying you can't solve NP-hard problems... it's not the case,... but as your input grows, the time to solve the problem may be bigger than the time ellapsed since the bigbang. You could say that the NP-hard problems for most input are not technically/practically sovable but they are in theories (you have the algorithm) unlike undecidable problems like the halting problem. Quentin Hi Quentin, Yes, they are solved algorithmically. I am trying to get some focus on the requirement of resources for computations to be said to be solvable. This is my criticism of the Platonic treatment of computer theory, it completely ignores these considerations. The Big Bang theory (considered in classical terms) has a related problem in its stipulation of initial conditions, just as the Pre-Established Harmony of Leibniz' Monadology. Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard problem. We cannot consider the solution to be accessible prior to its actual computation! The calculation of the minimum action configuration of the universe such that there is a universe that we observe now is in the state that it is and such is consistent with our existence in it must be explained either as being the result of some fortuitous accident or, as some claim, some intelligent design or some process working in some super-universe where our universe was somehow selected, if the prior computation idea is true. I am trying to find an alternative that does not require computations to occur prior to the universe's existence! Several people, such as Lee Smolin, Stuart Kaufmann and David Deutsch have advanced the idea that the universe is, literally, computing its next state in an ongoing fashion, so my conjecture is not new. The universe is computing solutions to NP-Hard problems, but not in any Platonic sense. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
On 10/23/2012 3:40 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/23/2012 2:03 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/22/2012 11:35 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/22/2012 6:05 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: I don't understand why you're focusing on NP-hard problems... NP-hard problems are solvable algorithmically... but not efficiently. When I read you (I'm surely misinterpreting), it seems like you're saying you can't solve NP-hard problems... it's not the case,... but as your input grows, the time to solve the problem may be bigger than the time ellapsed since the bigbang. You could say that the NP-hard problems for most input are not technically/practically sovable but they are in theories (you have the algorithm) unlike undecidable problems like the halting problem. Quentin Hi Quentin, Yes, they are solved algorithmically. I am trying to get some focus on the requirement of resources for computations to be said to be solvable. This is my criticism of the Platonic treatment of computer theory, it completely ignores these considerations. The Big Bang theory (considered in classical terms) has a related problem in its stipulation of initial conditions, just as the Pre-Established Harmony of Leibniz' Monadology. Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard problem. We cannot consider the solution to be accessible prior to its actual computation! Why not? NP-hard problems have solutions ex hypothesi; it's part of their defintion. Having a solution in the abstract sense, is different from actual access to the solution. You cannot do any work with the abstract fact that a NP-Hard problem has a solution, you must actually compute a solution! The truth that there exists a minimum path for a traveling salesman to follow given N cities does not guide her anywhere. This should not be so unobvious! But you wrote, Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard problem. An existence that is guaranteed by the definition. When you refer to the universe computing itself as an NP-hard problem, you are assuming that computing the universe is member of a class of problems. It actually doesn't make any sense to refer to a single problem as NP-hard, since the hard refers to how the difficulty scales with different problems of increasing size. I'm not clear on what this class is. Are you thinking of something like computing Feynman path integrals for the universe? What would a prior computation mean? Where did you get that cluster of words? From you, below, in the next to last paragraph (just because I quit writing doesn't mean I quit reading at the same point). Are you supposing that there is a computation and *then* there is an implementation (in matter) that somehow realizes the computation that was formerly abstract. That would seem muddled. Right! It would be, at least, muddled. That is my point! But no one but you has ever suggested the universe is computed and then implemented to a two-step process. So it seems to be a muddle of your invention. Brent If the universe is to be explained as a computation then it must be realized by the computation - not by some later (in what time measure?) events. Exactly. The computation cannot occur before the universe! Did you stop reading at this point? Brent The calculation of the minimum action configuration of the universe such that there is a universe that we observe now is in the state that it is and such is consistent with our existence in it must be explained either as being the result of some fortuitous accident or, as some claim, some intelligent design or some process working in some super-universe where our universe was somehow selected, if the prior computation idea is true. I am trying to find an alternative that does not require computations to occur prior to the universe's existence! Several people, such as Lee Smolin, Stuart Kaufmann and David Deutsch have advanced the idea that the universe is, literally, computing its next state in an ongoing fashion, so my conjecture is not new. The universe is computing solutions to NP-Hard problems, but not in any Platonic sense. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
On 10/23/2012 9:43 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King I saw a paper once on the possibility of the universe inventing itself as it goes along. I forget the result or why, but it had to do with the amount of information in the universe, the amount needed to do such a calc, etc. Is some limnit exceeded ? Hi Roger, The currently accepted theoretical upper bound on computation is the Bekenstein bound. http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Bekenstein_bound But this bound is based on the assumption that the radius of a sphere that can enclose a given system is equivalent to what is required to effectively isolate that system, if an event horizon where to exist at the surface. It ignores the implications of quantum entanglement, but for the sake of 0-th order approximations of it, it works. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/23/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-22, 14:35:15 Subject: Re: Interactions between mind and brain On 10/22/2012 6:05 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: I don't understand why you're focusing on NP-hard problems... NP-hard problems are solvable algorithmically... but not efficiently. When I read you (I'm surely misinterpreting), it seems like you're saying you can't solve NP-hard problems... it's not the case,... but as your input grows, the time to solve the problem may be bigger than the time ellapsed since the bigbang. You could say that the NP-hard problems for most input are not technically/practically sovable but they are in theories (you have the algorithm) unlike undecidable problems like the halting problem. Quentin Hi Quentin, Yes, they are solved algorithmically. I am trying to get some focus on the requirement of resources for computations to be said to be solvable. This is my criticism of the Platonic treatment of computer theory, it completely ignores these considerations. The Big Bang theory (considered in classical terms) has a related problem in its stipulation of initial conditions, just as the Pre-Established Harmony of Leibniz' Monadology. Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard problem. We cannot consider the solution to be accessible prior to its actual computation! The calculation of the minimum action configuration of the universe such that there is a universe that we observe now is in the state that it is and such is consistent with our existence in it must be explained either as being the result of some fortuitous accident or, as some claim, some intelligent design or some process working in some super-universe where our universe was somehow selected, if the prior computation idea is true. I am trying to find an alternative that does not require computations to occur prior to the universe's existence! Several people, such as Lee Smolin, Stuart Kaufmann and David Deutsch have advanced the idea that the universe is, literally, computing its next state in an ongoing fashion, so my conjecture is not new. The universe is computing solutions to NP-Hard problems, but not in any Platonic sense. -- Onward! Stephen -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
Hi, Stephen,
you wrote some points in accordance with my thinking (whatever that is
worth) with one point I disagree with:
if you want to argue a point, do not accept it as a base for your argument
(even negatively not). You do that all the time. (SPK? etc.) -
My fundamental question: what do you (all) call *'mind*'?
(Sub: does the *brain* do/learn mind functions? HOW?)
(('experimentally observed' is restricted to our present level of
understanding/technology(instrumentation)/theories.
Besides: miraculous is subject to oncoming explanatory novel info, when
it changes into merely 'functonal'.))
To fish out some of my agreeing statements:
*Well, I don't follow the crowd*
Science is no voting matter. 90+% believed the Flat Earth.
**
*... Alter 1 neuron and you might not have the same mind...
*(Meaning: the 'invasion(?)' called 'altering a neuron' MAY change the
functionalist's complexity *IN THE MIND!-* which is certainly beyond our
knowable domain. That makes the 'hard' hard. We 'like' to explain DOWN
everything in today's knowable terms. (Beware my agnostic views!)
Computation of course I consider a lot more than that (Platonistic?)
algorithmic calculation on our existing (and so knowable?) embryonic
device. I go for the Latin orig.: to THINK together - mathematically, or
beyond. That mat be a deficiency from my (Non-Indo-European) mother tongue
where the (improper?) translatable equivalent closes to the term
expectable. I am counting on your visit tomorrow.
* I strongly believe that computational complexity plays a huge role in
many aspects of the hard problem of consciousness and that the Platonic
approach to computer science is obscuring solutions as it is blind to
questions of resource availability and distribution.*
(and a lot more, do we 'know' about them, or not (yet).
*Is the brain strictly a classical system? - No,...
*The *BRAIN* may be - as a 'Physical-World' figment of our bio-physio
conventional science image, but its mind-related function(?) (especially
the hard one) is much more than a 'system': ALL 'parts' inventoried in
explained functionality).
And: I keep away from the beloved thought-experiments invented to make
uncanny ideas practically(?) feasible.
*...As I see it, there is no brain change without a mind change and vice
versa. The mind and brain are dual,... *
Thanks, Stephen, originally I thought there may be some (tissue-related)
minor brain-changes not affecting the mind of which the 'brains' serves as
a (material) tool in our sci? explanations.
Reading your post(s) I realized that it is a complexity and ANY change in
one part has consequences in the others.
So whatever 'part' we landscape as the *'neuronal brain'* it is
still part of the wider complexity unknowable.
Have a good trip onward
John M
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 8:43 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
On 10/21/2012 7:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 1:55 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
wrote:
If there is a top-down effect of the mind on the atoms then there we
would expect some scientific evidence of this. Evidence would
constitute, for example, neurons firing when measurements of
transmembrane potentials, ion concentrations etc. suggest that they
should not. You claim that such anomalous behaviour of neurons and
other cells due to consciousness is widespread, yet it has never been
experimentally observed. Why?
Hi Stathis,
How would you set up the experiment? How do you control for an
effect
that may well be ubiquitous? Did you somehow miss the point that
consciousness can only be observed in 1p? Why are you so insistent on a
3p
of it?
A top-down effect of consciousness on matter could be inferred if
miraculous events were observed in neurophysiology research. The
consciousness itself cannot be directly observed.
Hi Stathis,
This would be true only if consciousness is separate from matter, such
as in Descartes failed theory of substance dualism. In the dual aspect
theory that I am arguing for, there would never be any miracles that
would contradict physical law. At most there would be statistical
deviations from classical predictions. Check out
http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/**ratmech.pdfhttp://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdffor
details. My support for this theory and not materialism follows from
materialism demonstrated inability to account for 1p. Dual aspect monism
has 1p built in from first principles. BTW, I don't use the term dualism
any more as what I am advocating seems to be too easily confused with the
failed version.
I don't mean putting an extra module into the brain, I mean putting
the brain directly into the same configuration it is put into by
learning the language in the normal way.
How might we do that? Alter 1 neuron and you might not have the same
mind.
When you learn something, your brain physically changes. After a year
studying Chinese it goes from configuration SPK-E
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
On 10/23/2012 1:29 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/23/2012 3:40 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/23/2012 2:03 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/22/2012 11:35 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/22/2012 6:05 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: I don't understand why you're focusing on NP-hard problems... NP-hard problems are solvable algorithmically... but not efficiently. When I read you (I'm surely misinterpreting), it seems like you're saying you can't solve NP-hard problems... it's not the case,... but as your input grows, the time to solve the problem may be bigger than the time ellapsed since the bigbang. You could say that the NP-hard problems for most input are not technically/practically sovable but they are in theories (you have the algorithm) unlike undecidable problems like the halting problem. Quentin Hi Quentin, Yes, they are solved algorithmically. I am trying to get some focus on the requirement of resources for computations to be said to be solvable. This is my criticism of the Platonic treatment of computer theory, it completely ignores these considerations. The Big Bang theory (considered in classical terms) has a related problem in its stipulation of initial conditions, just as the Pre-Established Harmony of Leibniz' Monadology. Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard problem. We cannot consider the solution to be accessible prior to its actual computation! Why not? NP-hard problems have solutions ex hypothesi; it's part of their defintion. Having a solution in the abstract sense, is different from actual access to the solution. You cannot do any work with the abstract fact that a NP-Hard problem has a solution, you must actually compute a solution! The truth that there exists a minimum path for a traveling salesman to follow given N cities does not guide her anywhere. This should not be so unobvious! But you wrote, Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard problem. An existence that is guaranteed by the definition. Hi Brent, OH! Well, I thank you for helping me clean up my language! Let me try again. ;--) First I need to address the word existence. I have tried to argue that to exists is to be necessarily possible but that attempt has fallen on deaf ears, well, it has until now for you are using it exactly how I am arguing that it should be used, as in An existence that is guaranteed by the definition. DO you see that existence does nothing for the issue of properties? The existence of a pink unicorn and the existence of the 1234345465475766th prime number are the same kind of existence, once we drop the pretense that existence is dependent or contingent on physicality. Is it possible to define Physicality can be considered solely in terms of bundles of particular properties, kinda like Bruno's bundles of computations that define any given 1p. My thinking is that what is physical is exactly what some quantity of separable 1p have as mutually consistent (or representable as a Boolean Algebra) but this consideration seems to run independent of anything physical. What could reasonably constrain the computations so that there is some thing real to a physical universe? There has to be something that cannot be changed merely by changing one's point of view. When you refer to the universe computing itself as an NP-hard problem, you are assuming that computing the universe is member of a class of problems. Yes. It can be shown that computing a universe that contains something consistent with Einstein's GR is NP-Hard, as the problem of deciding whether or not there exists a smooth diffeomorphism between a pair of 3,1 manifolds has been proven (by Markov) to be so. This tells me that if we are going to consider the evolution of the universe to be something that can be a simulation running on some powerful computer (or an abstract computation in Platonia) then that simulation has to at least the equivalent to solving an NP-Hard problem. The prior existence, per se, of a solution is no different than the non-constructable proof that Diffeo_3,1 /subset NP-Hard that Markov found. It actually doesn't make any sense to refer to a single problem as NP-hard, since the hard refers to how the difficulty scales with different problems of increasing size. These terms, Scale and Size, do they refer to some thing abstract or something physical or, perhaps, both in some sense? I'm not clear on what this class is. It is an equivalence class of computationally soluble problems. http://cs.joensuu.fi/pages/whamalai/daa/npsession.pdf There are many of them. Are you thinking of something like computing Feynman path integrals for the universe? Not exactly, but that is one example of a computational problem. What would a prior computation mean? Where did you get that cluster of words? From you, below, in the next to last paragraph (just because I quit writing doesn't
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
On 10/23/2012 3:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/23/2012 1:29 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/23/2012 3:40 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/23/2012 2:03 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/22/2012 11:35 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/22/2012 6:05 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: I don't understand why you're focusing on NP-hard problems... NP-hard problems are solvable algorithmically... but not efficiently. When I read you (I'm surely misinterpreting), it seems like you're saying you can't solve NP-hard problems... it's not the case,... but as your input grows, the time to solve the problem may be bigger than the time ellapsed since the bigbang. You could say that the NP-hard problems for most input are not technically/practically sovable but they are in theories (you have the algorithm) unlike undecidable problems like the halting problem. Quentin Hi Quentin, Yes, they are solved algorithmically. I am trying to get some focus on the requirement of resources for computations to be said to be solvable. This is my criticism of the Platonic treatment of computer theory, it completely ignores these considerations. The Big Bang theory (considered in classical terms) has a related problem in its stipulation of initial conditions, just as the Pre-Established Harmony of Leibniz' Monadology. Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard problem. We cannot consider the solution to be accessible prior to its actual computation! Why not? NP-hard problems have solutions ex hypothesi; it's part of their defintion. Having a solution in the abstract sense, is different from actual access to the solution. You cannot do any work with the abstract fact that a NP-Hard problem has a solution, you must actually compute a solution! The truth that there exists a minimum path for a traveling salesman to follow given N cities does not guide her anywhere. This should not be so unobvious! But you wrote, Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard problem. An existence that is guaranteed by the definition. Hi Brent, OH! Well, I thank you for helping me clean up my language! Let me try again. ;--) First I need to address the word existence. I have tried to argue that to exists is to be necessarily possible but that attempt has fallen on deaf ears, well, it has until now for you are using it exactly how I am arguing that it should be used, as in An existence that is guaranteed by the definition. DO you see that existence does nothing for the issue of properties? The existence of a pink unicorn and the existence of the 1234345465475766th prime number are the same kind of existence, I don't see that they are even similar. Existence of the aforesaid prime number just means it satisfies a certain formula within an axiom system. The pink unicorn fails existence of a quite different kind, namely an ability to locate it in spacetime. It may still satisfy some propositions, such as, The animal that is pink, has one horn, and loses it's power in the presence of a virgin is obviously metaphorical.; just not ones we think of as axiomatic. once we drop the pretense that existence is dependent or contingent on physicality. It's not a pretense; it's a rejection of Platonism, or at least a distinction between different meanings of 'exists'. Is it possible to define Physicality can be considered solely in terms of bundles of particular properties, kinda like Bruno's bundles of computations that define any given 1p. My thinking is that what is physical is exactly what some quantity of separable 1p have as mutually consistent But do the 1p have to exist? Can they be Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson? (or representable as a Boolean Algebra) but this consideration seems to run independent of anything physical. What could reasonably constrain the computations so that there is some thing real to a physical universe? That's already assuming the universe is just computation, which I think is begging the question. It's the same as saying, Why this and not that. There has to be something that cannot be changed merely by changing one's point of view. So long as you thing other 1p viewpoints exist then intersubjective agreement defines the 'real' 3p world. When you refer to the universe computing itself as an NP-hard problem, you are assuming that computing the universe is member of a class of problems. Yes. It can be shown that computing a universe that contains something consistent with Einstein's GR is NP-Hard, as the problem of deciding whether or not there exists a smooth diffeomorphism between a pair of 3,1 manifolds has been proven (by Markov) to be so. This tells me that if we are going to consider the evolution of the universe to be something that can be a simulation running on some powerful computer (or an abstract computation in Platonia) then that simulation has to at least the equivalent to solving an NP-Hard problem. The
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
On 10/23/2012 4:53 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Hi, Stephen,
you wrote some points in accordance with my thinking (whatever that is
worth) with one point I disagree with:
if you want to argue a point, do not accept it as a base for your
argument (even negatively not). You do that all the time. (SPK? etc.) -
Hi John,
My English is pathetic and my rhetoric is even worse, I know
this... I don't have an internal narrative in English, its all
proprioceptive sensations that I have to translate into English as best
I can... Dyslexia sucks! What I try to do is lay down a claim and then
argue for its validity; my language often is muddled... but the point
gets across sometimes. I have to accept that limitation...
My fundamental question: what do you (all) call *_'mind_*'?
Actually, mind - for me- is a concept, an abstraction, it isn't a
thing at all...
(Sub: does the *_brain_* do/learn mind functions? HOW?)
The same way that we learn to communicate with each other. How
exactly? /hypothesis non fingo///.
(('experimentally observed' is restricted to our present level of
understanding/technology(instrumentation)/theories.
Besides: miraculous is subject to oncoming explanatory novel info,
when it changes into merely 'functonal'.))
I agree.
To fish out some of my agreeing statements:
/*Well, I don't follow the crowd*/
Science is no voting matter. 90+% believed the Flat Earth.
I wish more ppl understood that fact!
*//*
/*...* Alter 1 neuron and you might not have the same mind...
/(Meaning: the 'invasion(?)' called 'altering a neuron' MAY change the
functionalist's complexity /IN THE MIND!-/ which is certainly beyond
our knowable domain. That makes the 'hard' hard. We 'like' to explain
DOWN everything in today's knowable terms. (Beware my agnostic views!)
Agnostisism is a good stance to take. I am a bit too bold and lean
into my beliefs. Sometimes too far...
Computation of course I consider a lot more than that (Platonistic?)
algorithmic calculation on our existing (and so knowable?) embryonic
device. I go for the Latin orig.: to THINK together - mathematically,
or beyond. That mat be a deficiency from my (Non-Indo-European) mother
tongue where the (improper?) translatable equivalent closes to the
term expectable. I am counting on your visit tomorrow.
That is similar to my notion of faith as expectation of future
truth...
/I strongly believe that computational complexity plays a huge role
in many aspects of the hard problem of consciousness and that the
Platonic approach to computer science is obscuring solutions as it is
blind to questions of resource availability and distribution./
(and a lot more, do we 'know' about them, or not (yet).
yep, unknown unknowns!
/Is the brain strictly a classical system? - No,...
/The *BRAIN* may be - as a 'Physical-World' figment of our
bio-physio conventional science image, but its mind-related
function(?) (especially the hard one) is much more than a 'system':
ALL 'parts' inventoried in explained functionality).
And: I keep away from the beloved thought-experiments invented to
make uncanny ideas practically(?) feasible.
Ah, I love thought experiments, the are the laboratory of
philosophy. ;-)
/...As I see it, there is no brain change without a mind change and
vice versa. The mind and brain are dual,... /
Thanks, Stephen, originally I thought there may be some
(tissue-related) minor brain-changes not affecting the mind of which
the 'brains' serves as a (material) tool in our sci? explanations.
Reading your post(s) I realized that it is a complexity and ANY change
in one part has consequences in the others.
Right. I have to account for the degradation effects.
Psycho-physical parallelism is either exact or not at all.
So whatever 'part' we landscape as the /'neuronal brain'/ it is
still part of the wider complexity unknowable.
Indeed!
Have a good trip onward
Thanks. ;-)
John M
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 8:43 PM, Stephen P. King
stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote:
On 10/21/2012 7:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 1:55 AM, Stephen P. King
stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote:
If there is a top-down effect of the mind on the atoms
then there we
would expect some scientific evidence of this.
Evidence would
constitute, for example, neurons firing when
measurements of
transmembrane potentials, ion concentrations etc.
suggest that they
should not. You claim that such anomalous behaviour of
neurons and
other cells due to consciousness is widespread, yet it
has never been
experimentally observed. Why?
Hi Stathis,
How would you set up the
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
On 10/23/2012 7:16 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/23/2012 3:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/23/2012 1:29 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/23/2012 3:40 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: snip But you wrote, Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard problem. An existence that is guaranteed by the definition. Hi Brent, OH! Well, I thank you for helping me clean up my language! Let me try again. ;--) First I need to address the word existence. I have tried to argue that to exists is to be necessarily possible but that attempt has fallen on deaf ears, well, it has until now for you are using it exactly how I am arguing that it should be used, as in An existence that is guaranteed by the definition. DO you see that existence does nothing for the issue of properties? The existence of a pink unicorn and the existence of the 1234345465475766th prime number are the same kind of existence, I don't see that they are even similar. Existence of the aforesaid prime number just means it satisfies a certain formula within an axiom system. The pink unicorn fails existence of a quite different kind, namely an ability to locate it in spacetime. It may still satisfy some propositions, such as, The animal that is pink, has one horn, and loses it's power in the presence of a virgin is obviously metaphorical.; just not ones we think of as axiomatic. Hi Brent, Why are they so different in your thinking? If the aforesaid prime number is such that there does not exist a physical symbol to represent it, how is it different from the pink unicorn? Why the insistence on a Pink Unicorn being a real' creature? I am using the case of the unicorn to force discussion of an important issue. We seem to have no problem believing that some mathematical object that cannot be physically constructed and yet balk at the idea of some cartoon creature. As I see it, the physical paper with a drawing of a pink horse with a horn protruding from its forehead or the brain activity of the little girl that is busy dreaming of riding a pink unicorn is just as physical as the mathematician crawling out an elaborate abstract proof on her chalkboard. A physical process is involved. So why the prejudice against the Unicorn? Both exists in our minds and, if my thesis is correct, then there is a physical process involved somewhere. No minds without bodies and no bodies without minds, or so the expression goes... once we drop the pretense that existence is dependent or contingent on physicality. It's not a pretense; it's a rejection of Platonism, or at least a distinction between different meanings of 'exists'. Right, I am questioning Platonism and trying to clear up the ambiguity in the word 'exists'. Is it possible to define Physicality can be considered solely in terms of bundles of particular properties, kinda like Bruno's bundles of computations that define any given 1p. My thinking is that what is physical is exactly what some quantity of separable 1p have as mutually consistent But do the 1p have to exist? Can they be Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson? 1p is the one thing that we cannot doubt, at least about our own 1p. Descartes did a good job discussing that in his /Meditations/... That something other than ourselves has a 1p, well, that is part of the hard problem! BTW, my definition of physicality is not so different from Bruno's, neither of us assumes that it is ontologically primitive and both of us, AFAIK, consider it as emergent or something from that which is sharable between a plurality of 1p. Do you have a problem with his concept of it? (or representable as a Boolean Algebra) but this consideration seems to run independent of anything physical. What could reasonably constrain the computations so that there is some thing real to a physical universe? That's already assuming the universe is just computation, which I think is begging the question. It's the same as saying, Why this and not that. No, I am trying to nail down whether the universe is computable or not. If it is computable, then it is natural to ask if something is computing it. If it is not computable, well.. that's a different can of worms! I am testing a hypothesis that requires the universe (at least the part that we can observe and talk about) to be representable as a particular kind of topological space that is dual to a Boolean algebra; therefore it must be computable in some sense. There has to be something that cannot be changed merely by changing one's point of view. So long as you think other 1p viewpoints exist then intersubjective agreement defines the 'real' 3p world. My thinking is that it exists as a necessary possibility in some a priori sense and it actually existing in a 'real 3p' sense are not the same thing. Is this a problem? The latter implies that it is accessible in some way. The former, well, there is some debate...
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
2012/10/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 10/21/2012 7:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 1:55 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: If there is a top-down effect of the mind on the atoms then there we would expect some scientific evidence of this. Evidence would constitute, for example, neurons firing when measurements of transmembrane potentials, ion concentrations etc. suggest that they should not. You claim that such anomalous behaviour of neurons and other cells due to consciousness is widespread, yet it has never been experimentally observed. Why? Hi Stathis, How would you set up the experiment? How do you control for an effect that may well be ubiquitous? Did you somehow miss the point that consciousness can only be observed in 1p? Why are you so insistent on a 3p of it? A top-down effect of consciousness on matter could be inferred if miraculous events were observed in neurophysiology research. The consciousness itself cannot be directly observed. Hi Stathis, This would be true only if consciousness is separate from matter, such as in Descartes failed theory of substance dualism. In the dual aspect theory that I am arguing for, there would never be any miracles that would contradict physical law. At most there would be statistical deviations from classical predictions. Check out http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/**ratmech.pdfhttp://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdffor details. My support for this theory and not materialism follows from materialism demonstrated inability to account for 1p. Dual aspect monism has 1p built in from first principles. BTW, I don't use the term dualism any more as what I am advocating seems to be too easily confused with the failed version. I don't mean putting an extra module into the brain, I mean putting the brain directly into the same configuration it is put into by learning the language in the normal way. How might we do that? Alter 1 neuron and you might not have the same mind. When you learn something, your brain physically changes. After a year studying Chinese it goes from configuration SPK-E to configuration SPK-E+C. If your brain were put directly into configuration SPK-E+C then you would know Chinese and have a false memory of the year of learning it. Ah, but is that change, from SPK-E to SPK-E+C, one that is numerable strictly in terms of a number of neurons changed? No. I would conjecture that it is a computational problem that is at least NP-hard. My reasoning is that if the change where emulable by a computation X *and* that X could also could be used to solve a P-hard problem, then there should exist an algorithm that could easily translate any statement in one language into another *and* finding that algorithm should require only some polynomial quantity of resources (relative to the number of possible algorithms). It should be easy to show that this is not the case. I don't understand why you're focusing on NP-hard problems... NP-hard problems are solvable algorithmically... but not efficiently. When I read you (I'm surely misinterpreting), it seems like you're saying you can't solve NP-hard problems... it's not the case,... but as your input grows, the time to solve the problem may be bigger than the time ellapsed since the bigbang. You could say that the NP-hard problems for most input are not technically/practically sovable but they are in theories (you have the algorithm) unlike undecidable problems like the halting problem. Quentin I strongly believe that computational complexity plays a huge role in many aspects of the hard problem of consciousness and that the Platonic approach to computer science is obscuring solutions as it is blind to questions of resource availability and distribution. In a thought experiment we can say that the imitation stimulates the surrounding neurons in the same way as the original. We can even say that it does this miraculously. Would such a device *necessarily* replicate the consciousness along with the neural impulses, or could the two be separated? Is the brain strictly a classical system? No, although the consensus appears to be that quantum effects are not significant in its functioning. In any case, this does not invalidate functionalism. Well, I don't follow the crowd. I agree that functionalist is not dependent on the type of physics of the system, but there is an issue of functional closure that must be met in my conjecture; there has to be some way for the system (that supports the conscious capacity) to be closed under the transformation involved. As I said, technical problems with computers are not relevant to the argument. The implant is just a device that has the correct timing of neural impulses. Would it necessarily preserve consciousness? Let's see. If I ingest psychoactive substances, there is a 1p observable
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
On 10/22/2012 6:05 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: I don't understand why you're focusing on NP-hard problems... NP-hard problems are solvable algorithmically... but not efficiently. When I read you (I'm surely misinterpreting), it seems like you're saying you can't solve NP-hard problems... it's not the case,... but as your input grows, the time to solve the problem may be bigger than the time ellapsed since the bigbang. You could say that the NP-hard problems for most input are not technically/practically sovable but they are in theories (you have the algorithm) unlike undecidable problems like the halting problem. Quentin Hi Quentin, Yes, they are solved algorithmically. I am trying to get some focus on the requirement of resources for computations to be said to be solvable. This is my criticism of the Platonic treatment of computer theory, it completely ignores these considerations. The Big Bang theory (considered in classical terms) has a related problem in its stipulation of initial conditions, just as the Pre-Established Harmony of Leibniz' Monadology. Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard problem. We cannot consider the solution to be accessible prior to its actual computation! The calculation of the minimum action configuration of the universe such that there is a universe that we observe now is in the state that it is and such is consistent with our existence in it must be explained either as being the result of some fortuitous accident or, as some claim, some intelligent design or some process working in some super-universe where our universe was somehow selected, if the prior computation idea is true. I am trying to find an alternative that does not require computations to occur prior to the universe's existence! Several people, such as Lee Smolin, Stuart Kaufmann and David Deutsch have advanced the idea that the universe is, literally, computing its next state in an ongoing fashion, so my conjecture is not new. The universe is computing solutions to NP-Hard problems, but not in any Platonic sense. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interactions between mind and brain
On 10/21/2012 7:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 1:55 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: If there is a top-down effect of the mind on the atoms then there we would expect some scientific evidence of this. Evidence would constitute, for example, neurons firing when measurements of transmembrane potentials, ion concentrations etc. suggest that they should not. You claim that such anomalous behaviour of neurons and other cells due to consciousness is widespread, yet it has never been experimentally observed. Why? Hi Stathis, How would you set up the experiment? How do you control for an effect that may well be ubiquitous? Did you somehow miss the point that consciousness can only be observed in 1p? Why are you so insistent on a 3p of it? A top-down effect of consciousness on matter could be inferred if miraculous events were observed in neurophysiology research. The consciousness itself cannot be directly observed. Hi Stathis, This would be true only if consciousness is separate from matter, such as in Descartes failed theory of substance dualism. In the dual aspect theory that I am arguing for, there would never be any miracles that would contradict physical law. At most there would be statistical deviations from classical predictions. Check out http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf for details. My support for this theory and not materialism follows from materialism demonstrated inability to account for 1p. Dual aspect monism has 1p built in from first principles. BTW, I don't use the term dualism any more as what I am advocating seems to be too easily confused with the failed version. I don't mean putting an extra module into the brain, I mean putting the brain directly into the same configuration it is put into by learning the language in the normal way. How might we do that? Alter 1 neuron and you might not have the same mind. When you learn something, your brain physically changes. After a year studying Chinese it goes from configuration SPK-E to configuration SPK-E+C. If your brain were put directly into configuration SPK-E+C then you would know Chinese and have a false memory of the year of learning it. Ah, but is that change, from SPK-E to SPK-E+C, one that is numerable strictly in terms of a number of neurons changed? No. I would conjecture that it is a computational problem that is at least NP-hard. My reasoning is that if the change where emulable by a computation X *and* that X could also could be used to solve a P-hard problem, then there should exist an algorithm that could easily translate any statement in one language into another *and* finding that algorithm should require only some polynomial quantity of resources (relative to the number of possible algorithms). It should be easy to show that this is not the case. I strongly believe that computational complexity plays a huge role in many aspects of the hard problem of consciousness and that the Platonic approach to computer science is obscuring solutions as it is blind to questions of resource availability and distribution. In a thought experiment we can say that the imitation stimulates the surrounding neurons in the same way as the original. We can even say that it does this miraculously. Would such a device *necessarily* replicate the consciousness along with the neural impulses, or could the two be separated? Is the brain strictly a classical system? No, although the consensus appears to be that quantum effects are not significant in its functioning. In any case, this does not invalidate functionalism. Well, I don't follow the crowd. I agree that functionalist is not dependent on the type of physics of the system, but there is an issue of functional closure that must be met in my conjecture; there has to be some way for the system (that supports the conscious capacity) to be closed under the transformation involved. As I said, technical problems with computers are not relevant to the argument. The implant is just a device that has the correct timing of neural impulses. Would it necessarily preserve consciousness? Let's see. If I ingest psychoactive substances, there is a 1p observable effect Is this a circumstance that is different in kind from that device? The psychoactive substances cause a physical change in your brain and thereby also a psychological change. Of course. As I see it, there is no brain change without a mind change and vice versa. The mind and brain are dual, as Boolean algebras and topological spaces are dual, the relation is an isomorphism between structures that have oppositely directed arrows of transformation. The math is very straight forward... People just have a hard time understanding the idea that all of matter is some form of topological space and there is no known calculus of variations for Boolean algebras (no one is looking for it, except for me, that
