Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-24 Thread Brent Meeker

On 2/23/2011 7:02 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Feb 22, 2011 at 4:32 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com 
mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:




On Feb 18, 3:06 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Fri, Feb 18, 2011 at 6:15 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com
mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

  On Feb 18, 5:30 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
   Peter,

   Correct me if I am wrong but I think we have established
some things we
   agree on:

   Consciousness is informational
  No

   There are more ways to have disorder than order

  Yes

   Bayesian reasoning is a good approach in matters of truth
   The universe could be a second old, and we would have no way
of telling

  Sort of.

   White rabbits are not commonly seen

  Yes

   This universe appears to follow laws having a short description

  Yes

   Evolution requires non-chaotic universes

   Where I think we disagree is on assumptions related to
measure, of a
   universe's initial conditions vs. a universe's laws.  I
agree there are
  very
   many possibilities for what my next moment of experience
might bring, yet
  of
   all the strange things I could observe, the universe doesn't
often
  surprise,
   laws seem to be obeyed.  It is as if there is some equation
balancing two
   extremes, and we see the result of who wins: universes with
simple laws
  (few
   possibilities) but random initial conditions (many
possibilities) vs.
   universes with complex or random laws (many possibilities)
but with
  ordered
   initial conditions (few possibilities).

   Universes which are ruled by chaotic or unpredictable laws
with white
   rabbits present probably also prevent life from evolving.
 However as you
   mentioned, observers may be part of the initial conditions
for such a
   universe.

  initial conditions only come into where you have a temporal
  structure, and that only applies to some corners of Platonia

 Perhaps consciousness is only possible in universes with a temporal
 structure over which the computation within the observer's mind
is feasible.

Maybe it's only possible in universes made of matter



Are you suggesting some form of 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism ?


In any case, it seems there are two ways a line of questioning could end:

What is life made out of?  Cells.  What are cells made out of?  
Chemicals.  What are chemicals made out of?  Atoms.  What are atoms 
made out of? Quarks.  What are Quarks made out of?  Vibrating 
strings.  What are strings made out of?


1. We don't know and can't say.
2. They are mathematical objects.


3. They are spirits.
4. They are concepts.
...

If they are fundamental they just are - that's what it means to be 
fundamental.  Of course we can't *know* they are fundamental even if 
they are.  But having a mathematical (i.e. non-contradictory) 
description doesn't make them immaterial.


Brent

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-23 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Feb 22, 2011 at 4:32 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:



 On Feb 18, 3:06 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
  On Fri, Feb 18, 2011 at 6:15 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 
   On Feb 18, 5:30 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
Peter,
 
Correct me if I am wrong but I think we have established some things
 we
agree on:
 
Consciousness is informational
   No
 
There are more ways to have disorder than order
 
   Yes
 
Bayesian reasoning is a good approach in matters of truth
The universe could be a second old, and we would have no way of
 telling
 
   Sort of.
 
White rabbits are not commonly seen
 
   Yes
 
This universe appears to follow laws having a short description
 
   Yes
 
Evolution requires non-chaotic universes
 
Where I think we disagree is on assumptions related to measure, of a
universe's initial conditions vs. a universe's laws.  I agree there
 are
   very
many possibilities for what my next moment of experience might bring,
 yet
   of
all the strange things I could observe, the universe doesn't often
   surprise,
laws seem to be obeyed.  It is as if there is some equation balancing
 two
extremes, and we see the result of who wins: universes with simple
 laws
   (few
possibilities) but random initial conditions (many possibilities) vs.
universes with complex or random laws (many possibilities) but with
   ordered
initial conditions (few possibilities).
 
Universes which are ruled by chaotic or unpredictable laws with white
rabbits present probably also prevent life from evolving.  However as
 you
mentioned, observers may be part of the initial conditions for such a
universe.
 
   initial conditions only come into where you have a temporal
   structure, and that only applies to some corners of Platonia
 
  Perhaps consciousness is only possible in universes with a temporal
  structure over which the computation within the observer's mind is
 feasible.

 Maybe it's only possible in universes made of matter



Are you suggesting some form of
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism ?

In any case, it seems there are two ways a line of questioning could end:

What is life made out of?  Cells.  What are cells made out of?  Chemicals.
What are chemicals made out of?  Atoms.  What are atoms made out of?
Quarks.  What are Quarks made out of?  Vibrating strings.  What are strings
made out of?

1. We don't know and can't say.
2. They are mathematical objects.

If matter is required for life how do you know matter isn't composed of
something more fundamental?




 There are many possibilities for the laws, but few possibilities
for the initial conditions.
 
Our universe does not seem to be that way, however, owing to the lack
 of
white rabbits.  Our universe's laws seem simple, and life had to
 evolve
   from
initial conditions for which there could have been many
 possibilities.
 
The question should then be, which side of the equation wins out most
   often?
 Every possible universe has its laws and initial conditions, for
 which
there are many possibilities.  The two must be considered together.
  For
this universe the initial conditions were chaotic and unordered, but
 the
laws were simple.  You propose that universes with chaotic laws are
 more
likely.  The most likely of these would be chaotic laws with chaotic
   initial
conditions,
 
   Most of Platonia is structured in such a way that there isn't
   even a distinction between initial conditions  and laws.
 
  How long could an observe exist in such a universe, if at all?

 Why is that important? There are an awful lot of such universes, after
 all,
 so the chance of glimpsing one should be high


The question is what is bigger:
(Number of orderly universes * Expected number of observers in such a
universe) vs. (Number of chaotic universes * Number of observers in such a
universe)
Based on observations I have concluded the terms on the left must be
larger.  You have concluded the terms on the right must be larger and then
made other conclusions based on that.  I think any determination as to which
is larger would require evaluating the UDA very deeply, and having an
understanding of exactly what information patterns lead to conscious
observers (or something to that effect).  We are very far (technology wise)
from running the UDA that deeply, I think.




   but I think we agree life and observers are not likely to arise
in this case,
 
   I keep pointing out that  it coudn't evolve, so it doesn't exist
   doesn't apply to Platonia. Everything non contradictory exists there.
   Being contradictory is the only barrier to Platonic existence.
 
  Perhaps you did not read my message in detail.  I acknowledged there are
  non-evolved observers in Platonia, however, they require extremely
 ordered
  initial conditions

 No they don't. They don't require anything to 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-23 Thread benjayk


1Z wrote:
 
 
 
 On Feb 18, 3:07 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 17, 8:52 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
  1Z wrote:

   On Feb 17, 6:14 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
   1Z wrote:

On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
 wrote:
1Z wrote:

  Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot
 interfer
  at
   all
  with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct
 physics
  has
   to
be
  reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an
   invisible
  epiphenomena.

  Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent
  numbers.
  Numbers
  have to exist for the conclusion to follow

 Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is
 explained
   from
   
 something non physical.

 The anti realist position is not that numbers are some
 existing
  non-
 physical
 thing: it is that they are not existent at all.

If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems
  very
   much
like a non-fictional and true statement, like I have two hands
  mean?

It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.

   You can't have one without the other.
   The statement 2 hands exists requires that 2 of something (the
  number
   2)
   exists.

   The idea that 2 hands exist implies that 2 exists implies that 3
   things exist (the left hand, the  right hand and two)

  Right. You just made an argument that ALL numbers do exist. Do you
 have a
  problem with that?

  It was intended as a reductio ad absurdum

 That's what I thought, so I guessed you have a problem with the
 conclusion.
 What's absurd with all numbers existing?
 
 What's absurd is the 2=3

That 2 exists implies that 3 things exists does not mean 2=3. And 2=3 is not
necessarily absurd, just an unusual expression. It might mean 2*...=3*...
.



1Z wrote:
 
 1Z wrote:

  1Z wrote:

   1Z wrote:

If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't
 have
   two
of
something, right?

And if you have none of something, none exists.

   Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that.

   1Z wrote:

Or is it a fictional statement?

Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
have a separate referent. However, and, or, is, not etc
do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
whole*
to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.

   Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word
 implies
   the
   existence of an object that is connected to the word.

   That's a straight contradiction.

  I expressed myself badly here...

  I wanted to express that some words don't seem to have a direct
 referent
  in
  the sense of an object, but that it is possible to objectify them and
  then
  they do have a referent.

  What is objectify ?

 In this case I mean the linguistic act of transforming a non-noun word
 into
 a noun that expresses the same concept.
 I'm not sure if this can be properly called objectifying but this was the
 word that came to my mind.
 
 
 Why should something have necessary and eternal existence
 just because someone rephrased a sentence?
That's not the reason that it has existence. The rephrasing is only intended
to make it more clear that a referent exists, because it is easier to think
of a referent as an object that is lingustically expressed as a noun.


1Z wrote:
 
  Probably I should just say that every word has a referent.

  Clearly  not, e.g unicorn.

 Of course it has a referent. If you say unicorn this refers to ideas
 about
 an mythological creature.
 
 An idea about a unicorn is an individual of the type idea, Unicorns
 do not exist because ideas about them do.
But unicorns *themselves* can also be conceived of ideas.

I have no problem of saying unicorns don't exist, but this only means not
existing in the same sense as horses do and doesn't exclude the existence
of unicorns in some more general sense.


1Z wrote:
 
 The Sense of a term is an idea in any case. There is no reason
 why the Reference should bend back on itself an be an idea
 as well.  (Except for  a few exceptions such as the referent
 of concept, idea, etc).
 
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference
The distinction between sense and reference makes sense on some level, but
ultimately it still makes sense to conceive of the object that is referred
to as the internal representation of (another, yet on some level the same)
object that is referred to; that is, reference can be reference to sense.

When it comes to abstract things like sense, reference and meaning it is
inevitable that we conflate them because their meaning is broad, overlapping
and vague.


1Z wrote:
 
That it does not refer to an animal in the same
 way as horse does, does not mean it has no referent at all.
 
 But if number terms just refer to ideas, that is not
 Platonism, that 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-23 Thread benjayk


1Z wrote:
 
 
 
 On Feb 18, 4:00 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 17, 10:38 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
  Brent Meeker-2 wrote:

   On 2/17/2011 12:27 PM, benjayk wrote:

   Brent Meeker-2 wrote:

   On 2/17/2011 10:14 AM, benjayk wrote:

   1Z wrote:

   On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjaykbenjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com  
  wrote:

   1Z wrote:

   Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer
 at
   all
   with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics
  has
   to

   be

   reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an
   invisible
   epiphenomena.

   Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent
 numbers.
   Numbers
   have to exist for the conclusion to follow

   Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is
 explained
   from

   something non physical.

   The anti realist position is not that numbers are some
 existing
  non-
   physical
   thing: it is that they are not existent at all.

   If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems
  very
   much
   like a non-fictional and true statement, like I have two
 hands
   mean?

   It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.

   You can't have one without the other.

   Sure you can.  You can have an apple and an orange.  Whether they
   constitute two of something depends on you thinking of them as
 fruits.

  I don't think you can conceive of an apple and and orange without
 them
  constituting two things.

  That doesn't mean two is a third thing with a separate exisence.

 It doesn't have to have seperate existence.
 The parts of my body exist, even though they have no seperate existence
 from
 my body.
 
 If you are saying that two is not separate from the apple and the
 orange...that
 is Aristoteleanism, not Platonism
 
I'm not necessarily defending Platonism (with the implication that numbers
are *more real* than material things or even the only real thing), only the
reality of numbers. Numbers and material things might be co-dependent.

In my mind there can be no animal if there is no particular animal. Because
in this case, animal doesn't mean animal, but means anything. So equally
there are no two thing if there are no *particular* two things. Because to
count something, it must have particularity. Nothing in particular can't
be counted, or it can be counted as every number which really makes counting
meaningless.
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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-23 Thread 1Z


On Feb 23, 4:10 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 18, 3:07 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
  1Z wrote:

   On Feb 17, 8:52 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
   1Z wrote:

On Feb 17, 6:14 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
1Z wrote:

 On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
  wrote:
 1Z wrote:

   Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot
  interfer
   at
all
   with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct
  physics
   has
to
 be
   reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an
invisible
   epiphenomena.

   Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent
   numbers.
   Numbers
   have to exist for the conclusion to follow

  Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is
  explained
from

  something non physical.

  The anti realist position is not that numbers are some
  existing
   non-
  physical
  thing: it is that they are not existent at all.

 If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems
   very
much
 like a non-fictional and true statement, like I have two hands
   mean?

 It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.

You can't have one without the other.
The statement 2 hands exists requires that 2 of something (the
   number
2)
exists.

The idea that 2 hands exist implies that 2 exists implies that 3
things exist (the left hand, the  right hand and two)

   Right. You just made an argument that ALL numbers do exist. Do you
  have a
   problem with that?

   It was intended as a reductio ad absurdum

  That's what I thought, so I guessed you have a problem with the
  conclusion.
  What's absurd with all numbers existing?

  What's absurd is the 2=3

 That 2 exists implies that 3 things exists does not mean 2=3. And 2=3 is not
 necessarily absurd, just an unusual expression. It might mean 2*...=3*...

Anything might mean anything if the symbols are reinterpreted
arbitrarily.
However, one must assume that the speaker does not intend such an
interpretation


 1Z wrote:

  1Z wrote:

   1Z wrote:

1Z wrote:

 If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't
  have
two
 of
 something, right?

 And if you have none of something, none exists.

Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that.

1Z wrote:

 Or is it a fictional statement?

 Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
 have a separate referent. However, and, or, is, not etc
 do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
 whole*
 to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.

Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word
  implies
the
existence of an object that is connected to the word.

That's a straight contradiction.

   I expressed myself badly here...

   I wanted to express that some words don't seem to have a direct
  referent
   in
   the sense of an object, but that it is possible to objectify them and
   then
   they do have a referent.

   What is objectify ?

  In this case I mean the linguistic act of transforming a non-noun word
  into
  a noun that expresses the same concept.
  I'm not sure if this can be properly called objectifying but this was the
  word that came to my mind.

  Why should something have necessary and eternal existence
  just because someone rephrased a sentence?

 That's not the reason that it has existence.

So what is?

 The rephrasing is only intended
 to make it more clear that a referent exists, because it is easier to think
 of a referent as an object that is lingustically expressed as a noun.



 1Z wrote:

   Probably I should just say that every word has a referent.

   Clearly  not, e.g unicorn.

  Of course it has a referent. If you say unicorn this refers to ideas
  about
  an mythological creature.

  An idea about a unicorn is an individual of the type idea, Unicorns
  do not exist because ideas about them do.

 But unicorns *themselves* can also be conceived of ideas.

What does conceived of ideas mean?

 I have no problem of saying unicorns don't exist, but this only means not
 existing in the same sense as horses do and doesn't exclude the existence
 of unicorns in some more general sense.

You have the theory that they exist in some half baked sense, and I
have the
theory that they don't exist at all. Mine is more parsimonious.

 1Z wrote:

  The Sense of a term is an idea in any case. There is no reason
  why the Reference should bend back on itself an be an idea
  as well.  (Except for  a few exceptions such as the referent
  of concept, idea, etc).

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference

 The distinction between sense and reference makes sense on some level, but
 ultimately it still makes sense to conceive of the object that 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-23 Thread 1Z


On Feb 23, 4:10 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
 1Z wrote:

 Then God does not exist as an actor in the world, but God does still exists
 as an idea.  

 1Z wrote:

   1Z wrote:

   something existing or simply existence exists, if it is meaningful
to use the word not, something that does not exist or absence
   exist
(existing in the absolute sense and not existing relative to
  something
else)
and if if it is meaningful to use the word two, two of
  something
   or
the
number 2 exists.

Nope. To say that two of something exist is not to say two exists.

   OK; I don't really get that, but let's say this is so.

   Then you get the functionally same structure as the numbers, but you
   don't
   call them one, two, three,... but one of something, two of
  something,
   three of something,

   I need functionally the same structure, because I need some basis
   for mathematics. But its an asbtract structure that doesn't exist.

  But if one of something doesn't exist one stone doesn't exist,
  because a
  stone clearly is something.

  And if one stone exists, a stone exist, not one

 If one stone exists one ... exists because one stone IS one 
 One really means just thing or one thing or one of one thing or one
 of one of one of one of one thing.

And there I was thinking it was the successor of zero, or cardinality
of a set whose only member is the empty set.

 If we use more than one one there is
 the convention that they both refer to the same thing, otherwise it might be
 said that 1+1=3, because the second 1 may be another thing that is twice
 as numerous - which we obviously want to avoid for the sake of clarity.

 1Z wrote:

  If one of something doesn't exist you have to conclude that all things
  (including all material things like atoms) fail to exist. Which is quite
  a
  strange conclusion.

  Furthermore you just said it IS an abstract structure,

  Sure. But not an existing abstract structure. Just like
  the unicorn isn't an existing mythological animal.

 But is expresses existence.

That was the is of identity.

 Or what does is express else?

It has at least three meanings.

 The point is not that we can't deny existence in a particular context. We
 may say numbers do not exist as material things (though even this is
 debatable, because we can regard all material objects as instantiations of
 numbers).
 The point is that if we *completely* deny existence of numbers, completely
 can just mean some restricted realm, because the usage of the words one,
 two, three,... already implies a kind of existence.

No it doesn't. Use of words does  not imply existence, otherwise
God does not exist would imply God exists.

All things we can
 talk of do exist in some sense even if just a weak sense of existence as
 ideas or existence of possibility.

That is false. If the thing X we are talking of is not defined as an
idea, then the existence of an idea-of-the-thing-X, is not
the existence of X itself. A thing can only exist
as the kind of thing it is supposed to be.

It is trivial, really.

It is trivially wrong.

 But this trivial existence together with the axioms of arithmetics, Yes,
 doctor. and Church's thesis is all that is needed for Bruno's argument.

It is useless for Bruno's argument because he needs minds to come
from numbers, and that cannot work if numbers exist only *in* minds.

 It
 doesn't require numbers to be existent in any specific sense that you seem
 to have in mind.

Yes it does: it requires numbers to be primary compared to minds. It
may
require nothing more than that, but so what?

 As soon as you use numbers you establish the necessary existence.

 1Z wrote:

  The abstract/concrete distinction needs an explanation. The Platonist
  explanation is that abstracta are invisible entities existing in a
  special
  realm. The formalist explanation is that concreta exist and abstracta
  donn't.

 The problem is that concreta are abstracta. My horse Tom at this wednesday
 12:30 is my horse Tom is a horse is is a mammal is an animal is something.

 If something doesn't exist, my horse Tom can't either.

You mean if nothing exists, your horse can't. However, that
does not prove that concreta are abstracta

 Furthermore we don't find absolute concreta anywhere.

Who said we should? I clearly said the are disjoint categories.
Concreta
exist, abstracta don't

 At the bottom we can
 just find some probabilities of measuring something and not some ultimate
 concrete thing.

I didn't say ultimately concrete

 The distinction between abstract/concrete is not difficult to explain. We
 create all kinds of categories so why not a category that distinguishes
 between specific things and less specific things.

Why not a category that distinguishes between the existent,
and concepts of the non existent?

 I don't think it is more
 fundamental than that.
 --
 View this message in 
 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-23 Thread 1Z


On Feb 23, 3:02 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Tue, Feb 22, 2011 at 4:32 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

  On Feb 18, 3:06 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
   On Fri, Feb 18, 2011 at 6:15 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

On Feb 18, 5:30 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 Peter,

 Correct me if I am wrong but I think we have established some things
  we
 agree on:

 Consciousness is informational
No

 There are more ways to have disorder than order

Yes

 Bayesian reasoning is a good approach in matters of truth
 The universe could be a second old, and we would have no way of
  telling

Sort of.

 White rabbits are not commonly seen

Yes

 This universe appears to follow laws having a short description

Yes

 Evolution requires non-chaotic universes

 Where I think we disagree is on assumptions related to measure, of a
 universe's initial conditions vs. a universe's laws.  I agree there
  are
very
 many possibilities for what my next moment of experience might bring,
  yet
of
 all the strange things I could observe, the universe doesn't often
surprise,
 laws seem to be obeyed.  It is as if there is some equation balancing
  two
 extremes, and we see the result of who wins: universes with simple
  laws
(few
 possibilities) but random initial conditions (many possibilities) vs.
 universes with complex or random laws (many possibilities) but with
ordered
 initial conditions (few possibilities).

 Universes which are ruled by chaotic or unpredictable laws with white
 rabbits present probably also prevent life from evolving.  However as
  you
 mentioned, observers may be part of the initial conditions for such a
 universe.

initial conditions only come into where you have a temporal
structure, and that only applies to some corners of Platonia

   Perhaps consciousness is only possible in universes with a temporal
   structure over which the computation within the observer's mind is
  feasible.

  Maybe it's only possible in universes made of matter

 Are you suggesting some form 
 ofhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism?

 In any case, it seems there are two ways a line of questioning could end:

 What is life made out of?  Cells.  What are cells made out of?  Chemicals.
 What are chemicals made out of?  Atoms.  What are atoms made out of?
 Quarks.  What are Quarks made out of?  Vibrating strings.  What are strings
 made out of?

 1. We don't know and can't say.
 2. They are mathematical objects.

 If matter is required for life how do you know matter isn't composed of
 something more fundamental?

How do you know that primary matter doesn't label whatever is
fundamental
whether currently understood or not.



  There are many possibilities for the laws, but few possibilities
 for the initial conditions.

 Our universe does not seem to be that way, however, owing to the lack
  of
 white rabbits.  Our universe's laws seem simple, and life had to
  evolve
from
 initial conditions for which there could have been many
  possibilities.

 The question should then be, which side of the equation wins out most
often?
  Every possible universe has its laws and initial conditions, for
  which
 there are many possibilities.  The two must be considered together.
   For
 this universe the initial conditions were chaotic and unordered, but
  the
 laws were simple.  You propose that universes with chaotic laws are
  more
 likely.  The most likely of these would be chaotic laws with chaotic
initial
 conditions,

Most of Platonia is structured in such a way that there isn't
even a distinction between initial conditions  and laws.

   How long could an observe exist in such a universe, if at all?

  Why is that important? There are an awful lot of such universes, after
  all,
  so the chance of glimpsing one should be high

 The question is what is bigger:
 (Number of orderly universes * Expected number of observers in such a
 universe) vs. (Number of chaotic universes * Number of observers in such a
 universe)
 Based on observations I have concluded the terms on the left must be
 larger.

Well...it's not a black-and-white distinction between order and chaos.
There are more
completely chaotic universes than ordered ones, and there are almost
as many almost
chaotic universes as completely chaotic ones. Let's split a universe
into an ordered part and a chaotic part (either of which can be null
to preserve generality).
Then we can match up

1 oberserver observing order
against
1 observer observing chaos

2 oberservers observing order
against
2 observers observing chaos.
...
etc ad infinitum.
However, there are more ways of being chaotic than there are of being
ordered, so
out of each of these pairs there will be  more observing chaos
universes.


 You have 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-22 Thread 1Z


On Feb 18, 3:06 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Fri, Feb 18, 2011 at 6:15 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

  On Feb 18, 5:30 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
   Peter,

   Correct me if I am wrong but I think we have established some things we
   agree on:

   Consciousness is informational
  No

   There are more ways to have disorder than order

  Yes

   Bayesian reasoning is a good approach in matters of truth
   The universe could be a second old, and we would have no way of telling

  Sort of.

   White rabbits are not commonly seen

  Yes

   This universe appears to follow laws having a short description

  Yes

   Evolution requires non-chaotic universes

   Where I think we disagree is on assumptions related to measure, of a
   universe's initial conditions vs. a universe's laws.  I agree there are
  very
   many possibilities for what my next moment of experience might bring, yet
  of
   all the strange things I could observe, the universe doesn't often
  surprise,
   laws seem to be obeyed.  It is as if there is some equation balancing two
   extremes, and we see the result of who wins: universes with simple laws
  (few
   possibilities) but random initial conditions (many possibilities) vs.
   universes with complex or random laws (many possibilities) but with
  ordered
   initial conditions (few possibilities).

   Universes which are ruled by chaotic or unpredictable laws with white
   rabbits present probably also prevent life from evolving.  However as you
   mentioned, observers may be part of the initial conditions for such a
   universe.

  initial conditions only come into where you have a temporal
  structure, and that only applies to some corners of Platonia

 Perhaps consciousness is only possible in universes with a temporal
 structure over which the computation within the observer's mind is feasible.

Maybe it's only possible in universes made of matter

    There are many possibilities for the laws, but few possibilities
   for the initial conditions.

   Our universe does not seem to be that way, however, owing to the lack of
   white rabbits.  Our universe's laws seem simple, and life had to evolve
  from
   initial conditions for which there could have been many possibilities.

   The question should then be, which side of the equation wins out most
  often?
    Every possible universe has its laws and initial conditions, for which
   there are many possibilities.  The two must be considered together.  For
   this universe the initial conditions were chaotic and unordered, but the
   laws were simple.  You propose that universes with chaotic laws are more
   likely.  The most likely of these would be chaotic laws with chaotic
  initial
   conditions,

  Most of Platonia is structured in such a way that there isn't
  even a distinction between initial conditions  and laws.

 How long could an observe exist in such a universe, if at all?

Why is that important? There are an awful lot of such universes, after
all,
so the chance of glimpsing one should be high

  but I think we agree life and observers are not likely to arise
   in this case,

  I keep pointing out that  it coudn't evolve, so it doesn't exist
  doesn't apply to Platonia. Everything non contradictory exists there.
  Being contradictory is the only barrier to Platonic existence.

 Perhaps you did not read my message in detail.  I acknowledged there are
 non-evolved observers in Platonia, however, they require extremely ordered
 initial conditions

No they don't. They don't require anything to evolve, and they
don't need to be embedded in ordered universes since
there is  no contradiction in so much order being bolted onto so
much chaos.

, and, the laws of such universes must be non-chaotic
 enough that they aren't immediately destroyed thereafter.

They don't necessarily have any laws.

  so the remaining possibility is chaotic laws with ordered
   initial conditions (which can admit observers at the start).

   If the possibilities for initial conditions wins out by having more
   combinations than random (yet stable enough to be supportive of observers
   present at the initial conditions) laws, then this could explain the lack
  of
   observed white rabbits in the whole of mathematical reality.

  I don't see why ordered initial conditions would win out.

 Right, I think that disordered initial conditions win out.  Which is why
 evolution is the most common path to observers.  Observers aren't present in
 the disordered initial conditions, but follow because the ordered laws are
 just right.

You are commiting a False Dichotomy fallacy

There are degrees of order and disorder. One of the intermediate
degrees is a union of Ordered Observer and Chaotic Everything Else.
There are
many others

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-22 Thread 1Z


On Feb 18, 3:07 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 17, 8:52 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
  1Z wrote:

   On Feb 17, 6:14 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
   1Z wrote:

On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
1Z wrote:

  Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer
  at
   all
  with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics
  has
   to
be
  reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an
   invisible
  epiphenomena.

  Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent
  numbers.
  Numbers
  have to exist for the conclusion to follow

 Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained
   from
   
 something non physical.

 The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing
  non-
 physical
 thing: it is that they are not existent at all.

If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems
  very
   much
like a non-fictional and true statement, like I have two hands
  mean?

It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.

   You can't have one without the other.
   The statement 2 hands exists requires that 2 of something (the
  number
   2)
   exists.

   The idea that 2 hands exist implies that 2 exists implies that 3
   things exist (the left hand, the  right hand and two)

  Right. You just made an argument that ALL numbers do exist. Do you have a
  problem with that?

  It was intended as a reductio ad absurdum

 That's what I thought, so I guessed you have a problem with the conclusion.
 What's absurd with all numbers existing?

What's absurd is the 2=3


 1Z wrote:

  1Z wrote:

   1Z wrote:

If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have
   two
of
something, right?

And if you have none of something, none exists.

   Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that.

   1Z wrote:

Or is it a fictional statement?

Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
have a separate referent. However, and, or, is, not etc
do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
whole*
to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.

   Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word implies
   the
   existence of an object that is connected to the word.

   That's a straight contradiction.

  I expressed myself badly here...

  I wanted to express that some words don't seem to have a direct referent
  in
  the sense of an object, but that it is possible to objectify them and
  then
  they do have a referent.

  What is objectify ?

 In this case I mean the linguistic act of transforming a non-noun word into
 a noun that expresses the same concept.
 I'm not sure if this can be properly called objectifying but this was the
 word that came to my mind.


Why should something have necessary and eternal existence
just because someone rephrased a sentence?

  Probably I should just say that every word has a referent.

  Clearly  not, e.g unicorn.

 Of course it has a referent. If you say unicorn this refers to ideas about
 an mythological creature.

An idea about a unicorn is an individual of the type idea, Unicorns
do not exist because ideas about them do.

The Sense of a term is an idea in any case. There is no reason
why the Reference should bend back on itself an be an idea
as well.  (Except for  a few exceptions such as the referent
of concept, idea, etc).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference


That it does not refer to an animal in the same
 way as horse does, does not mean it has no referent at all.

But if number terms just refer to ideas, that is not
Platonism, that is Psychologism

 1Z wrote:

  1Z wrote:

   If it is meaningful to use the word and, something and something
  or a
   conjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word or,
  something
   or
   something or a disjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the
  word
   is,

   To  say there is an existing statue of liberty says nothing more
   that there is a statue of liberty

  That depends how you interpret the sentence. In general I agree, but
  there
  is an existing statue of liberty might be used with existing in the
  sense
  of existing in the stable consensus reality.

  So you could say there is an existing statue of liberty (that exists in
  the consensus reality) in contrast to there is a 'non-existant' statue
  of
  serfdom (that is absent in the consensus reality; but it does exists in
  my
  imagination).

  Your comment is probably meant to imply there is something wrong with
  what I
  wrote, but I don't get what it is.

  It is that words like is don't need a referent

 I don't know what you mean by that. In what way do words need anything?

 My point is that is clearly has a referent, namely existence.
 Existence exists, I hope you agree 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-22 Thread 1Z


On Feb 18, 4:00 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 17, 10:38 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
  Brent Meeker-2 wrote:

   On 2/17/2011 12:27 PM, benjayk wrote:

   Brent Meeker-2 wrote:

   On 2/17/2011 10:14 AM, benjayk wrote:

   1Z wrote:

   On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjaykbenjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com  
  wrote:

   1Z wrote:

   Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at
   all
   with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics
  has
   to

   be

   reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an
   invisible
   epiphenomena.

   Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
   Numbers
   have to exist for the conclusion to follow

   Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained
   from

   something non physical.

   The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing
  non-
   physical
   thing: it is that they are not existent at all.

   If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems
  very
   much
   like a non-fictional and true statement, like I have two hands
   mean?

   It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.

   You can't have one without the other.

   Sure you can.  You can have an apple and an orange.  Whether they
   constitute two of something depends on you thinking of them as fruits.

  I don't think you can conceive of an apple and and orange without them
  constituting two things.

  That doesn't mean two is a third thing with a separate exisence.

 It doesn't have to have seperate existence.
 The parts of my body exist, even though they have no seperate existence from
 my body.

If you are saying that two is not separate from the apple and the
orange...that
is Aristoteleanism, not Platonism

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-18 Thread 1Z


On Feb 17, 8:52 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 17, 6:14 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
  1Z wrote:

   On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
   1Z wrote:

 Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at
  all
 with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has
  to
   be
 reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an
  invisible
 epiphenomena.

 Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
 Numbers
 have to exist for the conclusion to follow

Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained
  from
    
something non physical.

The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
physical
thing: it is that they are not existent at all.

   If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very
  much
   like a non-fictional and true statement, like I have two hands mean?

   It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.

  You can't have one without the other.
  The statement 2 hands exists requires that 2 of something (the number
  2)
  exists.

  The idea that 2 hands exist implies that 2 exists implies that 3
  things exist (the left hand, the  right hand and two)

 Right. You just made an argument that ALL numbers do exist. Do you have a
 problem with that?

It was intended as a reductio ad absurdum


 1Z wrote:

  1Z wrote:

   If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have
  two
   of
   something, right?

   And if you have none of something, none exists.

  Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that.

  1Z wrote:

   Or is it a fictional statement?

   Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
   have a separate referent. However, and, or, is, not etc
   do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
   whole*
   to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.

  Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word implies
  the
  existence of an object that is connected to the word.

  That's a straight contradiction.

 I expressed myself badly here...

 I wanted to express that some words don't seem to have a direct referent in
 the sense of an object, but that it is possible to objectify them and then
 they do have a referent.

What is objectify ?

 Probably I should just say that every word has a referent.

Clearly  not, e.g unicorn.

 1Z wrote:

  If it is meaningful to use the word and, something and something or a
  conjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word or, something
  or
  something or a disjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word
  is,

  To  say there is an existing statue of liberty says nothing more
  that there is a statue of liberty

 That depends how you interpret the sentence. In general I agree, but there
 is an existing statue of liberty might be used with existing in the sense
 of existing in the stable consensus reality.

 So you could say there is an existing statue of liberty (that exists in
 the consensus reality) in contrast to there is a 'non-existant' statue of
 serfdom (that is absent in the consensus reality; but it does exists in my
 imagination).

 Your comment is probably meant to imply there is something wrong with what I
 wrote, but I don't get what it is.


It is that words like is don't need a referent

 1Z wrote:

 something existing or simply existence exists, if it is meaningful
  to use the word not, something that does not exist or absence exist
  (existing in the absolute sense and not existing relative to something
  else)
  and if if it is meaningful to use the word two, two of something or
  the
  number 2 exists.

  Nope. To say that two of something exist is not to say two exists.

 OK; I don't really get that, but let's say this is so.

 Then you get the functionally same structure as the numbers, but you don't
 call them one, two, three,... but one of something, two of something,
 three of something,


I need functionally the same structure, because I need some basis
for mathematics. But its an asbtract structure that doesn't exist.

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-18 Thread 1Z


On Feb 18, 5:30 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 Peter,

 Correct me if I am wrong but I think we have established some things we
 agree on:

 Consciousness is informational
No

 There are more ways to have disorder than order

Yes

 Bayesian reasoning is a good approach in matters of truth
 The universe could be a second old, and we would have no way of telling

Sort of.

 White rabbits are not commonly seen

Yes

 This universe appears to follow laws having a short description

Yes

 Evolution requires non-chaotic universes

 Where I think we disagree is on assumptions related to measure, of a
 universe's initial conditions vs. a universe's laws.  I agree there are very
 many possibilities for what my next moment of experience might bring, yet of
 all the strange things I could observe, the universe doesn't often surprise,
 laws seem to be obeyed.  It is as if there is some equation balancing two
 extremes, and we see the result of who wins: universes with simple laws (few
 possibilities) but random initial conditions (many possibilities) vs.
 universes with complex or random laws (many possibilities) but with ordered
 initial conditions (few possibilities).

 Universes which are ruled by chaotic or unpredictable laws with white
 rabbits present probably also prevent life from evolving.  However as you
 mentioned, observers may be part of the initial conditions for such a
 universe.

initial conditions only come into where you have a temporal
structure, and that only applies to some corners of Platonia

  There are many possibilities for the laws, but few possibilities
 for the initial conditions.

 Our universe does not seem to be that way, however, owing to the lack of
 white rabbits.  Our universe's laws seem simple, and life had to evolve from
 initial conditions for which there could have been many possibilities.

 The question should then be, which side of the equation wins out most often?
  Every possible universe has its laws and initial conditions, for which
 there are many possibilities.  The two must be considered together.  For
 this universe the initial conditions were chaotic and unordered, but the
 laws were simple.  You propose that universes with chaotic laws are more
 likely.  The most likely of these would be chaotic laws with chaotic initial
 conditions,

Most of Platonia is structured in such a way that there isn't
even a distinction between initial conditions  and laws.


but I think we agree life and observers are not likely to arise
 in this case,

I keep pointing out that  it coudn't evolve, so it doesn't exist
doesn't apply to Platonia. Everything non contradictory exists there.
Being contradictory is the only barrier to Platonic existence.

so the remaining possibility is chaotic laws with ordered
 initial conditions (which can admit observers at the start).

 If the possibilities for initial conditions wins out by having more
 combinations than random (yet stable enough to be supportive of observers
 present at the initial conditions) laws, then this could explain the lack of
 observed white rabbits in the whole of mathematical reality.

I don't see why ordered initial conditions would win out.

 Do you agree with the logic at least?





   Einstein believed this, which is evident in this The distinction between
   past, present, and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion.

   See:http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2408/

That our
 universe is conceivable as a static four dimensional block is
  supportive
of
 the theory that it is a mathematical object.

But there is an appearance of flow, and if mind isn't flowing
because brain isn't flowing, where is it coming from?

   The brain generates the illusion of flow.

  I can't see how it could, when it has no flow itself.

 Do you think the subjective perception of time rules out block time, or
 would you say block time is indistinguishable from 3 spacial dimensions
 which evolve over time?  I have a thought experiment to show a physical flow
 of time can in no way be necessary for the perception of the flow of time.
  Let's say there are two theories: Presentism (only the present moment is
 real, and every moment in time has its chance at being the present) vs.
 Block time (all points in time exist and are equally real).

 Presentism makes the appearance of the flow of time obvious.  It seems like
 time is flowing because it is in fact flowing.  However, upon deeper
 consideration you will see that it refutes this relation.  If only the
 present time is real, then what you experience in this moment must have no
 dependence whatsoever on the existence of prior moments (since they no
 longer exist).  You perceive the existence of time's flow from the existence
 of this single slice of time.  Since the existence of past moments has no
 bearing on your experience in this moment, however, then it becomes
 absolutely needless to say the past moment must cease to exist to give
 the 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-18 Thread Jason Resch
On Fri, Feb 18, 2011 at 6:15 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:



 On Feb 18, 5:30 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
  Peter,
 
  Correct me if I am wrong but I think we have established some things we
  agree on:
 
  Consciousness is informational
 No

  There are more ways to have disorder than order

 Yes

  Bayesian reasoning is a good approach in matters of truth
  The universe could be a second old, and we would have no way of telling

 Sort of.

  White rabbits are not commonly seen

 Yes

  This universe appears to follow laws having a short description

 Yes

  Evolution requires non-chaotic universes
 
  Where I think we disagree is on assumptions related to measure, of a
  universe's initial conditions vs. a universe's laws.  I agree there are
 very
  many possibilities for what my next moment of experience might bring, yet
 of
  all the strange things I could observe, the universe doesn't often
 surprise,
  laws seem to be obeyed.  It is as if there is some equation balancing two
  extremes, and we see the result of who wins: universes with simple laws
 (few
  possibilities) but random initial conditions (many possibilities) vs.
  universes with complex or random laws (many possibilities) but with
 ordered
  initial conditions (few possibilities).
 
  Universes which are ruled by chaotic or unpredictable laws with white
  rabbits present probably also prevent life from evolving.  However as you
  mentioned, observers may be part of the initial conditions for such a
  universe.

 initial conditions only come into where you have a temporal
 structure, and that only applies to some corners of Platonia



Perhaps consciousness is only possible in universes with a temporal
structure over which the computation within the observer's mind is feasible.



   There are many possibilities for the laws, but few possibilities
  for the initial conditions.
 
  Our universe does not seem to be that way, however, owing to the lack of
  white rabbits.  Our universe's laws seem simple, and life had to evolve
 from
  initial conditions for which there could have been many possibilities.
 
  The question should then be, which side of the equation wins out most
 often?
   Every possible universe has its laws and initial conditions, for which
  there are many possibilities.  The two must be considered together.  For
  this universe the initial conditions were chaotic and unordered, but the
  laws were simple.  You propose that universes with chaotic laws are more
  likely.  The most likely of these would be chaotic laws with chaotic
 initial
  conditions,

 Most of Platonia is structured in such a way that there isn't
 even a distinction between initial conditions  and laws.


How long could an observe exist in such a universe, if at all?



 but I think we agree life and observers are not likely to arise
  in this case,

 I keep pointing out that  it coudn't evolve, so it doesn't exist
 doesn't apply to Platonia. Everything non contradictory exists there.
 Being contradictory is the only barrier to Platonic existence.


Perhaps you did not read my message in detail.  I acknowledged there are
non-evolved observers in Platonia, however, they require extremely ordered
initial conditions, and, the laws of such universes must be non-chaotic
enough that they aren't immediately destroyed thereafter.



 so the remaining possibility is chaotic laws with ordered
  initial conditions (which can admit observers at the start).
 
  If the possibilities for initial conditions wins out by having more
  combinations than random (yet stable enough to be supportive of observers
  present at the initial conditions) laws, then this could explain the lack
 of
  observed white rabbits in the whole of mathematical reality.

 I don't see why ordered initial conditions would win out.


Right, I think that disordered initial conditions win out.  Which is why
evolution is the most common path to observers.  Observers aren't present in
the disordered initial conditions, but follow because the ordered laws are
just right.

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-18 Thread benjayk


1Z wrote:
 
 
 
 On Feb 17, 8:52 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 17, 6:14 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
  1Z wrote:

   On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
   1Z wrote:

 Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer
 at
  all
 with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics
 has
  to
   be
 reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an
  invisible
 epiphenomena.

 Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent
 numbers.
 Numbers
 have to exist for the conclusion to follow

Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained
  from
    
something non physical.

The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing
 non-
physical
thing: it is that they are not existent at all.

   If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems
 very
  much
   like a non-fictional and true statement, like I have two hands
 mean?

   It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.

  You can't have one without the other.
  The statement 2 hands exists requires that 2 of something (the
 number
  2)
  exists.

  The idea that 2 hands exist implies that 2 exists implies that 3
  things exist (the left hand, the  right hand and two)

 Right. You just made an argument that ALL numbers do exist. Do you have a
 problem with that?
 
 It was intended as a reductio ad absurdum
That's what I thought, so I guessed you have a problem with the conclusion.
What's absurd with all numbers existing?


1Z wrote:
 

 1Z wrote:

  1Z wrote:

   If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have
  two
   of
   something, right?

   And if you have none of something, none exists.

  Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that.

  1Z wrote:

   Or is it a fictional statement?

   Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
   have a separate referent. However, and, or, is, not etc
   do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
   whole*
   to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.

  Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word implies
  the
  existence of an object that is connected to the word.

  That's a straight contradiction.

 I expressed myself badly here...

 I wanted to express that some words don't seem to have a direct referent
 in
 the sense of an object, but that it is possible to objectify them and
 then
 they do have a referent.
 
 What is objectify ?
In this case I mean the linguistic act of transforming a non-noun word into
a noun that expresses the same concept.
I'm not sure if this can be properly called objectifying but this was the
word that came to my mind.


1Z wrote:
 
 Probably I should just say that every word has a referent.
 
 Clearly  not, e.g unicorn.
Of course it has a referent. If you say unicorn this refers to ideas about
an mythological creature. That it does not refer to an animal in the same
way as horse does, does not mean it has no referent at all.


1Z wrote:
 
 1Z wrote:

  If it is meaningful to use the word and, something and something
 or a
  conjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word or,
 something
  or
  something or a disjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the
 word
  is,

  To  say there is an existing statue of liberty says nothing more
  that there is a statue of liberty

 That depends how you interpret the sentence. In general I agree, but
 there
 is an existing statue of liberty might be used with existing in the
 sense
 of existing in the stable consensus reality.

 So you could say there is an existing statue of liberty (that exists in
 the consensus reality) in contrast to there is a 'non-existant' statue
 of
 serfdom (that is absent in the consensus reality; but it does exists in
 my
 imagination).

 Your comment is probably meant to imply there is something wrong with
 what I
 wrote, but I don't get what it is.
 
 
 It is that words like is don't need a referent
I don't know what you mean by that. In what way do words need anything?

My point is that is clearly has a referent, namely existence.
Existence exists, I hope you agree with that.


1Z wrote:
 
 1Z wrote:

 something existing or simply existence exists, if it is meaningful
  to use the word not, something that does not exist or absence
 exist
  (existing in the absolute sense and not existing relative to something
  else)
  and if if it is meaningful to use the word two, two of something
 or
  the
  number 2 exists.

  Nope. To say that two of something exist is not to say two exists.

 OK; I don't really get that, but let's say this is so.

 Then you get the functionally same structure as the numbers, but you
 don't
 call them one, two, three,... but one of something, two of something,
 three of something,
 
 
 I need functionally the same structure, because I need some basis
 for 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-18 Thread benjayk


1Z wrote:
 
 
 
 On Feb 17, 10:38 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
 Brent Meeker-2 wrote:

  On 2/17/2011 12:27 PM, benjayk wrote:

  Brent Meeker-2 wrote:

  On 2/17/2011 10:14 AM, benjayk wrote:

  1Z wrote:

  On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjaykbenjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com  
 wrote:

  1Z wrote:

  Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at
  all
  with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics
 has
  to

  be

  reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an
  invisible
  epiphenomena.

  Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
  Numbers
  have to exist for the conclusion to follow

  Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained
  from

  something non physical.

  The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing
 non-
  physical
  thing: it is that they are not existent at all.

  If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems
 very
  much
  like a non-fictional and true statement, like I have two hands
  mean?

  It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.

  You can't have one without the other.

  Sure you can.  You can have an apple and an orange.  Whether they
  constitute two of something depends on you thinking of them as fruits.

 I don't think you can conceive of an apple and and orange without them
 constituting two things.
 
 That doesn't mean two is a third thing with a separate exisence.

It doesn't have to have seperate existence.
The parts of my body exist, even though they have no seperate existence from
my body.

Whether you think of it as a third thing is a question of interpretation.
One could as well deny that an apple and an orange are two things because
there is really just one thing, namely an apple and an orange.


1Z wrote:
 
The and already implies there are two things
 (usually).

 But even if we grant that an apple and an orange are not necessarily two
 things
 
 THat is not what is at dispute. Two fruit are two fruit, not two fruit
 and
 one number.
Two fruit are two fruit and not two fruit and a fruit; nevertheless it
implied that a fruit exists.

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-18 Thread Brent Meeker

On 2/18/2011 7:06 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Fri, Feb 18, 2011 at 6:15 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com 
mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:




On Feb 18, 5:30 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 Peter,

 Correct me if I am wrong but I think we have established some
things we
 agree on:

 Consciousness is informational
No

 There are more ways to have disorder than order

Yes

 Bayesian reasoning is a good approach in matters of truth
 The universe could be a second old, and we would have no way of
telling

Sort of.

 White rabbits are not commonly seen

Yes

 This universe appears to follow laws having a short description

Yes

 Evolution requires non-chaotic universes

 Where I think we disagree is on assumptions related to measure, of a
 universe's initial conditions vs. a universe's laws.  I agree
there are very
 many possibilities for what my next moment of experience might
bring, yet of
 all the strange things I could observe, the universe doesn't
often surprise,
 laws seem to be obeyed.  It is as if there is some equation
balancing two
 extremes, and we see the result of who wins: universes with
simple laws (few
 possibilities) but random initial conditions (many
possibilities) vs.
 universes with complex or random laws (many possibilities) but
with ordered
 initial conditions (few possibilities).

 Universes which are ruled by chaotic or unpredictable laws with
white
 rabbits present probably also prevent life from evolving.
 However as you
 mentioned, observers may be part of the initial conditions for
such a
 universe.

initial conditions only come into where you have a temporal
structure, and that only applies to some corners of Platonia



Perhaps consciousness is only possible in universes with a temporal 
structure over which the computation within the observer's mind is 
feasible.



  There are many possibilities for the laws, but few possibilities
 for the initial conditions.

 Our universe does not seem to be that way, however, owing to the
lack of
 white rabbits.  Our universe's laws seem simple, and life had to
evolve from
 initial conditions for which there could have been many
possibilities.

 The question should then be, which side of the equation wins out
most often?
  Every possible universe has its laws and initial conditions,
for which
 there are many possibilities.  The two must be considered
together.  For
 this universe the initial conditions were chaotic and unordered,
but the
 laws were simple.  You propose that universes with chaotic laws
are more
 likely.  The most likely of these would be chaotic laws with
chaotic initial
 conditions,

Most of Platonia is structured in such a way that there isn't
even a distinction between initial conditions  and laws.


How long could an observe exist in such a universe, if at all?


but I think we agree life and observers are not likely to arise
 in this case,

I keep pointing out that  it coudn't evolve, so it doesn't exist
doesn't apply to Platonia. Everything non contradictory exists there.
Being contradictory is the only barrier to Platonic existence.


Perhaps you did not read my message in detail.  I acknowledged there 
are non-evolved observers in Platonia, however, they require extremely 
ordered initial conditions, and, the laws of such universes must be 
non-chaotic enough that they aren't immediately destroyed thereafter.


You seem to imagine these universes as operating with causal laws.  It 
doesn't matter if observers are destroyed immediately since they can 
reappear out of chaos later - if the universe even has a time order so 
that immediately and later are defined.  It has nothing to do with 
initial conditions.  Initial conditions are only significant when later 
conditions depend on them through causal laws.


Brent

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-18 Thread Russell Standish
On Thu, Feb 17, 2011 at 04:34:40PM -0800, 1Z wrote:
 
   I am quite entitled to reject MUH until is has been found.
 
  How will you know when it is found?
 
 Bruno or Tegmrark or somebody will announce it.

I have already found it, announced it more than 10 years ago, and
published it in a peer reviewed journal. See my paper Why Occams Razor.


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Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-17 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 16 Feb 2011, at 22:36, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 2/16/2011 12:33 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

hat matter adds to a bundle of properties is existence. A non-
existent bundle of properties is a mere concept, a mere possibility.
Thus the concept of matter is very much tied to the idea of
contingency or somethingism -- the idea that only certain possible
things exist.


Only certain possible number relations exist. And relatively to a  
number there is the provable relations, the consistent relations,  
the true relation, and then the combination of those.


I don't understand that?  A relation might imply a contradiction and  
therefore be impossible.


Yes.




But I would suppose that all possible relations would exist in  
Platonia.


Yes. I was perhaps unclear. Only certain possible relation =  
possible relation. It was an insistence type of use of certain.  
But possible in this context is consistent for this or that machine  
number. Possibility (consistency) applies to theories or machine or  
number.





What non-contraditory relations would not exist?


I am glad you accept they all exist.
Sorry for having been unclear.
But even contradictory relation exists relatively to number/theory.  
(PA is inconsistent) is consistent with PA, and (PA + (PA is  
inconsistent) is true, that is, it belongs to arithmetical truth. and  
If PA is consistent then PA + provable('0=1') is consistent is true  
and provable by PA, etc.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-17 Thread 1Z


On Feb 16, 10:58 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 11:41 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

  On Feb 16, 3:40 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
   On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 9:04 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

On Feb 16, 8:27 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Tue, Feb 15, 2011 at 4:19 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

  On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
   On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:

   I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with
  synasthesia
   apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual
  properties.

  Some people perceive pink elephants too. However, other people
  don't
  perceive them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
  really being perceived at all.

 The guy who reported seeing the digits of pi like a vast landscape
  also
 receited over 20,000 digits from memory.  That should lend a little
  more
 credence to his claims.

Which are what? I don't think *he* is claiming numbers objectively
exist. And isn't the fact that all synaesthetes visualise them
differently
somehat contrary to *that* claim.

  Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?

 Unless you've visited every time period in every corner of reality
  how
can
 you assert unicrons don't exist?

The same way I assert everything: the evidence I have is good enough.

The fossile record might suggest they have
 never lived on this planet but that hardly rules out their existence
 everywhere.

 Does XYZ exist?
 Let me look around...  I can't see it right now, it must not exist!

 Instead we should take a more humble approach:

 I've looked around and cannot see it here, it probably doesn't exist
here,
 however I have no idea whether or not it exists in places I cannot
  see or
 have not looked.

 I think Bayesian inference:
   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference#Evidence_and_changing.
  ..
 Is particularly useful in answering questions relating to existence.
   The
 question is, what prior probability would you set to a proposition
  such
as
 Other universes not visible to us exist.  1Z and Brent would seem
  to
 assign a rather low probability, but that just means a higher
  threshold
of
 evidence will be required to convince them.  Lacking any evidence at
  all,
 the least biased prior probability to begin with is 0.5.  If some
evidence,
 for fine tuning for example, accumulates then you should adjust your
assumed
 probability that the proposition Other universes not visible to us
exist
 is true.

 Are you aware of a better or more fair way of addressing such a
  question?

I am a fallibilist. You are preaching to the converted.

   Okay it seems we have a common foundation we agree on.  Can you explain
  why
   you have confidence in the unreality of other possible universes rather
  than
   uncertainty?  What evidence have you seen for or against that
  proposition?

 Peter,

 Thank you for your very detailed and thoughtful response.

  The  mathematical multiverse suffers from a double wammy: it is
  predicts
  too much (white rabbits) and explains too little (time and
  consciousness are
  not explained). Physical multiverses are a bit more of a nuanced
  issue. Many worlds
  is not my favourite interpretation of QM, but at the end of the day
  there could be
  empirical evidence one way or the other.

 If universes are mathematical objects, they follows well-defined equations.

Physical universes will. Mathematical universes need not. Platonia
will include all the discontinous and non-differentiable functions.
You
have to take the rough with the smooth.

  A few, more rare, universe may have an additional law, at time X, in
 location Y, a white rabbit will pop into existence, but the description for
 such a universe is much longer.

Platonia includes eveything that is not seld contradictory, and
there is no contradiction in randomness and chaos. Moreoever
there must be many disordered sets for every ordered set.

 In self-similar mathematical structures,
 such as the programs generated by the UDA, the simpler structures recur much
 more frequently, and so the measure for a particular instantiation of an
 observer would have a higher measure in universes with shorter
 descriptions/definitions.

That applies if the UDA is the only primary structure. However,
if your argument for a UDA is that it necessarily exists in Platonia,
it has to be an island of order in a sea of chaos.

 Further, life cannot evolve in a universe with
 unpredictable laws or with laws which constantly change.

But time and causality are just forms of order that apply
in only a few small corners of Platonia. In much
of Platonia, the question How did this evolve

 If evolution is
 the most common path to 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-17 Thread benjayk


1Z wrote:
 
  Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at all
  with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has to be
  reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an invisible
  epiphenomena.

  Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
  Numbers
  have to exist for the conclusion to follow

 Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained from  
 something non physical.
 
 The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
 physical
 thing: it is that they are not existent at all.
 
If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very much
like a non-fictional and true statement, like I have two hands mean?
If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have two of
something, right?

Or is it a fictional statement?

But this is obviously absurd! - Except if you accept that fictional things
are, too, real in a sense, but this would mean that fictional
numbers/computation can indeed be what determines the appearance of the
physical.

Or numbers are material things and numbers give rise to (in this case) the
rest of material things. In this case your sense of material is quite
akward, though.

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-17 Thread 1Z


On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
 1Z wrote:

   Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at all
   with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has to be
   reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an invisible
   epiphenomena.

   Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
   Numbers
   have to exist for the conclusion to follow

  Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained from  
  something non physical.

  The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
  physical
  thing: it is that they are not existent at all.

 If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very much
 like a non-fictional and true statement, like I have two hands mean?

It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.

 If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have two of
 something, right?

And if you have none of something, none exists.

 Or is it a fictional statement?

Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
have a separate referent. However, and, or, is, not etc
do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
whole*
to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.

 But this is obviously absurd! - Except if you accept that fictional things
 are, too, real in a sense, but this would mean that fictional
 numbers/computation can indeed be what determines the appearance of the
 physical.

 Or numbers are material things and numbers give rise to (in this case) the
 rest of material things. In this case your sense of material is quite
 akward, though.

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-17 Thread benjayk


1Z wrote:
 
 
 
 On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
 1Z wrote:

   Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at all
   with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has to
 be
   reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an invisible
   epiphenomena.

   Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
   Numbers
   have to exist for the conclusion to follow

  Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained from
  
  something non physical.

  The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
  physical
  thing: it is that they are not existent at all.

 If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very much
 like a non-fictional and true statement, like I have two hands mean?
 
 It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.

You can't have one without the other.
The statement 2 hands exists requires that 2 of something (the number 2)
exists.


1Z wrote:
 
 If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have two
 of
 something, right?
 
 And if you have none of something, none exists.
Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that.


1Z wrote:
 
 Or is it a fictional statement?

 Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
 have a separate referent. However, and, or, is, not etc
 do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
 whole*
 to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.
Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word implies the
existence of an object that is connected to the word.

If it is meaningful to use the word and, something and something or a
conjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word or, something or
something or a disjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word
is, something existing or simply existence exists, if it is meaningful
to use the word not, something that does not exist or absence exist
(existing in the absolute sense and not existing relative to something else)
and if if it is meaningful to use the word two, two of something or the
number 2 exists.
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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-17 Thread Brent Meeker

On 2/17/2011 10:14 AM, benjayk wrote:


1Z wrote:
   



On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjaykbenjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com  wrote:
 

1Z wrote:

   

Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at all
with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has to
   

be
   

reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an invisible
epiphenomena.
   
   

Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
Numbers
have to exist for the conclusion to follow
 
   

Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained from
   


   

something non physical.
   
   

The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
physical
thing: it is that they are not existent at all.
 

If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very much
like a non-fictional and true statement, like I have two hands mean?
   

It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.
 

You can't have one without the other.
The statement 2 hands exists requires that 2 of something (the number 2)
exists.
   


It requires that two of something exist, but not that the number itself 
2 exist.  In symbolic logic it and be expressed as Ex Ey (Hand(x) + Hand 
(y) + (x=/=y)), no mention of the number 2.




1Z wrote:
   
 

If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have two
of
something, right?
   

And if you have none of something, none exists.
 

Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that.
   


What if you have no zero?  :-)




1Z wrote:
   
 

Or is it a fictional statement?

   

Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
have a separate referent. However, and, or, is, not etc
do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
whole*
to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.
 

Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word implies the
existence of an object that is connected to the word.
   


You seem to not understand what referent means.  The above sentence is 
self contradictory.


Brent


If it is meaningful to use the word and, something and something or a
conjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word or, something or
something or a disjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word
is, something existing or simply existence exists, if it is meaningful
to use the word not, something that does not exist or absence exist
(existing in the absolute sense and not existing relative to something else)
and if if it is meaningful to use the word two, two of something or the
number 2 exists.
   


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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-17 Thread 1Z


On Feb 17, 6:14 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
  1Z wrote:

Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at all
with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has to
  be
reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an invisible
epiphenomena.

Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
Numbers
have to exist for the conclusion to follow

   Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained from
   
   something non physical.

   The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
   physical
   thing: it is that they are not existent at all.

  If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very much
  like a non-fictional and true statement, like I have two hands mean?

  It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.

 You can't have one without the other.
 The statement 2 hands exists requires that 2 of something (the number 2)
 exists.

The idea that 2 hands exist implies that 2 exists implies that 3
things exist (the left hand, the  right hand and two)

 1Z wrote:

  If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have two
  of
  something, right?

  And if you have none of something, none exists.

 Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that.

 1Z wrote:

  Or is it a fictional statement?

  Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
  have a separate referent. However, and, or, is, not etc
  do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
  whole*
  to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.

 Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word implies the
 existence of an object that is connected to the word.

That's a straight contradiction.

 If it is meaningful to use the word and, something and something or a
 conjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word or, something or
 something or a disjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word
 is,

To  say there is an existing statue of liberty says nothing more
that there is a statue of liberty

something existing or simply existence exists, if it is meaningful
 to use the word not, something that does not exist or absence exist
 (existing in the absolute sense and not existing relative to something else)
 and if if it is meaningful to use the word two, two of something or the
 number 2 exists.

Nope. To say that two of something exist is not to say two exists.

 View this message in 
 context:http://old.nabble.com/Maudlin---How-many-times-does-COMP-have-to-be-f...
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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-17 Thread benjayk


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
 
 On 2/17/2011 10:14 AM, benjayk wrote:

 1Z wrote:



 On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjaykbenjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com  wrote:
  
 1Z wrote:


 Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at all
 with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has to

 be

 reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an invisible
 epiphenomena.


 Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
 Numbers
 have to exist for the conclusion to follow
  

 Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained from



 something non physical.


 The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
 physical
 thing: it is that they are not existent at all.
  
 If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very
 much
 like a non-fictional and true statement, like I have two hands mean?

 It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.
  
 You can't have one without the other.
 The statement 2 hands exists requires that 2 of something (the number
 2)
 exists.

 
 It requires that two of something exist, but not that the number itself 
 2 exist.
What is the difference between two of something and two?
Numbers always express quantity of something, even if this something is just
numbers.

It's like writing 2x and 2. It may be formally different, but I don't
see a difference in the concept that is expressed. 2 is just shorter than
2x or 2*1 or 1+1.
(I am aware that 2x is of course different than 2 when they are both used in
a common context like in 2x+2=8; but not when all numbers are written with
an x behind them)


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
 
   In symbolic logic it and be expressed as Ex Ey (Hand(x) + Hand 
 (y) + (x=/=y)), no mention of the number 2.
You are aware that you just written down TWO Hands?
You don't need to write two to express that 2 is meant. You can write II
or 1 plus 1 or the number of my hands or pi/pi + pi/pi or whatever.


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
 

 1Z wrote:

  
 If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have two
 of
 something, right?

 And if you have none of something, none exists.
  
 Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that.

 
 What if you have no zero?  :-)
Uhm, then I get one out of platonia. I heard they are free there, maybe you
should get some. They are very useful. ;)


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
 

 1Z wrote:

  
 Or is it a fictional statement?


 Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
 have a separate referent. However, and, or, is, not etc
 do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
 whole*
 to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.
  
 Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word implies
 the
 existence of an object that is connected to the word.

 
 You seem to not understand what referent means.  The above sentence is 
 self contradictory.
I thought referent is that thing which a word refers to.
If you allow just objects as referents, then some words have no direct
referent.

Like and.
One could argue it doesn't directly refer to an object. But nevertheless
there are objects that reflect what the word means, like conjunction.
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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-17 Thread benjayk


1Z wrote:
 
 
 On Feb 17, 6:14 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
  1Z wrote:

Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at
 all
with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has
 to
  be
reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an
 invisible
epiphenomena.

Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
Numbers
have to exist for the conclusion to follow

   Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained
 from
   
   something non physical.

   The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
   physical
   thing: it is that they are not existent at all.

  If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very
 much
  like a non-fictional and true statement, like I have two hands mean?

  It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.

 You can't have one without the other.
 The statement 2 hands exists requires that 2 of something (the number
 2)
 exists.
 
 The idea that 2 hands exist implies that 2 exists implies that 3
 things exist (the left hand, the  right hand and two)
Right. You just made an argument that ALL numbers do exist. Do you have a
problem with that?


1Z wrote:
 
 1Z wrote:

  If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have
 two
  of
  something, right?

  And if you have none of something, none exists.

 Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that.

 1Z wrote:

  Or is it a fictional statement?

  Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
  have a separate referent. However, and, or, is, not etc
  do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
  whole*
  to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.

 Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word implies
 the
 existence of an object that is connected to the word.
 
 That's a straight contradiction.
I expressed myself badly here...

I wanted to express that some words don't seem to have a direct referent in
the sense of an object, but that it is possible to objectify them and then
they do have a referent.

Probably I should just say that every word has a referent.


1Z wrote:
 
 If it is meaningful to use the word and, something and something or a
 conjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word or, something
 or
 something or a disjunction exists, if it is meaningful to use the word
 is,
 
 To  say there is an existing statue of liberty says nothing more
 that there is a statue of liberty
That depends how you interpret the sentence. In general I agree, but there
is an existing statue of liberty might be used with existing in the sense
of existing in the stable consensus reality.

So you could say there is an existing statue of liberty (that exists in
the consensus reality) in contrast to there is a 'non-existant' statue of
serfdom (that is absent in the consensus reality; but it does exists in my
imagination).

Your comment is probably meant to imply there is something wrong with what I
wrote, but I don't get what it is.


1Z wrote:
 
something existing or simply existence exists, if it is meaningful
 to use the word not, something that does not exist or absence exist
 (existing in the absolute sense and not existing relative to something
 else)
 and if if it is meaningful to use the word two, two of something or
 the
 number 2 exists.
 
 Nope. To say that two of something exist is not to say two exists.
 
OK; I don't really get that, but let's say this is so.

Then you get the functionally same structure as the numbers, but you don't
call them one, two, three,... but one of something, two of something,
three of something,
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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-17 Thread Brent Meeker

On 2/17/2011 12:27 PM, benjayk wrote:


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
   

On 2/17/2011 10:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
 

1Z wrote:

   


On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjaykbenjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com   wrote:

 

1Z wrote:


   

Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at all
with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has to

   

be

   

reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an invisible
epiphenomena.

   


   

Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
Numbers
have to exist for the conclusion to follow

 


   

Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained from

   


   

something non physical.

   


   

The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
physical
thing: it is that they are not existent at all.

 

If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very
much
like a non-fictional and true statement, like I have two hands mean?

   

It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.

 

You can't have one without the other.
   


Sure you can.  You can have an apple and an orange.  Whether they 
constitute two of something depends on you thinking of them as fruits.



The statement 2 hands exists requires that 2 of something (the number
2)
exists.

   

It requires that two of something exist, but not that the number itself
2 exist.
 

What is the difference between two of something and two?
   


Two of something exists if the somethings exist.


Numbers always express quantity of something, even if this something is just
numbers.

It's like writing 2x and 2. It may be formally different, but I don't
see a difference in the concept that is expressed. 2 is just shorter than
2x or 2*1 or 1+1.
(I am aware that 2x is of course different than 2 when they are both used in
a common context like in 2x+2=8; but not when all numbers are written with
an x behind them)


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
   

   In symbolic logic it and be expressed as Ex Ey (Hand(x) + Hand
(y) + (x=/=y)), no mention of the number 2.
 

You are aware that you just written down TWO Hands?
You don't need to write two to express that 2 is meant. You can write II
or 1 plus 1 or the number of my hands or pi/pi + pi/pi or whatever.
   


Writing x x is writing two x's, but it's not writing a number. Actually 
I have no objection to supposing the number two exists - so long as  its 
existence is qualified as existing in some completely different sense 
than hands exist.


Brent




Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
   
 

1Z wrote:

   


 

If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have two
of
something, right?

   

And if you have none of something, none exists.

 

Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that.

   

What if you have no zero?  :-)
 

Uhm, then I get one out of platonia. I heard they are free there, maybe you
should get some. They are very useful. ;)


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
   
 

1Z wrote:

   


 

Or is it a fictional statement?


   

Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
have a separate referent. However, and, or, is, not etc
do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
whole*
to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.

 

Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word implies
the
existence of an object that is connected to the word.

   

You seem to not understand what referent means.  The above sentence is
self contradictory.
 

I thought referent is that thing which a word refers to.
If you allow just objects as referents, then some words have no direct
referent.

Like and.
One could argue it doesn't directly refer to an object. But nevertheless
there are objects that reflect what the word means, like conjunction.
   


You could say and is conjuction and exists in the land of 
connectives.  But this sort of extension of exists threatens to blur 
the use of the word in meaninglessness.  Russell's theory of types tried 
to reconstruct mathematics that way.


Brent

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-17 Thread Jason Resch
On Thu, Feb 17, 2011 at 9:06 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:



 On Feb 16, 10:58 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
  On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 11:41 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 
   On Feb 16, 3:40 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 9:04 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 
 On Feb 16, 8:27 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
  On Tue, Feb 15, 2011 at 4:19 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com
 wrote:
 
   On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
 wrote:
On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:
 
I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with
   synasthesia
apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual
   properties.
 
   Some people perceive pink elephants too. However, other
 people
   don't
   perceive them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
   really being perceived at all.
 
  The guy who reported seeing the digits of pi like a vast
 landscape
   also
  receited over 20,000 digits from memory.  That should lend a
 little
   more
  credence to his claims.
 
 Which are what? I don't think *he* is claiming numbers objectively
 exist. And isn't the fact that all synaesthetes visualise them
 differently
 somehat contrary to *that* claim.
 
   Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
 
  Unless you've visited every time period in every corner of
 reality
   how
 can
  you assert unicrons don't exist?
 
 The same way I assert everything: the evidence I have is good
 enough.
 
 The fossile record might suggest they have
  never lived on this planet but that hardly rules out their
 existence
  everywhere.
 
  Does XYZ exist?
  Let me look around...  I can't see it right now, it must not
 exist!
 
  Instead we should take a more humble approach:
 
  I've looked around and cannot see it here, it probably doesn't
 exist
 here,
  however I have no idea whether or not it exists in places I
 cannot
   see or
  have not looked.
 
  I think Bayesian inference:

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference#Evidence_and_changing.
   ..
  Is particularly useful in answering questions relating to
 existence.
The
  question is, what prior probability would you set to a
 proposition
   such
 as
  Other universes not visible to us exist.  1Z and Brent would
 seem
   to
  assign a rather low probability, but that just means a higher
   threshold
 of
  evidence will be required to convince them.  Lacking any evidence
 at
   all,
  the least biased prior probability to begin with is 0.5.  If some
 evidence,
  for fine tuning for example, accumulates then you should adjust
 your
 assumed
  probability that the proposition Other universes not visible to
 us
 exist
  is true.
 
  Are you aware of a better or more fair way of addressing such a
   question?
 
 I am a fallibilist. You are preaching to the converted.
 
Okay it seems we have a common foundation we agree on.  Can you
 explain
   why
you have confidence in the unreality of other possible universes
 rather
   than
uncertainty?  What evidence have you seen for or against that
   proposition?
 
  Peter,
 
  Thank you for your very detailed and thoughtful response.
 
   The  mathematical multiverse suffers from a double wammy: it is
   predicts
   too much (white rabbits) and explains too little (time and
   consciousness are
   not explained). Physical multiverses are a bit more of a nuanced
   issue. Many worlds
   is not my favourite interpretation of QM, but at the end of the day
   there could be
   empirical evidence one way or the other.
 
  If universes are mathematical objects, they follows well-defined
 equations.

 Physical universes will. Mathematical universes need not. Platonia
 will include all the discontinous and non-differentiable functions.
 You
 have to take the rough with the smooth.


Why couldn't a physical universe be discontinuous?



   A few, more rare, universe may have an additional law, at time X, in
  location Y, a white rabbit will pop into existence, but the description
 for
  such a universe is much longer.

 Platonia includes eveything that is not seld contradictory, and
 there is no contradiction in randomness and chaos. Moreoever
 there must be many disordered sets for every ordered set.


Chaotic mathematical structures may exist, but life seems to require the
right balance between complexity and simplicity.  Too complex and there is
not enough time to adapt to changing rules, too simple, and life may not be
possible at all.  That you don't find yourself in a chaotic mathematical
structure should not be surprising.



  In self-similar mathematical structures,
  such as the programs generated by the UDA, the simpler structures recur
 much
  more frequently, and so the measure for a particular 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-17 Thread benjayk


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
 
 On 2/17/2011 12:27 PM, benjayk wrote:

 Brent Meeker-2 wrote:

 On 2/17/2011 10:14 AM, benjayk wrote:
  
 1Z wrote:



 On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjaykbenjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com   wrote:

  
 1Z wrote:



 Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at
 all
 with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has
 to


 be


 reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an
 invisible
 epiphenomena.




 Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
 Numbers
 have to exist for the conclusion to follow

  


 Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained
 from




 something non physical.




 The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
 physical
 thing: it is that they are not existent at all.

  
 If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very
 much
 like a non-fictional and true statement, like I have two hands
 mean?


 It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.

  
 You can't have one without the other.

 
 Sure you can.  You can have an apple and an orange.  Whether they 
 constitute two of something depends on you thinking of them as fruits.

I don't think you can conceive of an apple and and orange without them
constituting two things. The and already implies there are two things
(usually).

But even if we grant that an apple and an orange are not necessarily two
things it is harder to deny that we need the number one in order to have one
apple/orange/hand.


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
 
 The statement 2 hands exists requires that 2 of something (the
 number
 2)
 exists.


 It requires that two of something exist, but not that the number itself
 2 exist.
  
 What is the difference between two of something and two?

 
 Two of something exists if the somethings exist.

Why can two not just mean  two of something existing?


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
 
 Numbers always express quantity of something, even if this something is
 just
 numbers.

 It's like writing 2x and 2. It may be formally different, but I don't
 see a difference in the concept that is expressed. 2 is just shorter
 than
 2x or 2*1 or 1+1.
 (I am aware that 2x is of course different than 2 when they are both used
 in
 a common context like in 2x+2=8; but not when all numbers are written
 with
 an x behind them)


 Brent Meeker-2 wrote:

In symbolic logic it and be expressed as Ex Ey (Hand(x) + Hand
 (y) + (x=/=y)), no mention of the number 2.
  
 You are aware that you just written down TWO Hands?
 You don't need to write two to express that 2 is meant. You can write
 II
 or 1 plus 1 or the number of my hands or pi/pi + pi/pi or whatever.

 
 Writing x x is writing two x's, but it's not writing a number.
Then you treat a number as a symbol. I would rather call that numeral but
OK.

I'm refering to the concept of a quantity of two. And x x clearly
represents a quantity of two.


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
 
  Actually 
 I have no objection to supposing the number two exists - so long as  its 
 existence is qualified as existing in some completely different sense 
 than hands exist.
I think few would claim that numbers do not exist in a different way then
hands.
That's hard to argue with. A hand is much more specific than a number, it is
material, it is concrete...

But that does not mean that numbers exist in a lesser way.


Brent Meeker-2 wrote:
 

 Brent Meeker-2 wrote:

  
 1Z wrote:



  
 If you have two hands, two does exists, otherwise you couldn't have
 two
 of
 something, right?


 And if you have none of something, none exists.

  
 Well, so zero exists, I have no problem with that.


 What if you have no zero?  :-)
  
 Uhm, then I get one out of platonia. I heard they are free there, maybe
 you
 should get some. They are very useful. ;)


 Brent Meeker-2 wrote:

  
 1Z wrote:



  
 Or is it a fictional statement?



 Nope. You seem to think every word in a true sentence must
 have a separate referent. However, and, or, is, not etc
 do not have separate referents. A true sentence must refer *as a
 whole*
 to some state of affairs. That is the only requirement.

  
 Not every word must have an object as referent, but every word implies
 the
 existence of an object that is connected to the word.


 You seem to not understand what referent means.  The above sentence is
 self contradictory.
  
 I thought referent is that thing which a word refers to.
 If you allow just objects as referents, then some words have no direct
 referent.

 Like and.
 One could argue it doesn't directly refer to an object. But nevertheless
 there are 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-17 Thread 1Z


On Feb 17, 10:25 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Thu, Feb 17, 2011 at 9:06 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

  On Feb 16, 10:58 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
   On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 11:41 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

On Feb 16, 3:40 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 9:04 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

  On Feb 16, 8:27 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
   On Tue, Feb 15, 2011 at 4:19 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com
  wrote:

On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
  wrote:
 On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:

 I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with
synasthesia
 apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual
properties.

Some people perceive pink elephants too. However, other
  people
don't
perceive them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
really being perceived at all.

   The guy who reported seeing the digits of pi like a vast
  landscape
also
   receited over 20,000 digits from memory.  That should lend a
  little
more
   credence to his claims.

  Which are what? I don't think *he* is claiming numbers objectively
  exist. And isn't the fact that all synaesthetes visualise them
  differently
  somehat contrary to *that* claim.

Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?

   Unless you've visited every time period in every corner of
  reality
how
  can
   you assert unicrons don't exist?

  The same way I assert everything: the evidence I have is good
  enough.

  The fossile record might suggest they have
   never lived on this planet but that hardly rules out their
  existence
   everywhere.

   Does XYZ exist?
   Let me look around...  I can't see it right now, it must not
  exist!

   Instead we should take a more humble approach:

   I've looked around and cannot see it here, it probably doesn't
  exist
  here,
   however I have no idea whether or not it exists in places I
  cannot
see or
   have not looked.

   I think Bayesian inference:

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference#Evidence_and_changing.
..
   Is particularly useful in answering questions relating to
  existence.
 The
   question is, what prior probability would you set to a
  proposition
such
  as
   Other universes not visible to us exist.  1Z and Brent would
  seem
to
   assign a rather low probability, but that just means a higher
threshold
  of
   evidence will be required to convince them.  Lacking any evidence
  at
all,
   the least biased prior probability to begin with is 0.5.  If some
  evidence,
   for fine tuning for example, accumulates then you should adjust
  your
  assumed
   probability that the proposition Other universes not visible to
  us
  exist
   is true.

   Are you aware of a better or more fair way of addressing such a
question?

  I am a fallibilist. You are preaching to the converted.

 Okay it seems we have a common foundation we agree on.  Can you
  explain
why
 you have confidence in the unreality of other possible universes
  rather
than
 uncertainty?  What evidence have you seen for or against that
proposition?

   Peter,

   Thank you for your very detailed and thoughtful response.

The  mathematical multiverse suffers from a double wammy: it is
predicts
too much (white rabbits) and explains too little (time and
consciousness are
not explained). Physical multiverses are a bit more of a nuanced
issue. Many worlds
is not my favourite interpretation of QM, but at the end of the day
there could be
empirical evidence one way or the other.

   If universes are mathematical objects, they follows well-defined
  equations.

  Physical universes will. Mathematical universes need not. Platonia
  will include all the discontinous and non-differentiable functions.
  You
  have to take the rough with the smooth.

 Why couldn't a physical universe be discontinuous?

The more discontinuity you have, the less predictability you
have.

A few, more rare, universe may have an additional law, at time X, in
   location Y, a white rabbit will pop into existence, but the description
  for
   such a universe is much longer.

  Platonia includes eveything that is not seld contradictory, and
  there is no contradiction in randomness and chaos. Moreoever
  there must be many disordered sets for every ordered set.

 Chaotic mathematical structures may exist, but life seems to require the
 right balance between complexity and simplicity.

An evolutionary history of life does, but so what? Time
and causality themselves exist in only some corners of Platonia.
There is no contradiction in having a bubble of 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-17 Thread 1Z


On Feb 17, 10:38 pm, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
 Brent Meeker-2 wrote:

  On 2/17/2011 12:27 PM, benjayk wrote:

  Brent Meeker-2 wrote:

  On 2/17/2011 10:14 AM, benjayk wrote:

  1Z wrote:

  On Feb 17, 3:10 pm, benjaykbenjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com   wrote:

  1Z wrote:

  Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at
  all
  with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has
  to

  be

  reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an
  invisible
  epiphenomena.

  Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
  Numbers
  have to exist for the conclusion to follow

  Physics is not eliminated, on the contrary, physics is explained
  from

  something non physical.

  The anti realist position is not that numbers are some existing non-
  physical
  thing: it is that they are not existent at all.

  If numbers don't exist at all, what does a statement that seems very
  much
  like a non-fictional and true statement, like I have two hands
  mean?

  It's asserting the existence of hands, not numbers.

  You can't have one without the other.

  Sure you can.  You can have an apple and an orange.  Whether they
  constitute two of something depends on you thinking of them as fruits.

 I don't think you can conceive of an apple and and orange without them
 constituting two things.

That doesn't mean two is a third thing with a separate exisence.

The and already implies there are two things
 (usually).

 But even if we grant that an apple and an orange are not necessarily two
 things

THat is not what is at dispute. Two fruit are two fruit, not two fruit
and
one number.

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-17 Thread Jason Resch
Peter,

Correct me if I am wrong but I think we have established some things we
agree on:

Consciousness is informational
There are more ways to have disorder than order
Bayesian reasoning is a good approach in matters of truth
The universe could be a second old, and we would have no way of telling
White rabbits are not commonly seen
This universe appears to follow laws having a short description
Evolution requires non-chaotic universes

Where I think we disagree is on assumptions related to measure, of a
universe's initial conditions vs. a universe's laws.  I agree there are very
many possibilities for what my next moment of experience might bring, yet of
all the strange things I could observe, the universe doesn't often surprise,
laws seem to be obeyed.  It is as if there is some equation balancing two
extremes, and we see the result of who wins: universes with simple laws (few
possibilities) but random initial conditions (many possibilities) vs.
universes with complex or random laws (many possibilities) but with ordered
initial conditions (few possibilities).

Universes which are ruled by chaotic or unpredictable laws with white
rabbits present probably also prevent life from evolving.  However as you
mentioned, observers may be part of the initial conditions for such a
universe.  There are many possibilities for the laws, but few possibilities
for the initial conditions.

Our universe does not seem to be that way, however, owing to the lack of
white rabbits.  Our universe's laws seem simple, and life had to evolve from
initial conditions for which there could have been many possibilities.

The question should then be, which side of the equation wins out most often?
 Every possible universe has its laws and initial conditions, for which
there are many possibilities.  The two must be considered together.  For
this universe the initial conditions were chaotic and unordered, but the
laws were simple.  You propose that universes with chaotic laws are more
likely.  The most likely of these would be chaotic laws with chaotic initial
conditions, but I think we agree life and observers are not likely to arise
in this case, so the remaining possibility is chaotic laws with ordered
initial conditions (which can admit observers at the start).

If the possibilities for initial conditions wins out by having more
combinations than random (yet stable enough to be supportive of observers
present at the initial conditions) laws, then this could explain the lack of
observed white rabbits in the whole of mathematical reality.

Do you agree with the logic at least?



  Einstein believed this, which is evident in this The distinction between
  past, present, and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion.
 
  See:http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2408/
 
   That our
universe is conceivable as a static four dimensional block is
 supportive
   of
the theory that it is a mathematical object.
 
   But there is an appearance of flow, and if mind isn't flowing
   because brain isn't flowing, where is it coming from?
 
  The brain generates the illusion of flow.

 I can't see how it could, when it has no flow itself.



Do you think the subjective perception of time rules out block time, or
would you say block time is indistinguishable from 3 spacial dimensions
which evolve over time?  I have a thought experiment to show a physical flow
of time can in no way be necessary for the perception of the flow of time.
 Let's say there are two theories: Presentism (only the present moment is
real, and every moment in time has its chance at being the present) vs.
Block time (all points in time exist and are equally real).

Presentism makes the appearance of the flow of time obvious.  It seems like
time is flowing because it is in fact flowing.  However, upon deeper
consideration you will see that it refutes this relation.  If only the
present time is real, then what you experience in this moment must have no
dependence whatsoever on the existence of prior moments (since they no
longer exist).  You perceive the existence of time's flow from the existence
of this single slice of time.  Since the existence of past moments has no
bearing on your experience in this moment, however, then it becomes
absolutely needless to say the past moment must cease to exist to give
the appearance of the flow of time.  Rather, if it still continued to exist,
it must (according to Presentism) have no impact at all on what you feel now
in the present.  Therefore even if all moments in time remain real, your
experience of the flow of time would be intact.  It is, by Occam, simpler to
believe that past moments continue to exist, rather than believe some
process causes future moments to come into existence, and past moments to
disappear from existence, since without such a process, observations will be
identical.



 It's like saying that a brain with no colour processing
 centres can nonetheless halucinate in colour. Even
 illusions require some real 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-16 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Feb 15, 2011 at 4:19 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:



 On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
  On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:
 
 
 
  I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with synasthesia
  apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual properties.

 Some people perceive pink elephants too. However, other people don't
 perceive them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
 really being perceived at all.



The guy who reported seeing the digits of pi like a vast landscape also
receited over 20,000 digits from memory.  That should lend a little more
credence to his claims.

 Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?

Unless you've visited every time period in every corner of reality how can
you assert unicrons don't exist?  The fossile record might suggest they have
never lived on this planet but that hardly rules out their existence
everywhere.

Does XYZ exist?
Let me look around...  I can't see it right now, it must not exist!

Instead we should take a more humble approach:

I've looked around and cannot see it here, it probably doesn't exist here,
however I have no idea whether or not it exists in places I cannot see or
have not looked.

I think Bayesian inference:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference#Evidence_and_changing_beliefs
Is particularly useful in answering questions relating to existence.  The
question is, what prior probability would you set to a proposition such as
Other universes not visible to us exist.  1Z and Brent would seem to
assign a rather low probability, but that just means a higher threshold of
evidence will be required to convince them.  Lacking any evidence at all,
the least biased prior probability to begin with is 0.5.  If some evidence,
for fine tuning for example, accumulates then you should adjust your assumed
probability that the proposition Other universes not visible to us exist
is true.

Are you aware of a better or more fair way of addressing such a question?


Jason

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-16 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 15 Feb 2011, at 20:22, 1Z wrote:



I want to say number aren't real, so I'm not really a number



All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
real,



Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?


I meant in general.



I don't need anything more than
1) I am real
2) Unreal things don't generate real things

I think both of those are hard to dispute.


But nobody believes that numbers are unreal. They believe that numbers  
are not material but that is different.
You beg the question by identifying real with material, and by  
assuming a primitive materiality. This is obstructive of thought,  
only. Your critics of science reminds me on the critics on Einstein's  
relativity by Bergson. I do appreciate Bergson, but his dialog with  
Einstein was a dialog of deaf. A bit like Goethe critics of Newton.  
Pseudo-philosophy, like pseudo-religion, are authoritative argument in  
disguise.








You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
with a merely formal statement of bivalence


I use bivalence but also yes doctor.


But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing
to a physical substitution


The whole point of the UDA+MGA is to show that YD (defined by a  
physical substitution) does lead to the abandon of the physical as  
primary. So you are just confirming that you are using the notion of  
primary matter as a reason for not studying an argument. You should  
better search an error in it.







Then after concluding, we can
take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is
explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among other
things) from that.


Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by  
the

fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.



I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number



It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can  
uderstand
that the feeling of matter is a construct of your mind. Then it  
is
just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth  
contains

all the emulation of all programs,



As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
running programmes.


Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers'  
configurations.



If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make
and indexical judgement of actuality.


Sure. But that's begging the question again and again.







You contradict your self,



No I don't. How many times have I explained that
mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
sense that doesn't imply real existence



Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes
doctor +
occam gives the ontological conclusion.



No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.


That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many fictive terms as  
you

want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the
testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).



If it is testable, it is false.


Why?


Not enough WR's.


Intuitively you are right, but you have to take into account computer  
science which shows that intuition here is of no use. It might be  
possible that in fine mechanism leads to too much White Rabbits, but  
that has not been proved yet. Again, that would not change the  
reasoning, just the conclusion.







What does comp nothing exists mean?



Sorry. I meant In which case comp implies nothing exists.



Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known
computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical.


You will not find any book in physics, except by Zristotle which  
use

the notion of primary matter.



They all do. Physicists think matter/energy exists.


Some does not. John A. Wheeler is open to the idea that physics  
emerge

from something non physical (cf It from Bit).


And everyone else doesn't.


New paradigm takes time to be swallowed.





Anyway, to refer to a what people think is not an argument.


Then why is it refer to books?


Because (good) books contain (good) arguments.






You will not find any book on computers which mention the notion of
matter.



They don't mention pixie dust either. One cannot
conclude from that that anyone has a background
assumption that computers are made of pixie dust.


The point is that the notion of computer used in the proof is the
traditional mathematical notion.


There is  no mathematical notion such that you can run a  programme on
it.


(Sigma_1) arithmetical reality do run all programs, in the  
mathematical (non material, but real) sense. To make primitive matter  
to instantiate consciousness, you will have to make consciousness and  
matter non Turing emulable, and this is in a very special way. With  
mechanism, neither consciousness nor matter are 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-16 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 15 Feb 2011, at 20:25, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:




In science we never know if our premisses and conclusions are
true or
not.



I can still resist the conclusion by *believing* Platonism
to be false, while believing comp to be true.



platonism is ambiguous.



I mean and have always meant mathematical Platonism


But you talk on a paper with a different terminology.


What paper? The Klein paper doesn't mention it.



We were talking on the UDA+MGA argument of sane04, albeit MGA refers  
to the presentation that I have presented on this list, well, about   
two years ago.






You are
confusing people.




Any way, you can resist any conclusion in
science with some ad-hoc philosophy.



There is nothing unscientific in the attitude
the immaterial things don't exist.


Right, but irrelevant.




So you are not saying something
informative here.
Ad without a minimal amount of arithmetical realism you cannot
endorse
Church thesis,



A formalist can endorses anything with no ontological
realism whatsoever. All that is left without any ontological
realism is a formal axiom of bivalence


... which added to the theological bet yes doctor entails that
materialism, to explain matter,  is not better than vitalism to
explain life.


Materialism can solve WR just fine


Not in a way compatible with CT+YD (that's the point). Or there is  
something wrong in UDA+MGA. Up to now, your move consists in saying  
that seven is unreal and that mathematics is fiction. If mathematics  
is fiction, Church thesis is senseless, and CT is part of making sense  
of digital in digital mechanism.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-16 Thread 1Z


On Feb 16, 8:27 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Tue, Feb 15, 2011 at 4:19 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

  On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
   On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:

   I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with synasthesia
   apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual properties.

  Some people perceive pink elephants too. However, other people don't
  perceive them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
  really being perceived at all.

 The guy who reported seeing the digits of pi like a vast landscape also
 receited over 20,000 digits from memory.  That should lend a little more
 credence to his claims.

Which are what? I don't think *he* is claiming numbers objectively
exist. And isn't the fact that all synaesthetes visualise them
differently
somehat contrary to *that* claim.

  Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?

 Unless you've visited every time period in every corner of reality how can
 you assert unicrons don't exist?  

The same way I assert everything: the evidence I have is good enough.

The fossile record might suggest they have
 never lived on this planet but that hardly rules out their existence
 everywhere.

 Does XYZ exist?
 Let me look around...  I can't see it right now, it must not exist!

 Instead we should take a more humble approach:

 I've looked around and cannot see it here, it probably doesn't exist here,
 however I have no idea whether or not it exists in places I cannot see or
 have not looked.

 I think Bayesian 
 inference:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference#Evidence_and_changing...
 Is particularly useful in answering questions relating to existence.  The
 question is, what prior probability would you set to a proposition such as
 Other universes not visible to us exist.  1Z and Brent would seem to
 assign a rather low probability, but that just means a higher threshold of
 evidence will be required to convince them.  Lacking any evidence at all,
 the least biased prior probability to begin with is 0.5.  If some evidence,
 for fine tuning for example, accumulates then you should adjust your assumed
 probability that the proposition Other universes not visible to us exist
 is true.

 Are you aware of a better or more fair way of addressing such a question?


I am a fallibilist. You are preaching to the converted.

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-16 Thread 1Z


On Feb 16, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 15 Feb 2011, at 20:22, 1Z wrote:





  I want to say number aren't real, so I'm not really a number

  All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
  nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
  real,

  Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?

  I meant in general.

  I don't need anything more than
  1) I am real
  2) Unreal things don't generate real things

  I think both of those are hard to dispute.

 But nobody believes that numbers are unreal.

I do. Hartry Field does. Etc.

 They believe that numbers  
 are not material but that is different.
 You beg the question by identifying real with material, and by  
 assuming a primitive materiality.

You beg the question by assuming Platonism

This is obstructive of thought,  
 only. Your critics of science reminds me on the critics on Einstein's  
 relativity by Bergson. I do appreciate Bergson, but his dialog with  
 Einstein was a dialog of deaf. A bit like Goethe critics of Newton.  
 Pseudo-philosophy, like pseudo-religion, are authoritative argument in  
 disguise.



  You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
  with a merely formal statement of bivalence

  I use bivalence but also yes doctor.

  But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing
  to a physical substitution

 The whole point of the UDA+MGA is to show that YD (defined by a  
 physical substitution) does lead to the abandon of the physical as  
 primary.

The physical cant be abandoned unless there is something to
take its place. Hence you need Platonism

 So you are just confirming that you are using the notion of  
 primary matter as a reason for not studying an argument. You should  
 better search an error in it.





  Then after concluding, we can
  take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is
  explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among other
  things) from that.

  Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by  
  the
  fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.

  I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
  medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number

  It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
  reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can  
  uderstand
  that the feeling of matter is a construct of your mind. Then it  
  is
  just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth  
  contains
  all the emulation of all programs,

  As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
  running programmes.

  Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers'  
  configurations.

  If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make
  and indexical judgement of actuality.

 Sure. But that's begging the question again and again.


The converse is also question begging.

  You contradict your self,

  No I don't. How many times have I explained that
  mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
  sense that doesn't imply real existence

  Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes
  doctor +
  occam gives the ontological conclusion.

  No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.

  That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many fictive terms as  
  you
  want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the
  testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).

  If it is testable, it is false.

  Why?

  Not enough WR's.

 Intuitively you are right, but you have to take into account computer  
 science which shows that intuition here is of no use. It might be  
 possible that in fine mechanism leads to too much White Rabbits, but  
 that has not been proved yet. Again, that would not change the  
 reasoning, just the conclusion.

WRs follow from any straightforward approach to measure.
The burden is on the multiversalists to avoid the objection.

  What does comp nothing exists mean?

  Sorry. I meant In which case comp implies nothing exists.

  Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known
  computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical.

  You will not find any book in physics, except by Zristotle which  
  use
  the notion of primary matter.

  They all do. Physicists think matter/energy exists.

  Some does not. John A. Wheeler is open to the idea that physics  
  emerge
  from something non physical (cf It from Bit).

  And everyone else doesn't.

 New paradigm takes time to be swallowed.

That is quite a climb-down from your original claim
that no physicist believes in matter.

  Anyway, to refer to a what people think is not an argument.

  Then why is it refer to books?

 Because (good) books contain (good) arguments.

Oh, right, If  a physics text mentions matter, it is a Bad Book.

  You will not find any book on computers which mention the notion of
  matter.

  They don't 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-16 Thread Jason Resch
On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 9:04 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:



 On Feb 16, 8:27 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
  On Tue, Feb 15, 2011 at 4:19 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 
   On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:
 
I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with synasthesia
apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual properties.
 
   Some people perceive pink elephants too. However, other people don't
   perceive them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
   really being perceived at all.
 
  The guy who reported seeing the digits of pi like a vast landscape also
  receited over 20,000 digits from memory.  That should lend a little more
  credence to his claims.

 Which are what? I don't think *he* is claiming numbers objectively
 exist. And isn't the fact that all synaesthetes visualise them
 differently
 somehat contrary to *that* claim.

   Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
 
  Unless you've visited every time period in every corner of reality how
 can
  you assert unicrons don't exist?

 The same way I assert everything: the evidence I have is good enough.

 The fossile record might suggest they have
  never lived on this planet but that hardly rules out their existence
  everywhere.
 
  Does XYZ exist?
  Let me look around...  I can't see it right now, it must not exist!
 
  Instead we should take a more humble approach:
 
  I've looked around and cannot see it here, it probably doesn't exist
 here,
  however I have no idea whether or not it exists in places I cannot see or
  have not looked.
 
  I think Bayesian inference:
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference#Evidence_and_changing...
  Is particularly useful in answering questions relating to existence.  The
  question is, what prior probability would you set to a proposition such
 as
  Other universes not visible to us exist.  1Z and Brent would seem to
  assign a rather low probability, but that just means a higher threshold
 of
  evidence will be required to convince them.  Lacking any evidence at all,
  the least biased prior probability to begin with is 0.5.  If some
 evidence,
  for fine tuning for example, accumulates then you should adjust your
 assumed
  probability that the proposition Other universes not visible to us
 exist
  is true.
 
  Are you aware of a better or more fair way of addressing such a question?
 

 I am a fallibilist. You are preaching to the converted.


Okay it seems we have a common foundation we agree on.  Can you explain why
you have confidence in the unreality of other possible universes rather than
uncertainty?  What evidence have you seen for or against that proposition?

If more evidence accumulated for Fine-Tuning, would that be sufficient for
you to believe it is probably true that universes ruled by other laws exist
also?

Do you think the prior probability that other physical universes exist
should be greater than the prior probability that mathematical objects
exist?  If so, why and to what degree?

Finally, do you see any difference between all possible (self-consistent)
universes exist vs. all logically possible objects in math exist?

Jason

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-16 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 16 Feb 2011, at 16:17, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 16, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 15 Feb 2011, at 20:22, 1Z wrote:






I want to say number aren't real, so I'm not really a number



All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
real,



Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?



I meant in general.



I don't need anything more than
1) I am real
2) Unreal things don't generate real things



I think both of those are hard to dispute.


But nobody believes that numbers are unreal.


I do. Hartry Field does. Etc.


Fair enough. Nobody except nominalist philosophers.





They believe that numbers
are not material but that is different.
You beg the question by identifying real with material, and by
assuming a primitive materiality.


You beg the question by assuming Platonism


I assume that arithmetical truth (actually the tiny effective part) is  
true independently of observers. It is a common assumption, and I am  
not saying it is true, just part of what is needed to make sense of  
the term  'digital' in digital mechanism. All we nedd is that it makes  
sense to say that ExP(x) or that ~ExP(x), with P decidable, so that we  
can say that the (mathematica) run of a (mathematical) program stop,  
or does not stop, and proceed to the consequences of Church thesis.






This is obstructive of thought,
only. Your critics of science reminds me on the critics on Einstein's
relativity by Bergson. I do appreciate Bergson, but his dialog with
Einstein was a dialog of deaf. A bit like Goethe critics of Newton.
Pseudo-philosophy, like pseudo-religion, are authoritative argument  
in

disguise.




You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
with a merely formal statement of bivalence



I use bivalence but also yes doctor.



But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing
to a physical substitution


The whole point of the UDA+MGA is to show that YD (defined by a
physical substitution) does lead to the abandon of the physical as
primary.


The physical cant be abandoned unless there is something to
take its place. Hence you need Platonism


The physical is not abandoned. Just that if comp is correct it has to  
be retrieved from self-reference logic.







So you are just confirming that you are using the notion of
primary matter as a reason for not studying an argument. You should
better search an error in it.






Then after concluding, we can
take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is
explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among  
other

things) from that.



Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by
the
fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital  
graft.



I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number



It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can
uderstand
that the feeling of matter is a construct of your mind. Then it
is
just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth
contains
all the emulation of all programs,



As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
running programmes.



Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers'
configurations.



If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make
and indexical judgement of actuality.


Sure. But that's begging the question again and again.



The converse is also question begging.



I don't see this. The ontology and the epistemology are clear enough.
Primary matter is not needed, unless there are too much WR, but that  
is the point: the mind body problem is reduced into a problem of WRs.






You contradict your self,



No I don't. How many times have I explained that
mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
sense that doesn't imply real existence



Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes
doctor +
occam gives the ontological conclusion.



No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.



That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many fictive terms as
you
want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the
testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).



If it is testable, it is false.



Why?



Not enough WR's.


Intuitively you are right, but you have to take into account computer
science which shows that intuition here is of no use. It might be
possible that in fine mechanism leads to too much White Rabbits, but
that has not been proved yet. Again, that would not change the
reasoning, just the conclusion.


WRs follow from any straightforward approach to measure.


It is nice that you have at least understood this. It is the main  
contribution. But I doubt anyone can take you seriously with the idea  
that the measure problem admit a straightforward approach, and AUDA  

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-16 Thread 1Z


On Feb 16, 3:40 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 9:04 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

  On Feb 16, 8:27 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
   On Tue, Feb 15, 2011 at 4:19 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
 On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:

 I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with synasthesia
 apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual properties.

Some people perceive pink elephants too. However, other people don't
perceive them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
really being perceived at all.

   The guy who reported seeing the digits of pi like a vast landscape also
   receited over 20,000 digits from memory.  That should lend a little more
   credence to his claims.

  Which are what? I don't think *he* is claiming numbers objectively
  exist. And isn't the fact that all synaesthetes visualise them
  differently
  somehat contrary to *that* claim.

    Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?

   Unless you've visited every time period in every corner of reality how
  can
   you assert unicrons don't exist?

  The same way I assert everything: the evidence I have is good enough.

  The fossile record might suggest they have
   never lived on this planet but that hardly rules out their existence
   everywhere.

   Does XYZ exist?
   Let me look around...  I can't see it right now, it must not exist!

   Instead we should take a more humble approach:

   I've looked around and cannot see it here, it probably doesn't exist
  here,
   however I have no idea whether or not it exists in places I cannot see or
   have not looked.

   I think Bayesian inference:
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference#Evidence_and_changing...
   Is particularly useful in answering questions relating to existence.  The
   question is, what prior probability would you set to a proposition such
  as
   Other universes not visible to us exist.  1Z and Brent would seem to
   assign a rather low probability, but that just means a higher threshold
  of
   evidence will be required to convince them.  Lacking any evidence at all,
   the least biased prior probability to begin with is 0.5.  If some
  evidence,
   for fine tuning for example, accumulates then you should adjust your
  assumed
   probability that the proposition Other universes not visible to us
  exist
   is true.

   Are you aware of a better or more fair way of addressing such a question?

  I am a fallibilist. You are preaching to the converted.

 Okay it seems we have a common foundation we agree on.  Can you explain why
 you have confidence in the unreality of other possible universes rather than
 uncertainty?  What evidence have you seen for or against that proposition?


The  mathematical multiverse suffers from a double wammy: it is
predicts
too much (white rabbits) and explains too little (time and
consciousness are
not explained). Physical multiverses are a bit more of a nuanced
issue. Many worlds
is not my favourite interpretation of QM, but at the end of the day
there could be
empirical evidence one way or the other.

Mathematical monism is both too broad and too narrow.

Too broad: If I am just a mathematical structure, I should have a much
wider range of experience than I do. There is a mathemtical structure
corresponding to myself with all my experiences up to time T. There is
a vast array of mathematical structures corresponding to other
versions of me with having a huge range of experiences -- ordinary
ones, like continuing to type, extraordinary ones like seeing my
computer sudenly turn into bowl of petunias. All these versions of me
share the memories of the me who is writing this, so they all
identify themselves as me. Remember, that for mathematical monism it
is only necessary that a possible experience has a mathematical
description. This is known as the White Rabbit problem. If we think in
terms of multiverse theories, we would say that there is one me in
this universe and other me's in other universes,a nd they are kept
out of contact with each other. The question is whether a purely
mathematical scheme has enough resources to impose isolation or
otherwise remove the White Rabbit problem.

Too narrow: there are a number of prima-facie phenomena which a purely
mathematical approach struggles to deal with.

* space
* time
* consciousness
* causality
* necessity/contingency

Why space ? It is tempting to think that if a number of, or some other
mathematical entity, occurs in a set with other numbers, that is, as
it were, a space which is disconnected from other sets, so that a
set forms a natural model of an *isolated* universe withing a
multiverse, a universe which does not suffer from the White Rabbit
problem. However, maths per se does not work that way. The number 2
that appears in the set of even numbers is 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-16 Thread 1Z


On Feb 16, 5:10 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 16 Feb 2011, at 16:17, 1Z wrote:





  On Feb 16, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 15 Feb 2011, at 20:22, 1Z wrote:

  I want to say number aren't real, so I'm not really a number

  All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
  nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
  real,

  Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?

  I meant in general.

  I don't need anything more than
  1) I am real
  2) Unreal things don't generate real things

  I think both of those are hard to dispute.

  But nobody believes that numbers are unreal.

  I do. Hartry Field does. Etc.

 Fair enough. Nobody except nominalist philosophers.

Is that supposed to mean that the intuitions of working mathematicians
override the mere arguments of philosophers

  They believe that numbers
  are not material but that is different.
  You beg the question by identifying real with material, and by
  assuming a primitive materiality.

  You beg the question by assuming Platonism

 I assume that arithmetical truth (actually the tiny effective part) is
 true independently of observers. It is a common assumption, and I am
 not saying it is true, just part of what is needed to make sense of
 the term  'digital' in digital mechanism. All we nedd is that it makes
 sense to say that ExP(x) or that ~ExP(x), with P decidable, so that we
 can say that the (mathematica) run of a (mathematical) program stop,
 or does not stop, and proceed to the consequences of Church thesis.

Without Platonism you cannot eliminate matter



  This is obstructive of thought,
  only. Your critics of science reminds me on the critics on Einstein's
  relativity by Bergson. I do appreciate Bergson, but his dialog with
  Einstein was a dialog of deaf. A bit like Goethe critics of Newton.
  Pseudo-philosophy, like pseudo-religion, are authoritative argument
  in
  disguise.

  You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
  with a merely formal statement of bivalence

  I use bivalence but also yes doctor.

  But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing
  to a physical substitution

  The whole point of the UDA+MGA is to show that YD (defined by a
  physical substitution) does lead to the abandon of the physical as
  primary.

  The physical cant be abandoned unless there is something to
  take its place. Hence you need Platonism

 The physical is not abandoned.

It is abandoned as primary. In your own words.

 Just that if comp is correct it has to
 be retrieved from self-reference logic.



  So you are just confirming that you are using the notion of
  primary matter as a reason for not studying an argument. You should
  better search an error in it.

  Then after concluding, we can
  take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is
  explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among
  other
  things) from that.

  Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by
  the
  fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital
  graft.

  I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
  medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number

  It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
  reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can
  uderstand
  that the feeling of matter is a construct of your mind. Then it
  is
  just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth
  contains
  all the emulation of all programs,

  As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
  running programmes.

  Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers'
  configurations.

  If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make
  and indexical judgement of actuality.

  Sure. But that's begging the question again and again.

  The converse is also question begging.

 I don't see this. The ontology and the epistemology are clear enough.
 Primary matter is not needed,

Given the assumption of Platonism. And vice versa

 unless there are too much WR, but that
 is the point: the mind body problem is reduced into a problem of WRs.





  You contradict your self,

  No I don't. How many times have I explained that
  mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
  sense that doesn't imply real existence

  Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes
  doctor +
  occam gives the ontological conclusion.

  No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.

  That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many fictive terms as
  you
  want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the
  testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).

  If it is testable, it is false.

  Why?

  Not enough WR's.

  Intuitively you are right, but you have to take into account computer
  science which shows that intuition here is of no use. It might be
  possible that in fine mechanism 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-16 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 16 Feb 2011, at 18:41, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 16, 3:40 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 9:04 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:


On Feb 16, 8:27 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

On Tue, Feb 15, 2011 at 4:19 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:



On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:

On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:


I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with  
synasthesia
apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual  
properties.


Some people perceive pink elephants too. However, other people  
don't

perceive them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
really being perceived at all.


The guy who reported seeing the digits of pi like a vast  
landscape also
receited over 20,000 digits from memory.  That should lend a  
little more

credence to his claims.



Which are what? I don't think *he* is claiming numbers objectively
exist. And isn't the fact that all synaesthetes visualise them
differently
somehat contrary to *that* claim.



  Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?


Unless you've visited every time period in every corner of  
reality how

can

you assert unicrons don't exist?


The same way I assert everything: the evidence I have is good  
enough.



The fossile record might suggest they have
never lived on this planet but that hardly rules out their  
existence

everywhere.



Does XYZ exist?
Let me look around...  I can't see it right now, it must not  
exist!



Instead we should take a more humble approach:


I've looked around and cannot see it here, it probably doesn't  
exist

here,
however I have no idea whether or not it exists in places I  
cannot see or

have not looked.



I think Bayesian inference:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference#Evidence_and_changing 
...
Is particularly useful in answering questions relating to  
existence.  The
question is, what prior probability would you set to a  
proposition such

as
Other universes not visible to us exist.  1Z and Brent would  
seem to
assign a rather low probability, but that just means a higher  
threshold

of
evidence will be required to convince them.  Lacking any evidence  
at all,

the least biased prior probability to begin with is 0.5.  If some

evidence,
for fine tuning for example, accumulates then you should adjust  
your

assumed

probability that the proposition Other universes not visible to us

exist

is true.


Are you aware of a better or more fair way of addressing such a  
question?



I am a fallibilist. You are preaching to the converted.


Okay it seems we have a common foundation we agree on.  Can you  
explain why
you have confidence in the unreality of other possible universes  
rather than
uncertainty?  What evidence have you seen for or against that  
proposition?



The  mathematical multiverse suffers from a double wammy: it is
predicts
too much (white rabbits) and explains too little (time and
consciousness are
not explained). Physical multiverses are a bit more of a nuanced
issue. Many worlds
is not my favourite interpretation of QM, but at the end of the day
there could be
empirical evidence one way or the other.

Mathematical monism is both too broad and too narrow.

Too broad: If I am just a mathematical structure, I should have a much
wider range of experience than I do. There is a mathemtical structure
corresponding to myself with all my experiences up to time T. There is
a vast array of mathematical structures corresponding to other
versions of me with having a huge range of experiences -- ordinary
ones, like continuing to type, extraordinary ones like seeing my
computer sudenly turn into bowl of petunias. All these versions of me
share the memories of the me who is writing this, so they all
identify themselves as me. Remember, that for mathematical monism it
is only necessary that a possible experience has a mathematical
description. This is known as the White Rabbit problem. If we think in
terms of multiverse theories, we would say that there is one me in
this universe and other me's in other universes,a nd they are kept
out of contact with each other. The question is whether a purely
mathematical scheme has enough resources to impose isolation or
otherwise remove the White Rabbit problem.

Too narrow: there are a number of prima-facie phenomena which a purely
mathematical approach struggles to deal with.

   * space
   * time
   * consciousness
   * causality
   * necessity/contingency

Why space ? It is tempting to think that if a number of, or some other
mathematical entity, occurs in a set with other numbers, that is, as
it were, a space which is disconnected from other sets, so that a
set forms a natural model of an *isolated* universe withing a
multiverse, a universe which does not suffer from the White Rabbit
problem. However, maths per se does not work that way. The number 2
that appears in the set of even numbers is exactly the same 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-16 Thread Brent Meeker

On 2/16/2011 12:33 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

hat matter adds to a bundle of properties is existence. A non-
existent bundle of properties is a mere concept, a mere possibility.
Thus the concept of matter is very much tied to the idea of
contingency or somethingism -- the idea that only certain possible
things exist.


Only certain possible number relations exist. And relatively to a 
number there is the provable relations, the consistent relations, the 
true relation, and then the combination of those.


I don't understand that?  A relation might imply a contradiction and 
therefore be impossible.  But I would suppose that all possible 
relations would exist in Platonia.  What non-contraditory relations 
would not exist?


Brent

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-16 Thread Jason Resch
On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 11:41 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:



 On Feb 16, 3:40 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
  On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 9:04 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 
   On Feb 16, 8:27 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Feb 15, 2011 at 4:19 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 
 On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
  On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:
 
  I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with
 synasthesia
  apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual
 properties.
 
 Some people perceive pink elephants too. However, other people
 don't
 perceive them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
 really being perceived at all.
 
The guy who reported seeing the digits of pi like a vast landscape
 also
receited over 20,000 digits from memory.  That should lend a little
 more
credence to his claims.
 
   Which are what? I don't think *he* is claiming numbers objectively
   exist. And isn't the fact that all synaesthetes visualise them
   differently
   somehat contrary to *that* claim.
 
 Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
 
Unless you've visited every time period in every corner of reality
 how
   can
you assert unicrons don't exist?
 
   The same way I assert everything: the evidence I have is good enough.
 
   The fossile record might suggest they have
never lived on this planet but that hardly rules out their existence
everywhere.
 
Does XYZ exist?
Let me look around...  I can't see it right now, it must not exist!
 
Instead we should take a more humble approach:
 
I've looked around and cannot see it here, it probably doesn't exist
   here,
however I have no idea whether or not it exists in places I cannot
 see or
have not looked.
 
I think Bayesian inference:
  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference#Evidence_and_changing.
 ..
Is particularly useful in answering questions relating to existence.
  The
question is, what prior probability would you set to a proposition
 such
   as
Other universes not visible to us exist.  1Z and Brent would seem
 to
assign a rather low probability, but that just means a higher
 threshold
   of
evidence will be required to convince them.  Lacking any evidence at
 all,
the least biased prior probability to begin with is 0.5.  If some
   evidence,
for fine tuning for example, accumulates then you should adjust your
   assumed
probability that the proposition Other universes not visible to us
   exist
is true.
 
Are you aware of a better or more fair way of addressing such a
 question?
 
   I am a fallibilist. You are preaching to the converted.
 
  Okay it seems we have a common foundation we agree on.  Can you explain
 why
  you have confidence in the unreality of other possible universes rather
 than
  uncertainty?  What evidence have you seen for or against that
 proposition?



Peter,

Thank you for your very detailed and thoughtful response.


 The  mathematical multiverse suffers from a double wammy: it is
 predicts
 too much (white rabbits) and explains too little (time and
 consciousness are
 not explained). Physical multiverses are a bit more of a nuanced
 issue. Many worlds
 is not my favourite interpretation of QM, but at the end of the day
 there could be
 empirical evidence one way or the other.



If universes are mathematical objects, they follows well-defined equations.
 A few, more rare, universe may have an additional law, at time X, in
location Y, a white rabbit will pop into existence, but the description for
such a universe is much longer.  In self-similar mathematical structures,
such as the programs generated by the UDA, the simpler structures recur much
more frequently, and so the measure for a particular instantiation of an
observer would have a higher measure in universes with shorter
descriptions/definitions.  Further, life cannot evolve in a universe with
unpredictable laws or with laws which constantly change.  If evolution is
the most common path to observers, then again the measure will be higher for
observers located in orderly predictable universes.

Where randomness and unpredictability come from results from observers
lacking sufficient knowledge to locate in which universe they exist, or in
which universe their next consciousness moment may be.  Consider this simple
experiment:

You will be anesthetized on Friday and awoken on Monday morning.  Once you
awake you will be asked what day it is.  Your answer is clear in this case:
It will be Monday.
But then consider this twist: After giving your answer you will be given a
memory formation blocking drug, and anesthetized again until Tuesday
morning.  Where upon you will be asked what day it is.  When you are
informed of this second part of the experiment on Friday, can you still be
sure when you are woken, that it is in 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-16 Thread Brent Meeker

On 2/14/2011 4:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 11:23 AM, Brent Meeker 
meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:


On 2/13/2011 11:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 12:52 AM, Brent Meeker
meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:

On 2/13/2011 10:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker
meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
wrote:

On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:


On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent
Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com  wrote:


What do you think the chances are
that any random object in
Plato's heaven, or any random Turing
machine will support intelligent life?
1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?

Zero.

Does that allow us to argue:

1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite
number of
possibilities has measure
0
2) Our universe exists so it has measure0
3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably
infinite
possibilities
4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from
uncountable
infinite possibilities (since all
of maths includes the real line, etc)
5) MUH is false.


Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven
and Turing machines are not the right kind of things to
support life.



I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me
understand by answering the following questions:

Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a
Turing machine?


Because a Turing machine is an abstraction.  If you mean a
realization of a Turing machine, then I suppose there could
be a simulation of life on it.




How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's
heaven distinguish it from a universe that does not?


I doubt that Plato's heaven exists.  So no universes would
exist in it.

Brent



Exists is a funny word.  It seems to embody knowledge and opinion
from one observer's viewpoint based on their own limited
experiences and interactions within their local portion of reality.


Indeed.  I'm not sure it's unqualified use is meaningful.



If Plato's heaven is such a thing that contains all possible
structures, does the fact that it contains all possible
structures hold true whether or not it exists?


All possible brick structures?  Please explain as precisely as
possible what Platonia is.



If there are universes existing abstractly inside Plato's heaven,
and some of those universes contain conscious observers, does
ascribing the property of non-existence to Plato's heaven or to
those universes make those observers not conscious, or is the
abstraction enough?


What does abstractly existing mean.?  How is it different from
just exsiting?



What properties can something which is non-existent have?

It seems there are two choices: 1. Things which are non-existent
can have other properties besides non-existence.


Sure.  Sherlock Holmes is non-existent and has the property of
being a detective.



E.g., a non-existent universe has atoms, stars, worlds, and
people on some of those worlds.  Or 2. Non-existent things cannot
have any other properties besides non-existence.  It sounds like
you belong to this second camp.

However, this seems to lead immediately to mathematical realism. 
As there are objects with definite objectively explorable

properties in math.  7's primality and parity are properties of
7.  But how can 7 have properties if it does not exist?  If
non-existent things can have properties, why can't consciousness
be one of those properties?  What is the difference between a
non-existent brain experiencing a sunset and an existent brain
experiencing a sunset?


Only one of them exists.



Please explain as precisely as possible what it means for
something to not exist.


If I can kick it and it kicks back it exists.

Brent



What do you think about this passage from Fabric of Reality, where 
David Deutsch argues numbers do kick back:


/Do/ abstract, non-physical entities exist? Are they part of the 
fabric of reality? I am not interested here in issues of mere word 
usage. It is obvious that numbers, the laws of physics, and so on do 
‘exist’ in some senses and not in others. The substantive question is 
this: 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 14 Feb 2011, at 18:46, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 2/14/2011 1:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 14 Feb 2011, at 07:13, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com 
 wrote:

On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:

On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com  wrote:


What do you think the chances are that any random object in
Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine will support  
intelligent life?

1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?

Zero.

Does that allow us to argue:

1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
possibilities has measure
0
2) Our universe exists so it has measure0
3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
possibilities
4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
infinite possibilities (since all
of maths includes the real line, etc)
5) MUH is false.


Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing  
machines are not the right kind of things to support life.



I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me understand  
by answering the following questions:


Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing  
machine?


How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven  
distinguish it from a universe that does not?


That is a good argument which convinces many people, who actually  
ask what is the MGA for?


Here I can imagine what 1Z could answer to How can entities within  
a universe that exists in Plato's heaven distinguish it from a  
universe that does not?.
He assumes the existence of primary matter or of a primitively real  
physical universe,


It's equivocation to speak of entities existing in a domain that  
doesn't exist.


I agree.



If something like arithmetical universe exists, it exists in a very  
different sense of the word than material objects exist.


Arithmetical universe (model of arithmetic theories) already exist in  
a different sense than the existence of natural number. For the  
existence of natural numbers you don't need to postulate sets or  
'universes'. In the comp physics, both person and matter exists in a  
quite different sense than numbers. All the different type of  
existence can be explained intuitively with the notion of persons  
views, or technically by the use of the modalities. ExP(x) means  
usually that there exist a number n such that it is the case that  
P(n), but the existence of matter will be described by a quantized  
formula of the type BD(ExBD(P(n)), or something like that. The  
intensional difference makes all the difference of the notion of  
existence rather transparent. All existence are build from the  
number existence, but none are equivalent to number existence which  
can be taken as the most primitive form of existence.




If there are entities in that universe that are aware of it  
(whatever that may mean) then they a perforce aware in a different  
sense.


Not necessarily. If their awareness is emulated by a computation, then  
such an awareness will not feel any difference if the computation is  
done by this or that type of reality, but the content of their  
consciousness, and the stability of the experience may depend on it in  
the long term. The indeterminacy of their first person experience  
depends on the set of all continuations available in the maximal  
everything structure. That is why we can test the mechanist  
hypothesis.








and will, by decision, attribute consciousness, only to the  
creature made off that primary matter,


No, there is no need to assume primary matter.  One need only  
recognize that there is *this* universe which we are aware of and  
exist in and it is not the same as some other universe which may or  
may not exist in some different sense or another.


OK.





even if the consciousness relies in the computation implemented in  
that matter. So 1Z accepts the idea that arithmetical truth is full  
of zombies, like the 1Z described in arithmetic through the  
arithmetical emulation of our galaxy (say).
But that moves is made impossible by the MGA. To attach  
consciousness to matter, you have to introduce something non Turing  
emulable in that consciousness, or, like Jack Mallah did, attribute  
a physical activity to a piece of matter having no physical  
activity at all relevant with the computation.


But the idea of multiple worlds started with Everett whose  
interpretation of QM implies that there are no pieces of matter with  
no activity.  The universe is defined by a wave function in a  
Hilbert space and pieces of matter are just certain projections.


OK. I don't see why this change anything in the paragraph you quoted.





But this prevent to say yes to the doctor *qua computatio*.


No it doesn't.  Whatever the doctor uses to replace neurons in your  
head is also matter and also part of the universal wave function.


OK.







Do you (the reader of the list, not Jason) agree with 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread David Nyman
On 15 February 2011 00:42, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

 I've tried to argue before that the causal closure of physics is a
 very strong claim that is also very restrictive if applied
 consistently.  Trouble is, in my view, it very rarely is so applied.
 The Hard Problem, and the corresponding zombie intuition, is a sort of
 reductio of the strongest version of this claim - i.e. that what
 exists is reducible to a micro-physical substrate that is fully
 constitutive of all phenomena of whatever type. If this proposition
 were ever to be taken at face value, then further theorising would
 perforce just stop right there; indeed there can be no theories in
 such a scenario, just the sub-atomic events that might have been said
 (but by whom?) to underlie them.

 No, that wouldn't follow because REDUCTION IS NOT ELIMINATION!!!

Yes, so you keep saying, or in this case, shouting ;-)  And of course
I agree with you.  To claim that reality consisted solely of
disconnected events would of course be nonsensical.  Any such
proposition leads directly to a reductio ad absurdum; observation
informs us that reality is manifestly integrated at multiple levels.
But this is the point: all such observation is a posteriori; it isn't
a priori deducible from the theory of a fundamental substrate of
micro-physical entities and their relations.  Moreover, such a theory
does not, a priori, legitimise or require the postulation of complex
higher-order entities in order to account for the state of affairs at
its own level.  But this state of affairs, ex hypothesi, exhausts what
is real.  Therefore if we properly reduce - or restrict - our account
to this level, and hence eliminate any appeal to higher-level concepts
or states, nothing real should be left out.  But this does not accord
with observation. Consequently, higher-level states must also be, in
some ineliminable sense real, or to put it another way, both
differentiation and integration must play a role in an adequate
account of reality.

Remember I'm just doing accounting, not peddling solutions.  My point,
on this accounting, is that the elusive HP and its zombie spawn seem
to be the consequence of an incomplete tally of what is real, and
that this in turn is consequent on intuiting the completeness of
micro-physical theory in the wrong spirit.

David



 On Feb 14, 11:08 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
 On 14 February 2011 20:46, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:

  I asked several times: what are numbers? without getting a reasonable
  reply.
  Sometimes I really like 1Z's twists.

 That may be, but I would also like to see if we can get things
 untwisted.  I'm not peddling any theory of my own here, I'm just
 trying to do some simple accounting.  For example according to some
 theory X doesn't exist and then somewhere else in the same theory
 something supposedly depends on assuming X.  This doesn't add up.
 Part of the problem - most of it, perhaps - is
 psychological-linguistic.  Being dead wrong about some theory of the
 mind (fortunately) doesn't stop our minds from functioning.  But that
 very same fact can blind us to circular reasoning.

 I've tried to argue before that the causal closure of physics is a
 very strong claim that is also very restrictive if applied
 consistently.  Trouble is, in my view, it very rarely is so applied.
 The Hard Problem, and the corresponding zombie intuition, is a sort of
 reductio of the strongest version of this claim - i.e. that what
 exists is reducible to a micro-physical substrate that is fully
 constitutive of all phenomena of whatever type. If this proposition
 were ever to be taken at face value, then further theorising would
 perforce just stop right there; indeed there can be no theories in
 such a scenario, just the sub-atomic events that might have been said
 (but by whom?) to underlie them.

 No, that wouldn't follow because REDUCTION IS NOT ELIMINATION!!!

  Of course this hardly reflects our
 experience (how could it?).  We do not discover ourselves to be in
 some maximally fragmented state (what could it be like?) but rather
 in some integrated state of an altogether higher order;

 Do you think reduction means reduction to *disconnected* bits and
 pieces.

 but such
 quotidian reality apparently impresses us so little that we are quite
 capable of theorising it cheerfully out of existence (e.g. eliminative
 materialism).  Well, as Groucho Marx once innocently enquired who you
 gonna believe - me or your own eyes?.

 David

  David,

  I was laughing all the way from the computer that '7 does not exist'. And
  yes, it does not.
  Do qualia exist without the substrate they serve for as qualia?
  It goes into our deeper thought to identify 'existing' -
  I am willing to go as far as if our mind handles it, 'it' DOES exist
  so the quale like; 7(?) [i.e. the monitor for the eggs in your fridge] is
  existing. Not answering the question 'what it is? - but principally I am
  also against ontology in a 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 14 Feb 2011, at 19:53, 1Z wrote:


CT needs arithmetical platonism/realism.


No it doesn't. It may need bivalence, which is not the same thing (me,
passim)


Reread the definition of AR. I define AR by bivalence.





If you believe the contrary,
could you give me a form of CT which does not presuppose  it?


Every effectively calculable function is a computable function


What is an effectively computable function? What is a computable  
function. Function computable form what to what?







See my papers.



That is just what I am criticising. You need the ontological
premise that mathematical entities have real existence,
and it is a separate premise from comp. That is my
response to your writings.



The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of consensual
reality (doctor, brain, etc.).



If I agree only to the existence of doctors, brains and silicon
computers,
the conclusion that I am an immaterial dreaming machine cannot  
follow


Then you have to present a refutation of UDA+MGA, without begging the
question.


No, I can just present a refutation of Platonism. The conlcusion
does't follo
without it.


Platonism in your sense is not used at all in the reasoning.






It does not assume that physical things
really or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers
really
exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical sense.



There is no generally agreed mathematical sense. If mathematical
anti-realists are right, they don't exist at all and I am therefore
not one.


Mathematicians don't care about the nature of the existence of  
natural

numbers.


Fine. Such an ontologically non-commital idea of AR cannot support
your conclusion



Why?






They all agree with statement like there exist prime
number, etc.


Yes, they tend to agree on a set of true existence statements, and to
disagree on
what existence means.


Only during the pause café. It does not change their mind on the  
issues in their papers.








Read a book on logic and computability.



Read a book on philosophy, on the limitations of
apriori reasoning, on the contentious nature of mathematical
ontology.



You are the one opposing a paper in applied logic in the cognitive
and
physical science. I suggest you look at books to better see what  
i am

taking about.



You are the one who is doing ontology without realising it.


On consciousness. Not on numbers,


You're saying *my* consciousness *is* a number!


Where? Consciousness, like truth, is not even definable in arithmetic.  
I keep insisting on that all the time.







which I use in the usual
mathematical or theoretical computer sense. The reasoning is agonstic
on God, primary universe, mind, etc. at the start.
The only ontology used in the reasoning is the ontology of my
consciousness, and some amount of consensual reality (existence of
universe, brains, doctors, ...). Of course I do not assume either  
that

such things are primitoively material, except at step 8 for the
reductio ad absurdo. Up to step seven you can still believe in a
primitively material reality.


You cannot eliminate the existence of matter in favour of the
existence
of numbers without assuming the existence of numbers


I assume no more than the axiom of Robinson Arithmetic. Physicists  
assumes them too, albeit not explicitly.







Boolos and
Jeffrey, or Mendelson, or the Dover book by Martin Davis are
excellent.
It is a traditional exercise to define those machine in  
arithmetic.



I have no doubt, but you don't get real minds and universes
out of hypothetical machines.


You mean mathematical machine. They are not hypothetical. Unless  
you

believe that the number seven is hypothetical,



I do. Haven't you got that yet?


I did understand that seven is immaterial.


Not just immaterial. Non existent.


Ex(x = s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0)) is provable in Robinson Arithmetic.
And you tell me that your are formalist, so be it.







But I am OK with seven
being hypothetical. It changes nothing in the reasoning.


I am not running on some immaterial TM that exists only in your head


How do you know that?









in which case I get
hypothetical minds and hypothetical universes.



I am not generated by a hypothesis: I generate hypotheses.


Confusion level. If you suppose a TOE you are supposed to be  
explained

by that TOE.


Explained by, not caused by. Things fell before Newton explained
gravity


That was my point.






In that sense you are generated by an hypothesis,


I am not generated by a hypothesis, even a true one, any more
than my house is built on a map, even an accurate one.


That's why I put 'in that (uninteresting) sense'.






Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at all
with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has to be
reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an invisible
epiphenomena.


Physics cannot be eliminated in favour of non existent numbers.
Numbers
have to exist for the 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
enough for the comp consequences.,



Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.


That's my point.


Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
I am an immaterial dreaming machine.


It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the  
philosophy you want. Just be careful in case you do say yes to a  
physically real doctor.








Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to  
say

that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'



Not at all.


OK. This means that you are using arithmetical platonia in a sense
which is not relevant for the reasoning.
If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at  
all.


I accept CT and reject Platonism,
and thus the reasoning does not go
through.


To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P  
on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the  
use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is what I  
called Arithmetical realism.
I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in  
which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the  
projection of something else. That use of Platonism come up in the  
conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start.







. People needs to be
ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.



No, they just need to be anti realist.


Same remark.


Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.


Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the  
fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.







Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is  
hard to

define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
realist about them.



Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
you 7 doesn't exist.


You contradict your self,


No I don't. How many times have I explained that
mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
sense that doesn't imply real existence


Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes doctor +  
occam gives the ontological conclusion.







unless you mean that seven is not made of
matter. In which case comp nothing exists.


What does comp nothing exists mean?


Sorry. I meant In which case comp implies nothing exists.





Even to say I am not arithmetical realist is
enough to be an arithmetical realist



Nonsense.


Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical
realism in mathematics.


I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
and you think you are a  number


I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital  
backup. So locally I am a number, in that sense. But this concerns  
only my third person I (body), and I show that the first person  
naturally associated (by its memories, or by the classical theory of  
knowledge) is not a number.








. A real anti-ariothmetical
realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need  
to be

an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.



Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
is not
just reference.


A reasoning is valid, or not valid.


A true conclusion requires soundness as well as validity


In science we never know if our premisses and conclusions are true or  
not. We judge validity only.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread David Nyman
On 15 February 2011 13:27, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
 and you think you are a  number

 I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital backup. So
 locally I am a number, in that sense. But this concerns only my third
 person I (body), and I show that the first person naturally associated (by
 its memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number.

I hesitate (really!) to but into one of these delightful to-ings and
fro-ings, but it strikes me that a focus on Peter's claim, and Bruno's
rebuttal, above might be fruitful for the overall discussion.  Peter's
objection seems to be summed up by you think you are a number.  But
Bruno's reply is that the first person naturally associated (by its
memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number.
He has said elsewhere that comp can be considered a form of
(objective) idealism, and hence its ontological basis - i.e. what is
RITSIAR - is the ideal, or equivalently, consciousness in some
primary or undifferentiated sense.  From this perspective, the number
realm is conceived not as an independent ontology in itself, but
rather as the effective means of differentiating the epistemology of
persons and their physical environments, whose ontology is inherited
from the whole.

Does this help?

David



 On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:



 On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:



 On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
 you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
 enough for the comp consequences.,

 Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
 not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.

 That's my point.

 Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
 I am an immaterial dreaming machine.

 It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the
 philosophy you want. Just be careful in case you do say yes to a
 physically real doctor.





 Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to say
 that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'

 Not at all.

 OK. This means that you are using arithmetical platonia in a sense
 which is not relevant for the reasoning.
 If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at all.

 I accept CT and reject Platonism,
 and thus the reasoning does not go
 through.

 To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P on any
 input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the use of
 classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is what I called
 Arithmetical realism.
 I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in which
 the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the projection of
 something else. That use of Platonism come up in the conclusion of the
 reasoning and is not assumed at the start.




 . People needs to be
 ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.

 No, they just need to be anti realist.

 Same remark.

 Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.

 Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the fact
 that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.





 Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is hard to
 define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
 realist about them.

 Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
 you 7 doesn't exist.

 You contradict your self,

 No I don't. How many times have I explained that
 mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
 sense that doesn't imply real existence

 Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes doctor + occam
 gives the ontological conclusion.




 unless you mean that seven is not made of
 matter. In which case comp nothing exists.

 What does comp nothing exists mean?

 Sorry. I meant In which case comp implies nothing exists.



 Even to say I am not arithmetical realist is
 enough to be an arithmetical realist

 Nonsense.

 Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical
 realism in mathematics.

 I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
 and you think you are a  number

 I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital backup. So
 locally I am a number, in that sense. But this concerns only my third
 person I (body), and I show that the first person naturally associated (by
 its memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number.





 . A real anti-ariothmetical
 realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need to be
 an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.

 Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
 is not
 just reference.

 A reasoning is 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread 1Z


On Feb 15, 12:56 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
 On 15 February 2011 00:42, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

  I've tried to argue before that the causal closure of physics is a
  very strong claim that is also very restrictive if applied
  consistently.  Trouble is, in my view, it very rarely is so applied.
  The Hard Problem, and the corresponding zombie intuition, is a sort of
  reductio of the strongest version of this claim - i.e. that what
  exists is reducible to a micro-physical substrate that is fully
  constitutive of all phenomena of whatever type. If this proposition
  were ever to be taken at face value, then further theorising would
  perforce just stop right there; indeed there can be no theories in
  such a scenario, just the sub-atomic events that might have been said
  (but by whom?) to underlie them.

  No, that wouldn't follow because REDUCTION IS NOT ELIMINATION!!!

 Yes, so you keep saying, or in this case, shouting ;-)  And of course
 I agree with you.  To claim that reality consisted solely of
 disconnected events would of course be nonsensical.  Any such
 proposition leads directly to a reductio ad absurdum; observation
 informs us that reality is manifestly integrated at multiple levels.
 But this is the point: all such observation is a posteriori; it isn't
 a priori deducible from the theory of a fundamental substrate of
 micro-physical entities and their relations.

Asserted without evidence argument.

AFAICS, any *correct* theory must, as an analytical truth, recover
*all* appearances
including appearances of integration...that is what a correct theory
means.

 Moreover, such a theory
 does not, a priori, legitimise or require the postulation of complex
 higher-order entities

*irreducible* higher order entities. Houses still exist, but they
are made of bricks which are made of

 in order to account for the state of affairs at
 its own level.  But this state of affairs, ex hypothesi, exhausts what
 is real.  Therefore if we properly reduce - or restrict - our account
 to this level, and hence eliminate any appeal to higher-level concepts
 or states, nothing real should be left out.  But this does not accord
 with observation.

What  observation? That there are higher order entities? But
reductionism *says* there are. It just says they are reducible.

 Consequently, higher-level states must also be, in
 some ineliminable sense real,

So what? The claim of reductionism is that they are
reducible, not that they are eliminable! You
are arguing from your incorrect premise.

or to put it another way, both
 differentiation and integration must play a role in an adequate
 account of reality.

But didn't you just agree that integration isn't absent from
scientific accounts? If we want to explain how ice, liquid water and
steam
are made of the same components, we must also explain how
those components are integrated in each case--how they are
bound together or not as the case may be-- so that we can save
appearances, and explain
the differences between them.

 Remember I'm just doing accounting, not peddling solutions.  My point,
 on this accounting, is that the elusive HP and its zombie spawn seem
 to be the consequence of an incomplete tally of what is real, and
 that this in turn is consequent on intuiting the completeness of
 micro-physical theory in the wrong spirit.


Still unclear. Are you saying that reductionism can't solve the HP
because it can't integrate anything (although I have just explained
how it can and must)?

Or just making the more standard argument that the HP is an
exceptional problem?

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread 1Z


On Feb 15, 1:16 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 14 Feb 2011, at 19:53, 1Z wrote:

  CT needs arithmetical platonism/realism.

  No it doesn't. It may need bivalence, which is not the same thing (me,
  passim)

 Reread the definition of AR. I define AR by bivalence.

Fine. Then it isn't an ontological premiss, and the ontological
conclusion
that I am an Immaterial Dreaming Machine doesn't follow.

  If you believe the contrary,
  could you give me a form of CT which does not presuppose  it?

  Every effectively calculable function is a computable function

 What is an effectively computable function?

Something a human can work out given instruction

 What is a computable  
 function.

Something a computer can do given a programme

 Function computable form what to what?


  See my papers.

  That is just what I am criticising. You need the ontological
  premise that mathematical entities have real existence,
  and it is a separate premise from comp. That is my
  response to your writings.

  The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of consensual
  reality (doctor, brain, etc.).

  If I agree only to the existence of doctors, brains and silicon
  computers,
  the conclusion that I am an immaterial dreaming machine cannot  
  follow

  Then you have to present a refutation of UDA+MGA, without begging the
  question.

  No, I can just present a refutation of Platonism. The conlcusion
  does't follo
  without it.

 Platonism in your sense is not used at all in the reasoning.

The the conclusion doesn't follow.

  It does not assume that physical things
  really or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers
  really
  exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical sense.

  There is no generally agreed mathematical sense. If mathematical
  anti-realists are right, they don't exist at all and I am therefore
  not one.

  Mathematicians don't care about the nature of the existence of  
  natural
  numbers.

  Fine. Such an ontologically non-commital idea of AR cannot support
  your conclusion

 Why?

Because the conclusions of ontolgocial arguments either
follow from ontological premisses, or don't follow at all.

  They all agree with statement like there exist prime
  number, etc.

  Yes, they tend to agree on a set of true existence statements, and to
  disagree on
  what existence means.

 Only during the pause café. It does not change their mind on the  
 issues in their papers.

Why would it, since they are not doing *philosophy* of maths.

  Read a book on logic and computability.

  Read a book on philosophy, on the limitations of
  apriori reasoning, on the contentious nature of mathematical
  ontology.

  You are the one opposing a paper in applied logic in the cognitive
  and
  physical science. I suggest you look at books to better see what  
  i am
  taking about.

  You are the one who is doing ontology without realising it.

  On consciousness. Not on numbers,

  You're saying *my* consciousness *is* a number!

 Where? Consciousness, like truth, is not even definable in arithmetic.  
 I keep insisting on that all the time.

Fine. Then consc. doesn't emerge from aritmetic, and physics does't
emerge
from consc.

  which I use in the usual
  mathematical or theoretical computer sense. The reasoning is agonstic
  on God, primary universe, mind, etc. at the start.
  The only ontology used in the reasoning is the ontology of my
  consciousness, and some amount of consensual reality (existence of
  universe, brains, doctors, ...). Of course I do not assume either  
  that
  such things are primitoively material, except at step 8 for the
  reductio ad absurdo. Up to step seven you can still believe in a
  primitively material reality.

  You cannot eliminate the existence of matter in favour of the
  existence
  of numbers without assuming the existence of numbers

 I assume no more than the axiom of Robinson Arithmetic.

You obviously don't adopt those axioms in the sense that
an anti realist would. Why keep arguing against anti realism?

Physicists  
 assumes them too, albeit not explicitly.



  Boolos and
  Jeffrey, or Mendelson, or the Dover book by Martin Davis are
  excellent.
  It is a traditional exercise to define those machine in  
  arithmetic.

  I have no doubt, but you don't get real minds and universes
  out of hypothetical machines.

  You mean mathematical machine. They are not hypothetical. Unless  
  you
  believe that the number seven is hypothetical,

  I do. Haven't you got that yet?

  I did understand that seven is immaterial.

  Not just immaterial. Non existent.

 Ex(x = s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0)) is provable in Robinson Arithmetic.

Yes. But it means nothing ontologically. I can prove that if
Sherlock Holmes is on the room, and Hercules Poirot is in the
room, two detectives are on the room. But it has
nothing to do with reality.

 And you tell me that your are formalist, so be it.



  But I am OK with seven
  being hypothetical. 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread 1Z


On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:





  On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
  enough for the comp consequences.,

  Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
  not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.

  That's my point.

  Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
  I am an immaterial dreaming machine.

 It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the  
 philosophy you want.

I want to say number aren't real, so I'm not really a number

Just be careful in case you do say yes to a  
 physically real doctor.





  Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to  
  say
  that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'

  Not at all.

  OK. This means that you are using arithmetical platonia in a sense
  which is not relevant for the reasoning.
  If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at  
  all.

  I accept CT and reject Platonism,
  and thus the reasoning does not go
  through.

 To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P  
 on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the  
 use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is what I  
 called Arithmetical realism.

That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.

 I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in  
 which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the  
 projection of something else.

In the context of phiosophy of mathematics, Platonism
is the claim that numbers have immaterial, non spatio temporal
existence

That use of Platonism come up in the  
 conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start.



  . People needs to be
  ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.

  No, they just need to be anti realist.

  Same remark.

  Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.

 Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the  
 fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.

I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number

  Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is  
  hard to
  define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
  realist about them.

  Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
  you 7 doesn't exist.

  You contradict your self,

  No I don't. How many times have I explained that
  mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
  sense that doesn't imply real existence

 Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes doctor +  
 occam gives the ontological conclusion.

No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.


  unless you mean that seven is not made of
  matter. In which case comp nothing exists.

  What does comp nothing exists mean?

 Sorry. I meant In which case comp implies nothing exists.

Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known
computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical.

  Even to say I am not arithmetical realist is
  enough to be an arithmetical realist

  Nonsense.

  Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical
  realism in mathematics.

  I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
  and you think you are a  number

 I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital  
 backup. So locally I am a number, in that sense.

That's misleading. There is a difference between being tied
to no particular physical instance and being tied to no instance at
all.

But this concerns  
 only my third person I (body), and I show that the first person  
 naturally associated (by its memories, or by the classical theory of  
 knowledge) is not a number.



  . A real anti-ariothmetical
  realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need  
  to be
  an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.

  Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
  is not
  just reference.

  A reasoning is valid, or not valid.

  A true conclusion requires soundness as well as validity

 In science we never know if our premisses and conclusions are true or  
 not.

I can still resist the conclusion by *believing* Platonism
to be false, while believing comp to be true.

We judge validity only.

 Bruno

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread 1Z


On Feb 15, 1:54 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
 On 15 February 2011 13:27, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

  I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
  and you think you are a  number

  I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital backup. So
  locally I am a number, in that sense. But this concerns only my third
  person I (body), and I show that the first person naturally associated (by
  its memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number.

 I hesitate (really!) to but into one of these delightful to-ings and
 fro-ings, but it strikes me that a focus on Peter's claim, and Bruno's
 rebuttal, above might be fruitful for the overall discussion.  Peter's
 objection seems to be summed up by you think you are a number.  But
 Bruno's reply is that the first person naturally associated (by its
 memories, or by the classical theory of knowledge) is not a number.

He thinks he's an immaterial something or other. I am not particularly
bothered about whether that is an immaterial number, immaterial
machine,
etc.

 He has said elsewhere that comp can be considered a form of
 (objective) idealism, and hence its ontological basis - i.e. what is
 RITSIAR - is the ideal, or equivalently, consciousness in some
 primary or undifferentiated sense.  From this perspective, the number
 realm is conceived not as an independent ontology in itself, but
 rather as the effective means of differentiating the epistemology of
 persons and their physical environments, whose ontology is inherited
 from the whole.

 Does this help?

 David

No. I don't thinkBM is assuming the primacy of consciousness, and I
can make  no sense of it.

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 15 Feb 2011, at 01:42, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 2/14/2011 11:36 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Programs are not written with physical instantiation in mind...  
even if eventually you run it.


Really?  Did people write programs before computers were invented?


If you abstract from Babbage quasi-computer, then yes. Combinators,  
lambda expressions, including universal one, have been written before  
computers have been builded.






What is important is the computation which doesn't care about the  
physical instantiation as such.


A program could be written to care about it's instantiation, but  
usually it's the programmer who cares.


We care about higher level instantiation. Theoretically and  
empirically we know that our lowest level instantiation is given by a  
sum on many histories.


Bruno






When I stop executing a program does it cease to exist ? And come  
back to existence the instant I run it ?


A program may be written on paper, punched on cards, or encoded in  
neurons.


Brent


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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:09, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 15, 1:16 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 14 Feb 2011, at 19:53, 1Z wrote:


CT needs arithmetical platonism/realism.


No it doesn't. It may need bivalence, which is not the same thing  
(me,

passim)


Reread the definition of AR. I define AR by bivalence.


Fine. Then it isn't an ontological premiss, and the ontological
conclusion
that I am an Immaterial Dreaming Machine doesn't follow.



But comp is not just CT. Comp is also yes doctor, which uses some  
ontological commitment, notably is physical reality (albeit not  
necessarily a primitive one), and bet on self-consciousness. And the  
conclusion is not ontological per se. The reasoning does not show that  
primary matter does not exist, only that it cannot be used to select  
my consciousness evolution.







If you believe the contrary,

could you give me a form of CT which does not presuppose  it?



Every effectively calculable function is a computable function


What is an effectively computable function?


Something a human can work out given instruction


No. That is a computable function.




What is a computable
function.


Something a computer can do given a programme


No. You need CT to define a computer as anything computing what a  
universal machine (an immaterial mathematical concept) computes.







Function computable form what to what?



I answer for you: from N to N. N is the set of natural numbers.






See my papers.



That is just what I am criticising. You need the ontological
premise that mathematical entities have real existence,
and it is a separate premise from comp. That is my
response to your writings.


The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of  
consensual

reality (doctor, brain, etc.).



If I agree only to the existence of doctors, brains and silicon
computers,
the conclusion that I am an immaterial dreaming machine cannot
follow


Then you have to present a refutation of UDA+MGA, without begging  
the

question.



No, I can just present a refutation of Platonism. The conlcusion
does't follo
without it.


Platonism in your sense is not used at all in the reasoning.


The the conclusion doesn't follow.



?





It does not assume that physical things
really or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers
really
exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical  
sense.



There is no generally agreed mathematical sense. If mathematical
anti-realists are right, they don't exist at all and I am  
therefore

not one.



Mathematicians don't care about the nature of the existence of
natural
numbers.



Fine. Such an ontologically non-commital idea of AR cannot support
your conclusion


Why?


Because the conclusions of ontolgocial arguments either
follow from ontological premisses, or don't follow at all.



Yes. I have already acquiesce ten times on this. And then?







They all agree with statement like there exist prime
number, etc.


Yes, they tend to agree on a set of true existence statements, and  
to

disagree on
what existence means.


Only during the pause café. It does not change their mind on the
issues in their papers.


Why would it, since they are not doing *philosophy* of maths.



So why would I?






Read a book on logic and computability.



Read a book on philosophy, on the limitations of
apriori reasoning, on the contentious nature of mathematical
ontology.


You are the one opposing a paper in applied logic in the  
cognitive

and
physical science. I suggest you look at books to better see what
i am
taking about.



You are the one who is doing ontology without realising it.



On consciousness. Not on numbers,



You're saying *my* consciousness *is* a number!


Where? Consciousness, like truth, is not even definable in  
arithmetic.

I keep insisting on that all the time.


Fine. Then consc. doesn't emerge from aritmetic, and physics does't
emerge
from consc.


You are quick here. I don't see argument. Just assertions.






which I use in the usual
mathematical or theoretical computer sense. The reasoning is  
agonstic

on God, primary universe, mind, etc. at the start.
The only ontology used in the reasoning is the ontology of my
consciousness, and some amount of consensual reality (existence of
universe, brains, doctors, ...). Of course I do not assume either
that
such things are primitoively material, except at step 8 for the
reductio ad absurdo. Up to step seven you can still believe in a
primitively material reality.



You cannot eliminate the existence of matter in favour of the
existence
of numbers without assuming the existence of numbers


I assume no more than the axiom of Robinson Arithmetic.


You obviously don't adopt those axioms in the sense that
an anti realist would. Why keep arguing against anti realism?



I don't argue against anti-realism. I argue against the relevance of  
anti-realism, and philosophy for showing the validity or non validity  
of a reasoning.








Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:






On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:



On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or  
false? If
you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,  
which is

enough for the comp consequences.,



Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.



That's my point.



Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
I am an immaterial dreaming machine.


It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the
philosophy you want.


I want to say number aren't real, so I'm not really a number


All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me  
nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not real,  
which is a bit absurd at the start.

Could you define what you mean by real?






Just be careful in case you do say yes to a
physically real doctor.






Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to
say
that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'



Not at all.


OK. This means that you are using arithmetical platonia in a  
sense

which is not relevant for the reasoning.
If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at
all.



I accept CT and reject Platonism,
and thus the reasoning does not go
through.


To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P
on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the
use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is  
what I

called Arithmetical realism.


That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.


Right. But then Comp is CT + yes doctor, where yes doctor is a  
memo for it exists a level of description of my generalized body such  
that   (see the paper).







I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in
which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the
projection of something else.


In the context of phiosophy of mathematics, Platonism
is the claim that numbers have immaterial, non spatio temporal
existence


I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a conclusion  
related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the  
arithmetical realism vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A  
arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true  
independently of me, you, etc.








That use of Platonism come up in the
conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start.




. People needs to be
ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.



No, they just need to be anti realist.



Same remark.



Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.


Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the
fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.


I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number


It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being  
reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand  
that the feeling of matter is a construct of your mind. Then it is  
just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains  
all the emulation of all programs, and this in relative proportion. AT  
contains a natural matrix, and we can test it because it has a non  
trivial precise mathematical structure, related to the self- 
referential points of view available to the universal numbers.








Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is
hard to
define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are  
not

realist about them.



Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
you 7 doesn't exist.



You contradict your self,



No I don't. How many times have I explained that
mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
sense that doesn't imply real existence


Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes  
doctor +

occam gives the ontological conclusion.


No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.


That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many fictive terms as you  
want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the  
testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).








unless you mean that seven is not made of
matter. In which case comp nothing exists.



What does comp nothing exists mean?


Sorry. I meant In which case comp implies nothing exists.


Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known
computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical.


You will not find any book in physics, except by Zristotle which use  
the notion of primary matter.
You will not find any book on computers which mention 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread 1Z


On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:





  On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or  
  false? If
  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,  
  which is
  enough for the comp consequences.,

  Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
  not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.

  That's my point.

  Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
  I am an immaterial dreaming machine.

  It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with the
  philosophy you want.

  I want to say number aren't real, so I'm not really a number

 All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me  
 nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not real,  

Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?

 which is a bit absurd at the start.
 Could you define what you mean by real?

i can point to my own reality.

  Just be careful in case you do say yes to a
  physically real doctor.

  Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to
  say
  that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'

  Not at all.

  OK. This means that you are using arithmetical platonia in a  
  sense
  which is not relevant for the reasoning.
  If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at
  all.

  I accept CT and reject Platonism,
  and thus the reasoning does not go
  through.

  To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any program P
  on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept the
  use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is  
  what I
  called Arithmetical realism.

  That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.

 Right. But then Comp is CT + yes doctor, where yes doctor is a  
 memo for it exists a level of description of my generalized body such  
 that   (see the paper).

I am not a description. I for descriptions.

  I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology in
  which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the
  projection of something else.

  In the context of phiosophy of mathematics, Platonism
  is the claim that numbers have immaterial, non spatio temporal
  existence

 I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a conclusion  
 related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the  
 arithmetical realism vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A  
 arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true  
 independently of me, you, etc.

You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
with a merely formal statement of bivalence


  That use of Platonism come up in the
  conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start.

  . People needs to be
  ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.

  No, they just need to be anti realist.

  Same remark.

  Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.

  Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the
  fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.

  I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
  medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number

 It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being  
 reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand  
 that the feeling of matter is a construct of your mind. Then it is  
 just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains  
 all the emulation of all programs,

As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
running programmes.

and this in relative proportion. AT  
 contains a natural matrix, and we can test it because it has a non  
 trivial precise mathematical structure, related to the self-
 referential points of view available to the universal numbers.





  Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is
  hard to
  define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are  
  not
  realist about them.

  Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
  you 7 doesn't exist.

  You contradict your self,

  No I don't. How many times have I explained that
  mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
  sense that doesn't imply real existence

  Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes  
  doctor +
  occam gives the ontological conclusion.

  No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.

 That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many fictive terms as you  
 want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the  
 testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).

If it 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:






On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:



On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:



On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or
false? If
you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,
which is
enough for the comp consequences.,



Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.



That's my point.



Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
I am an immaterial dreaming machine.


It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with  
the

philosophy you want.



I want to say number aren't real, so I'm not really a number


All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not  
real,


Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?


I meant in general.






which is a bit absurd at the start.
Could you define what you mean by real?


i can point to my own reality.


To your own consciousness. I grant that. But nothing else. Wake up!






Just be careful in case you do say yes to a
physically real doctor.


Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough  
to

say
that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'



Not at all.



OK. This means that you are using arithmetical platonia in a
sense
which is not relevant for the reasoning.
If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning  
at

all.



I accept CT and reject Platonism,
and thus the reasoning does not go
through.


To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any  
program P
on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept  
the

use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is
what I
called Arithmetical realism.



That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.


Right. But then Comp is CT + yes doctor, where yes doctor is a
memo for it exists a level of description of my generalized body  
such

that   (see the paper).


I am not a description. I for descriptions.


I am not a description too. Neither from the first nor the third  
person view.
The difficulty of logic consists in the understanding of the  
difference between a fact which might be true, like 1+1=2, and a  
description of that fact, like 1+1=2. Modern tools makes it possible  
to handle that difference in purely formal ways.
The difficulty in MGA consists in understanding the difference between  
a computation (be it immaterial or material) and a description of a  
computation (be it immaterial or material).





I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology  
in

which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the
projection of something else.



In the context of phiosophy of mathematics, Platonism
is the claim that numbers have immaterial, non spatio temporal
existence


I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a  
conclusion

related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the
arithmetical realism vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A
arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true
independently of me, you, etc.


You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
with a merely formal statement of bivalence


I use bivalence but also yes doctor. Then after concluding, we can  
take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is  
explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among other  
things) from that.










That use of Platonism come up in the
conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start.



. People needs to be
ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.



No, they just need to be anti realist.



Same remark.



Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.



Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the
fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.



I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number


It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand
that the feeling of matter is a construct of your mind. Then it is
just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains
all the emulation of all programs,


As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
running programmes.


Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers' configurations.






and this in relative proportion. AT
contains a natural matrix, and we can test it because it has a non
trivial precise mathematical structure, related to 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread 1Z


On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:


  In science we never know if our premisses and conclusions are  
  true or
  not.

  I can still resist the conclusion by *believing* Platonism
  to be false, while believing comp to be true.

  platonism is ambiguous.

  I mean and have always meant mathematical Platonism

 But you talk on a paper with a different terminology.

What paper? The Klein paper doesn't mention it.

 You are  
 confusing people.



  Any way, you can resist any conclusion in
  science with some ad-hoc philosophy.

  There is nothing unscientific in the attitude
  the immaterial things don't exist.

 Right, but irrelevant.



  So you are not saying something
  informative here.
  Ad without a minimal amount of arithmetical realism you cannot  
  endorse
  Church thesis,

  A formalist can endorses anything with no ontological
  realism whatsoever. All that is left without any ontological
  realism is a formal axiom of bivalence

 ... which added to the theological bet yes doctor entails that  
 materialism, to explain matter,  is not better than vitalism to  
 explain life.

Materialism can solve WR just fine

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2011/2/15 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com



 On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
 
 
 
 
 
   On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
   On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
 
   On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
   On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
 
   On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
   On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
 
   On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
   Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or
   false? If
   you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,
   which is
   enough for the comp consequences.,
 
   Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
   not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
 
   That's my point.
 
   Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
   I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
 
   It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with
   the
   philosophy you want.
 
   I want to say number aren't real, so I'm not really a number
 
   All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
   nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
   real,
 
   Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
 
  I meant in general.


 I don't need anything more than
 1) I am real
 2) Unreal things don't generate real things

 I think both of those are hard to dispute.


You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument that prove
that they are unreal (or real or whatever). The principle is sound, the
choice is not without arguments. You say numbers don't exist... but as I
said before, I can think about them in my mind... I exist, hence they
transitively exist through my mind at the least. I do not chose if a number
is prime or not hence I'm not inventing them as I'm not inventing the world
around me.



   which is a bit absurd at the start.
   Could you define what you mean by real?
 
   i can point to my own reality.
 
  To your own consciousness. I grant that. But nothing else. Wake up!



   That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.
 
   Right. But then Comp is CT + yes doctor, where yes doctor is a
   memo for it exists a level of description of my generalized body
   such
   that   (see the paper).
 
   I am not a description. I for descriptions.
 
  I am not a description too. Neither from the first nor the third
  person view.
  The difficulty of logic consists in the understanding of the
  difference between a fact which might be true, like 1+1=2, and a
  description of that fact, like 1+1=2. Modern tools makes it possible
  to handle that difference in purely formal ways.
  The difficulty in MGA consists in understanding the difference between
  a computation (be it immaterial or material) and a description of a
  computation (be it immaterial or material).
  existence
 
   I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a
   conclusion
   related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the
   arithmetical realism vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A
   arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true
   independently of me, you, etc.
 
   You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
   with a merely formal statement of bivalence
 
  I use bivalence but also yes doctor.

 But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing
 to a physical substitution

  Then after concluding, we can
  take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is
  explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among other
  things) from that.

   Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the
   fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.
 
   I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
   medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number
 
   It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
   reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand
   that the feeling of matter is a construct of your mind. Then it is
   just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains
   all the emulation of all programs,
 
   As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
   running programmes.
 
  Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers' configurations.


 If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make
 and indexical judgement of actuality.


   You contradict your self,
 
   No I don't. How many times have I explained that
   mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
   sense that doesn't imply real existence
 
   Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes
   doctor +
   occam gives the ontological conclusion.
 
   No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.
 
   That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many fictive terms as you
   want, it will 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread 1Z


On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:





  On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or
  false? If
  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,
  which is
  enough for the comp consequences.,

  Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
  not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.

  That's my point.

  Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
  I am an immaterial dreaming machine.

  It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with  
  the
  philosophy you want.

  I want to say number aren't real, so I'm not really a number

  All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
  nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not  
  real,

  Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?

 I meant in general.


I don't need anything more than
1) I am real
2) Unreal things don't generate real things

I think both of those are hard to dispute.

  which is a bit absurd at the start.
  Could you define what you mean by real?

  i can point to my own reality.

 To your own consciousness. I grant that. But nothing else. Wake up!



  That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.

  Right. But then Comp is CT + yes doctor, where yes doctor is a
  memo for it exists a level of description of my generalized body  
  such
  that   (see the paper).

  I am not a description. I for descriptions.

 I am not a description too. Neither from the first nor the third  
 person view.
 The difficulty of logic consists in the understanding of the  
 difference between a fact which might be true, like 1+1=2, and a  
 description of that fact, like 1+1=2. Modern tools makes it possible  
 to handle that difference in purely formal ways.
 The difficulty in MGA consists in understanding the difference between  
 a computation (be it immaterial or material) and a description of a  
 computation (be it immaterial or material).
 existence

  I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a  
  conclusion
  related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the
  arithmetical realism vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A
  arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true
  independently of me, you, etc.

  You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
  with a merely formal statement of bivalence

 I use bivalence but also yes doctor.

But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing
to a physical substitution

 Then after concluding, we can  
 take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is  
 explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among other  
 things) from that.

  Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the
  fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.

  I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
  medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number

  It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
  reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand
  that the feeling of matter is a construct of your mind. Then it is
  just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains
  all the emulation of all programs,

  As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
  running programmes.

 Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers' configurations.


If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make
and indexical judgement of actuality.


  You contradict your self,

  No I don't. How many times have I explained that
  mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
  sense that doesn't imply real existence

  Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes
  doctor +
  occam gives the ontological conclusion.

  No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.

  That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many fictive terms as you
  want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the
  testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).

  If it is testable, it is false.

 Why?

Not enough WR's.

  What does comp nothing exists mean?

  Sorry. I meant In which case comp implies nothing exists.

  Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known
  computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical.

  You will not find any book in physics, except by Zristotle which use
  the notion of primary matter.

  They all do. Physicists think matter/energy exists.

 Some does not. John A. Wheeler is 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread Brent Meeker

On 2/15/2011 11:28 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2011/2/15 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com



On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:





  On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or
  false? If
  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,
  which is
  enough for the comp consequences.,

  Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and
therefore
  not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or
don't.

  That's my point.

  Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
  I am an immaterial dreaming machine.

  It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you
want, with
  the
  philosophy you want.

  I want to say number aren't real, so I'm not really a number

  All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
  nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
  real,

  Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?

 I meant in general.


I don't need anything more than
1) I am real
2) Unreal things don't generate real things

I think both of those are hard to dispute.


You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument that 
prove that they are unreal (or real or whatever). The principle is 
sound, the choice is not without arguments. You say numbers don't 
exist... but as I said before, I can think about them in my mind...


Actually I don't think you can.  You can think of the symbol 7 and the 
word seven and you can probably think of seven things, xxx,  but I 
doubt you can think of the number seven.  I'm pretty sure you can't 
think of the set of all sets with seven members.  And I'm quite sure you 
can't think of all the integers or all arithmetic.


I exist, hence they transitively exist through my mind at the least. I 
do not chose if a number is prime or not hence I'm not inventing them 
as I'm not inventing the world around me.


Can you think of Sherlock Holmes?  a pink unicorn?   Can you think of a 
number that is one bigger than the biggest number you can think of 
(which per Peano must exist)?


Brent

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2011/2/15 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com

  On 2/15/2011 11:28 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



 2011/2/15 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com



 On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
 
 
 
 
 
   On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
   On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
 
   On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
   On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
 
   On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
   On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
 
   On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
   Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or
   false? If
   you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,
   which is
   enough for the comp consequences.,
 
   Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
   not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
 
   That's my point.
 
   Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
   I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
 
   It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with
   the
   philosophy you want.
 
   I want to say number aren't real, so I'm not really a number
 
   All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
   nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
   real,
 
   Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
 
  I meant in general.


  I don't need anything more than
 1) I am real
 2) Unreal things don't generate real things

 I think both of those are hard to dispute.


  You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument that
 prove that they are unreal (or real or whatever). The principle is sound,
 the choice is not without arguments. You say numbers don't exist... but as I
 said before, I can think about them in my mind...


 Actually I don't think you can.  You can think of the symbol 7 and the
 word seven and you can probably think of seven things, xxx,  but I
 doubt you can think of the number seven.  I'm pretty sure you can't think of
 the set of all sets with seven members.  And I'm quite sure you can't think
 of all the integers or all arithmetic.


  I exist, hence they transitively exist through my mind at the least. I do
 not chose if a number is prime or not hence I'm not inventing them as I'm
 not inventing the world around me.


 Can you think of Sherlock Holmes?  a pink unicorn?   Can you think of a
 number that is one bigger than the biggest number you can think of (which
 per Peano must exist)?

 Brent


The difference is I can choose what are/who are/the behavior of... Sherlock
 holmes/pink unicorn/whatever... not the numbers once an axiomatic system is
chosen.

Quentin


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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread Brent Meeker

On 2/15/2011 12:28 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2011/2/15 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com 
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com


On 2/15/2011 11:28 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2011/2/15 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com



On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:





  On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal
marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either
true or
  false? If
  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical
realism,
  which is
  enough for the comp consequences.,

  Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule
and therefore
  not as a claim that some set of objects either
exist or don't.

  That's my point.

  Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
  I am an immaterial dreaming machine.

  It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you
want, with
  the
  philosophy you want.

  I want to say number aren't real, so I'm not really a
number

  All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
  nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and
what is not
  real,

  Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you
know that?

 I meant in general.


I don't need anything more than
1) I am real
2) Unreal things don't generate real things

I think both of those are hard to dispute.


You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument
that prove that they are unreal (or real or whatever). The
principle is sound, the choice is not without arguments. You say
numbers don't exist... but as I said before, I can think about
them in my mind...


Actually I don't think you can.  You can think of the symbol 7
and the word seven and you can probably think of seven things,
xxx,  but I doubt you can think of the number seven.  I'm
pretty sure you can't think of the set of all sets with seven
members.  And I'm quite sure you can't think of all the integers
or all arithmetic.



I exist, hence they transitively exist through my mind at the
least. I do not chose if a number is prime or not hence I'm not
inventing them as I'm not inventing the world around me.


Can you think of Sherlock Holmes?  a pink unicorn?   Can you think
of a number that is one bigger than the biggest number you can
think of (which per Peano must exist)?

Brent


The difference is I can choose what are/who are/the behavior of... 
Sherlock  holmes/pink unicorn/whatever... not the numbers once an 
axiomatic system is chosen.


No, it's only a difference of degree.  You can't choose Sherlock Holmes 
to be an American or a bus driver.  He exists in a looser axiomatic 
system than integers, but he is still defined by being consistent with 
the character in the stories by Conan Doyle.  Similarly, you can't 
imagine a pink unicorn that is blue and has two horns.


Brent

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread 1Z


On Feb 15, 8:39 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
 On 2/15/2011 12:28 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:





  2011/2/15 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
  mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com

      On 2/15/2011 11:28 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

      2011/2/15 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com

          On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
          mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
           On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:

            On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
          mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
            On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:

            On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
          mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
            On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:

            On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
          mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
            On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:

            On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal
          marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
            Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either
          true or
            false? If
            you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical
          realism,
            which is
            enough for the comp consequences.,

            Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule
          and therefore
            not as a claim that some set of objects either
          exist or don't.

            That's my point.

            Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
            I am an immaterial dreaming machine.

            It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you
          want, with
            the
            philosophy you want.

            I want to say number aren't real, so I'm not really a
          number

            All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
            nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and
          what is not
            real,

            Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you
          know that?

           I meant in general.

          I don't need anything more than
          1) I am real
          2) Unreal things don't generate real things

          I think both of those are hard to dispute.

      You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument
      that prove that they are unreal (or real or whatever). The
      principle is sound, the choice is not without arguments. You say
      numbers don't exist... but as I said before, I can think about
      them in my mind...

      Actually I don't think you can.  You can think of the symbol 7
      and the word seven and you can probably think of seven things,
      xxx,  but I doubt you can think of the number seven.  I'm
      pretty sure you can't think of the set of all sets with seven
      members.  And I'm quite sure you can't think of all the integers
      or all arithmetic.

      I exist, hence they transitively exist through my mind at the
      least. I do not chose if a number is prime or not hence I'm not
      inventing them as I'm not inventing the world around me.

      Can you think of Sherlock Holmes?  a pink unicorn?   Can you think
      of a number that is one bigger than the biggest number you can
      think of (which per Peano must exist)?

      Brent

  The difference is I can choose what are/who are/the behavior of...
  Sherlock  holmes/pink unicorn/whatever... not the numbers once an
  axiomatic system is chosen.

 No, it's only a difference of degree.  You can't choose Sherlock Holmes
 to be an American or a bus driver.  He exists in a looser axiomatic
 system than integers, but he is still defined by being consistent with
 the character in the stories by Conan Doyle.  Similarly, you can't
 imagine a pink unicorn that is blue and has two horns.

 Brent

The ontology of fiction can be true of mathematics even if the
methodology isn't.

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread 1Z


On Feb 15, 7:28 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
 2011/2/15 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com





  On Feb 15, 6:13 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
   On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:

On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:

On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:

On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:

On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or
false? If
you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,
which is
enough for the comp consequences.,

Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.

That's my point.

Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
I am an immaterial dreaming machine.

It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with
the
philosophy you want.

I want to say number aren't real, so I'm not really a number

All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
real,

Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?

   I meant in general.

  I don't need anything more than
  1) I am real
  2) Unreal things don't generate real things

  I think both of those are hard to dispute.

 You arbitrarily choose the unreal things... without any argument that prove
 that they are unreal (or real or whatever).

It's the inverse of Bruno's argument: immateriality is an unnecessary
posit
given materiality.

 The principle is sound, the
 choice is not without arguments. You say numbers don't exist... but as I
 said before, I can think about them in my mind

You can think about fictional entities too. Why would
something have to exist outside your head in order for you
to think about it?

... I exist, hence they
 transitively exist through my mind at the least.

But Bruno claims *they* are generating *you*.

 I do not chose if a number
 is prime or not hence

Certain things follow inevitably when you are
following rules. That does not need to be explained
by positing anything beyond the rules themselves.

 I'm not inventing them

Well, someone told you the rules. You didn't invent
chess either

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread Brent Meeker

On 2/15/2011 1:01 PM, 1Z wrote:

The difference is I can choose what are/who are/the behavior of...
Sherlock  holmes/pink unicorn/whatever... not the numbers once an
axiomatic system is chosen.
   


  No, it's only a difference of degree.  You can't choose Sherlock Holmes
  to be an American or a bus driver.  He exists in a looser axiomatic
  system than integers, but he is still defined by being consistent with
  the character in the stories by Conan Doyle.  Similarly, you can't
  imagine a pink unicorn that is blue and has two horns.

  Brent
 

The ontology of fiction can be true of mathematics even if the
methodology isn't.
   


It seems that fictional characters exist in a different domain than 
Platonia.  One of the attributes of fictional characters that 
distinguishes them from real people is that there questions about them 
that would have factual answers if they were real but which don't 
because they are fictional.  For example, did Sherlock Holmes have a 
mole on his left arm?  If I asked that of say, Conan Doyle, we wouldn't 
know the answer but we would suppose there is a definite fact of the 
matter.


Because numbers are wholly defined by a set of axioms, it seems that 
they are more real than fictional characters.  Whatever question you can 
ask about a number has a factual answer, although you may not know it or 
how to find it.  But when you consider arithmetic as a whole this no 
longer holds.  There may be questions that aren't decidable and whose 
answer could be added as an axiom; the way a writer could add a mole to 
Sherlock Holmes' arm.


Brent

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread 1Z


On Feb 15, 9:22 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:

  Whatever question you can
 ask about a number has a factual answer, although you may not know it or
 how to find it...numbers are wholly defined by a set of axioms, it seems that
 they are more real than fictional characters.

But being able to answer question is essentially epistemic. It doesn't
imply any ontology in itself. The epistemic fact that we can , in
principle, answer
questions about real people may be explained by the existence and
perceptual accessibility
of real people: but our ability to answer questions about mathematical
objects
is explained by the existence of clear definitions and rules doesn't
need to posit
of existing immaterial numbers (plus some mode of quasi-perceptual
access
to them).

  But when you consider arithmetic as a whole this no
 longer holds.  There may be questions that aren't decidable and whose
 answer could be added as an axiom; the way a writer could add a mole to
 Sherlock Holmes' arm.

 Brent

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread Brent Meeker

On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:


On Feb 15, 9:22 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com  wrote:
   
 

Whatever question you can
   

ask about a number has a factual answer, although you may not know it or
how to find it...numbers are wholly defined by a set of axioms, it seems that
they are more real than fictional characters.
 

But being able to answer question is essentially epistemic. It doesn't
imply any ontology in itself. The epistemic fact that we can , in
principle, answer
questions about real people may be explained by the existence and
perceptual accessibility
of real people:


So the epistemic facts have an ontological implication.  If I describe a 
man who lives at 10 Baker Street, smokes dope, and works as a detective 
you won't know whether he's real or not.  But if I tell you there is no 
fact of the matter about whether he has a mole on his arm, then you'll 
know he's a fiction.



but our ability to answer questions about mathematical
objects
is explained by the existence of clear definitions and rules doesn't
need to posit
of existing immaterial numbers (plus some mode of quasi-perceptual
access
to them).
   


I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with synasthesia 
apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual properties.


Brent


But when you consider arithmetic as a whole this no
   

longer holds.  There may be questions that aren't decidable and whose
answer could be added as an axiom; the way a writer could add a mole to
Sherlock Holmes' arm.

Brent
 
   


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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-15 Thread 1Z


On Feb 15, 10:12 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
 On 2/15/2011 1:48 PM, 1Z wrote:





  On Feb 15, 9:22 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com  wrote:

      Whatever question you can

  ask about a number has a factual answer, although you may not know it or
  how to find it...numbers are wholly defined by a set of axioms, it seems 
  that
  they are more real than fictional characters.

  But being able to answer question is essentially epistemic. It doesn't
  imply any ontology in itself. The epistemic fact that we can , in
  principle, answer
  questions about real people may be explained by the existence and
  perceptual accessibility
  of real people:

 So the epistemic facts have an ontological implication.  If I describe a
 man who lives at 10 Baker Street, smokes dope, and works as a detective
 you won't know whether he's real or not.  But if I tell you there is no
 fact of the matter about whether he has a mole on his arm, then you'll
 know he's a fiction.

If I can figure out information I haven't been given
from information I have been given, I don't need to suppose
that I didn't figure it out and instead perceived it  by by some
sixth sense.

  but our ability to answer questions about mathematical
  objects
  is explained by the existence of clear definitions and rules doesn't
  need to posit
  of existing immaterial numbers (plus some mode of quasi-perceptual
  access
  to them).

 I agree.  Although it's interesting that some people with synasthesia
 apparently perceive numbers as having various perceptual properties.

Some people perceive pink elephants too. However, other people don't
perceive them , leading cynics to suppose that they are not
really being perceived at all.

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 14 Feb 2011, at 07:13, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com 
 wrote:

On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:

On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com  wrote:


What do you think the chances are that any random object in
Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine will support  
intelligent life?

1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?

Zero.

Does that allow us to argue:

1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
possibilities has measure
0
2) Our universe exists so it has measure0
3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
possibilities
4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
infinite possibilities (since all
of maths includes the real line, etc)
5) MUH is false.


Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing  
machines are not the right kind of things to support life.



I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me understand  
by answering the following questions:


Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing  
machine?


How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven  
distinguish it from a universe that does not?


That is a good argument which convinces many people, who actually ask  
what is the MGA for?


Here I can imagine what 1Z could answer to How can entities within a  
universe that exists in Plato's heaven distinguish it from a universe  
that does not?.
He assumes the existence of primary matter or of a primitively real  
physical universe, and will, by decision, attribute consciousness,  
only to the creature made off that primary matter, even if the  
consciousness relies in the computation implemented in that matter. So  
1Z accepts the idea that arithmetical truth is full of zombies, like  
the 1Z described in arithmetic through the arithmetical emulation of  
our galaxy (say).
But that moves is made impossible by the MGA. To attach consciousness  
to matter, you have to introduce something non Turing emulable in that  
consciousness, or, like Jack Mallah did, attribute a physical activity  
to a piece of matter having no physical activity at all relevant with  
the computation. But this prevent to say yes to the doctor *qua  
computatio*.


Do you (the reader of the list, not Jason) agree with the 323  
principle? If the physical running of a computer entails some  
consciousness, and if that running does not use the register 323, does  
the same running of that computer with the 323 register deleted, run  
the same consciousness, or not?


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Feb 2011, at 19:10, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 10, 1:24 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 09 Feb 2011, at 16:49, 1Z wrote:






On Feb 8, 6:17 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 07 Feb 2011, at 23:58, 1Z wrote:



On Feb 7, 6:29 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

Peter,



Everything is fine. You should understand the reasoning by using
only
the formal definition of arithmetical realism,



You reasoning *cannot* be both valid and ontologically
neutral because it has ontological conclusions.



Wrong.



Wrong about what?


You were wrong on the idea that an argument cannot be valid and
ontological. It is enough that the premises have ontological clauses.


So which is the ontological premise? You don't say
that Platonism is an explicit premise. But it isn't
a corollary of CT either.


CT needs arithmetical platonism/realism. If you believe the contrary,  
could you give me a form of CT which does not presuppose  it?







See my papers.



That is just what I am criticising. You need the ontological
premise that mathematical entities have real existence,
and it is a separate premise from comp. That is my
response to your writings.


The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of consensual
reality (doctor, brain, etc.).


If I agree only to the existence of doctors, brains and silicon
computers,
the conclusion that I am an immaterial dreaming machine cannot follow


Then you have to present a refutation of UDA+MGA, without begging the  
question.







It does not assume that physical things
really or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers  
really

exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical sense.


There is no generally agreed mathematical sense. If mathematical
anti-realists are right, they don't exist at all and I am therefore
not one.


Mathematicians don't care about the nature of the existence of natural  
numbers. They all agree with statement like there exist prime  
number, etc.







Read a book on logic and computability.



Read a book on philosophy, on the limitations of
apriori reasoning, on the contentious nature of mathematical  
ontology.


You are the one opposing a paper in applied logic in the cognitive  
and

physical science. I suggest you look at books to better see what i am
taking about.


You are the one who is doing ontology without realising it.


On consciousness. Not on numbers, which I use in the usual  
mathematical or theoretical computer sense. The reasoning is agonstic  
on God, primary universe, mind, etc. at the start.
The only ontology used in the reasoning is the ontology of my  
consciousness, and some amount of consensual reality (existence of  
universe, brains, doctors, ...). Of course I do not assume either that  
such things are primitoively material, except at step 8 for the  
reductio ad absurdo. Up to step seven you can still believe in a  
primitively material reality.






Boolos and
Jeffrey, or Mendelson, or the Dover book by Martin Davis are
excellent.
It is a traditional exercise to define those machine in arithmetic.



I have no doubt, but you don't get real minds and universes
out of hypothetical machines.


You mean mathematical machine. They are not hypothetical. Unless you
believe that the number seven is hypothetical,


I do. Haven't you got that yet?


I did understand that seven is immaterial. But I am OK with seven  
being hypothetical. It changes nothing in the reasoning.







in which case I get
hypothetical minds and hypothetical universes.


I am not generated by a hypothesis: I generate hypotheses.


Confusion level. If you suppose a TOE you are supposed to be explained  
by that TOE. In that sense you are generated by an hypothesis, even if  
your own consciousness here and now is plausibly not an hypothesis.






It is not a big deal to
accomodate the vocabulary.





Recently Brent Meeker sent an excellent reference by Calude
illustrating how PA can prove the existence of universal machine  
(or

number).



Oh good griefit can only prove the *mathematical* existence. If
mathematical existence is not real existence, I am not an  
immaterial

machine.


Comp can explain why mathematical machine believes that they are made
of stuff. If you have an argument that stuff is primary, then you  
have

an argument against comp.


That doesn't follow. An immaterial machine might believe it is
material,
but so might a material machine. So arguing that matter is prmiary
has no impact on comp.


Comp will imply that such a primary matter cannnot interfer at all  
with your consciousness, so that IF comp is correct physics has to be  
reduced to number theory, and such a primary matter is an invisible  
epiphenomena. Occam does the rest.








Not against the validity of the reasoning.




what is at is the side of formalism
that says maths is ontologically non-commital game playing.


That is not formalism. That is conventionalism (in math).


So you say. I 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread 1Z


On Feb 14, 6:50 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
  Perhaps humans are merely
 severely disabled when it comes to seeing and feeling the mathematical
 reality and our deficit in seeing this reality is much the same as an ant's
 poor vision prevents it from making out a mountain vista.  

If mathematicians share this deficit, then they are doing maths
successfully without being able to peep into Plato's heaven, so
they Plato's heaven does not explain their abilities. There is no
need to posit its existence to explain anything.

Nevertheless, a
 creature with such a capability is not inconceivable, and arguably some
 synesthetes have experienced this.

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Tammet#Synesthesia


Or synaesthetes are just co-opting their visual processing
to solve maths problems, as graphics co-processors
can also be used for number crunching.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graphics_processing_unit#Stream_Processing_and_General_Purpose_GPUs_.28GPGPU.29

BYW, Tammet is no good at advanced maths which tends not to be
visualisable.

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread 1Z


On Feb 14, 7:24 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 12:52 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.comwrote:



   On 2/13/2011 10:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

  On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker 
  meeke...@dslextreme.comwrote:

  On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com  wrote:

   What do you think the chances are that any random object in
  Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine will support intelligent
  life?
  1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?

   Zero.

  Does that allow us to argue:

  1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
  possibilities has measure
  0
  2) Our universe exists so it has measure0
  3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
  possibilities
  4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
  infinite possibilities (since all
  of maths includes the real line, etc)
  5) MUH is false.

   Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing
  machines are not the right kind of things to support life.

  I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me understand by
  answering the following questions:

  Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing machine?

  Because a Turing machine is an abstraction.  If you mean a realization of a
  Turing machine, then I suppose there could be a simulation of life on it.

  How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven
  distinguish it from a universe that does not?

  I doubt that Plato's heaven exists.  So no universes would exist in it.

  Brent

 Exists is a funny word.  It seems to embody knowledge and opinion from one
 observer's viewpoint based on their own limited experiences and interactions
 within their local portion of reality.  If Plato's heaven is such a thing
 that contains all possible structures, does the fact that it contains all
 possible structures hold true whether or not it exists?

It's a correct definition whether or not it exists.

  If there are
 universes existing abstractly inside Plato's heaven, and some of those
 universes contain conscious observers, does ascribing the property of
 non-existence to Plato's heaven or to those universes make those observers
 not conscious, or is the abstraction enough?

Thing that aren't real can't have  real properties, but
hypothetical things have hypothetical properties

 What properties can something
 which is non-existent have?

 It seems there are two choices: 1. Things which are non-existent can have
 other properties besides non-existence.  E.g., a non-existent universe has
 atoms, stars, worlds, and people on some of those worlds.  Or 2.
 Non-existent things cannot have any other properties besides non-existence.
 It sounds like you belong to this second camp.

3. Hypothetical things have hypothetical properties.

 However, this seems to lead immediately to mathematical realism.  As there
 are objects with definite objectively explorable properties in math.

Hypothetical properties can be reasoned about. If I said you
had 3 stakes and 5 phials of holy water, you could tell me
how many vampires you could kill. But vampires don't exist.
Defnitiness is epistemological and descriptive, not ontological.

 7's
 primality and parity are properties of 7.  But how can 7 have properties if
 it does not exist?

In the way that vampires have the property of not liking garlic.

 If non-existent things can have properties, why can't
 consciousness be one of those properties?  

The consciousness of a hypothetical conscious being is only
a hypothetical consciousness.

What is the difference between a
 non-existent brain experiencing a sunset and an existent brain experiencing
 a sunset?  Please explain as precisely as possible what it means for
 something to not exist.

That's not what needs explaining. What needs explaining is
that people tend to use the word property interchangably
for a) a characteristic predicated of something as a matter of theory
or definition b) a characteristic of something that is a discoverable
part of the fabric of the world.

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread 1Z


On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
 you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
 enough for the comp consequences.,

Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.

 Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to say
 that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'

Not at all.

. People needs to be
 ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.

No, they just need to be anti realist.

 Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is hard to
 define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
 realist about them.

Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
you 7 doesn't exist.

 Even to say I am not arithmetical realist is
 enough to be an arithmetical realist

Nonsense.

. A real anti-ariothmetical
 realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need to be
 an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.


Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
is not
just reference.

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:




On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
enough for the comp consequences.,


Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.


That's my point.





Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to say
that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'


Not at all.


OK. This means that you are using arithmetical platonia in a sense  
which is not relevant for the reasoning.

If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at all.






. People needs to be
ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.


No, they just need to be anti realist.


Same remark.





Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is hard to
define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
realist about them.


Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
you 7 doesn't exist.


You contradict your self, unless you mean that seven is not made of  
matter. In which case comp nothing exists.







Even to say I am not arithmetical realist is
enough to be an arithmetical realist


Nonsense.



Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical  
realism in mathematics.






. A real anti-ariothmetical
realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need to be
an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.



Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
is not
just reference.


A reasoning is valid, or not valid. Playing with words will not help  
you to understand it.


Bruno Marchal

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 14 Feb 2011, at 12:13, 1Z wrote:


Thing that aren't real can't have  real properties, but
hypothetical things have hypothetical properties


You talk like if you knew what is real. Do you agree that the  
existence of primary matter can only be an hypothesis? A useful  
simplifying assumption perhaps?


Bruno Marchal


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread Brent Meeker

On 2/13/2011 11:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 12:52 AM, Brent Meeker 
meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:


On 2/13/2011 10:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker
meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:

On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:


On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com  wrote:


What do you think the chances are that
any random object in
Plato's heaven, or any random Turing
machine will support intelligent life?
1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?

Zero.

Does that allow us to argue:

1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
possibilities has measure
0
2) Our universe exists so it has measure0
3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
possibilities
4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from
uncountable
infinite possibilities (since all
of maths includes the real line, etc)
5) MUH is false.


Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and
Turing machines are not the right kind of things to support life.



I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me
understand by answering the following questions:

Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing
machine?


Because a Turing machine is an abstraction.  If you mean a
realization of a Turing machine, then I suppose there could be a
simulation of life on it.




How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven
distinguish it from a universe that does not?


I doubt that Plato's heaven exists.  So no universes would exist
in it.

Brent



Exists is a funny word.  It seems to embody knowledge and opinion from 
one observer's viewpoint based on their own limited experiences and 
interactions within their local portion of reality.


Indeed.  I'm not sure it's unqualified use is meaningful.

If Plato's heaven is such a thing that contains all possible 
structures, does the fact that it contains all possible structures 
hold true whether or not it exists?


All possible brick structures?  Please explain as precisely as possible 
what Platonia is.


If there are universes existing abstractly inside Plato's heaven, and 
some of those universes contain conscious observers, does ascribing 
the property of non-existence to Plato's heaven or to those universes 
make those observers not conscious, or is the abstraction enough?


What does abstractly existing mean.?  How is it different from just 
exsiting?



What properties can something which is non-existent have?

It seems there are two choices: 1. Things which are non-existent can 
have other properties besides non-existence.


Sure.  Sherlock Holmes is non-existent and has the property of being a 
detective.


E.g., a non-existent universe has atoms, stars, worlds, and people on 
some of those worlds.  Or 2. Non-existent things cannot have any other 
properties besides non-existence.  It sounds like you belong to this 
second camp.


However, this seems to lead immediately to mathematical realism.  As 
there are objects with definite objectively explorable properties in 
math.  7's primality and parity are properties of 7.  But how can 7 
have properties if it does not exist?  If non-existent things can have 
properties, why can't consciousness be one of those properties?  What 
is the difference between a non-existent brain experiencing a sunset 
and an existent brain experiencing a sunset?


Only one of them exists.

Please explain as precisely as possible what it means for something to 
not exist.


If I can kick it and it kicks back it exists.

Brent



Jason

No facts about it if it is non existent?
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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread Brent Meeker

On 2/14/2011 1:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 Feb 2011, at 07:13, Jason Resch wrote:




On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker 
meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:


On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:


On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com  wrote:


What do you think the chances are that any
random object in
Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine
will support intelligent life?
1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?

Zero.

Does that allow us to argue:

1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
possibilities has measure
0
2) Our universe exists so it has measure0
3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
possibilities
4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
infinite possibilities (since all
of maths includes the real line, etc)
5) MUH is false.


Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing
machines are not the right kind of things to support life.



I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me understand by 
answering the following questions:


Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing machine?

How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven 
distinguish it from a universe that does not?


That is a good argument which convinces many people, who actually ask 
what is the MGA for?


Here I can imagine what 1Z could answer to How can entities within a 
universe that exists in Plato's heaven distinguish it from a universe 
that does not?.
He assumes the existence of primary matter or of a primitively real 
physical universe,


It's equivocation to speak of entities existing in a domain that doesn't 
exist.  If something like arithmetical universe exists, it exists in a 
very different sense of the word than material objects exist.  If there 
are entities in that universe that are aware of it (whatever that may 
mean) then they a perforce aware in a different sense.


and will, by decision, attribute consciousness, only to the creature 
made off that primary matter,


No, there is no need to assume primary matter.  One need only recognize 
that there is *this* universe which we are aware of and exist in and it 
is not the same as some other universe which may or may not exist in 
some different sense or another.


even if the consciousness relies in the computation implemented in 
that matter. So 1Z accepts the idea that arithmetical truth is full of 
zombies, like the 1Z described in arithmetic through the 
arithmetical emulation of our galaxy (say).
But that moves is made impossible by the MGA. To attach consciousness 
to matter, you have to introduce something non Turing emulable in that 
consciousness, or, like Jack Mallah did, attribute a physical activity 
to a piece of matter having no physical activity at all relevant with 
the computation.


But the idea of multiple worlds started with Everett whose 
interpretation of QM implies that there are no pieces of matter with no 
activity.  The universe is defined by a wave function in a Hilbert space 
and pieces of matter are just certain projections.



But this prevent to say yes to the doctor *qua computatio*.


No it doesn't.  Whatever the doctor uses to replace neurons in your head 
is also matter and also part of the universal wave function.




Do you (the reader of the list, not Jason) agree with the 323 
principle? If the physical running of a computer entails some 
consciousness, and if that running does not use the register 323, does 
the same running of that computer with the 323 register deleted, run 
the same consciousness, or not?


I'd say that's an empirical question.  But in terms of answering the 
doctor we can say that leaving out register 323 very likely makes it a 
different computer.


Brent



Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/



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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread David Nyman
On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

 Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
 you 7 doesn't exist.

Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
analogous sense?  And that consequently any computational
characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing
to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a
formal game?  I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but
if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is
real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind?
I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm
not clear what is supposed to have any claim to reality here, other
than the physical tokens instantiating the computation.

David



 On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
 you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
 enough for the comp consequences.,

 Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
 not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.

 Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to say
 that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'

 Not at all.

. People needs to be
 ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.

 No, they just need to be anti realist.

 Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is hard to
 define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
 realist about them.

 Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
 you 7 doesn't exist.

 Even to say I am not arithmetical realist is
 enough to be an arithmetical realist

 Nonsense.

. A real anti-ariothmetical
 realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need to be
 an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.


 Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
 is not
 just reference.

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread 1Z


On Feb 14, 10:16 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 11 Feb 2011, at 19:10, 1Z wrote:





  On Feb 10, 1:24 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 09 Feb 2011, at 16:49, 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 8, 6:17 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 07 Feb 2011, at 23:58, 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 7, 6:29 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  Peter,

  Everything is fine. You should understand the reasoning by using
  only
  the formal definition of arithmetical realism,

  You reasoning *cannot* be both valid and ontologically
  neutral because it has ontological conclusions.

  Wrong.

  Wrong about what?

  You were wrong on the idea that an argument cannot be valid and
  ontological. It is enough that the premises have ontological clauses.

  So which is the ontological premise? You don't say
  that Platonism is an explicit premise. But it isn't
  a corollary of CT either.

 CT needs arithmetical platonism/realism.

No it doesn't. It may need bivalence, which is not the same thing (me,
passim)

 If you believe the contrary,  
 could you give me a form of CT which does not presuppose  it?

Every effectively calculable function is a computable function

  See my papers.

  That is just what I am criticising. You need the ontological
  premise that mathematical entities have real existence,
  and it is a separate premise from comp. That is my
  response to your writings.

  The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of consensual
  reality (doctor, brain, etc.).

  If I agree only to the existence of doctors, brains and silicon
  computers,
  the conclusion that I am an immaterial dreaming machine cannot follow

 Then you have to present a refutation of UDA+MGA, without begging the  
 question.

No, I can just present a refutation of Platonism. The conlcusion
does't follo
without it.

  It does not assume that physical things
  really or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers  
  really
  exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical sense.

  There is no generally agreed mathematical sense. If mathematical
  anti-realists are right, they don't exist at all and I am therefore
  not one.

 Mathematicians don't care about the nature of the existence of natural  
 numbers.

Fine. Such an ontologically non-commital idea of AR cannot support
your conclusion

They all agree with statement like there exist prime  
 number, etc.

Yes, they tend to agree on a set of true existence statements, and to
disagree on
what existence means.

  Read a book on logic and computability.

  Read a book on philosophy, on the limitations of
  apriori reasoning, on the contentious nature of mathematical  
  ontology.

  You are the one opposing a paper in applied logic in the cognitive  
  and
  physical science. I suggest you look at books to better see what i am
  taking about.

  You are the one who is doing ontology without realising it.

 On consciousness. Not on numbers,

You're saying *my* consciousness *is* a number!

which I use in the usual  
 mathematical or theoretical computer sense. The reasoning is agonstic  
 on God, primary universe, mind, etc. at the start.
 The only ontology used in the reasoning is the ontology of my  
 consciousness, and some amount of consensual reality (existence of  
 universe, brains, doctors, ...). Of course I do not assume either that  
 such things are primitoively material, except at step 8 for the  
 reductio ad absurdo. Up to step seven you can still believe in a  
 primitively material reality.

You cannot eliminate the existence of matter in favour of the
existence
of numbers without assuming the existence of numbers

  Boolos and
  Jeffrey, or Mendelson, or the Dover book by Martin Davis are
  excellent.
  It is a traditional exercise to define those machine in arithmetic.

  I have no doubt, but you don't get real minds and universes
  out of hypothetical machines.

  You mean mathematical machine. They are not hypothetical. Unless you
  believe that the number seven is hypothetical,

  I do. Haven't you got that yet?

 I did understand that seven is immaterial.

Not just immaterial. Non existent.

 But I am OK with seven  
 being hypothetical. It changes nothing in the reasoning.

I am not running on some immaterial TM that exists only in your head



  in which case I get
  hypothetical minds and hypothetical universes.

  I am not generated by a hypothesis: I generate hypotheses.

 Confusion level. If you suppose a TOE you are supposed to be explained  
 by that TOE.

Explained by, not caused by. Things fell before Newton explained
gravity

 In that sense you are generated by an hypothesis,

I am not generated by a hypothesis, even a true one, any more
than my house is built on a map, even an accurate one.

even if  
 your own consciousness here and now is plausibly not an hypothesis.





  It is not a big deal to
  accomodate the vocabulary.

  Recently Brent Meeker sent an excellent reference by Calude
  

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread 1Z


On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:



  On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
  you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
  enough for the comp consequences.,

  Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
  not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.

 That's my point.

Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
I am an immaterial dreaming machine.


  Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to say
  that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'

  Not at all.

 OK. This means that you are using arithmetical platonia in a sense  
 which is not relevant for the reasoning.
 If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at all.

I accept CT and reject Platonism, and thus the reasoning does not go
through.

  . People needs to be
  ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.

  No, they just need to be anti realist.

 Same remark.

Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.

  Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is hard to
  define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
  realist about them.

  Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
  you 7 doesn't exist.

 You contradict your self,

No I don't. How many times have I explained that
mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
sense that doesn't imply real existence

unless you mean that seven is not made of  
 matter. In which case comp nothing exists.

What does comp nothing exists mean?

  Even to say I am not arithmetical realist is
  enough to be an arithmetical realist

  Nonsense.

 Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical  
 realism in mathematics.

I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
and you think you are a  number

  . A real anti-ariothmetical
  realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need to be
  an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.

  Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
  is not
  just reference.

 A reasoning is valid, or not valid.

A true conclusion requires soundness as well as validity

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread 1Z


On Feb 14, 2:56 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 14 Feb 2011, at 12:13, 1Z wrote:



  Thing that aren't real can't have  real properties, but
  hypothetical things have hypothetical properties

 You talk like if you knew what is real.

I only have to know what real means.

Do you agree that the  
 existence of primary matter can only be an hypothesis?

Only in the sense that everything is. It is beside the point
anyway. Talk of properties does not imply that they are real
or that what has them is real. Such talk is really about definitions.

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2011/2/14 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com



 On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
 
 
 
   On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
   Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or false? If
   you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism, which is
   enough for the comp consequences.,
 
   Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
   not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
 
  That's my point.

 Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
 I am an immaterial dreaming machine.

 
   Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough to say
   that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'
 
   Not at all.
 
  OK. This means that you are using arithmetical platonia in a sense
  which is not relevant for the reasoning.
  If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning at all.

 I accept CT and reject Platonism, and thus the reasoning does not go
 through.

   . People needs to be
   ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.
 
   No, they just need to be anti realist.
 
  Same remark.

 Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.

   Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is hard to
   define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are not
   realist about them.
 
   Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
   you 7 doesn't exist.
 
  You contradict your self,

 No I don't. How many times have I explained that
 mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
 sense that doesn't imply real existence


You still did not define what is real existence... that it kicks back is not
an acceptable definition.

When you're dead you don't exist ? If yes what does it means to exist at all
?


 unless you mean that seven is not made of
  matter. In which case comp nothing exists.

 What does comp nothing exists mean?

   Even to say I am not arithmetical realist is
   enough to be an arithmetical realist
 
   Nonsense.
 
  Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical
  realism in mathematics.

 I am  not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
 and you think you are a  number

   . A real anti-ariothmetical
   realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need to be
   an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.
 
   Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah. Meaning
   is not
   just reference.
 
  A reasoning is valid, or not valid.

 A true conclusion requires soundness as well as validity

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread 1Z


On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
 On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

  Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
  you 7 doesn't exist.

 Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
 analogous sense?

I can still have seven eggs in my fridge, and I can still
have a computation running on a physical computer.

  And that consequently any computational
 characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing
 to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a
 formal game?

If computation is multiply realisable, it never reduces to
any particular physical behaviour, even if it always instantiated a
such

  I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but
 if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is
 real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind?

No. Every running programme is physical. Only programmes
with nothing to run on are eliminated

 I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm
 not clear what is supposed to have any claim to reality here, other
 than the physical tokens instantiating the computation.

 David


If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
a computation. What is eliminated?

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2011/2/14 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com



 On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
  On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 
   Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
   you 7 doesn't exist.
 
  Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
  analogous sense?

 I can still have seven eggs in my fridge, and I can still
 have a computation running on a physical computer.

   And that consequently any computational
  characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing
  to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a
  formal game?

 If computation is multiply realisable, it never reduces to
 any particular physical behaviour, even if it always instantiated a
 such

   I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but
  if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is
  real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind?

 No. Every running programme is physical. Only programmes
 with nothing to run on are eliminated


Programs are not written with physical instantiation in mind... even if
eventually you run it. What is important is the computation which doesn't
care about the physical instantiation as such.

When I stop executing a program does it cease to exist ? And come back to
existence the instant I run it ?


   I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm
  not clear what is supposed to have any claim to reality here, other
  than the physical tokens instantiating the computation.
 
  David


 If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
 a computation. What is eliminated?

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread David Nyman
On 14 February 2011 19:32, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:


 If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
 a computation. What is eliminated?

But such talk is all a posteriori and hence merely circular.  A
priori, if you claim that reality can be reduced to (i.e. actually
consists exclusively of) physical tokens doing whatever they are
doing, then that's all you have to play with, and moreover all you
appear to need to get the job done.  If you want to further claim that
computation also exists in some sense capable of accounting for all
the a posteriori appearances (including all this talk of computation
and mind) you need to get a bigger boat.  Or else you've just
eliminated both the computation and the mind (after all, who needs
'em? - not the physical tokens, apparently).  The distinction between
reduction and elimination is mere absent-mindedness: you just have
to forget to remember that you can't eat your cake and still have it.

David




 On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
 On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

  Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
  you 7 doesn't exist.

 Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
 analogous sense?

 I can still have seven eggs in my fridge, and I can still
 have a computation running on a physical computer.

  And that consequently any computational
 characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing
 to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a
 formal game?

 If computation is multiply realisable, it never reduces to
 any particular physical behaviour, even if it always instantiated a
 such

  I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but
 if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is
 real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind?

 No. Every running programme is physical. Only programmes
 with nothing to run on are eliminated

 I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm
 not clear what is supposed to have any claim to reality here, other
 than the physical tokens instantiating the computation.

 David


 If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
 a computation. What is eliminated?

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread John Mikes
David,

I was laughing all the way from the computer that '7 does not exist'. And
yes, it does not.
Do qualia exist without the substrate they serve for as qualia?
It goes into our deeper thought to identify 'existing' -
I am willing to go as far as if our mind handles it, 'it' DOES exist
so the quale like; 7(?) [i.e. the monitor for the eggs in your fridge] is
existing. Not answering the question 'what it is? - but principally I am
also against ontology in a worldview of change, where being makes only
sense as transitionally becoming and transition substitutes for stagnancy.
Panta Rhei also boggles my mind, especially when I cut out conventional
time.

I asked several times: what are numbers? without getting a reasonable
reply.
Sometimes I really like 1Z's twists.

On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 2:32 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:



 On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
  On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 
   Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
   you 7 doesn't exist.
 
  Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
  analogous sense?

 I can still have seven eggs in my fridge, and I can still
 have a computation running on a physical computer.

   And that consequently any computational
  characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing
  to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a
  formal game?

 If computation is multiply realisable, it never reduces to
 any particular physical behaviour, even if it always instantiated a
 such

   I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but
  if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is
  real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind?

 No. Every running programme is physical. Only programmes
 with nothing to run on are eliminated

  I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm
  not clear what is supposed to have any claim to reality here, other
  than the physical tokens instantiating the computation.
 
  David


 If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
 a computation. What is eliminated?

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread David Nyman
On 14 February 2011 20:46, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:

 I asked several times: what are numbers? without getting a reasonable
 reply.
 Sometimes I really like 1Z's twists.

That may be, but I would also like to see if we can get things
untwisted.  I'm not peddling any theory of my own here, I'm just
trying to do some simple accounting.  For example according to some
theory X doesn't exist and then somewhere else in the same theory
something supposedly depends on assuming X.  This doesn't add up.
Part of the problem - most of it, perhaps - is
psychological-linguistic.  Being dead wrong about some theory of the
mind (fortunately) doesn't stop our minds from functioning.  But that
very same fact can blind us to circular reasoning.

I've tried to argue before that the causal closure of physics is a
very strong claim that is also very restrictive if applied
consistently.  Trouble is, in my view, it very rarely is so applied.
The Hard Problem, and the corresponding zombie intuition, is a sort of
reductio of the strongest version of this claim - i.e. that what
exists is reducible to a micro-physical substrate that is fully
constitutive of all phenomena of whatever type. If this proposition
were ever to be taken at face value, then further theorising would
perforce just stop right there; indeed there can be no theories in
such a scenario, just the sub-atomic events that might have been said
(but by whom?) to underlie them.   Of course this hardly reflects our
experience (how could it?).  We do not discover ourselves to be in
some maximally fragmented state (what could it be like?) but rather
in some integrated state of an altogether higher order; but such
quotidian reality apparently impresses us so little that we are quite
capable of theorising it cheerfully out of existence (e.g. eliminative
materialism).  Well, as Groucho Marx once innocently enquired who you
gonna believe - me or your own eyes?.

David

 David,

 I was laughing all the way from the computer that '7 does not exist'. And
 yes, it does not.
 Do qualia exist without the substrate they serve for as qualia?
 It goes into our deeper thought to identify 'existing' -
 I am willing to go as far as if our mind handles it, 'it' DOES exist
 so the quale like; 7(?) [i.e. the monitor for the eggs in your fridge] is
 existing. Not answering the question 'what it is? - but principally I am
 also against ontology in a worldview of change, where being makes only
 sense as transitionally becoming and transition substitutes for stagnancy.
 Panta Rhei also boggles my mind, especially when I cut out conventional
 time.

 I asked several times: what are numbers? without getting a reasonable
 reply.
 Sometimes I really like 1Z's twists.

 On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 2:32 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:


 On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
  On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
 
   Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
   you 7 doesn't exist.
 
  Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
  analogous sense?

 I can still have seven eggs in my fridge, and I can still
 have a computation running on a physical computer.

   And that consequently any computational
  characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing
  to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a
  formal game?

 If computation is multiply realisable, it never reduces to
 any particular physical behaviour, even if it always instantiated a
 such

   I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but
  if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is
  real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind?

 No. Every running programme is physical. Only programmes
 with nothing to run on are eliminated

  I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm
  not clear what is supposed to have any claim to reality here, other
  than the physical tokens instantiating the computation.
 
  David


 If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
 a computation. What is eliminated?

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To post to this 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread Jason Resch
On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 11:23 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.comwrote:

  On 2/13/2011 11:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 12:52 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.comwrote:

  On 2/13/2011 10:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker 
 meeke...@dslextreme.comwrote:

 On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:


 On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com  wrote:



  What do you think the chances are that any random object in
 Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine will support
 intelligent life?
 1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?


  Zero.


 Does that allow us to argue:

 1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
 possibilities has measure
 0
 2) Our universe exists so it has measure0
 3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
 possibilities
 4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
 infinite possibilities (since all
 of maths includes the real line, etc)
 5) MUH is false.



  Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing
 machines are not the right kind of things to support life.



 I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me understand by
 answering the following questions:

 Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing machine?


  Because a Turing machine is an abstraction.  If you mean a realization
 of a Turing machine, then I suppose there could be a simulation of life on
 it.



 How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven
 distinguish it from a universe that does not?


  I doubt that Plato's heaven exists.  So no universes would exist in it.

 Brent



 Exists is a funny word.  It seems to embody knowledge and opinion from one
 observer's viewpoint based on their own limited experiences and interactions
 within their local portion of reality.


 Indeed.  I'm not sure it's unqualified use is meaningful.


  If Plato's heaven is such a thing that contains all possible structures,
 does the fact that it contains all possible structures hold true whether or
 not it exists?


 All possible brick structures?  Please explain as precisely as possible
 what Platonia is.


  If there are universes existing abstractly inside Plato's heaven, and
 some of those universes contain conscious observers, does ascribing the
 property of non-existence to Plato's heaven or to those universes make those
 observers not conscious, or is the abstraction enough?


 What does abstractly existing mean.?  How is it different from just
 exsiting?


   What properties can something which is non-existent have?

 It seems there are two choices: 1. Things which are non-existent can have
 other properties besides non-existence.


 Sure.  Sherlock Holmes is non-existent and has the property of being a
 detective.


  E.g., a non-existent universe has atoms, stars, worlds, and people on
 some of those worlds.  Or 2. Non-existent things cannot have any other
 properties besides non-existence.  It sounds like you belong to this second
 camp.

 However, this seems to lead immediately to mathematical realism.  As there
 are objects with definite objectively explorable properties in math.  7's
 primality and parity are properties of 7.  But how can 7 have properties if
 it does not exist?  If non-existent things can have properties, why can't
 consciousness be one of those properties?  What is the difference between a
 non-existent brain experiencing a sunset and an existent brain experiencing
 a sunset?


 Only one of them exists.


  Please explain as precisely as possible what it means for something to
 not exist.


 If I can kick it and it kicks back it exists.

 Brent



What do you think about this passage from Fabric of Reality, where David
Deutsch argues numbers do kick back:

*Do* abstract, non-physical entities exist? Are they part of the fabric of
reality? I am not interested here in issues of mere word usage. It is
obvious that numbers, the laws of physics, and so on do ‘exist’ in some
senses and not in others. The substantive question is this: how are we to
understand such entities? Which of them are merely convenient forms of
words, referring ultimately only to ordinary, physical reality? Which are
merely ephemeral features of our culture? Which are arbitrary, like the
rules of a trivial game that we need only look up? And which, if any, can be
explained only in a way that attributes an independent existence to them?
Things of this last type *must* be part of the fabric of reality as
{222} defined in this book, because one would have to understand them
in order to
understand everything that is understood.

This suggests that we ought to apply Dr Johnson's criterion again. If we
want to know whether a given abstraction really exists, we should ask
whether it ‘kicks back’ in a complex, autonomous way. For example,
mathematicians characterize the ‘natural numbers’ i, 2, 3,... in the first
instance through a precise 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread 1Z


On Feb 14, 8:07 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
 On 14 February 2011 19:32, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:



  If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
  a computation. What is eliminated?

 But such talk is all a posteriori and hence merely circular.

That the aposteriori is uniformly circular is new to me. Proof?

 A
 priori, if you claim that reality can be reduced to (i.e. actually
 consists exclusively of) physical tokens doing whatever they are
 doing, then that's all you have to play with, and moreover all you
 appear to need to get the job done.  If you want to further claim that
 computation also exists

Once more with feeling: reductions are identification, not
eliminations.
To say that there is nothing more to a computation than physical
behaviour is not
to say there is no computation.

in some sense capable of accounting for all
 the a posteriori appearances (including all this talk of computation
 and mind) you need to get a bigger boat.

Why?

 Or else you've just
 eliminated both the computation and the mind (after all, who needs
 'em? - not the physical tokens, apparently).  The distinction between
 reduction and elimination

is what I have said it is.


is mere absent-mindedness: you just have
 to forget to remember that you can't eat your cake and still have it.

 David



  On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
  On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

   Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
   you 7 doesn't exist.

  Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
  analogous sense?

  I can still have seven eggs in my fridge, and I can still
  have a computation running on a physical computer.

   And that consequently any computational
  characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing
  to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a
  formal game?

  If computation is multiply realisable, it never reduces to
  any particular physical behaviour, even if it always instantiated a
  such

   I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but
  if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is
  real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind?

  No. Every running programme is physical. Only programmes
  with nothing to run on are eliminated

  I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm
  not clear what is supposed to have any claim to reality here, other
  than the physical tokens instantiating the computation.

  David

  If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
  a computation. What is eliminated?

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread 1Z


On Feb 14, 11:08 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
 On 14 February 2011 20:46, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:

  I asked several times: what are numbers? without getting a reasonable
  reply.
  Sometimes I really like 1Z's twists.

 That may be, but I would also like to see if we can get things
 untwisted.  I'm not peddling any theory of my own here, I'm just
 trying to do some simple accounting.  For example according to some
 theory X doesn't exist and then somewhere else in the same theory
 something supposedly depends on assuming X.  This doesn't add up.
 Part of the problem - most of it, perhaps - is
 psychological-linguistic.  Being dead wrong about some theory of the
 mind (fortunately) doesn't stop our minds from functioning.  But that
 very same fact can blind us to circular reasoning.

 I've tried to argue before that the causal closure of physics is a
 very strong claim that is also very restrictive if applied
 consistently.  Trouble is, in my view, it very rarely is so applied.
 The Hard Problem, and the corresponding zombie intuition, is a sort of
 reductio of the strongest version of this claim - i.e. that what
 exists is reducible to a micro-physical substrate that is fully
 constitutive of all phenomena of whatever type. If this proposition
 were ever to be taken at face value, then further theorising would
 perforce just stop right there; indeed there can be no theories in
 such a scenario, just the sub-atomic events that might have been said
 (but by whom?) to underlie them.

No, that wouldn't follow because REDUCTION IS NOT ELIMINATION!!!

  Of course this hardly reflects our
 experience (how could it?).  We do not discover ourselves to be in
 some maximally fragmented state (what could it be like?) but rather
 in some integrated state of an altogether higher order;

Do you think reduction means reduction to *disconnected* bits and
pieces.

 but such
 quotidian reality apparently impresses us so little that we are quite
 capable of theorising it cheerfully out of existence (e.g. eliminative
 materialism).  Well, as Groucho Marx once innocently enquired who you
 gonna believe - me or your own eyes?.

 David

  David,

  I was laughing all the way from the computer that '7 does not exist'. And
  yes, it does not.
  Do qualia exist without the substrate they serve for as qualia?
  It goes into our deeper thought to identify 'existing' -
  I am willing to go as far as if our mind handles it, 'it' DOES exist
  so the quale like; 7(?) [i.e. the monitor for the eggs in your fridge] is
  existing. Not answering the question 'what it is? - but principally I am
  also against ontology in a worldview of change, where being makes only
  sense as transitionally becoming and transition substitutes for stagnancy.
  Panta Rhei also boggles my mind, especially when I cut out conventional
  time.

  I asked several times: what are numbers? without getting a reasonable
  reply.
  Sometimes I really like 1Z's twists.

  On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 2:32 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

  On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
   On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:

Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
you 7 doesn't exist.

   Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
   analogous sense?

  I can still have seven eggs in my fridge, and I can still
  have a computation running on a physical computer.

    And that consequently any computational
   characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing
   to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a
   formal game?

  If computation is multiply realisable, it never reduces to
  any particular physical behaviour, even if it always instantiated a
  such

    I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but
   if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is
   real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind?

  No. Every running programme is physical. Only programmes
  with nothing to run on are eliminated

   I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm
   not clear what is supposed to have any claim to reality here, other
   than the physical tokens instantiating the computation.

   David

  If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
  a computation. What is eliminated?

  --
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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread Brent Meeker

On 2/14/2011 11:36 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Programs are not written with physical instantiation in mind... even 
if eventually you run it.


Really?  Did people write programs before computers were invented?

What is important is the computation which doesn't care about the 
physical instantiation as such.


A program could be written to care about it's instantiation, but usually 
it's the programmer who cares.




When I stop executing a program does it cease to exist ? And come back 
to existence the instant I run it ?


A program may be written on paper, punched on cards, or encoded in neurons.

Brent


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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-14 Thread 1Z


On Feb 15, 12:12 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 11:23 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.comwrote:



   On 2/13/2011 11:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

  On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 12:52 AM, Brent Meeker 
  meeke...@dslextreme.comwrote:

   On 2/13/2011 10:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

  On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker 
  meeke...@dslextreme.comwrote:

  On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:

  On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com  wrote:

   What do you think the chances are that any random object in
  Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine will support
  intelligent life?
  1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?

   Zero.

  Does that allow us to argue:

  1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
  possibilities has measure
  0
  2) Our universe exists so it has measure0
  3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
  possibilities
  4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
  infinite possibilities (since all
  of maths includes the real line, etc)
  5) MUH is false.

   Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing
  machines are not the right kind of things to support life.

  I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me understand by
  answering the following questions:

  Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing machine?

   Because a Turing machine is an abstraction.  If you mean a realization
  of a Turing machine, then I suppose there could be a simulation of life on
  it.

  How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven
  distinguish it from a universe that does not?

   I doubt that Plato's heaven exists.  So no universes would exist in it.

  Brent

  Exists is a funny word.  It seems to embody knowledge and opinion from one
  observer's viewpoint based on their own limited experiences and interactions
  within their local portion of reality.

  Indeed.  I'm not sure it's unqualified use is meaningful.

   If Plato's heaven is such a thing that contains all possible structures,
  does the fact that it contains all possible structures hold true whether or
  not it exists?

  All possible brick structures?  Please explain as precisely as possible
  what Platonia is.

   If there are universes existing abstractly inside Plato's heaven, and
  some of those universes contain conscious observers, does ascribing the
  property of non-existence to Plato's heaven or to those universes make those
  observers not conscious, or is the abstraction enough?

  What does abstractly existing mean.?  How is it different from just
  exsiting?

    What properties can something which is non-existent have?

  It seems there are two choices: 1. Things which are non-existent can have
  other properties besides non-existence.

  Sure.  Sherlock Holmes is non-existent and has the property of being a
  detective.

   E.g., a non-existent universe has atoms, stars, worlds, and people on
  some of those worlds.  Or 2. Non-existent things cannot have any other
  properties besides non-existence.  It sounds like you belong to this second
  camp.

  However, this seems to lead immediately to mathematical realism.  As there
  are objects with definite objectively explorable properties in math.  7's
  primality and parity are properties of 7.  But how can 7 have properties if
  it does not exist?  If non-existent things can have properties, why can't
  consciousness be one of those properties?  What is the difference between a
  non-existent brain experiencing a sunset and an existent brain experiencing
  a sunset?

  Only one of them exists.

   Please explain as precisely as possible what it means for something to
  not exist.

  If I can kick it and it kicks back it exists.

  Brent

 What do you think about this passage from Fabric of Reality, where David
 Deutsch argues numbers do kick back:

 *Do* abstract, non-physical entities exist? Are they part of the fabric of
 reality? I am not interested here in issues of mere word usage. It is
 obvious that numbers, the laws of physics, and so on do ‘exist’ in some
 senses and not in others. The substantive question is this: how are we to
 understand such entities? Which of them are merely convenient forms of
 words, referring ultimately only to ordinary, physical reality? Which are
 merely ephemeral features of our culture? Which are arbitrary, like the
 rules of a trivial game that we need only look up? And which, if any, can be
 explained only in a way that attributes an independent existence to them?
 Things of this last type *must* be part of the fabric of reality as
 {222} defined in this book, because one would have to understand them
 in order to
 understand everything that is understood.

 This suggests that we ought to apply Dr Johnson's criterion again. If we
 want to know whether a given abstraction really exists, we should ask
 whether it ‘kicks back’ in a complex, 

Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-13 Thread Brent Meeker

On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:


On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com  wrote:

   

What do you think the chances are that any random object in
Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine will support intelligent life?
1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?
   

Zero.
 

Does that allow us to argue:

1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
possibilities has measure
0
2) Our universe exists so it has measure0
3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
possibilities
4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
infinite possibilities (since all
of maths includes the real line, etc)
5) MUH is false.
   


Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing 
machines are not the right kind of things to support life.


Brent

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-13 Thread Jason Resch
On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.comwrote:

 On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:


 On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com  wrote:



 What do you think the chances are that any random object in
 Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine will support intelligent
 life?
 1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?


 Zero.


 Does that allow us to argue:

 1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
 possibilities has measure
 0
 2) Our universe exists so it has measure0
 3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
 possibilities
 4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
 infinite possibilities (since all
 of maths includes the real line, etc)
 5) MUH is false.



 Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing machines
 are not the right kind of things to support life.



I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me understand by
answering the following questions:

Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing machine?

How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven distinguish
it from a universe that does not?


Jason

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-13 Thread Jason Resch
On Sat, Feb 12, 2011 at 7:46 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:



 On Feb 12, 9:05 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
  2011/2/12 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com
 
 
 
 
 
   On Feb 11, 11:50 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2011/2/11 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com
 
 On Feb 10, 1:24 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
  On 09 Feb 2011, at 16:49, 1Z wrote:
 
   On Feb 8, 6:17 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
   On 07 Feb 2011, at 23:58, 1Z wrote:
 
   On Feb 7, 6:29 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
   Peter,
 
   Everything is fine. You should understand the reasoning by
 using
   only
   the formal definition of arithmetical realism,
 
   You reasoning *cannot* be both valid and ontologically
   neutral because it has ontological conclusions.
 
   Wrong.
 
   Wrong about what?
 
  You were wrong on the idea that an argument cannot be valid and
  ontological. It is enough that the premises have ontological
 clauses.
 
 So which is the ontological premise? You don't say
 that Platonism is an explicit premise. But it isn't
 a corollary of CT either.
 
The ontological premise is that *you* could be replaced by *a digital
   brain*
in other word a program and still be you.
 
   That just repeats the same ambiguity. Is the programe supposed to be
   physically
   instantiated as patterns of electrical charge in circuitry, or
   floating around in Plato's heaven.
 
  When I program, I don't care about circuitry, I care about what the
 program
  does.

 It does nothing without circuitry.

 The circuitry add nothing from this POV.

 Choosing to ignore things doesn't make them non-existent.


I think the same when it comes to mathematical truths, mathematical objects
and other possible universes.

Adhering to the idea that all we can observe is all that exists is to go
against the trend science has established.  As time goes on, humans have had
to continually revise and extend their concept of reality.  We've learned
that the Earth is just one planet of many in this solar system, that the sun
is just one of many stars.  That the stars we can see with the naked eye are
just 1/200,000,000 of the stars in this galaxy.  That this galaxy is one of
the hundreds of billions we can observe.  That the true size of the universe
compared to what we can observe is at least 10^23 times bigger (perhaps
infinite).  With Everett, that all this may be just one possible branch
among a vast number of possible histories.

Nature continues to surprise us, and tell us that much more is out there
than we initially think, it has happened enough times that we should no
longer be so surprised, rather, perhaps we should even expect it.  Is a
blind, deaf, mute justified in believing reality consists only of what can
be felt in the immediate surroundings?  How big would the universe be for a
being with an intuitive crystal clear sense of the properties of
mathematical objects, one who could feel the squareness of a number in the
same way you can feel the squareness of a tile?  Do you think one's sense
capabilities dictate the extent of reality?  Perhaps humans are merely
severely disabled when it comes to seeing and feeling the mathematical
reality and our deficit in seeing this reality is much the same as an ant's
poor vision prevents it from making out a mountain vista.  Nevertheless, a
creature with such a capability is not inconceivable, and arguably some
synesthetes have experienced this.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Tammet#Synesthesia

Jason

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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-13 Thread Brent Meeker

On 2/13/2011 10:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker 
meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:


On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:


On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com  wrote:


What do you think the chances are that any
random object in
Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine
will support intelligent life?
1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?

Zero.

Does that allow us to argue:

1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
possibilities has measure
0
2) Our universe exists so it has measure0
3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
possibilities
4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
infinite possibilities (since all
of maths includes the real line, etc)
5) MUH is false.


Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing
machines are not the right kind of things to support life.



I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me understand by 
answering the following questions:


Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing machine?


Because a Turing machine is an abstraction.  If you mean a realization 
of a Turing machine, then I suppose there could be a simulation of life 
on it.




How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven 
distinguish it from a universe that does not?


I doubt that Plato's heaven exists.  So no universes would exist in it.

Brent




Jason
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Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?

2011-02-13 Thread Jason Resch
On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 12:52 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.comwrote:

  On 2/13/2011 10:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.comwrote:

 On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:


 On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com  wrote:



  What do you think the chances are that any random object in
 Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine will support intelligent
 life?
 1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?


  Zero.


 Does that allow us to argue:

 1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
 possibilities has measure
 0
 2) Our universe exists so it has measure0
 3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
 possibilities
 4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
 infinite possibilities (since all
 of maths includes the real line, etc)
 5) MUH is false.



  Hmmm.  I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing
 machines are not the right kind of things to support life.



 I am very puzzled by this statement.  You could help me understand by
 answering the following questions:

 Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing machine?


 Because a Turing machine is an abstraction.  If you mean a realization of a
 Turing machine, then I suppose there could be a simulation of life on it.



 How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven
 distinguish it from a universe that does not?


 I doubt that Plato's heaven exists.  So no universes would exist in it.

 Brent



Exists is a funny word.  It seems to embody knowledge and opinion from one
observer's viewpoint based on their own limited experiences and interactions
within their local portion of reality.  If Plato's heaven is such a thing
that contains all possible structures, does the fact that it contains all
possible structures hold true whether or not it exists?  If there are
universes existing abstractly inside Plato's heaven, and some of those
universes contain conscious observers, does ascribing the property of
non-existence to Plato's heaven or to those universes make those observers
not conscious, or is the abstraction enough?  What properties can something
which is non-existent have?

It seems there are two choices: 1. Things which are non-existent can have
other properties besides non-existence.  E.g., a non-existent universe has
atoms, stars, worlds, and people on some of those worlds.  Or 2.
Non-existent things cannot have any other properties besides non-existence.
It sounds like you belong to this second camp.

However, this seems to lead immediately to mathematical realism.  As there
are objects with definite objectively explorable properties in math.  7's
primality and parity are properties of 7.  But how can 7 have properties if
it does not exist?  If non-existent things can have properties, why can't
consciousness be one of those properties?  What is the difference between a
non-existent brain experiencing a sunset and an existent brain experiencing
a sunset?  Please explain as precisely as possible what it means for
something to not exist.

Jason

No facts about it if it is non existent?

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