Re: Is QTI false?
On Apr 2, 11:21 pm, stephenk stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Nick, On Apr 2, 7:22 am, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: Yes agreed. Also if timelike entanglements occurred there would be less worry about conflict with relativity than there was originally with spacelike effects. However if I understand decoherence correctly, information from the system passes into the environment so it is there somehow but very dispersed. [SPK] Yes, but only rarely is the environment an ideal gas or monolithic solid such that our usual ideas of diffusion and dispersal will apply. I suspect that we need to think about how decoherence works in a framework that takes into consideration a wide variety of rates and that considers how the phase entanglement is distributed. I have tried to find work examining this and only recently some papers have come out. See:http://www.quantiki.org/wiki/Decoherence-free_subspacesandhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decoherence-free_subspaces It took a while, but Tegmark's no-go is finally loosing its hold. (I swear that guy is the reincarnation of Lord Kelvin!) From what I can tell decoherence is more of an effects that disperses among the many-worlds and not one that spreads within a single world - like photons. We really do not have good physical analogies for it! I did write a paper once(when I was younger and more stupid, so it has very doubtful worth) but I tried to formalise mathematically how memories might be stored in space time rather than in the brain at all ie working on the idea that the brain was more of an aeriel rather than a hard drive. These memories could then be later picked up by a simulated entity by appropriate tuning. It was a stab in the dark. [SPK] Interesting idea! It reminds me of Sheldrake's Morphic fields. I think that James P. Hogan wrote a novel based on a similar idea also, except in Paths to Otherwhere the ideas was to tune in on differing parallel worlds and even travel between them. I think that we still do not fully understand the implications of QM. Onward! Stephen On Apr 2, 1:59 am, stephenk stephe...@charter.net wrote: snip The idea that the EPR effect would work across time-like as well as space-like intervals makes sense in light of relativity. I am surprised that more people have not looked into it! The main difficulty I see is that there is a huge prejudice against the idea that macroscopic systems can be entangled such that EPR type relations could hold and have effects like you are considering here. Most of the arguments for decoherence inevitably assume that *all* of the degrees of freedom of a QM system are subject to one and the same decoherence rate with its environment. What if this is not the case? What if there is a stratification of sorts possible within macroscopic systems such that degrees of freedom can decohere are differing rates? Correlations of the EPR type would be possible within these, it seems to me...- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - Yes Sheldrakes ideas are just the kind of thing I was thinking of. I think that he looked at my paper and used a reference to, I think? alligned himself with Matti Pitkanen who was a referee for the paper. Pitkanen promotes Topological Geometrodynamics and somehow this accounts for consciousness etc - I think? Unfortunately I am no good at quantum field theory and GMD seems full of it - I really can't understand any of it. He uses p-adic numbers but it's a while since I read about it. He has quite a few papers out on vixra.org. so I guess I should browse them again. Best wishes Nick -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
-Original Message- From: Nick Prince Sent: Monday, April 04, 2011 1:55 PM To: Everything List Subject: Re: Is QTI false? Yes Sheldrakes ideas are just the kind of thing I was thinking of. I think that he looked at my paper and used a reference to, I think? alligned himself with Matti Pitkanen who was a referee for the paper. Pitkanen promotes Topological Geometrodynamics and somehow this accounts for consciousness etc - I think? Unfortunately I am no good at quantum field theory and GMD seems full of it - I really can't understand any of it. He uses p-adic numbers but it's a while since I read about it. He has quite a few papers out on vixra.org. so I guess I should browse them again. Best wishes Nick ** Hi Nick, I know Matti well, we have been discussing his theory for quite a while in a private group that Hitoshi Kitada hosts. He used topological notions to try to explain consciousness. We are very interested in your comments on his work! Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Apr 4, 7:16 pm, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.net wrote: -Original Message- From: Nick Prince Sent: Monday, April 04, 2011 1:55 PM To: Everything List Subject: Re: Is QTI false? Yes Sheldrakes ideas are just the kind of thing I was thinking of. I think that he looked at my paper and used a reference to, I think? alligned himself with Matti Pitkanen who was a referee for the paper. Pitkanen promotes Topological Geometrodynamics and somehow this accounts for consciousness etc - I think? Unfortunately I am no good at quantum field theory and GMD seems full of it - I really can't understand any of it. He uses p-adic numbers but it's a while since I read about it. He has quite a few papers out on vixra.org. so I guess I should browse them again. Best wishes Nick ** Hi Nick, I know Matti well, we have been discussing his theory for quite a while in a private group that Hitoshi Kitada hosts. He used topological notions to try to explain consciousness. We are very interested in your comments on his work! Onward! Stephen- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - Hi Stephen Well what interested me was that I thought he was saying a similar thing as me but in a much more rigorous and very knowledgeable but different way in terms of the physics, but accounting for all the connections with field theory etc. However, as I said, I really did not have the background to evaluate or understand anything he was saying in his work. I was really very grateful that he considered my own ideas as even worth putting in a journal when it was really only a speculative stab at proposing a possible way in which physics might favour the reconstitution of past structures in the absence of information. So yes some sort of morphogenesis affect and I thought that this might actually explain how we remember things and may be the way that copying of consciousness might be possible. Please convey my regards to Matti and thanks for once giving me some consideration. I will look at his work again. Nick -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Mon, Apr 04, 2011 at 02:25:04PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote: Hi Russell Hi Russell Sorry I'm not making it clear what I meant – but I think I may have got a handle on it now. I was thinking about Bruno’s thought experiment. Suppose I am encoded in Brussels, my original is destroyed and I am reconstituted in Moscow and Washington. The reconstitution in Moscow is immediate, but in Washington, it takes place after a delay of a year or so. Now this single universe process is assumed to carry over into the case of a universe which splits via MWI, at an appropriate time, into one where I survive some disaster and another in which I do not. But suppose in the one where I do not survive, the medics manage to make a copy of me which gets activated a year or so later. This then mirrors Bruno’s experiment. Now I think I was getting mixed up about Microscopic and macroscopic things and thought that somehow this violated QM in some way. However as long as the copying process produces an “appropriate” Hamiltonian representing the “me” which is sufficient to encapsulate what was essentially my consciousness and “state” prior to the split, then the gap should be just the same as in Bruno’s example. Would you (anyone) disagree? What constitutes an appropriate Hamiltonian of me is another issue, but in principle this is what I am thinking is the way to approach the two parallel situations. Best Nick Thanks Nick. I had got the wrong end of the stick. You have cleverly highlighted an intuition pump that exposes a potential difference between QM and COMP. If you took causality to be important for consciousness then you would have to disagree at Bruno's step 4 of the UDA. You would also disregard continuations that existed outside our future light cone - such as the case of Tegmark's level 1 Multiverse (spatially separated regions of spacetime that happen to have the same microscopic configuration). I think that causality is a red herring here (and possibly even a misleading concept). What counts is consistency between prior and successor observer moments. Then step 4 goes through in the quantum multiverse, as it does in Bruno's teleportation experiment. On a somewhat related issue, let me proved that time machines are possible, in principle. Consider David Deutsch's discussion of time travel in which he resolves the grandfather paradox by means of the multiverse. When you travel back in time, and then folloow the normal course of history, you will end up (with near certainty - ie probability 1) in a different branch to where you started. If you kill your own grandfather, you will definitely end up in a branch in which your grandfather never had your father. To travel in time and (multi-) space in the Multiverse has to be equivalent to selecting a particular book from the Library of Babel. And how might you do that? There is no catalogue - the catalogue is somewhere there in the library, along with all its false cousins. The only possibility is to have the book to start with, then you could find its copy in the library. Just the same, time travel in the multiverse requires you to have an accurate description of the past observer moment - and the machine can only select an OM that is consistent with your description, it cannot know which of the infinitely many consistent OMs you had in mind, though. So all you need to go back in time is a sufficiently powerful virtual reality generator to generate the experience of what you remembered being at that time. The future history will, of course, unfold completely differently, just as in the example above, so any such machine will be useless for winning the lottery. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Apr 2, 7:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 Apr 2011, at 13:52, Nick Prince wrote: On Apr 1, 6:33 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Nick, On 31 Mar 2011, at 23:41, Nick Prince wrote: Bruno wrote With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are not excluded. Hi Bruno Maybe what I am trying to say is that very old or dying brains might deterorate in a specific way that allows the transition from an old to a young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way homomorphic to a young brain. At the software level of the brain, I think that this is very plausible. It already happens during sleep, and with some drugs. But this can take many modalities. Darwinian selection might even have selected brain features helping the recovering of shocks and disease. And what is best than a little visit in Mother Platonia :) That the dead brain does that, is more Harry Potter like, but then dying consists in following the most normal world where we survive, and this, very plausibly, is not a *very* normal world, despite it obeys the same physical laws. Eventually, where you go, might even depend on you and on what you identify yourself with. Indeed this defines the consciousness I am considering and is therefore subtrate dependent. The UD reasoning shows that there is just no substrate at all. The apparent 'substrate is made-of (an internal sort of projection) an infinity of (digital) computations, that is number relations. If all of physics can be simulated on a computer then no problem. Well, the substrate is not simulable on a computer. At least not a priori. But your reasoning still go through, given that your mind is a sort of truncation from that substrate, and that, by definition, you survive on the (infinitely many) computations where you survive. But this is indeterminate, if only because we cannot know our level of substitution. If you accept the classical theory of knowledge, it is easy. Computer are already conscious. They have not the tools to manifest their consciousness, and by programming them, we don't help them with that respect. Consciousness is not programmable. It exists in Platonia, and a universal machine is only a sort of interface between different levels of the Platonic reality (arithmetical truth). This is an interesting comment! Are you saying that everything including consciousness really emanates from platonia? Yes. Would you agree that we exist eternally in platonia? Yes. (but who we?) Yes in a trivial sense. Comp makes arithmetical platonia enough, and it contains our histories. It is the block ontological reality. It is far greater than the computable (99,999...% of arithmetical truth is not computable, decidable, etc.). Yes, in less trivial senses: - in the sense of the comp or quantum-like form of immortality, like above. - in the sense à-la 'salvia divinorum', which is that we might be able to remain conscious out of time, space, etc. It is like remembering we really are one and live in Platonia. With comp, that would be like remembering that we are nothing more than a universal machine. I have not yet a clear opinion on this. Both practically and theoretically. But there is something interesting in lurking there. It is related to the personal identity question, and who are we? If so then perhaps we need only consider computationalism /QM as a means of comprehending the steps to this understanding. Sure. This platonic realm is very useful but hard to pin down as a concept. With comp it is just the well known structure (N, +, *), often called, by logicians, 'the standard model of Peano Arithmetic'. If you accept that propositions like 24 is even are true, or false, independently of you and me, that almost enough. You can pin down the arithmetical platonia by the set of true arithmetical sentences, or even just the set of their Gödel numbers, so that it is only a particular set of numbers. The arithmetical sentences are the grammatically correct formula build from the logical symbol (A, E, x, y, z, ..., , V, ~, -, (, ), = ) together with the symbol 0, s, +, *. For example: - the arithmetical truth 1 2 can be written Ex(s(0) + x = s(s(0))), - the arithmetical truth saying that if a number is more little than another number, then it is more little than the successor of that another number is written: AxAy((x y) - (x s(y))), where x y abbreviates Ez(x+s(z) = y), - the proposition 24 is even can be written Ez(z * s(s(0)) = s (s (s (s
Re: Is QTI false?
On Apr 2, 12:08 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Apr 2, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: Ok Stathis thanks for that but what about the consciousness of the viking living in 200 AD. The NCDSC will require some pretty unusual branches to accomodate his survival. I've read some of your posts before about personal identity and much of it makes a lot of sense. I've thought about the possibility of mind uploads , even for my viking friend but this would require the generation of huge numbers of variants to ensure there was one which could provide a consistent extension for him. Indeed it would mean every possible viking would have to be generated from DNA possibilities alone as well as with different memories. It's a bit of a tall order but not implausible. It also means that many completely NEW vikings will be generated who never existed in the past but think they did! You would survive in the most probable way given your circumstances, but it's not difficult to think of a means of survival for any possible situation. For example, if you are a viking it transpires that you are living in a simulation and the programmers magically save you. None of this is problematic if every possibility actually happens somewhere in the multiverse. Also note that it does not have to be your actual matter that continues in some form. It just has to be another entity somewhere in the multiverse with a mind that is a consistent extension of your mind at the moment of your demise. -- Stathis Papaioannou Hi Stathis Thanks for helpfulful replies. You say that none of this is problematic if every possibility actually happens. I'm wondering if you are thinking of Tegmarks levels 1-4 universes. By this I mean do you think there no limits to what is possible or that logically impossible things happen like having a square circle or something. When people on the list talk of the plenitude or multiverse I wonder if some think the laws of physics are different or whether it is just the physical constants. I accept that most will think that level 1 is quite rich for many possiblities, but not every possibility. I would think that Logical possibility is a limit except logical would have to mean arithmetical truth as Bruno speaks of. Logical - as in common sense can often be far from common. Best wishes Nick -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Tue, Apr 5, 2011 at 9:43 AM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: On Apr 2, 12:08 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Apr 2, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: Ok Stathis thanks for that but what about the consciousness of the viking living in 200 AD. The NCDSC will require some pretty unusual branches to accomodate his survival. I've read some of your posts before about personal identity and much of it makes a lot of sense. I've thought about the possibility of mind uploads , even for my viking friend but this would require the generation of huge numbers of variants to ensure there was one which could provide a consistent extension for him. Indeed it would mean every possible viking would have to be generated from DNA possibilities alone as well as with different memories. It's a bit of a tall order but not implausible. It also means that many completely NEW vikings will be generated who never existed in the past but think they did! You would survive in the most probable way given your circumstances, but it's not difficult to think of a means of survival for any possible situation. For example, if you are a viking it transpires that you are living in a simulation and the programmers magically save you. None of this is problematic if every possibility actually happens somewhere in the multiverse. Also note that it does not have to be your actual matter that continues in some form. It just has to be another entity somewhere in the multiverse with a mind that is a consistent extension of your mind at the moment of your demise. -- Stathis Papaioannou Hi Stathis Thanks for helpfulful replies. You say that none of this is problematic if every possibility actually happens. I'm wondering if you are thinking of Tegmarks levels 1-4 universes. By this I mean do you think there no limits to what is possible or that logically impossible things happen like having a square circle or something. When people on the list talk of the plenitude or multiverse I wonder if some think the laws of physics are different or whether it is just the physical constants. I accept that most will think that level 1 is quite rich for many possiblities, but not every possibility. I would think that Logical possibility is a limit except logical would have to mean arithmetical truth as Bruno speaks of. Logical - as in common sense can often be far from common. Best wishes Nick Even Tegmark's Level 1 multiverse is sufficient to provide continuation of consciousness at every apparently terminal event; for example through the device of waking from a dream. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Sat, Apr 2, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: Ok Stathis thanks for that but what about the consciousness of the viking living in 200 AD. The NCDSC will require some pretty unusual branches to accomodate his survival. I've read some of your posts before about personal identity and much of it makes a lot of sense. I've thought about the possibility of mind uploads , even for my viking friend but this would require the generation of huge numbers of variants to ensure there was one which could provide a consistent extension for him. Indeed it would mean every possible viking would have to be generated from DNA possibilities alone as well as with different memories. It's a bit of a tall order but not implausible. It also means that many completely NEW vikings will be generated who never existed in the past but think they did! You would survive in the most probable way given your circumstances, but it's not difficult to think of a means of survival for any possible situation. For example, if you are a viking it transpires that you are living in a simulation and the programmers magically save you. None of this is problematic if every possibility actually happens somewhere in the multiverse. Also note that it does not have to be your actual matter that continues in some form. It just has to be another entity somewhere in the multiverse with a mind that is a consistent extension of your mind at the moment of your demise. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
Yes agreed. Also if timelike entanglements occurred there would be less worry about conflict with relativity than there was originally with spacelike effects. However if I understand decoherence correctly, information from the system passes into the environment so it is there somehow but very dispersed. I did write a paper once(when I was younger and more stupid, so it has very doubtful worth) but I tried to formalise mathematically how memories might be stored in space time rather than in the brain at all ie working on the idea that the brain was more of an aeriel rather than a hard drive. These memories could then be later picked up by a simulated entity by appropriate tuning. It was a stab in the dark. Best Nick On Apr 2, 1:59 am, stephenk stephe...@charter.net wrote: On Apr 1, 7:38 pm, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: On Apr 1, 12:26 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 8:42 AM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: Stathis wrote That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since from the third person perspective rare events such as living to a great age happen only rarely. However, from the first person perspective you will live to a great age, and this will happen in the most probable way, even if it is improbable in absolute (third person) terms. Stathis Papaioannou- Hi Stathis I am wondering how this might work out in practice. In particular, if I find myself more and more in worlds where I am older, would I expect to see others older and as old as me? If ageing happens in the most probable way then would this not mean that I would expect to see this as a first person plural experience because I would feel it improbable if I were the only 500 year person around? The most probable way I can think of is that as you get older, medical science advances and everyone lives longer, then eventually mind uploading becomes available. -- Stathis Papaioannou- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - Ok Stathis thanks for that but what about the consciousness of the viking living in 200 AD. The NCDSC will require some pretty unusual branches to accomodate his survival. I've read some of your posts before about personal identity and much of it makes a lot of sense. I've thought about the possibility of mind uploads , even for my viking friend but this would require the generation of huge numbers of variants to ensure there was one which could provide a consistent extension for him. Indeed it would mean every possible viking would have to be generated from DNA possibilities alone as well as with different memories. It's a bit of a tall order but not implausible. It also means that many completely NEW vikings will be generated who never existed in the past but think they did! To keep everything more tidy I would expect that the laws of physics might still hold in secret a form of epr effect across timelike intervals rather than the more usual spacelike ones. This would entail consciousness being able to be tuned to accept a state change into the appropriate person in a similar way that measuring the spin of a particle in one place tunes the spin of a partner particle in the well known way. There is no problem achieving contiuity if the (appropriately complete) information about a person is kept safe over the time interval as in Bruno's teleportation thought experiment. However if we wanted to produce a Bostrom type ancestor simulation then there would be a huge reduncy of consciousness generated in order to enable consistent extensions to be available as the NCDSC would need. Regards Nick Hi Nick, The idea that the EPR effect would work across time-like as well as space-like intervals makes sense in light of relativity. I am surprised that more people have not looked into it! The main difficulty I see is that there is a huge prejudice against the idea that macroscopic systems can be entangled such that EPR type relations could hold and have effects like you are considering here. Most of the arguments for decoherence inevitably assume that *all* of the degrees of freedom of a QM system are subject to one and the same decoherence rate with its environment. What if this is not the case? What if there is a stratification of sorts possible within macroscopic systems such that degrees of freedom can decohere are differing rates? Correlations of the EPR type would be possible within these, it seems to me... Onward! Stephen- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit
Re: Is QTI false?
On Apr 1, 6:33 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Nick, On 31 Mar 2011, at 23:41, Nick Prince wrote: Bruno wrote With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are not excluded. Hi Bruno Maybe what I am trying to say is that very old or dying brains might deterorate in a specific way that allows the transition from an old to a young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way homomorphic to a young brain. At the software level of the brain, I think that this is very plausible. It already happens during sleep, and with some drugs. But this can take many modalities. Darwinian selection might even have selected brain features helping the recovering of shocks and disease. And what is best than a little visit in Mother Platonia :) That the dead brain does that, is more Harry Potter like, but then dying consists in following the most normal world where we survive, and this, very plausibly, is not a *very* normal world, despite it obeys the same physical laws. Eventually, where you go, might even depend on you and on what you identify yourself with. Indeed this defines the consciousness I am considering and is therefore subtrate dependent. The UD reasoning shows that there is just no substrate at all. The apparent 'substrate is made-of (an internal sort of projection) an infinity of (digital) computations, that is number relations. If all of physics can be simulated on a computer then no problem. Well, the substrate is not simulable on a computer. At least not a priori. But your reasoning still go through, given that your mind is a sort of truncation from that substrate, and that, by definition, you survive on the (infinitely many) computations where you survive. But this is indeterminate, if only because we cannot know our level of substitution. If you accept the classical theory of knowledge, it is easy. Computer are already conscious. They have not the tools to manifest their consciousness, and by programming them, we don't help them with that respect. Consciousness is not programmable. It exists in Platonia, and a universal machine is only a sort of interface between different levels of the Platonic reality (arithmetical truth). This is an interesting comment! Are you saying that everything including consciousness really emanates from platonia? Yes. Would you agree that we exist eternally in platonia? Yes. (but who we?) Yes in a trivial sense. Comp makes arithmetical platonia enough, and it contains our histories. It is the block ontological reality. It is far greater than the computable (99,999...% of arithmetical truth is not computable, decidable, etc.). Yes, in less trivial senses: - in the sense of the comp or quantum-like form of immortality, like above. - in the sense à-la 'salvia divinorum', which is that we might be able to remain conscious out of time, space, etc. It is like remembering we really are one and live in Platonia. With comp, that would be like remembering that we are nothing more than a universal machine. I have not yet a clear opinion on this. Both practically and theoretically. But there is something interesting in lurking there. It is related to the personal identity question, and who are we? If so then perhaps we need only consider computationalism /QM as a means of comprehending the steps to this understanding. Sure. This platonic realm is very useful but hard to pin down as a concept. With comp it is just the well known structure (N, +, *), often called, by logicians, 'the standard model of Peano Arithmetic'. If you accept that propositions like 24 is even are true, or false, independently of you and me, that almost enough. You can pin down the arithmetical platonia by the set of true arithmetical sentences, or even just the set of their Gödel numbers, so that it is only a particular set of numbers. The arithmetical sentences are the grammatically correct formula build from the logical symbol (A, E, x, y, z, ..., , V, ~, -, (, ), = ) together with the symbol 0, s, +, *. For example: - the arithmetical truth 1 2 can be written Ex(s(0) + x = s(s(0))), - the arithmetical truth saying that if a number is more little than another number, then it is more little than the successor of that another number is written: AxAy((x y) - (x s(y))), where x y abbreviates Ez(x+s(z) = y), - the proposition 24 is even can be written Ez(z * s(s(0)) = s (s (s (s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0), etc. Best, Bruno marchal Hi Bruno Okay so in some sense if everything logically possible can be formally
Re: Is QTI false?
On Mar 31, 1:43 am, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Mar 30, 2011 at 03:15:59PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote: In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI” And I want to put forward some issues arising from this. It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear to live a finite, small lifetime of around 70 years. From the many discussions on this list, it also seems to me that, this is the single biggest argument (that I can understand) which points to the QTI being false. Unfortunately it appears that the whole ASSA/RSSA debate - which might have been a candidate for clarifying the issue - turns out to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach. So is QTI false? Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the conscious mind becomes so similar to that of a newborn - or even unborn - baby that perhaps “a diminishing?” consciousness always finds an appropriate route (in some branch) to avoid a cul de sac event. (This is one possible form of the No Cul De Sac Conjecture =NCDSC) This is a variant of an argument that David Parfit uses in his book Reasons and Persons, where he considers a continuum from his mind to that of Napoleon. (Don't flame me if I get the details wrong - the essence is what is important). I hadn't read that book at the time I wrote mine, otherwise, I would undoubtedly have cited it. Now in the case of Parfit's argument, I find considerable doubt that the argument can be made to work. Whilst, if I randomly knocked out 1% of your neurons, you will still be awake, and probably little different from the experience, if I knocked out certain keystone (as the concept is called in ecology) neurons to a level of 1% of all neurons, your brain function would fall apart quite rapidly. Yet to transition from your brain to that of Napoleons would require rewiring those same keystone neurons, and that, I believe casts significant doubt that the continuum is possible, even in principle. Now, we also know that infant minds are not a tabula rasa. So I am sceptical that the transition of a dementiaed mind to an infant mind is possible, for just the same reason. To avoid the cul de sac event, there would surely have to be a critical stage whereby consciousness diminishes and reaches a form of cusp at the point of lapsing into non existence and thereby requiring the necessity of an extension route or branch to another consistent universe. In short, from the third person POV, the person dies but from the first person -(now primitive) consciousness – state, there is rebirth. I am thinking that before we get to the croaking Amoeba there is a discontinuity in what we understand as consciousness – at least the form that applies to the NCDSC. The no cul-de-sac conjecture is perhaps a bit of a misnomer. It is not really well defined enough to embark on a proof, which it really ought to be. Certainly, in the Theatetical formulation that Bruno is investigating, there are NCDSC-like theorems in some hypostases, ([]p-p IIRC). Also, in QM, an observation along the lines of something like m(t)=\psi(t)|P(o(t))|\psi(t), where P is a project operator onto all worlds consistent with some observer o. The no cul-de-sac conjecture would correspond to m(t) != 0, except on a set of measure zero. Assuming m(t) is analytic, this is kind of obvious, but unfortunately QM really only requires second order differentiability of its objects, meaning that the proof never quite gets off the ground :(. Now if all this were to be the case, then maybe it says something very specific about the substrate on which consciousness runs. There would be something special about the architecture which the substrate employs to implement consciousness because it relies on a certain mode of decay, facilitating the branching to a new born baby having an appropriate structure (portal?) to secure a consistent extension of the consciousness into another branch. Unless a computer could simulate such a special substrate then it could not be used to implement consciousness. This would mean that it would be wise to say no to the Doctor! – Comp might be false? The Turing principle (p135 of David Deutsch’s book – “the Fabric of Reality”) would imply that, a universal machine could simulate the physical structure of brains in such a way so as to be able to act as a medium whereby, if the above argument is possible, consistent extensions of conscious physical observers (persons) could avoid cul de sacs. But until we can understand the nature of what consciousness is, we are stumped as to how a computer can be programmed to implement it. However some alien civilizations may have known these techniques for ages now, thereby perhaps explaining why we each have lived even as
Re: Is QTI false?
On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 6:38 PM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.comwrote: On Apr 1, 12:26 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 8:42 AM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: Stathis wrote That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since from the third person perspective rare events such as living to a great age happen only rarely. However, from the first person perspective you will live to a great age, and this will happen in the most probable way, even if it is improbable in absolute (third person) terms. Stathis Papaioannou- Hi Stathis I am wondering how this might work out in practice. In particular, if I find myself more and more in worlds where I am older, would I expect to see others older and as old as me? If ageing happens in the most probable way then would this not mean that I would expect to see this as a first person plural experience because I would feel it improbable if I were the only 500 year person around? The most probable way I can think of is that as you get older, medical science advances and everyone lives longer, then eventually mind uploading becomes available. -- Stathis Papaioannou- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - Ok Stathis thanks for that but what about the consciousness of the viking living in 200 AD. The NCDSC will require some pretty unusual branches to accomodate his survival. The Viking doesn't need to live until modern times to accommodate his survival. When he dies he might then realize that his life as a viking was part of a Sim Viking played by some human living in the 22nd century. Or perhaps some alien species studying what it is like to be a human, or perhaps some omega-point God-like mind which explores consciousness itself and integrates experiences of all beings it simulates. Though such continuations are perhaps rare (perhaps not based on some assumptions of the simulation argument) in any case the probability of the Viking surviving to say, 140 are probably less than the probability that his life is a simulation experienced by another mind. Consider what Youtube is today, a site for sharing video clips. Imagine what it might be 20 years from now, a fully immersive library of experiences, perhaps transcoded directly from recordings of a brain. If you upload one of your experiences to this Youtube and a million people choose to experience it, who is the true owner of that experience? When the experience clip ends, which of the millions of current or future viewers might you find yourself to be? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On 02 Apr 2011, at 13:52, Nick Prince wrote: On Apr 1, 6:33 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Nick, On 31 Mar 2011, at 23:41, Nick Prince wrote: Bruno wrote With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are not excluded. Hi Bruno Maybe what I am trying to say is that very old or dying brains might deterorate in a specific way that allows the transition from an old to a young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way homomorphic to a young brain. At the software level of the brain, I think that this is very plausible. It already happens during sleep, and with some drugs. But this can take many modalities. Darwinian selection might even have selected brain features helping the recovering of shocks and disease. And what is best than a little visit in Mother Platonia :) That the dead brain does that, is more Harry Potter like, but then dying consists in following the most normal world where we survive, and this, very plausibly, is not a *very* normal world, despite it obeys the same physical laws. Eventually, where you go, might even depend on you and on what you identify yourself with. Indeed this defines the consciousness I am considering and is therefore subtrate dependent. The UD reasoning shows that there is just no substrate at all. The apparent 'substrate is made-of (an internal sort of projection) an infinity of (digital) computations, that is number relations. If all of physics can be simulated on a computer then no problem. Well, the substrate is not simulable on a computer. At least not a priori. But your reasoning still go through, given that your mind is a sort of truncation from that substrate, and that, by definition, you survive on the (infinitely many) computations where you survive. But this is indeterminate, if only because we cannot know our level of substitution. If you accept the classical theory of knowledge, it is easy. Computer are already conscious. They have not the tools to manifest their consciousness, and by programming them, we don't help them with that respect. Consciousness is not programmable. It exists in Platonia, and a universal machine is only a sort of interface between different levels of the Platonic reality (arithmetical truth). This is an interesting comment! Are you saying that everything including consciousness really emanates from platonia? Yes. Would you agree that we exist eternally in platonia? Yes. (but who we?) Yes in a trivial sense. Comp makes arithmetical platonia enough, and it contains our histories. It is the block ontological reality. It is far greater than the computable (99,999...% of arithmetical truth is not computable, decidable, etc.). Yes, in less trivial senses: - in the sense of the comp or quantum-like form of immortality, like above. - in the sense à-la 'salvia divinorum', which is that we might be able to remain conscious out of time, space, etc. It is like remembering we really are one and live in Platonia. With comp, that would be like remembering that we are nothing more than a universal machine. I have not yet a clear opinion on this. Both practically and theoretically. But there is something interesting in lurking there. It is related to the personal identity question, and who are we? If so then perhaps we need only consider computationalism /QM as a means of comprehending the steps to this understanding. Sure. This platonic realm is very useful but hard to pin down as a concept. With comp it is just the well known structure (N, +, *), often called, by logicians, 'the standard model of Peano Arithmetic'. If you accept that propositions like 24 is even are true, or false, independently of you and me, that almost enough. You can pin down the arithmetical platonia by the set of true arithmetical sentences, or even just the set of their Gödel numbers, so that it is only a particular set of numbers. The arithmetical sentences are the grammatically correct formula build from the logical symbol (A, E, x, y, z, ..., , V, ~, -, (, ), = ) together with the symbol 0, s, +, *. For example: - the arithmetical truth 1 2 can be written Ex(s(0) + x = s(s(0))), - the arithmetical truth saying that if a number is more little than another number, then it is more little than the successor of that another number is written: AxAy((x y) - (x s(y))), where x y abbreviates Ez(x+s(z) = y), - the proposition 24 is even can be written Ez(z * s(s(0)) = s (s (s (s (s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0), etc. Best, Bruno marchal Hi Bruno Okay so in some sense if everything logically possible can be formally represented in arithmetic as a kind of algorithm, then it exists along with the UD in platonia. This
Re: Is QTI false?
On 4/2/2011 6:08 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Sat, Apr 2, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: Ok Stathis thanks for that but what about the consciousness of the viking living in 200 AD. The NCDSC will require some pretty unusual branches to accomodate his survival. I've read some of your posts before about personal identity and much of it makes a lot of sense. I've thought about the possibility of mind uploads , even for my viking friend but this would require the generation of huge numbers of variants to ensure there was one which could provide a consistent extension for him. Indeed it would mean every possible viking would have to be generated from DNA possibilities alone as well as with different memories. It's a bit of a tall order but not implausible. It also means that many completely NEW vikings will be generated who never existed in the past but think they did! You would survive in the most probable way given your circumstances, but it's not difficult to think of a means of survival for any possible situation. For example, if you are a viking it transpires that you are living in a simulation and the programmers magically save you. None of this is problematic if every possibility actually happens somewhere in the multiverse. Also note that it does not have to be your actual matter that continues in some form. It just has to be another entity somewhere in the multiverse with a mind that is a consistent extension of your mind at the moment of your demise. But then why is your demise relevant? Presumably because if you did not die then the most consistent extension would be that your consciousness remain associated with your body - but as your body/brain deteriorates the most consistent extension becomeswhat? another deteriorating brain? Why is it not just the continuingly deteriorating brain already associated with you? Brent No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 8.5.449 / Virus Database: 271.1.1/3545 - Release Date: 04/01/11 18:36:00 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
Hi Nick, On Apr 2, 7:22 am, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: Yes agreed. Also if timelike entanglements occurred there would be less worry about conflict with relativity than there was originally with spacelike effects. However if I understand decoherence correctly, information from the system passes into the environment so it is there somehow but very dispersed. [SPK] Yes, but only rarely is the environment an ideal gas or monolithic solid such that our usual ideas of diffusion and dispersal will apply. I suspect that we need to think about how decoherence works in a framework that takes into consideration a wide variety of rates and that considers how the phase entanglement is distributed. I have tried to find work examining this and only recently some papers have come out. See: http://www.quantiki.org/wiki/Decoherence-free_subspaces and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decoherence-free_subspaces It took a while, but Tegmark's no-go is finally loosing its hold. (I swear that guy is the reincarnation of Lord Kelvin!) From what I can tell decoherence is more of an effects that disperses among the many-worlds and not one that spreads within a single world - like photons. We really do not have good physical analogies for it! I did write a paper once(when I was younger and more stupid, so it has very doubtful worth) but I tried to formalise mathematically how memories might be stored in space time rather than in the brain at all ie working on the idea that the brain was more of an aeriel rather than a hard drive. These memories could then be later picked up by a simulated entity by appropriate tuning. It was a stab in the dark. [SPK] Interesting idea! It reminds me of Sheldrake's Morphic fields. I think that James P. Hogan wrote a novel based on a similar idea also, except in Paths to Otherwhere the ideas was to tune in on differing parallel worlds and even travel between them. I think that we still do not fully understand the implications of QM. Onward! Stephen On Apr 2, 1:59 am, stephenk stephe...@charter.net wrote: snip The idea that the EPR effect would work across time-like as well as space-like intervals makes sense in light of relativity. I am surprised that more people have not looked into it! The main difficulty I see is that there is a huge prejudice against the idea that macroscopic systems can be entangled such that EPR type relations could hold and have effects like you are considering here. Most of the arguments for decoherence inevitably assume that *all* of the degrees of freedom of a QM system are subject to one and the same decoherence rate with its environment. What if this is not the case? What if there is a stratification of sorts possible within macroscopic systems such that degrees of freedom can decohere are differing rates? Correlations of the EPR type would be possible within these, it seems to me... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Sat, Apr 02, 2011 at 05:12:28AM -0700, Nick Prince wrote: Hi Russell I have considered also the possibility that the NCDSC may not necessarilly operate simultaneously - this would imply temporary 3rd person culde sacs! Just as in Bruno's teleportation experiment, there is no reason why the reconstitution of the individual cannot be delayed. From the ist person pov, everything works the same and continuity is experienced. I'm unsure how this fits in with MWI though. Such delays would not be easily accounted for in the state vector's superposition. Hence if someone reaches a NCDS event and somehow later on they find a consistent extension in a simulation of some sort, then what happens to the temporary branch cul de sac in terms of a quantum mechanical explanation? Nick Prince It doesn't really make sense to say 3rd person cul-de-sacs. These would be just regular deaths, as we see all around us, all the time. When you say temporary cul-de-sacs, do you mean after which there is some kind of amnesia, and then you follow a non cul-de-sac history? If these really existed, then I would say the NCDS conjecture is refuted, and QTI, stricto-sensu, is false. But, its going to be hard to come up with such a scenario. The best I could do was after decapitation, there are reports of some people indicating they're still conscious seconds later. But even these scenarios are not immune to the waking up after a dream explanation. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Sun, Apr 3, 2011 at 7:36 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: But then why is your demise relevant? Presumably because if you did not die then the most consistent extension would be that your consciousness remain associated with your body - but as your body/brain deteriorates the most consistent extension becomeswhat? another deteriorating brain? Why is it not just the continuingly deteriorating brain already associated with you? It is, and eventually you will become completely demented and die. But there is a possible successor from this state who regains your memories and remembers at least the early stages of the deterioration, as well as a successor who remains moderately demented. There is no guarantee that you will survive indefinitely with most of your memories, although most societies in which you live will aim for this ideal, which I think makes it a bit more likely. But in the worst case you could survive indefinitely in pain and misery. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Sun, Apr 3, 2011 at 8:42 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: When you say temporary cul-de-sacs, do you mean after which there is some kind of amnesia, and then you follow a non cul-de-sac history? If these really existed, then I would say the NCDS conjecture is refuted, and QTI, stricto-sensu, is false. But, its going to be hard to come up with such a scenario. The best I could do was after decapitation, there are reports of some people indicating they're still conscious seconds later. But even these scenarios are not immune to the waking up after a dream explanation. You lose consciousness every day then wake up again with most of your memories intact. The same could happen after decapitation, though with greater difficulty. The information in your brain prior to decapitation could be collected and used to resurrect you at the Omega Point, and hence there would be no (permanent, first person) cul-de-sac. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
Nick, the rewinding of the aging process is tricky. Now I am diverting from my lately absorbed worldview of an unlimited complexity of everything of which we (humans) can acknowledge only a part and build from that our 'mini-solipsism' (after Colin H) - matching in *part* with many humans, by which I lost faith in the figment of a physical world - incl. atoms (molecules?) after 1/2 c. of chemistry. Returning to the *conventional terms*: *aging* includes un-equilibratable changes, with ingredients within and without the organism so a *return *has the same difficulties as religion has in the *'resurrection of all'*. Partial retrospect may occur e.g. in the memory sense. What comp(?) could do is beyond me, we have very scant imagination about a *universal computer* (way above the capabilities humans can muster and master). We also have very scant imagination about circumstances leading to our term: *TIME * so the topic is ready for a dissertation of *'Alice'.* (I don't want even to mention (?) my denial for* 'statistical' and 'probability'* - both - provided by arbitrary limitations - lacking the 'time' factor, hence useless in most cases they are applied in.) The 500 year old *you* is ambiguous: it is not only the brain - the tool we use in our mentality (what is it?) - that ages, but also the very organs of the other tool in our complex living contraption so I would refuse to prognosticate changes in the life-process (if there is such) with 500 years changes of tissues, chemical machines (glands, sensors, potentials and flexibility etc.) bodily coordination and mental compliance in the physiological processes. Good game, anyway. Best regards John Mikes On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 5:41 PM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.comwrote: Bruno wrote With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are not excluded. Hi Bruno Maybe what I am trying to say is that very old or dying brains might deterorate in a specific way that allows the transition from an old to a young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way homomorphic to a young brain. Indeed this defines the consciousness I am considering and is therefore subtrate dependent. If all of physics can be simulated on a computer then no problem. If you accept the classical theory of knowledge, it is easy. Computer are already conscious. They have not the tools to manifest their consciousness, and by programming them, we don't help them with that respect. Consciousness is not programmable. It exists in Platonia, and a universal machine is only a sort of interface between different levels of the Platonic reality (arithmetical truth). This is an interesting comment! Are you saying that everything including consciousness really emanates from platonia? Would you agree that we exist eternally in platonia? If so then perhaps we need only consider computationalism /QM as a means of comprehending the steps to this understanding. This platonic realm is very useful but hard to pin down as a concept. Best Nick -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On 01 Apr 2011, at 01:51, Johnathan Corgan wrote: On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Or something like that. Quantum logic (and also its arithmetical form) has many notion of implication. The one above is the closer to the Sazaki Hook which Hardegree used to show that orthomodularity in quantum ortholattice is related to the notion of counterfactual. You will find the reference in my papers. Unfortunately orthomodularity is still an open problem in the arithmetical 'quantum logic'. Eric Vandenbusche is currently trying to optimize the G* theorem prover to get an answer. And here I thought I was making progress in understanding Bruno's thesis. I clearly have a *long* way further to go in my studies :-) AUDA certainly asks for some familiarity with logic, and logics. That means work, 'course. A good, but advanced book, helpful and important for that more advanced part is the book by Robert Goldblatt: Goldblatt, R. I. (1993). Mathematics of Modality. CSLI Lectures Notes, Stanford California. It contains his PhD thesis, + many papers with results that I use to relate quantum logic with arithmetical self-reference. And there are the books by Boolos, Smullyan, etc. Bon courage :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
Hi Nick, On 31 Mar 2011, at 23:41, Nick Prince wrote: Bruno wrote With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are not excluded. Hi Bruno Maybe what I am trying to say is that very old or dying brains might deterorate in a specific way that allows the transition from an old to a young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way homomorphic to a young brain. At the software level of the brain, I think that this is very plausible. It already happens during sleep, and with some drugs. But this can take many modalities. Darwinian selection might even have selected brain features helping the recovering of shocks and disease. And what is best than a little visit in Mother Platonia :) That the dead brain does that, is more Harry Potter like, but then dying consists in following the most normal world where we survive, and this, very plausibly, is not a *very* normal world, despite it obeys the same physical laws. Eventually, where you go, might even depend on you and on what you identify yourself with. Indeed this defines the consciousness I am considering and is therefore subtrate dependent. The UD reasoning shows that there is just no substrate at all. The apparent 'substrate is made-of (an internal sort of projection) an infinity of (digital) computations, that is number relations. If all of physics can be simulated on a computer then no problem. Well, the substrate is not simulable on a computer. At least not a priori. But your reasoning still go through, given that your mind is a sort of truncation from that substrate, and that, by definition, you survive on the (infinitely many) computations where you survive. But this is indeterminate, if only because we cannot know our level of substitution. If you accept the classical theory of knowledge, it is easy. Computer are already conscious. They have not the tools to manifest their consciousness, and by programming them, we don't help them with that respect. Consciousness is not programmable. It exists in Platonia, and a universal machine is only a sort of interface between different levels of the Platonic reality (arithmetical truth). This is an interesting comment! Are you saying that everything including consciousness really emanates from platonia? Yes. Would you agree that we exist eternally in platonia? Yes. (but who we?) Yes in a trivial sense. Comp makes arithmetical platonia enough, and it contains our histories. It is the block ontological reality. It is far greater than the computable (99,999...% of arithmetical truth is not computable, decidable, etc.). Yes, in less trivial senses: - in the sense of the comp or quantum-like form of immortality, like above. - in the sense à-la 'salvia divinorum', which is that we might be able to remain conscious out of time, space, etc. It is like remembering we really are one and live in Platonia. With comp, that would be like remembering that we are nothing more than a universal machine. I have not yet a clear opinion on this. Both practically and theoretically. But there is something interesting in lurking there. It is related to the personal identity question, and who are we? If so then perhaps we need only consider computationalism /QM as a means of comprehending the steps to this understanding. Sure. This platonic realm is very useful but hard to pin down as a concept. With comp it is just the well known structure (N, +, *), often called, by logicians, 'the standard model of Peano Arithmetic'. If you accept that propositions like 24 is even are true, or false, independently of you and me, that almost enough. You can pin down the arithmetical platonia by the set of true arithmetical sentences, or even just the set of their Gödel numbers, so that it is only a particular set of numbers. The arithmetical sentences are the grammatically correct formula build from the logical symbol (A, E, x, y, z, ..., , V, ~, -, (, ), = ) together with the symbol 0, s, +, *. For example: - the arithmetical truth 1 2 can be written Ex(s(0) + x = s(s(0))), - the arithmetical truth saying that if a number is more little than another number, then it is more little than the successor of that another number is written: AxAy((x y) - (x s(y))), where x y abbreviates Ez(x+s(z) = y), - the proposition 24 is even can be written Ez(z * s(s(0)) = s (s (s (s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0), etc. Best, Bruno marchal http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe
Re: Is QTI false?
On 01 Apr 2011, at 02:10, meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 03/31/11, Nick Princenickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:Bruno wrote With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are not excluded. Hi Bruno Maybe what I am trying to say is that very old or dying brains might deterorate in a specific way that allows the transition from an old to a young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way homomorphic to a young brain. Why not consider that it becomes homomorphic to an unconscious brain? If your consciousness is a property of some bundle of UD computations it does not follow that the most probable continuation is also conscious. This means that you will die in the most probable continuation (the normal first plural one), but it is enough there is a few, less normal, where you survive, for surviving from your first person point of view. This is why we put Dt in Bp Dt. To have a probability or a credibility we ensure that we take into account only the continuations where we survive. A continuation where I die can only be conceived in the third person perspective, but the surviving calculus bears on the first person perspectives. We already know that if you get hit in the head the most probable continuation is unconsciousness for a time. You cannot be conscious that you are unconscious. You can have a conscious experience which makes you feel like if in some past you were less or perhaps not conscious, that's all, and that might be a construct of the actual mind. I do think we are conscious the whole night, every night, even during the 'slow' (non REM) sleep, but we forget that, and suffer of repeated amnesia (unless some training). Bruno Brent Indeed this defines the consciousness I am considering and is therefore subtrate dependent. If all of physics can be simulated on a computer then no problem. If you accept the classical theory of knowledge, it is easy. Computer are already conscious. They have not the tools to manifest their consciousness, and by programming them, we don't help them with that respect. Consciousness is not programmable. It exists in Platonia, and a universal machine is only a sort of interface between different levels of the Platonic reality (arithmetical truth). This is an interesting comment! Are you saying that everything including consciousness really emanates from platonia? Would you agree that we exist eternally in platonia? If so then perhaps we need only consider computationalism /QM as a means of comprehending the steps to this understanding. This platonic realm is very useful but hard to pin down as a concept. Best Nick -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On 01 Apr 2011, at 00:58, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 02:52:44PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: It is here that if we apply Bayes' theorem (like in the Doomday argument), we should be astonished not being already very old (from our first person perspective). But Bayes cannot be applied in this setting, as we have already discussed a lot in the past. Bruno Marchal Superficially, this seems to be a very succinct form of Mallah's argument. You're basically saying that given I'm Russell Standish, and QTI, why don't I find myself arbitrarily far removed from the origin (my birth). Applying some form of ASSA (which makes no sense, imo). Of course, the objections to this are obvious, and have been discussed before in this list. The above doomsday argument assumes a linear sequence of OMs that characterise Russell Standish, which cannot be the case in a Multiverse (required for QTI). Sampling of Russell Standish observer moments must be over all OMs that were born Russell Standish, and weighted by the universal prior, giving more weight to being a baby than an adult. Why am I not a baby? What is the universal prior? Now all we need is for Mallah to admit that the above is not a strawman, and we're done. ASSA vs RSSA can be put in the dustbin :). RSSA too? It is used in both QM and comp. But in wikipedia I have seen a definition of SSA much restrictive than the one used in this list. I prefer to keep on with the first-person indeterminacy instead of RSSA. -- Bruno -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Apr 1, 12:26 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 8:42 AM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: Stathis wrote That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since from the third person perspective rare events such as living to a great age happen only rarely. However, from the first person perspective you will live to a great age, and this will happen in the most probable way, even if it is improbable in absolute (third person) terms. Stathis Papaioannou- Hi Stathis I am wondering how this might work out in practice. In particular, if I find myself more and more in worlds where I am older, would I expect to see others older and as old as me? If ageing happens in the most probable way then would this not mean that I would expect to see this as a first person plural experience because I would feel it improbable if I were the only 500 year person around? The most probable way I can think of is that as you get older, medical science advances and everyone lives longer, then eventually mind uploading becomes available. -- Stathis Papaioannou- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - Ok Stathis thanks for that but what about the consciousness of the viking living in 200 AD. The NCDSC will require some pretty unusual branches to accomodate his survival. I've read some of your posts before about personal identity and much of it makes a lot of sense. I've thought about the possibility of mind uploads , even for my viking friend but this would require the generation of huge numbers of variants to ensure there was one which could provide a consistent extension for him. Indeed it would mean every possible viking would have to be generated from DNA possibilities alone as well as with different memories. It's a bit of a tall order but not implausible. It also means that many completely NEW vikings will be generated who never existed in the past but think they did! To keep everything more tidy I would expect that the laws of physics might still hold in secret a form of epr effect across timelike intervals rather than the more usual spacelike ones. This would entail consciousness being able to be tuned to accept a state change into the appropriate person in a similar way that measuring the spin of a particle in one place tunes the spin of a partner particle in the well known way. There is no problem achieving contiuity if the (appropriately complete) information about a person is kept safe over the time interval as in Bruno's teleportation thought experiment. However if we wanted to produce a Bostrom type ancestor simulation then there would be a huge reduncy of consciousness generated in order to enable consistent extensions to be available as the NCDSC would need. Regards Nick -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Apr 1, 7:38 pm, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: On Apr 1, 12:26 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 8:42 AM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: Stathis wrote That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since from the third person perspective rare events such as living to a great age happen only rarely. However, from the first person perspective you will live to a great age, and this will happen in the most probable way, even if it is improbable in absolute (third person) terms. Stathis Papaioannou- Hi Stathis I am wondering how this might work out in practice. In particular, if I find myself more and more in worlds where I am older, would I expect to see others older and as old as me? If ageing happens in the most probable way then would this not mean that I would expect to see this as a first person plural experience because I would feel it improbable if I were the only 500 year person around? The most probable way I can think of is that as you get older, medical science advances and everyone lives longer, then eventually mind uploading becomes available. -- Stathis Papaioannou- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - Ok Stathis thanks for that but what about the consciousness of the viking living in 200 AD. The NCDSC will require some pretty unusual branches to accomodate his survival. I've read some of your posts before about personal identity and much of it makes a lot of sense. I've thought about the possibility of mind uploads , even for my viking friend but this would require the generation of huge numbers of variants to ensure there was one which could provide a consistent extension for him. Indeed it would mean every possible viking would have to be generated from DNA possibilities alone as well as with different memories. It's a bit of a tall order but not implausible. It also means that many completely NEW vikings will be generated who never existed in the past but think they did! To keep everything more tidy I would expect that the laws of physics might still hold in secret a form of epr effect across timelike intervals rather than the more usual spacelike ones. This would entail consciousness being able to be tuned to accept a state change into the appropriate person in a similar way that measuring the spin of a particle in one place tunes the spin of a partner particle in the well known way. There is no problem achieving contiuity if the (appropriately complete) information about a person is kept safe over the time interval as in Bruno's teleportation thought experiment. However if we wanted to produce a Bostrom type ancestor simulation then there would be a huge reduncy of consciousness generated in order to enable consistent extensions to be available as the NCDSC would need. Regards Nick Hi Nick, The idea that the EPR effect would work across time-like as well as space-like intervals makes sense in light of relativity. I am surprised that more people have not looked into it! The main difficulty I see is that there is a huge prejudice against the idea that macroscopic systems can be entangled such that EPR type relations could hold and have effects like you are considering here. Most of the arguments for decoherence inevitably assume that *all* of the degrees of freedom of a QM system are subject to one and the same decoherence rate with its environment. What if this is not the case? What if there is a stratification of sorts possible within macroscopic systems such that degrees of freedom can decohere are differing rates? Correlations of the EPR type would be possible within these, it seems to me... Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
Brent, Nick, On 31 Mar 2011, at 03:06, meekerdb wrote: On 3/30/2011 3:15 PM, Nick Prince wrote: In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI” And I want to put forward some issues arising from this. It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear to live a finite, small lifetime of around 70 years. From the many discussions on this list, it also seems to me that, this is the single biggest argument (that I can understand) which points to the QTI being false. Unfortunately it appears that the whole ASSA/RSSA debate - which might have been a candidate for clarifying the issue - turns out to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach. So is QTI false? Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the conscious mind becomes so similar to that of a newborn - or even unborn - baby that perhaps “a diminishing?” consciousness always finds an appropriate route (in some branch) to avoid a cul de sac event. (This is one possible form of the No Cul De Sac Conjecture =NCDSC) Sure, the cul de sac is avoided by reaching the state of unconscious which is then consistent with with many more continuations. e.g. as a rock. I am not sure this makes sense. By definition a cul-de-sac world has no continuation. To be unconscious or dead (never more conscious) means no more experience at all (if that means something). The QTI is based on quantum theory of unitary evolution; not on the survival of memories or consciousness. Those are claimed to be consequences, so they must be justified from QM, not just promoted from conjecture to axiom. Assuming comp, QTI should be a particular case of Comp-TI. But this is complex to analyzed for the reason that we can survive ith amnesia, so that we can never be sure of who is the person who really survive. Comp and QM TI might end up trivial if there is only one person in the fundamental reality. Russell is right. The presence or non-presence of cul-de-sac is a question of points of view. Precisely we have that G* proves the equivalence of Bp and Bp Dp. But the machine cannot see that equivalence. The modality Bp entails the existence of cul-de-sac world at each states, and Bp Dp eliminates those end worlds. People have to go back to the semantic of G or of normal modal logic to see this. In a cul-de-sac world every statements are provable, but none are possible or consistent. With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are not excluded. Brent To avoid the cul de sac event, there would surely have to be a critical stage whereby consciousness diminishes and reaches a form of cusp at the point of lapsing into non existence and thereby requiring the necessity of an extension route or branch to another consistent universe. In short, from the third person POV, the person dies but from the first person -(now primitive) consciousness – state, there is rebirth. I am thinking that before we get to the croaking Amoeba there is a discontinuity in what we understand as consciousness – at least the form that applies to the NCDSC. Now if all this were to be the case, then maybe it says something very specific about the substrate on which consciousness runs. There would be something special about the architecture which the substrate employs to implement consciousness because it relies on a certain mode of decay, facilitating the branching to a new born baby having an appropriate structure (portal?) to secure a consistent extension of the consciousness into another branch. Unless a computer could simulate such a special substrate then it could not be used to implement consciousness. This would mean that it would be wise to say no to the Doctor! – Comp might be false? Comp might certainly be false. But I am not sure I see your point here. There is an infinity of computational histories going through your state. The substrate (matter) is made-of that infinity of computations. The Turing principle (p135 of David Deutsch’s book – “the Fabric of Reality”) would imply that, a universal machine could simulate the physical structure of brains in such a way so as to be able to act as a medium whereby, if the above argument is possible, consistent extensions of conscious physical observers (persons) could avoid cul de sacs. I think that the Turing principle is contradictory with Church thesis. What we can do is to (re)define matter by adding the Dp (= ~D ~p) in each state. It is needed for defining the first person measure one in the case of the first person indeterminacy. matter and physics is a probability/credibility
Re: Is QTI false?
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:15 AM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI” And I want to put forward some issues arising from this. It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear to live a finite, small lifetime of around 70 years. From the many discussions on this list, it also seems to me that, this is the single biggest argument (that I can understand) which points to the QTI being false. Unfortunately it appears that the whole ASSA/RSSA debate - which might have been a candidate for clarifying the issue - turns out to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach. So is QTI false? Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the conscious mind becomes so similar to that of a newborn - or even unborn - baby that perhaps “a diminishing?” consciousness always finds an appropriate route (in some branch) to avoid a cul de sac event. (This is one possible form of the No Cul De Sac Conjecture =NCDSC) To avoid the cul de sac event, there would surely have to be a critical stage whereby consciousness diminishes and reaches a form of cusp at the point of lapsing into non existence and thereby requiring the necessity of an extension route or branch to another consistent universe. In short, from the third person POV, the person dies but from the first person -(now primitive) consciousness – state, there is rebirth. I am thinking that before we get to the croaking Amoeba there is a discontinuity in what we understand as consciousness – at least the form that applies to the NCDSC. Now if all this were to be the case, then maybe it says something very specific about the substrate on which consciousness runs. There would be something special about the architecture which the substrate employs to implement consciousness because it relies on a certain mode of decay, facilitating the branching to a new born baby having an appropriate structure (portal?) to secure a consistent extension of the consciousness into another branch. Unless a computer could simulate such a special substrate then it could not be used to implement consciousness. This would mean that it would be wise to say no to the Doctor! – Comp might be false? I followed you up until that paragraph. Why should the rebirth from a no-consciousness state say anything about the substrate on which consciousness runs? It matters only that there be some entity that remembers being the entity that faded away for that entity to be reborn. How that entity is implementedt and whether it is even causally related to the first entity in any way is irrelevant. The Turing principle (p135 of David Deutsch’s book – “the Fabric of Reality”) would imply that, a universal machine could simulate the physical structure of brains in such a way so as to be able to act as a medium whereby, if the above argument is possible, consistent extensions of conscious physical observers (persons) could avoid cul de sacs. But until we can understand the nature of what consciousness is, we are stumped as to how a computer can be programmed to implement it. However some alien civilizations may have known these techniques for ages now, thereby perhaps explaining why we each have lived even as long as we now perceive we have. A stronger statement would be that if universal virtual reality generators are physically possible, then they must be built somewhere in some universes! But supposing the above (reincarnational) speculation was false in some way. In that case, I have yet to see a convincing argument as to how the the no cul de sac conjecture can be reconciled with people living to great ages. Whatever sampling assumption is applied, the facts are that we don’t typically see people reaching ages greater than 100+ yrs). Therefore either QTI is false or people just don’t get old! Rather, the special physical conditions of death associated with dementia or oxygen starvation of the brain, facilitate continued extensions of consciousness by branching into worlds where we supervene over new born babies (or something – animals, aliens?) - accidental deaths of people of any “normal ages” we can think about could of course be accommodated by the NCDSC). That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since from the third person perspective rare events such as living to a great age happen only rarely. However, from the first person perspective you will live to a great age, and this will happen in the most probable way, even if it is improbable in absolute (third person) terms. The mechanics of such reincarnational transitions would be interesting to speculate about since I see this as the only way out for a QTI. Nick Prince - Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Re: Is QTI false?
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 11:43 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: This is a variant of an argument that David Parfit uses in his book Reasons and Persons, where he considers a continuum from his mind to that of Napoleon. (Don't flame me if I get the details wrong - the essence is what is important). I hadn't read that book at the time I wrote mine, otherwise, I would undoubtedly have cited it. Now in the case of Parfit's argument, I find considerable doubt that the argument can be made to work. Whilst, if I randomly knocked out 1% of your neurons, you will still be awake, and probably little different from the experience, if I knocked out certain keystone (as the concept is called in ecology) neurons to a level of 1% of all neurons, your brain function would fall apart quite rapidly. Yet to transition from your brain to that of Napoleons would require rewiring those same keystone neurons, and that, I believe casts significant doubt that the continuum is possible, even in principle. Now, we also know that infant minds are not a tabula rasa. So I am sceptical that the transition of a dementiaed mind to an infant mind is possible, for just the same reason. It doesn't have to happen by removal of neurons in a single individual. The transition could happen, for example, by having a series of separate individuals who share a proportion of their predecessors' memories. They don't even have to run on the same substrate, let alone the same brain. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On 31 Mar 2011, at 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:15 AM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI” And I want to put forward some issues arising from this. It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear to live a finite, small lifetime of around 70 years. From the many discussions on this list, it also seems to me that, this is the single biggest argument (that I can understand) which points to the QTI being false. Unfortunately it appears that the whole ASSA/RSSA debate - which might have been a candidate for clarifying the issue - turns out to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach. So is QTI false? Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the conscious mind becomes so similar to that of a newborn - or even unborn - baby that perhaps “a diminishing?” consciousness always finds an appropriate route (in some branch) to avoid a cul de sac event. (This is one possible form of the No Cul De Sac Conjecture =NCDSC) To avoid the cul de sac event, there would surely have to be a critical stage whereby consciousness diminishes and reaches a form of cusp at the point of lapsing into non existence and thereby requiring the necessity of an extension route or branch to another consistent universe. In short, from the third person POV, the person dies but from the first person -(now primitive) consciousness – state, there is rebirth. I am thinking that before we get to the croaking Amoeba there is a discontinuity in what we understand as consciousness – at least the form that applies to the NCDSC. Now if all this were to be the case, then maybe it says something very specific about the substrate on which consciousness runs. There would be something special about the architecture which the substrate employs to implement consciousness because it relies on a certain mode of decay, facilitating the branching to a new born baby having an appropriate structure (portal?) to secure a consistent extension of the consciousness into another branch. Unless a computer could simulate such a special substrate then it could not be used to implement consciousness. This would mean that it would be wise to say no to the Doctor! – Comp might be false? I followed you up until that paragraph. Why should the rebirth from a no-consciousness state say anything about the substrate on which consciousness runs? It matters only that there be some entity that remembers being the entity that faded away for that entity to be reborn. How that entity is implementedt and whether it is even causally related to the first entity in any way is irrelevant. I followed you up until the last sentence. How that entity is implemented and whether it is even causally related to the first entity in any way is irrelevant for the question of being reborn, OK, but for computing the measure, and thus deriving the laws of the most probable substrate with respect to which he is reborn (his physics), you have to take into account the most probable computational histories. The notion of cause emerges from that, and that is what makes its rebirth relatively stable for him, and not an harry Potter like sequence of luck. This makes the physical laws invariant for such rebirth, although we might find ourself at different level or layers of some virtual reality of the future, so some apparent laws could be expected to change. The Turing principle (p135 of David Deutsch’s book – “the Fabric of Reality”) would imply that, a universal machine could simulate the physical structure of brains in such a way so as to be able to act as a medium whereby, if the above argument is possible, consistent extensions of conscious physical observers (persons) could avoid cul de sacs. But until we can understand the nature of what consciousness is, we are stumped as to how a computer can be programmed to implement it. However some alien civilizations may have known these techniques for ages now, thereby perhaps explaining why we each have lived even as long as we now perceive we have. A stronger statement would be that if universal virtual reality generators are physically possible, then they must be built somewhere in some universes! But supposing the above (reincarnational) speculation was false in some way. In that case, I have yet to see a convincing argument as to how the the no cul de sac conjecture can be reconciled with people living to great ages. Whatever sampling assumption is applied, the facts are that we don’t typically see people reaching ages greater than 100+ yrs). Therefore either QTI is false or people just don’t get old! Rather, the special physical conditions of death associated with dementia or oxygen starvation of the brain, facilitate continued
Re: Is QTI false?
-Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 8:52 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Is QTI false? On 31 Mar 2011, at 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:15 AM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI” And I want to put forward some issues arising from this. It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear to live a finite, small lifetime of around 70 years. From the many discussions on this list, it also seems to me that, this is the single biggest argument (that I can understand) which points to the QTI being false. Unfortunately it appears that the whole ASSA/RSSA debate - which might have been a candidate for clarifying the issue - turns out to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach. So is QTI false? Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the conscious mind becomes so similar to that of a newborn - or even unborn - baby that perhaps “a diminishing?” consciousness always finds an appropriate route (in some branch) to avoid a cul de sac event. (This is one possible form of the No Cul De Sac Conjecture =NCDSC) To avoid the cul de sac event, there would surely have to be a critical stage whereby consciousness diminishes and reaches a form of cusp at the point of lapsing into non existence and thereby requiring the necessity of an extension route or branch to another consistent universe. In short, from the third person POV, the person dies but from the first person -(now primitive) consciousness – state, there is rebirth. I am thinking that before we get to the croaking Amoeba there is a discontinuity in what we understand as consciousness – at least the form that applies to the NCDSC. Now if all this were to be the case, then maybe it says something very specific about the substrate on which consciousness runs. There would be something special about the architecture which the substrate employs to implement consciousness because it relies on a certain mode of decay, facilitating the branching to a new born baby having an appropriate structure (portal?) to secure a consistent extension of the consciousness into another branch. Unless a computer could simulate such a special substrate then it could not be used to implement consciousness. This would mean that it would be wise to say no to the Doctor! – Comp might be false? I followed you up until that paragraph. Why should the rebirth from a no-consciousness state say anything about the substrate on which consciousness runs? It matters only that there be some entity that remembers being the entity that faded away for that entity to be reborn. How that entity is implementedt and whether it is even causally related to the first entity in any way is irrelevant. I followed you up until the last sentence. How that entity is implemented and whether it is even causally related to the first entity in any way is irrelevant for the question of being reborn, OK, but for computing the measure, and thus deriving the laws of the most probable substrate with respect to which he is reborn (his physics), you have to take into account the most probable computational histories. The notion of cause emerges from that, and that is what makes its rebirth relatively stable for him, and not an harry Potter like sequence of luck. This makes the physical laws invariant for such rebirth, although we might find ourself at different level or layers of some virtual reality of the future, so some apparent laws could be expected to change. The Turing principle (p135 of David Deutsch’s book – “the Fabric of Reality”) would imply that, a universal machine could simulate the physical structure of brains in such a way so as to be able to act as a medium whereby, if the above argument is possible, consistent extensions of conscious physical observers (persons) could avoid cul de sacs. But until we can understand the nature of what consciousness is, we are stumped as to how a computer can be programmed to implement it. However some alien civilizations may have known these techniques for ages now, thereby perhaps explaining why we each have lived even as long as we now perceive we have. A stronger statement would be that if universal virtual reality generators are physically possible, then they must be built somewhere in some universes! But supposing the above (reincarnational) speculation was false in some way. In that case, I have yet to see a convincing argument as to how the the no cul de sac conjecture can be reconciled with people living to great ages. Whatever sampling assumption is applied, the facts are that we don’t typically see people reaching ages greater than 100+ yrs). Therefore either QTI is false or people just don’t get old! Rather, the special physical
Re: Is QTI false?
On 31 Mar 2011, at 15:35, Stephen Paul King wrote: -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Thursday, March 31, 2011 8:52 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Is QTI false? On 31 Mar 2011, at 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:15 AM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI” And I want to put forward some issues arising from this. It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear to live a finite, small lifetime of around 70 years. From the many discussions on this list, it also seems to me that, this is the single biggest argument (that I can understand) which points to the QTI being false. Unfortunately it appears that the whole ASSA/RSSA debate - which might have been a candidate for clarifying the issue - turns out to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach. So is QTI false? Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the conscious mind becomes so similar to that of a newborn - or even unborn - baby that perhaps “a diminishing?” consciousness always finds an appropriate route (in some branch) to avoid a cul de sac event. (This is one possible form of the No Cul De Sac Conjecture =NCDSC) To avoid the cul de sac event, there would surely have to be a critical stage whereby consciousness diminishes and reaches a form of cusp at the point of lapsing into non existence and thereby requiring the necessity of an extension route or branch to another consistent universe. In short, from the third person POV, the person dies but from the first person -(now primitive) consciousness – state, there is rebirth. I am thinking that before we get to the croaking Amoeba there is a discontinuity in what we understand as consciousness – at least the form that applies to the NCDSC. Now if all this were to be the case, then maybe it says something very specific about the substrate on which consciousness runs. There would be something special about the architecture which the substrate employs to implement consciousness because it relies on a certain mode of decay, facilitating the branching to a new born baby having an appropriate structure (portal?) to secure a consistent extension of the consciousness into another branch. Unless a computer could simulate such a special substrate then it could not be used to implement consciousness. This would mean that it would be wise to say no to the Doctor! – Comp might be false? I followed you up until that paragraph. Why should the rebirth from a no-consciousness state say anything about the substrate on which consciousness runs? It matters only that there be some entity that remembers being the entity that faded away for that entity to be reborn. How that entity is implementedt and whether it is even causally related to the first entity in any way is irrelevant. I followed you up until the last sentence. How that entity is implemented and whether it is even causally related to the first entity in any way is irrelevant for the question of being reborn, OK, but for computing the measure, and thus deriving the laws of the most probable substrate with respect to which he is reborn (his physics), you have to take into account the most probable computational histories. The notion of cause emerges from that, and that is what makes its rebirth relatively stable for him, and not an harry Potter like sequence of luck. This makes the physical laws invariant for such rebirth, although we might find ourself at different level or layers of some virtual reality of the future, so some apparent laws could be expected to change. The Turing principle (p135 of David Deutsch’s book – “the Fabric of Reality”) would imply that, a universal machine could simulate the physical structure of brains in such a way so as to be able to act as a medium whereby, if the above argument is possible, consistent extensions of conscious physical observers (persons) could avoid cul de sacs. But until we can understand the nature of what consciousness is, we are stumped as to how a computer can be programmed to implement it. However some alien civilizations may have known these techniques for ages now, thereby perhaps explaining why we each have lived even as long as we now perceive we have. A stronger statement would be that if universal virtual reality generators are physically possible, then they must be built somewhere in some universes! But supposing the above (reincarnational) speculation was false in some way. In that case, I have yet to see a convincing argument as to how the the no cul de sac conjecture can be reconciled with people living to great ages. Whatever sampling assumption is applied, the facts are that we don’t typically see people reaching ages greater than
Re: Is QTI false?
On Mar 31, 1:43 am, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: The observation that other people never seem to live beyond a certain age is not evidence against the NCDSC. Only logical impossibility can count. Even physical impossibility is insufficient, because there is always the possibility of mind uploading into machines that may be of arbitrary age. I follow that this observation is not evidence against the NCDSC but am wondering if it is evidence against QTI! If we eventually end up as Tegmark's amoeba then this can be deemed continuous in some sense but hardly immortal. My definition of immortal (which I held for the purpose of my posting) was that it would be more like a continuation of self aware consciousness - ie the ability to recognise I was experiencing an observer moment. Even Jacques Mallah accepted the possibility that people of arbitrarily old age must exist somewhere in the Multiverse. What he couldn't accept was the certainty of getting from here to there, that the NCDSC implies. The refinement of that debate lead to the distinction of ASSA vs RSSA, and the NCDSC. But If we were to find ourselves in a universe in which we alone were arbitrarily very old and all other people had ages that were distributed about a mean of 70 yrs (give or take thirty yrs) then that would lead me to believe I was living in a very improbable universe - I might suspect self delusion! I often wonder about so called delusional conditions and their validity? In any case I would have suspected that the NCDSC would bring me into the most probable universes on the whole ( RSSA?). Hence if I was living to a very ripe old age then I would expect others to be sharing this perception too along with others who were even much older than me. I agree that we might just be on the verge of discovering the uploading of minds into computers, but if I had been a viking in 200 AD this would not really be realistic - yet they too must still be alive somewhere if the defined QTI I am considering is valid. Nick -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
Bruno wrote With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are not excluded. Hi Bruno Maybe what I am trying to say is that very old or dying brains might deterorate in a specific way that allows the transition from an old to a young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way homomorphic to a young brain. Indeed this defines the consciousness I am considering and is therefore subtrate dependent. If all of physics can be simulated on a computer then no problem. If you accept the classical theory of knowledge, it is easy. Computer are already conscious. They have not the tools to manifest their consciousness, and by programming them, we don't help them with that respect. Consciousness is not programmable. It exists in Platonia, and a universal machine is only a sort of interface between different levels of the Platonic reality (arithmetical truth). This is an interesting comment! Are you saying that everything including consciousness really emanates from platonia? Would you agree that we exist eternally in platonia? If so then perhaps we need only consider computationalism /QM as a means of comprehending the steps to this understanding. This platonic realm is very useful but hard to pin down as a concept. Best Nick -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
Stathis wrote That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since from the third person perspective rare events such as living to a great age happen only rarely. However, from the first person perspective you will live to a great age, and this will happen in the most probable way, even if it is improbable in absolute (third person) terms. Stathis Papaioannou- Hi Stathis I am wondering how this might work out in practice. In particular, if I find myself more and more in worlds where I am older, would I expect to see others older and as old as me? If ageing happens in the most probable way then would this not mean that I would expect to see this as a first person plural experience because I would feel it improbable if I were the only 500 year person around? Nick -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 8:42 AM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote: Stathis wrote That we don't see extremely old people is consistent with QTI, since from the third person perspective rare events such as living to a great age happen only rarely. However, from the first person perspective you will live to a great age, and this will happen in the most probable way, even if it is improbable in absolute (third person) terms. Stathis Papaioannou- Hi Stathis I am wondering how this might work out in practice. In particular, if I find myself more and more in worlds where I am older, would I expect to see others older and as old as me? If ageing happens in the most probable way then would this not mean that I would expect to see this as a first person plural experience because I would feel it improbable if I were the only 500 year person around? The most probable way I can think of is that as you get older, medical science advances and everyone lives longer, then eventually mind uploading becomes available. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Or something like that. Quantum logic (and also its arithmetical form) has many notion of implication. The one above is the closer to the Sazaki Hook which Hardegree used to show that orthomodularity in quantum ortholattice is related to the notion of counterfactual. You will find the reference in my papers. Unfortunately orthomodularity is still an open problem in the arithmetical 'quantum logic'. Eric Vandenbusche is currently trying to optimize the G* theorem prover to get an answer. And here I thought I was making progress in understanding Bruno's thesis. I clearly have a *long* way further to go in my studies :-) Johnathan Corgan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Is QTI false?
On 03/31/11, Nick Princenickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:Bruno wrote With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are not excluded.Hi BrunoMaybe what I am trying to say is that very old or dying brains mightdeterorate in a specific way that allows the transition from an old toa young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way homomorphicto a young brain.Why not consider that it becomes homomorphic to an unconscious brain? If your consciousness is a property of some bundle of UD computations it does not follow that the most probable continuation is also conscious. We already know that if you get hit in the head the most probable continuation is unconsciousness for a time.BrentIndeed this defines the consciousness I amconsidering and is therefore subtrate dependent. If all of physicscan be simulated on a computer then no problem. If you accept the classical theory of knowledge, it is easy. Computer are already conscious. They have not the tools to manifest their consciousness, and by programming them, we don't help them with that respect. Consciousness is not programmable. It exists in Platonia, and a universal machine is only a sort of interface between different levels of the Platonic reality (arithmetical truth).This is an interesting comment! Are you saying that everythingincluding consciousness really emanates from platonia? Would youagree that we exist eternally in platonia? If so then perhaps we needonly consider computationalism /QM as a means of comprehending thesteps to this understanding. This platonic realm is very useful buthard to pin down as a concept.BestNick-- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Mar 31, 8:10 pm, meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 03/31/11,Nick Princenickmag.pri...@googlemail.comwrote:Bruno wrote With both QTI and COMP-TI we cannot go from being very old to being a baby. We can may be get slowly younger and younger in a more continuous way, by little backtracking. We always survive in the most normal world compatible with our states. But some kind of jumps are not excluded. Hi Bruno Maybe what I am trying to say is that very old or dying brains might deterorate in a specific way that allows the transition from an old to a young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way homomorphic to a young brain. Why not consider that it becomes homomorphic to an unconscious brain? If your consciousness is a property of some bundle of UD computations it does not follow that the most probable continuation is also conscious. We already know that if you get hit in the head the most probable continuation is unconsciousness for a time. Brent Indeed this defines the consciousness I am considering and is therefore subtrate dependent. If all of physics can be simulated on a computer then no problem. If you accept the classical theory of knowledge, it is easy. Computer are already conscious. They have not the tools to manifest their consciousness, and by programming them, we don't help them with that respect. Consciousness is not programmable. It exists in Platonia, and a universal machine is only a sort of interface between different levels of the Platonic reality (arithmetical truth). This is an interesting comment! Are you saying that everything including consciousness really emanates from platonia? Would you agree that we exist eternally in platonia? If so then perhaps we need only consider computationalism /QM as a means of comprehending the steps to this understanding. This platonic realm is very useful but hard to pin down as a concept. Best Nick Is not a sufficiently young brain not isomorphic to a unconscious brain? After all, the brain of a human fetus has to grow to come sufficient level of complexity to turn on... But given this, how to we avoid disembodied minds if we are assuming that minds supervene exclusively on brains (or equivalent)? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 02:52:44PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: It is here that if we apply Bayes' theorem (like in the Doomday argument), we should be astonished not being already very old (from our first person perspective). But Bayes cannot be applied in this setting, as we have already discussed a lot in the past. Bruno Marchal Superficially, this seems to be a very succinct form of Mallah's argument. You're basically saying that given I'm Russell Standish, and QTI, why don't I find myself arbitrarily far removed from the origin (my birth). Of course, the objections to this are obvious, and have been discussed before in this list. The above doomsday argument assumes a linear sequence of OMs that characterise Russell Standish, which cannot be the case in a Multiverse (required for QTI). Sampling of Russell Standish observer moments must be over all OMs that were born Russell Standish, and weighted by the universal prior, giving more weight to being a baby than an adult. Now all we need is for Mallah to admit that the above is not a strawman, and we're done. ASSA vs RSSA can be put in the dustbin :). -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On 3/31/2011 5:58 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 02:52:44PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: It is here that if we apply Bayes' theorem (like in the Doomday argument), we should be astonished not being already very old (from our first person perspective). But Bayes cannot be applied in this setting, as we have already discussed a lot in the past. Bruno Marchal Superficially, this seems to be a very succinct form of Mallah's argument. You're basically saying that given I'm Russell Standish, and QTI, why don't I find myself arbitrarily far removed from the origin (my birth). Of course, the objections to this are obvious, and have been discussed before in this list. The above doomsday argument assumes a linear sequence of OMs that characterise Russell Standish, which cannot be the case in a Multiverse (required for QTI). Sampling of Russell Standish observer moments must be over all OMs that were born Russell Standish, and weighted by the universal prior, giving more weight to being a baby than an adult. Is that assuming that QM uncertainty increases to the future but not the past:? Brent Now all we need is for Mallah to admit that the above is not a strawman, and we're done. ASSA vs RSSA can be put in the dustbin :). No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 8.5.449 / Virus Database: 271.1.1/3540 - Release Date: 03/30/11 09:54:00 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 09:52:25PM -0500, meekerdb wrote: Standish, and weighted by the universal prior, giving more weight to being a baby than an adult. Is that assuming that QM uncertainty increases to the future but not the past:? Brent In QM, the state evolves unitarily, which conserves total probability. However, not all observations are compatible with being an OM of the person of interest (ie the observer dies in some branches). Consequently, the total measure of observer moments must diminish as a function of OM age, roughly given by the observed 3rd person mortality curve. After 70-80 years, the total measure diminishes rapidly, but not to zero (assuming no cul-de-sac). Hence my statement - the measure must be biased towards being a baby. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On 3/31/2011 10:08 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 09:52:25PM -0500, meekerdb wrote: Standish, and weighted by the universal prior, giving more weight to being a baby than an adult. Is that assuming that QM uncertainty increases to the future but not the past:? Brent In QM, the state evolves unitarily, which conserves total probability. However, not all observations are compatible with being an OM of the person of interest (ie the observer dies in some branches). Couldn't the person have been born at different times too? QM Hamiltonians are time symmetric. If you try to infer the past you also have unitary evolution - just in the other direction. So I'm wondering where the arrow of time comes from in this view? Brent Consequently, the total measure of observer moments must diminish as a function of OM age, roughly given by the observed 3rd person mortality curve. After 70-80 years, the total measure diminishes rapidly, but not to zero (assuming no cul-de-sac). Hence my statement - the measure must be biased towards being a baby. Cheers No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 8.5.449 / Virus Database: 271.1.1/3540 - Release Date: 03/30/11 09:54:00 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 10:20:58PM -0500, meekerdb wrote: Couldn't the person have been born at different times too? QM Hamiltonians are time symmetric. If you try to infer the past you also have unitary evolution - just in the other direction. So I'm wondering where the arrow of time comes from in this view? Brent The arrow of time comes from tieing the 1st person view (observer moment) to the 3rd person unitary evolution via the anthropic principle. Not all 3rd person states support the 1st person view. I don't see what difference time translation symmetry of the birth moment makes. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Wed, Mar 30, 2011 at 03:15:59PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote: In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI” And I want to put forward some issues arising from this. It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear to live a finite, small lifetime of around 70 years. From the many discussions on this list, it also seems to me that, this is the single biggest argument (that I can understand) which points to the QTI being false. Unfortunately it appears that the whole ASSA/RSSA debate - which might have been a candidate for clarifying the issue - turns out to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach. So is QTI false? Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the conscious mind becomes so similar to that of a newborn - or even unborn - baby that perhaps “a diminishing?” consciousness always finds an appropriate route (in some branch) to avoid a cul de sac event. (This is one possible form of the No Cul De Sac Conjecture =NCDSC) This is a variant of an argument that David Parfit uses in his book Reasons and Persons, where he considers a continuum from his mind to that of Napoleon. (Don't flame me if I get the details wrong - the essence is what is important). I hadn't read that book at the time I wrote mine, otherwise, I would undoubtedly have cited it. Now in the case of Parfit's argument, I find considerable doubt that the argument can be made to work. Whilst, if I randomly knocked out 1% of your neurons, you will still be awake, and probably little different from the experience, if I knocked out certain keystone (as the concept is called in ecology) neurons to a level of 1% of all neurons, your brain function would fall apart quite rapidly. Yet to transition from your brain to that of Napoleons would require rewiring those same keystone neurons, and that, I believe casts significant doubt that the continuum is possible, even in principle. Now, we also know that infant minds are not a tabula rasa. So I am sceptical that the transition of a dementiaed mind to an infant mind is possible, for just the same reason. To avoid the cul de sac event, there would surely have to be a critical stage whereby consciousness diminishes and reaches a form of cusp at the point of lapsing into non existence and thereby requiring the necessity of an extension route or branch to another consistent universe. In short, from the third person POV, the person dies but from the first person -(now primitive) consciousness – state, there is rebirth. I am thinking that before we get to the croaking Amoeba there is a discontinuity in what we understand as consciousness – at least the form that applies to the NCDSC. The no cul-de-sac conjecture is perhaps a bit of a misnomer. It is not really well defined enough to embark on a proof, which it really ought to be. Certainly, in the Theatetical formulation that Bruno is investigating, there are NCDSC-like theorems in some hypostases, ([]p-p IIRC). Also, in QM, an observation along the lines of something like m(t)=\psi(t)|P(o(t))|\psi(t), where P is a project operator onto all worlds consistent with some observer o. The no cul-de-sac conjecture would correspond to m(t) != 0, except on a set of measure zero. Assuming m(t) is analytic, this is kind of obvious, but unfortunately QM really only requires second order differentiability of its objects, meaning that the proof never quite gets off the ground :(. Now if all this were to be the case, then maybe it says something very specific about the substrate on which consciousness runs. There would be something special about the architecture which the substrate employs to implement consciousness because it relies on a certain mode of decay, facilitating the branching to a new born baby having an appropriate structure (portal?) to secure a consistent extension of the consciousness into another branch. Unless a computer could simulate such a special substrate then it could not be used to implement consciousness. This would mean that it would be wise to say no to the Doctor! – Comp might be false? The Turing principle (p135 of David Deutsch’s book – “the Fabric of Reality”) would imply that, a universal machine could simulate the physical structure of brains in such a way so as to be able to act as a medium whereby, if the above argument is possible, consistent extensions of conscious physical observers (persons) could avoid cul de sacs. But until we can understand the nature of what consciousness is, we are stumped as to how a computer can be programmed to implement it. However some alien civilizations may have known these techniques for ages now, thereby perhaps explaining why we each have lived even as long as we now perceive we have. A stronger statement would be that if universal virtual reality generators are physically possible, then
Re: Is QTI false?
On 3/30/2011 3:15 PM, Nick Prince wrote: In Russell’s book there is a section on “Arguments against QTI” And I want to put forward some issues arising from this. It seems that (if MWI is true) we live in world(s) in which we appear to live a finite, small lifetime of around 70 years. From the many discussions on this list, it also seems to me that, this is the single biggest argument (that I can understand) which points to the QTI being false. Unfortunately it appears that the whole ASSA/RSSA debate - which might have been a candidate for clarifying the issue - turns out to be a confusing (to me anyway) and polarising approach. So is QTI false? Russell does put forward a possible solution in his book. He suggests the idea that as memory fades with dementia then perhaps the conscious mind becomes so similar to that of a newborn - or even unborn - baby that perhaps “a diminishing?” consciousness always finds an appropriate route (in some branch) to avoid a cul de sac event. (This is one possible form of the No Cul De Sac Conjecture =NCDSC) Sure, the cul de sac is avoided by reaching the state of unconscious which is then consistent with with many more continuations. e.g. as a rock. The QTI is based on quantum theory of unitary evolution; not on the survival of memories or consciousness. Those are claimed to be consequences, so they must be justified from QM, not just promoted from conjecture to axiom. Brent To avoid the cul de sac event, there would surely have to be a critical stage whereby consciousness diminishes and reaches a form of cusp at the point of lapsing into non existence and thereby requiring the necessity of an extension route or branch to another consistent universe. In short, from the third person POV, the person dies but from the first person -(now primitive) consciousness – state, there is rebirth. I am thinking that before we get to the croaking Amoeba there is a discontinuity in what we understand as consciousness – at least the form that applies to the NCDSC. Now if all this were to be the case, then maybe it says something very specific about the substrate on which consciousness runs. There would be something special about the architecture which the substrate employs to implement consciousness because it relies on a certain mode of decay, facilitating the branching to a new born baby having an appropriate structure (portal?) to secure a consistent extension of the consciousness into another branch. Unless a computer could simulate such a special substrate then it could not be used to implement consciousness. This would mean that it would be wise to say no to the Doctor! – Comp might be false? The Turing principle (p135 of David Deutsch’s book – “the Fabric of Reality”) would imply that, a universal machine could simulate the physical structure of brains in such a way so as to be able to act as a medium whereby, if the above argument is possible, consistent extensions of conscious physical observers (persons) could avoid cul de sacs. But until we can understand the nature of what consciousness is, we are stumped as to how a computer can be programmed to implement it. However some alien civilizations may have known these techniques for ages now, thereby perhaps explaining why we each have lived even as long as we now perceive we have. A stronger statement would be that if universal virtual reality generators are physically possible, then they must be built somewhere in some universes! But supposing the above (reincarnational) speculation was false in some way. In that case, I have yet to see a convincing argument as to how the the no cul de sac conjecture can be reconciled with people living to great ages. Whatever sampling assumption is applied, the facts are that we don’t typically see people reaching ages greater than 100+ yrs). Therefore either QTI is false or people just don’t get old! Rather, the special physical conditions of death associated with dementia or oxygen starvation of the brain, facilitate continued extensions of consciousness by branching into worlds where we supervene over new born babies (or something – animals, aliens?) - accidental deaths of people of any “normal ages” we can think about could of course be accommodated by the NCDSC). The mechanics of such reincarnational transitions would be interesting to speculate about since I see this as the only way out for a QTI. Nick Prince -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
RE: Conventional QTI = False
-Original Message- From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] I wasn't referring to that snippet, but another one discussing the evolution of superclusters of galaxies. The theory predicts that the universe will ultimately come to be dominated by said clusters. The snippet I mentioned seems to be referring to our measured velocity of ca 600km/s in the direction of the Virgo supercluster, although that wasn't explicitly mentioned in the article. Yes, I know the one you mean (the snippet and the supercluster). An article on the future evolution of the universe. That suffers from the same objection to the prediction that we'll fall into our galaxy's black hole, namely that the dynamics of the situation might be such that our galaxy is 'evaporated off' from the supercluster's potential well rather than 'relaxed into' it. (However I realise you were just making a casual remark in passing so maybe all this analysis is getting a bit over the top) Re our own supermassive black hole at the heart of the Milky Way - I assume we're in a stable orbit about that one, with the usual caveat that its impossible to prove stability of any arbitrary n-body orbit of course. The sun does seem to be in a very stable orbit about the galaxy - almost circular, in fact. See Rare Earth for an explanation of why this is one of the many factors that had to come out just right for us to exist at all... Charles
Re: Conventional QTI = False
I wasn't referring to that snippet, but another one discussing the evolution of superclusters of galaxies. The theory predicts that the universe will ultimately come to be dominated by said clusters. The snippet I mentioned seems to be referring to our measured velocity of ca 600km/s in the direction of the Virgo supercluster, although that wasn't explicitly mentioned in the article. Re our own supermassive black hole at the heart of the Milky Way - I assume we're in a stable orbit about that one, with the usual caveat that its impossible to prove stability of any arbitrary n-body orbit of course. Cheers George Levy wrote: Russell Standish wrote: Anyway, it looks like we're falling into a supermassive black hole right now, but we've got about 100 billion (10^11) years before we hit the event horizon. (Reported in New Scientist a couple of issue ago). George wrote: To avoid any scheduling conflict, I'll make sure to enter this in my scheduler. I wouldn't want to miss this for the world. George Charles Goodwin wrote: According to NS for 8th Sept the supermassive hole at the centre of our galaxy has been observed with much greater precision due to a flare which occured when matter fell into the accretion disc. But it doesn't say anything about us falling in Or is this just a general statement based on the momentum exchange which will take place inside the galaxy over the next few 100 billion years? Because momentum exchange can go either way - either the Earth (or what's left of it) is flung out of the galaxy or it falls into the central black hole. Similarly if the galaxy itself is orbiting a supermassive hole at the centre of the local group (say) that might also lead to 'evaporation' of the galaxy from the group or collapse into the central hole I just thought you needed to be aware of that. Set your scheduler for either ice or fire, a bang or a whimper Charles Thanks for the weather report Charles. I'll get dressed in layers, take my sunscreen lotion, and pack a good lunch. George Dr. Russell Standish Director High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
Re: Conventional QTI = False
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] I suspect you are trying to find ways of making QTI compatible with Jacques ASSA based argument, when it is clear his argument fails completely. Not that the argument is unimportant, as the reasons for the failure are also interesting. What the hell are you babbling about? - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate I know what no one else knows - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/ _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp
Re: Conventional QTI = False
Except that it is possible to perform an infinite amount of computation in the big crunch due to Tipler's argument, and only a finite amount of computation with the open universe (Dyson's argument). Sort of the opposite of what you might expect... Anyway, it looks like we're falling into a supermassive black hole right now, but we've got about 100 billion (10^11) years before we hit the event horizon. (Reported in New Scientist a couple of issue ago). Cheers Charles Goodwin wrote: Another thought on the Bayesian / SSA argument. Suppose (recent cosmological discoveries aside) that we discovered that the universe was going to fall back on itself into a big crunch in, say, 1 googol years' time. In such a universe QTI could still operate, but would only operate until the big crunch, which would act as a cul-de-sac. Now the SSA would say that typically you'd expect to find yourself (whatever that means) with an age around 0.5 googol, but that nevertheless there was a finite chance that you'd find yourself at age, say, 20. So assuming the SSA is valid for a moment, it wouldn't rule out QTI (although it would make it seem rather unlikely) if we discussed it when aged 20 in a closed universe. But it would be *impossible* if had the same discussion in an open universe! Odd that the average density of our branch of the multiverse should make all the difference to a theory based on the MWI . . . odd too (though not impossible) that the distant future history of the universe should determine the probability of events in the present . . . (BTW, would I be right in thinking that, applying the SSA to a person who finds himself to be 1 year old, the chances that he'll live to be 80 is 1/80?) Charles -Original Message- From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Wednesday, 12 September 2001 12:35 p.m. To: Charles Goodwin Cc: Everything-List (E-mail) Subject: Re: Conventional QTI = False The reason for failure of Jacques' argument is no. 1) from Charles's list below, which he obviously thought of independently of me. I originally posted this at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m583.html, on 10th May 1999. Unfortunately, I couldn't find where the orginal SSA argument was posted - perhaps this was via some other papers. The discussion that followed over the following year was quite interesting at times, and boringly technical at other times. It clarified a number of technical concepts, in particular what became known as the ASSA - which seems exactly like point 3) of Charles's post below: random hoppings of some soul between observer moments. Despite your protestations to the contrary Jacques, which I never found convincing. By contrast, soul hopping does not happen in the usual formulation of QTI, although I grant it is a feature of some computational theories of immortality based on infinite sized universes. I find it very droll that Jacques attempted to tar his opposition's theories with the very same brush that tars his own ASSA theory. The point of this is not to say that QTI is true (for which I retain my usual degree of scepticism), but simply that the Jacques Mallah SSA argument simply does not work as a counter argument. Cheers Charles Goodwin wrote: -Original Message- From: Jacques Mallah [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] I suspect you are trying to find ways of making QTI compatible with Jacques ASSA based argument, when it is clear his argument fails completely. Not that the argument is unimportant, as the reasons for the failure are also interesting. What the hell are you babbling about? I don't know whether he's thinking about my objections to the SSA argument, but mine certainly *appear* to undermine it (at least I haven't yet heard a good reason why they don't). Briefly, (1) the SSA argument neglects the fact that even with an infinitely long worldline, everyone must pass through every age from 0 upwards, which is precisely what we observe. It also (2) ignores a selection effect, namely that only in a thermodynamically low number of universes can a person who is not QTI-old expect to communicate with someone who *is* (and hence 99....% of discussion groups will necessarily be composed of QTI-young people). The SSA argument also (3) gives the strong impression (though this could *perhaps* be argued away) that it relies on us treating our worldlines as though we've just been dropped into them at some random point, like Billy Pilgrim; which is, of course, not what happens in reality. Maybe there are some more technical objections to the SSA argument, but these are the simplest and most obvious. Charles
Re: Conventional QTI = False
Hi Saibal, I don't know if there is an accepted formulation for QTI and the conservation of memory, however, the only constraint that seems logical to me is that the consciousness extensions should be logically consistent, because logical consistenty is a prerequisite for consciousness. I can imagine certain branches in which memory is totally lost, (the null case so to speak - because there is really no consciousness continuation) and other branches where memory is totally conserved, yet other cases where memory is transformed to reflect a different pastAll these will come true as long as there is a logical explanation for them to happen. You must keep in mind as Jacques mentionned, that memory is not necessary identical with the past. It only represents the present brain state which reflects in a consistent fashion more or less precisely what the past was. In some branches you will experience increasing old age without limit... all ou need is the logical explanation. For example upon dying as a human, you may wake up as a billion year old ten arm octopus living in a 30 dimensional space realizing that you were just dreaming in 3-Land. The number of explanations seems limitless. In this list, we are what we are, our age probably ranging from 20 to 80 because of our surrounding, because of anthropic reasons. Had we been a billion year old group (with the corresponding historical-anthropic reasons for being 1 billion year old), God knows what we would be talking and worrying about, but we would certainly not be debating this (F)allacious (I)nsane (N)onsense. :-) George Saibal Mitra wrote: QTI, as formulated by some on this list (I call this conventional QTI), is supposed to imply that you should experience becoming arbitrarily old with probability one. It is this prediction that I am attacking. I have no problems with the fact that according to quantum mechanics there is a finite probability that bullets fired from a machine gun toward you will all tunnel through your body. Or, that if you are thrown into a black hole (Russell Standish's example), you might be emitted from the black hole as Hawking radiation. The mistake is that QTI ONLY considers certain branches were you survive without memory loss, other branches are not considered. This leads to the paradox that you should experience yourself being infinitely old etc.. Saibal Charles Goodwin wrote: -Original Message- From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] In the case of a person suffering from a terminal disease, it is much more likely that he will survive in a branch where he was not diagnosed with the disease, than in a branch where the disease is magically cured. The latter possibility (conventional qti) can't be favoured above the first just because the surviving person is more similar to the original person. I don't understand this argument. The person survives (according to QTI) in both branches. In fact QTI postulates that an infinite number of copies of a person survives (although the *proportion* of the multiverse in which he survives tends to zero - but that is because the multivese is growing far faster than the branches in which a person survives). QTI postulates that ALL observer moments are part of a series (of a vast number of series') which survive to timelike infinity. You could object that in the first case your consciousness is somehow transferred to a different person (you ``jump´´ to a different branch that separated from the dying branch before you were diagnosed), but I would say that the surviving person has the same consciousness the original person would have if you cured his disease and erased all memory of having the disease. That isn't necessary (according to QTI). The multiverse is large enough to accomodate an uncountable infinity of branches in which a given person survives from ANY starting state, as well as a (larger) uncountable infinity in which he doesn't. Charles
RE: Conventional QTI = False
Re wrapping around - I've set MS Outlook to wrap at 132 characters (the largest value it will accept). It insists that I wrap somewhere (unfortunately). If you know any way to improve the situation let me know (I often go through and manually stick together the short lines). I could miss out the 's on quoted bits, but that might be confusing Re the SWE versus logical consistency. I suspect that at some deep level the two might become the same thing. If you are thinking of logical consistency from the pov of a conscious observer, I'm not sure what that entails. Is it logically consistent to find that you're really a 30-D octopus playing a 3D virtual reality game? I suppose it might be... But then I'm not sure what LC consists of on this argument. It can't consist of continuity or a lack of surprises! Using the SWE is definitely basing the argument on the known laws of QM, if not GR. The underlying assumption of the MWI is that the SWE describes *everything* (or that it's a very good approximation to the real explanation). Since QTI is based on the MWI, it has to assume the SWE as its basis, I would say. Logical consistency is probably a lower level requirement that in some manner generates the SWE (according to comp. theory at least). But if we're operating on the level of QM and not worrying about what goes on underneath then I'd say the SWE has got to be the basis of QTI. However I must admit I don't see how using the SWE limits the size of the multiverse. The SWE predicts a continuum of resultant states from a given initial states, which leads me to assume that (if the MWI is correct) the multiverse must contain a continuum / uncountable infinity of states. If that's a limit it's a fairly large one by most standards! Re logically possible vs physically possible universes. The set (or whatever one shoud call it) of all logically possible universes is called Platonia by Julian Barbour. The set of all physically possible universes with the same laws of physics as ours (plus some extra information, as David Deutsch has pointed out) is called the Multiverse. Platonia is either as big as the MV (both being continua) or bigger (a higher order of infinity than the Multiverse). All the above assumes the MWI is correct (evidence: quantum interference), and that Platonia exists (evidence (?) : the weak anthropic principle). Charles -Original Message- From: George Levy [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Wednesday, 12 September 2001 10:48 a.m. To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Conventional QTI = False Charles Goodwin wrote: George Levy wrote I don't know if there is an accepted formulation for QTI and the conservation of memory, however, the only constraint that seems logical to me is that the consciousness extensions should be logically consistent, because logical consistenty is a prerequisite for consciousness. I think the only constraint is that the extensions should be physically possible, i.e. possible outcomes of the schrodinger wave equation. If those are also logical outcomes then fine, but the SWE is the constraining factor. Interesting. You claim that the only constraint is the SWE. You opinion is based I presume on our current knowledge of physical laws. This puts a definite limit on the size of the multiverse. I claim the only constraint is logical consistency basing myself on the anthropic principle. This also puts a limit on the size of the multiverse. Bruno Marshall claims he can bridge the two by deriving the SWE (or maybe a simplified form) from logical consistency which implies that the currently conceivable physical multiverse is equal in size with the logical multiverse. BTW, your posts are the only ones that do not automatically wrap around at the end of a line, unless you start a new paragraph. Is there any way you or I (us?) could fix this? George
Re: Conventional QTI = False
The lines are too large for my screen to handle but I have fixed that by setting my Netscape to wrap automatically (it does so at around 70 characters). The output is irregular but it's OK. Charles Goodwin wrote: Re wrapping around - I've set MS Outlook to wrap at 132 characters (the largest value it will accept). It insists that I wrap somewhere (unfortunately). If you know any way to improve the situation let me know (I often go through and manually stick together the short lines). I could miss out the 's on quoted bits, but that might be confusing However I must admit I don't see how using the SWE limits the size of the multiverse. The SWE predicts a continuum of resultant states from a given initial states, which leads me to assume that (if the MWI is correct) the multiverse must contain a continuum / uncountable infinity of states. If that's a limit it's a fairly large one by most standards! The limits may just be different orders of infinity. Re logically possible vs physically possible universes. The set (or whatever one shoud call it) of all logically possible universes is called Platonia by Julian Barbour. The set of all physically possible universes with the same laws of physics as ours (plus some extra information, as David Deutsch has pointed out) is called the Multiverse. Platonia is either as big as the MV (both being continua) or bigger (a higher order of infinity than the Multiverse). Immortality does not have to be based on Quantum Theory. It can be derived from basic philosophical considerations borrowed from the Anthropic principle, Descartes and Leibniz (all possible worlds). What Barbour calls Platonia some philosophers call the Plenitude. All the above assumes the MWI is correct (evidence: quantum interference), and that Platonia exists (evidence (?) : the weak anthropic principle). The evidence for the Plenitude (Platonia) is the Principle of sufficient reason or more simply, causality (or the lack of). In the absence of any cause, for any given instance, all other possible instances must also exist. For any instance of universe (ours), all other possible universes must also exist. Hence, the Plenitude. Note, that by invoking the absence of any cause, this derivation specifically steers clear of the Creation by Design argument. In addition, this reliance on rationality, combined with the anthropic principle, leads to a theory of consciousness: I am rational because I am conscious. Bruno may have found a way to express this using a modern mathematical formulation. George
RE: Conventional QTI = False
-Original Message- From: Jacques Mallah [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] I suspect you are trying to find ways of making QTI compatible with Jacques ASSA based argument, when it is clear his argument fails completely. Not that the argument is unimportant, as the reasons for the failure are also interesting. What the hell are you babbling about? I don't know whether he's thinking about my objections to the SSA argument, but mine certainly *appear* to undermine it (at least I haven't yet heard a good reason why they don't). Briefly, (1) the SSA argument neglects the fact that even with an infinitely long worldline, everyone must pass through every age from 0 upwards, which is precisely what we observe. It also (2) ignores a selection effect, namely that only in a thermodynamically low number of universes can a person who is not QTI-old expect to communicate with someone who *is* (and hence 99....% of discussion groups will necessarily be composed of QTI-young people). The SSA argument also (3) gives the strong impression (though this could *perhaps* be argued away) that it relies on us treating our worldlines as though we've just been dropped into them at some random point, like Billy Pilgrim; which is, of course, not what happens in reality. Maybe there are some more technical objections to the SSA argument, but these are the simplest and most obvious. Charles
RE: Conventional QTI = False
-Original Message- From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Except that it is possible to perform an infinite amount of computation in the big crunch due to Tipler's argument, and only a finite amount of computation with the open universe (Dyson's argument). Sort of the opposite of what you might expect... I trust Dyson's argument more than Tipler's - the latter relies on a raft of unproven assumptions about what might be possible during the collapse. I was assuming a conventional big crunch in my argument. Anyway, it looks like we're falling into a supermassive black hole right now, but we've got about 100 billion (10^11) years before we hit the event horizon. (Reported in New Scientist a couple of issue ago). Enough time to move elsewhere I guess. Charles
Re: Conventional QTI = False
The reason for failure of Jacques' argument is no. 1) from Charles's list below, which he obviously thought of independently of me. I originally posted this at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m583.html, on 10th May 1999. Unfortunately, I couldn't find where the orginal SSA argument was posted - perhaps this was via some other papers. The discussion that followed over the following year was quite interesting at times, and boringly technical at other times. It clarified a number of technical concepts, in particular what became known as the ASSA - which seems exactly like point 3) of Charles's post below: random hoppings of some soul between observer moments. Despite your protestations to the contrary Jacques, which I never found convincing. By contrast, soul hopping does not happen in the usual formulation of QTI, although I grant it is a feature of some computational theories of immortality based on infinite sized universes. I find it very droll that Jacques attempted to tar his opposition's theories with the very same brush that tars his own ASSA theory. The point of this is not to say that QTI is true (for which I retain my usual degree of scepticism), but simply that the Jacques Mallah SSA argument simply does not work as a counter argument. Cheers Charles Goodwin wrote: -Original Message- From: Jacques Mallah [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] I suspect you are trying to find ways of making QTI compatible with Jacques ASSA based argument, when it is clear his argument fails completely. Not that the argument is unimportant, as the reasons for the failure are also interesting. What the hell are you babbling about? I don't know whether he's thinking about my objections to the SSA argument, but mine certainly *appear* to undermine it (at least I haven't yet heard a good reason why they don't). Briefly, (1) the SSA argument neglects the fact that even with an infinitely long worldline, everyone must pass through every age from 0 upwards, which is precisely what we observe. It also (2) ignores a selection effect, namely that only in a thermodynamically low number of universes can a person who is not QTI-old expect to communicate with someone who *is* (and hence 99....% of discussion groups will necessarily be composed of QTI-young people). The SSA argument also (3) gives the strong impression (though this could *perhaps* be argued away) that it relies on us treating our worldlines as though we've just been dropped into them at some random point, like Billy Pilgrim; which is, of course, not what happens in reality. Maybe there are some more technical objections to the SSA argument, but these are the simplest and most obvious. Charles Dr. Russell Standish Director High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
RE: Conventional QTI = False
Another thought on the Bayesian / SSA argument. Suppose (recent cosmological discoveries aside) that we discovered that the universe was going to fall back on itself into a big crunch in, say, 1 googol years' time. In such a universe QTI could still operate, but would only operate until the big crunch, which would act as a cul-de-sac. Now the SSA would say that typically you'd expect to find yourself (whatever that means) with an age around 0.5 googol, but that nevertheless there was a finite chance that you'd find yourself at age, say, 20. So assuming the SSA is valid for a moment, it wouldn't rule out QTI (although it would make it seem rather unlikely) if we discussed it when aged 20 in a closed universe. But it would be *impossible* if had the same discussion in an open universe! Odd that the average density of our branch of the multiverse should make all the difference to a theory based on the MWI . . . odd too (though not impossible) that the distant future history of the universe should determine the probability of events in the present . . . (BTW, would I be right in thinking that, applying the SSA to a person who finds himself to be 1 year old, the chances that he'll live to be 80 is 1/80?) Charles -Original Message- From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Wednesday, 12 September 2001 12:35 p.m. To: Charles Goodwin Cc: Everything-List (E-mail) Subject: Re: Conventional QTI = False The reason for failure of Jacques' argument is no. 1) from Charles's list below, which he obviously thought of independently of me. I originally posted this at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m583.html, on 10th May 1999. Unfortunately, I couldn't find where the orginal SSA argument was posted - perhaps this was via some other papers. The discussion that followed over the following year was quite interesting at times, and boringly technical at other times. It clarified a number of technical concepts, in particular what became known as the ASSA - which seems exactly like point 3) of Charles's post below: random hoppings of some soul between observer moments. Despite your protestations to the contrary Jacques, which I never found convincing. By contrast, soul hopping does not happen in the usual formulation of QTI, although I grant it is a feature of some computational theories of immortality based on infinite sized universes. I find it very droll that Jacques attempted to tar his opposition's theories with the very same brush that tars his own ASSA theory. The point of this is not to say that QTI is true (for which I retain my usual degree of scepticism), but simply that the Jacques Mallah SSA argument simply does not work as a counter argument. Cheers Charles Goodwin wrote: -Original Message- From: Jacques Mallah [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] I suspect you are trying to find ways of making QTI compatible with Jacques ASSA based argument, when it is clear his argument fails completely. Not that the argument is unimportant, as the reasons for the failure are also interesting. What the hell are you babbling about? I don't know whether he's thinking about my objections to the SSA argument, but mine certainly *appear* to undermine it (at least I haven't yet heard a good reason why they don't). Briefly, (1) the SSA argument neglects the fact that even with an infinitely long worldline, everyone must pass through every age from 0 upwards, which is precisely what we observe. It also (2) ignores a selection effect, namely that only in a thermodynamically low number of universes can a person who is not QTI-old expect to communicate with someone who *is* (and hence 99....% of discussion groups will necessarily be composed of QTI-young people). The SSA argument also (3) gives the strong impression (though this could *perhaps* be argued away) that it relies on us treating our worldlines as though we've just been dropped into them at some random point, like Billy Pilgrim; which is, of course, not what happens in reality. Maybe there are some more technical objections to the SSA argument, but these are the simplest and most obvious. Charles -- -- Dr. Russell Standish Director High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia [EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
Re: Conventional QTI = False
Never heard of this reasoning before. Can you expand please? This doesn't appear to be related to the problem of being required to forget how old you if you are immortal in a physical human sense. Cheers Saibal Mitra wrote: According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you can = also never forget anything. I don't believe this because I know for a = fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a = long time ago. Saibal Dr. Russell Standish Director High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
Re: Conventional QTI = False
I just argue that to compute the probability distribution for your next experience, given your previous ones, you must also consider continuations were you suffer memory loss. QTI fails to do so and it is precisely this that leads to the the prediction that you should find yourself being infinitely old, or that you should live for arbitrary long. If you are severly injured in an accident and dying, then the probability that you will survive in a branch where the accident never happened is much larger than living on in a branch where the accident did happen. That continuations with memory loss are important can be verified ``experimentally´´ (I don't remember everything that has happened to me). There are also continuations of me that never forget anything. I am not one of them. Saibal Russell Standish wrote: Never heard of this reasoning before. Can you expand please? This doesn't appear to be related to the problem of being required to forget how old you if you are immortal in a physical human sense. Cheers Saibal Mitra wrote: According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you can = also never forget anything. I don't believe this because I know for a = fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a = long time ago. Saibal -- -- Dr. Russell StandishDirector High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 -- --
Re: Conventional QTI = False
QTI, as formulated by some on this list (I call this conventional QTI), is supposed to imply that you should experience becoming arbitrarily old with probability one. It is this prediction that I am attacking. I have no problems with the fact that according to quantum mechanics there is a finite probability that bullets fired from a machine gun toward you will all tunnel through your body. Or, that if you are thrown into a black hole (Russell Standish's example), you might be emitted from the black hole as Hawking radiation. The mistake is that QTI ONLY considers certain branches were you survive without memory loss, other branches are not considered. This leads to the paradox that you should experience yourself being infinitely old etc.. Saibal Charles Goodwin wrote: -Original Message- From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] In the case of a person suffering from a terminal disease, it is much more likely that he will survive in a branch where he was not diagnosed with the disease, than in a branch where the disease is magically cured. The latter possibility (conventional qti) can't be favoured above the first just because the surviving person is more similar to the original person. I don't understand this argument. The person survives (according to QTI) in both branches. In fact QTI postulates that an infinite number of copies of a person survives (although the *proportion* of the multiverse in which he survives tends to zero - but that is because the multivese is growing far faster than the branches in which a person survives). QTI postulates that ALL observer moments are part of a series (of a vast number of series') which survive to timelike infinity. You could object that in the first case your consciousness is somehow transferred to a different person (you ``jump´´ to a different branch that separated from the dying branch before you were diagnosed), but I would say that the surviving person has the same consciousness the original person would have if you cured his disease and erased all memory of having the disease. That isn't necessary (according to QTI). The multiverse is large enough to accomodate an uncountable infinity of branches in which a given person survives from ANY starting state, as well as a (larger) uncountable infinity in which he doesn't. Charles
Re: Conventional QTI = False
As I said, this is a completely new interpretation of QTI, one never stated before. QTI does _not_ assume that memory is conserved. The prediction that one may end up being so old as to not know how old you are is based on the assumption that you total memory capacity remains constant - it need not do so. On the other hand, I have no problem with the fact that dementia might set in. I suspect you are trying to find ways of making QTI compatible with Jacques ASSA based argument, when it is clear his argument fails completely. Not that the argument is unimportant, as the reasons for the failure are also interesting. Cheers Saibal Mitra wrote: I just argue that to compute the probability distribution for your next experience, given your previous ones, you must also consider continuations were you suffer memory loss. QTI fails to do so and it is precisely this that leads to the the prediction that you should find yourself being infinitely old, or that you should live for arbitrary long. If you are severly injured in an accident and dying, then the probability that you will survive in a branch where the accident never happened is much larger than living on in a branch where the accident did happen. That continuations with memory loss are important can be verified ``experimentally´´ (I don't remember everything that has happened to me). There are also continuations of me that never forget anything. I am not one of them. Saibal Russell Standish wrote: Never heard of this reasoning before. Can you expand please? This doesn't appear to be related to the problem of being required to forget how old you if you are immortal in a physical human sense. Cheers Saibal Mitra wrote: According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you can = also never forget anything. I don't believe this because I know for a = fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a = long time ago. Saibal -- -- Dr. Russell StandishDirector High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 -- -- Dr. Russell Standish Director High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
Re: Conventional QTI = False
Saibal writes: According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you can also never forget anything. I don't believe this because I know for a fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a long time ago. Right, but to make the same argument against QTI you'd have to say, you don't believe this because you have died. But this is not possible. So the analogy is not as good as it looks. You do exist in branches where you have forgotten things, as well as in branches where you remember them. But you don't exist in branches where you have died, only in branches where you are still alive. They aren't really the same. There are arguments against QTI but this one does not work so well. Hal F.
RE: Conventional QTI = False
-Original Message- From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] In the case of a person suffering from a terminal disease, it is much more likely that he will survive in a branch where he was not diagnosed with the disease, than in a branch where the disease is magically cured. The latter possibility (conventional qti) can't be favoured above the first just because the surviving person is more similar to the original person. I don't understand this argument. The person survives (according to QTI) in both branches. In fact QTI postulates that an infinite number of copies of a person survives (although the *proportion* of the multiverse in which he survives tends to zero - but that is because the multivese is growing far faster than the branches in which a person survives). QTI postulates that ALL observer moments are part of a series (of a vast number of series') which survive to timelike infinity. You could object that in the first case your consciousness is somehow transferred to a different person (you ``jump´´ to a different branch that separated from the dying branch before you were diagnosed), but I would say that the surviving person has the same consciousness the original person would have if you cured his disease and erased all memory of having the disease. That isn't necessary (according to QTI). The multiverse is large enough to accomodate an uncountable infinity of branches in which a given person survives from ANY starting state, as well as a (larger) uncountable infinity in which he doesn't. Charles
Re: Conventional QTI = False
Hal Finney wrote: Saibal writes: According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you can also never forget anything. I don't believe this because I know for a fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a long time ago. Right, but to make the same argument against QTI you'd have to say, you don't believe this because you have died. But this is not possible. So the analogy is not as good as it looks. You do exist in branches where you have forgotten things, as well as in branches where you remember them. That is true, but I want to make the point that branches where I survive with memory loss have to be taken into account. In the case of a person suffering from a terminal disease, it is much more likely that he will survive in a branch where he was not diagnosed with the disease, than in a branch where the disease is magically cured. The latter possibility (conventional qti) can't be favoured above the first just because the surviving person is more similar to the original person. You could object that in the first case your consciousness is somehow transferred to a different person (you ``jump´´ to a different branch that separated from the dying branch before you were diagnosed), but I would say that the surviving person has the same consciousness the original person would have if you cured his disease and erased all memory of having the disease. Saibal
