Re: MGA 3

2008-12-11 Thread Russell Standish
On Wed, Dec 10, 2008 at 10:39:34AM +, Michael Rosefield wrote: This distinction between physicalism and materialism, with materialism allowing for features to emerge, it sounds to me like a join-the-dots puzzle - the physical substrate provides the dots, but the supervening system also

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-11 Thread Russell Standish
On Mon, Dec 08, 2008 at 09:43:47AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: Michael Lockwood distinguishes between materialism (consciousness supervenes on the physical world) and physicalism (the physical world suffices to explain everything). The difference between the two is that in physicalism,

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-10 Thread Michael Rosefield
This distinction between physicalism and materialism, with materialism allowing for features to emerge, it sounds to me like a join-the-dots puzzle - the physical substrate provides the dots, but the supervening system also contains lines - abstract structures implied by but not contained within

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-10 Thread Bruno Marchal
Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, Thanks for the references. You are welcome. ps- it is final exam crunch time, so I haven't been checking email so much as usual... I may get around to more detailed replies et cetera this weekend or next week. With pleasure. Best, Bruno On Sun, Dec 7,

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-09 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, Thanks for the references. --Abram ps- it is final exam crunch time, so I haven't been checking email so much as usual... I may get around to more detailed replies et cetera this weekend or next week. On Sun, Dec 7, 2008 at 1:12 PM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 07 Dec

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-08 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 08 Dec 2008, at 00:59, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Dec 06, 2008 at 03:32:53PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: I would be pleased if you can give me a version of MAT or MEC to which the argument does not apply. For example, the argument applies to most transfinite variant of MEC.

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-07 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 07 Dec 2008, at 06:19, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, Yes, I think there is a big difference between making an argument more detailed and making it more understandable. They can go together or be opposed. So a version of the argument targeted at my complaint might not be good at all

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-07 Thread Russell Standish
On Fri, Dec 05, 2008 at 10:06:30AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: Perhaps, but the whole point is that remains to be justify. It is *the* problem. If we assume comp, then we have to justify this. No doubt little programs play a key role, but the bigger one too, unless some destructive

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-07 Thread Russell Standish
On Sat, Dec 06, 2008 at 03:32:53PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: I would be pleased if you can give me a version of MAT or MEC to which the argument does not apply. For example, the argument applies to most transfinite variant of MEC. It does not apply when some magic is introduced in MAT,

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-06 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2008/12/6 Abram Demski [EMAIL PROTECTED]: The causal structure of a recording still looks far different from the causal structure of a person that happens to follow a recording and also happens to be wired to a machine that will kill them if they deviate. Or, even, correct them if they

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 05-déc.-08, à 20:51, Abram Demski a écrit : Bruno, Are you asserting this based on published findings concerning provability logic? If so, I would be very interested in references. If not, then your results obviously seem publishable :). I have published this in french a long time

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 05-déc.-08, à 22:11, Abram Demski a écrit : Bruno, Perhaps all I am saying is that you need to state more explicitly the assumptions about the connection between 1st and 3rd person, in both MEC and MAT. Simply taking them to be the general ideas that you take them to be does not

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2008/12/6 Abram Demski [EMAIL PROTECTED]: The causal structure of a recording still looks far different from the causal structure of a person that happens to follow a recording and also happens to be wired to a machine that will kill them if they deviate. Or,

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-06 Thread Abram Demski
Stathis, Yes, you are right. My main point is to show that such a point of view is possible, not to actually argue for it... but I am largely just asserting my intuitions nonetheless. --Abram On Sat, Dec 6, 2008 at 4:05 AM, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: 2008/12/6 Abram Demski

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-06 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, Yes, I think there is a big difference between making an argument more detailed and making it more understandable. They can go together or be opposed. So a version of the argument targeted at my complaint might not be good at all pedagogically... I would be pleased if you can give me a

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-06 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, Thanks, I will look up those names. If you have the time to reference specific papers, I would be grateful. --Abram On Sat, Dec 6, 2008 at 9:07 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 05-déc.-08, à 20:51, Abram Demski a écrit : Bruno, Are you asserting this based on

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, Yes, I think there is a big difference between making an argument more detailed and making it more understandable. They can go together or be opposed. So a version of the argument targeted at my complaint might not be good at all pedagogically... I would be

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2008/12/1 Abram Demski [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Yes, consciousness supervenes on computation, but that computation needs to actually take place (meaning, physically). Otherwise, how could consciousness supervene on it? Now, in order for a computation to be physically instantiated, the physical

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-05 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 05 Dec 2008, at 03:50, Jason Resch wrote: On Thu, Dec 4, 2008 at 5:19 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hmmm... It means you have still a little problem with step seven. I wish we share a computable environment, but we cannot decide this at will. I agree we have empirical

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-05 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 05 Dec 2008, at 03:56, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Dec 03, 2008 at 04:53:11PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: I really don't know. I expect that the mathematical structure, as seen from inside, is so big that Platonia cannot have it neither as element nor as subpart. (Ah, well, I

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-05 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 04 Dec 2008, at 15:58, Abram Demski wrote: PS Abram. I think I will have to meditate a bit longer on your (difficult) post. You may have a point (hopefully only pedagogical :) A little bit more commentary may be in order then... I think my point may be halfway between pedagogical and

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-05 Thread Abram Demski
Stathis, I think I can get around your objection by pointing out that the structure of counterfactuals is quite different for a recording vs. a full human who is wired to be killed if they deviate from a recording. Someone could fairly easily disarm the killing device, whereas it would be quite

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-05 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, Are you asserting this based on published findings concerning provability logic? If so, I would be very interested in references. If not, then your results obviously seem publishable :). That is, if you can show that huge amounts of set theory beyond ZFC emerge from provability logic in

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2008/12/6 Abram Demski [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Stathis, I think I can get around your objection by pointing out that the structure of counterfactuals is quite different for a recording vs. a full human who is wired to be killed if they deviate from a recording. Someone could fairly easily

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-05 Thread Abram Demski
Hi Stathis, This seems to be getting away from the simple requirement that the computer be able to handle counterfactuals. What if the device were not easy to disarm, but almost impossible to disarm? What if it had tentacles in every neurone, ready to destroy it if it fired at the wrong

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-05 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, Could you possibly link to the conversation with George Levy you refer to? I did not find it looking on my own. --Abram On Fri, Dec 5, 2008 at 4:20 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 05 Dec 2008, at 03:56, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Dec 03, 2008 at 04:53:11PM

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Jason, Le 03-déc.-08, à 17:20, Jason Resch a écrit : On Wed, Dec 3, 2008 at 9:53 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: and that by virtue of this imposed order, defines relations between particles.  Computation depends on relations, be it electrons in silicon, Chinese with

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-04 Thread Bruno Marchal
Brent, I try to single out where you depart from the comp hyp, to focus on the essential. I could add comments later on other paragraphs of your posts. Le 03-déc.-08, à 19:22, Brent Meeker a écrit : But there is causality. The sequence of events in the movie are directly caused by the

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-04 Thread Abram Demski
PS Abram. I think I will have to meditate a bit longer on your (difficult) post. You may have a point (hopefully only pedagogical :) A little bit more commentary may be in order then... I think my point may be halfway between pedagogical and serious... What I am saying is that people will

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-04 Thread Jason Resch
On Thu, Dec 4, 2008 at 5:19 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hmmm... It means you have still a little problem with step seven. I wish we share a computable environment, but we cannot decide this at will. I agree we have empirical evidence that here is such (partially) computable

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-04 Thread Russell Standish
On Wed, Dec 03, 2008 at 04:53:11PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: I really don't know. I expect that the mathematical structure, as seen from inside, is so big that Platonia cannot have it neither as element nor as subpart. (Ah, well, I am aware that this is counter-intuitive, but here

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-03 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Abram, On 02 Dec 2008, at 20:33, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, I am a bit confused. To me, you said Or, you are weakening the physical supervenience thesis by appeal to a notion of causality which seems to me a bit magical, and contrary to the local functionalism of the

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-03 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 02 Dec 2008, at 22:24, Brent Meeker wrote: Alice's brain and body are just local stable artifacts belonging to our (most probable) computational history, and making possible for Alice consciousness to differentiate through interactions with us, relatively to us. Bruno OK, that

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-03 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 03 Dec 2008, at 05:58, Jason Resch wrote: On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 11:33 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: All this is a bit complex because we have to take well into account the distinction between A computation in the real world, A description of a computation in the

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-03 Thread Jason Resch
On Wed, Dec 3, 2008 at 9:53 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: and that by virtue of this imposed order, defines relations between particles. Computation depends on relations, be it electrons in silicon, Chinese with radios or a system of beer cans and ping-pong balls; Here you

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-03 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, I think I see better now. Here is my explanation of why the causality I am invoking is not magical (and why it may not be an objection to your argument after all). Generally, the way I was viewing your argument was in terms of a hypothetical definition of consciousness, X, that is to be

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-03 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Abram, On 02 Dec 2008, at 20:33, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, I am a bit confused. To me, you said Or, you are weakening the physical supervenience thesis by appeal to a notion of causality which seems to me a bit magical, and contrary to the local functionalism

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-03 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Dec 2008, at 22:24, Brent Meeker wrote: Alice's brain and body are just local stable artifacts belonging to our (most probable) computational history, and making possible for Alice consciousness to differentiate through interactions with us,

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-02 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 02 Dec 2008, at 01:05, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, It sounds like what you are saying in this reply is that my version of COMP+MAT is consistent, but counter to your intuition (because you cannot see how consciousness could be attached to physical stuff). I have no problem a priori in

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-02 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 02 Dec 2008, at 03:33, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Dec 2008, at 03:25, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 07:10:43PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: I am speaking as someone unconvinced that MGA2 implies an absurdity. MGA2 implies that the consciousness is

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-02 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Günther, On 01 Dec 2008, at 22:53, Günther Greindl wrote: Hi Bruno, but no! Then we wouldn't have a substrate anymore. Oh( That is not true! We still have the projector and the film. We can project the movie in the air or directly in your eyes. Ok I see now where our intuitions

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-02 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, I am a bit confused. To me, you said Or, you are weakening the physical supervenience thesis by appeal to a notion of causality which seems to me a bit magical, and contrary to the local functionalism of the computationalist. This seems to say that the version of MAT that MGA is

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-02 Thread Abram Demski
Günther, Why does MGA 2 show that SMAT + MEC is inconsistent? The way I see it, SMAT + MEC should say that a recording of Alice does not count as conscious, because it lacks the proper causal structure (or equivalently, the proper counterfactual behavior). --Abram On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:53

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-02 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Dec 2008, at 03:33, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Dec 2008, at 03:25, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 07:10:43PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: I am speaking as someone unconvinced that MGA2 implies an absurdity. MGA2 implies

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-02 Thread Jason Resch
On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 11:33 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: All this is a bit complex because we have to take well into account the distinction between A computation in the real world, A description of a computation in the real world, And then most importantly: A

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 30 Nov 2008, at 19:14, Günther Greindl wrote: Hello Bruno, I must admit you have completely lost me with MGA 3. With MGA 1 and 2, I would say that, with MEC+MAT, also the the projection of the movie (and Lucky Alice in 1) are conscious - because it supervenes on the physical

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Abram, On 30 Nov 2008, at 19:17, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, No, she cannot be conscious that she is partially conscious in this case, because the scenario is set up such that she does everything as if she were fully conscious-- only the counterfactuals change. But, if someone tested

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-01 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 01 Dec 2008, at 03:25, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 07:10:43PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: I am speaking as someone unconvinced that MGA2 implies an absurdity. MGA2 implies that the consciousness is supervening on the stationary film. ? I could agree, but is this

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-01 Thread Günther Greindl
Hi Bruno, but no! Then we wouldn't have a substrate anymore. Oh( That is not true! We still have the projector and the film. We can project the movie in the air or directly in your eyes. Ok I see now where our intuitions differ (always the problem with thought experiment) - but maybe we

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-01 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, It sounds like what you are saying in this reply is that my version of COMP+MAT is consistent, but counter to your intuition (because you cannot see how consciousness could be attached to physical stuff). If this is the case, then it sounds like MGA only works for specific versions of

Re: MGA 3

2008-12-01 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Dec 2008, at 03:25, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 07:10:43PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: I am speaking as someone unconvinced that MGA2 implies an absurdity. MGA2 implies that the consciousness is supervening on the stationary film. ? I

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-30 Thread Russell Standish
On Sat, Nov 29, 2008 at 10:11:30AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Nov 2008, at 10:46, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 10:09:01AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: MGA 3 ... But this reasoning goes through if we make the hole in the film itself. Reconsider the

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-30 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 30 Nov 2008, at 04:23, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Nov 2008, at 15:56, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, The argument was more of the type : removal of unnecessay and unconscious or unintelligent parts. Those parts have just no perspective. If they have some perpective

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-30 Thread Bruno Marchal
Abram, My answer would have to be, no, she lacks the necessary counterfactual behaviors during that time. ? The film of the graph lacks also the counterfactuals. And, moreover, if only part of the brain were being run by a recording ... which lacks the counterfactual, ... then she

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-30 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 30 Nov 2008, at 11:57, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Nov 29, 2008 at 10:11:30AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Nov 2008, at 10:46, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 10:09:01AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: MGA 3 ... But this reasoning goes through if we make the

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-30 Thread Günther Greindl
Hello Bruno, I must admit you have completely lost me with MGA 3. With MGA 1 and 2, I would say that, with MEC+MAT, also the the projection of the movie (and Lucky Alice in 1) are conscious - because it supervenes on the physical activity. MEC says: it's the computation that counts, not the

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-30 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, No, she cannot be conscious that she is partially conscious in this case, because the scenario is set up such that she does everything as if she were fully conscious-- only the counterfactuals change. But, if someone tested those counterfactuals by doing something that the recording

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-30 Thread Günther Greindl
Bruno, I have reread MGA 2 and would like to add the following: We have the optical boolean graph: OBG - this computes alice's dream. we make a movie of this computation. Now we run again, but in OBG some nodes do not make the computation correctly, BUT the movie _triggers_ the nodes, so in

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-30 Thread Kory Heath
On Nov 30, 2008, at 10:14 AM, Günther Greindl wrote: I must admit you have completely lost me with MGA 3. I still find the whole thing easier to grasp when presented in terms of cellular automata. Let's say we have a computer program that starts with a large but finite 2D grid of bits,

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-30 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 07:10:43PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: I am speaking as someone unconvinced that MGA2 implies an absurdity. MGA2 implies that the consciousness is supervening on the stationary film. ? I could agree, but is this not absurd enough, given MEC and the

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-29 Thread Bruno Marchal
Abram, On 29 Nov 2008, at 04:49, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, I have done some thinking, and decided that I don't think this last step of the argument works for me. You provided two arguments, and so I provide two refutations. 1. (argument by removal of unnecessary parts): Suppose Alice

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-29 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 28 Nov 2008, at 23:20, Abram Demski wrote: Hi Bruno, So, basically, you are saying that I'm offering an alternative argument against materialism, correct? It seems to me you were going in that direction, yes. Well, *I* was suggesting that we run up against the problem of time in

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-29 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 28 Nov 2008, at 10:46, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 10:09:01AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: MGA 3 ... But this reasoning goes through if we make the hole in the film itself. Reconsider the image on the screen: with a hole in the film itself, you get a hole in the

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-29 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, The argument was more of the type : removal of unnecessay and unconscious or unintelligent parts. Those parts have just no perspective. If they have some perpective playing arole in Alice's consciousness, it would mean we have not well chosen the substitution level. You are

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-29 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Nov 2008, at 10:46, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 10:09:01AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: MGA 3 ... But this reasoning goes through if we make the hole in the film itself. Reconsider the image on the screen: with a hole in the film itself,

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-29 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 29 Nov 2008, at 15:56, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, The argument was more of the type : removal of unnecessay and unconscious or unintelligent parts. Those parts have just no perspective. If they have some perpective playing arole in Alice's consciousness, it would mean we have not well

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-29 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 29 Nov 2008, at 18:49, Brent Meeker wrote: This, I don't understand. And, btw, if that is true, then the physical supervenience thesis is already wrong. The physical supervenience thesis asks that consciousness is associated in real time and space with the activity of some machine

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-29 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, My answer would have to be, no, she lacks the necessary counterfactual behaviors during that time. And, moreover, if only part of the brain were being run by a recording then she would lack only some counterfactuals, and so she would count as partially conscious. --Abram On Sat, Nov 29,

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-29 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Nov 2008, at 15:56, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, The argument was more of the type : removal of unnecessay and unconscious or unintelligent parts. Those parts have just no perspective. If they have some perpective playing arole in Alice's consciousness, it

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-28 Thread Abram Demski
Hi Bruno, So, basically, you are saying that I'm offering an alternative argument against materialism, correct? It seems to me you were going in that direction, yes. Well, *I* was suggesting that we run up against the problem of time in *either* direction (physical reality / mathematical

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-28 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, I have done some thinking, and decided that I don't think this last step of the argument works for me. You provided two arguments, and so I provide two refutations. 1. (argument by removal of unnecessary parts): Suppose Alice lives in a cave all her life, with bread and water tossed down

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-27 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, It seems to me that this runs head-on into the problem of the definition of time... Here is my argument; I am sure there will be disagreement with it. Supposing that Alice's consciousness is spread out over the movie billboards next to the train track, there is no longer a normal

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-27 Thread Brent Meeker
Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, It seems to me that this runs head-on into the problem of the definition of time... Here is my argument; I am sure there will be disagreement with it. Supposing that Alice's consciousness is spread out over the movie billboards next to the train track, there

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Abram, On 27 Nov 2008, at 20:02, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, It seems to me that this runs head-on into the problem of the definition of time... Here is my argument; I am sure there will be disagreement with it. Supposing that Alice's consciousness is spread out over the movie

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-27 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, So, basically, you are saying that I'm offering an alternative argument against materialism, correct? Supposing that reality has a purely mathematical basis eliminates the problem, because removing the past is like removing the number 13. You say that the argument by counterfactuals

Re: MGA 3

2008-11-26 Thread Michael Rosefield
There's a quote you might like, by Korzybski: That which makes no difference _is_ no difference. -- - Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven? - Mmm. - That was me... and six other guys. 2008/11/26 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] MGA 3 It is the last MGA ! I realize