Re: Introduction

2011-06-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi, On 06 Jun 2011, at 11:31, whitespectre wrote: Hello, I just joined here and I am excited to explore the world of knowledge of everything and nothing, I am 22 years old and a computer science graduate and I recently had a psychotic episode where I realised that everything is a computation

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-07-05 Thread Marchal
Brent Meeker wrote: OK. So do you invoke an anthropic principle in the step (computer law) = (mind law) ... Let us a say a Church Turing Markov -tropic principle, eventually. If you want I (re)define the physical by what is observable by a sound universal machine. And observable is eventually

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-07-04 Thread Marchal
Brent Meeker wrote (out of line, but I guess it is by error): I'm a little unclear on the ontological hierarchy of your TOE. Do you propose to show that, out of all computations, all our conscious experiences are recovered (by somehow identifying appropriate histories corresponding to us in

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-07-03 Thread rwas
Check out The Whipping Star by Frank Herbert. A neat story but kind of twisted. The story is about stars that are conscious. Robert W. could be conscious/aware in a way that we might recognize. If so, then stars too would probably have a very different idea about foundations than we

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-07-03 Thread Marchal
Hi Fred, I think relying on the sum/integral over all possible programs as the FINAL explanation would lead to avoiding the questions about details of the criteria. We are safe because we are included in the overall sum. True, for the general purpose of explaining our existence, we don't know

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-07-02 Thread Marchal
Fred Chen wrote: I appreciate how something like the Universal Dovetailer or equivalent programs can generate an infinite set of programs that could include the one that describes our universe (including our consciousness). You are confusing Schmidhuber-like theories with me-like theories (if I

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-07-02 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Fred: Without knowing these criteria, we cannot tell what is the simplest possible universe containing consciousness. I don't see why we should limit ourselves to the simplest possible universe containing consciousness. I would think that all worlds containing consciousness would be

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-07-02 Thread Fred Chen
I don't see why we should limit ourselves to the simplest possible universe containing consciousness. I would think that all worlds containing consciousness would be inhabited naturally. Joel Actually I agree, fundamentally. Perhaps, there is just a gut feeling around that simplest

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-07-02 Thread Fred Chen
Bruno, Joel, et. al., I appreciate how something like the Universal Dovetailer or equivalent programs can generate an infinite set of programs that could include the one that describes our universe (including our consciousness). However, Godel's theorem applied to this top-down approach would

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-07-01 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Bruno: I should have been more clear. I put at the (3-) bottom arithmetical truth. It just means I believe sentence like 2+2=4, Fermat theorem, ... Yes, I think we agree on this point. I gave the example of the minimal cellular automaton as another third-person verifiable structure. We

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-30 Thread Marchal
Joel wrote: Bruno: I am not sure there is any (absolute) bottom. Mustn't we assume there is? If there is no bottom, what will we stand on? How can we understand anything at all? I should have been more clear. I put at the (3-) bottom arithmetical truth. It just means I believe sentence like

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-30 Thread Saibal Mitra
Joel wrote: This may be true, but has anyone here (or anywhere else) ever checked to see that we can't program the universe exactly with simple algorithms? I think this is something new. (Check out what Stephen Wolfram has been doing lately: http://www.wolframscience.com) Everyone's

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-29 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Bruno: See http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2793.html for a universal dovetailer written in LISP. Among the LISP programs you have all the simulation of Fortran programs, Joel's minimal cellular automata, etc. Yes, this is true. But (of course :) I would like to argue in favor of

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-29 Thread hpm
Joel: ... But there MAY be some reasons to want to know exactly which algorithm is really being run on the bottom... Bruno: I am not sure there is any (absolute) bottom. Joel: Mustn't we assume there is? If there is no bottom, what will we stand on? How can we understand anything at all? I

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-29 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
hpm: Races that live in space realize that it's perfectly OK to build structures that have no foundation at all. They can be circular and unsupported, yet if you spin them they'll have gravity just like the ponderous planetary piles! This is a clever argument, but I think it's just a

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-29 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Bruno: All of this may seem academic really, since we all know that any universal computer is as good as any other. It's kindof like arguing about the kind of wood God's stool is made out of! But there MAY be some reasons to want to know exactly which algorithm is really being run on the

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-29 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Fred: Perhaps you are saying all worlds have some commonality eventually? Such as the program you mention below? Yes, I suppose so. If you'd like something to visualize... Imagine a huuuge Game of Life grid. Some regions of space will contain worlds that are relatively self-contained for

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-28 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Bruno: The mind body admit a lot of subproblem, like what is free-will An illusion. An illusion? That is a rather quick answer. Let us not enter into that perenial debate. Perhaps I should ask you exemple of what is not an illusion, what is your ontology. Good idea. Let me just say that

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-28 Thread Fred Chen
Joel, thanks for your clarification. Fred: If two worlds within this everything are contradictory or not consistent with each other, with no common ground, how exactly do they interact? Well I believe the universe is strictly local and completely homogeneous at the bottommost layer.

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-28 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Fred: If two worlds within this everything are contradictory or not consistent with each other, with no common ground, how exactly do they interact? Well I believe the universe is strictly local and completely homogeneous at the bottommost layer. So even though two worlds/cosmoses may be

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-28 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Robert: I object to what I see as an attempt to constrain all viewpoints to a particular way of seeing. I think your idea is fine. A tool for seeing things from a given vantage point. I'm sure there are other vantage points worth visiting, and tools needed to see from those perspectives as

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-27 Thread Marchal
Serafino Cerulli-Irelli (scerir) wrote: Christof Schmidhuber wrote an interesting paper, along that path: Strings from Logic http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0011065 What are strings made of? The possibility is discussed that strings are purely mathematical objects, made of logical axioms. More

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-27 Thread Russell Standish
Christof and Juergen are brothers, aren't they? Marchal wrote: Serafino Cerulli-Irelli (scerir) wrote: Christof Schmidhuber wrote an interesting paper, along that path: Strings from Logic http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0011065 What are strings made of? The possibility is discussed that

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-27 Thread Fred Chen
Joel, let's clarify our positions: To be clear, I envision just one universe that contains everything. Within it may be many worlds or sub-worlds, but these are not independent. They interact. If two worlds within this everything are contradictory or not consistent with each other, with no

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-26 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Hi Fred: I agree that any useful TOE should be able to be implemented on a (large enough) computer. Yes, I agree. This computation can then SIMULATE the relevant or important aspects of the universe we observe, or all aspects of other possible universes, with their APPARENT real-number

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-26 Thread scerir
Let us take the realist approach and focus on the things we can actually compute fully. Joel Godel's theorem prevents us from simulating all aspects of our universe. Fred Is that true? Goedel's argument does not prove the existence of absolutely unprovable (arithmetical) truths.

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-26 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Bruno: Would you formalise that by the total (defined everywhere) functions from N to N, or do you accept the partial computable functions as well? And why would you not accept also the functions computable relatively to the halting problem? They correspond naturally to the function

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-26 Thread Marchal
Joel wrote: If we cannot program it... it's not a Theory of EVERYTHING. It's just a description. You really should be an intuitionist mathematicien. It is consistent with most intuitionist mathematical system that 1) all function from N to N is computable. 2) all function from R to

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-26 Thread Fred Chen
Hi Scerir. Thanks for your explanation of Godel's theorem. Goedel's argument does not prove the existence of absolutely unprovable (arithmetical) truths. Its conclusion is relative to some first-order axiom system (of elementary arithmetic), and proves only that there is a true proposition

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-26 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Hi Brent: I find myself agreeing with you on your general point that any computational theory of everything must be strictly finite - not just countable. Thank goodness! I was beginning to think I was all alone!! On the other hand I think you are missing the point about pi. Pi can be

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-26 Thread Marchal
Joel wrote Bruno: The formulations are as numerous than the philosophical systems. For a materialist the problem is to explain what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for having the feeling of pain in a leg. Consider me a materialist then, I suppose. In the literature a

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-25 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Joel: It seems to me there is a great deal more information in PI than just the 2 bytes it takes to convey it in an email message. Russell: Not much more. One could express pi by a short program - eg the Wallis formula, that would be a few tens of bytes on most Turing machines. Even

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-25 Thread Russell Standish
Joel Dobrzelewski wrote: And please explain for me how this calculation involved the continuum or infinite binary expansion of the symbol pi in any meaningful way. Sorry, missed getting in this riposte in the last post. What does a binary expansion have to with the calculation .1 * 10 =

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-25 Thread Russell Standish
Joel Dobrzelewski wrote: Ok, sorry for being a smart-ass. Instead of baiting the discussion to make my point, I'll try to simply state the position clearly. We humans cannot deal with infinite structures, like pi. Numbers like pi and e and Omega and all the others are the devil! :)

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-25 Thread Fred Chen
Hello again Joel. I think I can agree with you, in a pragmatic sense, with what you state below. I agree that any useful TOE should be able to be implemented on a (large enough) computer. This computation can then SIMULATE the relevant or important aspects of the universe we observe, or all

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-25 Thread Russell Standish
Joel Dobrzelewski wrote: And please explain for me how this calculation involved the continuum or infinite binary expansion of the symbol pi in any meaningful way. All you have really said was: 2 * broccoli = 2 broccoli No - I said the circumference of a circle of diameter 1 is pi.

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-25 Thread Russell Standish
Joel Dobrzelewski wrote: But I don't dispute this, as I wasn't talking about the finite representation. I was talking about the infinite process / function that pi represents. Maybe this is obvious, but my whole point is that we are fooling ourselves if we think we can compute physics

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-22 Thread Marchal
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Bruno Marchal: 1) The Schmidhuber-Ruhl-Dobrzelewski-... approaches (SRD) 2) The other approaches, which take into account the fact that we have not yet solved the mind body problem. Von Weizsaecker said, long time ago, that Nature is earlier than man. But

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-22 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Joel: What is the mind-body problem? Bruno: The formulations are as numerous than the philosophical systems. For a materialist the problem is to explain what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for having the feeling of pain in a leg. Consider me a materialist then, I suppose.

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-22 Thread scerir
Von Weizsaecker said, long time ago, that Nature is earlier than man. But man is earlier than natural science. and Bruno wrote: Of course natural science is an ambiguous experience. I suppose you mean Human Natural Science. Yes. I think so. Christof Schmidhuber wrote an interesting

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-21 Thread Marchal
Joel wrote: What is the mind-body problem? The formulations are as numerous than the philosophical systems. For a materialist the problem is to explain what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for having the feeling of pain in a leg. For an idealist the problem is to explain what are

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-21 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
George: My position, is that there are no separations between worlds. There is only one single huge world, the plenitude and we live in it. The plenitude is choke full of white rabbits. In fact most of it is white rabbit stuff. I very much agree. The reason we don't see them is that

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-21 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Fred: Your cellular automaton demos look pretty neat, but how can you tell if they are conscious or self-aware? Do two of these interact in a social manner? Well, in the 3D version there must exist (if these automata are indeed minimal) configurations that look just like you and me

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-21 Thread Marchal
Joel wrote: What is weird from one perspective is not too weird in another. Some might thing it's strange, and others might not. I agree. So what I say is that we must explain why the world seems to *remain* normal to us. Suppose you have a theory of elementary particles, and that your

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-20 Thread Fred Chen
Joel, Your cellular automaton demos look pretty neat, but how can you tell if they are conscious or self-aware? Do two of these interact in a social manner? Do they interact with the programmer? True, it is hard to determine probabilities in an infinite set, but we get a feel for how likely

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-20 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Scerir: Thanks for your thoughtful reply. Today is commonly accepted that the QM domain is incompatible with that local realism. That is because Bell inequalities actually are violated. Local hidden variables do not exist. I know this is not a popular view, but I am not convinced of the

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-20 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Hi Fred: I have not corresponded with the distribution in quite a while. Your posting below seems to have caused some furor. That's good, right?! I tend to feel that the position that our universe is a digital cellular automaton is vulnerable, mainly because it implies that we can create

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-20 Thread scerir
Joel Dobrzelewski: I know this is not a popular view, but I am not convinced of the validity of such experiments. One proponent of the realist opinion, who has better arguments than I, is Caroline Thompson: http://users.aber.ac.uk/cat/ Yes, I know. But chances for loopholes are very narrow,

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-19 Thread scerir
Joel : And non-local effects must be similarly ruled out, as they too are forbidden to our intellect. Just as it is impossible for us to create non-discrete (i.e. continuous) theories, it is also not possible for humans to construct truly non-local theories. I hope so. But there are

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-19 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Ok, sorry for being a smart-ass. Instead of baiting the discussion to make my point, I'll try to simply state the position clearly. We humans cannot deal with infinite structures, like pi. Numbers like pi and e and Omega and all the others are the devil! :) And we all know the devil is in

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-18 Thread rwas rwas
Hello, --- Joel Dobrzelewski [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell and Brent: I understand this is an extreme position, but I state it this way on purpose: to bring the issue to the foreground and get to the heart of the problem of science today. As long as we insist that continuous

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-18 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Russell and Brent: I understand this is an extreme position, but I state it this way on purpose: to bring the issue to the foreground and get to the heart of the problem of science today. As long as we insist that continuous objects really exist - we will always be fooling ourselves and forever

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-18 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Hi Robert: Discrete and finite viewpoints are an artifact of a finite consciousness. I agree. It can, just not all at once. You could say Ram and paper are temporally challenged entities. Do you have an example of something (other than the universe itself) that is not temporally

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-18 Thread Russell Standish
You picked a bad example with pi. Many mathematicians manipulate pi with exact precision in their calculations. Many use computer programs to do this also, eg Mathematica. The lack of any possible representation as a rational number does not prove a barrier to this. Your point would be better

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-17 Thread Russell Standish
Joel Dobrzelewski wrote: I stand by my original claim: Any successful human Theory of Everything must recognize the discrete nature of the human intellect, and our inability to express or engage the continuum in any meaningful way. That is a particularly extreme way of putting it. All

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-17 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Robert: but my view is that consciousness does'nt need descretization to function. Yes, I think we agree here. But I must admit, I am at a loss as to imagine what non-discrete might be. It's more likely that a more fluid view of the universe is the accurate model. Why? If we cannot

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-17 Thread Brent Meeker
On 17-Jun-01, Russell Standish wrote: Joel Dobrzelewski wrote: I stand by my original claim: Any successful human Theory of Everything must recognize the discrete nature of the human intellect, and our inability to express or engage the continuum in any meaningful way. That is a

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-15 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Hi George: You say that you believe that our universe is discrete. I agree with this... but I believe that discreteness is itself a mystery. Why discrete? It may very well be that discreteness is a necessary condition for consciousness and therefore anthropically driven. Discreteness

Re: Introduction (Digital Physics)

2001-06-14 Thread Joel Dobrzelewski
Thanks for your reply, Bruno... All this for reasons similar to those made by Everett in his many world papers. Have you read Everett ? (or at least Tegmark? or Deutsch?) Just Tegmark. I'm looking into the others... Is it more impressioning than the (binary) counting algorithm, which