Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-16 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Russell Standish writes: If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments, you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to consciousness. The QM state, by definition,

RE: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-16 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes: Under physicalism, one physical state corresponds to one total conscious state. I suppose it is possible, even under constraints which exlude baroque re-intrerpretations, for one physical state to implement more than one computational state. A computational state is

RE: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Russell Standish writes: I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of information, a particular meaning to a particular observer. Computationalists do sometimes say things like cognition is

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-15 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Oct 15, 2006 at 07:00:19PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Russell Standish writes: I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of information, a particular meaning to a particular

RE: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Russell Standish writes: OMs are defined by some information. Very clearly more than 1 bit is involved, but it is presumably finite. Let us say that within this OM I am aware of two apples - 1 red and 1 green. The information describing one of these apples is the component I was

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-15 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I was using quantum state as synonymous with physical state, which I guess is what you are referring to in the above paragraph. The observer sees a classical universe because in observing he collapses the wave function or selects one branch of the multiverse.

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-15 Thread 1Z
Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 07:03:18AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Also see my reply to Russell below: Russell Standish The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described by the Schroedinger equation. I make the identification that a

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-15 Thread 1Z
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: 1Z wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The key point I think is that both the A-theorists and the B-theorists are partially right. The B-series is easily compatible with the A-series. The point about a block universe is that there is no A-series, not

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-15 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Russell Standish writes: If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments, you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information that can be extracted from

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-15 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Oct 15, 2006 at 08:53:07PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Russell Standish writes: OMs are defined by some information. Very clearly more than 1 bit is involved, but it is presumably finite. Let us say that within this OM I am aware of two apples - 1 red and 1 green.

RE: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Russell Standish writes: If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments, you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information that

RE: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-14 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Russell Standish writes: If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments, you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information that can be extracted from observation. Functionalism explicitly

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-14 Thread marc . geddes
Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 07:03:18AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Also see my reply to Russell below: Russell Standish The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described by the Schroedinger equation. I make the identification that a

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-14 Thread Russell Standish
I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of information, a particular meaning to a particular observer. Quantum states have this property. For observables that the state is an eigenvalue of, the state

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-14 Thread marc . geddes
Russell Standish wrote: I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of information, a particular meaning to a particular observer. Quantum states have this property. For observables that the state is

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-14 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Oct 15, 2006 at 02:37:10AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Barbour argues the same way you do. But he does concede that his argument is not yet proven. The trouble is that in the case of, for instance, the electron, in the example you give, there is still an environment external

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-14 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Oct 15, 2006 at 03:21:52AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell Standish wrote: I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of information, a particular meaning to a particular

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-13 Thread marc . geddes
Russell Standish wrote: Most ensemble theories of everything would postulate that all possible observer moments are already there in the ensemble. This is certainly true of my construction, as Bruno's and Deutsch's Multiverse. It is debatable in Schmidhuber's though, as he seems to have

RE: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Marc Geddes writes: The implicit assumption in anthropic reasoning is that the observer moments are in some sense *already there* (i.e the future and past are already layed down in the block universe). This is what I waas disputing. If the observer moments do *not* in fact pre-exist in a

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-13 Thread Russell Standish
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 06:02:01AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell Standish wrote: Most ensemble theories of everything would postulate that all possible observer moments are already there in the ensemble. This is certainly true of my construction, as Bruno's and

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-13 Thread marc . geddes
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Do you believe there is a difference between the experience of a being living in a model block universe, such as having the observer moments of its life running simultaneously on different machines or as separate processes run in parallel on the one machine, and

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-13 Thread Russell Standish
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 07:03:18AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Also see my reply to Russell below: Russell Standish The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described by the Schroedinger equation. I make the identification that a quantum state is an observer

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-12 Thread marc . geddes
Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 11:44:38AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell, I like your position - but am still at a loss of a generally agreed-upon description of consciousness - applied in the lit as all variations of an unidentified thing anyone needs to his

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-12 Thread Russell Standish
On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 07:41:37AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory) and the 'Flowing River' view of time (A-Theory) can both be partially right *if* we

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-12 Thread marc . geddes
Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 07:41:37AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory) and the 'Flowing River' view of time (A-Theory) can both

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-12 Thread Russell Standish
On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 08:40:40AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: All the anthropic reasoning stuff is bunk in my opinion. It's based on the faulty idea that one can reason about consciousness by equating observer moments with parts of the block universe. But as I suggest above, you

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-12 Thread 1Z
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 07:41:37AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory) and the 'Flowing River'

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-12 Thread marc . geddes
Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 08:40:40AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: All the anthropic reasoning stuff is bunk in my opinion. It's based on the faulty idea that one can reason about consciousness by equating observer moments with parts of the block universe. But

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-12 Thread marc . geddes
1Z wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The key point I think is that both the A-theorists and the B-theorists are partially right. The B-series is easily compatible with the A-series. The point about a block universe is that there is no A-series, not that there is a B-series. This

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-12 Thread Russell Standish
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 03:38:13AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 08:40:40AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: All the anthropic reasoning stuff is bunk in my opinion. It's based on the faulty idea that one can reason about

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-10 Thread Russell Standish
: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 1:25 PM Subject: Re: Maudlin's argument On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 01:41:52PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: However, I don't see why having an interesting future should make

Not-Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-10 Thread jamikes
: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 2:52 AM Subject: Re: Maudlin's argument On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 11:44:38AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell, I like your position - but am still at a loss of a generally agreed

Re: Not-Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-10 Thread Russell Standish
Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 2:52 AM Subject: Re: Maudlin's argument On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 11:44:38AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell, I like your position - but am still at a loss of a generally agreed-upon

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-09 Thread jamikes
Subject: Re: Maudlin's argument On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 01:41:52PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: However, I don't see why having an interesting future should make the difference between consciousness and zombiehood. How do I know that I am not currently living through a virtual Sure, but I

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-08 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 07-oct.-06, à 16:48, 1Z a écrit : That is obviously wrong. Formalists are not Platonists, structuralists are not Platonists, Empiricists are not Platonists. After Godel, even formalists are platonist about numbers. If they say that they are formalist it means they are not platonist

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-08 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 07-oct.-06, à 16:48, 1Z a écrit : That is obviously wrong. Formalists are not Platonists, structuralists are not Platonists, Empiricists are not Platonists. After Godel, even formalists are platonist about numbers. Of course not. If they say that they are

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-08 Thread 1Z
Brent Meeker wrote: But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. The quantum world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some probability. Only under MWI. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-08 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 01:41:52PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: However, I don't see why having an interesting future should make the difference between consciousness and zombiehood. How do I know that I am not currently living through a virtual Sure, but I don't see how I am

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-07 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: I did not have problem with the expression platonic object but be careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter Jones) that we are reifying numbers and mathematical objects. That is exactly what mathematical Platonism has always meant [*] But reifying doesn't

RE: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Bruno Marchal writes: It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on no physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - I did not have problem with the expression platonic object but be careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-07 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 06-oct.-06, à 19:51, Brent Meeker a écrit : Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Bruno Marchal writes: Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could summarise, he states that one of the requirements for a conscious

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-07 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 07-oct.-06, à 11:37, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: I did not have problem with the expression platonic object but be careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter Jones) that we are reifying numbers and mathematical objects. That is exactly what mathematical Platonism

RE: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on no physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is also consistent to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and that perhaps if

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-07 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 07-oct.-06, à 11:37, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: I did not have problem with the expression platonic object but be careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter Jones) that we are reifying numbers and mathematical objects. That is

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-07 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on no physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is also consistent to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and

RE: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on no physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is also consistent to say that it supervenes on a recording, or

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-07 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 12:36:04AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: For how would a1/a1b1 know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of the multiverse? Perhaps they do depend on other Multiverse branches. This is no more absurd than saying recordings can be

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-07 Thread Russell Standish
On Sat, Oct 07, 2006 at 02:25:08PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: The quantum world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some probability. And I guess that is why Russell Standish believes that the Maudlin type of argument could be just an argument in favor

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-07 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on no physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is also consistent to say that it supervenes

RE: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Russell Standish writes: On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 12:36:04AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: For how would a1/a1b1 know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of the multiverse? Perhaps they do depend on other Multiverse branches. This is no more

RE: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-06 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Bruno Marchal writes: Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could summarise, he states that one of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it not be the trivial case of a recording, a

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 06-oct.-06, à 13:48, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Bruno Marchal writes: Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could summarise, he states that one of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Bruno Marchal writes: Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could summarise, he states that one of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it not be the trivial case of a

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-05 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could summarise, he states that one of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it not be the trivial case of a recording, a machine that plays out the same

RE: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-04 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could summarise, he states that one of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it not be the trivial case of a recording, a machine that plays out the same physical motion regardless of input. He then proposes a second

Re: Maudlin's argument

2006-10-03 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 03-oct.-06, à 06:56, George Levy a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote in explaining Maudlin's argument: For any given precise running computation associated to some inner experience, you can modify the device in such a way that the amount of physical activity involved is arbitrarily low, and even