Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

> On 26 Feb 2019, at 23:45, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 4:39:25 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: > > > On 2/26/2019 2:02 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 2:51:39 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >> >> >> On 2/26/2019 11:00 AM, Philip

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

> On 26 Feb 2019, at 19:43, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > On 2/26/2019 2:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 26 Feb 2019, at 01:04, Brent Meeker wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 2/25/2019 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Fictionalism does not apply to the arithmetical reality, nor to physics,

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 4:39:25 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: > > > > On 2/26/2019 2:02 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 2:51:39 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 2/26/2019 11:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

On 2/26/2019 2:02 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 2:51:39 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: On 2/26/2019 11:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 12:43:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: Right.  Truth and existence are quite different

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 2:51:39 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: > > > > On 2/26/2019 11:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 12:43:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> Right. Truth and existence are quite different things. >> >> Brent >> >> >> > For those

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

On 2/26/2019 11:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 12:43:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things. Brent For those from the type theory, programming language theory, constructive mathematics (whatever that

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 12:43:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: > > > > Right. Truth and existence are quite different things. > > Brent > > > For those from the type theory, programming language theory, constructive mathematics (whatever that clumping of schools is called): Truth and

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

On 2/26/2019 2:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Feb 2019, at 01:04, Brent Meeker wrote: On 2/25/2019 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Fictionalism does not apply to the arithmetical reality, nor to physics, but to the naïve idea of a “physical universe” as being the fundamental reality.

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

> On 26 Feb 2019, at 01:04, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > On 2/25/2019 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Fictionalism does not apply to the arithmetical reality, nor to physics, but >> to the naïve idea of a “physical universe” as being the fundamental reality. >> The theology of the

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 6:04:28 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: > > > > On 2/25/2019 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Fictionalism does not apply to the arithmetical reality, nor to > > physics, but to the naïve idea of a “physical universe” as being the > > fundamental reality. The theology

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

On 2/25/2019 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Fictionalism does not apply to the arithmetical reality, nor to physics, but to the naïve idea of a “physical universe” as being the fundamental reality. The theology of the universal machine is a priori quite non Aristotelian: there is no Creator,

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

> On 25 Feb 2019, at 11:52, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 3:34:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 22 Feb 2019, at 18:44, Philip Thrift > >> wrote: >> >> Some accept the possibility that there can be something that is immaterial. > > Yes. We call them

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 3:34:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 22 Feb 2019, at 18:44, Philip Thrift > > wrote: > > > Some accept the possibility that there can be something that is immaterial. > > > Yes. We call them “mathematician”. > > Bruno > > > This recent thesis I came

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

> On 22 Feb 2019, at 18:44, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Friday, February 22, 2019 at 3:57:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 21 Feb 2019, at 20:26, Philip Thrift > >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, February 21, 2019 at 8:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 18 Feb

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

On Friday, February 22, 2019 at 3:57:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 21 Feb 2019, at 20:26, Philip Thrift > > wrote: > > > > On Thursday, February 21, 2019 at 8:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 18 Feb 2019, at 20:18, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> On Monday, February 18,

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

> On 21 Feb 2019, at 20:26, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Thursday, February 21, 2019 at 8:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 18 Feb 2019, at 20:18, Philip Thrift > >> wrote: >> >> On Monday, February 18, 2019 at 9:14:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

On Thursday, February 21, 2019 at 8:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 18 Feb 2019, at 20:18, Philip Thrift > > wrote: > > On Monday, February 18, 2019 at 9:14:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/0SIiavzPI84/jUkaOlUdAwAJ > This is

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

> On 18 Feb 2019, at 20:18, Philip Thrift wrote: > > On Monday, February 18, 2019 at 9:14:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/0SIiavzPI84/jUkaOlUdAwAJ > This is the link to the reply in the topic "When Did Consciousness Begin?" As > I have

Re: Request to Bruno re modal logic

On 14 Apr 2017, at 19:31, David Nyman wrote: On 14 April 2017 at 17:59, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Apr 2017, at 19:26, David Nyman wrote: On 12 April 2017 at 20:59, Bruno Marchal wrote: 2 ^(2^9) * (3^2) * (5^17) * (7^2) * (11^21) *(13^2) * (17*17)

Re: Request to Bruno re modal logic

On 13 Apr 2017, at 16:23, David Nyman wrote: On 13 April 2017 at 14:56, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hmm You seem to want to replace the Outer-God, by the Inner-God. That is a risky move toward solipsim. S4Grz does not see the gap, but it does not see the other minds

Re: Request to Bruno re modal logic

On 14 April 2017 at 17:59, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 13 Apr 2017, at 19:26, David Nyman wrote: > > On 12 April 2017 at 20:59, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > 2 ^(2^9) * (3^2) * (5^17) * (7^2) * (11^21) *(13^2) * (17*17) * 3 ^ >> > > > ​Oh, I

Re: Request to Bruno re modal logic

On 13 Apr 2017, at 19:26, David Nyman wrote: On 12 April 2017 at 20:59, Bruno Marchal wrote: 2 ^(2^9) * (3^2) * (5^17) * (7^2) * (11^21) *(13^2) * (17*17) * 3 ^ ​Oh, I see what you mean: 3 ^(2^17) * (3^0) * (5^21) * (7^0)​ * (11^17) Now, you see

Re: Request to Bruno re modal logic

On 13 Apr 2017 2:56 p.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 13 Apr 2017, at 13:35, David Nyman wrote: On 13 April 2017 at 10:09, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Oops. > > Yet, you asked me about the modal logic, and I do think at some point I > have to say precisely

Re: Request to Bruno re modal logic

On 12 April 2017 at 20:59, Bruno Marchal wrote: 2 ^(2^9) * (3^2) * (5^17) * (7^2) * (11^21) *(13^2) * (17*17) * 3 ^ > ​Oh, I see what you mean: 3 ^(2^17) * (3^0) * (5^21) * (7^0)​ * (11^17) PS Are "(" and ")" meant to be the same? David -- You

Re: Request to Bruno re modal logic

On 12 April 2017 at 20:59, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 11 Apr 2017, at 18:21, David Nyman wrote: > > On 10 April 2017 at 18:32, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> On 10 Apr 2017, at 12:58, David Nyman wrote: >> >> Over the years there have been many references to

Re: Request to Bruno re modal logic

On 13 Apr 2017, at 14:11, David Nyman wrote: On 12 April 2017 at 20:59, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Apr 2017, at 18:21, David Nyman wrote: On 10 April 2017 at 18:32, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Apr 2017, at 12:58, David Nyman wrote: Over the years

Re: Request to Bruno re modal logic

On 13 April 2017 at 14:56, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hmm You seem to want to replace the Outer-God, by the Inner-God. That > is a risky move toward solipsim. S4Grz does not see the gap, but it does > not see the other minds either. ​But that's just it. We cannot ever "see"

Re: Request to Bruno re modal logic

On 13 Apr 2017, at 13:35, David Nyman wrote: On 13 April 2017 at 10:09, Bruno Marchal wrote: Oops. Yet, you asked me about the modal logic, and I do think at some point I have to say precisely what the G box [] is for. It is simple, but long and tedious. I hope you

Re: Request to Bruno re modal logic

On 12 April 2017 at 20:59, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 11 Apr 2017, at 18:21, David Nyman wrote: > > On 10 April 2017 at 18:32, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> On 10 Apr 2017, at 12:58, David Nyman wrote: >> >> Over the years there have been many references to

Re: Request to Bruno re modal logic

On 13 April 2017 at 10:09, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Oops. > > Yet, you asked me about the modal logic, and I do think at some point I > have to say precisely what the G box [] is for. It is simple, but long and > tedious. I hope you have not too much difficulties with my

Re: Request to Bruno re modal logic

On 11 Apr 2017, at 18:21, David Nyman wrote: On 10 April 2017 at 18:32, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Apr 2017, at 12:58, David Nyman wrote: ​Good, but I guess I was also asking for some sort of shortcut to the intuitive power of all this, because if the only route

Re: Request to Bruno re modal logic

On 11 Apr 2017, at 18:21, David Nyman wrote: On 10 April 2017 at 18:32, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Apr 2017, at 12:58, David Nyman wrote: Over the years there have been many references to various modal logics deployed in support of the comp theory, in particular for

Re: Request to Bruno re modal logic

On 4/11/2017 9:21 AM, David Nyman wrote: Yet, if the current theory is the giving of the two axioms: A1 p -> (q -> p) A2 (p -> (q -> r) ) -> ((p -> q) -> (p -> r)) With the inference rules modus ponens, and some substitution rule, it will be rather difficult to

Re: Request to Bruno re modal logic

On 10 April 2017 at 18:32, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 10 Apr 2017, at 12:58, David Nyman wrote: > > Over the years there have been many references to various modal logics > deployed in support of the comp theory, in particular for the analysis of > categorical distinctions

Re: Request to Bruno re modal logic

On 10 Apr 2017, at 12:58, David Nyman wrote: Over the years there have been many references to various modal logics deployed in support of the comp theory, in particular for the analysis of categorical distinctions between third-person and first- person logical consequences. Trouble is,

Request to Bruno re modal logic

Over the years there have been many references to various modal logics deployed in support of the comp theory, in particular for the analysis of categorical distinctions between third-person and first-person logical consequences. Trouble is, when Bruno refers to these logics in explanation of his

Re: Modal logic (derivation of physics sum up till end)

On 09 May 2014, at 02:22, LizR wrote: On 9 May 2014 05:07, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 08 May 2014, at 00:35, LizR wrote: (By the way I think Max Tegmark does a good job of explaining what this means in his book, even if he doesn't get to the reversal. He says you need to

Re: Modal logic (derivation of physics sum up till end)

On 08 May 2014, at 00:35, LizR wrote: On 6 May 2014 06:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Craig, Liz, Brent and/or anyone interested, Again, it is just an attempt. Take it easy. I have to train myself, and a bit yourself. You might tell me if this helps, if only a little bit.

Re: Modal logic (derivation of physics sum up till end)

On 9 May 2014 05:07, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 08 May 2014, at 00:35, LizR wrote: (By the way I think Max Tegmark does a good job of explaining what this means in his book, even if he doesn't get to the reversal. He says you need to assume a capsule theory of memory and talks

Re: Modal logic (derivation of physics sum up till end)

On 5/8/2014 5:22 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 May 2014 05:07, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 08 May 2014, at 00:35, LizR wrote: (By the way I think Max Tegmark does a good job of explaining what this means in his book, even if he doesn't get to the

Re: Modal logic (derivation of physics sum up till end)

On 9 May 2014 13:05, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/8/2014 5:22 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 May 2014 05:07, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 08 May 2014, at 00:35, LizR wrote: (By the way I think Max Tegmark does a good job of explaining what this means in his book, even

Re: Modal logic (derivation of physics sum up till end)

On 6 May 2014 06:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Craig, Liz, Brent and/or anyone interested, Again, it is just an attempt. Take it easy. I have to train myself, and a bit yourself. You might tell me if this helps, if only a little bit. OK... *** (it is also a second attempt

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 21 Jan 2014, at 11:14, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Thanks for the info. It is very interesting and It helps in many ways. You are welcome. The problem with mathematical notation is that it is good to store and systematize knowledge, not to make it understandable. The transmission of

Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

On 14 Feb 2014, at 23:27, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: What's the definition of G*? G* is a quite peculiar modal logic. It has as axioms all the theorem of G, + the

Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

;) From what I observed here, people in this list pass trough the following phases: 1- enter with an apparently bright idea 2- is exposed to comp bombardment 3- comp seduction 4- comp dislike (really comp explains everything and nothing. That means nothing) 5- comp aversion (too much comp, every

Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

On 15 Feb 2014, at 12:14, Alberto G. Corona wrote: ;) From what I observed here, people in this list pass trough the following phases: 1- enter with an apparently bright idea 2- is exposed to comp bombardment 3- comp seduction 4- comp dislike (really comp explains everything and nothing.

Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

On 16 February 2014 00:14, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: ;) From what I observed here, people in this list pass trough the following phases: 1- enter with an apparently bright idea 2- is exposed to comp bombardment 3- comp seduction 4- comp dislike (really comp explains

Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

On 13 Feb 2014, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: What's the definition of G*? G* is a quite peculiar modal logic. It has as axioms all the theorem of G, + the axiom: []A - A But is NOT close for the necessitation rule (can you see why that is

Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

To summarize: there are all possible combinations of 1 and 0's therefore everithing can be made isomorphic or emergent from 0 and 1's. So stop thinking and praise 0s and 1s hypothesis. -Why people make apparently weird distincitions? it does not matter: comp says nothing about it. it depends on

Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

On 14 Feb 2014, at 12:17, Alberto G. Corona wrote: To summarize: there are all possible combinations of 1 and 0's therefore everithing can be made isomorphic or emergent from 0 and 1's. ? So stop thinking and praise 0s and 1s hypothesis. ? -Why people make apparently weird

Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

On 2/14/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: What's the definition of G*? G* is a quite peculiar modal logic. It has as axioms all the theorem of G, + the axiom: []A - A But is NOT close for the

Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

On 15 February 2014 11:27, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I was merely using teleportation as an example to illustrate that possible is a relative concept depending on the accessiblity relation. What does possible in principle mean? Does it only mean not self contradictory? Does it

Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

On 13 Feb 2014, at 04:03, meekerdb wrote: On 2/12/2014 11:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on modal logic, directly related to the machine discourse (and this will be justified later, as it is not obvious at all). snip

Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

On 2/13/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: What's the definition of G*? G* is a quite peculiar modal logic. It has as axioms all the theorem of G, + the axiom: []A - A But is NOT close for the necessitation rule (can you see why that is impossible). This entails that G* has no Kripke

Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).

On 2/12/2014 11:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on modal logic, directly related to the machine discourse (and this will be justified later, as it is not obvious at all). On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:28, meekerdb wrote: On 2/12/2014

Re: Modal Logic (Part 3: summary + 1 exercise)

On 11 Feb 2014, at 04:27, LizR wrote: On 10 February 2014 01:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: So with - and f we can define all connectors. Is there a connector (like , V, -, ...) such that all connectors can be defined from it? You just said that ... oh do you mean without

Re: Modal Logic (Part 3: summary + 1 exercise)

On 12 February 2014 06:31, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Smullyan's brother, if I remember well, told to the little Raymond --'tonight, I will surprise you, I promise!' Little Raymond waited all the night, but got nothing, so at morning he complained to his brother I thought you

Re: Modal Logic (Part 3: summary + 1 exercise)

On 10 February 2014 01:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: So with - and f we can define all connectors. Is there a connector (like , V, -, ...) such that all connectors can be defined from it? You just said that ... oh do you mean without using 'f' ? This is a facultative

Re: Modal Logic (Part 3: summary + 1 exercise)

On 08 Feb 2014, at 22:05, LizR wrote: On 8 February 2014 08:43, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 07 Feb 2014, at 02:29, LizR wrote: On 7 February 2014 09:14, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Feb 2014, at 07:39, LizR wrote: snip OK, having had a look at what you say

Re: Biology, Buddha and the irreflexive Multiverse (was Re: Modal Logic (Part 3: summary + 1 exercise)

On 07 Feb 2014, at 23:21, meekerdb wrote: On 2/7/2014 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Feb 2014, at 21:29, meekerdb wrote: On 2/6/2014 12:14 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: In Kripke semantic all statements are relativized to the world you are in. []A can be true in some world and false in

Re: Modal Logic (Part 3: summary + 1 exercise)

On 8 February 2014 08:43, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 07 Feb 2014, at 02:29, LizR wrote: On 7 February 2014 09:14, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Feb 2014, at 07:39, LizR wrote: On 6 February 2014 08:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Which among

Biology, Buddha and the irreflexive Multiverse (was Re: Modal Logic (Part 3: summary + 1 exercise)

On 06 Feb 2014, at 21:29, meekerdb wrote: On 2/6/2014 12:14 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: In Kripke semantic all statements are relativized to the world you are in. []A can be true in some world and false in another. The meaning of [] is restricted, for each world, to the world they can

Re: Biology, Buddha and the irreflexive Multiverse (was Re: Modal Logic (Part 3: summary + 1 exercise)

On 2/7/2014 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Feb 2014, at 21:29, meekerdb wrote: On 2/6/2014 12:14 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: In Kripke semantic all statements are relativized to the world you are in. []A can be true in some world and false in another. The meaning of [] is restricted, for

Re: Modal Logic (Part 3: summary + 1 exercise)

On 06 Feb 2014, at 07:39, LizR wrote: On 6 February 2014 08:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Which among the next symbolic expressions is the one being a well formed formula: ((p - q) - ((p (p V r)) - q)) ))(p-)##à89- a - q) OK? I sure hope so. Well, I will pray a little

Re: Modal Logic (Part 3: summary + 1 exercise)

On 2/6/2014 12:14 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: In Kripke semantic all statements are relativized to the world you are in. []A can be true in some world and false in another. The meaning of [] is restricted, for each world, to the world they can access (through the accessibility relation available

Re: Modal Logic (Part 3: summary + 1 exercise)

On 7 February 2014 09:14, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Feb 2014, at 07:39, LizR wrote: On 6 February 2014 08:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Which among the next symbolic expressions is the one being a well formed formula: ((p - q) - ((p (p V r)) - q))

Re: Modal Logic (Part 3: summary + 1 exercise)

Hi Liz, Logician have a large notion of world. A world is a element of a set, called the set of worlds, or multiverse. Statisticians do the same, with the notion of population, which is also just a set. In fact classical logic and classical statistics have a sufficiently large common

Re: Modal Logic (Part 3: summary + 1 exercise)

On 6 February 2014 08:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Liz, Logician have a large notion of world. A world is a element of a set, called the set of worlds, or multiverse. Statisticians do the same, with the notion of population, which is also just a set. In fact classical

Re: Modal Logic (Part 2: From Leibniz to Kripke)

On 29 January 2014 23:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Ah? I read his book on GR. It is a bit old but still pleasant. Not sure that our minds crawl up our worldlines is wrong for block universe. Maybe you can elaborate a little bit. It creates the wrong image for people who don't

Re: Modal Logic (Part 2: From Leibniz to Kripke)

On 29 Jan 2014, at 01:05, LizR wrote: On 29 January 2014 08:29, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Liz, Others, Good morning Professor Marchal! In the general semantic of Leibniz, we have a non empty set of worlds W, and some valuation of the propositional variables (p, q, r, ...)

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 27 Jan 2014, at 23:57, LizR wrote: On 27 January 2014 06:11, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Jan 2014, at 01:56, LizR wrote: On 25 January 2014 23:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: if p is true (in this world, say) then it's true in all worlds that p is true in

Re: Modal Logic (Part 2: From Leibniz to Kripke)

On 29 January 2014 08:29, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Liz, Others, Good morning Professor Marchal! In the general semantic of Leibniz, we have a non empty set of worlds W, and some valuation of the propositional variables (p, q, r, ...) at each world. And we should be

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 26 Jan 2014, at 01:56, LizR wrote: On 25 January 2014 23:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: if p is true (in this world, say) then it's true in all worlds that p is true in at least one world. You need just use a conditional (if). The word asked was if. OK? OK. I think I

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 27 January 2014 06:11, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Jan 2014, at 01:56, LizR wrote: On 25 January 2014 23:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: if p is true (in this world, say) then it's true in all worlds that p is true in at least one world. You need just use

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 24 Jan 2014, at 21:52, LizR wrote: On 24 January 2014 23:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 24 Jan 2014, at 00:01, LizR wrote: On 24 January 2014 00:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: (Later, we will stop asking that all worlds (in the sense given) belongs in the

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 25 January 2014 23:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: if p is true (in this world, say) then it's true in all worlds that p is true in at least one world. You need just use a conditional (if). The word asked was if. OK? OK. I think I see. p becomes if p is true rather than p

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 24 Jan 2014, at 00:01, LizR wrote: On 24 January 2014 00:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: []p - p Here, there is no more truth table available, and so you have to think. The Leibniz semantic (the only semantic we have defined) provides all the information to solve the

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 24 Jan 2014, at 00:20, LizR wrote: On 24 January 2014 01:06, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 23 Jan 2014, at 08:57, LizR wrote: Everybody loves my baby. Therefore my baby loves my baby. But my baby loves nobody but me. Therefore - the only way this can be true - is if Alicia

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 24 January 2014 23:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 24 Jan 2014, at 00:01, LizR wrote: On 24 January 2014 00:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: (Later, we will stop asking that all worlds (in the sense given) belongs in the multiverse. We can decide to suppress all

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 23 Jan 2014, at 07:42, LizR wrote: On 23 January 2014 00:58, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Jan 2014, at 04:23, LizR wrote: I'm going to take a punt and assume the order in which things are ANDed together doesn't matter, in which case the above comes out as equal

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 23 Jan 2014, at 07:44, LizR wrote: I think after looking at your next post that I have messed up []p - p and therefore, no doubt, everything else. I need to do the truth table business ... later! No, you were 100% right. You confirms my feeling (when going in my bed yesterday

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 23 Jan 2014, at 08:57, LizR wrote: On 23 January 2014 08:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: OK. A last little exercise in the same vein, for the night. (coming from a book by Jeffrey): Alicia was singing this: Everybody loves my baby. My baby loves nobody but me. Can we

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 24 January 2014 00:33, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: []p - p Here, there is no more truth table available, and so you have to think. The Leibniz semantic (the only semantic we have defined) provides all the information to solve the puzzle. I read this as p is true in worlds

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 24 January 2014 01:06, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 23 Jan 2014, at 08:57, LizR wrote: Everybody loves my baby. Therefore my baby loves my baby. But my baby loves nobody but me. Therefore - the only way this can be true - is if Alicia *is* her baby. So the answer is yes!

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 22 Jan 2014, at 00:16, LizR wrote: On 21 January 2014 22:29, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Oh! You did not answer: ((COLD WET) - ICE) - ((COLD - ICE) V (WET - ICE)) So what? Afraid of the logician's trick? Or of the logician's madness? Try this one if you are afraid to be

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 22 Jan 2014, at 04:23, LizR wrote: On 21 January 2014 22:29, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: No, it is all good, Liz! What about: (p V q) - p Using the same formula this is equivalent to(~(p V q) V p), which for (0,1) is 0, hence not a law. and p - (p q) And this is (~p V

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

Hi Liz, May be I am to quick. On 22 Jan 2014, at 12:58, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Jan 2014, at 04:23, LizR wrote: On 21 January 2014 22:29, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: No, it is all good, Liz! What about: (p V q) - p Using the same formula this is equivalent to(~(p V q) V

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

I think after looking at your next post that I have messed up []p - p and therefore, no doubt, everything else. I need to do the truth table business ... later! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 23 January 2014 08:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: OK. A last little exercise in the same vein, for the night. (coming from a book by Jeffrey): Alicia was singing this: Everybody loves my baby. My baby loves nobody but me. Can we deduce from this that everybody loves

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 20 Jan 2014, at 23:47, LizR wrote: On 21 January 2014 08:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: If you remember Cantor, you see that if we take all variables into account, the multiverse is already a continuum. OK? A world is defined by a infinite sequence like true, false, false,

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

Thanks for the info. It is very interesting and It helps in many ways. The problem with mathematical notation is that it is good to store and systematize knowledge, not to make it understandable. The transmission of knowledge can only be done by replaying the historical process that produces the

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 1/21/2014 2:14 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Thanks for the info. It is very interesting and It helps in many ways. The problem with mathematical notation is that it is good to store and systematize knowledge, not to make it understandable. The transmission of knowledge can only be done by

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 21 January 2014 22:29, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Oh! You did not answer: ((COLD WET) - ICE) - ((COLD - ICE) V (WET - ICE)) So what? Afraid of the logician's trick? Or of the logician's madness? Try this one if you are afraid to be influenced by your intuition aboutCOLD,

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 21 January 2014 22:29, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: No, it is all good, Liz! What about: (p V q) - p Using the same formula this is equivalent to(~(p V q) V p), which for (0,1) is 0, hence not a law. and p - (p q) And this is (~p V (p q)) which is 0 for (1,0), hence

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

Actually, you will have to remind me what [] and mean before I go any further. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 21 January 2014 08:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: If you remember Cantor, you see that if we take all variables into account, the multiverse is already a continuum. OK? A world is defined by a infinite sequence like true, false, false, true, true, true, ... corresponding to p,

Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)

On 21 January 2014 08:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Are the following laws? I don't put the last outer parenthesis for reason of readability. p - p This is a law because p - q is equivalent to (~p V q) and (p V ~p) must be (true OR false), or (false OR true) which are both

Re: modal logic KTB (a.k.a. B)

Le 05-mars-08, à 10:19, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: logic B (KTB) can be used to capture a notion of vagueness, and, by a theorem of Goldblatt, it can be used to formalise classicaly a minimal form of von Neuman quantum logic in a manner similar to

Re: modal logic KTB (a.k.a. B)

Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: logic B (KTB) can be used to capture a notion of vagueness, and, by a theorem of Goldblatt, it can be used to formalise classicaly a minimal form of von Neuman quantum logic in a manner similar to the way the modal logic S4, or S4Grz, capture

Re: modal logic KTB (a.k.a. B)

The idea is to identify an accessible world with possible results of experiments. Symmetry then entails that if you do an experiment which gives some result, you can repeat the experience and get those results again. You can come back in the world you leave. It is an intuitive and

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