On 16 Aug 2012, at 16:47, Roger wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Has anybody ever provided a proof that life is a computable entity ?
Nobody agrees on what life is.
If it is material, then life is not emulable.
If it is a more abstract information exchange, then it might be.
Keep in mind that, contrarily to a widespread belief, comp makes
consciousness and matter not being emulable by a computer. Indeed,
consciousness and matter are based on the statistics on all
computations going through my actual state, and that is a complex
infinite set, which can not even be described in any finite way.
"Life" is a fuzzy notion, so it is hard to answer precisely. I usually
define it by self-reproduction, and in that sense, life is easy to
emulate, unlike consciousness. But if you attach consciousness to the
notion of life, then the answer in the comp theory is that life is in
platonia/God/arithmetical truth, not on earth, and we cannot emulate
it. We can still accept an artificial brain, as they might be a level
where the emulation of it will make it possible for my consciousness
(in Platonia) to manifest itself relatively to you.
With comp, the mind body relation is not the one we usually believe
in. We can, rather conventionally, ascribe a mind to a body, but we
cannot ascribe a body to a mind: only an infinity of bodies.
With comp, my consciousness is in platonia, and manifests itself in
infinities of "incarnation", that is local implementation relatively
to stabilizing universal number/machine, if they exist. To be sure,
such existence remains to be proved, but evidences already exists and
are rather strong, imo.
Bruno
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/16/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-15, 04:44:09
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible
On 14 Aug 2012, at 20:16, William R. Buckley wrote:
John:
Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience versus
universality, the Turing machine
can compute all computable computations, and this simply by virtue
of its construction.
It is deeper than that. It is in virtue of the fact that the set of
computable functions, unlike all other sets in math, is closed for
the diagonalization, and the price for this is incompleteness. It is
not trivial, and makes computational universality rather exceptional
and unexpected. The discovery of the universal machine is a very big
discovery, of the type: it changes everything we knew. I think.
For beliefs, knowledge, proofs, definability, etc. This never
happens, and the corresponding formal systems can always been
extended.
Bruno
wrb
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com
] On Behalf Of John Clark
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 9:39 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible
On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:09 PM, William R. Buckley <bill.buck...@gmail.com
> wrote:
> Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient[...]
Turing's entire reason for inventing what we now call a Turing
Machine was to prove that computational omniscience is NOT
possible. He rigorously proved that no Turing Machine, that is to
say no computer, can determine in advance if any given computer
program will eventually stop.
For example, it would be very easy to write a program to look for
the first even number greater than 2 that is not the sum of two
prime numbers and then stop. But will the machine ever stop? The
Turing Machine doesn't know, I don't know, you don't know, nobody
knows. Maybe it will stop in the next 5 seconds, maybe it will
stop in 5 billion years, maybe it will never stop. If you want to
know what the machine will do you just have to watch it and see,
and even the machine doesn't know what it will do until it does it.
John K Clark
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