On Apr 2, 11:21 pm, stephenk stephe...@charter.net wrote:
Hi Nick,
On Apr 2, 7:22 am, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:
Yes agreed. Also if timelike entanglements occurred there would be
less worry about conflict with relativity than there was originally
with spacelike
-Original Message-
From: Nick Prince
Sent: Monday, April 04, 2011 1:55 PM
To: Everything List
Subject: Re: Is QTI false?
Yes Sheldrakes ideas are just the kind of thing I was thinking of. I
think that he looked at my paper and used a reference to, I think?
alligned himself
On Apr 4, 7:16 pm, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
-Original Message-
From: Nick Prince
Sent: Monday, April 04, 2011 1:55 PM
To: Everything List
Subject: Re: Is QTI false?
Yes Sheldrakes ideas are just the kind of thing I was thinking of. I
think that he looked
On Mon, Apr 04, 2011 at 02:25:04PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
Hi Russell
Hi Russell
Sorry I'm not making it clear what I meant – but I think I may have
got a handle on it now. I was thinking about Bruno’s thought
experiment. Suppose I am encoded in Brussels, my original is destroyed
On Apr 2, 7:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 02 Apr 2011, at 13:52, Nick Prince wrote:
On Apr 1, 6:33 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi Nick,
On 31 Mar 2011, at 23:41, Nick Prince wrote:
Bruno wrote
With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being
On Apr 2, 12:08 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sat, Apr 2, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Nick Prince
nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:
Ok Stathis thanks for that but what about the consciousness of the
viking living in 200 AD. The NCDSC will require some pretty unusual
On Tue, Apr 5, 2011 at 9:43 AM, Nick Prince
nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:
On Apr 2, 12:08 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sat, Apr 2, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Nick Prince
nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:
Ok Stathis thanks for that but what about the consciousness
On Sat, Apr 2, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Nick Prince
nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:
Ok Stathis thanks for that but what about the consciousness of the
viking living in 200 AD. The NCDSC will require some pretty unusual
branches to accomodate his survival. I've read some of your posts
before
Yes agreed. Also if timelike entanglements occurred there would be
less worry about conflict with relativity than there was originally
with spacelike effects. However if I understand decoherence
correctly, information from the system passes into the environment so
it is there somehow but very
On Apr 1, 6:33 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi Nick,
On 31 Mar 2011, at 23:41, Nick Prince wrote:
Bruno wrote
With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a
baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more
continuous way, by little
On Mar 31, 1:43 am, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
On Wed, Mar 30, 2011 at 03:15:59PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI”
And I want to put forward some issues arising from this.
It seems that (if MWI is true) we live
On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 6:38 PM, Nick Prince
nickmag.pri...@googlemail.comwrote:
On Apr 1, 12:26 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 8:42 AM, Nick Prince
nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:
Stathis wrote
That we don't see extremely old
On 02 Apr 2011, at 13:52, Nick Prince wrote:
On Apr 1, 6:33 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi Nick,
On 31 Mar 2011, at 23:41, Nick Prince wrote:
Bruno wrote
With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to
being a
baby. We can may be get slowly younger and
On 4/2/2011 6:08 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sat, Apr 2, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Nick Prince
nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:
Ok Stathis thanks for that but what about the consciousness of the
viking living in 200 AD. The NCDSC will require some pretty unusual
branches to accomodate
Hi Nick,
On Apr 2, 7:22 am, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:
Yes agreed. Also if timelike entanglements occurred there would be
less worry about conflict with relativity than there was originally
with spacelike effects. However if I understand decoherence
correctly,
On Sat, Apr 02, 2011 at 05:12:28AM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
Hi Russell
I have considered also the possibility that the NCDSC may not
necessarilly operate simultaneously - this would imply temporary 3rd
person culde sacs! Just as in Bruno's teleportation experiment, there
is no reason why
On Sun, Apr 3, 2011 at 7:36 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But then why is your demise relevant? Presumably because if you did not die
then the most consistent extension would be that your consciousness remain
associated with your body - but as your body/brain deteriorates the most
On Sun, Apr 3, 2011 at 8:42 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
When you say temporary cul-de-sacs, do you mean after which there is
some kind of amnesia, and then you follow a non cul-de-sac history? If
these really existed, then I would say the NCDS conjecture is refuted,
and
Nick,
the rewinding of the aging process is tricky. Now I am diverting from my
lately absorbed worldview of an unlimited complexity of everything of which
we (humans) can acknowledge only a part and build from that our
'mini-solipsism' (after Colin H) - matching in *part* with many humans, by
On 01 Apr 2011, at 01:51, Johnathan Corgan wrote:
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Or something like that. Quantum logic (and also its arithmetical
form) has
many notion of implication. The one above is the closer to the
Sazaki Hook
which Hardegree
Hi Nick,
On 31 Mar 2011, at 23:41, Nick Prince wrote:
Bruno wrote
With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a
baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more
continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most
normal world compatible
On 01 Apr 2011, at 02:10, meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 03/31/11, Nick Princenickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:Bruno
wrote
With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to
being a
baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more
continuous way, by little
On 01 Apr 2011, at 00:58, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 02:52:44PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is here that if we apply Bayes' theorem (like in the Doomday
argument), we should be astonished not being already very old (from
our first person perspective). But Bayes cannot
On Apr 1, 12:26 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 8:42 AM, Nick Prince
nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:
Stathis wrote
That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since
from the third person perspective rare events such
On Apr 1, 7:38 pm, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:
On Apr 1, 12:26 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 8:42 AM, Nick Prince
nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:
Stathis wrote
That we don't see extremely old people is consistent
Brent, Nick,
On 31 Mar 2011, at 03:06, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/30/2011 3:15 PM, Nick Prince wrote:
In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI”
And I want to put forward some issues arising from this.
It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear
to
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:15 AM, Nick Prince
nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:
In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI”
And I want to put forward some issues arising from this.
It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear
to live a finite,
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 11:43 AM, Russell Standish
li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
This is a variant of an argument that David Parfit uses in his book
Reasons and Persons, where he considers a continuum from his mind
to that of Napoleon. (Don't flame me if I get the details wrong - the
essence
On 31 Mar 2011, at 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:15 AM, Nick Prince
nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:
In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI”
And I want to put forward some issues arising from this.
It seems that (if MWI is true) we
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 8:52 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Is QTI false?
On 31 Mar 2011, at 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:15 AM, Nick Prince
nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote
On 31 Mar 2011, at 15:35, Stephen Paul King wrote:
-Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 8:52 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Is QTI false?
On 31 Mar 2011, at 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:15 AM
On Mar 31, 1:43 am, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
The observation that other people never seem to live beyond a certain
age is not evidence against the NCDSC. Only logical
impossibility can count. Even physical impossibility is insufficient,
because there is always the
Bruno wrote
With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a
baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more
continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most
normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are
not
Stathis wrote
That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since
from the third person perspective rare events such as living to a
great age happen only rarely. However, from the first person
perspective you will live to a great age, and this will happen in the
most
On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 8:42 AM, Nick Prince
nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:
Stathis wrote
That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since
from the third person perspective rare events such as living to a
great age happen only rarely. However, from the first person
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Or something like that. Quantum logic (and also its arithmetical form) has
many notion of implication. The one above is the closer to the Sazaki Hook
which Hardegree used to show that orthomodularity in quantum
On 03/31/11, Nick Princenickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:Bruno wrote With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most normal world
On Mar 31, 8:10 pm, meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 03/31/11,Nick Princenickmag.pri...@googlemail.comwrote:Bruno wrote
With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a
baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more
continuous way, by little
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 02:52:44PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is here that if we apply Bayes' theorem (like in the Doomday
argument), we should be astonished not being already very old (from
our first person perspective). But Bayes cannot be applied in this
setting, as we have already
On 3/31/2011 5:58 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 02:52:44PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is here that if we apply Bayes' theorem (like in the Doomday
argument), we should be astonished not being already very old (from
our first person perspective). But Bayes cannot be
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 09:52:25PM -0500, meekerdb wrote:
Standish, and weighted by the universal prior, giving more weight to
being a baby than an adult.
Is that assuming that QM uncertainty increases to the future but not
the past:?
Brent
In QM, the state evolves unitarily, which
On 3/31/2011 10:08 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 09:52:25PM -0500, meekerdb wrote:
Standish, and weighted by the universal prior, giving more weight to
being a baby than an adult.
Is that assuming that QM uncertainty increases to the future but not
the past:?
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 10:20:58PM -0500, meekerdb wrote:
Couldn't the person have been born at different times too? QM
Hamiltonians are time symmetric. If you try to infer the past you
also have unitary evolution - just in the other direction. So I'm
wondering where the arrow of time
On Wed, Mar 30, 2011 at 03:15:59PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI”
And I want to put forward some issues arising from this.
It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear
to live a finite, small lifetime of
On 3/30/2011 3:15 PM, Nick Prince wrote:
In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI”
And I want to put forward some issues arising from this.
It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear
to live a finite, small lifetime of around 70 years. From the
-Original Message-
From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
I wasn't referring to that snippet, but another one discussing the
evolution of superclusters of galaxies. The theory predicts that the
universe will ultimately come to be dominated by said clusters. The
snippet I
I wasn't referring to that snippet, but another one discussing the
evolution of superclusters of galaxies. The theory predicts that the
universe will ultimately come to be dominated by said clusters. The
snippet I mentioned seems to be referring to our measured velocity of
ca 600km/s in the
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
I suspect you are trying to find ways of making QTI compatible with
Jacques ASSA based argument, when it is clear his argument fails
completely. Not that the argument is unimportant, as the reasons for
the failure are also interesting.
What the hell
-Original Message-
From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Wednesday, 12 September 2001 12:35 p.m.
To: Charles Goodwin
Cc: Everything-List (E-mail)
Subject: Re: Conventional QTI = False
The reason for failure of Jacques' argument is no. 1) from Charles's
list
Hi Saibal,
I don't know if there is an accepted formulation for QTI and the
conservation of memory, however, the only constraint that seems logical
to me is that the consciousness extensions should be logically
consistent, because logical consistenty is a prerequisite for
consciousness.
I can
-Original Message-
From: George Levy [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Wednesday, 12 September 2001 10:48 a.m.
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Conventional QTI = False
Charles Goodwin wrote:
George Levy wrote
I don't know if there is an accepted formulation for QTI
The lines are too large for my screen to handle but I have fixed that by
setting my Netscape to wrap automatically (it does so at around 70
characters). The output is irregular but it's OK.
Charles Goodwin wrote:
Re wrapping around - I've set MS Outlook to wrap at 132 characters (the largest
-Original Message-
From: Jacques Mallah [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
I suspect you are trying to find ways of making QTI compatible with
Jacques ASSA based argument, when it is clear his argument fails
completely. Not that the argument is
-Original Message-
From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Except that it is possible to perform an infinite amount of
computation in the big crunch due to Tipler's argument, and only a
finite amount of computation with the open universe (Dyson's
argument). Sort of the
The reason for failure of Jacques' argument is no. 1) from Charles's
list below, which he obviously thought of independently of me. I
originally posted this at
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m583.html, on 10th May
1999. Unfortunately, I couldn't find where the orginal SSA argument
was
that he'll
live to be 80 is 1/80?)
Charles
-Original Message-
From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Wednesday, 12 September 2001 12:35 p.m.
To: Charles Goodwin
Cc: Everything-List (E-mail)
Subject: Re: Conventional QTI = False
The reason for failure of Jacques
Never heard of this reasoning before. Can you expand please? This
doesn't appear to be related to the problem of being required to
forget how old you if you are immortal in a physical human sense.
Cheers
Saibal Mitra wrote:
According to the
I just argue that to compute the probability distribution for your next
experience, given your previous ones, you must also consider continuations
were you suffer memory loss. QTI fails to do so and it is precisely this
that leads to the the prediction that you should find yourself being
QTI, as formulated by some on this list (I call this conventional QTI), is
supposed to imply that you should experience becoming arbitrarily old with
probability one. It is this prediction that I am attacking.
I have no problems with the fact that according to quantum mechanics there
is a finite
As I said, this is a completely new interpretation of QTI, one never
stated before. QTI does _not_ assume that memory is conserved. The
prediction that one may end up being so old as to not know how old you
are is based on the assumption that you total memory capacity remains
constant - it need
Saibal writes:
According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you can
also never forget anything. I don't believe this because I know for a
fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a
long time ago.
Right, but to make the same argument against QTI
-Original Message-
From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
In the case of a person suffering from a terminal disease, it
is much more
likely that he will survive in a branch where he was not
diagnosed with the
disease, than in a branch where the disease is magically
cured.
Hal Finney wrote:
Saibal writes:
According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you can
also never forget anything. I don't believe this because I know for a
fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a
long time ago.
Right, but to make the
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