On 03.01.2012 21:42 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/3/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.01.2012 21:32 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/2/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.01.2012 07:01 meekerdb said the following:
...
Everett's MWI is based on QM which does assume a
On 1/4/2012 10:55 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 03.01.2012 21:42 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/3/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.01.2012 21:32 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/2/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.01.2012 07:01 meekerdb said the following:
...
On 1/4/2012 3:03 PM, meekerdb wrote:
In the MW interpretation there is no collapse, but there is a split
into (almost) orthogonal worlds or each person splits into
orthogonal minds. These are just projections onto different
quasi-classical subspaces corresponding to different measurement
On 02.01.2012 21:32 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/2/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.01.2012 07:01 meekerdb said the following:
...
Everett's MWI is based on QM which does assume a background time
and the state of the multiverse evolves in Hilbert space. This
evolution entails
On 1/3/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.01.2012 21:32 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/2/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.01.2012 07:01 meekerdb said the following:
...
Everett's MWI is based on QM which does assume a background time
and the state of the multiverse
On 31 Dec 2011, at 14:49, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote (in two posts):
On 31.12.2011 09:17 Pierz said the following:
On Dec 31, 6:17 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/30/2011 12:51 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.netwrote:
On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM,
On 31 Dec 2011, at 21:20, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/31/2011 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
As I've said we're on the same team with regards to primitive
materialism. But I have sympathy for the materialists on this
issue of
instantiation. After all, we need computers still, we can't rely on
the
On 01 Jan 2012, at 00:35, Pierz wrote:
When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that
you think one's
consciousness is a thing, a soul, that moves to different bundles
of computation so there
are some bundles that don't have any consciousness but could have
if you
On 01 Jan 2012, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/31/2011 3:35 PM, Pierz wrote:
When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that
you think one's
consciousness is a thing, a soul, that moves to different bundles
of computation so there
are some bundles that don't have any
On 01 Jan 2012, at 02:07, David Nyman wrote:
On 31 December 2011 23:35, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up
1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only
experience
myself on one branch at a time,
On 2 January 2012 05:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I don't understand that? Are you saying all the experiences are at
different times so they can the experience of one soul that's traversing the
experiences in sequence? I'd say they all exist timelessly, or more
exactly time is
On 1/2/2012 7:04 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 2 January 2012 05:54, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I don't understand that? Are you saying all the experiences are at
different times so they can the experience of one soul that's traversing the
experiences in sequence? I'd say they all
On 02.01.2012 07:01 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/1/2012 4:59 PM, Pierz wrote:
...
David says it better than I could have, but just to add that when
I say I that is just a sort of short-hand for the 1-p
perspective. There is no separate experiencer. In UDA, it's simply
the notes in a
On 1/2/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 02.01.2012 07:01 meekerdb said the following:
On 1/1/2012 4:59 PM, Pierz wrote:
...
David says it better than I could have, but just to add that when
I say I that is just a sort of short-hand for the 1-p
perspective. There is no separate
On 2 January 2012 18:56, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
You mean confused or confounded...not elided?
Elided: past participle, past tense of elide (Verb): Join together;
merge: the two things elided in his mind.
If consciousness were simply timelessly identical with some
supervenience
On 1/2/2012 12:57 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 2 January 2012 18:56, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
You mean confused or confounded...not elided?
Elided: past participle, past tense of elide (Verb): Join together;
merge: the two things elided in his mind.
Elide only means to join
On 2 January 2012 21:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Elided: past participle, past tense of elide (Verb): Join together;
merge: the two things elided in his mind.
Elide only means to join together two things by leaving out stuff in
between them. Its basic meaning is to leave out.
On 31.12.2011 22:57 meekerdb said the following:
On 12/31/2011 1:33 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 31.12.2011 22:00 meekerdb said the following:
...
Completely!? How do you know that? The Mars Rover doesn't just
record a sensor value in its computer, it also remember the value
and at a later
On 1 January 2012 02:04, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of
Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense
a
On 1/1/2012 9:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 January 2012 02:04, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically
On 1/1/2012 4:59 PM, Pierz wrote:
Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1- p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience myself on one
branch at a time, probabilistically according to the measure of computations. There's no individual
On Dec 31, 6:17 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/30/2011 12:51 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote:
You think it is ludicrous that a Mars Rover is programmed to monitor the
state of its
battery,
On 31 Dec 2011, at 01:44, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Thu, Dec 29, 2011 at 9:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Which computation? I don't see any computation in the projection of
the computation-movie. The Boolean graph nodes are broken. The light
patterns is exactly the
On 31 Dec 2011, at 03:37, Pierz wrote:
On Dec 31, 4:36 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 30 Dec 2011, at 03:10, Pierz wrote:
This thread has been extremely helpful to me in terms of getting to
the heart of this problem and the whole issue of supervenience -
thank
you Joseph
On 31.12.2011 09:17 Pierz said the following:
On Dec 31, 6:17 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/30/2011 12:51 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.netwrote:
On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote: You think it is ludicrous
that a Mars Rover is
On 12/31/2011 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
As I've said we're on the same team with regards to primitive
materialism. But I have sympathy for the materialists on this issue of
instantiation. After all, we need computers still, we can't rely on
the arithmetical platonia to predict the weather
On 12/31/2011 5:49 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 31.12.2011 09:17 Pierz said the following:
On Dec 31, 6:17 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/30/2011 12:51 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.netwrote:
On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote: You think
On 12/31/2011 1:33 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 31.12.2011 22:00 meekerdb said the following:
On 12/31/2011 5:49 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 31.12.2011 09:17 Pierz said the following:
On Dec 31, 6:17 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/30/2011 12:51 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Dec 30,
When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that you think
one's
consciousness is a thing, a soul, that moves to different bundles of
computation so there
are some bundles that don't have any consciousness but could have if you
jumped to them.
Not to wish to pre-empt
On 12/31/2011 3:35 PM, Pierz wrote:
When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that you think
one's
consciousness is a thing, a soul, that moves to different bundles of
computation so there
are some bundles that don't have any consciousness but could have if you jumped to
On 31 December 2011 23:35, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations.
On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote:
You think it is ludicrous that a Mars Rover is programmed to monitor the
state of its
battery, the temperature of its motors, the amount of memory available for
pictures, etc?
Brent
sigh Let's
On 29 Dec 2011, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/29/2011 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 12:10:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I still fail to see what you mean by swapping two
consciousness.
In this case we
On 30 Dec 2011, at 01:00, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Dec 29, 2011 at 05:47:07PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:
They both cannot supervene on the same physical state.
In my weak sense, they both supervene on the same physical state of
On 30 Dec 2011, at 01:57, Pierz wrote:
Of course, when consciousness is taken seriously into account, we can
sense some incoherence, but empirically, this is the hard part to
convey, and without MGA/Maudlin, I have not been able to convince of
the frank incoherence.
And you've been
On 30 December 2011 12:07, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
What is a consciousness apart from its content?
That's a good question. May be it is cosmic consciousness, or pure
consciousness of pure consciousness, or perhaps the innate consciousness of
the pre-löbian universal machine.
On 30 Dec 2011, at 03:10, Pierz wrote:
This thread has been extremely helpful to me in terms of getting to
the heart of this problem and the whole issue of supervenience - thank
you Joseph for your clarification of the meaning of the term and for
your succinct and clear summary of the MGA, and
On 30 Dec 2011, at 16:18, David Nyman wrote:
On 30 December 2011 12:07, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
What is a consciousness apart from its content?
That's a good question. May be it is cosmic consciousness, or pure
consciousness of pure consciousness, or perhaps the innate
On Thu, Dec 29, 2011 at 9:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Which computation? I don't see any computation in the projection of the
computation-movie. The Boolean graph nodes are broken. The light patterns
is exactly the same, with the boolean graph turned, or not, upside down.
On Dec 31, 4:36 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 30 Dec 2011, at 03:10, Pierz wrote:
This thread has been extremely helpful to me in terms of getting to
the heart of this problem and the whole issue of supervenience - thank
you Joseph for your clarification of the meaning of
On 12/30/2011 12:51 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote:
You think it is ludicrous that a Mars Rover is programmed to monitor the state
of its
battery, the temperature of its motors, the amount of memory available for
On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 12:10:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I still fail to see what you mean by swapping two consciousness.
In this case we have that the consciousness of [Tommy and Samantha]
supervenes (weakly) on the physical
On 28 Dec 2011, at 21:43, David Nyman wrote:
On 28 December 2011 19:43, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
What UDA1-7 and MGA do at once, is to show that the notion of
primitive
matter is spurious in the comp frame, but also (mainly perhaps)
that physics
is branch of number
On 12/29/2011 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 12:10:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I still fail to see what you mean by swapping two consciousness.
In this case we have that the consciousness of [Tommy and
On 28 Dec 2011, at 06:28, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 26 Dec 2011, at 05:47, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 23 Dec 2011, at 20:16, Joseph Knight
On 12/29/2011 11:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I was, unwillingly, more cruel. I exigate from my parents a proof, before going to bed,
that I will wake up being me, and not someone else. That 'consciousness swapping'
possibility terrified me, until I discover it makes no sense or it makes to much
On Thu, Dec 29, 2011 at 05:47:07PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:
They both cannot supervene on the same physical state.
In my weak sense, they both supervene on the same physical state of
the room, or universe, or even arithmetic.
We're
Of course, when consciousness is taken seriously into account, we can
sense some incoherence, but empirically, this is the hard part to
convey, and without MGA/Maudlin, I have not been able to convince of
the frank incoherence.
And you've been successful with the MGA? I am philosophically
This thread has been extremely helpful to me in terms of getting to
the heart of this problem and the whole issue of supervenience - thank
you Joseph for your clarification of the meaning of the term and for
your succinct and clear summary of the MGA, and to David for the nice
clarification of the
On 12/29/2011 4:00 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
The critique was against your step of unfolding the multiverse into a
single universe by dovetailing. You then asserted that the
consciousness supervened on the dovetailer, which as we've been
through above, cannot be the case.
Of course, you may
On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote:
As I have remarked before, I don't think the problem of consciousness will be
solved, it
will just come to be seen as an uninteresting question. Instead we will talk
about how to
design the ethics module in a robot or what internal perceptions to provide.
On 28 December 2011 06:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Consequently, it would have to be the case that any physical
computer (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
epistemological properties before it
On 12/28/2011 5:39 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Consequently, it would have to be the case that any physical
computer (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
epistemological properties before it could begin to
On 28 December 2011 17:01, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But as Peter D. Jones points out primitive matter isn't inconsequential.
It's consequent is realization. Being material is the property of existing
in contrast to those things that don't exist. Of course this is not a
popular
On 12/28/2011 10:03 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 28 December 2011 17:01, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But as Peter D. Jones points out primitive matter isn't inconsequential.
It's consequent is realization. Being material is the property of existing
in contrast to those things that
On 28 December 2011 18:17, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Once one fixes seriously on computation as the
supervenience basis for epistemological properties (ignoring
crypto-eliminativist sophistries about mere seeming) is one any
longer in a position to appeal to the content of
On 28 Dec 2011, at 14:39, David Nyman wrote:
On 28 December 2011 06:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Consequently, it would have to be the case that any physical
computer (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
experience, would itself first require to be constructed
On 12/28/2011 11:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 28 December 2011 18:17, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Once one fixes seriously on computation as the
supervenience basis for epistemological properties (ignoring
crypto-eliminativist sophistries about mere seeming) is one any
longer in a
On 28 December 2011 19:43, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
What UDA1-7 and MGA do at once, is to show that the notion of primitive
matter is spurious in the comp frame, but also (mainly perhaps) that physics
is branch of number theory/computer science (more precisely: of machine's
On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 12:10:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I still fail to see what you mean by swapping two consciousness.
In this case we have that the consciousness of [Tommy and Samantha]
supervenes (weakly) on the physical activity in the classroom (to
change them, we have to
On 26 Dec 2011, at 18:35, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On reflection,
this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or they
are ultimately
On 26 Dec 2011, at 23:49, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:34:52AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is not used in Maudlin's argument, but in your extension to
handle
multiversal supervenience.
You might make this precise, because I don't see the point. But the
best
On 27 December 2011 10:42, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Of course, when consciousness is taken seriously into account, we can sense
some incoherence, but empirically, this is the hard part to convey, and
without MGA/Maudlin, I have not been able to convince of the frank
incoherence.
On 26 Dec 2011, at 22:45, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 19:50, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
wrote:
Not if the sense of dualism *is* the primitive.
My comments, like the OP, were directed towards the assumptions of the
computational theory of mind, and the various ways in
On 26 Dec 2011, at 23:37, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 01:08:25PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Dec 2011, at 12:06, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:
Good
On 26 Dec 2011, at 20:49, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/26/2011 11:37 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 17:59, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Or a neutral monism in which they are different ways of organizing
the same
data - as quantum field theory can be done with either fields or
On 26 Dec 2011, at 18:48, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/26/2011 2:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Even if the physics is not concrete, but purely phenomenological as
indicated by steps 1-7 of the UDA, and if the consciousness
supervenes on
it, it is still physical supervenience, surely.
Not in the
On 26 Dec 2011, at 23:00, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/26/2011 1:45 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 19:50, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
wrote:
Not if the sense of dualism *is* the primitive.
My comments, like the OP, were directed towards the assumptions of
the
On 27 Dec 2011, at 13:59, David Nyman wrote:
On 27 December 2011 10:42, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Of course, when consciousness is taken seriously into account, we
can sense
some incoherence, but empirically, this is the hard part to convey,
and
without MGA/Maudlin, I have
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 26 Dec 2011, at 05:47, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 23 Dec 2011, at 20:16, Joseph Knight wrote:
The same problem arises in *Part 2*. Bruno
On 12/27/2011 4:59 AM, David Nyman wrote:
The frank incoherence comment was directed towards the case where,
rejecting any form of dualism, one grasps the single primitive horn
of the dilemma in the form of a primitively-physical monism, rather
than the arithmetical alternative. But for those
On 26 Dec 2011, at 05:47, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 23 Dec 2011, at 20:16, Joseph Knight wrote:
The same problem arises in Part 2. Bruno claims that we are forced
to accept that Alice’s consciousness supervenes
On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:44:41PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the concreteness or
otherwise of the supervened on.
Maudlin uses supervenience for physical supervenience, like Kim
and most
On 25 Dec 2011, at 23:21, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:25:58PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Sorry - perhaps static is the wrong word. I meant there is only one
UD, like there is only one number 1, so there's no way the UD
could be
different in the case of difference
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:44:41PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the concreteness or
otherwise of the supervened on.
Maudlin
On 26 Dec 2011, at 12:06, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:44:41PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the
On 26 Dec 2011, at 14:50, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 11:06, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.
This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
primitiveness is defined, or comes into
On 26 December 2011 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On reflection,
this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or they
are ultimately indistinguishable (i.e. frank eliminativism about
On 12/26/2011 2:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Even if the physics is not concrete, but purely phenomenological as
indicated by steps 1-7 of the UDA, and if the consciousness supervenes on
it, it is still physical supervenience, surely.
Not in the usual sense of supervenience, or what I call
On 12/26/2011 2:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If a low level emulate a high level, and if something does not supervene on the low
level X *when doing that emulation*, it will not supervene on the higher level too.
That's why once we can say yes to the doctor for a correct level, we can
On 12/26/2011 5:50 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 11:06, Russell Standishli...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.
This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
primitiveness is defined, or comes into
On 26 December 2011 17:59, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Or a neutral monism in which they are different ways of organizing the same
data - as quantum field theory can be done with either fields or particles.
Yes, perhaps, but then what precisely is the word neutral supposed
to signify
On 12/26/2011 11:37 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 17:59, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Or a neutral monism in which they are different ways of organizing the same
data - as quantum field theory can be done with either fields or particles.
Yes, perhaps, but then what
On Dec 26, 12:35 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
But once the central ontological distinction is made between qua
materia and qua computatio, a truthful eye cannot avoid seeing that
either there are two primitives in play here or only one. If the
former, then a dualism of some
On 26 December 2011 19:49, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
ISTM that in Bruno's schema, the physical computations are to be
seen as emerging from (or being filtered by) the mental ones.
He's often taken that way. But I think I now understand Bruno's idea that
consciousness still
On 12/26/2011 1:45 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 19:50, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Not if the sense of dualism*is* the primitive.
My comments, like the OP, were directed towards the assumptions of the
computational theory of mind, and the various ways in which
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 01:08:25PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Dec 2011, at 12:06, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:
Good analogy. Let's explore it further. Tommy is in the
On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:34:52AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is not used in Maudlin's argument, but in your extension to handle
multiversal supervenience.
You might make this precise, because I don't see the point. But the
best answer to your concrete multiverse argument, is that
On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:25:58PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Sorry - perhaps static is the wrong word. I meant there is only one
UD, like there is only one number 1, so there's no way the UD could be
different in the case of difference consious states.
This is ambiguous. There are
On 23 Dec 2011, at 20:16, Joseph Knight wrote:
On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 22 Dec 2011, at 23:27, Joseph Knight wrote:
Hello everyone and everything,
I have pompously made my own thread for this, even though we have
another MGA
On 23 Dec 2011, at 23:24, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 01:39:56PM -0600, Joseph Knight wrote:
In the case of dovetailing a region of the Multiverse, it is not the
case that consciousness can supervene on a universal dovetailer. If
the conscious content differs in some way,
On 23 Dec 2011, at 23:30, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 03:30:00PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Dec 2011, at 06:18, Russell Standish wrote:
In the case of dovetailing a region of the Multiverse, it is not the
case that consciousness can supervene on a universal
On 22 Dec 2011, at 23:27, Joseph Knight wrote:
Hello everyone and everything,
I have pompously made my own thread for this, even though we have
another MGA thread going, because the other one (sigh, I created
that one too) seems to have split into at least two different
discussions,
On Dec 22, 10:26 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/22/2011 7:00 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 22, 7:13 pm, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
This is because of the modularity of our brains:
Different sections of the brain perform specific functions. Some
On Dec 22, 10:35 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
Their experiment consisted of people clicking on the image of a word spoken
aloud. They found it took people longer for similar sounding words, such
as when present with an image of candy and candle. From this, they
concluded:
In
On 23 Dec 2011, at 06:18, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Dec 22, 2011 at 04:27:28PM -0600, Joseph Knight wrote:
Regarding Maudlin’s argument: Russell has recently stated that
Maudlin’s
argument doesn’t work in a multiverse, and that consciousness is
thus a
multiverse phenomenon. I
On Dec 22, 11:21 pm, Joseph Knight joseph.9...@gmail.com wrote:
Craig, no one would ever claim that the brain is a perfectly discrete
system (at the neuronal level at least) such as the sort represented in
Boolean models. But continuous neural networks can still be modeled (with
varying
On 12/23/2011 6:00 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 22, 10:26 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/22/2011 7:00 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 22, 7:13 pm, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.comwrote:
This is because of the modularity of our brains:
Different sections of the
On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 22 Dec 2011, at 23:27, Joseph Knight wrote:
Hello everyone and everything,
I have pompously made my own thread for this, even though we have another
MGA thread going, because the other one (sigh, I created that one
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