Hi Roger, We now know that matter is not infinitely divisible. So the argument of Leibniz is falsified. In appreciation, Richard
On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 6:50 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote: > > Leibniz on consciousness and the self as non-materialistic > > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/ > > > "In other writings, Leibniz suggests exactly what characteristic it is of > perception and consciousness > that the mechanical principles of materialism cannot account for. The > following passages, the first > from the New System of Nature (1695), the second from the Reply to Bayle > (1702), are revealing in this regard: > Furthermore, by means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which > corresponds to what is called the > I in us; such a thing could not occur in artificial machines, nor in the > simple mass of matter, however organized it may be. > But in addition to the general principles which establish the monads of which > compound things are > merely the results, internal experience refutes the Epicurean [i.e. > materialist] doctrine. This experience is the > consciousness which is in us of this I which apperceives things which occur > in the body. This perception > cannot be explained by figures and movements [of materials]. > > Leibniz's point is that whatever is the subject of perception and > consciousness must be truly one, > a single "I" properly regarded as one conscious being. An aggregate of matter > is not truly one and so > cannot be regarded as a single I, capable of being the subject of a unified > mental life. > This interpretation fits nicely with Lebniz's oft-repeated definition of > perception as the representation in the > simple of the compound, or of that which is outside. (Principles of Nature > and Grace, sec.2 (1714)). > More explicitly, in a letter to Antoine Arnauld of 9 October 1687, Leibniz > wrote that "In natural perception > and sensation, it is enough for what is divisible and material and dispersed > into many entities to be > expressed or represented in a single indivisible entity or in a substance > which is endowed with genuine unity. > If perception (and hence, consciousness) essentially involves a > representation of a variety of content in a simple, > indivisible "I" then we may construct Leibniz's argument against materialism > as follows: > > Materialism holds that matter can explain (is identical with, can give rise > to) perception. > A perception is a state whereby a variety of content is represented in a true > unity. > Thus, whatever is not a true unity cannot give rise to perception. Whatever is > divisible is not a true unity. Matter is infinitely divisible. Hence, matter > cannot > form a true unity. Hence, matter cannot explain (be identical with, give rise > to) > perception. If matter cannot explain (be identical to, give rise to) > perception, > then materialism is false. Hence, materialism is false. " > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 10/8/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.