Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
On 30 January 2004 Eric Hawthorne wrote: QUOTE I really think that to get a good grasp on this kind of issue, one has to get over ones-self. Step outside for a moment and consider whether you feeling conscious is as amazing or inexplicable as you think. Consciousness may very well just be an epi-phenomenon of a self-reflection-capable world-modelling representer and reasoner such as our brains. Minsky's society of mind idea isn't fully adequate as a consciousness explanation, but it makes inroads. Some of the most exciting work in this area IMHO is being done by the neurologist Antonio Damasio. Here is a review of his book on the topic of the feeling of consciousness: http://homepage.ntlworld.com/anthony.campbell1/bookreviews/r/damasio-2.html ENDQUOTE What I think you are saying is that the experience of consciousness is just the result of certain physical processes in the brain. This is of course true; how could it possibly be otherwise? It should in theory be possible to map each distinct mental state to a corresponding brain state. Also, if you used this knowledge to reconstruct a particular brain from raw materials, the resulting entity should be conscious in the same way as the original was. The problem, however, is that even though you might know every detail of the brain, you cannot know what it actually experiences unless you can somehow connect it to your own brain. For example, if the owner of the brain you are studying sees a red flash, you might know down to to the level of individual atoms what changes this produces in the brain; you might even be able to read the brain, scanning for neuronal activity and deducing correctly that the subject sees a red flash. However, it is impossible to know what it feels like to see a red flash unless you have the actual experience yourself. So I maintain that there is this extra bit of information -subjective experience or qualia - that you do not automatically have even if you know everything about the brain to an arbitrary level of precision. Moreover, it cannot be derived even in theory from the laws of physics - even though, of course, it is totally dependent on the laws of physics, like everything else in the Universe. _ E-mail just got a whole lot better. New ninemsn Premium. Click here http://ninemsn.com.au/premium/landing.asp
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: fact vs. value; formal vs. informal; precise vs. vague; objective vs. subjective; third person vs. first person; computation vs. thought; brain vs. mind; David Chalmer's easy problem vs. hard problem of consciousness: To me, this dichotomy remains the biggest mystery in science and philosophy. I have very reluctantly settled on the idea that there is a fundamental (=irreducible=axiomatic) difference here, which I know is something of a copout. I really would like to have one scientific theory that at least potentially explains everything. As it is, even finding a clear way of stating the dichotomy is proving elusive. Some previous posts in the current thread have attacked this idea by, for example, explaining ethics in terms of evolutionary theory or game theory, but this is like explaining a statement about the properties of sodium chloride in terms of the evolutionary or game theoretic advantages of the study of chemistry. Yes, you can legitimately talk about ethics or chemistry in these terms, but in so doing you are talking meta-ethics or meta-chemistry, which I think is what Bruno means by level shift. I really think that to get a good grasp on this kind of issue, one has to get over ones-self. Step outside for a moment and consider whether you feeling conscious is as amazing or inexplicable as you think. Consciousness may very well just be an epi-phenomenon of a self-reflection-capable world-modelling representer and reasoner such as our brains. Minsky's society of mind idea isn't fully adequate as a consciousness explanation, but it makes inroads. Some of the most exciting work in this area IMHO is being done by the neurologist Antonio Damasio. Here is a review of his book on the topic of the feeling of consciousness: http://homepage.ntlworld.com/anthony.campbell1/bookreviews/r/damasio-2.html One of his key idea is that the lowest level of consciousness is just the brain's representation of the sensor data about what our body is doing (how it is positioned and moving, if it aches anywhere, and what we're seeing, hearing in each instant etc). He says this is the brain's representation for the purpose of homeostasis i.e. the instantaneous status of the body. This homeostatis awareness (reflection of sensor data in the brain) he calls the proto-self. Then comes a level (he calls core consciousness) at which those low-level sense data are integrated into a conceptual (or object-modelling) level to form a continuous stream of consciousness feeling. This is the watching a movie but you are in the movie sense. Finally, at the high level, is added (or filled in) ideas from the memory and planning facilities of the higher brain. So what we are doing here is adding in ideas about things which take time. We are adding in (to help explain the stream of consciousness object-movie that we're in) a whole bunch of remembered specific episodes and facts and generalized space-time-world-situation-model concepts that we produced by processing experience after experience after experience. And we are adding in hypotheses about how things could go if (i.e. object-movie-that-we're-in-explorations of counterfactuals and hypotheticals and desired future states and plan run-throughs for getting there.) This is just using the same watching-object-movie-that-I'm-in capability but to daydream (remember, or wish, or plan) alternative scenarios rather than the sense-data direct movie of the core-self. This highest level self, he calls the autobiographical self because the highest level sense of consciousness is in effect, us writing the story of ourselves (that we're in) as well as reading the story of ourself (that we're in) at the same time. It is a story, and not just a stream-of-consciousness, because it has added in memories and experiences from the past, to provide a meaningful causal narrative to ourself about what is going on now, and what is going to happen next. So highest-level consciousness IS an autobiographical story of ourself and our doings and present-time but past-experientially interpreted experiences. And that is just the back-and-forth-in-time (or sideways to hypotheticals/counterfactuals) extension of the core-self movie that I'm both watching AND sensing that I'm in it sense, which itself is the CONCEPTUAL-OBJECT-INTERPRETATION of the continuous stream of homeostasis raw sense-data that the brain is continually receiving and processing in real-time to know what the state of the body is and what it senses to be around it. This makes PERFECT sense (and feels almost adequate, as an explanation of the feeling of consciousness) to me. Eric p.s. before someone jumps in about how off-topic this is, I think that's narrow minded because understanding consciousness is integral to understanding observers and their role in physics.
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
At 13:53 30/01/04 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: fact vs. value; formal vs. informal; precise vs. vague; objective vs. subjective; third person vs. first person; computation vs. thought; brain vs. mind; David Chalmer's easy problem vs. hard problem of consciousness: To me, this dichotomy remains the biggest mystery in science and philosophy. I have very reluctantly settled on the idea that there is a fundamental (=irreducible=axiomatic) difference here, which I know is something of a copout. I really would like to have one scientific theory that at least potentially explains everything. As it is, even finding a clear way of stating the dichotomy is proving elusive. Actually that *difference* is not *really* fundamental. Although I could have taken it as axiom, it appears that the mechanist hypothesis literally forces us to introduce that difference. It is hard to explain this without being a little bit technical. The main fact. is that, in the apparently crisp domain of formal provability by correct machine or correct theorem prover, once the machine are sufficiently powerful, we get this provable(p)does not entailprovable(p) and true(p) This should be astonishing, because we have restricted ourself to correct machine, so obviously provable(p) entails the truth of p, and thus provable(p) entails provable(p) and p; so what What happens is incompleteness; although provable(p) entails true(p), the machine is unable to prove that. That is the correct machine cannot prove its own correctness. By Tarski (or Kaplan Montague 1961) such correctness is not even expressible by the machine (unlike provability and consistency). But, (and that's what the meta shift of level makes it possible); we can define, for each proposition p, a modal connective knowable(p) by provable(p) and p. Accepting the idea that the first person is the knower, this trick makes it necessary for any correct machine to have a different logic for something which is strictly equivalent for any omniscient outsider. In some sense this explains why there is necessarily a gap between (3-person) communicable proof and (1-person) non-communicable (as such) knowledge. This is so important that not only the knower appears to be variant of the prover, but the observables, that is: physics, too. But that could lead me too far now and I prefer to stop. Some previous posts in the current thread have attacked this idea by, for example, explaining ethics in terms of evolutionary theory or game theory, but this is like explaining a statement about the properties of sodium chloride in terms of the evolutionary or game theoretic advantages of the study of chemistry. Yes, you can legitimately talk about ethics or chemistry in these terms, but in so doing you are talking meta-ethics or meta-chemistry, which I think is what Bruno means by level shift. Yes, ok. And indeed evolutionnary theory and game theory and even logic are sometimes used to just put that difference under the rug making consciousness a sort of epiphenomenon, which it is not, for incompleteness is inescapable, and introspective machines can only build their realities from it. All this can be felt as highly counter-intuitive, but the logic of self-reference *is* counter-intuitive. Bruno
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
Greetings, Some previous posts in the current thread have attacked this idea by, for example, explaining ethics in terms of evolutionary theory or game theory, but this is like explaining a statement about the properties of sodium chloride in terms of the evolutionary or game theoretic advantages of the study of chemistry. Yes, you can legitimately talk about ethics or chemistry in these terms, but in so doing you are talking meta-ethics or meta-chemistry, which I think is what Bruno means by level shift. Perhaps, but this view speaks to the rift between those that approach human behavior as being different in kind from other animals and those that see it as instead different in degree. The latter, myself included, find the study of ethology (animal behavior) and animal ecology as directly applicable to humans and in those very real fields of study, interpretiing behavior in the context of fitness is standard procedure. So in that sense examining human behavior in that same context can be seen as a legitimate extension of ethology and/or animal ecology, as opposed to some form of meta-psychology, ..anthropology, ..sociology etc.. We share 98%+ of our genetic heritage with bonobo chimps. Many researchers credit our cousins with primitive language capacity, tool usage, and even self-awareness. I doubt, though, that many would find interpreting chimp behavior in the context of fitness to be un-orthodox in anyway. Indeed it is the norm. Cheers CMR -- insert gratuitous quotation that implies my profundity here --
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Take these two statements: (a) Dulce et decorum est/ Pro patria mori (Wilfred Owen) (b) He died in the trenches during WW I from chlorine gas poisoning The former conveys feelings, values, wishes, while the latter conveys facts. The former is not true or false in the same way as the latter statement is. This has always seemed obvious to me and it has been stated in one form or another by philosophers of an empiricist bent since David Hume. Does anyone subscribing to this list really disagree that (a) and (b) are different at some fundamental level? Well since I don't really read Latin, this will be a little tough. Luckily this website does read latin. http://lysy2.archives.nd.edu/cgi-bin/words.exe?Dulce+et+decorum+est http://lysy2.archives.nd.edu/cgi-bin/words.exe?Pro+patria+mori So I'll assume that the second one is something like It's good to die for one's country. So what is this saying? It may simply be explaining that countries would do better if people were willing to die for them. If one were to do some kind of game-theory model of geopolitical evolution, one might conclude that this is factually true. What does the first one say? flattery is pleasing? or sweetness is a virtue? I'm sure that given enough time, one could show that both of these have a basis in evolution and specifically the evolution of successful cooperative social behaviour. Moral truths are complex truths. That doesn't make them less true. Just harder to explain. Eric
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
At 14:54 29/01/04 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: (a) Dulce et decorum est/ Pro patria mori (Wilfred Owen) (b) He died in the trenches during WW I from chlorine gas poisoning The former conveys feelings, values, wishes, while the latter conveys facts. The former is not true or false in the same way as the latter statement is. This has always seemed obvious to me and it has been stated in one form or another by philosophers of an empiricist bent since David Hume. Does anyone subscribing to this list really disagree that (a) and (b) are different at some fundamental level? I agree. I could even say that it is such nuance that I like to capture in some formal way to make it clearer. Actually, without pretending it is exactly that, that fundamental difference you single out here, is akin to the difference between first person and third person. But I quasi take as an (uncommunicable as it may be) fact that there is such a deep difference. Some will say come on, the subjective apprehension cannot be formalised. True, but there are tools to formalize, after some shift of level things which are not formalizable, at the previous level. But my point here is that I agree the difference between a and b is fundamental. Like I agree with your post where you say that science (per se) has nothing to say about ethic, which is different from saying that we cannot have a scientific attitude when discussing about ethic principle. I agree with you but that comforts my point: perhaps you would agree, for a time, even to take such a difference as an axiom? What I really like in comp, is that grand-mother is just uneliminable; I mean grand-mother psychology, also called folk psychology (but then somehow if you look at the details you will see that grand-mother physics have to be eliminated...) Bruno
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
fact vs. value; formal vs. informal; precise vs. vague; objective vs. subjective; third person vs. first person; computation vs. thought; brain vs. mind; David Chalmer's easy problem vs. hard problem of consciousness: To me, this dichotomy remains the biggest mystery in science and philosophy. I have very reluctantly settled on the idea that there is a fundamental (=irreducible=axiomatic) difference here, which I know is something of a copout. I really would like to have one scientific theory that at least potentially explains everything. As it is, even finding a clear way of stating the dichotomy is proving elusive. Some previous posts in the current thread have attacked this idea by, for example, explaining ethics in terms of evolutionary theory or game theory, but this is like explaining a statement about the properties of sodium chloride in terms of the evolutionary or game theoretic advantages of the study of chemistry. Yes, you can legitimately talk about ethics or chemistry in these terms, but in so doing you are talking meta-ethics or meta-chemistry, which I think is what Bruno means by level shift. Stathis Papaioannou From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2004 17:27:40 +0100 At 14:54 29/01/04 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: (a) Dulce et decorum est/ Pro patria mori (Wilfred Owen) (b) He died in the trenches during WW I from chlorine gas poisoning The former conveys feelings, values, wishes, while the latter conveys facts. The former is not true or false in the same way as the latter statement is. This has always seemed obvious to me and it has been stated in one form or another by philosophers of an empiricist bent since David Hume. Does anyone subscribing to this list really disagree that (a) and (b) are different at some fundamental level? I agree. I could even say that it is such nuance that I like to capture in some formal way to make it clearer. Actually, without pretending it is exactly that, that fundamental difference you single out here, is akin to the difference between first person and third person. But I quasi take as an (uncommunicable as it may be) fact that there is such a deep difference. Some will say come on, the subjective apprehension cannot be formalised. True, but there are tools to formalize, after some shift of level things which are not formalizable, at the previous level. But my point here is that I agree the difference between a and b is fundamental. Like I agree with your post where you say that science (per se) has nothing to say about ethic, which is different from saying that we cannot have a scientific attitude when discussing about ethic principle. I agree with you but that comforts my point: perhaps you would agree, for a time, even to take such a difference as an axiom? What I really like in comp, is that grand-mother is just uneliminable; I mean grand-mother psychology, also called folk psychology (but then somehow if you look at the details you will see that grand-mother physics have to be eliminated...) Bruno _ E-mail just got a whole lot better. New ninemsn Premium. Click here http://ninemsn.com.au/premium/landing.asp
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
At 11:58 28/01/04 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The big difference between ethical and aesthetic axioms and the axioms of empirical science is that the latter are so widely accepted that they are not even recognised as axioms, for the most part. If I say water boils at 100 degrees celcius, this can be proved or disproved to the satisfaction of just about anyone by measuring the temperature of boiling water on several different occasions with several different thermometers. The means of verification contains as it were hidden axioms: that checking the boiling point several times with different equipment and obtaining consistent results allows one to generalise about the boiling point of a substance under certain conditions. One could go a level deeper and point out the (axiomatic) assumption that a physical law proved here and now applies to all time and space, the assumption that a logical deduction applies to all possible universes, the axioms of logic itself, including rules for using the term axiom, definition of rule, definition of definition... Fortunately, we hardly ever have to go to such lengths in scientific fields because everyone agrees on the basic axioms. Now that I think of it, this could be used to define a field as a science: a field is a scientific field when the underlying axioms are well-defined and not in dispute by the scholars in that field. This all stands in stark contrast to ethics and aesthetics, where axiomatic statements (defined as statements taken as given, not dependent on any more basic assumptions) are in dispute all the time. For the record, I am all in favour of being nice to people, opposed to torture and murder, etc. I take these as axiomatic, meaning that I cannot give a more basic reason behind my acceptance of these beliefs. Some philosophers may push the axiom one level lower, and say, for example, murder is wrong _because_ it decreases the net happiness in the world. In that case, the axiom is the utilitarian belief that the good is the greatest happiness of the greatest number. However - and this is the point of this extended reply - there are many who would reject these axioms, especially if they are not of a liberal democratic bent, and there is no way to argue against them as being irrrational because if the axiom were rational or irrational it wouldn't be an axiom! If an advanced alien species decided to wipe us out because they regard us in the same way as we regard bacteria, do you seriously think you have a chance of convincing them they are doing something evil? What will your argument be when they point out the clause in the Handbook of Intergalactic Ethics which says (after the preamble where it says we hold these truths to be self-evident) ...more advanced species have the right to enslave, consume or destroy less advanced species. It isn't the same as if they got the boiling point of H2O wrong, is it? It is perhaps not as easy to get the H2O boiling point right, but you did not convince me of any fundamental impossibility of scientific ethic. Now, I believe that if there is any scientific ethic then it cannot be normative and cannot give moral injunctions. It will only give theories, which can be applied to solve problems like if you agree with this and that principle of ethic then you should agree with such and such other principles. You tell me that there will be too much theories. But I can imagine that some will win, or that some will be deduced from other more basic principles. I don' t really believe that there are scientific fields, I believe there exists scientific attitude which consists in trying to be the clearest possible with oneself and the other, and I believe that is valuable relatively to any question pertaining either in the human or exact fields, which are today artificially separated (making both of them less exact and less humane). Anyone having some understanding of science know that it goes from the doubt to more doubts, from astonishment to more astonishment, from vanity to modesty; so that reason can only make bigger our possibilities, falsify our reductions and pinpoint toward the vastness of our ignorance; so that (and that's a theorem with comp) scientific attitude is ethical by itself by making you *ever* more modest, and cautious. It is only a reductionist view of science which is in contradiction with the idea of scientific theology. The interest of Godel's theorem in this setting is that it demolishes in one strike a giant class of reductive views on just the world of numbers and machine. In the same vain deontic logic exemplifies the natural complexity and intractability of ethical questions: actually in any open rich domain science just gives negative hints of the type: it is not that, neither this, nor With comp there could even be some metatheorem like any normative ethical theory is unethical, etc. Bruno
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
On 28 Jan 2004 Bruno Marchal wrote: QUOTE- It is perhaps not as easy to get the H2O boiling point right, but you did not convince me of any fundamental impossibility of scientific ethic. Now, I believe that if there is any scientific ethic then it cannot be normative and cannot give moral injunctions. It will only give theories, which can be applied to solve problems like if you agree with this and that principle of ethic then you should agree with such and such other principles. You tell me that there will be too much theories. But I can imagine that some will win, or that some will be deduced from other more basic principles. -ENDQUOTE Actually, that's very well put: if you agree with this and that principle, you should agree with such and such other principles. It covers everything from Euclidian geometry to physics and chemistry to ethics and aesthetics. I still believe there is at least a quantitative difference between the former and the latter, however. If I return to my example of alien civilizations, I would be surprised if an alien textbook of maths, physics or chemistry did not contain many items recognisable to humans when appropriately translated, and in fact this very expectation has been used by SETI - eg. looking for radio transmissions containing a sequence of prime numbers. On the other hand, I would be surprised if alien art or ethics were not very different to what we know as humans, as there are large differences even between human cultures, not to mention the differences between various terrestrial species. Borrowing a phrase from genetics, scientific statements are highly conserved between cultures, ethical and aesthetic statements are moderately conserved, while nonsensical statements merge into the background noise. This is a quantitative difference, but I still think there is a qualitative difference which I have not managed to convey properly. Take these two statements: (a) Dulce et decorum est/ Pro patria mori (Wilfred Owen) (b) He died in the trenches during WW I from chlorine gas poisoning The former conveys feelings, values, wishes, while the latter conveys facts. The former is not true or false in the same way as the latter statement is. This has always seemed obvious to me and it has been stated in one form or another by philosophers of an empiricist bent since David Hume. Does anyone subscribing to this list really disagree that (a) and (b) are different at some fundamental level? Stathis Papaioannou Melbourne, Australia _ E-mail just got a whole lot better. New ninemsn Premium. Click here http://ninemsn.com.au/premium/landing.asp
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
At 22:17 26/01/04 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Yes, this is exactly what I mean. I could be the most rational of people and still consistently hold the evil views I have described (for the sake of argument, of course!), because good and evil. You cannot prove that a moral axiom is correct or incorrect, nor can you assume that it will be self-evident to everyone else just because it appears so to you. OK, but is that not true for any axiom of any theory? Let us make a try. Would you accept the following axiom for moral obligation and permission: Obligatory(p) implies permitted(p) No? (it is one of the deontic axiom most people working theoretically on laws accept; obviously a society in which that principle is not respected make it possible for the power in place to put anyone in jail, by just making some service obligatory and also interdicted !) Bruno
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
The big difference between ethical and aesthetic axioms and the axioms of empirical science is that the latter are so widely accepted that they are not even recognised as axioms, for the most part. If I say water boils at 100 degrees celcius, this can be proved or disproved to the satisfaction of just about anyone by measuring the temperature of boiling water on several different occasions with several different thermometers. The means of verification contains as it were hidden axioms: that checking the boiling point several times with different equipment and obtaining consistent results allows one to generalise about the boiling point of a substance under certain conditions. One could go a level deeper and point out the (axiomatic) assumption that a physical law proved here and now applies to all time and space, the assumption that a logical deduction applies to all possible universes, the axioms of logic itself, including rules for using the term axiom, definition of rule, definition of definition... Fortunately, we hardly ever have to go to such lengths in scientific fields because everyone agrees on the basic axioms. Now that I think of it, this could be used to define a field as a science: a field is a scientific field when the underlying axioms are well-defined and not in dispute by the scholars in that field. This all stands in stark contrast to ethics and aesthetics, where axiomatic statements (defined as statements taken as given, not dependent on any more basic assumptions) are in dispute all the time. For the record, I am all in favour of being nice to people, opposed to torture and murder, etc. I take these as axiomatic, meaning that I cannot give a more basic reason behind my acceptance of these beliefs. Some philosophers may push the axiom one level lower, and say, for example, murder is wrong _because_ it decreases the net happiness in the world. In that case, the axiom is the utilitarian belief that the good is the greatest happiness of the greatest number. However - and this is the point of this extended reply - there are many who would reject these axioms, especially if they are not of a liberal democratic bent, and there is no way to argue against them as being irrrational because if the axiom were rational or irrational it wouldn't be an axiom! If an advanced alien species decided to wipe us out because they regard us in the same way as we regard bacteria, do you seriously think you have a chance of convincing them they are doing something evil? What will your argument be when they point out the clause in the Handbook of Intergalactic Ethics which says (after the preamble where it says we hold these truths to be self-evident) ...more advanced species have the right to enslave, consume or destroy less advanced species. It isn't the same as if they got the boiling point of H2O wrong, is it? From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2004 15:05:48 +0100 At 22:17 26/01/04 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Yes, this is exactly what I mean. I could be the most rational of people and still consistently hold the evil views I have described (for the sake of argument, of course!). You cannot prove that a moral axiom is correct or incorrect, nor can you assume that it will be self-evident to everyone else just because it appears so to you. OK, but is that not true for any axiom of any theory? Let us make a try. Would you accept the following axiom for moral obligation and permission: Obligatory(p) implies permitted(p) No? (it is one of the deontic axiom most people working theoretically on laws accept; obviously a society in which that principle is not respected make it possible for the power in place to put anyone in jail, by just making some service obligatory and also interdicted !) Bruno _ Protect your inbox from harmful viruses with new ninemsn Premium. Click here http://ninemsn.com.au/premium/landing.asp
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
Yes, this is exactly what I mean. I could be the most rational of people and still consistently hold the evil views I have described (for the sake of argument, of course!), because good and evil. You cannot prove that a moral axiom is correct or incorrect, nor can you assume that it will be self-evident to everyone else just because it appears so to you. What you can do is try to persuade by appealing to the emotions, bringing up your children to share your values, identifying and minimising the factors in society which lead to evil behaviour, and so on: in other words, what people have always tried to do. -Stathis Papaioannou From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED],[EMAIL PROTECTED] CC: Everything-list [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2004 18:20:24 +0500 On 25-Jan-04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Let me give a clearer example. Suppose I say that I believe it is a good and noble thing for the strong to oppress the weak, even to the point of killing them; and that if I were in charge I would promote this moral position in schools, through the media, and with changes to the criminal law, so that eventually it becomes accepted as the norm. How are you going to argue against this? You can't point out any errors of fact because I haven't made any empirical claims (other than the trivial one that this is what I in fact believe). You may try to point out the dire social consequences of such a policy, but where in the above have I said anything about social consequences? Frankly, I don't care what the effects of my policy are because I consider the destruction of weaklings in as painful a manner as possible of the greatest importance, and if God is just, I believe that I will go to heaven for having stuck to my moral principles. I know that many people would be horrified by what I propose, but I am certainly not the only one in history to have thought this way! The point is, you cannot argue against my moral position, because I don't present any arguments or make any claims. All you can do is disagree with me and state an alternative moral position. True. But I can point out to people that 'weakling' is a relative term and that you may well conclude they are weaklings in the future. I will remind them that they loved and cared for some of those killed as weaklings and this caused them much grief. I would ask them whether they have any reason to agree with your theology. I would suggest that we band together and kill you before you kill someone we love. Brent Meeker It would be easy for us, if we do not learn to understand the world and appreciate the rights, privileges and duties of all other countries and peoples, to represent in our power the same danger to the world that fascism did. --- Ernest Hemingway _ Get less junk mail with ninemsn Premium. Click here http://ninemsn.com.au/premium/landing.asp
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
Let me give a clearer example. Suppose I say that I believe it is a good and noble thing for the strong to oppress the weak, even to the point of killing them; and that if I were in charge I would promote this moral position in schools, through the media, and with changes to the criminal law, so that eventually it becomes accepted as the norm. How are you going to argue against this? You can't point out any errors of fact because I haven't made any empirical claims (other than the trivial one that this is what I in fact believe). You may try to point out the dire social consequences of such a policy, but where in the above have I said anything about social consequences? Frankly, I don't care what the effects of my policy are because I consider the destruction of weaklings in as painful a manner as possible of the greatest importance, and if God is just, I believe that I will go to heaven for having stuck to my moral principles. I know that many people would be horrified by what I propose, but I am certainly not the only one in history to have thought this way! The point is, you cannot argue against my moral position, because I don't present any arguments or make any claims. All you can do is disagree with me and state an alternative moral position. From: Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2004 21:00:39 -0500 On Sun, Jan 25, 2004 at 01:01:42AM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: If I stop with (a) above, I am simply saying that this is how I feel about suffering, and this feeling is not contingent on the state of affairs in any actual or possible world [there, I got it in!]. (a) as stated is ill defined. In order to actually reason with it in practice, you'd have to define what activity, cause, net, human, and suffering mean, but then it's hard to see how one can just have a feeling that statement (a), by now highly technical, is true. What about a slightly different variation of (a), where the definition of human or suffering is given a small tweak? How do you decide which of them reflects your true feelings? The mere presense of many similar but contradictory moral statements might give you a feeling of arbitrariness that causes you to reject all of them. Difficulties like this lead to the desire for a set of basic moral axioms that can be defined precisely and still be seen by everyone as obvious and non-arbitrary. Again, maybe it doesn't exist, but we can't know for sure unless we're much smarter than we actually are. _ ninemsn Premium transforms your e-mail with colours, photos and animated text. Click here http://ninemsn.com.au/premium/landing.asp
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
Stathis is right. The moral axiomatic system will have to show that in moral/ethical issues we must allow ourselves to be guided by facts logic. **But even if it succeeds in showing that, one already has to have agreed to be guided by facts logic in order to be guided by the moral axiomatic system's argument.** One can read the dialogue (I forget which one) in which Socrates argues with somebody who believes that might makes right. Socrates engages his interlocutor into following the facts logic enough to follow his (Socrates') arguments. But in the end Socrates fails to convince him because in the end his interlocutor will not yield to facts logic. One can hold Socrates' particular arguments to be faulty but still see how it could all happen. Now, one may argue that up to a certain point it is impossible to ignore facts logic without being insane. That is true. But only up to a point. Otherwise we wouldn't have the saying, Denial is not just a river in Egypt.. (In! deed, logic facts are sometimes difficult to heed, we have to be sometimes quite toiling active in order to receive them, get them right, heed them -- to _allow_ them to determine us, our understanding behavior, in ways that they would not otherwise do, often against pressure for us to do otherwise.) - Ben Udell Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Let me give a clearer example. Suppose I say that I believe it is a good and noble thing for the strong to oppress the weak, even to the point of killing them; and that if I were in charge I would promote this moral position in schools, through the media, and with changes to the criminal law, so that eventually it becomes accepted as the norm. How are you going to argue against this? You can't point out any errors of fact because I haven't made any empirical claims (other than the trivial one that this is what I in fact believe). You may try to point out the dire social consequences of such a policy, but where in the above have I said anything about social consequences? Frankly, I don't care what the effects of my policy are because I consider the destruction of weaklings in as painful a manner as possible of the greatest importance, and if God is just, I believe that I will go to heaven for having stuck to my moral principles. I know that many people would be horrified by w! hat I propose, but I am certainly not the only one in history to have thought this way! The point is, you cannot argue against my moral position, because I don't present any arguments or make any claims. All you can do is disagree with me and state an alternative moral position. Wei Dai wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: If I stop with (a) above, I am simply saying that this is how I feel about suffering, and this feeling is not contingent on the state of affairs in any actual or possible world [there, I got it in!]. (a) as stated is ill defined. In order to actually reason with it in practice, you'd have to define what activity, cause, net, human, and suffering mean, but then it's hard to see how one can just have a feeling that statement (a), by now highly technical, is true. What about a slightly different variation of (a), where the definition of human or suffering is given a small tweak? How do you decide which of them reflects your true feelings? The mere presense of many similar but contradictory moral statements might give you a feeling of arbitrariness that causes you to reject all of them. Difficulties like this lead to the desire for a set of basic moral axioms that can be defined precisely and still be seen by everyone as obvious and non-arbitrary. Again, maybe it doesn't exist, but we can't know for sure unless we're much smarter than we actually are.
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
On 25-Jan-04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Let me give a clearer example. Suppose I say that I believe it is a good and noble thing for the strong to oppress the weak, even to the point of killing them; and that if I were in charge I would promote this moral position in schools, through the media, and with changes to the criminal law, so that eventually it becomes accepted as the norm. How are you going to argue against this? You can't point out any errors of fact because I haven't made any empirical claims (other than the trivial one that this is what I in fact believe). You may try to point out the dire social consequences of such a policy, but where in the above have I said anything about social consequences? Frankly, I don't care what the effects of my policy are because I consider the destruction of weaklings in as painful a manner as possible of the greatest importance, and if God is just, I believe that I will go to heaven for having stuck to my moral principles. I know that many people would be horrified by what I propose, but I am certainly not the only one in history to have thought this way! The point is, you cannot argue against my moral position, because I don't present any arguments or make any claims. All you can do is disagree with me and state an alternative moral position. True. But I can point out to people that 'weakling' is a relative term and that you may well conclude they are weaklings in the future. I will remind them that they loved and cared for some of those killed as weaklings and this caused them much grief. I would ask them whether they have any reason to agree with your theology. I would suggest that we band together and kill you before you kill someone we love. Brent Meeker It would be easy for us, if we do not learn to understand the world and appreciate the rights, privileges and duties of all other countries and peoples, to represent in our power the same danger to the world that fascism did. --- Ernest Hemingway
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
I have to say that I sympathize with Caesar, but my position is slightly different. I think there is a possibility that that objective morality does exist, but we're simply too stupid to realize what it is. Therefore we should try to improve our intelligence, through intelligence amplication, or artificial intelligence, before saying that objective morality is impossible and therefore we should just pursue other goals like survival, comfort or happiness. Some people have argued that in fact survival is an objective goal, because evolution makes sure that people who don't pursue survival don't exist. But if we assume that everything exists, the above statement has to be modified to an assertion that people who don't pursue survival have low measure. However the choice of measure itself is subjective, so why shouldn't one use a measure in which people who don't pursue survival have high measure (e.g., one which favors universes where those people survive anyway through good luck or benevolent gods)?
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
There are statements of fact, statements of logic (also called analytic or a priori), and statements of value. Statements of fact are verified or falsified empirically. Statements of logic include mathematical theorems and are verified or falsified by following the rules of logic or mathematics. Statements of value - which includes ethics and aesthetics - are expressions of one's feelings or wishes, are not, by their nature, right or wrong (except in the trivial sense of whether one is being truthful about one's feelings). Now, ethical statements may actually include statements of fact, and this part can be verified or falsified objectively. For example, I may say, (a) any activity which causes net human suffering is bad; (b) abortion causes net human suffering; therefore, (c) abortion is bad. Look first at the logical structure: classic syllogism, no problem. Second, look at premiss (b). There is a lot of research to do before allowing this as true: can a foetus at a certain stage experience pain? Is the harm to the foetus outweighed by the harm to the mother and unwanted child if there is no abortion? Finally, look at premiss (a). If asked why I believe this it may turn out to in fact be another composite, to be analysed as above. However, at some point, I will not be able to give any further explanation, and THAT is the basic ethical belief. If I stop with (a) above, I am simply saying that this is how I feel about suffering, and this feeling is not contingent on the state of affairs in any actual or possible world [there, I got it in!]. From: Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2004 06:47:39 -0500 I have to say that I sympathize with Caesar, but my position is slightly different. I think there is a possibility that that objective morality does exist, but we're simply too stupid to realize what it is. Therefore we should try to improve our intelligence, through intelligence amplication, or artificial intelligence, before saying that objective morality is impossible and therefore we should just pursue other goals like survival, comfort or happiness. Some people have argued that in fact survival is an objective goal, because evolution makes sure that people who don't pursue survival don't exist. But if we assume that everything exists, the above statement has to be modified to an assertion that people who don't pursue survival have low measure. However the choice of measure itself is subjective, so why shouldn't one use a measure in which people who don't pursue survival have high measure (e.g., one which favors universes where those people survive anyway through good luck or benevolent gods)? _ Get less junk mail with ninemsn Premium. Click here http://ninemsn.com.au/premium/landing.asp
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
On Sun, Jan 25, 2004 at 01:01:42AM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: If I stop with (a) above, I am simply saying that this is how I feel about suffering, and this feeling is not contingent on the state of affairs in any actual or possible world [there, I got it in!]. (a) as stated is ill defined. In order to actually reason with it in practice, you'd have to define what activity, cause, net, human, and suffering mean, but then it's hard to see how one can just have a feeling that statement (a), by now highly technical, is true. What about a slightly different variation of (a), where the definition of human or suffering is given a small tweak? How do you decide which of them reflects your true feelings? The mere presense of many similar but contradictory moral statements might give you a feeling of arbitrariness that causes you to reject all of them. Difficulties like this lead to the desire for a set of basic moral axioms that can be defined precisely and still be seen by everyone as obvious and non-arbitrary. Again, maybe it doesn't exist, but we can't know for sure unless we're much smarter than we actually are.
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
Morality, ethics, virtue, etc. imply a struggle for control -- at least within oneself, but often more widely. If morality had a set of obvious axioms, such as to lead to firm reliable answers to all moral questions in practice, it would be know-how, not morality. For everything there is a season a time, according to Ecclesiastes, but neither Ecclesiastes nor anything else always tells us just when those times seasons are. opportunity _ _ _ _ _ _ risk safeness _ _ _ _ _ _ _ futility ***For everything*** hope _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ fear confidence _ _ _ _ _ _ despair ***there is a season*** courage _ _ _ _ _ _ _ prudence due confidence _ _ _ _ realism ***and an out-of-season*** rashness _ _ _ _ _ _ _ cowardice complacency _ _ _ _ _ defeatism (Note: the above structure entails that Aristotle's doctrine of virtue as a 'mean' between two extremes is at best a sloppy heuristic that captures a sense of maintaining some sort of poise or grace under pressure.) Even when we agree on what the evil is -- a forest fire approaching the town for example -- still to fight it, may require the moral virtues of courage due confidence, lest in one's heart one succumb to cowardly or defeatist thoughts about the fire. To refuse to fight it instead to flee in one's car may require the moral virtues of prudence realism -- lest one succumb to rash or complacent thoughts about the fire. Sometimes boldness is good, sometimes caution is good. Courage is appropriately hopeful action despite pressure not to be hopeful. Pressure -- a struggle, as I said. Most traditional virtues can be defined in such manner. Why would one be under such pressure but through conflict among one's own values? The moral value system is not independent self-contained but depends on non-entirely-moral values -- the value of the town, the trees, etc. -- on knowledge on understanding things about oneself others. The moral value of the town is based on consideration! s of which many are themselves not moral or not directly moral. Morality cannot provide easy answers when easy answers cannot be provided for many relevant non-moral or not purely moral questions -- e.g, what are the stakes? what are the threats? what are the opportunities? Applying our axiomatic moral/ethical mathematic will probably land us in still more moral/ethical quandaries. We are left asking, when, specifically, singularly, are these seasons times of which Ecclesiastes speaks? Of course we're left asking. How could it be otherwise? Furthermore, from a risk-management perspective, opportunity equals risk. Safeness equals futility. As Freud said, life presents a choice not between pleasure pain, but between both neither. Any moral system will set up opportunity/risk situations where the risk is that of violating the morality. If we're talking not just about morality in the usual narrow sense, but in the sense of excellence, the virtues of character, then morality guarantees trials tests for those who would be moral. (That doesn't make morality bad -- a bad morality is one that tends to assure that those who seek to be moral shall lose.) And to the extent that we disagree about human nature, disagreements about morality may run corespondingly deep. - Ben Udell - Original Message - From: Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Saturday, January 24, 2004 9:00 PM Subject: Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism Stathis Papaioannou wrote: If I stop with (a) above, I am simply saying that this is how I feel about suffering, and this feeling is not contingent on the state of affairs in any actual or possible world [there, I got it in!] Wei Dai responded: (a) as stated is ill defined. In order to actually reason with it in practice, you'd have to define what activity, cause, net, human, and suffering mean, but then it's hard to see how one can just have a feeling that statement (a), by now highly technical, is true. What about a slightly different variation of (a), where the definition of human or suffering is given a small tweak? How do you decide which of them reflects your true feelings? The mere presense of many similar but contradictory moral statements might give you a feeling of arbitrariness that causes you to reject all of them. Difficulties like this lead to the desire for a set of basic moral axioms that can be defined precisely and still be seen by everyone as obvious and non-arbitrary. Again, maybe it doesn't exist, but we can't know for sure unless we're much smarter than we actually are.
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: This sort of argument has been raised many times over the centuries, both by rationalists and by their opponents, but it is based the fundamental error of conflating science with ethics. Science deals with matters of fact; it does not comment on whether these facts are good or bad, beautiful or ugly, desirable or undesirable. These latter qualities - values - are necessarily subjective, and lie in the domain of ethics and aesthetics Saying that life is worth living, or that you believe it is bad to kill, are simply statements of your values and feelings, and as such are valid independently of any scientific theory. It may not be an error to equate science and ethics. Science continually moves into new domains. I'm of the opinion that there is a valid utilitarian theory of co-operating intelligent agent ethics. Utilitarian because the purpose of the ethical principles can be shown to be group success (i.e. emergent-system survival / success in the competition with other potential variants of emergent intelligent-agent systems that don't include ethical principles as behaviour guides for their the agents.) Note the subtlety that the utility NEED not be to an individual agent directly, but may only accrue to individuals in the group, ON AVERAGE, due to the ethics and moral rules generally obeyed by the group members, and the consequent floating of (almost) all boats. One of the common debates is between ethical/moral relativism versus absolutism. I call this a confusion due to oversimplification of the issue, rather than a debate. In this regard, this debate is as silly as the nature vs nurture debate and its influence on,say, human behaviour, in which the answer is of course it's a complex feedback loop involving the interaction of inherited traits and the accidents of life. Duh! There is no nature vs nurture. It's always nature AND nurture. Arguing about which is more fundamental is truly unproductive hair-splitting. We should be researching exactly how the feedback loops work instead. So completely analogously, with absolute, and relative morals and ethics. My position is that there are absolute ethical principles and moral rules, but that those are all general rules, not instantiated rules. (i.e. absolutes in ethics/morals are all universally quantified rules that apply to general classes of situations and actions.) Relativism is justified in as far as it is simply debate about how the absolute general ethical and moral principles should map (do map) onto the current particular situation at hand. This mapping may not be simple. A single situation can be boundary-scoped differently, for example, or its agents can be seen as engaging in several different kinds of acts, with many effects for each act, and the importance to the essence of the situation of each act and effect can be debated from different perspectives that involve the interests and knowledge of different agents. So the single situation may map validly to several different instantiations of several ethical principles. And the moral rules applicable to the situation may be subject then to legitimate debate. Relativism may also question whether some moralist group's absolute moral principles are general enough, and may argue with some validity that they are not general enough to be applied without frequent error (and tragedies of injustice). e.g. Dont Eat Pork -- Yeah, whatever however, Don't eat the kinds of meat that are often rotten and disease-ridden in our climate, like Pork may be a valid moral rule at some historical time and place. e.g. Thou shalt not kill. -- Well that's an easy to remember simplification, but a little over simplified and too specific. How about: Minimize the amount of quality-life-years lost in this encounter. So, women and children first into the lifeboats. You old geezers are shark-bait. Or.. Take out the guy wearing the bomb. Now. And relativism is also justified in as far as it is the correct observation that many (most) situations of complex interactions beteen multiple intelligent agents can be described from multiple perspectives (and/or multiple situation-scope inclusions/exclusions). A specific situation can be (probably validly) described as co-incident incidences of the several instances of several different general ethical principles. A to B Our people have lived here from time immemorial. And your grandfathers killed my grandmother. You are pestilent invaders. Get out or we will have a just war against you. B to A Our people have lived here from time immemorial. And your grandfathers killed my grandmother. You are pestilent invaders. Get out or we will have a just war against you. Clearly, it is easy to imagine a situation in which both A and B are factually correct, except perhaps in their use of the word just. Most complex interaction situations requiring application of ethics and moral rules are
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
The previous message was actually off-list, but since you replied to the list as well: On Thu, Jan 22, 2004 at 05:07:29PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The study of why societies have certain ethical beliefs is a subject for evolutionary psychology, or anthropology/sociology (moving down the reductionist hierarchy), and the study of what brain processes underlie ethical beliefs and behaviour is a subject for neurophysiology/biochemistry/chemistry/ultimately quantum physics (moving up the reductionist hierarchy), but the actual experience of having an We agree so far. ethical belief, and its ultimate justification, is not subject to scientific study. It is the old philosophical distinction between qualia - Now that doesn't follow. the subjective experience in itself - versus a description of the brain processes underlying the subjective experience. Subjective experience is at I don't understand how you can detach the experience from the physical process generating the experience. Qualia is just process introspection artifacts. There isn't anything particularly interesting or deep about them. I don't understand why you think experiencing an instance of a class of behaviour algorithms, emerged from iterated interactions of agents invalidates scientific mode of inquiry. I'm interested in spiking networks. You can see your qualia just fine in a tool as coarse as fMRI. bottom simple, basic, irreducible. This does not by any means imply that there is anything mystical about it. I believe that there is a one to one, Ah, then disregard above diatribe. We don't seem to disagree. or possibly a many to one, relationship between brain states and mental states; a one to many relationship would imply that something magical was going on, and I cannot imagine how this could occur even in theory. To this extent, I believe that the identity theory of mind MUST be valid - but to say that a certain brain state is necessary and sufficient for the experience of a corresponding mental state is not to say that the mental state is the same thing as the brain state. I still don't understand why you think ethics isn't a noisy set of behaviour algorithms, and is not a domain of science. -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgp0.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
Eric Hawthorne wrote: QUOTE- It may not be an error to equate science and ethics. Science continually moves into new domains. I'm of the opinion that there is a valid utilitarian theory of co-operating intelligent agent ethics. Utilitarian because the purpose of the ethical principles can be shown to be group success (i.e. emergent-system survival / success in the competition with other potential variants of emergent intelligent-agent systems that don't include ethical principles as behaviour guides for their the agents.) -ENDQUOTE Indeed, you might be able to show that 'the purpose of the ethical principles can be shown to be group success', although I'm sure that someone will be able to think of exceptions. This is an explanation of why societies have certain ethical principles, and perhaps a method for arriving at new ethical principles. However, why should group success be a desirable goal? What if I said that I took sadistic pleasure in the suffering of others, and that I wanted to see the group fail rather than succeed, because I did not like the idea of people being more successful than I was? In your scientific study of ethics, you would have to add a footnote to the effect that some deviant elements in society do not follow the usual principles. You may go on to explore why this is, what could be done to avoid it, etc. But you would not be able to say that my deviant views were wrong and claim this as scientific statement. Deviant is a description of fact, but wrong is a value. It is like saying I like chocolate: you could explain this in terms of the physiological effects of glucose, caffeine, theobromine etc., but the truth or falsehood of the statement I like chocolate is independent of such considerations. Stathis Papaioannou Melbourne, Australia _ ninemsn Premium transforms your e-mail with colours, photos and animated text. Click here http://ninemsn.com.au/premium/landing.asp
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
Sorry. Can't help myself : Is there any point in completing that term paper really? Actually, between the above remark made in fun, the subsequent discussion, there are things in common. Above, the joke is that, if one adopts nihilism the view that nothing is worth caring about, then what value would one place in knowing this or in knowing anything? Ethics pertains to feelings values regarding power, submission, governing oneself, governing being governed, decision-making. Then there are also feelings values regarding other things, including knowledge, what's worth knowing, exploring, etc., standards of evidence, etc. We have no word like ethics for it although one might argue that the word philosophy was originally meant to mean it. These values with regard to cognition knowledge are values which in a refined deepened form motivate science, they dissolve under nihilism, along, therefore, with science itself. But this in turn leads to the dissolution of nihilism, which used scientific ideas. Vicious circle there. The subsequent discussion (below) concerns whether we really decide anything whether there's any scientific basis for values regarding decisions (or anything else). If it's all out of our hands, then we decide nothing, ethics is an illusion. But likewise, if it's all out of our hands, what is our basis for thinking we have any access to truth? It seems that we are determined to believe X or Y just as we are determined to do X or Y. So nihilism is just another determined belief. But if in spite of this there is truth for us to care about which we can do approach, then why shouldn't we think that there are right virtuous decisions for us to care about which we can do approach? (Is it that truth is real but right virtue are not? But that's another argument.) (Also, a random thought: we talk about the deterministic as if we were still talking about a coercive mechanical force imposed on us, rather than about mathematical regularities which we believe hold in principle. One question to ask is, who are we such that we dis-associate ourselves from the particular complex weavings of regularities that we represent?) Pretty amazing for a high-school senior term paper, by the way. - Benjamin Udell --- Eric Hawthorne wrote: Sorry. Can't help myself : Is there any point in completing that term paper really? On a few points. I don't believe in the point of view of nihilism because everything will happen in the multiverse, anyway, regardless of what I do. My reasons are a little vague, but here's a stab at it: 1. I look at us group of human observer SAS's as results of and guardians of emerged complex order in our universe. In fact I believe our universe (its temporal arrow etc) is only observable because it is the set of paths through the multiverse that has all this emerged complex order in it.I believe these potentially observable sets of paths through the multiverse's general disorder are rare (of small measure.) 2. Somehow, all of us human observers are clearly in or observing the SAME set of paths through the multiverse. Now that is significant. It tells us that in the emergent-order paths of multiverse info-state evolution, that those paths are observable consistently to ANY observer that emerges as part of the emerged complex order present in those paths. 3. I see humans (or other intelligent lifeforms) as in some strange ways the smart-lookahead guardians of the particular piece of emergent-order their most a part of (their planet, their ecosystems, their societies, themselves).The reason we emerged (or are still here) is because we have helped make our emergent complex system successful (robust). 4. For some strange reason, I value the most complex yet elegant and robust emergent order (for itself). This is why for example, I'm an environmental activist in my spare (hah!) time. 5. I think if one values elegant, robust complex order, and if one is an active part of the elegant, robust, complex order, who emerged precisely so that a SAS of the emerged system could sense and make sense of the surroundings, and could model and influence the future, and guard the SAS's own existence and that of the whole emerged system of which it is a part, then guard away I say, actively, not nihilistically. Model your world. Predict its different possible futures, and use your emerged (and cultivated, same thing) wisdom to steer yourself, and your society, and your ecosystem, and your planet, away from harm and too-soon reduction to entropy. In the very, very end, it is said, entropy wins (like the house wins in Vegas.) But why not have as good a game as possible before it ends in a billion or trillions of years. 6. Of course, it doesn't make sense to try to protect (and advance in elegance) an emergent order that is indeed truly robust, does it? But my point back there was that we are supposed to be part of the
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
The last world is right. I think that if there were infinites universes like our own and if all possible thinks that could append realy append, talking about existential and ethical nihilism or moralism make no sense. Certainly there will be infinites observers who believe in existential and ethical nihilism and other infinites who believe in moralism. And we can't say who is write. Federico
RE: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
This sort of argument has been raised many times over the centuries, both by rationalists and by their opponents, but it is based the fundamental error of conflating science with ethics. Science deals with matters of fact; it does not comment on whether these facts are good or bad, beautiful or ugly, desirable or undesirable. These latter qualities - values - are necessarily subjective, and lie in the domain of ethics and aesthetics. So of course, we're all going to die, and so will everyone we care about, and so will the world itself, eventually; but if you can convince yourself that life is worth living up until that moment, then life is worth living. Saying that life is worth living, or that you believe it is bad to kill, are simply statements of your values and feelings, and as such are valid independently of any scientific theory. From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2004 21:04:14 -0500 (EST) I am writing my high school senior project term paper on defending ethical and existential nihilism based on quantum and multiverse theory. I was looking for any comments on the subject. Here I place my outline for said paper: --- A Scientific Basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism I. Introduction A. Societal habit of classification of moral disciplines B. Difference of anyone to a possibly fitting classification makes such divvying impossible C. One must evaluate the individual sets of moral principles to establish their validity II. What is ethical?Establishing a Basis for Reference A. Definition of ethic/moral 1. Participation/contribution 2. Action 3. Earning B. Earning as an ethical point for reference 1. Earning governed by psychological history 2. Psychology influenced by the physical 3. The physical is governed by causality C. Ethic is debunked by the causal nature of space-time and quantum superpositioning III. Space-Time and Quantum Physics form a basis for inevitability A. The So-Called Relativity Theory Perspective 1. The space-time manifold is a substrate upon which things exist 2. The future condition of events or anything can be determined using equations to model energy and position over time 3. All things have a definite past, present, and future, ontologically 4. Limited by information acquisition a) speed of light b) infinitesimal spaces governed by quantum theory B. Quantum Physics Perspective 1. Heisenbergs Uncertainty Principle a) impossible to know ones future b) definite past 2. Schrödingers wave function a) Schrödingers Cat Paradox b) superposition of waves c) collapse of the wave function d) Copenhagen Interpretation (CHI) e) Hugh Everett IIIs theory that all possible resultant collapses can be defined by a superposition in Hilbert Space C. Multiverse TheoryMultiple Universes in which all possibilities are played out 1. There is a total number of possible arrangements of matter based on the limits of the entropy of space-time, where the total is equal to the permutation of particles and energies and dependent on the total number of particles 2. All these possibilities are superimposed upon one another to form an infinite-dimensional Hilbert Space in which the wave function resides, evolving over time a) Each universe is a subset, a space-time system in which one arrangement of matter exists b) One space-time event sequence is merely the use of time and physical law/rules to determine a valid progression of one universal space to another c) This creates multiple space-time pathways, each of which encompasses a version of the past, present, and future d) Each point has a past with possible futures to be determined upon collapse of the wave function e) Our own physical, present reality, interpreted as a resulting situation of the collapse, is one point in space-time with a sequence of probability states with the same past configuration f) This course of action leading to each possible reality yields multiple pathways from the beginning to the end of time g) Each point in time has nearly infinite future possibilities, but each path contains only itselfone path with two endpointsessentially arriving from the restraints of causality on the topological set IV. Philosophical Implications A. Every person has a definite past 1. Every person is the result of the path of space-time upon which its
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
The study of why societies have certain ethical beliefs is a subject for evolutionary psychology, or anthropology/sociology (moving down the reductionist hierarchy), and the study of what brain processes underlie ethical beliefs and behaviour is a subject for neurophysiology/biochemistry/chemistry/ultimately quantum physics (moving up the reductionist hierarchy), but the actual experience of having an ethical belief, and its ultimate justification, is not subject to scientific study. It is the old philosophical distinction between qualia - the subjective experience in itself - versus a description of the brain processes underlying the subjective experience. Subjective experience is at bottom simple, basic, irreducible. This does not by any means imply that there is anything mystical about it. I believe that there is a one to one, or possibly a many to one, relationship between brain states and mental states; a one to many relationship would imply that something magical was going on, and I cannot imagine how this could occur even in theory. To this extent, I believe that the identity theory of mind MUST be valid - but to say that a certain brain state is necessary and sufficient for the experience of a corresponding mental state is not to say that the mental state is the same thing as the brain state. Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] Melbourne, 22 January 2004 From: Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2004 13:30:16 +0100 Ethics is largely an artifact of evolutionary psychology, and as such a domain of science. On Wed, Jan 21, 2004 at 11:27:16PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: This sort of argument has been raised many times over the centuries, both by rationalists and by their opponents, but it is based the fundamental error of conflating science with ethics. Science deals with matters of fact; it does not comment on whether these facts are good or bad, beautiful or ugly, desirable or undesirable. These latter qualities - values - are necessarily subjective, and lie in the domain of ethics and aesthetics. So of course, we're all going to die, and so will everyone we care about, and so will the world itself, eventually; but if you can convince yourself that life is worth living up until that moment, then life is worth living. Saying that life is worth living, or that you believe it is bad to kill, are simply statements of your values and feelings, and as such are valid independently of any scientific theory. _ E-mail just got a whole lot better. New ninemsn Premium. Click here http://ninemsn.com.au/premium/landing.asp
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
Sorry. Can't help myself : Is there any point in completing that term paper really? On a few points. I don't believe in the point of view of nihilism because everything will happen in the multiverse, anyway, regardless of what I do.. My reasons are a little vague, but here's a stab at it: 1. I look at us group of human observer SAS's as results of and guardians of emerged complex order in our universe. In fact I believe our universe (its temporal arrow etc) is only observable because it is the set of paths through the multiverse that has all this emerged complex order in it.I believe these potentially observable sets of paths through the multiverse's general disorder are rare (of small measure.) 2. Somehow, all of us human observers are clearly in or observing the SAME set of paths through the multiverse. Now that is significant. It tells us that in the emergent-order paths of multiverse info-state evolution, that those paths are observable consistently to ANY observer that emerges as part of the emerged complex order present in those paths. 3. I see humans (or other intelligent lifeforms) as in some strange ways the smart-lookahead guardians of the particular piece of emergent-order their most a part of (their planet, their ecosystems, their societies, themselves).The reason we emerged (or are still here) is because we have helped make our emergent complex system successful (robust). 4. For some strange reason, I value the most complex yet elegant and robust emergent order (for itself). This is why for example, I'm an environmental activist in my spare (hah!) time. 5. I think if one values elegant, robust complex order, and if one is an active part of the elegant, robust, complex order, who emerged precisely so that a SAS of the emerged system could sense and make sense of the surroundings, and could model and influence the future, and guard the SAS's own existence and that of the whole emerged system of which it is a part, then guard away I say, actively, not nihilistically. Model your world. Predict its different possible futures, and use your emerged (and cultivated, same thing) wisdom to steer yourself, and your society, and your ecosystem, and your planet, away from harm and too-soon reduction to entropy. In the very, very end, it is said, entropy wins (like the house wins in Vegas.) But why not have as good a game as possible before it ends in a billion or trillions of years. 6. Of course, it doesn't make sense to try to protect (and advance in elegance) an emergent order that is indeed truly robust, does it? But my point back there was that we are supposed to be part of the emergent system's self-defense mechanism, because we can think and plan, and change things in our universe. 7. So can we change the multiverse as a whole? Probably not. But all that observers can ever co-observe is a single self-consistent universe in the multiverse. Look at earth and earthlife like a surfboard and surfer surfing this big coherent wave of informationally self-consistent order that is our universe. What we as the surfer can do is look ahead, and steer the board, and prolong the ride, and make it as amazing as possible before it tumbles into the vortex. That's enough control to say let's delay nihilism til the very last possible moment at least, shall we. Let's see where we might wash up if we keep riding well. Enough. Enough. This tortured analogy is killing me. 8. You may say that there's all these other virtual doppelganger surfers and surfboards (even on our same order-wave universe) so why bother steering anyway? One of us will make it. Yeah well I don't think so. I think all the emergent systems kind of compete with each other to organize things, and there's winners and losers, and the losers are all just info-noise. 8. I guess the above is premised on the supposition that we CAN steer. That we have any say over when and how our part of our universe degrades into entrop (info-noise.) This is really vague but I have some strange sense that what observing AGENT (actor) systems such as ourselves are doing is choosing (or having a part in choosing) the way in which their quantum world becomes their classical world. I think there's the possibility of free will there. It's like their steering the NOW wavefront itself (in their shared universe). If the possibly ordered paths through multiverse infospace near these observers are more than one possible path, maybe its the observers, by the sum total of their collective actions, that micro-manage the choice of future info-paths that will still be consistent with the path(s) their all on. Maybe the set of possible consistent and ordered paths is narrower and narrower as time goes on for them, but I think there are still choices to be made. It's possible that that's an illusion, but choice being an illusion is a concept for the theoretical meta-level, for OUTSIDE our universe path. Inside our path(s), our paths and the
Re: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism
Your conclusion that there is no scientific justification for morals of any sort, only that in the Darwinistic sense depends on the definition of scientific. Without morals an argument could be made that mankind would not exist - it would have self-destructed. Perhaps that is scientific justification for morals, at least as far as mankind is concerned. And perhaps our lack of morals will yet wipe us out through WMD, or other evil. Norman - Original Message - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, January 20, 2004 6:04 PM Subject: Modern Physical theory as a basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism I am writing my high school senior project term paper on defending ethical and existential nihilism based on quantum and multiverse theory. I was looking for any comments on the subject. Here I place my outline for said paper: --- A Scientific Basis for Ethical and Existential Nihilism I. Introduction A. Societal habit of classification of moral disciplines B. Difference of anyone to a possibly fitting classification makes such divvying impossible C. One must evaluate the individual sets of moral principles to establish their validity II. What is ethical?-Establishing a Basis for Reference A. Definition of ethic/moral 1. Participation/contribution 2. Action 3. Earning B. Earning as an ethical point for reference 1. Earning governed by psychological history 2. Psychology influenced by the physical 3. The physical is governed by causality C. Ethic is debunked by the causal nature of space-time and quantum superpositioning III. Space-Time and Quantum Physics form a basis for inevitability A. The So-Called Relativity Theory Perspective 1. The space-time manifold is a substrate upon which things exist 2. The future condition of events or anything can be determined using equations to model energy and position over time 3. All things have a definite past, present, and future, ontologically 4. Limited by information acquisition a) speed of light b) infinitesimal spaces governed by quantum theory B. Quantum Physics Perspective 1. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle a) impossible to know one's future b) definite past 2. Schrödinger's wave function a) Schrödinger's Cat Paradox b) superposition of waves c) collapse of the wave function d) Copenhagen Interpretation (CHI) e) Hugh Everett III's theory that all possible resultant collapses can be defined by a superposition in Hilbert Space C. Multiverse Theory-Multiple Universes in which all possibilities are played out 1. There is a total number of possible arrangements of matter based on the limits of the entropy of space-time, where the total is equal to the permutation of particles and energies and dependent on the total number of particles 2. All these possibilities are superimposed upon one another to form an infinite-dimensional Hilbert Space in which the wave function resides, evolving over time a) Each universe is a subset, a space-time system in which one arrangement of matter exists b) One space-time event sequence is merely the use of time and physical law/rules to determine a valid progression of one universal space to another c) This creates multiple space-time pathways, each of which encompasses a version of the past, present, and future d) Each point has a past with possible futures to be determined upon collapse of the wave function e) Our own physical, present reality, interpreted as a resulting situation of the collapse, is one point in space-time with a sequence of probability states with the same past configuration f) This course of action leading to each possible reality yields multiple pathways from the beginning to the end of time g) Each point in time has nearly infinite future possibilities, but each path contains only itself-one path with two endpoints-essentially arriving from the restraints of causality on the topological set IV. Philosophical Implications A. Every person has a definite past 1. Every person is the result of the path of space-time upon which its universe's energy has traveled 2. Because of causality and entropy bounds, one has no control over the past 3. A future is simply the result of influences of the wave function and its probabilities on space-time B. A person's future is inevitable 1. No matter what decision one chooses, the psyche's action is defined and controlled by the wave function in its space 2. All
