Re: Materialism and Mechanism

2019-01-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:57:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 10 Jan 2019, at 21:01, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 11:20:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 11:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:44:40 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 15:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> In terms of processing, I distinguish *experience processing* from 
>>> *information 
>>> processing.*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> OK. That is important, but the machines do that too. Information 
>>> processing is like computing and proving, and can be described in 3p terms. 
>>> It is the “[]p” in the list of self-referential modes. But the (Löbian) 
>>> machine is aware that she cannot know, nor even define precisely, her own 
>>> correctness, and that she cannot prove, if true, the equivalence between 
>>> []p and “[]p & p”, so she is bounded to find Theatetetus definition of the 
>>> soul or of the knower, which is pure 1p, and does not admits any pure 3p 
>>> description. I would say that this might corresponds to your “experience” 
>>> processing.
>>>
>>> Then, eventually the notion of “matter” can be explained in term of the 
>>> number experience processing (sharable for the quanta, and non sharable for 
>>> the qualia). There is no need to invoke some inert substance that nobody 
>>> can define nor test.
>>>
>>> All computers (physical universal machine) and the non material 
>>> universal machine are equivalent with respect to computability and 
>>> emulability. Please note that they are NOT equivalent with respect to 
>>> provability, even if, when self-referentially correct, their provability 
>>> predicate will all obey to the same theology (G*), but will differ in their 
>>> interpretation, contents, etc. 
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
>>>
>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>> This is interesting for a programming semantics (e.g. denotational) 
>> perspective, for experiential processing.
>>
>> This reminds me of Galen Strawson's argument (which has nothing to do 
>> with stochasticism or determinism) about "ree will. He has a definition of 
>> "self" such that your self is a real thing
>>
>>
>> OK.
>>
>>
>>
>> (that includes your consciousness, which is also a real thing), 
>>
>>
>> OK.
>>
>>
>> and to say your self has free will can't really be right, since you can't 
>> say (seriously) "I am free to not be my self" (since it is your self that 
>> is doing that): Whatever you chose, it is your self that is choosing.
>>
>>
>>
>> Once a universal machine introspect itself relatively to some universal 
>> number, it becomes aware that it can predict itself completely and 
>> free-will is a vague term alluding to the management of decision in absence 
>> of complete information. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> "Experience Processing": Maybe not this year [ International Conference 
>> on Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019  
>> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ ] …
>>
>>
>> I recently (it is nt used in my papers) consider that it implies a lot to 
>> admit that all universal machine are maximally conscious, and that the 
>> provability predicate (seen as an ideal self-referentially correct 
>> brain/body) only filters the consciousness of the universal machine. When 
>> unrpogrammed, and without input, its consciousness is quite different from 
>> the mundane consciousness, it is more like a highly dissociated state of 
>> consciousness, out of time and space, which needs a lot of spatio-temproral 
>> experiences to develop the aproprioperception of a body. In the humain 
>> brain, that sense is basically innate.
>>
>> The experience is not “processed” by a code, it is a truth filtered by a 
>> body/code. 
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> It the brain is biocomputing, as the human is a biocomputer [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_biocomputer ], then it is indeed 
> processing experience. (Processing is what computers do.)
>
>
> Does biocomputing violate Church’s thesis? If yes, give me a biocomputable 
> function from N to N which is not Turing-computable. If no, then the 
> biocomputation are realised in arithmetic, and biology, like physics emerge 
> from a statistics on all those computations. That can be tested (and has 
> been).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
 

*Slime Mold Can Solve Exponentially Complicated Problems in Linear Time*

http://www.sci-news.com/biology/slime-mold-problems-linear-time-06759.html


- pt

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Re: Materialism and Mechanism

2019-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 10 Jan 2019, at 21:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 11:20:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 11:20, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:44:40 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 15:20, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> In terms of processing, I distinguish experience processing from 
>>> information processing.
>> 
>> 
>> OK. That is important, but the machines do that too. Information processing 
>> is like computing and proving, and can be described in 3p terms. It is the 
>> “[]p” in the list of self-referential modes. But the (Löbian) machine is 
>> aware that she cannot know, nor even define precisely, her own correctness, 
>> and that she cannot prove, if true, the equivalence between []p and “[]p & 
>> p”, so she is bounded to find Theatetetus definition of the soul or of the 
>> knower, which is pure 1p, and does not admits any pure 3p description. I 
>> would say that this might corresponds to your “experience” processing.
>> 
>> Then, eventually the notion of “matter” can be explained in term of the 
>> number experience processing (sharable for the quanta, and non sharable for 
>> the qualia). There is no need to invoke some inert substance that nobody can 
>> define nor test.
>> 
>> All computers (physical universal machine) and the non material universal 
>> machine are equivalent with respect to computability and emulability. Please 
>> note that they are NOT equivalent with respect to provability, even if, when 
>> self-referentially correct, their provability predicate will all obey to the 
>> same theology (G*), but will differ in their interpretation, contents, etc. 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ 
>>> 
>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> - pt
>>> 
>> 
>> This is interesting for a programming semantics (e.g. denotational) 
>> perspective, for experiential processing.
>> 
>> This reminds me of Galen Strawson's argument (which has nothing to do with 
>> stochasticism or determinism) about "ree will. He has a definition of "self" 
>> such that your self is a real thing
> 
> OK.
> 
> 
> 
>> (that includes your consciousness, which is also a real thing),
> 
> OK.
> 
> 
>> and to say your self has free will can't really be right, since you can't 
>> say (seriously) "I am free to not be my self" (since it is your self that is 
>> doing that): Whatever you chose, it is your self that is choosing.
> 
> 
> Once a universal machine introspect itself relatively to some universal 
> number, it becomes aware that it can predict itself completely and free-will 
> is a vague term alluding to the management of decision in absence of complete 
> information. 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> "Experience Processing": Maybe not this year [ International Conference on 
>> Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019  
>> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/  ] …
> 
> I recently (it is nt used in my papers) consider that it implies a lot to 
> admit that all universal machine are maximally conscious, and that the 
> provability predicate (seen as an ideal self-referentially correct 
> brain/body) only filters the consciousness of the universal machine. When 
> unrpogrammed, and without input, its consciousness is quite different from 
> the mundane consciousness, it is more like a highly dissociated state of 
> consciousness, out of time and space, which needs a lot of spatio-temproral 
> experiences to develop the aproprioperception of a body. In the humain brain, 
> that sense is basically innate.
> 
> The experience is not “processed” by a code, it is a truth filtered by a 
> body/code. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It the brain is biocomputing, as the human is a biocomputer [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_biocomputer ], then it is indeed 
> processing experience. (Processing is what computers do.)

Does biocomputing violate Church’s thesis? If yes, give me a biocomputable 
function from N to N which is not Turing-computable. If no, then the 
biocomputation are realised in arithmetic, and biology, like physics emerge 
from a statistics on all those computations. That can be tested (and has been).

Bruno




> 
> - pt
> 
> -- 
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Re: Materialism and Mechanism

2019-01-10 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 11:20:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 Jan 2019, at 11:20, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:44:40 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 15:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>> In terms of processing, I distinguish *experience processing* from 
>> *information 
>> processing.*
>>
>>
>>
>> OK. That is important, but the machines do that too. Information 
>> processing is like computing and proving, and can be described in 3p terms. 
>> It is the “[]p” in the list of self-referential modes. But the (Löbian) 
>> machine is aware that she cannot know, nor even define precisely, her own 
>> correctness, and that she cannot prove, if true, the equivalence between 
>> []p and “[]p & p”, so she is bounded to find Theatetetus definition of the 
>> soul or of the knower, which is pure 1p, and does not admits any pure 3p 
>> description. I would say that this might corresponds to your “experience” 
>> processing.
>>
>> Then, eventually the notion of “matter” can be explained in term of the 
>> number experience processing (sharable for the quanta, and non sharable for 
>> the qualia). There is no need to invoke some inert substance that nobody 
>> can define nor test.
>>
>> All computers (physical universal machine) and the non material universal 
>> machine are equivalent with respect to computability and emulability. 
>> Please note that they are NOT equivalent with respect to provability, even 
>> if, when self-referentially correct, their provability predicate will all 
>> obey to the same theology (G*), but will differ in their interpretation, 
>> contents, etc. 
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
>>
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>>
>> - pt
>>
>> This is interesting for a programming semantics (e.g. denotational) 
> perspective, for experiential processing.
>
> This reminds me of Galen Strawson's argument (which has nothing to do with 
> stochasticism or determinism) about "ree will. He has a definition of 
> "self" such that your self is a real thing
>
>
> OK.
>
>
>
> (that includes your consciousness, which is also a real thing), 
>
>
> OK.
>
>
> and to say your self has free will can't really be right, since you can't 
> say (seriously) "I am free to not be my self" (since it is your self that 
> is doing that): Whatever you chose, it is your self that is choosing.
>
>
>
> Once a universal machine introspect itself relatively to some universal 
> number, it becomes aware that it can predict itself completely and 
> free-will is a vague term alluding to the management of decision in absence 
> of complete information. 
>
>
>
>
>
>
> "Experience Processing": Maybe not this year [ International Conference 
> on Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019  
> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ ] …
>
>
> I recently (it is nt used in my papers) consider that it implies a lot to 
> admit that all universal machine are maximally conscious, and that the 
> provability predicate (seen as an ideal self-referentially correct 
> brain/body) only filters the consciousness of the universal machine. When 
> unrpogrammed, and without input, its consciousness is quite different from 
> the mundane consciousness, it is more like a highly dissociated state of 
> consciousness, out of time and space, which needs a lot of spatio-temproral 
> experiences to develop the aproprioperception of a body. In the humain 
> brain, that sense is basically innate.
>
> The experience is not “processed” by a code, it is a truth filtered by a 
> body/code. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
It the brain is biocomputing, as the human is a biocomputer 
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_biocomputer ], then it is indeed 
processing experience. (Processing is what computers do.)

- pt

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Re: Materialism and Mechanism

2019-01-10 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 9 Jan 2019, at 11:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:44:40 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 15:20, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> In terms of processing, I distinguish experience processing from information 
>> processing.
> 
> 
> OK. That is important, but the machines do that too. Information processing 
> is like computing and proving, and can be described in 3p terms. It is the 
> “[]p” in the list of self-referential modes. But the (Löbian) machine is 
> aware that she cannot know, nor even define precisely, her own correctness, 
> and that she cannot prove, if true, the equivalence between []p and “[]p & 
> p”, so she is bounded to find Theatetetus definition of the soul or of the 
> knower, which is pure 1p, and does not admits any pure 3p description. I 
> would say that this might corresponds to your “experience” processing.
> 
> Then, eventually the notion of “matter” can be explained in term of the 
> number experience processing (sharable for the quanta, and non sharable for 
> the qualia). There is no need to invoke some inert substance that nobody can 
> define nor test.
> 
> All computers (physical universal machine) and the non material universal 
> machine are equivalent with respect to computability and emulability. Please 
> note that they are NOT equivalent with respect to provability, even if, when 
> self-referentially correct, their provability predicate will all obey to the 
> same theology (G*), but will differ in their interpretation, contents, etc. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ 
>> 
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> - pt
>> 
> 
> This is interesting for a programming semantics (e.g. denotational) 
> perspective, for experiential processing.
> 
> This reminds me of Galen Strawson's argument (which has nothing to do with 
> stochasticism or determinism) about "ree will. He has a definition of "self" 
> such that your self is a real thing

OK.



> (that includes your consciousness, which is also a real thing),

OK.


> and to say your self has free will can't really be right, since you can't say 
> (seriously) "I am free to not be my self" (since it is your self that is 
> doing that): Whatever you chose, it is your self that is choosing.


Once a universal machine introspect itself relatively to some universal number, 
it becomes aware that it can predict itself completely and free-will is a vague 
term alluding to the management of decision in absence of complete information. 



> 
> 
> 
> "Experience Processing": Maybe not this year [ International Conference on 
> Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019  
> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/  ] …

I recently (it is nt used in my papers) consider that it implies a lot to admit 
that all universal machine are maximally conscious, and that the provability 
predicate (seen as an ideal self-referentially correct brain/body) only filters 
the consciousness of the universal machine. When unrpogrammed, and without 
input, its consciousness is quite different from the mundane consciousness, it 
is more like a highly dissociated state of consciousness, out of time and 
space, which needs a lot of spatio-temproral experiences to develop the 
aproprioperception of a body. In the humain brain, that sense is basically 
innate.

The experience is not “processed” by a code, it is a truth filtered by a 
body/code. 

Bruno



> 
> - pt
> 
> -- 
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> .

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Re: Materialism and Mechanism

2019-01-09 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:44:40 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 6 Jan 2019, at 15:20, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> In terms of processing, I distinguish *experience processing* from 
> *information 
> processing.*
>
>
>
> OK. That is important, but the machines do that too. Information 
> processing is like computing and proving, and can be described in 3p terms. 
> It is the “[]p” in the list of self-referential modes. But the (Löbian) 
> machine is aware that she cannot know, nor even define precisely, her own 
> correctness, and that she cannot prove, if true, the equivalence between 
> []p and “[]p & p”, so she is bounded to find Theatetetus definition of the 
> soul or of the knower, which is pure 1p, and does not admits any pure 3p 
> description. I would say that this might corresponds to your “experience” 
> processing.
>
> Then, eventually the notion of “matter” can be explained in term of the 
> number experience processing (sharable for the quanta, and non sharable for 
> the qualia). There is no need to invoke some inert substance that nobody 
> can define nor test.
>
> All computers (physical universal machine) and the non material universal 
> machine are equivalent with respect to computability and emulability. 
> Please note that they are NOT equivalent with respect to provability, even 
> if, when self-referentially correct, their provability predicate will all 
> obey to the same theology (G*), but will differ in their interpretation, 
> contents, etc. 
>
> Bruno
>
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
>
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>
> - pt
>
> This is interesting for a programming semantics (e.g. denotational) 
perspective, for experiential processing.

This reminds me of Galen Strawson's argument (which has nothing to do with 
stochasticism or determinism) about "ree will. He has a definition of 
"self" such that your self is a real thing (that includes your 
consciousness, which is also a real thing), and to say your self has free 
will can't really be right, since you can't say (seriously) "I am free to 
not be my self" (since it is your self that is doing that): Whatever you 
chose, it is your self that is choosing.



"Experience Processing": Maybe not this year [ International Conference on 
Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019  
http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ 
] ...

- pt

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Re: Materialism and Mechanism

2019-01-07 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 6 Jan 2019, at 15:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 8:04:20 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sun, Jan 6, 2019 at 4:47 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 6:02:39 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 2:05 PM Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:52:19 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part) real 
>> materialists.
> 
> 
> That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the consequence of 
> Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, but still physicalist 
> (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The physical reality would be a 
> mathematical reality among others, but with computationalism, the physical 
> reality comes from a more global mathematical phenomenon based on the 
> behaviour/semantics of the material mode of self-rereyence (involving 
> probabilities, i.e., for those who have studied the self-referential modes 
> available, the []p & X modes, with X being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t).
> 
> This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not exist, I 
> would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they can mean 
> (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to physics", and physics is 
> what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific community.
> 
> (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being "explainable" by 
> physics.)
> 
> It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using both terms 
> ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I will typically 
> refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’."
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/ 
> 
> 
> Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of "physicalism" (unless 
> it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be reduced to physics"), though 
> materialism has a "weak" and "strong" definition.
> 
> Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is:
> 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvHVo6TslV4 
> 
> 
> 
> The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is whether 
> "primariness" is assumed or not.  These diagrams I made highlight the 
> difference:
> 
> 
> Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be explained or 
> derived from anything else):
> 
> 
> Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be explained 
> or derived from something more fundamental):
> 
> 
> You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with that 
> belief a "Primary Physicalism Agnostic".
> 
> Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of Primary 
> Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to consider why it 
> is you believe in something so strongly despite there being no evidence for 
> it.
> 
>  
> 
> 
> But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"?
> 
> 
> If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet functionally 
> equivalent replacement and experience no change in consciousness.
> 
> The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a loose 
> confirmation of digital mechanism.
> 
> Jason
> 
> 
> 
> A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter) be 
> reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of 
> theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?"  
> 
> See  List of unsolved problems in chemistry
> -  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry 
> 
> 
> Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of these open 
> problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical properties not reducible to 
> physical properties.
> 
> Doesn't that require chemical reactions that violate physical laws?
>  
> 
> If that is the case, what is physical (as I have defined physical) does not 
> cover what is chemical (much less biological).
> 
> Matter includes all levels of "stuff": physical, chemical, biological, 
> psychical. So materialism is the agnostic position: It doesn't matter whether 
> everything can be reduced to the physical or not.
> 
> 
> 
> In "replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet functionally 
> equivalent replacement", mechanical could of course include biomechanical (as 
> defined in synthetic biology), as there was no restriction of "mechanical".
> 

Re: Materialism and Mechanism

2019-01-06 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 8:53:25 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Jan 6, 2019 at 8:20 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Of course *physical, chemical, biological, psychical, sociological *laws 
>> (to run the spectrum) are all human inventions. 
>>
>> The questions are about how these laws interrelate (and terms like 
>> *emergence, 
>> reduction, downward causation* are used).
>>
>> In terms of processing, I distinguish *experience processing* from 
>> *information 
>> processing.*
>>
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
>>
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>>
>>
> From the above page: 
>
>  But suppose there was hardware that supported experiential functionality 
> as well. Programs in a language with experiential modalities could execute 
> “for real” in that computing substrate, as opposed to the 
> informational-only supporting hardware.
>
> *The connection between experience (phenomenal material consciousness) and 
> truth (experiential modal logic) would be that it is possible for there to 
> be different kinds of consciousness via alternative material substrates.*
>
> What does this imply for philosophical zombies? ([1 
> ], [2 
> ],
>  
> [3 
> ])
>  
> Are they possible within your theory?
>
> Are you familiar with Chalmer's fading and dancing qualia thought 
> experiment? [4 ]
> What does your theory predict regarding the behavior and experience of a 
> biological brain being replaced with some *information-only* hardware?
>
> Jason
>



I don't know what in the range of materials 
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_types_of_biochemistry ]  can 
be used to make experience processing beings.


In a recent online interaction I had with Philip Goff @Philip_Goff 
  (who does know and talks to David 
Chalmers), he says Chalmers keep changing on qualia and consciousness. (He 
said he recently changed Daniel Denett's position.) I think Galen Strawson 
("real materialism") would say the 1995 Chalmers paper is in the final 
analysis "a denial of consciousness".

I think there can be zombies in the sense that we can make robots (like a 
Sophie @RealSophiaRobot  + Google 
Assistant of the future) that are very intelligent and functional in the 
world but have no consciousness.

- pt

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Re: Materialism and Mechanism

2019-01-06 Thread Jason Resch
On Sun, Jan 6, 2019 at 8:20 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
>
>
> Of course *physical, chemical, biological, psychical, sociological *laws
> (to run the spectrum) are all human inventions.
>
> The questions are about how these laws interrelate (and terms like *emergence,
> reduction, downward causation* are used).
>
> In terms of processing, I distinguish *experience processing* from 
> *information
> processing.*
>
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
>
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>
>
>From the above page:

 But suppose there was hardware that supported experiential functionality
as well. Programs in a language with experiential modalities could execute
“for real” in that computing substrate, as opposed to the
informational-only supporting hardware.

*The connection between experience (phenomenal material consciousness) and
truth (experiential modal logic) would be that it is possible for there to
be different kinds of consciousness via alternative material substrates.*

What does this imply for philosophical zombies? ([1
], [2
],
[3
])
Are they possible within your theory?

Are you familiar with Chalmer's fading and dancing qualia thought
experiment? [4 ]
What does your theory predict regarding the behavior and experience of a
biological brain being replaced with some *information-only* hardware?

Jason

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Re: Materialism and Mechanism

2019-01-06 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 8:04:20 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Jan 6, 2019 at 4:47 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 6:02:39 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 2:05 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>


 On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:52:19 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019, Philip Thrift  
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift  
>>> wrote:
>>>

 On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
> On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
> Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part) 
> real materialists.
>
>
>
> That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the 
> consequence of Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, 
> but 
> still physicalist (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The 
> physical 
> reality would be a mathematical reality among others, but with 
> computationalism, the physical reality comes from a more global 
> mathematical phenomenon based on the behaviour/semantics of the 
> material 
> mode of self-rereyence (involving probabilities, i.e., for those who 
> have 
> studied the self-referential modes available, the []p & X modes, with 
> X 
> being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t).
>
> This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not 
> exist, I would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted.
>
> Bruno
>
>


 "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they 
 can mean (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to 
 physics", and 
 physics is what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific 
 community.

 (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being 
 "explainable" by physics.)

 It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using 
 both terms ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I 
 will 
 typically refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’."
 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

 Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of 
 "physicalism" (unless it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be 
 reduced to physics"), though materialism has a "weak" and "strong" 
 definition.

 Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is:

 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvHVo6TslV4


>>> The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is 
>>> whether "primariness" is assumed or not.  These diagrams I made 
>>> highlight 
>>> the difference:
>>>
>>>
>>> *Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be 
>>> explained or derived from anything else):*
>>> [image: primary-physicalism.png]
>>>
>>> *Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be 
>>> explained or derived from something more fundamental):*
>>> [image: non-primary-physicalism.png]
>>>
>>> You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with 
>>> that belief a "*Primary Physicalism Agnostic*".
>>>
>>> Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of 
>>> Primary Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to 
>>> consider why it is you believe in something so strongly despite there 
>>> being 
>>> no evidence for it.
>>>
>>>  
>>>


 But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"?


>>> If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet 
>>> functionally equivalent replacement and experience no change in 
>>> consciousness.
>>>
>>> The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a 
>>> loose confirmation of digital mechanism.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter) 
>> be reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of 
>> theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?"  
>>
>> See  *List of unsolved problems in chemistry*
>> -  
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry
>>
>> Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of 
>> these open problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical 

Re: Materialism and Mechanism

2019-01-06 Thread Jason Resch
On Sun, Jan 6, 2019 at 4:47 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 6:02:39 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 2:05 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:52:19 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



 On Saturday, January 5, 2019, Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
>>> wrote:


 On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:


 Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part)
 real materialists.



 That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the
 consequence of Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, but
 still physicalist (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The 
 physical
 reality would be a mathematical reality among others, but with
 computationalism, the physical reality comes from a more global
 mathematical phenomenon based on the behaviour/semantics of the 
 material
 mode of self-rereyence (involving probabilities, i.e., for those who 
 have
 studied the self-referential modes available, the []p & X modes, with X
 being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t).

 This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not
 exist, I would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted.

 Bruno


>>>
>>>
>>> "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they
>>> can mean (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to physics", 
>>> and
>>> physics is what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific 
>>> community.
>>>
>>> (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being
>>> "explainable" by physics.)
>>>
>>> It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using both
>>> terms ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I will
>>> typically refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’."
>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
>>>
>>> Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of "physicalism"
>>> (unless it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be reduced to
>>> physics"), though materialism has a "weak" and "strong" definition.
>>>
>>> Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is:
>>>
>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvHVo6TslV4
>>>
>>>
>> The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is
>> whether "primariness" is assumed or not.  These diagrams I made highlight
>> the difference:
>>
>>
>> *Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be
>> explained or derived from anything else):*
>> [image: primary-physicalism.png]
>>
>> *Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be
>> explained or derived from something more fundamental):*
>> [image: non-primary-physicalism.png]
>>
>> You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with
>> that belief a "*Primary Physicalism Agnostic*".
>>
>> Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of
>> Primary Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to
>> consider why it is you believe in something so strongly despite there 
>> being
>> no evidence for it.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"?
>>>
>>>
>> If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet
>> functionally equivalent replacement and experience no change in
>> consciousness.
>>
>> The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a loose
>> confirmation of digital mechanism.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
>
>
> A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter)
> be reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of
> theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?"
>
> See  *List of unsolved problems in chemistry*
> -
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry
>
> Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of
> these open problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical properties not
> reducible to physical properties.
>

 Doesn't that require chemical reactions that violate physical laws?


>
> If that is the case, what is physical (as I have defined physical)
> does not cover what is chemical (much less biological).
>
> 

Re: Materialism and Mechanism

2019-01-06 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 6:02:39 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 2:05 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:52:19 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>


 On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift  
> wrote:
>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part) real 
>>> materialists.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the 
>>> consequence of Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, but 
>>> still physicalist (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The 
>>> physical 
>>> reality would be a mathematical reality among others, but with 
>>> computationalism, the physical reality comes from a more global 
>>> mathematical phenomenon based on the behaviour/semantics of the 
>>> material 
>>> mode of self-rereyence (involving probabilities, i.e., for those who 
>>> have 
>>> studied the self-referential modes available, the []p & X modes, with X 
>>> being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t).
>>>
>>> This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not 
>>> exist, I would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they 
>> can mean (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to physics", 
>> and 
>> physics is what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific 
>> community.
>>
>> (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being "explainable" 
>> by physics.)
>>
>> It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using both 
>> terms ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I will 
>> typically refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’."
>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
>>
>> Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of "physicalism" 
>> (unless it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be reduced to 
>> physics"), though materialism has a "weak" and "strong" definition.
>>
>> Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is:
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvHVo6TslV4
>>
>>
> The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is 
> whether "primariness" is assumed or not.  These diagrams I made highlight 
> the difference:
>
>
> *Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be 
> explained or derived from anything else):*
> [image: primary-physicalism.png]
>
> *Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be 
> explained or derived from something more fundamental):*
> [image: non-primary-physicalism.png]
>
> You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with 
> that belief a "*Primary Physicalism Agnostic*".
>
> Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of Primary 
> Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to consider 
> why 
> it is you believe in something so strongly despite there being no 
> evidence 
> for it.
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>> But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"?
>>
>>
> If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet 
> functionally equivalent replacement and experience no change in 
> consciousness.
>
> The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a loose 
> confirmation of digital mechanism.
>
> Jason
>



 A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter) 
 be reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of 
 theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?"  

 See  *List of unsolved problems in chemistry*
 -  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry

 Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of 
 these open problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical properties not 
 reducible to physical properties.

>>>
>>> Doesn't that require chemical reactions that violate physical laws?
>>>  
>>>

 If that is the case, what is physical (as I have defined physical) does 
 not cover what is chemical (much less biological).

 Matter includes all levels of "stuff": physical, chemical, biological, 
 psychical. So materialism is the agnostic position: It doesn't matter 
 whether 

Re: Materialism and Mechanism

2019-01-05 Thread Jason Resch
On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 2:05 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:52:19 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



 On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift 
 wrote:

>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>> Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part) real
>> materialists.
>>
>>
>>
>> That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the consequence
>> of Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, but still
>> physicalist (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The physical
>> reality would be a mathematical reality among others, but with
>> computationalism, the physical reality comes from a more global
>> mathematical phenomenon based on the behaviour/semantics of the material
>> mode of self-rereyence (involving probabilities, i.e., for those who have
>> studied the self-referential modes available, the []p & X modes, with X
>> being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t).
>>
>> This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not
>> exist, I would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>
>
> "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they can
> mean (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to physics", and
> physics is what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific community.
>
> (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being "explainable"
> by physics.)
>
> It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using both
> terms ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I will
> typically refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’."
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
>
> Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of "physicalism"
> (unless it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be reduced to
> physics"), though materialism has a "weak" and "strong" definition.
>
> Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is:
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvHVo6TslV4
>
>
 The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is
 whether "primariness" is assumed or not.  These diagrams I made highlight
 the difference:


 *Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be explained
 or derived from anything else):*
 [image: primary-physicalism.png]

 *Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be
 explained or derived from something more fundamental):*
 [image: non-primary-physicalism.png]

 You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with
 that belief a "*Primary Physicalism Agnostic*".

 Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of Primary
 Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to consider why
 it is you believe in something so strongly despite there being no evidence
 for it.



>
>
> But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"?
>
>
 If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet
 functionally equivalent replacement and experience no change in
 consciousness.

 The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a loose
 confirmation of digital mechanism.

 Jason

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter) be
>>> reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of
>>> theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?"
>>>
>>> See  *List of unsolved problems in chemistry*
>>> -  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry
>>>
>>> Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of these
>>> open problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical properties not
>>> reducible to physical properties.
>>>
>>
>> Doesn't that require chemical reactions that violate physical laws?
>>
>>
>>>
>>> If that is the case, what is physical (as I have defined physical) does
>>> not cover what is chemical (much less biological).
>>>
>>> Matter includes all levels of "stuff": physical, chemical, biological,
>>> psychical. So materialism is the agnostic position: It doesn't matter
>>> whether everything can be reduced to the physical or not.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In "replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet
>>> functionally equivalent replacement", mechanical could of course include
>>> biomechanical (as defined in *synthetic biology*), as there was no
>>> restriction of 

Re: Materialism and Mechanism

2019-01-05 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:52:19 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019, Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>

 On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
> Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part) real 
> materialists.
>
>
>
> That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the consequence 
> of Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, but still 
> physicalist (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The physical 
> reality would be a mathematical reality among others, but with 
> computationalism, the physical reality comes from a more global 
> mathematical phenomenon based on the behaviour/semantics of the material 
> mode of self-rereyence (involving probabilities, i.e., for those who have 
> studied the self-referential modes available, the []p & X modes, with X 
> being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t).
>
> This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not exist, 
> I would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted.
>
> Bruno
>
>


 "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they can 
 mean (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to physics", and 
 physics is what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific community.

 (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being "explainable" 
 by physics.)

 It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using both 
 terms ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I will 
 typically refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’."
 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

 Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of "physicalism" 
 (unless it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be reduced to 
 physics"), though materialism has a "weak" and "strong" definition.

 Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is:

 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvHVo6TslV4


>>> The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is 
>>> whether "primariness" is assumed or not.  These diagrams I made highlight 
>>> the difference:
>>>
>>>
>>> *Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be explained 
>>> or derived from anything else):*
>>> [image: primary-physicalism.png]
>>>
>>> *Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be 
>>> explained or derived from something more fundamental):*
>>> [image: non-primary-physicalism.png]
>>>
>>> You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with that 
>>> belief a "*Primary Physicalism Agnostic*".
>>>
>>> Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of Primary 
>>> Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to consider why 
>>> it is you believe in something so strongly despite there being no evidence 
>>> for it.
>>>
>>>  
>>>


 But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"?


>>> If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet 
>>> functionally equivalent replacement and experience no change in 
>>> consciousness.
>>>
>>> The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a loose 
>>> confirmation of digital mechanism.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter) be 
>> reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of 
>> theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?"  
>>
>> See  *List of unsolved problems in chemistry*
>> -  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry
>>
>> Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of these 
>> open problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical properties not 
>> reducible to physical properties.
>>
>
> Doesn't that require chemical reactions that violate physical laws?
>  
>
>>
>> If that is the case, what is physical (as I have defined physical) does 
>> not cover what is chemical (much less biological).
>>
>> Matter includes all levels of "stuff": physical, chemical, biological, 
>> psychical. So materialism is the agnostic position: It doesn't matter 
>> whether everything can be reduced to the physical or not.
>>
>>
>>
>> In "replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet 
>> functionally equivalent replacement", mechanical could of course include 
>> biomechanical (as defined in *synthetic biology*), as there was no 
>> restriction of "mechanical".
>>
>>
> Mechanism is the belief that any mechanical replacement will do, 
> regardless of what that mechanical component is made of, so long as 

Re: Materialism and Mechanism

2019-01-05 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part) real 
>>> materialists.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the consequence of 
>>> Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, but still physicalist 
>>> (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The physical reality would be a 
>>> mathematical reality among others, but with computationalism, the physical 
>>> reality comes from a more global mathematical phenomenon based on the 
>>> behaviour/semantics of the material mode of self-rereyence (involving 
>>> probabilities, i.e., for those who have studied the self-referential modes 
>>> available, the []p & X modes, with X being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t).
>>>
>>> This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not exist, I 
>>> would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they can 
>> mean (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to physics", and 
>> physics is what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific community.
>>
>> (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being "explainable" by 
>> physics.)
>>
>> It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using both 
>> terms ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I will 
>> typically refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’."
>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
>>
>> Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of "physicalism" 
>> (unless it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be reduced to 
>> physics"), though materialism has a "weak" and "strong" definition.
>>
>> Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is:
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvHVo6TslV4
>>
>>
> The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is 
> whether "primariness" is assumed or not.  These diagrams I made highlight 
> the difference:
>
>
> *Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be explained or 
> derived from anything else):*
> [image: primary-physicalism.png]
>
> *Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be 
> explained or derived from something more fundamental):*
> [image: non-primary-physicalism.png]
>
> You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with that 
> belief a "*Primary Physicalism Agnostic*".
>
> Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of Primary 
> Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to consider why 
> it is you believe in something so strongly despite there being no evidence 
> for it.
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>> But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"?
>>
>>
> If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet 
> functionally equivalent replacement and experience no change in 
> consciousness.
>
> The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a loose 
> confirmation of digital mechanism.
>
> Jason
>



A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter) be 
reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of 
theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?"  

See  *List of unsolved problems in chemistry*
-  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry

Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of these 
open problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical properties not 
reducible to physical properties.

If that is the case, what is physical (as I have defined physical) does not 
cover what is chemical (much less biological).

Matter includes all levels of "stuff": physical, chemical, biological, 
psychical. So materialism is the agnostic position: It doesn't matter 
whether everything can be reduced to the physical or not.



In "replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet functionally 
equivalent replacement", mechanical could of course include biomechanical 
(as defined in *synthetic biology*), as there was no restriction of 
"mechanical".


- pt

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Re: Materialism and Mechanism

2019-01-05 Thread Jason Resch
On Saturday, January 5, 2019, Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:


 Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part) real
 materialists.



 That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the consequence
 of Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, but still
 physicalist (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The physical
 reality would be a mathematical reality among others, but with
 computationalism, the physical reality comes from a more global
 mathematical phenomenon based on the behaviour/semantics of the material
 mode of self-rereyence (involving probabilities, i.e., for those who have
 studied the self-referential modes available, the []p & X modes, with X
 being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t).

 This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not exist,
 I would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted.

 Bruno


>>>
>>>
>>> "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they can
>>> mean (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to physics", and
>>> physics is what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific community.
>>>
>>> (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being "explainable" by
>>> physics.)
>>>
>>> It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using both
>>> terms ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I will
>>> typically refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’."
>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
>>>
>>> Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of "physicalism"
>>> (unless it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be reduced to
>>> physics"), though materialism has a "weak" and "strong" definition.
>>>
>>> Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is:
>>>
>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvHVo6TslV4
>>>
>>>
>> The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is
>> whether "primariness" is assumed or not.  These diagrams I made highlight
>> the difference:
>>
>>
>> *Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be explained
>> or derived from anything else):*
>> [image: primary-physicalism.png]
>>
>> *Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be
>> explained or derived from something more fundamental):*
>> [image: non-primary-physicalism.png]
>>
>> You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with that
>> belief a "*Primary Physicalism Agnostic*".
>>
>> Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of Primary
>> Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to consider why
>> it is you believe in something so strongly despite there being no evidence
>> for it.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"?
>>>
>>>
>> If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet
>> functionally equivalent replacement and experience no change in
>> consciousness.
>>
>> The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a loose
>> confirmation of digital mechanism.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
>
>
> A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter) be
> reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of
> theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?"
>
> See  *List of unsolved problems in chemistry*
> -  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry
>
> Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of these
> open problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical properties not
> reducible to physical properties.
>

Doesn't that require chemical reactions that violate physical laws?


>
> If that is the case, what is physical (as I have defined physical) does
> not cover what is chemical (much less biological).
>
> Matter includes all levels of "stuff": physical, chemical, biological,
> psychical. So materialism is the agnostic position: It doesn't matter
> whether everything can be reduced to the physical or not.
>
>
>
> In "replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet functionally
> equivalent replacement", mechanical could of course include biomechanical
> (as defined in *synthetic biology*), as there was no restriction of
> "mechanical".
>
>
Mechanism is the belief that any mechanical replacement will do, regardless
of what that mechanical component is made of, so long as that component is
functionally equivalent to the part replaced.  Mechanism is the belief held
by 99% of scientists, who say they brain is a machine, and there is no
magic in it.

Jason


>
> - pt
>
> --
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