Re: JOINING Post and On measure alteration mechanisms and other practical tests for COMP
On 15 Jan 2012, at 00:17, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Jan 07, 2012 at 07:02:52AM +0200, acw wrote: On 1/6/2012 18:57, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Jan 2012, at 11:02, acw wrote: Thanks for replying. I was worried my post was too big and few people will bother reading it due to size. I hope to read your opinion on the viability of the experiment I presented in my original post. Any chance you could break it up into smaller digestible pieces? That would be good idea. read it twice, and generate too much comments in my head, and none seems to address the point. Now i am more busy, so acw will need to be patient I grasp his idea. To Bruno Marchal: Do you plan on ever publishing your thesis in english? My french is a bit rusty and it would take a rather long time to walk through it, however I did read the SANE and CCQ papers, as well as a few others. I think that SANE is enough, although some people pushes me to submit to some more public journal. It is not yet clear if physicist or logician will understand. Physicists asks the good questions but don't have the logical tools. Logicians have the right tools, but are not really interested in the applied question. By tradition modern logicians despise their philosophical origin. Some personal contingent problems slow me down, too. Don't want to bore you with this. If it's sufficient, I'll just have to read the right books to better understand AUDA, as it is now, I understood some parts, but also had trouble connecting some ideas in the AUDA. Maybe I should write a book. There is, on my url, a long version of the thesis in french: conscience et mécanisme, with all details, but then it is 700 pages long, and even there, non-logician does not grasp the logic. It is a pity but such kind of work reveals the abyssal gap between logicians and physicists, and the Penrose misunderstanding of Gödel's theorem has frightened the physicists to even take any look further. To defend the thesis it took me more time to explain elementary logic and computer science than philosophy of mind. A book would surely appeal to a larger audience, but a paper which only mentions the required reading could also be enough, although in the latter case fewer people would be willing to spend the time to understand it. There is a project underway to translate Secret de l'amibe into English, which IMHO is an even better introduction to the topic than Bruno's theses (a lot of technical detail has been supressed to make the central ideas digestible). We're about half way through at present - its a volunteer project though, so it will probably be another year or so before it is done/ Thanks to Russell and Kim. Does anyone have a complete downloadable archive of this mailing list, besides the web-accessible google groups or nabble one? Google groups seems to badly group posts together and generates some duplicates for older posts. I agree. Google groups are not practical. The first old archive were very nice (Escribe); but like with all software, archiving get worst with time. nabble is already better, and I don't know if there are other one. Note also that the everything list, maintained by Wei Dai, is a list lasting since a long time, so that the total archive must be rather huge. Thanks to Wei Dai to maintain the list, despite the ASSA people (Hal Finney, Wei Dai in some post, Schmidhuber, ...) seems to have quit after losing the argument with the RSSA people. Well, to be sure Russell Standish still use ASSA, it seems to me, and I have always defended the idea that ASSA is indeed not completely non sensical, although it concerns more the geography than the physics, in the comp frame. If someone from those early times still has the posts, it might be nice if they decided to post an archive (such as a mailer spool). For large Usenet groups, it's not unusual for people to have personal archives, even from 1980's and earlier. I have often thought this would be a very useful resource - sadly I never kept my own archive. It would probably be a good idea to webbot / spider to download the contents of the archives as they currently exist. That might be useful. Especially with things like NDAA, SOPA, etc. Looks like deeper threats than usual accumulate on the free world. I had no idea that was the reason I don't seem them post anymore(when I was looking at older posts, I saw they used to post here). For most people, the everything list is a side interest, and other priorities and interests will interfere with particpation. Bruno is one of the few people who has dedicated his life to this topic, so one shouldn't be too surprised if other people leave the list out of exhaustion :). In cognitive science, many confuse science and philosophy. I like philosophy but it is not my job. I don't defend any truth, but only attempt to criticize invalid arguments. As for losing the RSSA
Re: JOINING Post and On measure alteration mechanisms and other practical tests for COMP
On Sat, Jan 07, 2012 at 07:02:52AM +0200, acw wrote: On 1/6/2012 18:57, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Jan 2012, at 11:02, acw wrote: Thanks for replying. I was worried my post was too big and few people will bother reading it due to size. I hope to read your opinion on the viability of the experiment I presented in my original post. Any chance you could break it up into smaller digestible pieces? To Bruno Marchal: Do you plan on ever publishing your thesis in english? My french is a bit rusty and it would take a rather long time to walk through it, however I did read the SANE and CCQ papers, as well as a few others. I think that SANE is enough, although some people pushes me to submit to some more public journal. It is not yet clear if physicist or logician will understand. Physicists asks the good questions but don't have the logical tools. Logicians have the right tools, but are not really interested in the applied question. By tradition modern logicians despise their philosophical origin. Some personal contingent problems slow me down, too. Don't want to bore you with this. If it's sufficient, I'll just have to read the right books to better understand AUDA, as it is now, I understood some parts, but also had trouble connecting some ideas in the AUDA. Maybe I should write a book. There is, on my url, a long version of the thesis in french: conscience et mécanisme, with all details, but then it is 700 pages long, and even there, non-logician does not grasp the logic. It is a pity but such kind of work reveals the abyssal gap between logicians and physicists, and the Penrose misunderstanding of Gödel's theorem has frightened the physicists to even take any look further. To defend the thesis it took me more time to explain elementary logic and computer science than philosophy of mind. A book would surely appeal to a larger audience, but a paper which only mentions the required reading could also be enough, although in the latter case fewer people would be willing to spend the time to understand it. There is a project underway to translate Secret de l'amibe into English, which IMHO is an even better introduction to the topic than Bruno's theses (a lot of technical detail has been supressed to make the central ideas digestible). We're about half way through at present - its a volunteer project though, so it will probably be another year or so before it is done/ Does anyone have a complete downloadable archive of this mailing list, besides the web-accessible google groups or nabble one? Google groups seems to badly group posts together and generates some duplicates for older posts. I agree. Google groups are not practical. The first old archive were very nice (Escribe); but like with all software, archiving get worst with time. nabble is already better, and I don't know if there are other one. Note also that the everything list, maintained by Wei Dai, is a list lasting since a long time, so that the total archive must be rather huge. Thanks to Wei Dai to maintain the list, despite the ASSA people (Hal Finney, Wei Dai in some post, Schmidhuber, ...) seems to have quit after losing the argument with the RSSA people. Well, to be sure Russell Standish still use ASSA, it seems to me, and I have always defended the idea that ASSA is indeed not completely non sensical, although it concerns more the geography than the physics, in the comp frame. If someone from those early times still has the posts, it might be nice if they decided to post an archive (such as a mailer spool). For large Usenet groups, it's not unusual for people to have personal archives, even from 1980's and earlier. I have often thought this would be a very useful resource - sadly I never kept my own archive. It would probably be a good idea to webbot / spider to download the contents of the archives as they currently exist. I had no idea that was the reason I don't seem them post anymore(when I was looking at older posts, I saw they used to post here). For most people, the everything list is a side interest, and other priorities and interests will interfere with particpation. Bruno is one of the few people who has dedicated his life to this topic, so one shouldn't be too surprised if other people leave the list out of exhaustion :). As for losing the RSSA vs ASSA debate, what was the conclusive argument that tilts the favor toward RSSA (if it's too long, linking to the thread will do)? In my personal opinion, I used to initially consider ASSA as generally true, because assuming continuity of consciousness is a stronger hypothesis, despite being 'felt' from the inside, but then I realized that if I'm assuming consciousness/mind, I might as well assume continuity as well (from the perspective of the observer), otherwise I can't reason about my future expectations. There is a reasonably detailed discussion of this issue in my book. My
Re: JOINING Post and On measure alteration mechanisms and other practical tests for COMP
On Fri, Jan 6, 2012 at 10:57 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Assuming all possible (consistent mathematical) structures is the simplest possible hypothesis. The problem with this is that this 'whole' might be a bit too large or inconsistent in itself (like Russell's Paradox), and like I've said before, there is no way for us finite humans to know an oracle when we see it. If we're a bit more modest, we can use the only mathematical notion that we know to be truly universal - computation as by CTT. OK. The main problem also is in the self-localization in the possible math structure. Comp entails a first person indeterminacy which distribute us in the mathematical reality, and what we perceive might NOT be a purely mathematical structure, but something supervening on it from the inside view. This is a point missed by people like Chalmers, Tegmark, Schmidhuber, etc. Bruno, would you say that Tegmark has still missed the point, given this article he co-authored: http://lesswrong.com/lw/3pg/aguirre_tegmark_layzer_cosmological/ http://arxiv.org/abs/1008.1066 Thanks, Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: JOINING Post and On measure alteration mechanisms and other practical tests for COMP
On 07 Jan 2012, at 18:07, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Jan 6, 2012 at 10:57 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Assuming all possible (consistent mathematical) structures is the simplest possible hypothesis. The problem with this is that this 'whole' might be a bit too large or inconsistent in itself (like Russell's Paradox), and like I've said before, there is no way for us finite humans to know an oracle when we see it. If we're a bit more modest, we can use the only mathematical notion that we know to be truly universal - computation as by CTT. OK. The main problem also is in the self-localization in the possible math structure. Comp entails a first person indeterminacy which distribute us in the mathematical reality, and what we perceive might NOT be a purely mathematical structure, but something supervening on it from the inside view. This is a point missed by people like Chalmers, Tegmark, Schmidhuber, etc. Bruno, would you say that Tegmark has still missed the point, given this article he co-authored: http://lesswrong.com/lw/3pg/aguirre_tegmark_layzer_cosmological/ http://arxiv.org/abs/1008.1066 Thanks, Tegmark uses comp +swe, when comp makes it necessary to derive swe from universal number self-reference (which then gives both the quanta and the qualia (frely from the classical theory of knowledge). For the physical reality you can say that he is very close to comp, with Everett and Deutsch, but he missed the comp reversal between physics and number's 'theology'. He does not address the mind body problem, and seems unaware that comp reduces it in justifying swe (or the 'correct physical laws') from the math of self-observing universal machine. It is still an Aristotelian. He still infer (from observation) the unitary evolution. But he uses comp, so by UDA the unitary evolution must be derived from elementary arithmetic. From a platonist view, he is still cheating. He is still trying to copy on nature. He missed, following a long tradition, the mind-body problem, despite his physics, and even his metaphysics (mathematicalism) is very close to the comp needed physics. Yet UDA explains (or is supposed to explain) that physics *has to* be justified by universal introspection (and so based on G, G* and the intensional variants, to get that measure on the UD*, or on the sigma_1 propositions). It is very good physics, from a comp view. But he misses that physical realities are a first person sharable numbers' dreams. Like Everett explains the phenomenology of the collapse, comp asks for a phenomenological account of the swe in arithmetic. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: JOINING Post and On measure alteration mechanisms and other practical tests for COMP
On 1/6/2012 18:57, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Jan 2012, at 11:02, acw wrote: Hello everything-list, this is my first post here, but I've been reading this list for at least half a year, and I'm afraid this post will be a bit long as it contains many thoughts I've had on my mind for quite some time now. Welcome acw. It looks like you wrote an interesting post. But it is very long, as are most sentences in it. I will make some easy comments. I will come back on it later, when I have more time. Thanks, I look forward to the full response. A bit about me: I'm mostly self-taught in the matters concerning the topics of 'everything-list' (Multiverse hypotheses, philosophy of science, 'rationalism', theory of computation, cognitive science, AI, models of computation, logic, physics), and I greatly enjoy reading books and papers on the related subjects. My main activities center mostly around software development and a various other fields directly related to it. OK. Self-teaching is often of better quality than listening to others. It's fine and allows one to better study some matters, but it also may lead to gaps in knowledge if one isn't aware of the gaps. I will give my positions/assumptions first before talking about the actual topic I mentioned in the subject. One of my positions (what I'm betting on, but cannot know) is that of computationalism, that is, that one would survive a digital substitution. OK. As you know that is my working hypothesis. As a scientist I don't know the truth. I certainly find it plausible, given our current knowledge, and my main goal is to show that it leads to testable consequences. Mainly, it reduces the mind body problem into an arithmetical pure body problem. Neither do I claim to know the truth, or should anyone else, if someone claims to know it, they may be telling a lie, voluntarily or not. Our senses aren't that reliable to claim absolute knowledge about the world and even when talking about mathematical truth, the incompleteness theorem applies to everyone. Instead of truth, I tend to assign a theory a high confidence value, or to consider it more probable than others, but the only thing that we can really do beyond that is testing, falsification or verification of our expectations/theories. It sort of was the main goal of my post - to show that there are some practical ways to test COMP that one might be able to do some day. There are however many details regarding this that would have to be made more precise and topic's goal is to elucidate some of these uncertainties and invite others to give their ideas on the subject. Why computationalism? Chalmers' Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia thought experiment/argument shows that one can be forced to believe some seemingly absurd things about the nature of consciousness if functionalism is false (that is, if one assumes that conscious nature depends on more than just functional organization, such as some magical properties of matter). Taking it from functionalism to computationalism isn't very hard either, all it takes is assuming no concrete infinities are involved in the brain's implementation and the CTT(Church Turing Thesis) does the rest. OK. And if you make explicit that COMP assumes only the existence of a level, then you see that COMP, as discussed on this list, is a weaker hypothesis that all the comp discussed in the literature. That is why I refer to the generalized brain. The level can be so low that the generalized brain is an entire galaxy or even a multiverse quantum state. This does not make the assumption trivial, the main reversal, between Aristotle theology and Plato theology still follows. Too low a level and functionalism is no longer very practically testable, but the consequences of COMP (reversal) would still apply if it's true. In my example (the experiment) from the previous post, I tried to assume a reasonable (mid(atomic)/high(neurons or higher)) substitution level, in that it could be tested someday. Such a mid/high-substitution level allows for the mind's implementation to become substrate independent (SIM), but if the new implementation isn't too exact, would the continuation likely or not: it should be conscious, but would it be likely to experience a continuation into a SIM after saying 'yes' to the doctor? Would it be more likely to end up amnesiac and just choose not to become a SIM? I've discussed the matter of errors or inexact 'copies' in the previous post and will wait for your response on that part before going into more details again. In a way, I think it might be more reasonable to consider the mind's implementation and the environment's implementation separately (even if environment+mind are at least one (and infinity of) TM in COMP) as the environment has more chance to vary and only indirectly leads to conscious experience, or that it might be more of a wildcard. While I cannot ever know if
Re: Joining Post
On 9/27/2011 10:40 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 11:52 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/27/2011 9:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote: I don't think that. I just noted it's logically possible, contrary to assertions that our universe must be duplicated infinitely many times. If our universe is not duplicated a huge number of times, then quantum computers would not work. They rely on huge numbers of universes different from ours aside from a few entangled particles. Even normal interference patterns are explained by there existing a huge number of very similar universes. Or by Feynmann paths that zigzag in spacetime. Don't become to enamored of an interpretation. If you assume there is a single photon interfering with itself, how is it that this one particle can evaluate a problem whose computational complexity would exceed that of any conventional computer using all the matter in the universe? Has such a problem been solved? Anyway, the answer is by the one particle cycling back thru time, so it appears to us as many particles. However, according to Vilenkin, Greene, and Tegmark, a generic prediction of the theory of inflation is that there is an *infinite* number of Hubble volumes (what you are calling universes). Let's call the hypothesis that all quantum-physical possibilities are realized infinitely many times the hypothesis of Cosmic Repetition. Brian Greene argues for this hypothesis quite persuasively. He says, In an infinitely big universe, there are infinitely many patches [i.e., Hubble volumes]; so, with only finitely many different particles arrangements, the arrangements of particles within patches must be duplicated an infinite number of times. (The Hidden Reality, pg. 33) It's plausible - but not logically required. Suppose all the infinite universes are number 1, 2, ... Number 1 is ours. Number 2 something different. Numbers 3,4, ...inf are exact copies of number 2. So there are only two arrangements of particles; in spite of there being infinitely many universes. Not logically required, but I would say it is not consistent with our current theories and observations. As for the probability distribution of matter and/or outcomes, I'll let Tegmark do the explaining: Observers living in parallel universes at Level I observe the exact same laws of physics as we do, but with different initial conditions than those in our Hubble volume. This is questionable. Most theories of the universe starting from a quantum fluctuation or tunneling from a prior universe assume that the universe must start very small - no more than a few Planck volumes. The generalized theory of inflation is eternal inflation. It leads to an exponentially growing volume which expands forever. This limits the amount of information that can possibly be provided as initial conditions. So where does all the information come from? I haven't heard the theory that there is an upper bound on the information content for this universe set by the big bang. In one Planck volume there is only room for one bit. That's the holographic principle. Yet our universe appears to take more than 1 bit to describe, and it seems to have a possibly infinite volume. That's why I provided the (possible) explanation below. As to where information comes from, if all possibilities exist, the total information content may be zero, and the appearance of a large amount of information is a local illusion. QM allows negative information (hidden correlations) so that one possibility is that the net information is zero or very small and the apparent information is created by the existence of the hubble horizon. The currently favored theory is that the initial conditions (the densities and motions of different types of matter early on) were created by quantum fluctuations during the inflation epoch (see section 3). This quantum mechanism generates initial conditions that are for all practical purposes random, producing density fluctuations described by what mathematicians call an ergodic random field. Ergodic means that if you imagine generating an ensemble of universes, each with its own random initial conditions, then the probability distribution of outcomes in a given volume is identical to the distribution that you get by sampling different volumes in a single universe. That's not what ergodic
Re: Joining Post
On Sep 28, 2011, at 1:28 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/27/2011 10:40 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 11:52 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/27/2011 9:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote: I don't think that. I just noted it's logically possible, contrary to assertions that our universe must be duplicated infinitely many times. If our universe is not duplicated a huge number of times, then quantum computers would not work. They rely on huge numbers of universes different from ours aside from a few entangled particles. Even normal interference patterns are explained by there existing a huge number of very similar universes. Or by Feynmann paths that zigzag in spacetime. Don't become to enamored of an interpretation. If you assume there is a single photon interfering with itself, how is it that this one particle can evaluate a problem whose computational complexity would exceed that of any conventional computer using all the matter in the universe? Has such a problem been solved? Quantum computers have been built, but last I checked it was only 7 qubits. There is no known principle which would forbid quantum computers having more qubits. Even one with a few thousand could solve problems we could not otherwise. Anyway, the answer is by the one particle cycling back thru time, so it appears to us as many particles. If this is a possible answer you should write David deutsch, since he says he has never received an explanation in a non many worlds framework. Then again, if every partical is going backwards in time to cover every possibility, is that really any different? Would not all possibilities be realized infinitely often? However, according to Vilenkin, Greene, and Tegmark, a generic prediction of the theory of inflation is that there is an *infinite* number of Hubble volumes (what you are calling universes). Let's call the hypothesis that all quantum-physical possibilities are realized infinitely many times the hypothesis of Cosmic Repetition. Brian Greene argues for this hypothesis quite persuasively. He says, In an infinitely big universe, there are infinitely many patches [i.e., Hubble volumes]; so, with only finitely many different particles arrangements, the arrangements of particles within patches must be duplicated an infinite number of times. (The Hidden Reality, pg. 33) It's plausible - but not logically required. Suppose all the infinite universes are number 1, 2, ... Number 1 is ours. Number 2 something different. Numbers 3,4, ...inf are exact copies of number 2. So there are only two arrangements of particles; in spite of there being infinitely many universes. Not logically required, but I would say it is not consistent with our current theories and observations. As for the probability distribution of matter and/or outcomes, I'll let Tegmark do the explaining: Observers living in parallel universes at Level I observe the exact same laws of physics as we do, but with different initial conditions than those in our Hubble volume. This is questionable. Most theories of the universe starting from a quantum fluctuation or tunneling from a prior universe assume that the universe must start very small - no more than a few Planck volumes. The generalized theory of inflation is eternal inflation. It leads to an exponentially growing volume which expands forever. This limits the amount of information that can possibly be provided as initial conditions. So where does all the information come from? I haven't heard the theory that there is an upper bound on the information content for this universe set by the big bang. In one Planck volume there is only room for one bit. That's the holographic principle. Yet our universe appears to take more than 1 bit to describe, and it seems to have a possibly infinite volume. That's why I provided the (possible) explanation below. As to where information comes from, if all possibilities exist, the total information content may be zero, and the appearance of a large amount of information is a local illusion. QM allows negative information (hidden correlations) so that one possibility is that the net information is zero or very small and the apparent information is created by the existence of the hubble horizon. The currently favored theory is that the initial conditions (the densities and motions of different types of matter early on) were created by quantum fluctuations during the inflation epoch (see section 3). This quantum mechanism generates initial conditions that are for all practical purposes random, producing density fluctuations described by what mathematicians call an ergodic random field. Ergodic means that if you imagine generating an ensemble of universes, each with its own random initial conditions, then the probability distribution of outcomes
Re: Joining Post
Jon, (nihil0) On 28 Sep 2011, at 01:18, nihil0 wrote: On Sep 27, 2:46 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I think Daniel Dennett's book Elbow Room is an excellent defense of compatibilist free will and why it is the only kind worth having. Great suggestion. The wikipedia page was fairly informative, but I'll probably buy the book anyway. From what I gather, he believes the kind of free will worth wanting is the appearance (or illusion) that we can control our behavior to a large extent. I agree with him that we don't want to be uncaused causes (or uninfluenced influences) of events, which is how quantum particles appear to behave (i.e., stochastically). Everything that is physically possible is not very well defined. And in any case it doesn't follow that in an infinite universe everything possible must happen infinitely many times. For example it might be that almost all universes are uninteresting and barren and only a finite number are interesting like ours. Technically I think you are right. However, I was only talking about an infinite universe likes ours that operates in accordance with the laws of quantum physics. Let me explain by using what I've read of Victor Stenger and Brian Greene. There are three ingredients in the argument that all quantum-physical possibilities in our universe happen infinitely many times. 1) There is an infinite number of Hubble volumes in our universe, which are all casually disconnected (as the theory of inflation implies). 2) There is a limit on how much matter and energy can exist within a region of space of a given size, such as a Hubble volume. 3) There is only a finite number of possible configurations of matter, due to the Uncertainty Principle. I can explain any of these ingredients in more depth if you'd like me to, but I hope you see that they lead to the conclusion that all quantum-physical possibilities in our universe are realized infinitely many times. Bruno you say, To have everything happening, you need the universe being infinitely big, but also homogenous, and robust enough for making possible gigantic connections and gigantic computations, etc. I thought that physicists have observed our universe to be homogenous on very large scales, but perhaps I'm mistaken. See the Cosmological Principal http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmological_principle. I don't assume physics. But, although it is not relevant for my point, it is not clear for me that the cosmological principle makes a UD possibly running in the universe. Such a physical UD has to be *very* demanding in physical space and time. But a concrete universe with a UD is an hypothesis which is used for pedagogical purpose only. The step 8 (MGA) eliminates that assumption. MGA = the Movie graph argument. I explained it in this list: http://www.nabble.com/MGA-1-td20566948.html#a20566948 I'm not exactly sure what you mean by robust enough for making possible gigantic connections and gigantic computations, etc. Imagine a program with 10^(10^(10^ . repeated a billion times ...) instructions. And this, for a logician, is still a very tiny little number. yet to store it in a machine in such a way that the program will do what it is supposed to do, you need more than a homogenous universe, you need a way to avoid systematically black holes, star explosion, etc. but perhaps the following explanation will be helpful. During the inflation right before the Big Bang, all of the now disconnected Hubble volumes were squeezed together and could affect each other. Brian Greene says they conducted a variety of cosmic handshakes, establishing, for example, a uniform temperature. The UD argument does not presuppose any physical laws. Just a minimal amount of physical reality (but not that such a physical reality is primitive). Best, Bruno Cheers, Jon On Sep 27, 2:46 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/26/2011 10:35 PM, nihil0 wrote: It's a little late for this post since I've already posted 2 or 3 things, but I figured I might as well introduce myself. I'm majoring at philosophy at the University of Michigan, however I'm studying abroad for a trimester at Oxford. I turn 21 on Oct. 4. The main questions I've been researching are the following: 1. What kind of free will is worth wanting, and do we have it, despite the deterministic evolution of the Schrodinger Equation? I think Daniel Dennett's book Elbow Room is an excellent defense of compatibilist free will and why it is the only kind worth having. 2. Recent cosmological evidence indicates that our universe is infinitely big, and everything that is physically possible happens an infinite number of times. Everything that is physically possible is not very well defined. And in any case it doesn't follow that in an infinite universe everything possible must happen infinitely many times. For example it might be that almost all universes are
Re: Joining Post
On 9/26/2011 10:35 PM, nihil0 wrote: It's a little late for this post since I've already posted 2 or 3 things, but I figured I might as well introduce myself. I'm majoring at philosophy at the University of Michigan, however I'm studying abroad for a trimester at Oxford. I turn 21 on Oct. 4. The main questions I've been researching are the following: 1. What kind of free will is worth wanting, and do we have it, despite the deterministic evolution of the Schrodinger Equation? I think Daniel Dennett's book Elbow Room is an excellent defense of compatibilist free will and why it is the only kind worth having. 2. Recent cosmological evidence indicates that our universe is infinitely big, and everything that is physically possible happens an infinite number of times. Everything that is physically possible is not very well defined. And in any case it doesn't follow that in an infinite universe everything possible must happen infinitely many times. For example it might be that almost all universes are uninteresting and barren and only a finite number are interesting like ours. Does this imply that I can't make a difference to the total (or per capita) amount of well-being in the world? I used to be a utilitarian until I read Nick Bostrom's paper The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggretive Ethics. Dunno. 3. Can only mathematical truths be known for certain? Can you know something without knowing it for certain? Sure. In fact I'm not so sure mathematical truths can always be known for certain. For example the four-color theorem has a proof so long that it is hard to be sure it is complete and has no errors. I think it has only been checked by computer. And we know computer programs can have bugs. 4. Do the laws of physics determine (i.e., enforce) events, or do they merely describe patterns and regularities that we have observed? It must be the latter, since we change the laws of physics as we get new information. But I wouldn't say merely. It's quite a feat to have predictively successful theories. I would be grateful if anyone could shed some light on any of these questions. I'm very impressed with what I've read so far from people. Glad to be here, Jon Welcome aboard. Brent Each philosopher knows a lot but, as a whole, philosophers don't know anything. If they did, they would be scientists. --- Ludwig Krippahl :-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Joining Post
Jon, Welcome to the list. On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 12:35 AM, nihil0 jonathan.wol...@gmail.com wrote: It's a little late for this post since I've already posted 2 or 3 things, but I figured I might as well introduce myself. Its never too late ;-) I'm majoring at philosophy at the University of Michigan, however I'm studying abroad for a trimester at Oxford. I turn 21 on Oct. 4. I'm not sure if you were looking for people's input regarding these questions below or not, but I thought I would offer my take. The main questions I've been researching are the following: 1. What kind of free will is worth wanting, and do we have it, despite the deterministic evolution of the Schrodinger Equation? The opposite of determinism is indeterminism (randomness) meaning the outcome is not determined by anything as far as we can tell. Let me explain the story of two artificial intelligences, and you tell me which one you believe to have a more free (less restricted) will: Robot A is programmed to have a certain personality, one in which it takes risks to aquire new experiences. It evaluates two competing needs before making a decision, the need to get out of the house and experience novel things (such as skiing, riding a bike, jumping out of a plane, etc.) vs. the need to stay alive to such that it can continue to have new experiences. It's will function evaluates these competing goals, taking into account every factor its algorithms can to make the best decision for itself. The outcome of these algorithms determine what it will do. Robot B is similarly programmed, to have more or less the same personality, but it's risk taking function is a lot simpler. When it decides whether or not to execute a certain plan, it takes the previous closing price of the SP 500 index, multiplies it by the number of nanoseconds since 1970, then divides by 1,000 and takes the remainder. If the remainder is less than 853 it takes the risk, otherwise it does not. What the robot decides do is the robot's own decision, and it obviously favors risk, but the only real input the robot's own algorithms is the risk factor 853 times out of 1,000 it takes the risk. It has no control over the other two inputs which ultimately make the determination as to what it does. One thing is clear from looking at these two robots. The behavior of robot A can be much more nuanced, intelligent, adaptive, etc. It's personality and will are all to itself. Just because we cannot predict what robot B will do in advance does not make its will more free. I will repeat what another on this list asked a while ago, when we say free will, free from what?. Robot A's will is self-determined, and the only way to determine it in advance is to implement all the algorithms and decision making functions that constitute it and evaluate them. In a sense, we are re-implementing, or duplicating its will in order to see what it decides, rather than predicting it. As to your question of what kind of free will is worth having, I will ask you, in what additional ways can Robot A's will be made free? 2. Recent cosmological evidence indicates that our universe is infinitely big, and everything that is physically possible happens an infinite number of times. Does this imply that I can't make a difference to the total (or per capita) amount of well-being in the world? I used to be a utilitarian until I read Nick Bostrom's paper The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggretive Ethics. What Bostom's paper does not seem consider (I only looked at the abstract) is that if the universe is infinitely big, you also exist an infinite number of times and places, (as does everyone else) so I would ignore his paper's conclusion that no one can make any meaningful changes in the amount of good or bad. Even if you say everything happens, we can change the relative measure, or the frequency of the things that happen by virtue of the type of people we are. Has anyone ever helped you and have you been glad for it? I think a single affirmative answer to this question disproves Bostrom's conclusion, which is based on some tricks we can mathematically play with infinity. You can use these same tricks to prove there are as many numbers that end in 0 as there are numbers, but would you rather have something happen to you on every Nth day of your life, or only every Nth day that was evenly divisible by 10? After living an infinite number of days, an infinite number of bad things will have happened to you, sure, but in which of those lives will you have suffered more? 3. Can only mathematical truths be known for certain? We cannot even know mathematical truths for certain. Can you trust 100% your math teacher, your reasoning, your eyes, when following a proof, or that of someone else? Perhaps we can be .9 certain of some mathematicians reasoning, and the fact that no one else has yet caught an error, and we are not currently delusional, but there is still an
Re: Joining Post
Hi Jon, welcome, On 27 Sep 2011, at 07:35, nihil0 wrote: It's a little late for this post since I've already posted 2 or 3 things, but I figured I might as well introduce myself. I'm majoring at philosophy at the University of Michigan, however I'm studying abroad for a trimester at Oxford. I turn 21 on Oct. 4. The main questions I've been researching are the following: 1. What kind of free will is worth wanting, and do we have it, despite the deterministic evolution of the Schrodinger Equation? Non determinism is useless to explain free will. You can illustrate this with iterated self-duplication, or with the use of random coin. It seems to me that adding randomness can only restrict free will. free will is more of the type of partial self-determination. It might be explained by the ability of some entities (machines) to be partially aware of some ignorance spectrum on the way to achieve some goal. For example your goal is to be happy tonight, but you ignore if this will be realize through going to the movie or to the restaurant. Free-will might correspond to your conscious ability to make a choice despite you have not all information at your disposition. It generates a genuine feeling of responsibility, and dterminism does not eliminate it. A lawyer cannot defend a murderer by saying to the member of the jury that the murderer has only obey to to the deterministic equation of the universe. That defence will be nullified by the jury and judge who will condemn it to jail, arguing that they are also just obeying the same deterministic law. 2. Recent cosmological evidence indicates that our universe is infinitely big, and everything that is physically possible happens an infinite number of times. Actually this is never justified. To have everything happening, you need the universe being infinitely big, but also homogenous, and robust enough for making possible gigantic connections and gigantic computations, etc. Does this imply that I can't make a difference to the total (or per capita) amount of well-being in the world? I used to be a utilitarian until I read Nick Bostrom's paper The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggretive Ethics. You can act on your own proportion of well-being, of you and the people you care about in some neighborhood, in your common future. I would say. 3. Can only mathematical truths be known for certain? Is there any mathematical truth that we can known for certain? I really doubt so. A case can be made for arithmetical truth, but even here, I would say personally that I believe them only with a very high plausibility coefficient. We can do dream in which the feeling of certainty is associated with what we realize, after awakening, to be blatant non sensical idea. I thought, one feverish night, that the color of the curtains did refute the use of the modus ponens rule in classical propositional logic. What is clear is that arithmetic is the most lesser doubtful part of math, and with fever or drugs, seems to be shared by everyone, with the exception of the ultrafinitists, which are rare (and I think inconsistent). I have never meet someone doubting the excluded middle use in arithmetic. It makes sense for intuitionist people too, even if they interpret it differently. Above arithmetic and finitist thinking things are more doubtful, and all mathematicians are glad when analytical proofs are replaced by elementary first order reasoning, which certainty is amenable to finitist or arithmetical reasoning. The mathematical reality is globally not much more certain than physics, and is full of surprises and mysteries. Can you know something without knowing it for certain? yes, and I can prove to you that if we are machine, and if you accept Theaetetus' theory of knowledge, it is even the general rule. In that theory knwoledge is true opinion, and with only once exception, true opinion is subjectively like an opinion and cannot be made certain. The only certainty exception is the fact that you are conscious here and now. All the rest can be doubted. 4. Do the laws of physics determine (i.e., enforce) events, or do they merely describe patterns and regularities that we have observed? The second one. I might argue from the mechanist hypothesis, but many things should be explained first. In fact I doubt very much about the existence of a primary physical universe. I am willing to think that this is epistemologically incoherent once we assume that the brain works like a machine. The laws of physics need, in that case, to be themselves complex pattern emerging statistically from infinitely many arithmetical relations. This cannot be explained shortly, but if you are patient, opportunities will appear to dig on this issue. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List
Re: Joining Post
On Sep 27, 2:46 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I think Daniel Dennett's book Elbow Room is an excellent defense of compatibilist free will and why it is the only kind worth having. Great suggestion. The wikipedia page was fairly informative, but I'll probably buy the book anyway. From what I gather, he believes the kind of free will worth wanting is the appearance (or illusion) that we can control our behavior to a large extent. I agree with him that we don't want to be uncaused causes (or uninfluenced influences) of events, which is how quantum particles appear to behave (i.e., stochastically). Everything that is physically possible is not very well defined. And in any case it doesn't follow that in an infinite universe everything possible must happen infinitely many times. For example it might be that almost all universes are uninteresting and barren and only a finite number are interesting like ours. Technically I think you are right. However, I was only talking about an infinite universe likes ours that operates in accordance with the laws of quantum physics. Let me explain by using what I've read of Victor Stenger and Brian Greene. There are three ingredients in the argument that all quantum-physical possibilities in our universe happen infinitely many times. 1) There is an infinite number of Hubble volumes in our universe, which are all casually disconnected (as the theory of inflation implies). 2) There is a limit on how much matter and energy can exist within a region of space of a given size, such as a Hubble volume. 3) There is only a finite number of possible configurations of matter, due to the Uncertainty Principle. I can explain any of these ingredients in more depth if you'd like me to, but I hope you see that they lead to the conclusion that all quantum-physical possibilities in our universe are realized infinitely many times. Bruno you say, To have everything happening, you need the universe being infinitely big, but also homogenous, and robust enough for making possible gigantic connections and gigantic computations, etc. I thought that physicists have observed our universe to be homogenous on very large scales, but perhaps I'm mistaken. See the Cosmological Principal http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmological_principle. I'm not exactly sure what you mean by robust enough for making possible gigantic connections and gigantic computations, etc. but perhaps the following explanation will be helpful. During the inflation right before the Big Bang, all of the now disconnected Hubble volumes were squeezed together and could affect each other. Brian Greene says they conducted a variety of cosmic handshakes, establishing, for example, a uniform temperature. Cheers, Jon On Sep 27, 2:46 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/26/2011 10:35 PM, nihil0 wrote: It's a little late for this post since I've already posted 2 or 3 things, but I figured I might as well introduce myself. I'm majoring at philosophy at the University of Michigan, however I'm studying abroad for a trimester at Oxford. I turn 21 on Oct. 4. The main questions I've been researching are the following: 1. What kind of free will is worth wanting, and do we have it, despite the deterministic evolution of the Schrodinger Equation? I think Daniel Dennett's book Elbow Room is an excellent defense of compatibilist free will and why it is the only kind worth having. 2. Recent cosmological evidence indicates that our universe is infinitely big, and everything that is physically possible happens an infinite number of times. Everything that is physically possible is not very well defined. And in any case it doesn't follow that in an infinite universe everything possible must happen infinitely many times. For example it might be that almost all universes are uninteresting and barren and only a finite number are interesting like ours. Does this imply that I can't make a difference to the total (or per capita) amount of well-being in the world? I used to be a utilitarian until I read Nick Bostrom's paper The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggretive Ethics. Dunno. 3. Can only mathematical truths be known for certain? Can you know something without knowing it for certain? Sure. In fact I'm not so sure mathematical truths can always be known for certain. For example the four-color theorem has a proof so long that it is hard to be sure it is complete and has no errors. I think it has only been checked by computer. And we know computer programs can have bugs. 4. Do the laws of physics determine (i.e., enforce) events, or do they merely describe patterns and regularities that we have observed? It must be the latter, since we change the laws of physics as we get new information. But I wouldn't say merely. It's quite a feat to have predictively successful theories. I would be grateful if anyone could shed some light
Re: Joining Post
On 9/27/2011 4:18 PM, nihil0 wrote: On Sep 27, 2:46 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: I think Daniel Dennett's book Elbow Room is an excellent defense of compatibilist free will and why it is the only kind worth having. Great suggestion. The wikipedia page was fairly informative, but I'll probably buy the book anyway. From what I gather, he believes the kind of free will worth wanting is the appearance (or illusion) that we can control our behavior to a large extent. I agree with him that we don't want to be uncaused causes (or uninfluenced influences) of events, which is how quantum particles appear to behave (i.e., stochastically). Everything that is physically possible is not very well defined. And in any case it doesn't follow that in an infinite universe everything possible must happen infinitely many times. For example it might be that almost all universes are uninteresting and barren and only a finite number are interesting like ours. Technically I think you are right. However, I was only talking about an infinite universe likes ours that operates in accordance with the laws of quantum physics. Let me explain by using what I've read of Victor Stenger and Brian Greene. There are three ingredients in the argument that all quantum-physical possibilities in our universe happen infinitely many times. 1) There is an infinite number of Hubble volumes in our universe, which are all casually disconnected (as the theory of inflation implies). 2) There is a limit on how much matter and energy can exist within a region of space of a given size, such as a Hubble volume. 3) There is only a finite number of possible configurations of matter, due to the Uncertainty Principle. I can explain any of these ingredients in more depth if you'd like me to, but I hope you see that they lead to the conclusion that all quantum-physical possibilities in our universe are realized infinitely many times. No they don't. There's an implicit assumption that what happens in these other universes has the same or similar probability distribution as we observe in ours. A reasonable assumption, but not a logically necessary one. I think it's what Bruno means by homogeneous. It's logically possible that all but a finite number of these universes are just exact copies of the same completely empty universe, for example. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Joining Post
On 9/27/2011 4:18 PM, nihil0 wrote: 1) There is an infinite number of Hubble volumes in our universe, which are all casually disconnected (as the theory of inflation implies). 2) There is a limit on how much matter and energy can exist within a region of space of a given size, such as a Hubble volume. 3) There is only a finite number of possible configurations of matter, due to the Uncertainty Principle. I can explain any of these ingredients in more depth if you'd like me to, but I hope you see that they lead to the conclusion that all quantum-physical possibilities in our universe are realized infinitely many times. On Sep 27, 7:47 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: No they don't. There's an implicit assumption that what happens in these other universes has the same or similar probability distribution as we observe in ours. A reasonable assumption, but not a logically necessary one. I think it's what Bruno means by homogeneous. It's logically possible that all but a finite number of these universes are just exact copies of the same completely empty universe, for example. Brent You imply that it's logically possible that there is only a finite number of universes that are filled with matter, and you seem to think few will resemble ours. However, according to Vilenkin, Greene, and Tegmark, a generic prediction of the theory of inflation is that there is an *infinite* number of Hubble volumes (what you are calling universes). Let's call the hypothesis that all quantum-physical possibilities are realized infinitely many times the hypothesis of Cosmic Repetition. Brian Greene argues for this hypothesis quite persuasively. He says, In an infinitely big universe, there are infinitely many patches [i.e., Hubble volumes]; so, with only finitely many different particles arrangements, the arrangements of particles within patches must be duplicated an infinite number of times. (The Hidden Reality, pg. 33) As for the probability distribution of matter and/or outcomes, I'll let Tegmark do the explaining: Observers living in parallel universes at Level I observe the exact same laws of physics as we do, but with different initial conditions than those in our Hubble volume. The currently favored theory is that the initial conditions (the densities and motions of different types of matter early on) were created by quantum fluctuations during the inflation epoch (see section 3). This quantum mechanism generates initial conditions that are for all practical purposes random, producing density fluctuations described by what mathematicians call an ergodic random field. Ergodic means that if you imagine generating an ensemble of universes, each with its own random initial conditions, then the probability distribution of outcomes in a given volume is identical to the distribution that you get by sampling different volumes in a single universe. In other words, it means that everything that could in principle have happened here did in fact happen somewhere else. Inflation in fact generates all possible initial conditions with non-zero probability, the most likely ones being almost uniform with fluctuations at the 10^5 level that are amplified by gravitational clustering to form galaxies, stars, planets and other structures. This means both that pretty much all imaginable matter configurations occur in some Hubble volume far away, and also that we should expect our own Hubble volume to be a fairly typical one — at least typical among those that contain observers. A crude estimate suggests that the closest identical copy of you is about ∼ 10^(10^29)m away. . . (The Multiverse Hierarchy, section 1B, http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.1283) Do you still disagree with the hypothesis of Cosmic Repetition? Which parts of the argument do you accept or deny? Best regards, Jon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
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On 9/27/2011 8:07 PM, nihil0 wrote: On 9/27/2011 4:18 PM, nihil0 wrote: 1) There is an infinite number of Hubble volumes in our universe, which are all casually disconnected (as the theory of inflation implies). 2) There is a limit on how much matter and energy can exist within a region of space of a given size, such as a Hubble volume. 3) There is only a finite number of possible configurations of matter, due to the Uncertainty Principle. I can explain any of these ingredients in more depth if you'd like me to, but I hope you see that they lead to the conclusion that all quantum-physical possibilities in our universe are realized infinitely many times. On Sep 27, 7:47 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: No they don't. There's an implicit assumption that what happens in these other universes has the same or similar probability distribution as we observe in ours. A reasonable assumption, but not a logically necessary one. I think it's what Bruno means by homogeneous. It's logically possible that all but a finite number of these universes are just exact copies of the same completely empty universe, for example. Brent You imply that it's logically possible that there is only a finite number of universes that are filled with matter, and you seem to think few will resemble ours. I don't think that. I just noted it's logically possible, contrary to assertions that our universe must be duplicated infinitely many times. However, according to Vilenkin, Greene, and Tegmark, a generic prediction of the theory of inflation is that there is an *infinite* number of Hubble volumes (what you are calling universes). Let's call the hypothesis that all quantum-physical possibilities are realized infinitely many times the hypothesis of Cosmic Repetition. Brian Greene argues for this hypothesis quite persuasively. He says, In an infinitely big universe, there are infinitely many patches [i.e., Hubble volumes]; so, with only finitely many different particles arrangements, the arrangements of particles within patches must be duplicated an infinite number of times. (The Hidden Reality, pg. 33) It's plausible - but not logically required. Suppose all the infinite universes are number 1, 2, ... Number 1 is ours. Number 2 something different. Numbers 3,4, ...inf are exact copies of number 2. So there are only two arrangements of particles; in spite of there being infinitely many universes. As for the probability distribution of matter and/or outcomes, I'll let Tegmark do the explaining: Observers living in parallel universes at Level I observe the exact same laws of physics as we do, but with different initial conditions than those in our Hubble volume. This is questionable. Most theories of the universe starting from a quantum fluctuation or tunneling from a prior universe assume that the universe must start very small - no more than a few Planck volumes. This limits the amount of information that can possibly be provided as initial conditions. So where does all the information come from? QM allows negative information (hidden correlations) so that one possibility is that the net information is zero or very small and the apparent information is created by the existence of the hubble horizon. The currently favored theory is that the initial conditions (the densities and motions of different types of matter early on) were created by quantum fluctuations during the inflation epoch (see section 3). This quantum mechanism generates initial conditions that are for all practical purposes random, producing density fluctuations described by what mathematicians call an ergodic random field. Ergodic means that if you imagine generating an ensemble of universes, each with its own random initial conditions, then the probability distribution of outcomes in a given volume is identical to the distribution that you get by sampling different volumes in a single universe. In other words, it means that everything that could in principle have happened here did in fact happen somewhere else. Inflation in fact generates all possible initial conditions with non-zero probability, the most likely ones being almost uniform with fluctuations at the 10^5 level that are amplified by gravitational clustering to form galaxies, stars, planets and other structures. This means both that pretty much all imaginable matter configurations occur in some Hubble volume far away, and also that we should expect our own Hubble volume to be a fairly typical one — at least typical among those that contain observers. A crude estimate suggests that the closest identical copy of you is about ∼ 10^(10^29)m away. . . (The Multiverse Hierarchy, section 1B, http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.1283) Do you still disagree with the hypothesis of Cosmic Repetition? Which parts of the argument do you accept or deny? See above. Brent Best regards, Jon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 10:52 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/27/2011 8:07 PM, nihil0 wrote: On 9/27/2011 4:18 PM, nihil0 wrote: 1) There is an infinite number of Hubble volumes in our universe, which are all casually disconnected (as the theory of inflation implies). 2) There is a limit on how much matter and energy can exist within a region of space of a given size, such as a Hubble volume. 3) There is only a finite number of possible configurations of matter, due to the Uncertainty Principle. I can explain any of these ingredients in more depth if you'd like me to, but I hope you see that they lead to the conclusion that all quantum-physical possibilities in our universe are realized infinitely many times. On Sep 27, 7:47 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: No they don't. There's an implicit assumption that what happens in these other universes has the same or similar probability distribution as we observe in ours. A reasonable assumption, but not a logically necessary one. I think it's what Bruno means by homogeneous. It's logically possible that all but a finite number of these universes are just exact copies of the same completely empty universe, for example. Brent You imply that it's logically possible that there is only a finite number of universes that are filled with matter, and you seem to think few will resemble ours. I don't think that. I just noted it's logically possible, contrary to assertions that our universe must be duplicated infinitely many times. If our universe is not duplicated a huge number of times, then quantum computers would not work. They rely on huge numbers of universes different from ours aside from a few entangled particles. Even normal interference patterns are explained by there existing a huge number of very similar universes. However, according to Vilenkin, Greene, and Tegmark, a generic prediction of the theory of inflation is that there is an *infinite* number of Hubble volumes (what you are calling universes). Let's call the hypothesis that all quantum-physical possibilities are realized infinitely many times the hypothesis of Cosmic Repetition. Brian Greene argues for this hypothesis quite persuasively. He says, In an infinitely big universe, there are infinitely many patches [i.e., Hubble volumes]; so, with only finitely many different particles arrangements, the arrangements of particles within patches must be duplicated an infinite number of times. (The Hidden Reality, pg. 33) It's plausible - but not logically required. Suppose all the infinite universes are number 1, 2, ... Number 1 is ours. Number 2 something different. Numbers 3,4, ...inf are exact copies of number 2. So there are only two arrangements of particles; in spite of there being infinitely many universes. Not logically required, but I would say it is not consistent with our current theories and observations. As for the probability distribution of matter and/or outcomes, I'll let Tegmark do the explaining: Observers living in parallel universes at Level I observe the exact same laws of physics as we do, but with different initial conditions than those in our Hubble volume. This is questionable. Most theories of the universe starting from a quantum fluctuation or tunneling from a prior universe assume that the universe must start very small - no more than a few Planck volumes. The generalized theory of inflation is eternal inflation. It leads to an exponentially growing volume which expands forever. This limits the amount of information that can possibly be provided as initial conditions. So where does all the information come from? I haven't heard the theory that there is an upper bound on the information content for this universe set by the big bang. As to where information comes from, if all possibilities exist, the total information content may be zero, and the appearance of a large amount of information is a local illusion. QM allows negative information (hidden correlations) so that one possibility is that the net information is zero or very small and the apparent information is created by the existence of the hubble horizon. The currently favored theory is that the initial conditions (the densities and motions of different types of matter early on) were created by quantum fluctuations during the inflation epoch (see section 3). This quantum mechanism generates initial conditions that are for all practical purposes random, producing density fluctuations described by what mathematicians call an ergodic random field. Ergodic means that if you imagine generating an ensemble of universes, each with its own random initial conditions, then the probability distribution of outcomes in a given volume is identical to the distribution that you get by sampling different volumes in a single universe. In other words, it means that everything that could in
Re: Joining Post
On 9/27/2011 9:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 10:52 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/27/2011 8:07 PM, nihil0 wrote: On 9/27/2011 4:18 PM, nihil0 wrote: 1) There is an infinite number of Hubble volumes in our universe, which are all casually disconnected (as the theory of inflation implies). 2) There is a limit on how much matter and energy can exist within a region of space of a given size, such as a Hubble volume. 3) There is only a finite number of possible configurations of matter, due to the Uncertainty Principle. I can explain any of these ingredients in more depth if you'd like me to, but I hope you see that they lead to the conclusion that all quantum-physical possibilities in our universe are realized infinitely many times. On Sep 27, 7:47 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: No they don't. There's an implicit assumption that what happens in these other universes has the same or similar probability distribution as we observe in ours. A reasonable assumption, but not a logically necessary one. I think it's what Bruno means by homogeneous. It's logically possible that all but a finite number of these universes are just exact copies of the same completely empty universe, for example. Brent You imply that it's logically possible that there is only a finite number of universes that are filled with matter, and you seem to think few will resemble ours. I don't think that. I just noted it's logically possible, contrary to assertions that our universe must be duplicated infinitely many times. If our universe is not duplicated a huge number of times, then quantum computers would not work. They rely on huge numbers of universes different from ours aside from a few entangled particles. Even normal interference patterns are explained by there existing a huge number of very similar universes. Or by Feynmann paths that zigzag in spacetime. Don't become to enamored of an interpretation. However, according to Vilenkin, Greene, and Tegmark, a generic prediction of the theory of inflation is that there is an *infinite* number of Hubble volumes (what you are calling universes). Let's call the hypothesis that all quantum-physical possibilities are realized infinitely many times the hypothesis of Cosmic Repetition. Brian Greene argues for this hypothesis quite persuasively. He says, In an infinitely big universe, there are infinitely many patches [i.e., Hubble volumes]; so, with only finitely many different particles arrangements, the arrangements of particles within patches must be duplicated an infinite number of times. (The Hidden Reality, pg. 33) It's plausible - but not logically required. Suppose all the infinite universes are number 1, 2, ... Number 1 is ours. Number 2 something different. Numbers 3,4, ...inf are exact copies of number 2. So there are only two arrangements of particles; in spite of there being infinitely many universes. Not logically required, but I would say it is not consistent with our current theories and observations. As for the probability distribution of matter and/or outcomes, I'll let Tegmark do the explaining: Observers living in parallel universes at Level I observe the exact same laws of physics as we do, but with different initial conditions than those in our Hubble volume. This is questionable. Most theories of the universe starting from a quantum fluctuation or tunneling from a prior universe assume that the universe must start very small - no more than a few Planck volumes. The generalized theory of inflation is eternal inflation. It leads to an exponentially growing volume which expands forever. This limits the amount of information that can possibly be provided as initial conditions. So where does all the information come from? I haven't heard the theory that there is an upper bound on the information content for this universe set by the big bang. In one Planck volume there is only room for one bit. That's the holographic principle. As to where information comes from, if all possibilities exist, the total information content may be zero, and the appearance of a large amount of information is a local illusion. QM allows negative information (hidden correlations) so that one possibility is that the net information is zero or very small and the apparent information is created by the existence of the
Re: Joining Post
On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 11:52 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 9/27/2011 9:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote: I don't think that. I just noted it's logically possible, contrary to assertions that our universe must be duplicated infinitely many times. If our universe is not duplicated a huge number of times, then quantum computers would not work. They rely on huge numbers of universes different from ours aside from a few entangled particles. Even normal interference patterns are explained by there existing a huge number of very similar universes. Or by Feynmann paths that zigzag in spacetime. Don't become to enamored of an interpretation. If you assume there is a single photon interfering with itself, how is it that this one particle can evaluate a problem whose computational complexity would exceed that of any conventional computer using all the matter in the universe? However, according to Vilenkin, Greene, and Tegmark, a generic prediction of the theory of inflation is that there is an *infinite* number of Hubble volumes (what you are calling universes). Let's call the hypothesis that all quantum-physical possibilities are realized infinitely many times the hypothesis of Cosmic Repetition. Brian Greene argues for this hypothesis quite persuasively. He says, In an infinitely big universe, there are infinitely many patches [i.e., Hubble volumes]; so, with only finitely many different particles arrangements, the arrangements of particles within patches must be duplicated an infinite number of times. (The Hidden Reality, pg. 33) It's plausible - but not logically required. Suppose all the infinite universes are number 1, 2, ... Number 1 is ours. Number 2 something different. Numbers 3,4, ...inf are exact copies of number 2. So there are only two arrangements of particles; in spite of there being infinitely many universes. Not logically required, but I would say it is not consistent with our current theories and observations. As for the probability distribution of matter and/or outcomes, I'll let Tegmark do the explaining: Observers living in parallel universes at Level I observe the exact same laws of physics as we do, but with different initial conditions than those in our Hubble volume. This is questionable. Most theories of the universe starting from a quantum fluctuation or tunneling from a prior universe assume that the universe must start very small - no more than a few Planck volumes. The generalized theory of inflation is eternal inflation. It leads to an exponentially growing volume which expands forever. This limits the amount of information that can possibly be provided as initial conditions. So where does all the information come from? I haven't heard the theory that there is an upper bound on the information content for this universe set by the big bang. In one Planck volume there is only room for one bit. That's the holographic principle. Yet our universe appears to take more than 1 bit to describe, and it seems to have a possibly infinite volume. As to where information comes from, if all possibilities exist, the total information content may be zero, and the appearance of a large amount of information is a local illusion. QM allows negative information (hidden correlations) so that one possibility is that the net information is zero or very small and the apparent information is created by the existence of the hubble horizon. The currently favored theory is that the initial conditions (the densities and motions of different types of matter early on) were created by quantum fluctuations during the inflation epoch (see section 3). This quantum mechanism generates initial conditions that are for all practical purposes random, producing density fluctuations described by what mathematicians call an ergodic random field. Ergodic means that if you imagine generating an ensemble of universes, each with its own random initial conditions, then the probability distribution of outcomes in a given volume is identical to the distribution that you get by sampling different volumes in a single universe. That's not what ergodic means. In the theory of stochastic processes it means that ensemble statistics are the same as temporal statistics. In the eternal expansion theory it is not assumed that the physics is the same in each bubble universe. This one bubble is infinitely big according to eternal inflation. It is hypothesized that the spontaneous symmetry breaking that results in different coupling constants for the weak, strong, EM, and gravity forces is random. That's how it provides and anthropic explanation for fine-tuning - we're in the one where the random symmetry breaking was favorable to life. This is one hypothesis to explain fine tuning, I am not sure how well it is supported. In other words, it means that everything that could in
Re: Joining Post
Brent Meeker wrote: Actually it collapses before, see quant-ph/0402146 v1. It is shown that in a Young's slit experiment with C70 buckyballs, the interference fringes disappear when the buckyballs are sufficiently heated to radiate some IR photons. No observer is needed, only the interaction with the environment. Decoherence doesn't defeat quantum uncertainty, it partially hides the multiplicity of other worlds due to thermal connections of the environment. It results inevitably in tracing any single history. Decoherence is why Schrödinger placed the cat in a box, to isolate the experiment from the external observer. The colleague walking in after I have opened the box to observe the cat is also disconnected from the experiment in my description. For them the room is the box. Decoherence still applies to each history. It helps to remember that where Schrödinger's cat paradox shows how the uncertainty of a single electron can be amplified to produce widely diverse timelines, normally the uncertainty of trillions upon trillions of microscopic events entangle to construct a path of history. Decoherence is like placing a mirror in with the cat, the cat doesn't see its own phase space, each branching time line observes a near classical history, while the global superposition of worlds exists beyond the realm of measurement. Puppet implies you are pulling the strings. So can you bend the universe to your will? I had previously implied a hand puppet, and I was considering the implications of sampling the whole set of many worlds, as if they all exist simultaneously, and in each proceeding moment we find ourselves in one particular universe. This places in question the individuality and will of observed others apart from the probabilistic selection of the experienced world. The hand in the puppet is the universe itself. I am undecided on if the observer can bend reality. I don't rule such things out based on skepticism. An individual's will would largely be a product of their personal history, and thus physical events or states, so I do expect a considerable measure of entanglement between the mind/brain and the environment. I will be un-subscribing from this list. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Joining Post
On Jan 3, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, Is hurting or make the puppet suffer morally correct with your position ? If it is not, then this is strange since they are only puppets and you *are*...(means you can't hurt them because they aren't) This is simply sollipsism and (un)fortunately completely circular. Also as you acknowledge other pilots existence in other universe, how is this different than acknowledging simply the existence of other people ? Günther Greindl wrote: This is the question of why _I_ experience the world as I do and not the other worlds. This is not the identity crisis question of why am I not that person over there, nor is it circular, or solipsism (although if true it could lead to a philosophy of solipsism). This is basic quantum theory applied to the macro-world. Ever since Schrödinger disapprovingly amplified the uncertainty of atomic decay and showed that quantum uncertainty extends to the macro-world, this issue has been apparent. I am certain this observer over observed issue has been discussed before. Someone has mentioned that John Wheeler described this, describing a free floating observer that dictates reality all the way back to the big bang. He just didn't discuss the issue of pilots and puppets. In the instant I observe the contents of the box the uncertainty collapses, however, the colleague who walks in the room one second later in pilot form is not subject to my observation, for them the outcome of the event is still uncertain until they open the lab door and look in, at which point they branch into two futures defined by different pasts, me in tears (I love cats) or the cat alive and me happy. Their observation of me (tears or jeers) will correspond to their observation of the cat. HOWEVER, the colleague I observe (their observation) is predetermined (made measurably deterministic) by my earlier observation. Their observation will correspond to my observation, in a sense making them a puppet of the universe I observe. It helps to imagine a person inside the box wearing a gas mask watching the cat. They don't see a quantum uncertainty or a probability cloud. But from your perspective outside the box the indeterminacy of the cat as dead or alive now extends to what the person in the mask observes. There are necessarily two copies of the observer inside the box. When you open the box you connect to one of them. Also, the cat experiment box can have two doors and be placed in between two rooms, so that two observers in different rooms open their own door at the same time to see the outcome of the event. The outcome of one observer in one room has no influence on the outcome of the other. But having observed an outcome, each observer interacts with the colleague who observes the same outcome. This is a more complicated example of the EPR paradox, i.e., spooky action at a distance, or one outcome effecting a remote other outcome. The floating observer is constantly sampling a probability landscape governed by the whole of what is possible for a given event or situation. Each observation rules the entire scope of their o-region by turning the uncertainty of infinite possibilities into a finite observation. If lab personnel walk in every ten minutes each branches into both dead-cat / live-cat time lines as they learn of the cats demise. Same applies to what's behind every door in the macro-world. Sub-atomic decisions add up and trace forward to extremely varied possible worlds. Until we pick up and read the newspaper there is no definite news. We still live with the uncertainty of history back to the big bang every time we view deeper into the universe, or discover other planets around stars. There isn't just one world out there, or one history to select from, just as there isn't one future. Observations of what are naturally assumed to be other observers (how they response to stimuli, behavior, belief systems, intelligence, individual spontaneity) are inevitably subject to the same sampling process which decides if the cyanide canister has been broken. There of course might be a great deal of selection bias for various reasons, in the same way what is observed corresponds to the laws of nature. There is certainly room for Karma based upon the same symmetries that dictate conservations, forces, laws and constants. So suppose we do put a colleague in Schrödinger's box instead of the cat without the gas mask. The first sampling decides if they are dead or alive when we open the box. A second sampling is of how they react to having been put in the box and experimented on in a life or death situation. For the survivor, there is a very wide but definite range of possible reactions, anger, horror, crying, nervous breakdown, hidden resentment, disinterest, objectivity, laughter, excitement, exhilaration, enlightenment. Considering how a thousand different colleagues would react, there are distinct probabilities, let's say 25% anger, 15% horror, 15% crying, 1%
Re: Joining Post
Gevin Giorbran wrote: On Jan 3, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, Is hurting or make the puppet suffer morally correct with your position ? If it is not, then this is strange since they are only puppets and you *are*...(means you can't hurt them because they aren't) This is simply sollipsism and (un)fortunately completely circular. Also as you acknowledge other pilots existence in other universe, how is this different than acknowledging simply the existence of other people ? Günther Greindl wrote: This is the question of why _I_ experience the world as I do and not the other worlds. This is not the identity crisis question of why am I not that person over there, nor is it circular, or solipsism (although if true it could lead to a philosophy of solipsism). This is basic quantum theory applied to the macro-world. Ever since Schrödinger disapprovingly amplified the uncertainty of atomic decay and showed that quantum uncertainty extends to the macro-world, this issue has been apparent. I am certain this observer over observed issue has been discussed before. Someone has mentioned that John Wheeler described this, describing a free floating observer that dictates reality all the way back to the big bang. He just didn't discuss the issue of pilots and puppets. In the instant I observe the contents of the box the uncertainty collapses, Actually it collapses before, see quant-ph/0402146 v1. It is shown that in a Young's slit experiment with C70 buckyballs, the interference fringes disappear when the buckyballs are sufficiently heated to radiate some IR photons. No observer is needed, only the interaction with the environment. however, the colleague who walks in the room one second later in pilot form is not subject to my observation, for them the outcome of the event is still uncertain until they open the lab door and look in, at which point they branch into two futures defined by different pasts, me in tears (I love cats) or the cat alive and me happy. Their observation of me (tears or jeers) will correspond to their observation of the cat. HOWEVER, the colleague I observe (their observation) is predetermined (made measurably deterministic) by my earlier observation. Their observation will correspond to my observation, in a sense making them a puppet of the universe I observe. Puppet implies you are pulling the strings. So can you bend the universe to your will? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Joining Post
On Jan 2, 9:47 pm, Gevin Giorbran [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Three years of college, no degrees, no status. Left school and started writing, and authored three books about the existence and structure of all possible universes, including Exploring A Many Worlds Universe in 1997, arguing as the main theme in each book that our universe ends in finite time (est. 120 billion years in '94) as expansion stretches space perfectly flat, this causing time to end at a ground state of absolute zero. The books were legally copyrighted in '94, '96, and '97, all prior to 1998 when we discovered the expansion of the universe is in fact accelerating us towards absolute zero. When I wrote my first three books the mainstream of science considered a finite end of time at zero to be impossible, and today the third law still states it cannot happen, but old science often gets in the way of new science. The recent measurements of acceleration indicate the (phantom) dark energy density causing acceleration is increasing, which makes the big rip scenario the leading future candidate. Caldwell describes the possibility of time as ending at the ultimate singularity and Sean Carroll is stating our universe ends as empty space as if this is now obvious. I agree, but further state there is no zero or a beginning from nothing in our past, the ultimate zero exists only in our future. The universe has pronouncedly been expanding at zero since time began because zero is the ultimate great attractor, the very cause of time. My prediction that time ends at zero was based upon a bounded model of all possible states, which also predicts structure or limitations of the greater multiverse. My fourth book, Everything Forever: Learning to See Timelessness, explains the governing role a cosmic zero plays in the evolution of all universes and all life. Thoughts of late: I believe there necessarily is only one pilot observer in each universe or O-region. All third party observers in each pilot's experience are subject to quantum mechanical sampling. The members of this Everything-list from my particular experience are a probabilistic sampling of the ultimate whole of what is possible considering this scenario. Any feedback I receive will correspond to that same spectrum of what is possible, therein reflecting a sampling of personalities, knowledge, beliefs, responses, in accordance with what are most probably found in a scientific discussion group about many worlds. So am I the only real observer in this universe? The name of the movie escapes me where Dustin Hoffman uses a bed sheet to portray parts of a single unified universe. His hand moves from one place to another under the sheet, as he says this is the Eiffel tower, this is you, this is me, this is a tree. It is all just one universe he says, which suggests we are all just puppets of that universe. True at least until you consider how quantum mechanics breaks the universe up into discreet states, and even divides apart observers into separate universes. We can only converse with the puppets of a quantum mechanical universe. Pilots cannot communicate with one another, since observers cannot communicate independent of governing probabilities. The only saving grace is if all possible pilots and their O-regions exist, so real pilots at least correspond to the quantum puppets of an observers experience. Sorry, yes you are a puppet, well perhaps the reader of this post isn't a puppet, but the responses I observe will be from puppets, while only real pilots are left to question if the set of possible pilots is more or less restricted than the spectrum of people a pilot experiences in the quantum world adjacent one's consciousness. Are pilots and puppets identical and thus existentially the same? Am I a pilot or a puppet? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Joining Post
Hi, Sorry, yes you are a puppet, well perhaps the reader of this post isn't a puppet, but the responses I observe will be from puppets, while only real pilots are left to question if the set of possible pilots is more or less restricted than the spectrum of people a pilot experiences in the quantum world adjacent one's consciousness. This is the question of why _I_ experience the world as I do and not the other worlds. If one assumes MWI - or better (Bill's wording): Many Objects Interpretation, of course every person will split into many persons (as the quantum states in his body decohere). So, we are all pilots _and_ puppets (I guess that was what you were saying) - depending from the point of view. And that leads to the measure question: you will more likely experience worlds which have greater measure. Is that what you are asking? Regards, Günther -- Günther Greindl Department of Philosophy of Science University of Vienna [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/ Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/ Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Joining Post
Hi, Is hurting or make the puppet suffer morally correct with your position ? If it is not, then this is strange since they are only puppets and you *are*...(means you can't hurt them because they aren't) This is simply sollipsism and (un)fortunately completely circular. Also as you acknowledge other pilots existence in other universe, how is this different than acknowledging simply the existence of other people ? (same existence as your) Quentin Anciaux Le Thursday 03 January 2008 05:47:40 Gevin Giorbran, vous avez écrit : Three years of college, no degrees, no status. Left school and started writing, and authored three books about the existence and structure of all possible universes, including Exploring A Many Worlds Universe in 1997, arguing as the main theme in each book that our universe ends in finite time (est. 120 billion years in '94) as expansion stretches space perfectly flat, this causing time to end at a ground state of absolute zero. The books were legally copyrighted in '94, '96, and '97, all prior to 1998 when we discovered the expansion of the universe is in fact accelerating us towards absolute zero. When I wrote my first three books the mainstream of science considered a finite end of time at zero to be impossible, and today the third law still states it cannot happen, but old science often gets in the way of new science. The recent measurements of acceleration indicate the (phantom) dark energy density causing acceleration is increasing, which makes the big rip scenario the leading future candidate. Caldwell describes the possibility of time as ending at the ultimate singularity and Sean Carroll is stating our universe ends as empty space as if this is now obvious. I agree, but further state there is no zero or a beginning from nothing in our past, the ultimate zero exists only in our future. The universe has pronouncedly been expanding at zero since time began because zero is the ultimate great attractor, the very cause of time. My prediction that time ends at zero was based upon a bounded model of all possible states, which also predicts structure or limitations of the greater multiverse. My fourth book, Everything Forever: Learning to See Timelessness, explains the governing role a cosmic zero plays in the evolution of all universes and all life. Thoughts of late: I believe there necessarily is only one pilot observer in each universe or O-region. All third party observers in each pilot's experience are subject to quantum mechanical sampling. The members of this Everything-list from my particular experience are a probabilistic sampling of the ultimate whole of what is possible considering this scenario. Any feedback I receive will correspond to that same spectrum of what is possible, therein reflecting a sampling of personalities, knowledge, beliefs, responses, in accordance with what are most probably found in a scientific discussion group about many worlds. So am I the only real observer in this universe? The name of the movie escapes me where Dustin Hoffman uses a bed sheet to portray parts of a single unified universe. His hand moves from one place to another under the sheet, as he says this is the Eiffel tower, this is you, this is me, this is a tree. It is all just one universe he says, which suggests we are all just puppets of that universe. True at least until you consider how quantum mechanics breaks the universe up into discreet states, and even divides apart observers into separate universes. We can only converse with the puppets of a quantum mechanical universe. Pilots cannot communicate with one another, since observers cannot communicate independent of governing probabilities. The only saving grace is if all possible pilots and their O-regions exist, so real pilots at least correspond to the quantum puppets of an observers experience. Sorry, yes you are a puppet, well perhaps the reader of this post isn't a puppet, but the responses I observe will be from puppets, while only real pilots are left to question if the set of possible pilots is more or less restricted than the spectrum of people a pilot experiences in the quantum world adjacent one's consciousness. Are pilots and puppets identical and thus existentially the same? -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: JOINING post
Thanks for your answers to my joining post! Dear Russell, your book Theory of Nothing has overwhelmed me, it's a fantastic work. Several months ago, I slowly began writing a book on the theory that everything exists (in German) -- but I will not go on because your book seems to be so great and complete, dealing with so many different aspects, that my project would have never been able to compare with it. I do not know into which direction my thinking will evolve. But I'm convinced that your book will always serve as the basic reference for works linked to the theory of the everything ensemble. Youness --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: JOINING post
On Fri, Aug 31, 2007 at 12:40:08AM -0700, Youness Ayaita wrote: Hello everyone. Yesterday I found this list. I am still surprised and pleased that my old ideas are also developed and discussed by others than myself. Since my thought is only little influenced by the literature, I hope that I will be able to give some new perspectives in future discussions. Youness Welcome to the list! We've been going about ten years now, and had some extremely stimulating discussions, of which only a smattering has ended up in the published literature. I look forward to hearing some new ideas. My book, Theory of Nothing is probably still the best summary of the list's discussion up until circa beginning of 2006, and is available as a free download fropm my website, or as a hardcopy from Amazon.com. There have been some interesting topics discussed since that time, of course. We tried to get a Wiki going to at least sort out definitional matters, but I found myself the only contributer, so it is not in a healthy state. Cheers -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: JOINING post
Hi Youness, Le 31-août-07, à 09:40, Youness Ayaita wrote : Hello everyone. You are welcome. My name's Youness Ayaita and currently I'm a graduate student of physics and mathematics at Heidelberg University, with special interests in the field of theoretical quantum physics and in the question how it comes to our specific laws of nature. In the beginning of the year 2003 (I was as a sixteen-year-old) philosophical considerations led me to the idea that possibly everything exists. Independently from everything that was said or written by others working on the issue, I went on developing my theories and found different justifications for the everything- hypothesis (some of which are substantially different from the mathematicalist approach or the motivation by information theory). In particular, I was interested in the implications of the everything- hypothesis for physics, or to be more precise, for the expected structure of the world that we experience. I asked the question whether it is even possible (in principle) to mathematically deduce properties of the physical world from the everything-hypothesis (if the answer is yes, then this could provide some kind of experimental test of the everything-hypothesis, making it falsifiable in a vague-- though not exact--sense). In this context, I found several plausible arguments and I explored ideas how to capture mathematically the Everything. Nice. Until the end of the year 2005, I had no idea that other people were seriously working on the issue. But then, I read of David Lewis and bought his book On the Plurality of Worlds. A good one. Note that David Lewis has evolved on his critics of its erzatz world. Eventually he took those world seriously. I thionk he got the idea that universal machine cannot really distinguish erzats world and real worlds. Later, in 2006, I was interested in the philosophy of quantum physics and became a supporter of the Everett interpretation. I read recent publications by Wallace, Saunders, Zurek, Zeh, Deutsch, Tegmark and others. Nice stuff. Yesterday I found this list. I am still surprised and pleased that my old ideas are also developed and discussed by others than myself. Since my thought is only little influenced by the literature, I hope that I will be able to give some new perspectives in future discussions. Don't hesitate. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: JOINING post
Dear Mindaugas Indriunas (this reply wsas sitting half-way written in my DRAFTS box. Excuse the delay, please) I feel we get entangled into more than what we want to. As I translate (to my mind) your words, a 'consequence' should be viewed as 'connected' to its originating (you said: cause), while I keep it more open that an 'entailer' can have different entailments, according to the total interconnectedness and the changings. of the totality. ((since many variants from diverse parts play into the process)) So the 'originating point may be ONE of the outcomeS of that cause(-es we regognized so far). I like to view 'process' linked to all changes in the totality - not the 'snapshots' which science likes to study (states? equilibria?). So I am not so sure about CAUSE, in most cases it is a model-view: we select a portion of the totality for our observation (=model) and find IN IT a momentum that can be picked in the entailment of the object. WE call it 'cause', while the totality interferes with other effects as well, maybe beyond our model, maybe others are not even discovered yet, and a cumulative outcome is the 'object' we assign to that ONE cause within the limited model we observed. This is the way I 'separate' the process of our universe FROM - what you called (not my word) originating point in the (model view) called 'universe'. (ours, that is, among unlimited and different others.) * I see a dynamic interactive process, not 'rules', which are extracted from a selection (model) of observations as accounted for most occurring. (People call that 'statistical'). Physical law is such, cellular automata are sub-models - in this view, deduced rules change. I think it is time to get over the conventional prejudices based on a primitive explanatory mindset upon superficial observations, I say 'superficial' because we are not (yet as well) capable of applying FULL informative understanding to our observations. That resuloted historically in the 'primitive material worldview' and the quantized edifice of the physical views. I cannot tell what is the right stance but hope in progressing into a better understanding. Most advanced poisitions of today still anchor in the old views. We CANNOT do better. I condone it as a possibiloity of stepping forward. You as part of the new generation may get further. John Mikes On 3/13/07, 明迪 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear John, I feel I understand your view and distinction of origination point and origination. Origination is entailment of origination point. Origination point is part of our world (the item to be originated). Is that correct? Now, my opinion is that there is no origination of the origination point, because whatever it may be, it is connected to the item to be originated through causality. What I mean is, if we were to find some relatively simple rule generating our world, then we could actually try to reduce it to some even simpler rule. It is now thought of that some rules governing cellular automata are irreducible, since there seem to be no simpler rule to produce the patterns they some cellular automata produce, however, suppose that our world is governed by some relatively simple rule. In this case, there is a rule to reduce most if not all of the cellular automata rules, since it actually produces all the cellular automata that we know :-). Analogically, if we find that our world is some cellular automata with the initial state that we do not know, we could try to find the world produced by an even simpler rule, that eventually produces the initial state of our world. Mindaugas Indriunas On 3/8/07, John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I feel a misunderstanding here: origination point IMO is part of the item to be originated, the pertinent 'point' (within and for) the evolving total to grow out from. As I used 'origination refers to the entailment producing such point - if we use a 'point' to start with. Such 'point' is the limit we can go back to, not further to 'its' entailing circumstgances we have no access to. I tried to adjust to a vocabulary I responded to, not my own and preferred one. Hence the misunderstandability. Sorry. John Mikes - Original Message - From: 明迪 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2007 10:45 AM Subject: Re: JOINING post Dear John Mikes, I thought your words 'Origin of (our) universe' are the same as the word 'origination-point'. You said: (1) 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know. And you also said: (2) we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely). From (2) claim it logically follows a statement we can reach to items later or equal to origination-point. I agree (2) statement, but slightly disagree with (1) statement. Mindaugas Indriunas On 3/5/07, John M
Re: JOINING post
Dear Mindaugas. you wrote: Analogically, if we find that our world is some cellular automata ... I PRESUME THIS IS your STARTING POINT: if... if not, if we find that our world is more(?) than a cellular automaton - which is in my word-use 'reductionist' - then the world is NOT governed by some simple rules. We don't set rules, we select models, count/identify in them the occurrences and deduct what happened most which then is called law. And the world is not GOVERNED. it is a process of them all. Nothing can be excluded from the interefficiency, because that would lead to separate worlds - which may well be, but we do not know about them. So your 'origination point' is causally connected (your word) to the rest of the totality and its process. A 'next step' segmentually observed. Initial state? I don't believe the narrative of the physical cosmology, because it has logical flaws even in human logic. I made another narrative, which may not be more 'true', but eliminates SOME flaws. You can make another one. We know nothing about that 'origin', it was before the 'time' of Loebian machines (even before my time). We can speculate, it is cheap. John - Original Message - From: 明迪 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2007 2:45 AM Subject: Re: JOINING post Dear John, I feel I understand your view and distinction of origination point and origination. Origination is entailment of origination point. Origination point is part of our world (the item to be originated). Is that correct? Now, my opinion is that there is no origination of the origination point, because whatever it may be, it is connected to the item to be originated through causality. What I mean is, if we were to find some relatively simple rule generating our world, then we could actually try to reduce it to some even simpler rule. It is now thought of that some rules governing cellular automata are irreducible, since there seem to be no simpler rule to produce the patterns they some cellular automata produce, however, suppose that our world is governed by some relatively simple rule. In this case, there is a rule to reduce most if not all of the cellular automata rules, since it actually produces all the cellular automata that we know :-).with the initial state that we do not know, we could try to find the world produced by an even simpler rule, that eventually produces the initial state of our world. Mindaugas Indriunas On 3/8/07, John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I feel a misunderstanding here: origination point IMO is part of the item to be originated, the pertinent 'point' (within and for) the evolving total to grow out from. As I used 'origination refers to the entailment producing such point - if we use a 'point' to start with. Such 'point' is the limit we can go back to, not further to 'its' entailing circumstgances we have no access to. I tried to adjust to a vocabulary I responded to, not my own and preferred one. Hence the misunderstandability. Sorry. John Mikes - Original Message - From: 明迪 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2007 10:45 AM Subject: Re: JOINING post Dear John Mikes, I thought your words 'Origin of (our) universe' are the same as the word 'origination-point'. You said: (1) 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know. And you also said: (2) we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely). From (2) claim it logically follows a statement we can reach to items later or equal to origination-point. I agree (2) statement, but slightly disagree with (1) statement. Mindaugas Indriunas On 3/5/07, John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear Mindaugas Indriunas, what I meant consists of the worldview that we can use in our speculations only our present cognitive inventory of our existing mind. No information from super(extra)natural sources included. Accoredingly we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely). Nor can a 'valid' ALGORITHM reach back further. Itg cannot 'generate' information about ' no information' topics. All we can speak about are intra-existence items, the rest is fantasy, sci-fi, religion. What I may use in a narrative, but by no means in the conventionally outlined scientific method. John M --- 明迪 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear John Mikes. I am sorry for the late response. I will reply only to 1 part of your letter: 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know. If we do come up
Re: JOINING post
Dear John, I feel I understand your view and distinction of origination point and origination. Origination is entailment of origination point. Origination point is part of our world (the item to be originated). Is that correct? Now, my opinion is that there is no origination of the origination point, because whatever it may be, it is connected to the item to be originated through causality. What I mean is, if we were to find some relatively simple rule generating our world, then we could actually try to reduce it to some even simpler rule. It is now thought of that some rules governing cellular automata are irreducible, since there seem to be no simpler rule to produce the patterns they some cellular automata produce, however, suppose that our world is governed by some relatively simple rule. In this case, there is a rule to reduce most if not all of the cellular automata rules, since it actually produces all the cellular automata that we know :-). Analogically, if we find that our world is some cellular automata with the initial state that we do not know, we could try to find the world produced by an even simpler rule, that eventually produces the initial state of our world. Mindaugas Indriunas On 3/8/07, John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I feel a misunderstanding here: origination point IMO is part of the item to be originated, the pertinent 'point' (within and for) the evolving total to grow out from. As I used 'origination refers to the entailment producing such point - if we use a 'point' to start with. Such 'point' is the limit we can go back to, not further to 'its' entailing circumstgances we have no access to. I tried to adjust to a vocabulary I responded to, not my own and preferred one. Hence the misunderstandability. Sorry. John Mikes - Original Message - From: 明迪 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2007 10:45 AM Subject: Re: JOINING post Dear John Mikes, I thought your words 'Origin of (our) universe' are the same as the word 'origination-point'. You said: (1) 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know. And you also said: (2) we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely). From (2) claim it logically follows a statement we can reach to items later or equal to origination-point. I agree (2) statement, but slightly disagree with (1) statement. Mindaugas Indriunas On 3/5/07, John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear Mindaugas Indriunas, what I meant consists of the worldview that we can use in our speculations only our present cognitive inventory of our existing mind. No information from super(extra)natural sources included. Accoredingly we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely). Nor can a 'valid' ALGORITHM reach back further. Itg cannot 'generate' information about ' no information' topics. All we can speak about are intra-existence items, the rest is fantasy, sci-fi, religion. What I may use in a narrative, but by no means in the conventionally outlined scientific method. John M --- 明迪 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear John Mikes. I am sorry for the late response. I will reply only to 1 part of your letter: 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know. If we do come up with an alorythm that actually does produce the data that we postdict (predict in the past), we may be able to (with some certainty) know it. Even the cellular automaton that is equivalent to universal turing machine, has its beginning. Mindaugas Indriunas --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: JOINING post
2 objections: A. If I state that i cannot do something that does not (logically) imply that I CAN do another thing. B. Your last line is your opinion substantiated by nothing, I appreciate anybodies opinion as such, it may have a personal (not factual) meaning - weight. We diverted from my point that I resist to reach back in statements to a state that may have been (or may not have been?) before (outside?) our comprehensive limits. John M On 3/6/07, 明迪 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear John Mikes, I thought your words 'Origin of (our) universe' are the same as the word 'origination-point'. You said: (1) 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know. And you also said: (2) we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely). From (2) claim it logically follows a statement we can reach to items later or equal to origination-point. I agree (2) statement, but slightly disagree with (1) statement. Mindaugas Indriunas On 3/5/07, John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear Mindaugas Indriunas, what I meant consists of the worldview that we can use in our speculations only our present cognitive inventory of our existing mind. No information from super(extra)natural sources included. Accoredingly we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely). Nor can a 'valid' ALGORITHM reach back further. Itg cannot 'generate' information about ' no information' topics. All we can speak about are intra-existence items, the rest is fantasy, sci-fi, religion. What I may use in a narrative, but by no means in the conventionally outlined scientific method. John M --- 明迪 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear John Mikes. I am sorry for the late response. I will reply only to 1 part of your letter: 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know. If we do come up with an alorythm that actually does produce the data that we postdict (predict in the past), we may be able to (with some certainty) know it. Even the cellular automaton that is equivalent to universal turing machine, has its beginning. Mindaugas Indriunas http://i.tai.lt --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: JOINING post
I feel a misunderstanding here: origination point IMO is part of the item to be originated, the pertinent 'point' (within and for) the evolving total to grow out from. As I used 'origination refers to the entailment producing such point - if we use a 'point' to start with. Such 'point' is the limit we can go back to, not further to 'its' entailing circumstgances we have no access to. I tried to adjust to a vocabulary I responded to, not my own and preferred one. Hence the misunderstandability. Sorry. John Mikes - Original Message - From: 明迪 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2007 10:45 AM Subject: Re: JOINING post Dear John Mikes, I thought your words 'Origin of (our) universe' are the same as the word 'origination-point'. You said: (1) 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know. And you also said: (2) we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely). From (2) claim it logically follows a statement we can reach to items later or equal to origination-point. I agree (2) statement, but slightly disagree with (1) statement. Mindaugas Indriunas On 3/5/07, John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear Mindaugas Indriunas, what I meant consists of the worldview that we can use in our speculations only our present cognitive inventory of our existing mind. No information from super(extra)natural sources included. Accoredingly we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely). Nor can a 'valid' ALGORITHM reach back further. Itg cannot 'generate' information about ' no information' topics. All we can speak about are intra-existence items, the rest is fantasy, sci-fi, religion. What I may use in a narrative, but by no means in the conventionally outlined scientific method. John M --- 明迪 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear John Mikes. I am sorry for the late response. I will reply only to 1 part of your letter: 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know. If we do come up with an alorythm that actually does produce the data that we postdict (predict in the past), we may be able to (with some certainty) know it. Even the cellular automaton that is equivalent to universal turing machine, has its beginning. Mindaugas Indriunas --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: JOINING post
Dear John Mikes, I thought your words 'Origin of (our) universe' are the same as the word 'origination-point'. You said: (1) 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know. And you also said: (2) we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely). From (2) claim it logically follows a statement we can reach to items later or equal to origination-point. I agree (2) statement, but slightly disagree with (1) statement. Mindaugas Indriunas On 3/5/07, John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear Mindaugas Indriunas, what I meant consists of the worldview that we can use in our speculations only our present cognitive inventory of our existing mind. No information from super(extra)natural sources included. Accoredingly we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely). Nor can a 'valid' ALGORITHM reach back further. Itg cannot 'generate' information about ' no information' topics. All we can speak about are intra-existence items, the rest is fantasy, sci-fi, religion. What I may use in a narrative, but by no means in the conventionally outlined scientific method. John M --- 明迪 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear John Mikes. I am sorry for the late response. I will reply only to 1 part of your letter: 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know. If we do come up with an alorythm that actually does produce the data that we postdict (predict in the past), we may be able to (with some certainty) know it. Even the cellular automaton that is equivalent to universal turing machine, has its beginning. Mindaugas Indriunas http://i.tai.lt --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: JOINING post
Dear John Mikes. I am sorry for the late response. I will reply only to 1 part of your letter: 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know. If we do come up with an alorythm that actually does produce the data that we postdict (predict in the past), we may be able to (with some certainty) know it. Even the cellular automaton that is equivalent to universal turing machine, has its beginning. Mindaugas Indriunas http://i.tai.lt --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: JOINING post
Dear Mindaugas Indriunas, what I meant consists of the worldview that we can use in our speculations only our present cognitive inventory of our existing mind. No information from super(extra)natural sources included. Accoredingly we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely). Nor can a 'valid' ALGORITHM reach back further. Itg cannot 'generate' information about ' no information' topics. All we can speak about are intra-existence items, the rest is fantasy, sci-fi, religion. What I may use in a narrative, but by no means in the conventionally outlined scientific method. John M --- 明迪 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear John Mikes. I am sorry for the late response. I will reply only to 1 part of your letter: 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know. If we do come up with an alorythm that actually does produce the data that we postdict (predict in the past), we may be able to (with some certainty) know it. Even the cellular automaton that is equivalent to universal turing machine, has its beginning. Mindaugas Indriunas http://i.tai.lt --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: JOINING post
Bruno Marchal wrote: I will take a look once I get enough time. It seems you belong to the ASSA group, that is you accept some form of bayesianism for fundamental probability question. Hope you will wake them up ... (ASSA = absolute self-sampling assumption). You should read Nick Bostrom and the posts by Hal Finney, Wei Dai and some others in the list archive) ... Apparently we agree on mathematicalism ... Bruno, Thanks for the welcome, I've been looking over the list archive and have found your posts to be very logical and concisely described. From what I gather your believe in mathematicalism and computationalism. In the posts of yours I have seen, I have not come across anything that I would disagree with. My question is, do you see ASSA as incompatible with COMP, and if so how? One of the ideas I describe on the website I posted is that Turing machines, being mathematical structures exist and there should exist an instance of a turing machine for every possible program. Some of these programs define more states than others (before looping or halting) and life forms should be most likely to occur within programs that define the most states. Is what I described compatible with both COMP and ASSA? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: JOINING post
Hi Jason, Welcome, Le 03-janv.-07, à 11:07, Jason a écrit : http://home.gcn.cx/users/jason/ideas.html I will take a look once I get enough time. It seems you belong to the ASSA group, that is you accept some form of bayesianism for fundamental probability question. Hope you will wake them up ... (ASSA = absolute self-sampling assumption). You should read Nick Bostrom and the posts by Hal Finney, Wei Dai and some others in the list archive) ... Apparently we agree on mathematicalism ... Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: JOINING post
andy wrote: Hi Everyone, This is really a cool list, where even the most exotic scenarios are seriously taken into account. I'm andy, have mostly worked in IT during the 13 years since my physics graduation. I like simple theories. You may notice this in future postings and on my web site. Hopefully some day you will find some more lines about me at www.universes.org/a/andy.html It doesn't exist Doriano Cheers andy [EMAIL PROTECTED]
