### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 03.01.2012 21:42 meekerdb said the following:

On 1/3/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 02.01.2012 21:32 meekerdb said the following:

On 1/2/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 02.01.2012 07:01 meekerdb said the following:

...

Everett's MWI is based on QM which does assume a background
time and the state of the multiverse evolves in Hilbert
space. This evolution entails the evolution of the state of
different observers which are simultaneous.

Is an observer (or better many observers observing
simultaneously) is still necessary also by Everett's MWI? What
equation then describes an observer?

No. Observer is just shorthand for an interacting system that
collapses the wave function, i.e. couples the thing observed
into the quasi-classical environment. The observation is the
mathematical step of tracing over the environmental degrees of
freedom. So, within physics, there's an equation describing
observation.

Will the wave function collapse if we solve just the Schrödiner
equation?

No.

Does this concern both, normal and MWI? If yes, then what MWI actually
solves?

Evgenii

Brent

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 1/4/2012 10:55 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 03.01.2012 21:42 meekerdb said the following:

On 1/3/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 02.01.2012 21:32 meekerdb said the following:

On 1/2/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 02.01.2012 07:01 meekerdb said the following:

...

Everett's MWI is based on QM which does assume a background
time and the state of the multiverse evolves in Hilbert
space. This evolution entails the evolution of the state of
different observers which are simultaneous.

Is an observer (or better many observers observing
simultaneously) is still necessary also by Everett's MWI? What
equation then describes an observer?

No. Observer is just shorthand for an interacting system that
collapses the wave function, i.e. couples the thing observed
into the quasi-classical environment. The observation is the
mathematical step of tracing over the environmental degrees of
freedom. So, within physics, there's an equation describing
observation.

Will the wave function collapse if we solve just the Schrödiner
equation?

No.

Does this concern both, normal and MWI? If yes, then what MWI actually solves?

In the MW interpretation there is no collapse, but there is a split into (almost)
orthogonal worlds or each person splits into orthogonal minds.   These are just
projections onto different quasi-classical subspaces corresponding to different
measurement values.  The projection is a mathematical, not a physical, operation.

Brent

Evgenii

Brent

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 1/4/2012 3:03 PM, meekerdb wrote:
In the MW interpretation there is no collapse, but there is a split
into (almost) orthogonal worlds or each person splits into
orthogonal minds.   These are just projections onto different
quasi-classical subspaces corresponding to different measurement
values.  The projection is a mathematical, not a physical, operation.

Hi,

Could you elaborate on the meaning of the word almost as it is
used here? How do we go from the implicit always of orthogonal
relations between state vectors of the linear algebra of Hilbert spaces
to an almost orthogonal relation? Is this a definable function/morphism?

Onward!

Stephen

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 02.01.2012 21:32 meekerdb said the following:

On 1/2/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 02.01.2012 07:01 meekerdb said the following:

...

Everett's MWI is based on QM which does assume a background time
and the state of the multiverse evolves in Hilbert space. This
evolution entails the evolution of the state of different
observers which are simultaneous.

Is an observer (or better many observers observing simultaneously)
is still necessary also by Everett's MWI? What equation then
describes an observer?

No. Observer is just shorthand for an interacting system that
collapses the wave function, i.e. couples the thing observed into
the quasi-classical environment. The observation is the mathematical
step of tracing over the environmental degrees of freedom. So, within
physics, there's an equation describing observation.

Will the wave function collapse if we solve just the Schrödiner equation?

Evgenii

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 1/3/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 02.01.2012 21:32 meekerdb said the following:

On 1/2/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 02.01.2012 07:01 meekerdb said the following:

...

Everett's MWI is based on QM which does assume a background time
and the state of the multiverse evolves in Hilbert space. This
evolution entails the evolution of the state of different
observers which are simultaneous.

Is an observer (or better many observers observing simultaneously)
is still necessary also by Everett's MWI? What equation then
describes an observer?

No. Observer is just shorthand for an interacting system that
collapses the wave function, i.e. couples the thing observed into
the quasi-classical environment. The observation is the mathematical
step of tracing over the environmental degrees of freedom. So, within
physics, there's an equation describing observation.

Will the wave function collapse if we solve just the Schrödiner equation?

No.

Brent

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 31 Dec 2011, at 14:49, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote (in two posts):

On 31.12.2011 09:17 Pierz said the following:

On Dec 31, 6:17 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

On 12/30/2011 12:51 AM, Pierz wrote:

On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.netwrote:

On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote: You think it is ludicrous
that a Mars Rover is programmed to monitor the state of its
battery, the temperature of its motors, the amount of memory
available for pictures, etc?

Brent

sighLet's not go down that boringly overtrodden path, but
agree to disagree on what constitutes consciousness.

sigh  The phrase was internal perception not consciousness.

Well usually the term 'perception' entails consciousness. If you
mean that you ate try indifferent as to whether the machine is
conscious, well OK. I see something deeper in the consciousness
problem.

I would agree. When AI people use the word perception to describe
a sensor connected to a computer, in my view they loose the biggest
part of the meaning. A human being perceives also unconsciously and
this part of perception could be similar to what we find in Mars
Rover but on the other hand a human being has conscious experiences.
This part is completely missing in AI.

I agree. You need to add something like self-perception. This can be
be done by using a theorem by Kleene in computer science, which
handles very well the notion of self. With the current machines, this
has not yet economical interest, though. More about that self notion
in my comment to other posts.

On 29.12.2011 19:40 Bruno Marchal said the following:

So a self-driving car is probably much more close to have a first
person view than a rock, especially if you make it possible for the
car to memorize its short term instances of computation (sensing,
planning, etc.) into a long scenario involving herself.

Good point. Thanks Bruno. A self-driving car does have an estimate
of its current state and then it updates it both internally and
based on external measurements. It also makes some planning, soft of
what to do next.

OK. What is still lacking is something like an hippocampus and a
cerebral stem, to manage the short term and long term memories and the
general instinctive bet in a reality (more or less consciousness).

Yet, if we consider a self-driving car and a rock from the viewpoint
of physicalism (or could be even better atomism), then the
difference will be much more difficult to find. After all there are
in both cases interacting electrons and nuclei (well probably some
electromagnetic waves as well) and nothing more.

But physicalism is not epistemologically compatible with mechanism.
Below our substitution level, things are made of infinite works of
infinities of Universal machine/numbers. This might, or not, lead to a
refutation of computationalism, but up to now nature confirms rather
remarkably this many-statistically-interfering-dreams aspect of
reality.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 31 Dec 2011, at 21:20, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/31/2011 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

As I've said we're on the same team with regards to primitive
materialism. But I have sympathy for the materialists on this
issue of

instantiation. After all, we need computers still, we can't rely on
the arithmetical platonia to predict the weather for us.

Again, we need brain, bodies and computer to optimize the
probability of staying in the branch we share at our substitution
level. And if the argument is correct, the weather and you are
already in Platonia. The local relative body is needed to not jump
too quickly in alternate consciousness/realities.

When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that
you think one's consciousness is a thing, a soul, that moves to
different bundles of computation so there are some bundles that
don't have any consciousness but could have if you jumped to them.

Some people provided good answer to this, including you Brent. I might

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 01 Jan 2012, at 00:35, Pierz wrote:

When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that
you think one's
consciousness is a thing, a soul, that moves to different bundles
of computation so there
are some bundles that don't have any consciousness but could have
if you jumped to them.

Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense
a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.

OK.
More on this in my reply to David, asap.

As for Mars Rover I'm curious to know this: If we programmed it to
avoid danger, would it experience fear? Until we understand the
qualia, you're as in the dark as we are on this question. You assume
the affirmative, we assume the negative. That's why I sigh. Such
arguments go nowhere but a reassertion of our biases/intuitions, and
the result is unedifying.

I disagree. We have just to make our assumptions more clear and
precise so that we get new consequences. To get the qualia, we need in
fine to abandon the primitive matter ontology, and more importantly,
the epistemological idea that physicalism is true. The physical has to
supervene on (non human) consciousness, which supervenes on all the
relations between all (universal) numbers.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 01 Jan 2012, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/31/2011 3:35 PM, Pierz wrote:
When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that
you think one's
consciousness is a thing, a soul, that moves to different bundles
of computation so there
are some bundles that don't have any consciousness but could have
if you jumped to them.

Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up
1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only
experience

myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one
sense

a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.

As for Mars Rover I'm curious to know this: If we programmed it to
avoid danger, would it experience fear?

If we programmed it to sacrifice other important values (like
conserving power, or keeping all its parts) I'd speculate that it,
in some sense, felt fear.

Until we understand the
qualia, you're as in the dark as we are on this question. You assume
the affirmative, we assume the negative. That's why I sigh. Such
arguments go nowhere but a reassertion of our biases/intuitions, and
the result is unedifying.

And that's why I think questions of consciousness will ultimately be
overtaken-by-events.  The interesting questions will be how danger
is recognized and avoided, how relations to others are managed,
etc.  And we will probably talk about them as if the AI is conscious
just by analogy to ourselves while at a lower level we know which
module is doing what and how changing it will change behavior.  But
where's the vis viva of their automobile.

I disagree. The vis viva is really useless. Consciousness exists, and
it has a fundamental role in the handling of highly complex self-
referential relations, some of them being responsible for the
selection of physical realities. Consciousness is somehow the mother
of all qualia, including the sharable quanta. That comes from the
ontological reversal. You don't need anything magic, just the ability
of some numbers to infer the existence of anything. Consciousness can
be approximated by the first person true belief in something. It is
somehow the zeroth mystical state, but we are blase because without
it, there would be no knowledge at all, nor even any physical
reality: just third person truth about numbers/finite things.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 01 Jan 2012, at 02:07, David Nyman wrote:

On 31 December 2011 23:35, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:

Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up
1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only
experience

myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one
sense

a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.

Yes, and the sense in which there is a single consciousness that
experiences every possible state is indeed an unusual one.  It's as
if we want to say that all such first-personal experiences occur
indifferently or even simultaneously, but on reflection there can be
no relation of simultaneity between distinguishable conscious events.
The first-person is, by definition, always in the singular and present
NOW.

Yes.
And Brent makes himself this more precise when he said later (to
David) that:

Are you saying all the experiences are at different times so they can
the experience of one soul that's traversing the experiences in
sequence?   I'd say they all exist timelessly, or more exactly time is
inferred from the relation of their contents.

The difficulty consists here in placing the inference and the relation
between contents in one (relative) computational state. Here, the
theorem of Kleene (which handles the notion of self) cannot be used in
a completely satisfactory way, and this is part of the impossibility
to introspect the working of one's consciousness. We have to be unable
to know who we really are, except for some unnameable subject. But we
can be aware of that intrinsic ignorance. Ramana Maharshi provides a
technic based on the meditation on the koan Who am I to help
grasping intuitively that counter-intuitive idea.

As Schrödinger remarked:

This life of yours which you are living is not merely a piece of this
entire existence, but in a certain sense the whole; only this whole is
not so constituted that it can be surveyed in one single glance.

I think that Schroedinger was well inspired.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On 2 January 2012 05:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

I don't understand that?  Are you saying all the experiences are at
different times so they can the experience of one soul that's traversing the
experiences in sequence?   I'd say they all exist timelessly, or more
exactly time is inferred from the relation of their contents.

I'd agree, but keeping clear the distinction that consciousness (1-p)
is not identical with its putative supervenience base (3-p).  If we
refrain from calling the contents of the latter experiences, it
might make it easier to isolate the 3-p sense in which they all exist
timelessly from the distinct 1-p experiential sense in which time is
inferred from the content of each unique moment.

So we mustn't be misled into imagining
arrays of conscious moments as somehow sitting there all together in
timeless identity with their 3-p supervenience base, because to do so
would be to destroy all logical possibility of recovering the
uniqueness of the experiential moment.

How so?  The uniqueness is inherent in the experience.  It doesn't depend on
being embedded in spacetime.  Spacetime is a model inferred from
intersubjective agreement of individual experiences.

Again, I agree, but with the same distinction.  There is indeed the
3-p sense of inherently distinguishable subsets of some co-existent
supervenience base.  But this mustn't be elided with the distinct 1-p
experiential sense of the unique presence of each conscious moment.
If consciousness were simply timelessly identical with some
supervenience base, there would be no such distinction to be made.
But if that were the case time  would never be inferred, or to put
it more simply, nothing would ever happen.

David

On 1/1/2012 9:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 1 January 2012 02:04, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense
a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.

That seems incoherent to me.  How is it different from there are many
experiences?  I is just a construct from a subset of experiences and
there
can be many different subsets from which many different Is can be
constructed.     But I don't know what it would mean to say there is just
one I or to say that I can jump from one thread of experience to
another.  That would presuppose that consciousness, the I, is something
apart from the experiences it jumps to.

This is a tricky one.  Pierz says above that from 3-p, all branches
are conscious.  But perhaps it might be more accurate to say
something more like from 3-p, all branches are in some measure
accessible to consciousness.  Consciousness indeed supervenes on all
branches, but never all at the same time.

I don't understand that?  Are you saying all the experiences are at
different times so they can the experience of one soul that's traversing the
experiences in sequence?   I'd say they all exist timelessly, or more
exactly time is inferred from the relation of their contents.

Supervenience is not an
identity claim.  The putative supervenience base is an inclusive
category embracing all 3-p descriptions indifferently, whereas 1-p
experiences are characterised precisely by their mutual exclusivity.

I agree with you that I is just a construct from a subset of
experiences and there
can be many different subsets from which many different Is can be
constructed. I in this objective sense can be coherently understood
as an ensemble of co-existing 3-p descriptions.  But any conscious
experience, by contrast, is always a singular occasion - a unique
moment in time, if you like.  So we mustn't be misled into imagining
arrays of conscious moments as somehow sitting there all together in
timeless identity with their 3-p supervenience base, because to do so
would be to destroy all logical possibility of recovering the
uniqueness of the experiential moment.

How so?  The uniqueness is inherent in the experience.  It doesn't depend on
being embedded in spacetime.  Spacetime is a model inferred from
intersubjective agreement of individual experiences.

Brent

It is this very numerical  problem - the fact that there are many
bodies but only one conscious experience - that led Schrödinger to
make his remark about our consciousness being not merely a piece of
this entire existence, but in a certain sense the whole.  Because
whenever we try to think of it as merely a piece, the question will
always obtrude but why only THIS piece right NOW?.  A criterion of
selection is implied which would be capable of transforming the
totality of 3-p indifferent co-existence into a unique 1-p
manifestation.  And this in turn entails, as Schrödinger observed,
that in some sense (to be ```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 01 Jan 2012, at 18:35, David Nyman wrote:

On 1 January 2012 02:04, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing
up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only
experience

myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one
sense

a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.

That seems incoherent to me.  How is it different from there are many
experiences?  I is just a construct from a subset of experiences
and there

can be many different subsets from which many different Is can be
constructed. But I don't know what it would mean to say there
is just

one I or to say that I can jump from one thread of experience to
another.  That would presuppose that consciousness, the I, is
something

apart from the experiences it jumps to.

This is a tricky one.  Pierz says above that from 3-p, all branches
are conscious.  But perhaps it might be more accurate to say
something more like from 3-p, all branches are in some measure
accessible to consciousness.

OK. And the measure is a conditional measure relative to the state
you are in. Of course, from the internal view of the state, you are
always in.

Consciousness indeed supervenes on all
branches, but never all at the same time.

Of course, this is a bit ambiguous. Like Brent said (or will say) time
is an internal construct related to the machine's ability to sum up
his comp path, and foresee/bet-on its possible futures.

Supervenience is not an
identity claim.

Key point.

The putative supervenience base is an inclusive
category embracing all 3-p descriptions indifferently, whereas 1-p
experiences are characterised precisely by their mutual exclusivity.

Indeed.

I agree with you that I is just a construct from a subset of
experiences and there
can be many different subsets from which many different Is can be
constructed.

Hmm...  (more below)

I in this objective sense can be coherently understood
as an ensemble of co-existing 3-p descriptions.  But any conscious
experience, by contrast, is always a singular occasion - a unique
moment in time, if you like.  So we mustn't be misled into imagining
arrays of conscious moments as somehow sitting there all together in
timeless identity with their 3-p supervenience base, because to do so
would be to destroy all logical possibility of recovering the
uniqueness of the experiential moment.

OK.

It is this very numerical  problem - the fact that there are many
bodies but only one conscious experience - that led Schrödinger to
make his remark about our consciousness being not merely a piece of
this entire existence, but in a certain sense the whole.  Because
whenever we try to think of it as merely a piece, the question will
always obtrude but why only THIS piece right NOW?.  A criterion of
selection is implied which would be capable of transforming the
totality of 3-p indifferent co-existence into a unique 1-p
manifestation.  And this in turn entails, as Schrödinger observed,
that in some sense (to be resolved!) each individual conscious
fragment of the present must be a unique summation, by the system as
a whole, of itself.

I think I agree. But how is that possible? The answer is behind my
hmm... above. I disagree with the idea that the self is a construct
based on past experiences. Past experiences are important, but does
not constitute the self which is a much more primitive notion. In
fact we must, I think, distinguish between the two notion of third
person self (more or less your body, or your local relative Gödel
number, which, by Kleene's theorem, can be handled by the machine,
and the first person self, which is the same except that it is
connected with truth (and to meaning through that connection).
The machine can know entirely its local third person self-description.
That is not obvious, and comes from the fact that if phi_i is a
universal enumeration of the computable (partial and total) function,
we can solve equation of the kind (with F being any computable function)

phi_e(x, y, ...) = F(e, x, y, ...)

The program e is able to refer to its own code. This is not obvious
(and is Kleene's result, although the math for this is already in
Gödel's proof). I can prove it later. This is proved by the
diagonalization technic. As an exemple phi_k( ) = k describes a
program k, without input, which is able to output its own complete
description (the elementary amoeba).

The first person self is more like

phi_e(x, y, ...) = F(e, x, y, ...)  TRUE(F(e, x, y, ...)) (cf
Bp  p)

From the proper theological point of view (G* minus G) those two
relations are equivalent (e being self-referentially correct by
Kleene's diagonalization), but e cannot know that, so that the logic
of those two relations will differ a lot. e can prove the first
```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 02 Jan 2012, at 01:59, Pierz wrote:

Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing
up 1-  p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I
only experience  myself on one branch at a time,
probabilistically according to the  measure of computations.
There's no individual soul, just in one sense  a single
consciousness that experiences every possible state.  That seems
incoherent to me.  How is it different from there are many
experiences?  I is just a construct from a subset of
experiences and there  can be many different subsets from which
many different Is can be  constructed. But I don't know
what it would mean to say there is just  one I or to say that
I can jump from one thread of experience to  another.  That
would presuppose that consciousness, the I, is something
apart from the experiences it jumps to.

David says it better than I could have, but just to add that when I
say I that is just a sort of short-hand for the 1-p perspective.

All right. I will call that the 1-self (or the first person, the inner
God, the third hypostase Bp  p (in AUDA)).

There is no separate experiencer. In UDA, it's simply the notes in a
'diary', some verifiable record of that branch of the computational
histories. There isn't really a 'jumping' of anything, there are just
these different computational branches. And in saying there's one
consciousness that experiences every possible state, that doesn't
imply experiencing them simultaneously. That theoretical objective
vantage point, seeing all histories, is the privilege of God perhaps,
or no-one. (Don't jump on me about the God bit, there's obviously no
God in an arithmetical ontology).

With comp, just arithmetical truth is enough. Please note that such a
thing, despite our intuition, does escape all effective theories. It
is a non constructive notion. We cannot define it at all. Well, some
will say that we can define it in set theory, but then we have to rely
on set-theoretical truth which is an even much more fuzzy notion.

Also, just to note that this is no
more incoherent than Everett. Many Worlds implies the same view of the
subject.

Absolutely so. Comp can be seen as an extension of Everett, in which
the Schroedinger equation becomes a theorem. A priori we might get too
much worlds/dreams, but the computer science self-referential
constraints shows that this is not obvious at all.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 02 Jan 2012, at 07:01, meekerdb wrote:

On 1/1/2012 4:59 PM, Pierz wrote:
Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing
up 1-  p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I
only experience  myself on one branch at a time,
probabilistically according to the  measure of computations.
There's no individual soul, just in one sense  a single
consciousness that experiences every possible state.  That
seems incoherent to me.  How is it different from there are
many  experiences?  I is just a construct from a subset of
experiences and there  can be many different subsets from which
many different Is can be  constructed. But I don't know
what it would mean to say there is just  one I or to say that
I can jump from one thread of experience to  another.  That
would presuppose that consciousness, the I, is something
apart from the experiences it jumps to.

David says it better than I could have, but just to add that when I
say I that is just a sort of short-hand for the 1-p perspective.
There is no separate experiencer. In UDA, it's simply the notes in a
'diary', some verifiable record of that branch of the computational
histories. There isn't really a 'jumping' of anything, there are just
these different computational branches. And in saying there's one
consciousness that experiences every possible state, that doesn't
imply experiencing them simultaneously. That theoretical objective
vantage point, seeing all histories, is the privilege of God perhaps,
or no-one. (Don't jump on me about the God bit, there's obviously no
God in an arithmetical ontology). Also, just to note that this is no
more incoherent than Everett. Many Worlds implies the same view of
the

subject.

Everett's MWI is based on QM which does assume a background time and
the state of the multiverse evolves in Hilbert space.   This
evolution entails the evolution of the state of different observers
which are simultaneous.

This is due to the fact that Everett QM is non relativistic. It is a
methodological simplification. The true Everett QM should be based,
at least, on a theory handling gravitation (and thus space-time) in
the quantum frame. With string theory we keep some space and time
background, which makes me think it is not the real theory. With
loop gravity, or alike, there is a chance to get the correct
quantization of space and time, and those should appear as pure
quantum phenomena. Of course, I think that with comp the whole
physicalness is a proto-quantum reality, with proto-quantum being
related to the qualia-quanta computationalist  unification.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 1/2/2012 7:04 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 2 January 2012 05:54, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

I don't understand that?  Are you saying all the experiences are at
different times so they can the experience of one soul that's traversing the
experiences in sequence?   I'd say they all exist timelessly, or more
exactly time is inferred from the relation of their contents.

I'd agree, but keeping clear the distinction that consciousness (1-p)
is not identical with its putative supervenience base (3-p).  If we
refrain from calling the contents of the latter experiences, it
might make it easier to isolate the 3-p sense in which they all exist
timelessly from the distinct 1-p experiential sense in which time is
inferred from the content of each unique moment.

So we mustn't be misled into imagining
arrays of conscious moments as somehow sitting there all together in
timeless identity with their 3-p supervenience base, because to do so
would be to destroy all logical possibility of recovering the
uniqueness of the experiential moment.

How so?  The uniqueness is inherent in the experience.  It doesn't depend on
being embedded in spacetime.  Spacetime is a model inferred from
intersubjective agreement of individual experiences.

Again, I agree, but with the same distinction.  There is indeed the
3-p sense of inherently distinguishable subsets of some co-existent
supervenience base.  But this mustn't be elided with the distinct 1-p
experiential sense of the unique presence of each conscious moment.

You mean confused or confounded...not elided?

If consciousness were simply timelessly identical with some
supervenience base, there would be no such distinction to be made.
But if that were the case time  would never be inferred, or to put
it more simply, nothing would ever happen.

You seem to be saying that time must be inherent in the 3p base, otherwise it could not be
inferred.  But why can't time be inferred from any ordered sequence.  That's the theory
frequently put forward here.  Numbers are timeless, but they are well ordered.  Frames of
a movie film exist all at once, but they have an implicit order.

Brent

David

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 02.01.2012 07:01 meekerdb said the following:

On 1/1/2012 4:59 PM, Pierz wrote:

...

David says it better than I could have, but just to add that when
I say I that is just a sort of short-hand for the 1-p
perspective. There is no separate experiencer. In UDA, it's simply
the notes in a 'diary', some verifiable record of that branch of
the computational histories. There isn't really a 'jumping' of
anything, there are just these different computational branches.
And in saying there's one consciousness that experiences every
possible state, that doesn't imply experiencing them
simultaneously. That theoretical objective vantage point, seeing
all histories, is the privilege of God perhaps, or no-one. (Don't
jump on me about the God bit, there's obviously no God in an
arithmetical ontology). Also, just to note that this is no more
incoherent than Everett. Many Worlds implies the same view of the
subject.

Everett's MWI is based on QM which does assume a background time and
the state of the multiverse evolves in Hilbert space. This evolution
entails the evolution of the state of different observers which are
simultaneous.

Is an observer (or better many observers observing simultaneously) is
still necessary also by Everett's MWI? What equation then describes an
observer?

Evgenii

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 1/2/2012 12:24 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 02.01.2012 07:01 meekerdb said the following:

On 1/1/2012 4:59 PM, Pierz wrote:

...

David says it better than I could have, but just to add that when
I say I that is just a sort of short-hand for the 1-p
perspective. There is no separate experiencer. In UDA, it's simply
the notes in a 'diary', some verifiable record of that branch of
the computational histories. There isn't really a 'jumping' of
anything, there are just these different computational branches.
And in saying there's one consciousness that experiences every
possible state, that doesn't imply experiencing them
simultaneously. That theoretical objective vantage point, seeing
all histories, is the privilege of God perhaps, or no-one. (Don't
jump on me about the God bit, there's obviously no God in an
arithmetical ontology). Also, just to note that this is no more
incoherent than Everett. Many Worlds implies the same view of the
subject.

Everett's MWI is based on QM which does assume a background time and
the state of the multiverse evolves in Hilbert space. This evolution
entails the evolution of the state of different observers which are
simultaneous.

Is an observer (or better many observers observing simultaneously) is still necessary
also by Everett's MWI? What equation then describes an observer?

No.  Observer is just shorthand for an interacting system that collapses the wave
function, i.e. couples the thing observed into the quasi-classical environment.  The
observation is the mathematical step of tracing over the environmental degrees of
freedom.  So, within physics, there's an equation describing observation.

Brent

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On 2 January 2012 18:56, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

You mean confused or confounded...not elided?

Elided: past participle, past tense of elide (Verb): Join together;
merge: the two things elided in his mind.

If consciousness were simply timelessly identical with some
supervenience base, there would be no such distinction to be made.
But if that were the case time  would never be inferred, or to put
it more simply, nothing would ever happen.

You seem to be saying that time must be inherent in the 3p base, otherwise
it could not be inferred.  But why can't time be inferred from any ordered
sequence.  That's the theory frequently put forward here.  Numbers are
timeless, but they are well ordered.  Frames of a movie film exist all at
once, but they have an implicit order.

No, that wasn't my point.  I agree that time can be inferred from an
ordered sequence, for example a coexistent ordered sequence of 3-p
states. But the 1-p observation, on which the relevant notion of
inference depends, supervenes on - without being identical with -
only a restricted *selection* from the 3-p ensemble.  Moreover,
selection in this 1-p sense - as in what is exclusively present at
any moment to a conscious observer - must be distinguished from a
weaker sense which we use merely to isolate, in principle, specific
members of a 3-p ensemble.  Unless, that is, we mean to say that
specific conscious moments, as experienced 1-personally, are uniquely
present only in principle.

ISTM inevitable that, short of outright denial of the singularly
present and selective nature of all 1-p experiences, contextualised by
a history of successive such moments, we are led to the intuition
that there is something else at work here, though what it is cannot
perhaps be captured more precisely than Bruno's hmm...

David

On 1/2/2012 7:04 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 2 January 2012 05:54, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

I don't understand that?  Are you saying all the experiences are at
different times so they can the experience of one soul that's traversing
the
experiences in sequence?   I'd say they all exist timelessly, or more
exactly time is inferred from the relation of their contents.

I'd agree, but keeping clear the distinction that consciousness (1-p)
is not identical with its putative supervenience base (3-p).  If we
refrain from calling the contents of the latter experiences, it
might make it easier to isolate the 3-p sense in which they all exist
timelessly from the distinct 1-p experiential sense in which time is
inferred from the content of each unique moment.

So we mustn't be misled into imagining
arrays of conscious moments as somehow sitting there all together in
timeless identity with their 3-p supervenience base, because to do so
would be to destroy all logical possibility of recovering the
uniqueness of the experiential moment.

How so?  The uniqueness is inherent in the experience.  It doesn't depend
on
being embedded in spacetime.  Spacetime is a model inferred from
intersubjective agreement of individual experiences.

Again, I agree, but with the same distinction.  There is indeed the
3-p sense of inherently distinguishable subsets of some co-existent
supervenience base.  But this mustn't be elided with the distinct 1-p
experiential sense of the unique presence of each conscious moment.

You mean confused or confounded...not elided?

If consciousness were simply timelessly identical with some
supervenience base, there would be no such distinction to be made.
But if that were the case time  would never be inferred, or to put
it more simply, nothing would ever happen.

You seem to be saying that time must be inherent in the 3p base, otherwise
it could not be inferred.  But why can't time be inferred from any ordered
sequence.  That's the theory frequently put forward here.  Numbers are
timeless, but they are well ordered.  Frames of a movie film exist all at
once, but they have an implicit order.

Brent

David

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 1/2/2012 12:57 PM, David Nyman wrote:

On 2 January 2012 18:56, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

You mean confused or confounded...not elided?

Elided: past participle, past tense of elide (Verb): Join together;
merge: the two things elided in his mind.

Elide only means to join together two things by leaving out stuff in between them.  Its
basic meaning is to leave out.  That's why I questioned it.

If consciousness were simply timelessly identical with some
supervenience base, there would be no such distinction to be made.
But if that were the case time  would never be inferred, or to put
it more simply, nothing would ever happen.

You seem to be saying that time must be inherent in the 3p base, otherwise
it could not be inferred.  But why can't time be inferred from any ordered
sequence.  That's the theory frequently put forward here.  Numbers are
timeless, but they are well ordered.  Frames of a movie film exist all at
once, but they have an implicit order.

No, that wasn't my point.  I agree that time can be inferred from an
ordered sequence, for example a coexistent ordered sequence of 3-p
states. But the 1-p observation, on which the relevant notion of
inference depends, supervenes on - without being identical with -
only a restricted *selection* from the 3-p ensemble.  Moreover,
selection in this 1-p sense - as in what is exclusively present at
any moment to a conscious observer - must be distinguished from a
weaker sense which we use merely to isolate, in principle, specific
members of a 3-p ensemble.

If we distinguish these two then we've lost the explanatory power because now we have to
postulate some different kind of selection that depends on consciousness, which was
the concept we hoped to explain.

Brent

Unless, that is, we mean to say that
specific conscious moments, as experienced 1-personally, are uniquely
present only in principle.

ISTM inevitable that, short of outright denial of the singularly
present and selective nature of all 1-p experiences, contextualised by
a history of successive such moments, we are led to the intuition
that there is something else at work here, though what it is cannot
perhaps be captured more precisely than Bruno's hmm...

David

On 1/2/2012 7:04 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 2 January 2012 05:54, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.netwrote:

I don't understand that?  Are you saying all the experiences are at
different times so they can the experience of one soul that's traversing
the
experiences in sequence?   I'd say they all exist timelessly, or more
exactly time is inferred from the relation of their contents.

I'd agree, but keeping clear the distinction that consciousness (1-p)
is not identical with its putative supervenience base (3-p).  If we
refrain from calling the contents of the latter experiences, it
might make it easier to isolate the 3-p sense in which they all exist
timelessly from the distinct 1-p experiential sense in which time is
inferred from the content of each unique moment.

So we mustn't be misled into imagining
arrays of conscious moments as somehow sitting there all together in
timeless identity with their 3-p supervenience base, because to do so
would be to destroy all logical possibility of recovering the
uniqueness of the experiential moment.

How so?  The uniqueness is inherent in the experience.  It doesn't depend
on
being embedded in spacetime.  Spacetime is a model inferred from
intersubjective agreement of individual experiences.

Again, I agree, but with the same distinction.  There is indeed the
3-p sense of inherently distinguishable subsets of some co-existent
supervenience base.  But this mustn't be elided with the distinct 1-p
experiential sense of the unique presence of each conscious moment.

You mean confused or confounded...not elided?

If consciousness were simply timelessly identical with some
supervenience base, there would be no such distinction to be made.
But if that were the case time  would never be inferred, or to put
it more simply, nothing would ever happen.

You seem to be saying that time must be inherent in the 3p base, otherwise
it could not be inferred.  But why can't time be inferred from any ordered
sequence.  That's the theory frequently put forward here.  Numbers are
timeless, but they are well ordered.  Frames of a movie film exist all at
once, but they have an implicit order.

Brent

David

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On 2 January 2012 21:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

Elided: past participle, past tense of elide (Verb): Join together;
merge: the two things elided in his mind.

Elide only means to join together two things by leaving out stuff in
between them.  Its basic meaning is to leave out.  That's why I questioned
it.

Confound will do just as well.

Moreover,
selection in this 1-p sense - as in what is exclusively present at
any moment to a conscious observer - must be distinguished from a
weaker sense which we use merely to isolate, in principle, specific
members of a 3-p ensemble.

If we distinguish these two then we've lost the explanatory power because
now we have to postulate some different kind of selection that depends on
consciousness, which was the concept we hoped to explain.

Sure, but isn't the problem precisely that (at least for some of us)
the first sense just doesn't seem to be adequately explained by
exclusive reference to the second?   If this were not so, there would
be no controversy.  So for those of us who may still be wondering
hmm..., the loss of explanatory power might be an exclusively 3-p
paradigm running out of potency just before the final leap from
objective framework to subjective experience.

To others, this doubtless seems too much like giving up on explanation
itself.  Why should methods that have been so successful in so many
cases not ultimately lead to full and final elucidation in this matter
also, thorny though it may presently seem?  In the meantime, any
temporarily troublesome loose ends are likely as illusory as that
old phantom, vis viva.

In practice, since I am partially persuaded by both of these lines of
thought, it's fortunate that nothing compels me to premature
commitment to either.

David

On 1/2/2012 12:57 PM, David Nyman wrote:

On 2 January 2012 18:56, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

You mean confused or confounded...not elided?

Elided: past participle, past tense of elide (Verb): Join together;
merge: the two things elided in his mind.

Elide only means to join together two things by leaving out stuff in
between them.  Its basic meaning is to leave out.  That's why I questioned
it.

If consciousness were simply timelessly identical with some
supervenience base, there would be no such distinction to be made.
But if that were the case time  would never be inferred, or to put
it more simply, nothing would ever happen.

You seem to be saying that time must be inherent in the 3p base,
otherwise
it could not be inferred.  But why can't time be inferred from any
ordered
sequence.  That's the theory frequently put forward here.  Numbers are
timeless, but they are well ordered.  Frames of a movie film exist all at
once, but they have an implicit order.

No, that wasn't my point.  I agree that time can be inferred from an
ordered sequence, for example a coexistent ordered sequence of 3-p
states. But the 1-p observation, on which the relevant notion of
inference depends, supervenes on - without being identical with -
only a restricted *selection* from the 3-p ensemble.  Moreover,
selection in this 1-p sense - as in what is exclusively present at
any moment to a conscious observer - must be distinguished from a
weaker sense which we use merely to isolate, in principle, specific
members of a 3-p ensemble.

If we distinguish these two then we've lost the explanatory power because
now we have to postulate some different kind of selection that depends on
consciousness, which was the concept we hoped to explain.

Brent

Unless, that is, we mean to say that
specific conscious moments, as experienced 1-personally, are uniquely
present only in principle.

ISTM inevitable that, short of outright denial of the singularly
present and selective nature of all 1-p experiences, contextualised by
a history of successive such moments, we are led to the intuition
that there is something else at work here, though what it is cannot
perhaps be captured more precisely than Bruno's hmm...

David

On 1/2/2012 7:04 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 2 January 2012 05:54, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net    wrote:

I don't understand that?  Are you saying all the experiences are at
different times so they can the experience of one soul that's
traversing
the
experiences in sequence?   I'd say they all exist timelessly, or more
exactly time is inferred from the relation of their contents.

I'd agree, but keeping clear the distinction that consciousness (1-p)
is not identical with its putative supervenience base (3-p).  If we
refrain from calling the contents of the latter experiences, it
might make it easier to isolate the 3-p sense in which they all exist
timelessly from the distinct 1-p experiential sense in which time is
inferred from the content of each unique moment.

So we mustn't be misled into imagining
arrays of conscious moments as somehow sitting there all together in
timeless identity with their 3-p ```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 31.12.2011 22:57 meekerdb said the following:

On 12/31/2011 1:33 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 31.12.2011 22:00 meekerdb said the following:

...

Completely!? How do you know that? The Mars Rover doesn't just
record a sensor value in its computer, it also remember the value
and at a later time it may act on that value in combination with
other values, some internal and some external, to which it
assigns different levels of importance based on overall mission
goals. Exactly what would have to be added to make the Rover
human-like conscious?

Conscious experience is what is missing. To this end, it is not
enough to write values in the database. Google saves a lot of
information in its database, so what?

Google doesn't learn, plan, or act in our world.

database. Does it change something?

separate conscious and unconscious experience. Roughly speaking,
unconscious experience is some feedback loops that goes through the
brain without us experiencing them. On the contrary, we have for
example 3D visual conscious experience. Please note that part of
information from eyes is processed unconsciously.

But that was my question. What part is processed consciously. I gave
my speculation below. You just said, conscious experience was what
was needed to make the experience conscious. I need hardly point out

Science has just recently started to research on conscious experience
and so far this phenomenon has not been repeated in vitro yet. Moreover,
it seems that the modern science does not have means to describe it:

Jeffrey A. Gray, Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem.
p.5. “To put this Hard Problem into a preliminary nut-shell: it arises
because nothing in our current theoretical models of brain and behavior
accounts for the existence of conscious experience, still less for its
detailed properties.”

This shows that we have to wait for more research in this direction to
give a precise definition.

On other other hand, it is relatively easy to observe conscious
experience, if you start from yourself. The experience of 3D visual
world, music, feeling, etc. These phenomena must be researched, I do not
believe it is a good idea to neglect them just because the current state
of science cannot explain them.

The results described in Gray's book show that conscious phenomena are
rather slow, it takes about a quarter of a second to form conscious
phenomena. In comparison, the unconscious feedback loops are by an order
of magnitude faster. This means that common reasoning I saw something
and then I have done it is actually wrong. We get in conscious
the conscious experience is kind of a multi-functional display created
by the brain to allow for late error correction. However, he stresses in
his book that right now we have no idea how that display is created and
functions.

In any case, in his book you will find the description of many
experiments in this respect.

Do you agree that human beings have conscious as well as
unconscious experience? If yes, please separate the experience of
Mars Rover into these two components.

I did. See below.

Brent

In my view you find in Mars Rover just feedbacks loop as in a
self-driving car. This is the reason, I have employed the word
completely. I agree though, it would be better to use instead of
completely in my knowledge.

Evgenii

I think it would be recording a kind of general historical
narrative which it would draw on as a source of information used
in planning future actions by means of an internal simulation of
itself and the local environment. I think that would also make it
what Bruno calls a Lobian machine.

I do not see here the division between conscious and unconscious
experience here. Do you mean that if I save something into the database,
this belong to conscious experience?

The hard problem of consciousness is not to explain intellect, this
presumably could be done. The hard problem is conscious experience and
this must be researched further.

Let me finish by two more quotes from Gray. First the hard problem put
differently:

p. 40. “Given, that there is a scientific story that goes seamlessly
from sensory input to behavioural output without reference to
consciousness then, when we try to add conscious experience back into
the story, we can’t find anything for it to do. Consciousness, it seems,
has no casual powers, it stands outside the casual chain.”

Second that a conscious life does exist:

p. 7. “So be prepared to discover that much of your consciousness life
is illusory. But cling, nonetheless, to that fundamental rock upon which
Descartes built his great conceptual edifice (no matter how
unsatisfactory it turned out to be in other respects): whatever else may
```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On 1 January 2012 02:04, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense
a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.

That seems incoherent to me.  How is it different from there are many
experiences?  I is just a construct from a subset of experiences and there
can be many different subsets from which many different Is can be
constructed.     But I don't know what it would mean to say there is just
one I or to say that I can jump from one thread of experience to
another.  That would presuppose that consciousness, the I, is something
apart from the experiences it jumps to.

This is a tricky one.  Pierz says above that from 3-p, all branches
are conscious.  But perhaps it might be more accurate to say
something more like from 3-p, all branches are in some measure
accessible to consciousness.  Consciousness indeed supervenes on all
branches, but never all at the same time.  Supervenience is not an
identity claim.  The putative supervenience base is an inclusive
category embracing all 3-p descriptions indifferently, whereas 1-p
experiences are characterised precisely by their mutual exclusivity.

I agree with you that I is just a construct from a subset of
experiences and there
can be many different subsets from which many different Is can be
constructed. I in this objective sense can be coherently understood
as an ensemble of co-existing 3-p descriptions.  But any conscious
experience, by contrast, is always a singular occasion - a unique
moment in time, if you like.  So we mustn't be misled into imagining
arrays of conscious moments as somehow sitting there all together in
timeless identity with their 3-p supervenience base, because to do so
would be to destroy all logical possibility of recovering the
uniqueness of the experiential moment.

It is this very numerical  problem - the fact that there are many
bodies but only one conscious experience - that led Schrödinger to
make his remark about our consciousness being not merely a piece of
this entire existence, but in a certain sense the whole.  Because
whenever we try to think of it as merely a piece, the question will
always obtrude but why only THIS piece right NOW?.  A criterion of
selection is implied which would be capable of transforming the
totality of 3-p indifferent co-existence into a unique 1-p
manifestation.  And this in turn entails, as Schrödinger observed,
that in some sense (to be resolved!) each individual conscious
fragment of the present must be a unique summation, by the system as
a whole, of itself.

David

On 12/31/2011 5:07 PM, David Nyman wrote:

On 31 December 2011 23:35, Pierzpier...@gmail.com  wrote:

Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense
a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.

That seems incoherent to me.  How is it different from there are many
experiences?  I is just a construct from a subset of experiences and there
can be many different subsets from which many different Is can be
constructed.     But I don't know what it would mean to say there is just
one I or to say that I can jump from one thread of experience to
another.  That would presuppose that consciousness, the I, is something
apart from the experiences it jumps to.

Brent

Yes, and the sense in which there is a single consciousness that
experiences every possible state is indeed an unusual one.  It's as
if we want to say that all such first-personal experiences occur
indifferently or even simultaneously, but on reflection there can be
no relation of simultaneity between distinguishable conscious events.
The first-person is, by definition, always in the singular and present
NOW.

As Schrödinger remarked:

This life of yours which you are living is not merely a piece of this
entire existence, but in a certain sense the whole; only this whole is
not so constituted that it can be surveyed in one single glance.

David

When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that you
think one's
consciousness is a thing, a soul, that moves to different bundles of
computation so there
are some bundles that don't have any consciousness but could have if you
jumped to them.

Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense
a single consciousness ```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

``` Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense
a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.  That seems
incoherent to me.  How is it different from there are many  experiences?
I is just a construct from a subset of experiences and there  can be
many different subsets from which many different Is can be  constructed.
But I don't know what it would mean to say there is just  one I or
to say that I can jump from one thread of experience to  another.  That
would presuppose that consciousness, the I, is something  apart from the
experiences it jumps to.

David says it better than I could have, but just to add that when I
say I that is just a sort of short-hand for the 1-p perspective.
There is no separate experiencer. In UDA, it's simply the notes in a
'diary', some verifiable record of that branch of the computational
histories. There isn't really a 'jumping' of anything, there are just
these different computational branches. And in saying there's one
consciousness that experiences every possible state, that doesn't
imply experiencing them simultaneously. That theoretical objective
vantage point, seeing all histories, is the privilege of God perhaps,
or no-one. (Don't jump on me about the God bit, there's obviously no
God in an arithmetical ontology). Also, just to note that this is no
more incoherent than Everett. Many Worlds implies the same view of the
subject.

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 1/1/2012 9:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 1 January 2012 02:04, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense
a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.

That seems incoherent to me.  How is it different from there are many
experiences?  I is just a construct from a subset of experiences and there
can be many different subsets from which many different Is can be
constructed. But I don't know what it would mean to say there is just
one I or to say that I can jump from one thread of experience to
another.  That would presuppose that consciousness, the I, is something
apart from the experiences it jumps to.

This is a tricky one.  Pierz says above that from 3-p, all branches
are conscious.  But perhaps it might be more accurate to say
something more like from 3-p, all branches are in some measure
accessible to consciousness.  Consciousness indeed supervenes on all
branches, but never all at the same time.

I don't understand that?  Are you saying all the experiences are at different times so
they can the experience of one soul that's traversing the experiences in sequence?   I'd
say they all exist timelessly, or more exactly time is inferred from the relation of their
contents.

Supervenience is not an
identity claim.  The putative supervenience base is an inclusive
category embracing all 3-p descriptions indifferently, whereas 1-p
experiences are characterised precisely by their mutual exclusivity.

I agree with you that I is just a construct from a subset of
experiences and there
can be many different subsets from which many different Is can be
constructed. I in this objective sense can be coherently understood
as an ensemble of co-existing 3-p descriptions.  But any conscious
experience, by contrast, is always a singular occasion - a unique
moment in time, if you like.  So we mustn't be misled into imagining
arrays of conscious moments as somehow sitting there all together in
timeless identity with their 3-p supervenience base, because to do so
would be to destroy all logical possibility of recovering the
uniqueness of the experiential moment.

How so?  The uniqueness is inherent in the experience.  It doesn't depend on being
embedded in spacetime.  Spacetime is a model inferred from intersubjective agreement of
individual experiences.

Brent

It is this very numerical  problem - the fact that there are many
bodies but only one conscious experience - that led Schrödinger to
make his remark about our consciousness being not merely a piece of
this entire existence, but in a certain sense the whole.  Because
whenever we try to think of it as merely a piece, the question will
always obtrude but why only THIS piece right NOW?.  A criterion of
selection is implied which would be capable of transforming the
totality of 3-p indifferent co-existence into a unique 1-p
manifestation.  And this in turn entails, as Schrödinger observed,
that in some sense (to be resolved!) each individual conscious
fragment of the present must be a unique summation, by the system as
a whole, of itself.

David

On 12/31/2011 5:07 PM, David Nyman wrote:

On 31 December 2011 23:35, Pierzpier...@gmail.comwrote:

Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense
a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.

That seems incoherent to me.  How is it different from there are many
experiences?  I is just a construct from a subset of experiences and there
can be many different subsets from which many different Is can be
constructed. But I don't know what it would mean to say there is just
one I or to say that I can jump from one thread of experience to
another.  That would presuppose that consciousness, the I, is something
apart from the experiences it jumps to.

Brent

Yes, and the sense in which there is a single consciousness that
experiences every possible state is indeed an unusual one.  It's as
if we want to say that all such first-personal experiences occur
indifferently or even simultaneously, but on reflection there can be
no relation of simultaneity between distinguishable conscious events.
The first-person is, by definition, always in the singular and present
NOW.

As Schrödinger remarked:

This life of yours which you are living is not merely a piece of this
entire existence, but in a certain sense the whole; only this whole is
not so constituted that it can be surveyed in one single glance.

David

When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that you
```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 1/1/2012 4:59 PM, Pierz wrote:

Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-  p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience  myself on one
branch at a time, probabilistically according to the  measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense  a single consciousness that
experiences every possible state.  That seems incoherent to me.  How is it different from there are many  experiences?  I is just a construct from a subset of
experiences and there  can be many different subsets from which many different Is can be  constructed. But I don't know what it would mean to say there is
just  one I or to say that I can jump from one thread of experience to  another.  That would presuppose that consciousness, the I, is
something  apart from the experiences it jumps to.

David says it better than I could have, but just to add that when I
say I that is just a sort of short-hand for the 1-p perspective.
There is no separate experiencer. In UDA, it's simply the notes in a
'diary', some verifiable record of that branch of the computational
histories. There isn't really a 'jumping' of anything, there are just
these different computational branches. And in saying there's one
consciousness that experiences every possible state, that doesn't
imply experiencing them simultaneously. That theoretical objective
vantage point, seeing all histories, is the privilege of God perhaps,
or no-one. (Don't jump on me about the God bit, there's obviously no
God in an arithmetical ontology). Also, just to note that this is no
more incoherent than Everett. Many Worlds implies the same view of the
subject.

Everett's MWI is based on QM which does assume a background time and the state of the
multiverse evolves in Hilbert space.   This evolution entails the evolution of the state
of different observers which are simultaneous.

Brent

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On Dec 31, 6:17 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/30/2011 12:51 AM, Pierz wrote:

On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:
On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote:
You think it is ludicrous that a Mars Rover is programmed to monitor the
state of its
battery, the temperature of its motors, the amount of memory available for
pictures, etc?

Brent
sigh  Let's not go down that boringly overtrodden path, but agree to
disagree on what constitutes consciousness.

sigh The phrase was internal perception not consciousness.

Well usually the term 'perception' entails consciousness. If you mean
that you ate try indifferent as to whether the machine is conscious,
well OK. I see something deeper in the consciousness problem.

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 31 Dec 2011, at 01:44, Joseph Knight wrote:

On Thu, Dec 29, 2011 at 9:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:

Which computation?  I don't see any computation in the projection of
the computation-movie. The Boolean graph nodes are broken. The light
patterns is exactly the same, with the boolean graph turned, or not,
upside down. You argument seems to rely on non relevant (with
respect to the possible computation) idiosyncracies of this thought
experience implementation. I will think about a version of MGA
making this more obvious.

OK, I think I see where my error lies. I thought the absurdity arose
later in the argument than it actually does. I see that by my
reasoning we would have conscious supervening on the particular
physical system and not the computation itself, which would
contradict comp. If we extract the computation from the glass/node
system in the form of the film, then by comp consciousness should
supervene on the film, when clearly it cannot. Is that roughly what
you are saying?

I think so.

It does matter for the computation what the light lands on.

But what is the computation in this case?

This doesn't violate 323, or comp. It means that the whole system
(crystal/glass+film) must be taken into account in your analysis.

The whole system is considered, and then changed in a way which does
not change the physical activity, except for operating nodes which
are retreived, and this to show that the physical activity does not
implement the computation, but is only a mimicking of non relevant
appearances associated accidentally with the original computation.

It is no better than taking half of the brain and ignoring the
other half. It isn't a matter of substitution level.

OK. But you have to explain me the role of the broken node, in the
computation, or even in the light patterns. You might try, as an
exercise to refute your own argument by changing the original device.

OK. I will think about it too.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 31 Dec 2011, at 03:37, Pierz wrote:

On Dec 31, 4:36 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 30 Dec 2011, at 03:10, Pierz wrote:

This thread has been extremely helpful to me in terms of getting to
the heart of this problem and the whole issue of supervenience -
thank

you Joseph for your clarification of the meaning of the term and for
your succinct and clear summary of the MGA, and to David for the
nice
clarification of the 'qua materia'/'qua computation' distinction.
But

I have yet to see why the MGA proves that consciousness can't
supervene on abstract computation +  concrete implementation.

I would say it does. If you agree with my answer to Russell on
supervenience, that should be clear.
Indeed you can see MGA as proving that IF my consciousness supervenes
on abstract computation + concrete implementation then my
consciousness supervenes on abstract computation only. Concrete
implementations become explainable in term of relative abstract
implementations (kind of things you can easily translated in term of
the phi_i and the W_i, and from that, in pure arithmetic).

I can
see that Joseph's refutation misses the mark because the issue is
that

the replaying of a recording, whether on a screen or within the
original mechanism, performs no computations. But why cannot the
materialist/computationalist merely counter that Alice *is* a zombie
during the playback of the movie, because the required instantiation
of  a computation is absent?

I tend to agree. but most people will not because they define the
zombie explicitly by an entity behaving like a human *in all*
situations, so that whatever they are, they handle the
counterfactuals. But accepting your sense of zombie, that I am
guessing, I am OK for saying that Alice, or any appearance of a
person

in a movie can be seen as a sort of zombie.

OK, yes my terms are sometimes less than rigorous, sorry about that. I
suppose I just mean not conscious in this instance. I do wonder
though (as an aside), whether you couldn't regard a recording as
'crystallising' in a sense the consciousness it records. If a
consciousness is abstract, then the recording continues to represent
that abstraction in the same way a body/brain represents the
abstraction.

Yes. The film does encode comp state, and as such can be used to
reimplement the person in a boolean graph, making possible the
recovery, not of the consciousness (which is in Platonia) but on its
relative ability to manifest itself relatively to you.

I heard recently about a condition called Transient
Global Amnesia in which people temporarily lose the ability to record
new memories beyond say the last minute, and forget years of their
history. In such an event, these people behave repetitively, much like
a recording (a 'broken record'), as if the same conscious state is
recycled over and over. Are they zombies? No, and you can easily
enough say they are just a computer stuck in a computational loop,
but  if consciousness is abstract, then a repeated calculation
represents the same conscious state, and the physical thing performing
the calculation is just a type of window onto that abstraction, just
as the recording is a window onto the abstraction. In that sense a
recording might be conscious, in the same way the person in the mirror
is as conscious as the person looking into it.

Yes. In that same way, and that why we will have to abandon the idea
that consciousness supervene on the physical, and accept the idea that
the physical supervene on consciousness, even if locally it has to
look like the contrary, for reason which can be explained and tested.

Sure, he is committed to consciousness of
the machine if the physical activity is identical, but in the
playback

of the film, the activity is not identical, since the connections
between logic gates are broken and/or overridden by the *projected*
activity (be it 'lucky rays' or the film).

OK.

Although the sequence of
firings in the network is the same, the causal connection between
firings is removed - indeed this is the point: no calculation is
being

carried out.

Indeed.

But a sequence of firings in a logic network is not the
entirety of that network's physical activity. Or rather, the
physical
activity of the sequence is not sufficient to define its activity
as a
computation. That requires the casual connection between firings
to be

retained.

Imagine a domino computer. I can't remember where I heard this first
(maybe on this list somewhere), but we can imagine a network of
spring-
loaded dominos that are set up to spring back upright after a
certain

time. By setting up rows of such dominos in a clever fashion, we can
use it to perform calculations. Let's say we perform a calculation
with a boolean output - either a domino at the end falls or it
doesn't. If we set up such a domino computer and push the first
domino, we initiate a causal chain reaction that performs the
calculation ```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 31.12.2011 09:17 Pierz said the following:

On Dec 31, 6:17 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

On 12/30/2011 12:51 AM, Pierz wrote:

On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.netwrote:

On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote: You think it is ludicrous
that a Mars Rover is programmed to monitor the state of its
battery, the temperature of its motors, the amount of memory
available for pictures, etc?

Brent

sighLet's not go down that boringly overtrodden path, but
agree to disagree on what constitutes consciousness.

sigh  The phrase was internal perception not consciousness.

Well usually the term 'perception' entails consciousness. If you
mean that you ate try indifferent as to whether the machine is
conscious, well OK. I see something deeper in the consciousness
problem.

I would agree. When AI people use the word perception to describe a
sensor connected to a computer, in my view they loose the biggest part
of the meaning. A human being perceives also unconsciously and this part
of perception could be similar to what we find in Mars Rover but on the
other hand a human being has conscious experiences. This part is
completely missing in AI.

Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 12/31/2011 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

As I've said we're on the same team with regards to primitive
materialism. But I have sympathy for the materialists on this issue of
instantiation. After all, we need computers still, we can't rely on
the arithmetical platonia to predict the weather for us.

Again, we need brain, bodies and computer to optimize the probability of staying in the
branch we share at our substitution level. And if the argument is correct, the weather
quickly in alternate consciousness/realities.

When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that you think one's
consciousness is a thing, a soul, that moves to different bundles of computation so there
are some bundles that don't have any consciousness but could have if you jumped to them.

Brent

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 12/31/2011 5:49 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 31.12.2011 09:17 Pierz said the following:

On Dec 31, 6:17 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

On 12/30/2011 12:51 AM, Pierz wrote:

On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.netwrote:

On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote: You think it is ludicrous
that a Mars Rover is programmed to monitor the state of its
battery, the temperature of its motors, the amount of memory
available for pictures, etc?

Brent

sighLet's not go down that boringly overtrodden path, but
agree to disagree on what constitutes consciousness.

sigh  The phrase was internal perception not consciousness.

Well usually the term 'perception' entails consciousness. If you
mean that you ate try indifferent as to whether the machine is
conscious, well OK. I see something deeper in the consciousness
problem.

I would agree. When AI people use the word perception to describe a sensor connected
to a computer, in my view they loose the biggest part of the meaning. A human being
perceives also unconsciously and this part of perception could be similar to what we
find in Mars Rover but on the other hand a human being has conscious experiences. This
part is completely missing in AI.

Completely!?  How do you know that?  The Mars Rover doesn't just record a sensor value in
its computer, it also remember the value and at a later time it may act on that value in
combination with other values, some internal and some external, to which it assigns
different levels of importance based on overall mission goals.  Exactly what would have to
be added to make the Rover human-like conscious?

I think it would be recording a kind of general historical narrative which it would draw
on as a source of information used in planning future actions by means of an internal
simulation of itself and the local environment.  I think that would also make it what
Bruno calls a Lobian machine.

Brent

Evgenii

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 12/31/2011 1:33 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 31.12.2011 22:00 meekerdb said the following:

On 12/31/2011 5:49 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 31.12.2011 09:17 Pierz said the following:

On Dec 31, 6:17 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/30/2011 12:51 AM, Pierz wrote:

On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote: You think it is
ludicrous that a Mars Rover is programmed to monitor the
state of its battery, the temperature of its motors, the
amount of memory available for pictures, etc?

Brent

sigh Let's not go down that boringly overtrodden path, but
agree to disagree on what constitutes consciousness.

sigh The phrase was internal perception not
consciousness.

Well usually the term 'perception' entails consciousness. If you
mean that you ate try indifferent as to whether the machine is
conscious, well OK. I see something deeper in the consciousness
problem.

I would agree. When AI people use the word perception to describe
a sensor connected to a computer, in my view they loose the biggest
part of the meaning. A human being perceives also unconsciously and
this part of perception could be similar to what we find in Mars
Rover but on the other hand a human being has conscious
experiences. This part is completely missing in AI.

Completely!? How do you know that? The Mars Rover doesn't just record
a sensor value in its computer, it also remember the value and at a
later time it may act on that value in combination with other values,
some internal and some external, to which it assigns different levels
of importance based on overall mission goals. Exactly what would have
to be added to make the Rover human-like conscious?

Conscious experience is what is missing. To this end, it is not enough to write values
in the database. Google saves a lot of information in its database, so what?

Google doesn't learn, plan, or act in our world.

Let us start with human beings. Experiments shows that one can separate conscious and
unconscious experience. Roughly speaking, unconscious experience is some feedback loops
that goes through the brain without us experiencing them. On the contrary, we have for
example 3D visual conscious experience. Please note that part of information from eyes
is processed unconsciously.

But that was my question.  What part is processed consciously.  I gave my speculation
below.  You just said, conscious experience was what was needed to make the experience
conscious.  I need hardly point out that is a non-answer.

Do you agree that human beings have conscious as well as unconscious experience? If yes,
please separate the experience of Mars Rover into these two components.

I did.  See below.

Brent

In my view you find in Mars Rover just feedbacks loop as in a self-driving car. This is
the reason, I have employed the word completely. I agree though, it would be better to
use instead of completely in my knowledge.

Evgenii

I think it would be recording a kind of general historical narrative
which it would draw on as a source of information used in planning
future actions by means of an internal simulation of itself and the
local environment. I think that would also make it what Bruno calls a
Lobian machine.

Brent

Evgenii

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that you think
one's
consciousness is a thing, a soul, that moves to different bundles of
computation so there
are some bundles that don't have any consciousness but could have if you
jumped to them.

Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense
a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.

As for Mars Rover I'm curious to know this: If we programmed it to
avoid danger, would it experience fear? Until we understand the
qualia, you're as in the dark as we are on this question. You assume
the affirmative, we assume the negative. That's why I sigh. Such
arguments go nowhere but a reassertion of our biases/intuitions, and
the result is unedifying.

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 12/31/2011 3:35 PM, Pierz wrote:

When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that you think
one's
consciousness is a thing, a soul, that moves to different bundles of
computation so there
are some bundles that don't have any consciousness but could have if you jumped to
them.

Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense
a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.

As for Mars Rover I'm curious to know this: If we programmed it to
avoid danger, would it experience fear?

If we programmed it to sacrifice other important values (like conserving power, or keeping
all its parts) I'd speculate that it, in some sense, felt fear.

Until we understand the
qualia, you're as in the dark as we are on this question. You assume
the affirmative, we assume the negative. That's why I sigh. Such
arguments go nowhere but a reassertion of our biases/intuitions, and
the result is unedifying.

And that's why I think questions of consciousness will ultimately be overtaken-by-events.
The interesting questions will be how danger is recognized and avoided, how relations to
others are managed, etc.  And we will probably talk about them as if the AI is conscious
just by analogy to ourselves while at a lower level we know which module is doing what and
how changing it will change behavior.  But nobody will ask where's the consciousness any
more than they ask where's the vis viva of their automobile.

Brent

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On 31 December 2011 23:35, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:

Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense
a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.

Yes, and the sense in which there is a single consciousness that
experiences every possible state is indeed an unusual one.  It's as
if we want to say that all such first-personal experiences occur
indifferently or even simultaneously, but on reflection there can be
no relation of simultaneity between distinguishable conscious events.
The first-person is, by definition, always in the singular and present
NOW.

As Schrödinger remarked:

This life of yours which you are living is not merely a piece of this
entire existence, but in a certain sense the whole; only this whole is
not so constituted that it can be surveyed in one single glance.

David

When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that you think
one's
consciousness is a thing, a soul, that moves to different bundles of
computation so there
are some bundles that don't have any consciousness but could have if you
jumped to them.

Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense
a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.

As for Mars Rover I'm curious to know this: If we programmed it to
avoid danger, would it experience fear? Until we understand the
qualia, you're as in the dark as we are on this question. You assume
the affirmative, we assume the negative. That's why I sigh. Such
arguments go nowhere but a reassertion of our biases/intuitions, and
the result is unedifying.

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote:

You think it is ludicrous that a Mars Rover is programmed to monitor the
state of its
battery, the temperature of its motors, the amount of memory available for
pictures, etc?

Brent

sigh Let's not go down that boringly overtrodden path, but agree to
disagree on what constitutes consciousness. I disagree with David
Deutsch that we could run a conscious entity on our laptop computer if
we only understood consciousness better, but I agree with him that we
do *not* understand it, and the Turing test is a bad one. But, as I
stated in a remark to Bruno above, those who see no mind-body duality
problem in the first place will never be persuaded of its existence,
just as I will never be persuaded that wiring a sensor in the Mars
Rover makes the machine conscious of its environment.

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 29 Dec 2011, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/29/2011 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 12:10:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But I still fail to see what you mean by swapping two
consciousness.

In this case we have that the consciousness of [Tommy and Samantha]
supervenes (weakly) on the physical activity in the classroom (to
change them, we have to change something physical in the
classroom),

in the same manner than the consciousness of Bruno and Russell
supervenes on the (phsyical, here) execution of the UD. That is
what

is used in the argument.

Bruno

We have two conscious states (Tommy and Samantha)

It might be the same consciousness, with different content.

???  That would be two different conscious states.  What is a
consciousness apart from its content?

That's a good question. May be it is cosmic consciousness, or pure
consciousness of pure consciousness, or perhaps the innate
consciousness of the pre-löbian universal machine. Of course we lack
identification criterium for consciousness, and my point was more
logical than assertative, in the frame of MGA's alleged refutations.
I hope this will be clarified in my answer to Russell on
supervenience. I will be occupied those next days, so I might answer
this next year.

Happy new year, Brent.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 30 Dec 2011, at 01:00, Russell Standish wrote:

On Thu, Dec 29, 2011 at 05:47:07PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:

They both cannot supervene on the same physical state.

In my weak sense, they both supervene on the same physical state of
the room, or universe, or even arithmetic.

of supervenience.

In the stanford encyclopedia, the standard definition is the weak one.
I think you confuse A sup B, with A sup only on B.

That is
by the definition of supervenience.

The intuitive definition of supervenience is that A supervenes on B
if we cannot have an A-difference without a B-difference.

Yes.

OK. Good. We do agree on the main vague definition, of supervenience.

If A supervenes on B, it supervene trivially on a disjoint union of
B and C, because we still cannot have an A-difference without a (B
union C difference).

No - the Tommy vs Samantha example is a counter example:

Let T sup B and S sup C.

But T and C are different conscious states, so cannot both supervene
on B u C.

This is not coherent with the definition above. A sup B means that
there is no A-difference without a B difference. But it does not mean
that a B-difference entails a A-difference. If A sup B, then A sup (B
disjoint-union C), because the fact that a A-difference needs a B-
difference will entails that a A-difference needs a (B disjoint-union
C) difference.
both supervene on B u C is ambiguous. Both individually supervenes
on B u C. And both in union does supervene on B u C.
If you negate such statement, by definition it would mean that a
difference in T and C can be attained without difference on B u C. I
thought your swapping consciousness was introduced for that very
purpose (and *that* would have been a logical problem for MGA).

Therefore they both cannot
supervene on the same classroom.

In that case I would have said that Tommy's consciousness supervenes
*only* on Tommy's brain (but I avoid this because we don't know and
cannot know what is our real generalized brain).

Whatever the generalised brains are, the foregoing discussion
implies that the intersection of two generalised brains must be
empty.

Which would logically makes the notion spurious. That vindicates what
I said, ISTM.

Perhaps the word swapping is misleading to you - I didn't mean
anything particularly profound by it.

I have still no idea of what you mean by that. Suppose that you tell
me that Bruno and Russell's consciousness swap every minutes, since
six months. What would that mean? I don't see how we could be aware
of such things, nor how we could verify this in any third (and
first) person way.

Nor do I. Not even a putative God could be aware, I would think.

OK.

I
wasn't suggesting such a thing, anyway. I was thinking more in terms
of first

consider Tommy's consiousness then afterwards think of
Samantha's. Thus you are swapping the focus of your attention.

That's why we have to be very careful with the notion of supervenience.

And this makes your argument (physicalist, for
the sake of the reasoning) against the consciousness instantiated by
the (concrete) UD dubious. I think. I mean that this critics on MGA
fails, at least by lack of clarity (for me).

The critique was against your step of unfolding the multiverse into a
single universe by dovetailing. You then asserted that the
consciousness supervened on the dovetailer, which as we've been
through above, cannot be the case.

I think the discussion above is irrelevant. I can just assert that the
running of the UD instanciate the many consciousness. And I have to
say that, if I believe in comp + sup-phys. Without sup-phys I can
still nuance the talk, in the sense that persistent consciousness is
*only* recovered from the first person point of view on the entire
(mathematical) execution of the UD.

Of course, you may refine your argument by dovetailing just the
generalised brain, and not its environment which contains other
brains. But in this case, I would point out that eliminating the
environment may well render the brain unconsious. There is certainly
evidence from sensory depreivation experiments that this might happen.

The generalized brain, by definition contains the environment. It does
not exclude the presence of other brain. We cannot logically exclude,
in the comp frame, that we need many brains to get the consciousness
of all individual brain content. Even if we find this not really
plausible.

Or maybe you have a different way of emulating a multiverse without
dovetailing?

If a unique processor dovetails on two programs, it executes those two
programs in the comp sense. Dovetailing just add delays of
reconstitution. If that was not the case, I would have to say no to
a doctor for question of implementation, which does not make sense
once we ```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 30 Dec 2011, at 01:57, Pierz wrote:

Of course, when consciousness is taken seriously into account, we can
sense some incoherence, but empirically, this is the hard part to
convey, and without MGA/Maudlin, I have not been able to convince of
the frank incoherence.

And you've been successful with the MGA?

With the academic. Less so with the media, club, press, etc. I got a
price for the thesis, but I have nver seen it. Instead of promotion,
there has been, as many people have witnessed defamation, and I still
don't know if it is just politics or if there isn something
ideological. Anyway, that's boring things of life kind of thing. But
most people get easily UDA1-7, and less easily the MGA. The math part
seems grasped only by logicians (which unfortunately are not so much
interested in the mind-body problem).

I am philosophically entirely
on your side with regards to this intuition of incoherence, and know
well the difficulty/impossibility of getting a materialist to
apprehend it. But has the logic of MGA actually ever converted a
materialist?

Yes. At least for some period of time. Some people get the point, and
then fall back in the Aristotelian habits.

Seems to me people are entrenched in their positions on
such matters and weapons of mere logic - especially complex logic -
will never move them.

It is normal in a field which use mainly authoritative (and thus
irrational) arguments since a long time (explicitly 1500 years in
occident). It is normal that it takes time.

Even weapons of empirical demonstration take a

In the human/fundamental science we are still using the boss is
right, and paradigms have still to wait for the boss is dead.

This is
not to say I am yet completely persuaded by the MGA either - I'll post
my doubts/questions as a separate reply here.

OK. Thanks. I like to share my passion for that subject. I will answer
asap.

Best wishes and happy new year,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On 30 December 2011 12:07, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

What is a consciousness apart from its content?

That's a good question. May be it is cosmic consciousness, or pure
consciousness of pure consciousness, or perhaps the innate consciousness of
the pre-löbian universal machine. Of course we lack identification criterium
for consciousness, and my point was more logical than assertative, in the
frame of MGA's alleged refutations. I hope this will be clarified in my
answer to Russell on supervenience. I will be occupied those next days, so I

This interesting comment resonates with today's early morning
ruminations (a pernicious habit I apparently share with Descartes!).
computationalism and something like Zuse's or Schmidhuber's.  If I
have understood these latter ideas, they postulate a particular
digital machine as somehow ontologically privileged, this UM then
providing a unique basis for all subsequent computational development.
In the process the primitive UM must emulate infinities of other UMs,
but as all this computation ultimately supervenes on the activity of
the primitive UM, ontologically speaking it is solus ipse, and all
points of view must therefore be referenced to it.

This idea seems to possess some nice features (for example with
respect to an ultimate reference point for who am I? questions), but
one might object that it originates too late in the computational
food chain.  After all, computation is itself reducible to more
fundamental combinatorial relations, so by what principle is some
particular UM - itself a complex combinatorial entity - supposed to
bootstrap itself into primitive existence?  Perhaps such an idea puts
the computational cart before the arithmetical horse.  And is the
primitive UM itself supposed to supervene on (i.e. be uniquely
anchored to) a primitively-physical machine?  If so, would this
supervenience claim be vulnerable to an MGA-type of refutation?

But in any case your comment above about the innate consciousness of
the pre-löbian universal machine is intriguing.  ISTM that in the end
epistemology and ontology must come to one thing: whatever we know is
ultimately a self-reflection of whatever we are.  Whatever we are is
both unique and multitudinous, a One that through
self-differentiation and self-combination explodes into combinatorial
universality.  And from that explosion the many are born and suffer.

Je vous souhaite une très heureuse nouvelle année.

David

On 29 Dec 2011, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/29/2011 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 12:10:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But I still fail to see what you mean by swapping two consciousness.
In this case we have that the consciousness of [Tommy and Samantha]
supervenes (weakly) on the physical activity in the classroom (to
change them, we have to change something physical in the classroom),
in the same manner than the consciousness of Bruno and Russell
supervenes on the (phsyical, here) execution of the UD. That is what
is used in the argument.

Bruno

We have two conscious states (Tommy and Samantha)

It might be the same consciousness, with different content.

???  That would be two different conscious states.  What is a
consciousness apart from its content?

That's a good question. May be it is cosmic consciousness, or pure
consciousness of pure consciousness, or perhaps the innate consciousness of
the pre-löbian universal machine. Of course we lack identification criterium
for consciousness, and my point was more logical than assertative, in the
frame of MGA's alleged refutations. I hope this will be clarified in my
answer to Russell on supervenience. I will be occupied those next days, so I

Happy new year, Brent.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 30 Dec 2011, at 03:10, Pierz wrote:

This thread has been extremely helpful to me in terms of getting to
the heart of this problem and the whole issue of supervenience - thank
you Joseph for your clarification of the meaning of the term and for
your succinct and clear summary of the MGA, and to David for the nice
clarification of the 'qua materia'/'qua computation' distinction. But
I have yet to see why the MGA proves that consciousness can't
supervene on abstract computation +  concrete implementation.

I would say it does. If you agree with my answer to Russell on
supervenience, that should be clear.
Indeed you can see MGA as proving that IF my consciousness supervenes
on abstract computation + concrete implementation then my
consciousness supervenes on abstract computation only. Concrete
implementations become explainable in term of relative abstract
implementations (kind of things you can easily translated in term of
the phi_i and the W_i, and from that, in pure arithmetic).

I can
see that Joseph's refutation misses the mark because the issue is that
the replaying of a recording, whether on a screen or within the
original mechanism, performs no computations. But why cannot the
materialist/computationalist merely counter that Alice *is* a zombie
during the playback of the movie, because the required instantiation
of  a computation is absent?

I tend to agree. but most people will not because they define the
zombie explicitly by an entity behaving like a human *in all*
situations, so that whatever they are, they handle the
counterfactuals. But accepting your sense of zombie, that I am
guessing, I am OK for saying that Alice, or any appearance of a person
in a movie can be seen as a sort of zombie.

Sure, he is committed to consciousness of
the machine if the physical activity is identical, but in the playback
of the film, the activity is not identical, since the connections
between logic gates are broken and/or overridden by the *projected*
activity (be it 'lucky rays' or the film).

OK.

Although the sequence of
firings in the network is the same, the causal connection between
firings is removed - indeed this is the point: no calculation is being
carried out.

Indeed.

But a sequence of firings in a logic network is not the
entirety of that network's physical activity. Or rather, the physical
activity of the sequence is not sufficient to define its activity as a
computation. That requires the casual connection between firings to be
retained.

Imagine a domino computer. I can't remember where I heard this first
(maybe on this list somewhere), but we can imagine a network of
spring-

loaded dominos that are set up to spring back upright after a certain
time. By setting up rows of such dominos in a clever fashion, we can
use it to perform calculations. Let's say we perform a calculation
with a boolean output - either a domino at the end falls or it
doesn't. If we set up such a domino computer and push the first
domino, we initiate a causal chain reaction that performs the
calculation we have programmed it for. Now imagine we disable the
causality by gluing the dominos upright. Now imagine we have a set of
instructions telling us to lower and raise dominos in such and such a
sequence. Our instructions happen to tells us to raise and lower them
in exactly the sequence they would have if they had simply been pushed
without the glue. This could be a random set of instructions that just
happens to be the same (as per luck rays), or a description
(recording) of a previous actual run of the computer (as per movie
graph). This is a restatement of the MGA scenario. In that case, the
casual interaction between dominos has been removed, but the sequence
of 'firings' in the network is retained.

OK. This should help to get the conclusion that consciousness is not
supervening on the physical behavior of the dominoes, but on the
abstract relationship which makes them doing a computation. Given that
most people agree that consciousness is not a material substance, we
have no problem to attach consciousness to that abstract setting,
which includes the counterfactuals by the mathematical definition (of
computation).

Now the materialist-computationalist already believes in the odd
scenario of a consciousness instantiated by a computation in which the
steps of the computation are performed in different places in time and
space - eg one step in a calculation is performed in Sydney on one
machine in 2011 and the next is performed on another in Melbourne in
2012  (local examples rather than Brussels-Amsterdam!). It is still a
potentially conscious calculation if a causal connection between
computational steps is retained.

Yes.

Remove the causality from the
scenario and it becomes meaningless and absurd - otherwise
consciousnesses would arise between all kinds of  unrelated things.

OK.

A
bit of half written code on my computer in Melbourne could be
```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 30 Dec 2011, at 16:18, David Nyman wrote:

On 30 December 2011 12:07, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

What is a consciousness apart from its content?

That's a good question. May be it is cosmic consciousness, or pure
consciousness of pure consciousness, or perhaps the innate
consciousness of
the pre-löbian universal machine. Of course we lack identification
criterium
for consciousness, and my point was more logical than assertative,
in the
frame of MGA's alleged refutations. I hope this will be clarified
in my
answer to Russell on supervenience. I will be occupied those next
days, so I

This interesting comment resonates with today's early morning
ruminations (a pernicious habit I apparently share with Descartes!).
computationalism and something like Zuse's or Schmidhuber's.  If I
have understood these latter ideas, they postulate a particular
digital machine as somehow ontologically privileged, this UM then
providing a unique basis for all subsequent computational development.
In the process the primitive UM must emulate infinities of other UMs,
but as all this computation ultimately supervenes on the activity of
the primitive UM, ontologically speaking it is solus ipse, and all
points of view must therefore be referenced to it.

Yes. It is still physicalism, but digital and computationalist. They
single out a particular universal (or not) history. It is open, I
think, if those universal story are robust, that is, contained a
universal dovetailer. By MGA that does not matter, if there is program
for the physical reality, to get both the qualia and the quanta in the
self-referentially correct way, you still have to justify its
existence from the mind-body arithmetical problem (and thus the modal
logics of self-reference, the machine interview, ...).

Digital physicalists are still cheating by copying Nature. So they
miss the whole psychological and theological side of the (comp) truth.

This idea seems to possess some nice features (for example with
respect to an ultimate reference point for who am I? questions), but
one might object that it originates too late in the computational
food chain.  After all, computation is itself reducible to more
fundamental combinatorial relations, so by what principle is some
particular UM - itself a complex combinatorial entity - supposed to
bootstrap itself into primitive existence?  Perhaps such an idea puts
the computational cart before the arithmetical horse.

Quantum computation might have violated Church thesis, after all. So
people can still speculate on hidden variable, and selection
principle to avoid the very big many dreams matrix. It seems to me
that QM shows on the contrary how deep we are already embedded in, as
comp suggested too.

And is the
primitive UM itself supposed to supervene on (i.e. be uniquely
anchored to) a primitively-physical machine?  If so, would this
supervenience claim be vulnerable to an MGA-type of refutation?

Once you fix a UM, you get them all. And the laws of physics should be
independent of the initial choice. You are right, digital physics get
a sort of conceptual problem if taken too naively. I think it is just
inconsistent. Digital physics implies comp, but comp entails that
physics cannot a priori be digital. In particular the appearance of
primitive matter is not really Turing emulable, because it is the
result of first person statistics on infinities of computation. The
distribution might be computable though.

But in any case your comment above about the innate consciousness of
the pre-löbian universal machine is intriguing.  ISTM that in the end
epistemology and ontology must come to one thing: whatever we know is
ultimately a self-reflection of whatever we are.  Whatever we are is
both unique and multitudinous, a One that through
self-differentiation and self-combination explodes into combinatorial
universality.  And from that explosion the many are born and suffer.

That's why progress can only be harm reduction. I think.

Je vous souhaite une très heureuse nouvelle année.

Cheers,

Bruno

On 29 Dec 2011, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/29/2011 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 12:10:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But I still fail to see what you mean by swapping two
consciousness.
In this case we have that the consciousness of [Tommy and
Samantha]

supervenes (weakly) on the physical activity in the classroom (to
change them, we have to change something physical in the
classroom),

in the same manner than the consciousness of Bruno and Russell
supervenes on the (phsyical, here) execution of the UD. That is
what

is used in the argument.

Bruno

We have two conscious states (Tommy and Samantha)

It might be the same consciousness, with ```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On Thu, Dec 29, 2011 at 9:47 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

Which computation?  I don't see any computation in the projection of the
computation-movie. The Boolean graph nodes are broken. The light patterns
is exactly the same, with the boolean graph turned, or not, upside down.
You argument seems to rely on non relevant (with respect to the possible
computation) idiosyncracies of this thought experience implementation. I
will think about a version of MGA making this more obvious.

OK, I think I see where my error lies. I thought the absurdity arose later
in the argument than it actually does. I see that by my reasoning we would
have conscious supervening on the particular physical system and not the
computation itself, which would contradict comp. If we extract the
computation from the glass/node system in the form of the film, then by
comp consciousness should supervene on the film, when clearly it cannot. Is
that roughly what you are saying?

It *does *matter for the computation what the light lands on.

But what is the computation in this case?

This doesn't violate 323, or comp. It means that the whole system
(crystal/glass+film) must be taken into account in your analysis.

The whole system is considered, and then changed in a way which does not
change the physical activity, except for operating nodes which are
retreived, and this to show that the physical activity does not implement
the computation, but is only a mimicking of non relevant appearances
associated accidentally with the original computation.

It is no better than taking half of the brain and ignoring the other half.
It isn't a matter of substitution level.

OK. But you have to explain me the role of the broken node, in the
computation, or even in the light patterns. You might try, as an exercise
to refute your own argument by changing the original device.

Let me restate my concern: Consciousness supervenes on the optical
graph+the recording, *even when the nodes are completely disconnected. *It
is true that most of the work is being done by the recording, but not all
of the work. The optical graph still matters, and the physical activity
of the system is not solely provided by the recording, as it still depends
on how the projected light interacts (physically) with the glass/crystal
surface.

But this is no more relevant in term of the computation, which is
supposed to be a copy of the brain processing at the right level or below.

There is a point in the argument at which you ignore the glass/crystal
system and focus solely on the movie/recording, claiming that Alice's
consciousness supervenes on the movie/recording. But this is false. *At
no point *does Alice's consciousness supervene on the recording, *not
even *when the nodes are completely disconnected.

Yes. That's why it is a reductio ad absurdum.

Its a reductio ad absurdum only if you artificially ignore the
interaction between the projected light and the crystal medium and lasers.
Because consciousness supervenes on crystal/glass/nodes+film, it is not
meaningful to make this move.

What is removed does not change the light pattern. The nodes are broken
and play no role in that computation, in case we could find one (as opposed
to find just a description of a computation, for which the nodes are also
irrelevant).

Consciousness changes do not imply film changes (even though the converse
may well be true). You have isolated a subsystem from the machine, mistaken
this subsystem for being sufficient for consciousness to supervene on --
little wonder an absurd conclusion follows!

I could because all this is supposed to be done below the substitution
level.

I understand that, but I don't understand how it addresses my point.

If the boolean graph is no more working, to insist we don't remove the
nodes gives them a special role not accounted in original computation,
which can be said to exist (relatively to us) by the fact the nodes did
operate the relevant elementary computable steps defining the (relative)
implementation of the computation. The role you give to the node, for
making the projection conscious seems magical and unrelated to the original
computation.

I am trying to think of an analogy to another system which would make my
argument clearer (and in the process learning how tricky the concept of
supervenience can be).

Actually, I do the same. I search a system where I can make it clearer
why the idiosyncrasies of the movie-graph are simpler to evacuate.
But in the present case, it seems rather obvious to me that the absurdity
is already there, before replacing the glass+smoke by a usual screen. There
argument to make that absurd.

I am not familiar with the stroboscopic argument.

It is an argument used to show (if that was necessary) that a movie ```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On Dec 31, 4:36 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 30 Dec 2011, at 03:10, Pierz wrote:

This thread has been extremely helpful to me in terms of getting to
the heart of this problem and the whole issue of supervenience - thank
you Joseph for your clarification of the meaning of the term and for
your succinct and clear summary of the MGA, and to David for the nice
clarification of the 'qua materia'/'qua computation' distinction. But
I have yet to see why the MGA proves that consciousness can't
supervene on abstract computation +  concrete implementation.

I would say it does. If you agree with my answer to Russell on
supervenience, that should be clear.
Indeed you can see MGA as proving that IF my consciousness supervenes
on abstract computation + concrete implementation then my
consciousness supervenes on abstract computation only. Concrete
implementations become explainable in term of relative abstract
implementations (kind of things you can easily translated in term of
the phi_i and the W_i, and from that, in pure arithmetic).

I can
see that Joseph's refutation misses the mark because the issue is that
the replaying of a recording, whether on a screen or within the
original mechanism, performs no computations. But why cannot the
materialist/computationalist merely counter that Alice *is* a zombie
during the playback of the movie, because the required instantiation
of  a computation is absent?

I tend to agree. but most people will not because they define the
zombie explicitly by an entity behaving like a human *in all*
situations, so that whatever they are, they handle the
counterfactuals. But accepting your sense of zombie, that I am
guessing, I am OK for saying that Alice, or any appearance of a person
in a movie can be seen as a sort of zombie.

OK, yes my terms are sometimes less than rigorous, sorry about that. I
suppose I just mean not conscious in this instance. I do wonder
though (as an aside), whether you couldn't regard a recording as
'crystallising' in a sense the consciousness it records. If a
consciousness is abstract, then the recording continues to represent
that abstraction in the same way a body/brain represents the
abstraction. I heard recently about a condition called Transient
Global Amnesia in which people temporarily lose the ability to record
new memories beyond say the last minute, and forget years of their
history. In such an event, these people behave repetitively, much like
a recording (a 'broken record'), as if the same conscious state is
recycled over and over. Are they zombies? No, and you can easily
enough say they are just a computer stuck in a computational loop,
but  if consciousness is abstract, then a repeated calculation
represents the same conscious state, and the physical thing performing
the calculation is just a type of window onto that abstraction, just
as the recording is a window onto the abstraction. In that sense a
recording might be conscious, in the same way the person in the mirror
is as conscious as the person looking into it.

Sure, he is committed to consciousness of
the machine if the physical activity is identical, but in the playback
of the film, the activity is not identical, since the connections
between logic gates are broken and/or overridden by the *projected*
activity (be it 'lucky rays' or the film).

OK.

Although the sequence of
firings in the network is the same, the causal connection between
firings is removed - indeed this is the point: no calculation is being
carried out.

Indeed.

But a sequence of firings in a logic network is not the
entirety of that network's physical activity. Or rather, the physical
activity of the sequence is not sufficient to define its activity as a
computation. That requires the casual connection between firings to be
retained.

Imagine a domino computer. I can't remember where I heard this first
(maybe on this list somewhere), but we can imagine a network of
spring-
loaded dominos that are set up to spring back upright after a certain
time. By setting up rows of such dominos in a clever fashion, we can
use it to perform calculations. Let's say we perform a calculation
with a boolean output - either a domino at the end falls or it
doesn't. If we set up such a domino computer and push the first
domino, we initiate a causal chain reaction that performs the
calculation we have programmed it for. Now imagine we disable the
causality by gluing the dominos upright. Now imagine we have a set of
instructions telling us to lower and raise dominos in such and such a
sequence. Our instructions happen to tells us to raise and lower them
in exactly the sequence they would have if they had simply been pushed
without the glue. This could be a random set of instructions that just
happens to be the same (as per luck rays), or a description
(recording) of a previous actual run of the computer (as per movie
```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 12/30/2011 12:51 AM, Pierz wrote:

On Dec 30, 6:35 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote:
You think it is ludicrous that a Mars Rover is programmed to monitor the state
of its
battery, the temperature of its motors, the amount of memory available for
pictures, etc?

Brent

sigh  Let's not go down that boringly overtrodden path, but agree to
disagree on what constitutes consciousness.

sigh The phrase was internal perception not consciousness.

Brent

I disagree with David
Deutsch that we could run a conscious entity on our laptop computer if
we only understood consciousness better, but I agree with him that we
do *not* understand it, and the Turing test is a bad one. But, as I
stated in a remark to Bruno above, those who see no mind-body duality
problem in the first place will never be persuaded of its existence,
just as I will never be persuaded that wiring a sensor in the Mars
Rover makes the machine conscious of its environment.

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 12:10:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But I still fail to see what you mean by swapping two consciousness.
In this case we have that the consciousness of [Tommy and Samantha]
supervenes (weakly) on the physical activity in the classroom (to
change them, we have to change something physical in the classroom),
in the same manner than the consciousness of Bruno and Russell
supervenes on the (phsyical, here) execution of the UD. That is what
is used in the argument.

Bruno

We have two conscious states (Tommy and Samantha)

It might be the same consciousness, with different content.

that clearly
differ.

The personal experience are disconnected.

They both cannot supervene on the same physical state.

In my weak sense, they both supervene on the same physical state of
the room, or universe, or even arithmetic.

That is
by the definition of supervenience.

The intuitive definition of supervenience is that A supervenes on B if
we cannot have an A-difference without a B-difference.
If A supervenes on B, it supervene trivially on a disjoint union of B
and C, because we still cannot have an A-difference without a (B union
C difference).

Therefore they both cannot
supervene on the same classroom.

In that case I would have said that Tommy's consciousness supervenes
*only* on Tommy's brain (but I avoid this because we don't know and
cannot know what is our real generalized brain).

Perhaps the word swapping is misleading to you - I didn't mean
anything particularly profound by it.

I have still no idea of what you mean by that. Suppose that you tell
me that Bruno and Russell's consciousness swap every minutes, since
six months. What would that mean? I don't see how we could be aware of
such things, nor how we could verify this in any third (and first)
person way. And this makes your argument (physicalist, for the sake of
the reasoning) against the consciousness instantiated by the
(concrete) UD dubious. I think. I mean that this critics on MGA fails,
at least by lack of clarity (for me).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 28 Dec 2011, at 21:43, David Nyman wrote:

On 28 December 2011 19:43, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

What UDA1-7 and MGA do at once, is to show that the notion of
primitive
matter is spurious in the comp frame, but also (mainly perhaps)
that physics
is branch of number theory/computer science (more precisely: of
machine's
theology). The physical reality is not a mathematical reality among
others,

it is more like the border of some mathematical reality.

Both a physicalist and an arithmeticalist have primitive objects
(number,
particle) but also elementary dynamic (laws of addition/
multiplication,
forces). And from this derives higher order constructs, some being
able to

develop self-reference and first person views.

But computationalism is not arithmeticalism. It does not reduce
physics as a
mathematical theory, but as a precise machine's theological
phenomenon.

Yes, I have always had the strong feeling that the self-reference of
experience to a localised point-of-view must somehow be fundamental,
or at least very deep, not circumstantial or trivial.  Since
childhood, I've always been puzzled by questions like why am I me and
not you?, which just made most other people smile or frown.  Usually
they would point at two objects (my body and theirs) and say with
finality well, that's you and this is me.

I was, unwillingly, more cruel. I exigate from my parents a proof,
before going to bed, that I will wake up being me, and not someone
else. That 'consciousness swapping' possibility terrified me, until I
discover it makes no sense or it makes to much sense: I do wake up as
you, every day, as you know, but don't remember.

With comp the question is non sensical, like we can introspect ourself
on the WM duplication, and understand that both the one in M and the
one in W will feel like if a miracle occurs: they get one bit of
information from the sky! Why am I the one in Moscow and not the one
in Washington?

However even then I felt - and more so now - that the real subject
of personal identity was not to be so easily characterised.  ISTM that
a straightforward physicalist approach - even a mathematical one - can
provide no real insight into this question of who or what am I? and
in effect must either assume, trivialise, ignore or deny it.  In
contrast to this, assuming CTM, the UDA gives a step-wise
demonstration of the way the indispensable role played by observation
leads inexorably to indeterminism in the localisation of the
first-person, independent (until the MGA) of issues of ultimate
ontological primitivity.  This is already a powerful indication that
there is something computationally real in play over and above the
structures of matter that characterise an observer's point-of-view.

OK.

So I believe you are right that computational reality must be
characterised primarily in such a way as to account for the
localisation of observers and the emergence of appearances, as opposed
to merely substituting an imaginary god's-eye description of
materiality.  Unfortunately (?) this also implies that reality must
then be Vastly larger and perhaps even more daunting than we could
have imagined.

Well said!

In fact it is like with the Mandelbrot set, which looks like a little
spot, but zooming in shows the devils in the pattern details. Like
with comp, from outside you don't need a lot (numbers, +, *), but from
inside it escapes all the bounds. The whole of observable (and even
non observable) physical reality is just a part or a border of that
inside. We can expect surprises.

PS I will comment other posts asap. Probably tomorrow.

D'accord.  J'attend avec un grand plaisir vos observations.

Merci,

Bruno

On 28 Dec 2011, at 14:39, David Nyman wrote:

On 28 December 2011 06:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

Consequently, it would have to be the case that any physical
computer (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
epistemological properties before it could begin to compute
anything further.  This should seem, to say the least, odd.

I'm not sure on why this should be odd.  The physical world is a
model we
created to explain things and so it's not odd that epistemology
preceded
ontology.  First we learn some facts and then we build a model to
explain

them.  The model defines our ontology.

My suggestion was that any oddness appears only if one tries to make
sense of CTM in terms of some sort of dual-property view rooted in
primitive materiality.  As Bruno says, this often seems to be at
least an implicit assumption.  But even in it own terms, such a
theory
can only isolate computation (and hence anything consequential on
it)

in terms of its epistemological properties, because the very
object-relations (e.g. those present in computers or brains), in
terms

of which any coherent appeal to computation can be made, are
```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 12/29/2011 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 12:10:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But I still fail to see what you mean by swapping two consciousness.
In this case we have that the consciousness of [Tommy and Samantha]
supervenes (weakly) on the physical activity in the classroom (to
change them, we have to change something physical in the classroom),
in the same manner than the consciousness of Bruno and Russell
supervenes on the (phsyical, here) execution of the UD. That is what
is used in the argument.

Bruno

We have two conscious states (Tommy and Samantha)

It might be the same consciousness, with different content.

???  That would be two different conscious states.  What is a consciousness apart from its
content?

Brent

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 28 Dec 2011, at 06:28, Joseph Knight wrote:

On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:

On 26 Dec 2011, at 05:47, Joseph Knight wrote:

On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:

On 23 Dec 2011, at 20:16, Joseph Knight wrote:

The same problem arises in Part 2. Bruno claims that we are
forced to accept that Alice’s consciousness supervenes on the film.

No. On the projection of the pellicle on the Boolean graph, and
then on the Boolean graph missing part. The idea is that we built
again the right physical activity, with the projection of the film
playing the role of the cosmic rays.

What is a pellicle? (Sorry) I understand this part, however. My
objections arise later.

A film. (But in french film is for cinema (movie?)).

OK, there was no confusion.

OK.

but (film + optical graph) is certainly changed, and Alice’s
dream turns out differently (if it occurs at all).

With comp + sup-phys, it can't.

Why? If we assume sup+phys, then some changes in the physical
system on which the dream supervenes certainly will lead to
changes in the dream.

I don't think so. Remember that we suppose comp (and sup-phys). So
we already agree that we can change the physical implementation if
it runs the computation at the correct level. So, we can change the
physical implementation as we wish, below the substitution level
without changing the first person private consciousness.

I think I wasn't clear here. I didn't mean changes in the
particular physical system consciousness is supervening on -- of
course by comp that doesn't matter. I meant that, assuming sup-phys
on physical system X, there must exist some changes in X which lead
to changes in consciousness.

OK.

Bruno isolates the film and thus reaches his apparent
contradictions. But this is not a permissible move.

I think that the term film could have different meaning in
french and english. But the film here means the projection of the
pellicle on the glass/crystal medium. This one is never broken. It
is a process which takes time, and occur in some place.

Not only is the definition of supervenience violated, but his
principle of irrelevant subparts is violated as well – for the
optical graph is not irrelevant for the execution of Alice’s
consciousness.

Of course, but once we put away the nodes, the physical activity
corresponding to the computation are not changed. The optical
graph becomes irrelevant for the physical activity on which
Alice's consciousness is supposed to supervene, by comp+sup-phys.

This is where my problem lies. Of course the physical activity of
the system is changed when you (invalidly) remove the optical
graph from the system. It is far from irrelevant. For example,
what mechanism causes the light to triggers the lasers? There must
be some internal mechanisms at work as well. The nodes aren't
connected to one another, but it matters whether or not the
recording is being projected on an optical graph, vs. a concrete
wall, vs. movie screen

Why? The relevant physical activity is the same.
Obviously I agree with you (the projection of the film does not
instantiate consciousness). The point is that if comp and sup-phys
are maintained, and if 323 is correct, then there is nothing
different from projecting the film on the glass crystal with the
boolean laser graph removed and a wall.

I have no problem with 323. My argument is that consciousness never
supervenes on the film/movie/recording.

I agree with that. If only because there are no more any computation
done in time and space (the original abstract computation does not
disappear, of course, so with comp, we will have to attach
consciousness to it, and not to its particular concrete
implementation.

So there is something different between projecting the film on the
glass crystal, and the wall. The relevant physical activity, in the
two cases (glass/crystal vs wall), is not the same. In the first
case (and not the second) the light interacts with the crystal
medium and triggers the lasers. How can you argue that this
interaction is irrelevant and can be removed?

Because that special activity has nothing to do with the original
computation. If it were, I could not have said yes to the doctor at
the start. Once the boolean graph is remove, we just get a special
weird screen. And the absurdity is still there: there are no
computation done when we project on that weird sort of screen.

You can still say yes to the doctor. But that activity does have
something to do with the computation. Suppose the film were
projected upside down, or equivalently that the boolean graph were
turned upside down (no change in the physical state of the film).
Unless we assume some incredible symmetry in the layout of the graph
(contradicting comp), there would most ```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 12/29/2011 11:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I was, unwillingly, more cruel. I exigate from my parents a proof, before going to bed,
that I will wake up being me, and not someone else. That 'consciousness swapping'
possibility terrified me, until I discover it makes no sense or it makes to much sense:
I do wake up as you, every day, as you know, but don't remember.

Greg Egan has written a nice little short story about a person who wakes up in a different
body everyday.  It's in his book Axiomatics.

Brent

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On Thu, Dec 29, 2011 at 05:47:07PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:

They both cannot supervene on the same physical state.

In my weak sense, they both supervene on the same physical state of
the room, or universe, or even arithmetic.

of supervenience.

That is
by the definition of supervenience.

The intuitive definition of supervenience is that A supervenes on B
if we cannot have an A-difference without a B-difference.

Yes.

If A supervenes on B, it supervene trivially on a disjoint union of
B and C, because we still cannot have an A-difference without a (B
union C difference).

No - the Tommy vs Samantha example is a counter example:

Let T sup B and S sup C.

But T and C are different conscious states, so cannot both supervene
on B u C.

Therefore they both cannot
supervene on the same classroom.

In that case I would have said that Tommy's consciousness supervenes
*only* on Tommy's brain (but I avoid this because we don't know and
cannot know what is our real generalized brain).

Whatever the generalised brains are, the foregoing discussion
implies that the intersection of two generalised brains must be empty.

Perhaps the word swapping is misleading to you - I didn't mean
anything particularly profound by it.

I have still no idea of what you mean by that. Suppose that you tell
me that Bruno and Russell's consciousness swap every minutes, since
six months. What would that mean? I don't see how we could be aware
of such things, nor how we could verify this in any third (and
first) person way.

Nor do I. Not even a putative God could be aware, I would think. I
wasn't suggesting such a thing, anyway. I was thinking more in terms of first
consider Tommy's consiousness then afterwards think of
Samantha's. Thus you are swapping the focus of your attention.

And this makes your argument (physicalist, for
the sake of the reasoning) against the consciousness instantiated by
the (concrete) UD dubious. I think. I mean that this critics on MGA
fails, at least by lack of clarity (for me).

The critique was against your step of unfolding the multiverse into a
single universe by dovetailing. You then asserted that the
consciousness supervened on the dovetailer, which as we've been
through above, cannot be the case.

Of course, you may refine your argument by dovetailing just the
generalised brain, and not its environment which contains other
brains. But in this case, I would point out that eliminating the
environment may well render the brain unconsious. There is certainly
evidence from sensory depreivation experiments that this might happen.

Or maybe you have a different way of emulating a multiverse without
dovetailing?

Cheers

--

Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```Of course, when consciousness is taken seriously into account, we can
sense some incoherence, but empirically, this is the hard part to
convey, and without MGA/Maudlin, I have not been able to convince of
the frank incoherence.

And you've been successful with the MGA? I am philosophically entirely
on your side with regards to this intuition of incoherence, and know
well the difficulty/impossibility of getting a materialist to
apprehend it. But has the logic of MGA actually ever converted a
materialist? Seems to me people are entrenched in their positions on
such matters and weapons of mere logic - especially complex logic -
will never move them. Even weapons of empirical demonstration take a
long time to persuade people - paradigms do not die easily. This is
not to say I am yet completely persuaded by the MGA either - I'll post
my doubts/questions as a separate reply here.

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```This thread has been extremely helpful to me in terms of getting to
the heart of this problem and the whole issue of supervenience - thank
you Joseph for your clarification of the meaning of the term and for
your succinct and clear summary of the MGA, and to David for the nice
clarification of the 'qua materia'/'qua computation' distinction. But
I have yet to see why the MGA proves that consciousness can't
supervene on abstract computation +  concrete implementation. I can
see that Joseph's refutation misses the mark because the issue is that
the replaying of a recording, whether on a screen or within the
original mechanism, performs no computations. But why cannot the
materialist/computationalist merely counter that Alice *is* a zombie
during the playback of the movie, because the required instantiation
of  a computation is absent? Sure, he is committed to consciousness of
the machine if the physical activity is identical, but in the playback
of the film, the activity is not identical, since the connections
between logic gates are broken and/or overridden by the *projected*
activity (be it 'lucky rays' or the film). Although the sequence of
firings in the network is the same, the causal connection between
firings is removed - indeed this is the point: no calculation is being
carried out. But a sequence of firings in a logic network is not the
entirety of that network's physical activity. Or rather, the physical
activity of the sequence is not sufficient to define its activity as a
computation. That requires the casual connection between firings to be
retained.

Imagine a domino computer. I can't remember where I heard this first
(maybe on this list somewhere), but we can imagine a network of spring-
loaded dominos that are set up to spring back upright after a certain
time. By setting up rows of such dominos in a clever fashion, we can
use it to perform calculations. Let's say we perform a calculation
with a boolean output - either a domino at the end falls or it
doesn't. If we set up such a domino computer and push the first
domino, we initiate a causal chain reaction that performs the
calculation we have programmed it for. Now imagine we disable the
causality by gluing the dominos upright. Now imagine we have a set of
instructions telling us to lower and raise dominos in such and such a
sequence. Our instructions happen to tells us to raise and lower them
in exactly the sequence they would have if they had simply been pushed
without the glue. This could be a random set of instructions that just
happens to be the same (as per luck rays), or a description
(recording) of a previous actual run of the computer (as per movie
graph). This is a restatement of the MGA scenario. In that case, the
casual interaction between dominos has been removed, but the sequence
of 'firings' in the network is retained.

Now the materialist-computationalist already believes in the odd
scenario of a consciousness instantiated by a computation in which the
steps of the computation are performed in different places in time and
space - eg one step in a calculation is performed in Sydney on one
machine in 2011 and the next is performed on another in Melbourne in
2012  (local examples rather than Brussels-Amsterdam!). It is still a
potentially conscious calculation if a causal connection between
computational steps is retained. Remove the causality from the
scenario and it becomes meaningless and absurd - otherwise
consciousnesses would arise between all kinds of  unrelated things. A
bit of half written code on my computer in Melbourne could be
completed by some half written code on your computer in Sydney, even
though the computers and the programmers never interacted. And of
course, everything physical is Turing emulable, so everything physical
performs (at least trivially) calculations. Consciousness would arise
between all the random motions of particles that could be regarded as
performing a calculation *if* they were causally connected. Madness.

So, given that causality is physical (even if such causality is highly
indirect), then comp-phys can argue that Alice is a zombie in the
projected film scenario because of the severance of causality between
the activity of logic nodes. The computer no longer instantiates a
physical computation and comp-phys requires both a computation and a
physical instantiation.

Personally, I think the scenario of a physically atomised computation
does comp-phys in anyway. The notion of physical activity seems
stretched beyond breaking point when we extend it to the sequence of
causes that connects the steps of such a computation. No further
reductio ad absurdum is required. But the problem with any reductio ad
absurdum is that different people find different things absurd, and
seeing as comp-phys accepts the possibility of a temporally and
spatially atomised, conscious computer, so it can use the same
principle to refute the MGA. Sure comp+phys forces us into absurdity,
but the absurdity has ```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 12/29/2011 4:00 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

The critique was against your step of unfolding the multiverse into a
single universe by dovetailing. You then asserted that the
consciousness supervened on the dovetailer, which as we've been
through above, cannot be the case.

Of course, you may refine your argument by dovetailing just the
generalised brain, and not its environment which contains other
brains. But in this case, I would point out that eliminating the
environment may well render the brain unconsious. There is certainly
evidence from sensory depreivation experiments that this might happen.

Or at least the conscious states form a loop and the consciousness resembles
that of a rock.

Brent

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 12/29/2011 4:11 PM, Pierz wrote:

As I have remarked before, I don't think the problem of consciousness will be
solved, it
will just come to be seen as an uninteresting question.  Instead we will talk
design the ethics module in a robot or what internal perceptions to provide.

Well, I utterly disagree with that. The problem of consciousness is
already an 'uninteresting problem' to many people (seemingly you are
one such person), but so long as it remains unsolved it will be
interesting to some conscious beings! And the notion of programming
the internal perceptions of a robot (as opposed to mere input-output
relations) is ludicrous without a solution to the problem.

You think it is ludicrous that a Mars Rover is programmed to monitor the state of its
battery, the temperature of its motors, the amount of memory available for pictures, etc?

Brent

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On 28 December 2011 06:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

Consequently, it would have to be the case that any physical
computer (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
epistemological properties before it could begin to compute
anything further.  This should seem, to say the least, odd.

I'm not sure on why this should be odd.  The physical world is a model we
created to explain things and so it's not odd that epistemology preceded
ontology.  First we learn some facts and then we build a model to explain
them.  The model defines our ontology.

My suggestion was that any oddness appears only if one tries to make
sense of CTM in terms of some sort of dual-property view rooted in
primitive materiality.  As Bruno says, this often seems to be at
least an implicit assumption.  But even in it own terms, such a theory
can only isolate computation (and hence anything consequential on it)
in terms of its epistemological properties, because the very
object-relations (e.g. those present in computers or brains), in terms
of which any coherent appeal to computation can be made, are
themselves nothing other than computationally-constructed
abstractions.  Consequently this seems (at least to me) to be in
practice pretty much indistinguishable from Bruno's characterisation
of the reversal of matter-computation, since, given that CTM
mandates at the outset that all possibility of engagement with matter
is fundamentally epistemological, there seems to be no remaining
motivation to appeal to inconsequential primitively-material
properties, except as a sort of religious commitment.

Since this seems quite consistent with what you say above, I'm not
really surprised it doesn't seem odd to you.

David

On 12/27/2011 4:59 AM, David Nyman wrote:

The frank incoherence comment was directed towards the case where,
rejecting any form of dualism, one grasps the single primitive horn
of the dilemma in the form of a primitively-physical monism, rather
than the  arithmetical alternative.  But for those willing to
contemplate some sort of property dualism (which is not always made
explicit), there is, as you say, no immediately obvious contradiction.

My own reasoning on this latter option has focused on the unquestioned
acceptance of  composite material structure which seems to underpin
the notion of a primitively physical machine.  As you once put it
ontological reduction entails ontological elimination.  IOW, the
reduction of materiality to a causally-complete micro-physical
mechanism automatically entails that macro-physical composites must
be considered fundamentally to be epistemological, not ontological,
realities. Micro-physics qua materia entails no such additional
ontological levels of organisation.

Consequently, it would have to be the case that any physical
computer (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
epistemological properties before it could begin to compute
anything further.  This should seem, to say the least, odd.

I'm not sure on why this should be odd.  The physical world is a model we
created to explain things and so it's not odd that epistemology preceded
ontology.  First we learn some facts and then we build a model to explain
them.  The model defines our ontology.

Brent

It might
even seem to be indistinguishable, in the final analysis, from
computational supervenience.

David

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 12/28/2011 5:39 AM, David Nyman wrote:

Consequently, it would have to be the case that any physical
computer (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
epistemological properties before it could begin to compute
anything further.  This should seem, to say the least, odd.

I'm not sure on why this should be odd.  The physical world is a model we
created to explain things and so it's not odd that epistemology preceded
ontology.  First we learn some facts and then we build a model to explain
them.  The model defines our ontology.

My suggestion was that any oddness appears only if one tries to make
sense of CTM in terms of some sort of dual-property view rooted in
primitive materiality.  As Bruno says, this often seems to be at
least an implicit assumption.  But even in it own terms, such a theory
can only isolate computation (and hence anything consequential on it)
in terms of its epistemological properties, because the very
object-relations (e.g. those present in computers or brains), in terms
of which any coherent appeal to computation can be made, are
themselves nothing other than computationally-constructed
abstractions.  Consequently this seems (at least to me) to be in
practice pretty much indistinguishable from Bruno's characterisation
of the reversal of matter-computation, since, given that CTM
mandates at the outset that all possibility of engagement with matter
is fundamentally epistemological, there seems to be no remaining
motivation to appeal to inconsequential primitively-material
properties, except as a sort of religious commitment.

But as Peter D. Jones points out primitive matter isn't inconsequential.  It's consequent
is realization.  Being material is the property of existing in contrast to those things
that don't exist.  Of course this is not a popular view on an Everything list, but it's
consistent with our epistemological experience that some things happen and some don't,
some things exist and others don't.

Brent

Since this seems quite consistent with what you say above, I'm not
really surprised it doesn't seem odd to you.

David

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On 28 December 2011 17:01, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

But as Peter D. Jones points out primitive matter isn't inconsequential.
It's consequent is realization.  Being material is the property of existing
in contrast to those things that don't exist.  Of course this is not a
popular view on an Everything list, but it's consistent with our
epistemological experience that some things happen and some don't, some
things exist and others don't.

I'm not sure that he was arguing purely in terms of CTM - I think he
is agnostic on that particular theory of mind (as indeed am I).
However, if one does restrict one's reasoning carefully to what is
consistent with CTM, it's surely questionable whether this move is
still open.  Once one fixes seriously on computation as the
supervenience basis for epistemological properties (ignoring
crypto-eliminativist sophistries about mere seeming) is one any
longer in a position to appeal to the content of experience as the
natural limit to the extent of computational existence?  Does it
seem quite as reasonable to argue that only certain computations are
permitted to exist per se because we conjecture that they are the
only ones being computed by the particular macroscopic physical
machines which happen to uniquely and primitively exist?  Particularly
since these particular machines require to be epistemologically
assembled for the purpose by from a kit of
inaccessible-but-even-more-primitively existing micro-physical parts?

As I say, I'm personally agnostic about CTM, although in the past, I
have been a vigorous opponent of the idea.  I was much impressed by
Searle and his Chinese Room argument, which made it perfectly obvious
that computation doesn't (indeed doesn't need to) exist in a
primitively material universe, and hence couldn't be a candidate for
hosting anything as real as consciousness.  However, especially in
the absence of credible alternatives, if we do treat the consequences
of CTM with proper seriousness it now seems to me that something like
Bruno's proposal would have to be the case - because computationalism
taken seriously opens up mathematical reality in a way that seems hard
to confine within somethingist limits.

David

On 12/28/2011 5:39 AM, David Nyman wrote:

Consequently, it would have to be the case that any physical
computer (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
epistemological properties before it could begin to compute
anything further.  This should seem, to say the least, odd.

I'm not sure on why this should be odd.  The physical world is a model
we
created to explain things and so it's not odd that epistemology
preceded
ontology.  First we learn some facts and then we build a model to
explain
them.  The model defines our ontology.

My suggestion was that any oddness appears only if one tries to make
sense of CTM in terms of some sort of dual-property view rooted in
primitive materiality.  As Bruno says, this often seems to be at
least an implicit assumption.  But even in it own terms, such a theory
can only isolate computation (and hence anything consequential on it)
in terms of its epistemological properties, because the very
object-relations (e.g. those present in computers or brains), in terms
of which any coherent appeal to computation can be made, are
themselves nothing other than computationally-constructed
abstractions.  Consequently this seems (at least to me) to be in
practice pretty much indistinguishable from Bruno's characterisation
of the reversal of matter-computation, since, given that CTM
mandates at the outset that all possibility of engagement with matter
is fundamentally epistemological, there seems to be no remaining
motivation to appeal to inconsequential primitively-material
properties, except as a sort of religious commitment.

But as Peter D. Jones points out primitive matter isn't inconsequential.
It's consequent is realization.  Being material is the property of existing
in contrast to those things that don't exist.  Of course this is not a
popular view on an Everything list, but it's consistent with our
epistemological experience that some things happen and some don't, some
things exist and others don't.

Brent

Since this seems quite consistent with what you say above, I'm not
really surprised it doesn't seem odd to you.

David

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 12/28/2011 10:03 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 28 December 2011 17:01, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

But as Peter D. Jones points out primitive matter isn't inconsequential.
It's consequent is realization.  Being material is the property of existing
in contrast to those things that don't exist.  Of course this is not a
popular view on an Everything list, but it's consistent with our
epistemological experience that some things happen and some don't, some
things exist and others don't.

I'm not sure that he was arguing purely in terms of CTM - I think he
is agnostic on that particular theory of mind (as indeed am I).
However, if one does restrict one's reasoning carefully to what is
consistent with CTM, it's surely questionable whether this move is
still open.  Once one fixes seriously on computation as the
supervenience basis for epistemological properties (ignoring
crypto-eliminativist sophistries about mere seeming) is one any
longer in a position to appeal to the content of experience as the
natural limit to the extent of computational existence?  Does it
seem quite as reasonable to argue that only certain computations are
permitted to exist per se because we conjecture that they are the
only ones being computed by the particular macroscopic physical
machines which happen to uniquely and primitively exist?

That seems to implicitly assume computation is fundamental and asks why fundamental matter
only implements some of them.

Particularly
since these particular machines require to be epistemologically
assembled for the purpose by from a kit of
inaccessible-but-even-more-primitively existing micro-physical parts?

I think you're taking it backwards.  If primitive matter exists simply as a marker of what
exists and what doesn't, then it is our model of it that is epistemologically assembled
and the existence is independent of our descriptive model.  That's the common sense view
of the world.

As I say, I'm personally agnostic about CTM, although in the past, I
have been a vigorous opponent of the idea.  I was much impressed by
Searle and his Chinese Room argument, which made it perfectly obvious
that computation doesn't (indeed doesn't need to) exist in a
primitively material universe, and hence couldn't be a candidate for
hosting anything as real as consciousness.  However, especially in
the absence of credible alternatives, if we do treat the consequences
of CTM with proper seriousness it now seems to me that something like
Bruno's proposal would have to be the case - because computationalism
taken seriously opens up mathematical reality in a way that seems hard
to confine within somethingist limits.

But to take it seriously you have to assume that mathematics exists.  That it is not just
a set of logically conditional tautologies.

Brent

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On 28 December 2011 18:17, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

Once one fixes seriously on computation as the
supervenience basis for epistemological properties (ignoring
crypto-eliminativist sophistries about mere seeming) is one any
longer in a position to appeal to the content of experience as the
natural limit to the extent of computational existence?  Does it
seem quite as reasonable to argue that only certain computations are
permitted to exist per se because we conjecture that they are the
only ones being computed by the particular macroscopic physical
machines which happen to uniquely and primitively exist?

That seems to implicitly assume computation is fundamental and asks why
fundamental matter only implements some of them.

Surely a dual property approach to CTM must entail the assumption
that both computation and matter are somehow both fundamental, in the
sense of their both being distinctively real, though non-identical?
If so, it seems reasonable to pose such a question.

Particularly since these particular machines require to be epistemologically
assembled for the purpose by from a kit of
inaccessible-but-even-more-primitively existing micro-physical parts?

I think you're taking it backwards.  If primitive matter exists simply as a
marker of what exists and what doesn't, then it is our model of it that is
epistemologically assembled and the existence is independent of our
descriptive model.  That's the common sense view of the world.

Sure, but that independent existence does not spontaneously take the
form of conveniently classically isolated macroscopic digital machines
like brains (i.e. according to CTM).  That identification itself seems
to be a highly-complex epistemological derivative. So we find
ourselves proposing that a device, which requires our prior
epistemological participation to differentiate it from the physical
environment in general, is same device responsible for the performance
of that very process.

However, especially in
the absence of credible alternatives, if we do treat the consequences
of CTM with proper seriousness it now seems to me that something like
Bruno's proposal would have to be the case - because computationalism
taken seriously opens up mathematical reality in a way that seems hard
to confine within somethingist limits.

But to take it seriously you have to assume that mathematics exists.  That
it is not just a set of logically conditional tautologies.

Yes, but there it is: if consciousness is real, and computation is
taken seriously as its supervenience base, is there a coherent
alternative?  One could try to believe that matter is unconscious
unless in some relevant sense it is in the process of computing,
but, rearrange matter how you will, nothing apparently material will
have changed, nor need to.  Do we nevertheless feel justified in
saying that consciousness is a some sort of reality that comes and
goes just because of these rearrangements?

I agree that it is hard for us (Aristotelean bigots, as Bruno might
think) to take seriously the idea that mathematics exists.  Clearly,
our ideas about mathematics aren't what exist - at least, not as a
primitive basis of reality.  But does something primitive exist which
is consistent with our idea - our description - of mathematics: well,
why not?  After all, we are all too familiar with the unreasonable
effectiveness of mathematics in the physical sciences, and it seems to
become even more unreasonably effective the more science extends its
reach.  And it's not just in deep down in microphysical structure that
we seem to observe such uncanny effectiveness, but up there in the big
cosmological picture.  Everyone seems to be headed in the everything
direction with observer selection as the ultimate filter.

Still, all this may just be the thunder of the herd heading for some
theoretical abyss. I guess my judgement is still suspended.

David

On 12/28/2011 10:03 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 28 December 2011 17:01, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

But as Peter D. Jones points out primitive matter isn't inconsequential.
It's consequent is realization.  Being material is the property of
existing
in contrast to those things that don't exist.  Of course this is not a
popular view on an Everything list, but it's consistent with our
epistemological experience that some things happen and some don't, some
things exist and others don't.

I'm not sure that he was arguing purely in terms of CTM - I think he
is agnostic on that particular theory of mind (as indeed am I).
However, if one does restrict one's reasoning carefully to what is
consistent with CTM, it's surely questionable whether this move is
still open.  Once one fixes seriously on computation as the
supervenience basis for epistemological properties (ignoring
crypto-eliminativist sophistries about mere seeming) is one any
longer in a position to appeal to the content of experience as the
natural limit ```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 28 Dec 2011, at 14:39, David Nyman wrote:

On 28 December 2011 06:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

Consequently, it would have to be the case that any physical
computer (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
epistemological properties before it could begin to compute
anything further.  This should seem, to say the least, odd.

I'm not sure on why this should be odd.  The physical world is a
model we
created to explain things and so it's not odd that epistemology
preceded
ontology.  First we learn some facts and then we build a model to
explain

them.  The model defines our ontology.

My suggestion was that any oddness appears only if one tries to make
sense of CTM in terms of some sort of dual-property view rooted in
primitive materiality.  As Bruno says, this often seems to be at
least an implicit assumption.  But even in it own terms, such a theory
can only isolate computation (and hence anything consequential on it)
in terms of its epistemological properties, because the very
object-relations (e.g. those present in computers or brains), in terms
of which any coherent appeal to computation can be made, are
themselves nothing other than computationally-constructed
abstractions.  Consequently this seems (at least to me) to be in
practice pretty much indistinguishable from Bruno's characterisation
of the reversal of matter-computation, since, given that CTM
mandates at the outset that all possibility of engagement with matter
is fundamentally epistemological, there seems to be no remaining
motivation to appeal to inconsequential primitively-material
properties, except as a sort of religious commitment.

Since this seems quite consistent with what you say above, I'm not
really surprised it doesn't seem odd to you.

This is correct as an argument against primitive matter. At least it
makes sense.

But I am not sure it will address the case of the immaterialist
physicalist, on a type close to Tegmark.

What UDA1-7 and MGA do at once, is to show that the notion of
primitive matter is spurious in the comp frame, but also (mainly
perhaps) that physics is branch of number theory/computer science
(more precisely: of machine's theology). The physical reality is not a
mathematical reality among others, it is more like the border of some
mathematical reality.

Both a physicalist and an arithmeticalist have primitive objects
(number, particle) but also elementary dynamic (laws of addition/
multiplication, forces). And from this derives higher order
constructs, some being able to develop self-reference and first person
views.

But computationalism is not arithmeticalism. It does not reduce
physics as a mathematical theory, but as a precise machine's
theological phenomenon.

It explains, perhaps wrongly, the origin of observables and its
invariants. The physical supervenes on the border of numbers'
consciousness. So the reversal is both ontological (switch particles
--- numbers/programs) and epistemological (physics = science of the
universal numbers multiplying and fusing dreams).

*

I don't think the model defines the ontology, like Brent says. Our
models define our belief about what we are searching.

Bruno

PS I will comment other posts asap. Probably tomorrow.

David

On 12/27/2011 4:59 AM, David Nyman wrote:

The frank incoherence comment was directed towards the case where,
rejecting any form of dualism, one grasps the single primitive
horn

of the dilemma in the form of a primitively-physical monism, rather
than the  arithmetical alternative.  But for those willing to
contemplate some sort of property dualism (which is not always made
explicit), there is, as you say, no immediately obvious

My own reasoning on this latter option has focused on the
unquestioned

acceptance of  composite material structure which seems to underpin
the notion of a primitively physical machine.  As you once put it
ontological reduction entails ontological elimination.  IOW, the
reduction of materiality to a causally-complete micro-physical
mechanism automatically entails that macro-physical composites
must

be considered fundamentally to be epistemological, not ontological,
realities. Micro-physics qua materia entails no such additional
ontological levels of organisation.

Consequently, it would have to be the case that any physical
computer (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
epistemological properties before it could begin to compute
anything further.  This should seem, to say the least, odd.

I'm not sure on why this should be odd.  The physical world is a
model we
created to explain things and so it's not odd that epistemology
preceded
ontology.  First we learn some facts and then we build a model to
explain

them.  The model defines our ontology.

Brent

```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 12/28/2011 11:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 28 December 2011 18:17, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

Once one fixes seriously on computation as the
supervenience basis for epistemological properties (ignoring
crypto-eliminativist sophistries about mere seeming) is one any
longer in a position to appeal to the content of experience as the
natural limit to the extent of computational existence?  Does it
seem quite as reasonable to argue that only certain computations are
permitted to exist per se because we conjecture that they are the
only ones being computed by the particular macroscopic physical
machines which happen to uniquely and primitively exist?

That seems to implicitly assume computation is fundamental and asks why
fundamental matter only implements some of them.

Surely a dual property approach to CTM must entail the assumption
that both computation and matter are somehow both fundamental, in the
sense of their both being distinctively real, though non-identical?
If so, it seems reasonable to pose such a question.

Particularly since these particular machines require to be epistemologically
assembled for the purpose by from a kit of
inaccessible-but-even-more-primitively existing micro-physical parts?

I think you're taking it backwards.  If primitive matter exists simply as a
marker of what exists and what doesn't, then it is our model of it that is
epistemologically assembled and the existence is independent of our
descriptive model.  That's the common sense view of the world.

Sure, but that independent existence does not spontaneously take the
form of conveniently classically isolated macroscopic digital machines
like brains (i.e. according to CTM).  That identification itself seems
to be a highly-complex epistemological derivative. So we find
ourselves proposing that a device, which requires our prior
epistemological participation to differentiate it from the physical
environment in general, is same device responsible for the performance
of that very process.

However, especially in
the absence of credible alternatives, if we do treat the consequences
of CTM with proper seriousness it now seems to me that something like
Bruno's proposal would have to be the case - because computationalism
taken seriously opens up mathematical reality in a way that seems hard
to confine within somethingist limits.

But to take it seriously you have to assume that mathematics exists.  That
it is not just a set of logically conditional tautologies.

Yes, but there it is: if consciousness is real, and computation is
taken seriously as its supervenience base, is there a coherent
alternative?  One could try to believe that matter is unconscious
unless in some relevant sense it is in the process of computing,
but, rearrange matter how you will, nothing apparently material will
have changed, nor need to.  Do we nevertheless feel justified in
saying that consciousness is a some sort of reality that comes and
goes just because of these rearrangements?

I don't see anything incoherent in the conventional view that it is certain computing
that distinguishes conscious instantiating physical processes from unconscious ones; yet
still holding that only some such processes exist (the ones we call material or physical).

I agree that it is hard for us (Aristotelean bigots, as Bruno might
think) to take seriously the idea that mathematics exists.

I don't think even Bruno takes seriously the idea that all mathematics exist, as sometimes
suggested by Tegmark.

Clearly,
our ideas about mathematics aren't what exist - at least, not as a
primitive basis of reality.  But does something primitive exist which
is consistent with our idea - our description - of mathematics: well,
why not?  After all, we are all too familiar with the unreasonable
effectiveness of mathematics in the physical sciences, and it seems to
become even more unreasonably effective the more science extends its
reach.  And it's not just in deep down in microphysical structure that
we seem to observe such uncanny effectiveness, but up there in the big
cosmological picture.

I don't see that at all.  Of course mathematics is effective for the physical (and other)
sciences, because (a) it is invented for the purpose and (b) any explicit, coherent model
is going to be mathematical because that's all mathematics is, being logically explicit
and consistent in drawing inferences.   Secondly, it's effectiveness is somewhat
overstated.  For example, general relativity, a paradigm of mathematical physics, is
famous for predicting singularities which are almost certainly unphysical.

Everyone seems to be headed in the everything
direction with observer selection as the ultimate filter.

Still, all this may just be the thunder of the herd heading for some
theoretical abyss. I guess my judgement is still suspended.

Me too.

Brent

David

On 12/28/2011 10:03 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 28 December 2011 17:01, ```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On 28 December 2011 19:43, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

What UDA1-7 and MGA do at once, is to show that the notion of primitive
matter is spurious in the comp frame, but also (mainly perhaps) that physics
is branch of number theory/computer science (more precisely: of machine's
theology). The physical reality is not a mathematical reality among others,
it is more like the border of some mathematical reality.

Both a physicalist and an arithmeticalist have primitive objects (number,
particle) but also elementary dynamic (laws of addition/multiplication,
forces). And from this derives higher order constructs, some being able to
develop self-reference and first person views.

But computationalism is not arithmeticalism. It does not reduce physics as a
mathematical theory, but as a precise machine's theological phenomenon.

Yes, I have always had the strong feeling that the self-reference of
experience to a localised point-of-view must somehow be fundamental,
or at least very deep, not circumstantial or trivial.  Since
childhood, I've always been puzzled by questions like why am I me and
not you?, which just made most other people smile or frown.  Usually
they would point at two objects (my body and theirs) and say with
finality well, that's you and this is me.

However even then I felt - and more so now - that the real subject
of personal identity was not to be so easily characterised.  ISTM that
a straightforward physicalist approach - even a mathematical one - can
provide no real insight into this question of who or what am I? and
in effect must either assume, trivialise, ignore or deny it.  In
contrast to this, assuming CTM, the UDA gives a step-wise
demonstration of the way the indispensable role played by observation
leads inexorably to indeterminism in the localisation of the
first-person, independent (until the MGA) of issues of ultimate
ontological primitivity.  This is already a powerful indication that
there is something computationally real in play over and above the
structures of matter that characterise an observer's point-of-view.

So I believe you are right that computational reality must be
characterised primarily in such a way as to account for the
localisation of observers and the emergence of appearances, as opposed
to merely substituting an imaginary god's-eye description of
materiality.  Unfortunately (?) this also implies that reality must
then be Vastly larger and perhaps even more daunting than we could
have imagined.

PS I will comment other posts asap. Probably tomorrow.

D'accord.  J'attend avec un grand plaisir vos observations.

David

On 28 Dec 2011, at 14:39, David Nyman wrote:

On 28 December 2011 06:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

Consequently, it would have to be the case that any physical
computer (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
epistemological properties before it could begin to compute
anything further.  This should seem, to say the least, odd.

I'm not sure on why this should be odd.  The physical world is a model we
created to explain things and so it's not odd that epistemology preceded
ontology.  First we learn some facts and then we build a model to explain
them.  The model defines our ontology.

My suggestion was that any oddness appears only if one tries to make
sense of CTM in terms of some sort of dual-property view rooted in
primitive materiality.  As Bruno says, this often seems to be at
least an implicit assumption.  But even in it own terms, such a theory
can only isolate computation (and hence anything consequential on it)
in terms of its epistemological properties, because the very
object-relations (e.g. those present in computers or brains), in terms
of which any coherent appeal to computation can be made, are
themselves nothing other than computationally-constructed
abstractions.  Consequently this seems (at least to me) to be in
practice pretty much indistinguishable from Bruno's characterisation
of the reversal of matter-computation, since, given that CTM
mandates at the outset that all possibility of engagement with matter
is fundamentally epistemological, there seems to be no remaining
motivation to appeal to inconsequential primitively-material
properties, except as a sort of religious commitment.

Since this seems quite consistent with what you say above, I'm not
really surprised it doesn't seem odd to you.

This is correct as an argument against primitive matter. At least it makes
sense.

But I am not sure it will address the case of the immaterialist physicalist,
on a type close to Tegmark.

What UDA1-7 and MGA do at once, is to show that the notion of primitive
matter is spurious in the comp frame, but also (mainly perhaps) that physics
is branch of number theory/computer science (more precisely: of machine's
theology). The physical reality is not a mathematical reality among others,
```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 12:10:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But I still fail to see what you mean by swapping two consciousness.
In this case we have that the consciousness of [Tommy and Samantha]
supervenes (weakly) on the physical activity in the classroom (to
change them, we have to change something physical in the classroom),
in the same manner than the consciousness of Bruno and Russell
supervenes on the (phsyical, here) execution of the UD. That is what
is used in the argument.

Bruno

We have two conscious states (Tommy and Samantha) that clearly
differ. They both cannot supervene on the same physical state. That is
by the definition of supervenience. Therefore they both cannot
supervene on the same classroom.

Perhaps the word swapping is misleading to you - I didn't mean
anything particularly profound by it.

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 26 Dec 2011, at 18:35, David Nyman wrote:

On 26 December 2011 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On reflection,
this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or they
are ultimately indistinguishable (i.e. frank eliminativism about
consciousness, or immaterialism - take your pick).

Some people, like Peter Jones (and many others) believe that
consciousness
might need both a computation together with at least one concrete
primitive
physical implementation. MGA is supposed to help those people to
see that

such an option cannot work.

But then they are dualists, even if they can't or won't admit it.  The
fact that they go on thinking and talking in a dualist way but won't
confess to it is why I say the ambiguity is studied.  Dennett, for
example, winks at it when he describes himself as a third-person
absolutist, revealing in the process perhaps a stronger commitment to
doctrine than truth; and consequently, despite his analytical rigour,
he is often led to use bullying and sophistry to defend absolutism
where truthfulness does not serve his purpose.

But once the central ontological distinction is made between qua
materia and qua computatio, a truthful eye cannot avoid seeing that
either there are two primitives in play here or only one.  If the
former, then a dualism of some kind must be contemplated, though a
duality in which one pole is placed at an unbridgeable epistemic
distance from the other (as Kant shows us).  Should one consequently
lean towards the latter option as more parsimonious, one of the pair
of ontological primitives must be dispensed with - i.e. redefined in
terms of the other.

If we attempt to collapse computation into the primitive physics
that implements it, then we are left just with physics; everything
must in the end be accounted for qua materia.  But in the presence of
consciousness, this is frankly incoherent, or more simply, impossible.
In the light of this, as Sherlock Holmes sagaciously observed, the
alternative, however improbable, must be true: if computation is to be
the chosen supervention base for consciousness, there can be no sense
in further appeal to any more primitive ontology.  Quod erat
demonstrandum.

I agree with some use of Occam, but this might not follow from a pure
logical point of view (if you let me play the role of the devil

The reason is that, without MGA or Maudlin, we might single out a
universal machine which would be a primitive material system, and
decide that consciousness is related to the computations appearing in
that primitive physical frame, and defined by the organization of
matter in that frame). This entails a property form of dualism, which
is not obviously contradictory. The physical universe becomes a sort
of primitive programming language, as it can be indeed, and
consciousness would supervene on the physical computation only. The
fact that, without MGA, we can conceive this explains the success of
the mechanist idea among materialist: there is matter obeying some
laws, and from those laws we can explain layers of different
organizations.
Of course, when consciousness is taken seriously into account, we can
sense some incoherence, but empirically, this is the hard part to
convey, and without MGA/Maudlin, I have not been able to convince of
the frank incoherence. The materialist move might seems ad hoc, but
to prove that it is incoherent is not easy. At first it seems to
provide an ability of distinguishing real from fictive, by universal
machine, but the problem is that, like Peter Jones defended, the
materialist will just consider the non material computation has having
no consciousness at all: so that the universal machine can still not
make the difference between real from fictive, but not because its
consciousness does not change, but because it disappears in the
fictive frame. They accept the idea that arithmetic is full of zombie,
because they believe that mathematics is essentially fictive, which
makes sense with their singling out a particular universal and
material (for them) machine. The only problem I can see is that they
have to attribute some physical activity to inactive (here and now)
piece of matter and to violate the 323 principle.

Bruno

On 26 Dec 2011, at 14:50, David Nyman wrote:

On 26 December 2011 11:06, Russell Standish
li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:

I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-
PHYS.

This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
primitiveness is defined, or comes into the argument. Maudlin's
argument is about regular supervenience, with no mention of
primitiveness.

The confusion is surely a consequence of a studied ambiguity in the
definition of supervention in the computational theory of mind: it
is
simply not stipulated explicitly whether consciousness is ```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 26 Dec 2011, at 23:49, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:34:52AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

It is not used in Maudlin's argument, but in your extension to
handle

multiversal supervenience.

You might make this precise, because I don't see the point. But the
multiverse has to be robust to handle the universal
counterfactuals, but then it contains a UD*, and we are back at the
step 7, and *in that case* the step seven is enough for the reversal
physics/mathematical computer science (arithmetic).

Bruno

It is true I was thinking in terms of a multiverse big enough to
contain a UD*, and I agree that steps 1-7 are sufficient for the
reversal here.

My problem, perhaps, is a lack of intuition of how to push through the
MGA when the multiverse is not big enough to support a universal
dovetailer.

OK. That might be a remaining things to clarify.

Does that last sentence even make sense?

I am not sure. You should conceive a very weird sort of non universal
multiverse

If not, then the
MGA only applies to a single universe, in which case my critique
simply doesn't apply.

That's ambiguous. The point is that the MGA applies to anything Turing
emulable on which consciousness can weakly supervene. Once it is
Turing emulable, it is, in theory (but that's enough) amenable to a
single physical computation, in a single universe, and given a role to
primitive matter force to associate again a physical activity to
something physically inactive.

Bruno

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On 27 December 2011 10:42, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

Of course, when consciousness is taken seriously into account, we can sense
some incoherence, but empirically, this is the hard part to convey, and
without MGA/Maudlin, I have not been able to convince of the frank
incoherence.

The frank incoherence comment was directed towards the case where,
rejecting any form of dualism, one grasps the single primitive horn
of the dilemma in the form of a primitively-physical monism, rather
than the  arithmetical alternative.  But for those willing to
contemplate some sort of property dualism (which is not always made
explicit), there is, as you say, no immediately obvious contradiction.

My own reasoning on this latter option has focused on the unquestioned
acceptance of  composite material structure which seems to underpin
the notion of a primitively physical machine.  As you once put it
ontological reduction entails ontological elimination.  IOW, the
reduction of materiality to a causally-complete micro-physical
mechanism automatically entails that macro-physical composites must
be considered fundamentally to be epistemological, not ontological,
realities. Micro-physics qua materia entails no such additional
ontological levels of organisation.

Consequently, it would have to be the case that any physical
computer (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
epistemological properties before it could begin to compute
anything further.  This should seem, to say the least, odd.  It might
even seem to be indistinguishable, in the final analysis, from
computational supervenience.

David

On 26 Dec 2011, at 18:35, David Nyman wrote:

On 26 December 2011 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On reflection,
this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or they
are ultimately indistinguishable (i.e. frank eliminativism about
consciousness, or immaterialism - take your pick).

Some people, like Peter Jones (and many others) believe that
consciousness
might need both a computation together with at least one concrete
primitive
physical implementation. MGA is supposed to help those people to see that
such an option cannot work.

But then they are dualists, even if they can't or won't admit it.  The
fact that they go on thinking and talking in a dualist way but won't
confess to it is why I say the ambiguity is studied.  Dennett, for
example, winks at it when he describes himself as a third-person
absolutist, revealing in the process perhaps a stronger commitment to
doctrine than truth; and consequently, despite his analytical rigour,
he is often led to use bullying and sophistry to defend absolutism
where truthfulness does not serve his purpose.

But once the central ontological distinction is made between qua
materia and qua computatio, a truthful eye cannot avoid seeing that
either there are two primitives in play here or only one.  If the
former, then a dualism of some kind must be contemplated, though a
duality in which one pole is placed at an unbridgeable epistemic
distance from the other (as Kant shows us).  Should one consequently
lean towards the latter option as more parsimonious, one of the pair
of ontological primitives must be dispensed with - i.e. redefined in
terms of the other.

If we attempt to collapse computation into the primitive physics
that implements it, then we are left just with physics; everything
must in the end be accounted for qua materia.  But in the presence of
consciousness, this is frankly incoherent, or more simply, impossible.
In the light of this, as Sherlock Holmes sagaciously observed, the
alternative, however improbable, must be true: if computation is to be
the chosen supervention base for consciousness, there can be no sense
in further appeal to any more primitive ontology.  Quod erat
demonstrandum.

I agree with some use of Occam, but this might not follow from a pure
logical point of view (if you let me play the role of the devil advocate).

The reason is that, without MGA or Maudlin, we might single out a universal
machine which would be a primitive material system, and decide that
consciousness is related to the computations appearing in that primitive
physical frame, and defined by the organization of matter in that frame).
This entails a property form of dualism, which is not obviously
contradictory. The physical universe becomes a sort of primitive programming
language, as it can be indeed, and consciousness would supervene on the
physical computation only. The fact that, without MGA, we can conceive this
explains the success of the mechanist idea among materialist: there is
matter obeying some laws, and from those laws we can explain layers of
different organizations.
Of course, when consciousness is taken seriously into account, we can ```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 26 Dec 2011, at 22:45, David Nyman wrote:

On 26 December 2011 19:50, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
wrote:

Not if the sense of dualism *is* the primitive.

My comments, like the OP, were directed towards the assumptions of the
computational theory of mind, and the various ways in which this is
generally interpreted.  Do bear in mind that consciousness is assumed
(i.e. in the relevant theory) to *supervene on* computation, not to be
identical with it.  Any theory in this domain aspires to give detailed
and falsifiable predictions of how complex systems, defined in terms
of the supervention basis of the theory, emerge, behave, have beliefs,
possess dispositions, make specific claims, about themselves and their
environments, in the precisely the terms they do, and so forth.  This
is of course a monumental endeavour, hardly yet begun, but it is in
the end an empirical one; it can be falsified by intractable
inconsistency with observation, or with the dictates of logic.

It seems to me on the other hand that we simply have no idea how to
give an explanatory account of the direct first-hand phenomena of
consciousness per se.  We don't even know what it would be like to
have such an idea.  I don't believe that it's an attainable goal of
any theory we possess.

I agree. But what we can explain is that there are some self-
referential truth which are available by machine, and that machine can
realize that they are non justifiable in any theory. In that sense we
can have a sort of meta-theory of consciousness, mostly axiomatized by
this true but incommunicable. Then it can be shown that such truth
have a role. If machine postulates them in some strong way, they
become inconsistent. If they postulate them in some weaker way, they
speed-up themselves relatively to their environment, and that gives to
such truth some local role, and that would explain why at some point
nature select animals exploiting that possibility.

Bruno

David

On Dec 26, 12:35 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:

But once the central ontological distinction is made between qua
materia and qua computatio, a truthful eye cannot avoid seeing
that

either there are two primitives in play here or only one.  If the
former, then a dualism of some kind must be contemplated, though a
duality in which one pole is placed at an unbridgeable epistemic
distance from the other (as Kant shows us).  Should one consequently
lean towards the latter option as more parsimonious, one of the pair
of ontological primitives must be dispensed with - i.e. redefined in
terms of the other.

Not if the sense of dualism *is* the primitive. A single continuum
which is ontologically perpendicular to itself in one sense,
unambiguously unified in another, and explicated as a spectrum of
combinatorial sense channels at every point in between. It's the
possibility of topological symmetry and algebraic-sequential
progression that gives rise to realism. Each primitive can be
redefined in terms of the other figuratively but not literally.
Computation is not realism. It is an analytical extraction through
which our intellectual sense can model many common exterior behaviors
and experiences, but I think it is not a primitive and has no causal
efficacy independent of a physical mechanism. Computationalism is
seductive as a primitive because it's purpose is to transparently
model universality and in so doing becomes conflated with
universality

in our minds, but this equivalence is figurative, not literal.

Craig

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 26 Dec 2011, at 23:37, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 01:08:25PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Dec 2011, at 12:06, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:

Good analogy. Let's explore it further. Tommy is in the
classroom. So
is Samantha. Let's swap Tommy's consciousness for Samantha's.
But the
classroom does not change!

Are you swapping the brain? That would be a change in the
classroom.
If you swap just the consciousness, I don't see the meaning, nor
the

relevance.

No, swapping the consciousness, not the brains.

What would that mean?

First consider whether
Tommy's consciousness supervenes on the classroom. If yes, then
consider whether Samantha's consciousness supervenes on the
classroom. By symmetry with Tommy, one should also say yes. In that
case you have two conscious entities supervening on the same
hardware, which contradicts the definition of supervenience.

I don't see this at all. If I run the UD, an infinity of different
consciousness will supervene on the physical phenomenon consisting
in that execution. I do already believe that different consciousness
occur in my own brain: they supervene on the activity of the whole
brain though. Supervenience of Y on X, means only that a change of Y
needs a change on X, not the reverse.

If Y supervene on X, Y supervene on X united to anything.

Therefore we must conclude that nobody supervenes on the classroom.

I have no understanding of what you mean by swapping consciousness
of two people.

Bruno

This is purely a technical result deriving from the definition of
supervenience. It says that if two conscious states differ, then so
must the sates of the hardware being supervened on.

In this case we have two conscious states (Tommy's and
Samantha's). They clearly differ. Therefore, the supervened hardware
must be in a different state for each consciousness.

So therefore, it is incorrect to say that both Tommy and Samantha
supervene on the same classroom. Although, presumably they do
supervene on

their own bodies which are within the classroom.

This is a direct counter example to your statement:

If Y supervene on X, Y supervene on X united to anything.

I suspect you might have a different notion of supervenience than
usually deployed. But in that case, perhaps a different term might be
called for (if it is important).

I use a weak notion of supervenience (there are tons of notion of
supervenience in the literature, most are distinguished by Kripke-like
modal (worlds) semantics.

We might think about changing the vocabulary a little bit.

But I still fail to see what you mean by swapping two consciousness.
In this case we have that the consciousness of [Tommy and Samantha]
supervenes (weakly) on the physical activity in the classroom (to
change them, we have to change something physical in the classroom),
in the same manner than the consciousness of Bruno and Russell
supervenes on the (phsyical, here) execution of the UD. That is what
is used in the argument.

Bruno

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 26 Dec 2011, at 20:49, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/26/2011 11:37 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 26 December 2011 17:59, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

Or a neutral monism in which they are different ways of organizing
the same
data - as quantum field theory can be done with either fields or
particles.

Yes, perhaps, but then what precisely is the word neutral supposed
to signify here?  Can one distinguish it meaningfully from
immaterial (i.e. not material)?

You can distinguish computation from both material and consciousness.

At any rate, organizing data is
an implicit appeal to computation, so in so far as consciousness is
deemed to supervene on something, we still seem to be appealing to
some sort of computational organisation.  That said, another question
obtrudes: if we are to think in terms of two different ways of
organizing the same data - perhaps physical ways and mental ways
- can either be considered as taking logical precedence over the
other?

ISTM that in Bruno's schema, the physical computations are to be
seen as emerging from (or being filtered by) the mental ones.

He's often taken that way.  But I think I now understand Bruno's
idea that consciousness still supervenes on (some kind of) physics.
It's just that neither is fundamental.  They are both generated by
computation.

Including self-reference, yes.

Or
more precisely, the physical computations to which we have access
(and
which define us) as observers seem so to emerge; but both of these
are

embedded within the much more extensive totality of computable
functions which are neither physical nor mental.  Perhaps this is
indeed a neutral background, in something like the sense you intend.

Right.

OK. Mechanism leads to a neutral monism of numbers and computations
(or just numbers+addition+multiplication), and physics + consciousness
arise from the internal points of view of some (relative) universal
numbers.

Bruno

Brent

David

On 12/26/2011 5:50 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 December 2011 11:06, Russell
Standishli...@hpcoders.com.auwrote:

I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-
PRIMITIVE-PHYS.

This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
primitiveness is defined, or comes into the argument.
Maudlin's

argument is about regular supervenience, with no mention of
primitiveness.

The confusion is surely a consequence of a studied ambiguity in the
definition of supervention in the computational theory of mind:
it is
simply not stipulated explicitly whether consciousness is
supposed to

supervene on a physical system - qua materia - or on the abstract
computation it implements - qua computatio.  Maudlin's argument
is

supposed to pump our intuition about the absurdity of the former
option, by showing that it is possible to reduce the structure and
activity of a physical implementation (qua materia) to some
arbitrarily trivial level.

But if we remove the aforesaid ambiguity, the qua materia
option is

surely empty of content from the outset.  If primitive physical
activity is supposed to be what ultimately determines what is real,
then second-order notions such as computation must be, in the
final

analysis, explanatorily irrelevant - we have no need of such
hypotheses.  The behaviour of any physical system can always be
shown

to be fully adequate, qua materia, in its own terms, and further
explanation is consequently otiose (i.e. the zombie argument, in
effect).  The ambiguity in the definition of CTM is that it makes
an

appeal to computation without making the explicit ontological
distinction between qua computatio and qua materia that is
required to make any sense of the supervention claim.  On
reflection,

this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or
they

are ultimately indistinguishable (i.e. frank eliminativism about
consciousness, or immaterialism - take your pick).  That's it, in a
nutshell.

Or a neutral monism in which they are different ways of organizing
the same
data - as quantum field theory can be done with either fields or
particles.

Brent

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 26 Dec 2011, at 18:48, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/26/2011 2:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Even if the physics is not concrete, but purely phenomenological as
indicated by steps 1-7 of the UDA, and if the consciousness
supervenes on

it, it is still physical supervenience, surely.

Not in the usual sense of supervenience, or what I call sup-phys.
It is a notion invented by the materialist/naturalist.
We can still have (and we shoud have) a remaining comp-phys
supervenience.

I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.

So are saying that consciousness must always supervene on physics,
but that the physics (and the consciousness) is not fundamental;
Both arise from computation?

Yes. That's why I say that the coupling consciousness/realities arise
from arithmetic/computations. Human consciousness might really
supervene on the local physics, but Löbian consciousness is
responsible for the earlier filtering of material realties which can
give rise to that local physics. This is handled mathematically by the
material hypostases (Bp  Dt ( p)).
From the points of view of a machine, it always seems her
consciousness is related to *some* physics. Our type of physics allows
dream sharing, which comes from its first person plural nature (the
multiplication of population of machines).

Bruno

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 26 Dec 2011, at 23:00, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/26/2011 1:45 PM, David Nyman wrote:

On 26 December 2011 19:50, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
wrote:

Not if the sense of dualism *is* the primitive.
My comments, like the OP, were directed towards the assumptions of
the

computational theory of mind, and the various ways in which this is
generally interpreted.  Do bear in mind that consciousness is assumed
(i.e. in the relevant theory) to *supervene on* computation, not to
be
identical with it.  Any theory in this domain aspires to give
detailed

and falsifiable predictions of how complex systems, defined in terms
of the supervention basis of the theory, emerge, behave, have
beliefs,
possess dispositions, make specific claims, about themselves and
their

environments, in the precisely the terms they do, and so forth.  This
is of course a monumental endeavour, hardly yet begun, but it is in
the end an empirical one; it can be falsified by intractable
inconsistency with observation, or with the dictates of logic.

It seems to me on the other hand that we simply have no idea how to
give an explanatory account of the direct first-hand phenomena of
consciousness per se.  We don't even know what it would be like to
have such an idea.  I don't believe that it's an attainable goal of
any theory we possess.

David

As I have remarked before, I don't think the problem of
consciousness will be solved, it will just come to be seen as an
uninteresting question.

I disagree. It can be meta-solved, and consciousness is what makes
our value valuable, so it is a sort of most fundamental value making
all the others possible. It makes a person being a person.

Instead we will talk about how to design the ethics module in a
robot or what internal perceptions to provide.

This is the usual slavery problem. I am not sure we can program
intelligence, but we can try to control it when it develops, but
machine developing it will develop their own intentions. At that
point, it is no more programming but respect, education and culture.

Bruno

Brent

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 27 Dec 2011, at 13:59, David Nyman wrote:

On 27 December 2011 10:42, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

Of course, when consciousness is taken seriously into account, we
can sense
some incoherence, but empirically, this is the hard part to convey,
and

without MGA/Maudlin, I have not been able to convince of the frank
incoherence.

The frank incoherence comment was directed towards the case where,
rejecting any form of dualism, one grasps the single primitive horn
of the dilemma in the form of a primitively-physical monism, rather
than the  arithmetical alternative.  But for those willing to
contemplate some sort of property dualism (which is not always made
explicit), there is, as you say, no immediately obvious contradiction.

My own reasoning on this latter option has focused on the unquestioned
acceptance of  composite material structure which seems to underpin
the notion of a primitively physical machine.  As you once put it
ontological reduction entails ontological elimination.  IOW, the
reduction of materiality to a causally-complete micro-physical
mechanism automatically entails that macro-physical composites must
be considered fundamentally to be epistemological, not ontological,
realities. Micro-physics qua materia entails no such additional
ontological levels of organisation.

Consequently, it would have to be the case that any physical
computer (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
epistemological properties before it could begin to compute
anything further.  This should seem, to say the least, odd.  It might
even seem to be indistinguishable, in the final analysis, from
computational supervenience.

Computational supervenience of the mind on computation (by one
universal machine) entails the supervenience of matter (first person
observable) on infinities of computations (by infinities of universal
machines).

The key point is perhaps that epistemological reduction: physics
becomes a situation independent study of what universal number can
observe, and the main invariant of that observation. Weak Materialist,
believers in primitive matter, are really like vitalist, they reifer
what they do not understand. I think we do that all the time in
everyday life, but it has to be avoided as much as possible in the
scientific communication.

Computationalism leads toward a property dualism, or better a multi-
modal realism (octalism), which correspond to *our* willingness to
attribute points of view to sufficiently rich self-referential
structures. Those happen to already inhabit elementary arithmetic, or
some combinator algebra.

Bruno

On 26 Dec 2011, at 18:35, David Nyman wrote:

On 26 December 2011 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On reflection,
this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or
they

are ultimately indistinguishable (i.e. frank eliminativism about
consciousness, or immaterialism - take your pick).

Some people, like Peter Jones (and many others) believe that
consciousness
might need both a computation together with at least one concrete
primitive
physical implementation. MGA is supposed to help those people to
see that

such an option cannot work.

But then they are dualists, even if they can't or won't admit it.
The

fact that they go on thinking and talking in a dualist way but won't
confess to it is why I say the ambiguity is studied.  Dennett, for
example, winks at it when he describes himself as a third-person
absolutist, revealing in the process perhaps a stronger
commitment to
doctrine than truth; and consequently, despite his analytical
rigour,

he is often led to use bullying and sophistry to defend absolutism
where truthfulness does not serve his purpose.

But once the central ontological distinction is made between qua
materia and qua computatio, a truthful eye cannot avoid seeing
that

either there are two primitives in play here or only one.  If the
former, then a dualism of some kind must be contemplated, though a
duality in which one pole is placed at an unbridgeable epistemic
distance from the other (as Kant shows us).  Should one consequently
lean towards the latter option as more parsimonious, one of the pair
of ontological primitives must be dispensed with - i.e. redefined in
terms of the other.

If we attempt to collapse computation into the primitive physics
that implements it, then we are left just with physics; everything
must in the end be accounted for qua materia.  But in the presence
of
consciousness, this is frankly incoherent, or more simply,
impossible.

In the light of this, as Sherlock Holmes sagaciously observed, the
alternative, however improbable, must be true: if computation is
to be
the chosen supervention base for consciousness, there can be no
sense

in further appeal to any more primitive ```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 26 Dec 2011, at 05:47, Joseph Knight wrote:

On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 23 Dec 2011, at 20:16, Joseph Knight wrote:

The same problem arises in *Part 2*. Bruno claims that we are forced to
accept that Alice’s consciousness supervenes on the film.

No. On the projection of the pellicle on the Boolean graph, and then on
the Boolean graph missing part. The idea is that we built again the right
physical activity, with the projection of the film playing the role of the
cosmic rays.

What is a pellicle? (Sorry) I understand this part, however. My
objections arise later.

A film. (But in french film is for cinema (movie?)).

OK, there was no confusion.

OK.

but (film + optical graph) is certainly changed, and Alice’s dream turns
out differently (if it occurs at all).

With comp + sup-phys, it can't.

Why? If we assume sup+phys, then some changes in the physical system on
which the dream supervenes certainly will lead to changes in the dream.

I don't think so. Remember that we suppose comp (and sup-phys). So we
already agree that we can change the physical implementation if it runs the
computation at the correct level. So, we can change the physical
implementation as we wish, below the substitution level without changing
the first person private consciousness.

I think I wasn't clear here. I didn't mean changes in the particular
physical system consciousness is supervening on -- of course by comp that
doesn't matter. I meant that, assuming sup-phys on physical system X, there
must exist some changes in X which lead to changes in consciousness.

OK.

Bruno isolates the film and thus reaches his apparent contradictions.
But this is not a permissible move.

I think that the term film could have different meaning in french and
english. But the film here means the projection of the pellicle on the
glass/crystal medium. This one is never broken. It is a process which takes
time, and occur in some place.

Not only is the definition of supervenience violated, but his principle
of irrelevant subparts is violated as well – for the optical graph is *
not *irrelevant for the execution of Alice’s consciousness.

Of course, but once we put away the nodes, the physical activity
corresponding to the computation are not changed. The optical graph becomes
irrelevant for the physical activity on which Alice's consciousness is
supposed to supervene, by comp+sup-phys.

This is where my problem lies. Of course the physical activity of the
system is changed when you (invalidly) remove the optical graph from the
system. It is far from irrelevant. For example, what mechanism causes the
light to triggers the lasers? There must be some internal mechanisms at
work as well. The nodes aren't connected to one another, but it matters
whether or not the recording is being projected on an optical graph, vs. a
concrete wall, vs. movie screen

Why? The relevant physical activity is the same.

Obviously I agree with you (the projection of the film does not
instantiate consciousness). The point is that if comp and sup-phys are
maintained, and if 323 is correct, then there is nothing different from
projecting the film on the glass crystal with the boolean laser graph
removed and a wall.

I have no problem with 323. My argument is that consciousness never
supervenes on the film/movie/recording.

I agree with that. If only because there are no more any computation done
in time and space (the original abstract computation does not disappear,
of course, so with comp, we will have to attach consciousness to it, and
not to its particular concrete implementation.

So there *is *something different between projecting the film on the
glass crystal, and the wall. The relevant physical activity, in the two
cases (glass/crystal vs wall), is not the same. In the first case (and not
the second) the light interacts with the crystal medium and triggers the
lasers. How can you argue that this interaction is irrelevant and can be
removed?

Because that special activity has nothing to do with the original
computation. If it were, I could not have said yes to the doctor at the
start. Once the boolean graph is remove, we just get a special weird
screen. And the absurdity is still there: there are no computation done
when we project on that weird sort of screen.

You can still say yes to the doctor. But that activity does have something
to do with the computation. Suppose the film were projected upside down, or
equivalently that the boolean graph were turned upside down (no change in
the physical state of the film). Unless we assume some incredible symmetry
in the layout of the graph (contradicting comp), there would most certainly
be a change in computation! It *does *matter for the computation what the
light lands on. This ```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 12/27/2011 4:59 AM, David Nyman wrote:

The frank incoherence comment was directed towards the case where,
rejecting any form of dualism, one grasps the single primitive horn
of the dilemma in the form of a primitively-physical monism, rather
than the  arithmetical alternative.  But for those willing to
contemplate some sort of property dualism (which is not always made
explicit), there is, as you say, no immediately obvious contradiction.

My own reasoning on this latter option has focused on the unquestioned
acceptance of  composite material structure which seems to underpin
the notion of a primitively physical machine.  As you once put it
ontological reduction entails ontological elimination.  IOW, the
reduction of materiality to a causally-complete micro-physical
mechanism automatically entails that macro-physical composites must
be considered fundamentally to be epistemological, not ontological,
realities. Micro-physics qua materia entails no such additional
ontological levels of organisation.

Consequently, it would have to be the case that any physical
computer (e.g. our brains), proposed as a supervenience base for
experience, would itself first require to be constructed out of
epistemological properties before it could begin to compute
anything further.  This should seem, to say the least, odd.

I'm not sure on why this should be odd.  The physical world is a model we created to
explain things and so it's not odd that epistemology preceded ontology.  First we learn
some facts and then we build a model to explain them.  The model defines our ontology.

Brent

It might
even seem to be indistinguishable, in the final analysis, from
computational supervenience.

David

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 26 Dec 2011, at 05:47, Joseph Knight wrote:

On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 9:05 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:

On 23 Dec 2011, at 20:16, Joseph Knight wrote:

The same problem arises in Part 2. Bruno claims that we are forced
to accept that Alice’s consciousness supervenes on the film.

No. On the projection of the pellicle on the Boolean graph, and
then on the Boolean graph missing part. The idea is that we built
again the right physical activity, with the projection of the film
playing the role of the cosmic rays.

What is a pellicle? (Sorry) I understand this part, however. My
objections arise later.

A film. (But in french film is for cinema (movie?)).

OK, there was no confusion.

OK.

but (film + optical graph) is certainly changed, and Alice’s dream
turns out differently (if it occurs at all).

With comp + sup-phys, it can't.

Why? If we assume sup+phys, then some changes in the physical
system on which the dream supervenes certainly will lead to changes
in the dream.

I don't think so. Remember that we suppose comp (and sup-phys). So
we already agree that we can change the physical implementation if
it runs the computation at the correct level. So, we can change the
physical implementation as we wish, below the substitution level
without changing the first person private consciousness.

I think I wasn't clear here. I didn't mean changes in the particular
physical system consciousness is supervening on -- of course by comp
that doesn't matter. I meant that, assuming sup-phys on physical
system X, there must exist some changes in X which lead to changes
in consciousness.

OK.

Bruno isolates the film and thus reaches his apparent
contradictions. But this is not a permissible move.

I think that the term film could have different meaning in french
and english. But the film here means the projection of the pellicle
on the glass/crystal medium. This one is never broken. It is a
process which takes time, and occur in some place.

Not only is the definition of supervenience violated, but his
principle of irrelevant subparts is violated as well – for the
optical graph is not irrelevant for the execution of Alice’s
consciousness.

Of course, but once we put away the nodes, the physical activity
corresponding to the computation are not changed. The optical graph
becomes irrelevant for the physical activity on which Alice's
consciousness is supposed to supervene, by comp+sup-phys.

This is where my problem lies. Of course the physical activity of
the system is changed when you (invalidly) remove the optical graph
from the system. It is far from irrelevant. For example, what
mechanism causes the light to triggers the lasers? There must be
some internal mechanisms at work as well. The nodes aren't
connected to one another, but it matters whether or not the
recording is being projected on an optical graph, vs. a concrete
wall, vs. movie screen

Why? The relevant physical activity is the same.
Obviously I agree with you (the projection of the film does not
instantiate consciousness). The point is that if comp and sup-phys
are maintained, and if 323 is correct, then there is nothing
different from projecting the film on the glass crystal with the
boolean laser graph removed and a wall.

I have no problem with 323. My argument is that consciousness never
supervenes on the film/movie/recording.

I agree with that. If only because there are no more any computation
done in time and space (the original abstract computation does not
disappear, of course, so with comp, we will have to attach
consciousness to it, and not to its particular concrete
implementation.

So there is something different between projecting the film on the
glass crystal, and the wall. The relevant physical activity, in the
two cases (glass/crystal vs wall), is not the same. In the first
case (and not the second) the light interacts with the crystal
medium and triggers the lasers. How can you argue that this
interaction is irrelevant and can be removed?

Because that special activity has nothing to do with the original
computation. If it were, I could not have said yes to the doctor at
the start. Once the boolean graph is remove, we just get a special
weird screen. And the absurdity is still there: there are no
computation done when we project on that weird sort of screen.

Let me restate my concern: Consciousness supervenes on the optical
graph+the recording, even when the nodes are completely
disconnected. It is true that most of the work is being done by
the recording, but not all of the work. The optical graph still
matters, and the physical activity of the system is not solely
provided by the recording, as it still depends on how the projected
light interacts (physically) with the glass/crystal surface.

But this is no more relevant in term of ```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:44:41PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the concreteness or
otherwise of the supervened on.

Maudlin uses supervenience for physical supervenience, like Kim
and most expert on supervenience.
I use physical supervenience, because in the dilemma mechanism/
materialsim I choose mechanism. I keep comp, and withdraw the
physical supervenience, so what remains is comp-supervenience, which
do no more refer to anything physical. the physical belongs at this
stage to the appearance of physical, and we have to retrieve the
physical laws from machine's psychology/theology. Which motivates
for AUDA.

Even if the physics is not concrete, but purely phenomenological as
indicated by steps 1-7 of the UDA, and if the consciousness
supervenes on

it, it is still physical supervenience, surely.

Not in the usual sense of supervenience, or what I call sup-phys. It
is a notion invented by the materialist/naturalist.
We can still have (and we shoud have) a remaining comp-phys
supervenience.

I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.

That is why I say supervenience has no purchase on concreteness.

OK.

So the consciousness are not
supervening on the UD, by definition of supervenience.

The consciousness of mister x does supervene on the running of the
relevant computation done by the UD. His consciousness supervene on
(infinitely many) subcomputations of the UD computation. That's why
in UDA step seven we have already the reversal physics/computer
science in the case we suppose our physical universe to be robust (=
executing concretely a universal dovetailer).
The consciousness of one student in a classroom, full of many
students, does supervene on the physical activity occurring in the
classroom as a whole, despite the classroom does not change itself
per se. (It does it in some sense, but then the UD does it to, after
all he changes itself into an infinity of different programs,
including many which changes themselves).

Good analogy. Let's explore it further. Tommy is in the classroom. So
is Samantha. Let's swap Tommy's consciousness for Samantha's. But the
classroom does not change!

Are you swapping the brain? That would be a change in the classroom.
If you swap just the consciousness, I don't see the meaning, nor the
relevance.

So neither Tommy's nor Samantha's
consciousness supervenes on the classroom as a whole, only (possibly)
on subsystems of the classroom.

They supervene on the whole activity of the classroom, in particular.
A change in their consciousness (like seeing a bird) entails some
change in the classroom.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 25 Dec 2011, at 23:21, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:25:58PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Sorry - perhaps static is the wrong word. I meant there is only one
UD, like there is only one number 1, so there's no way the UD
could be

different in the case of difference consious states.

This is ambiguous. There are infinities of UD programs. And the
consciousness instantiated in the UD, is never the UD's
consciousness, but the consciousness of the person executed in some
part of the UD processing. With sup-phys, this entails that there
are finite portion of UD* which do the conscious person
computation. We can apply MGA. It might be that in some of those
computation some register are not used, and, with 323, we can remove
them.

...

I don't see the need to apply Maudlin's argument to the whole
UD, just the
branches that are relevant. There are surely counterfactuals
between these
branches?

Again, all one proves with Maudlin's argument is that consciousness
does not supervene on the physical implementation of the dovetailer,

That is enough to throw out physicalism.

This seems to contradict your earlier statement in this post where you
say consciousness only supervenes on part of the UD.

To supervene of X entails to supervene on any Y extending X.
If my consciousness supervenes on X, then a change in my consciousness
does necessitate a change in X, which necessitates a change in X union
Y.

it may still supervene on the multiversal physics.

Like it may still supervene on a God's created multiversal physics.
Yes. Why not. But you need to say that it might still supervene ONLY
on a multiversal physics. But then why not ONLY a God's created
multiversal physics? Such move can always be done, but it is a
crime against Occam, because the reasoning shows that there is
nothing computationally relevant in those additions.
If it where, it would mean we have been incorrect in the choice of
the substitution level.

So long as the supervenience is on phenomoinal physics experienced by
the conscious entitity, it really matters not whether the physics is
made by a God. I don't particularly care if I supervene on a computer
located on the 3rd planet of beta Carianae - what matters is that I
supervene on the physics of this world, right here and now - whatever
that physics actually is.

OK. My point is that such a physics cannot be primary. Sorry if I was
unclear.

Maybe the implied assumption here is that if physics is emulable,
and

something does not supervene on the emulated physics, then it cannot
supervene on the original.

?

Its a pretty straight forward question. I'll put it in symbols. Let
sup

mean supervene and em mean emulates:

If X em Y, then A not sup X = A not sup Y.

Is this true? If so, why?

If a low level emulate a high level, and if something does not
supervene on the low level X *when doing that emulation*, it will not
supervene on the higher level too. That's why once we can say yes to
the doctor for a correct level, we can automatically say yes for any
coarse grained level (if we can afford it). If I emulate my brain at
the level of quantum strings, and if my consciousness is not present
in that emulation, it means the real level is lower, not higher.

Is this assumption being made? Can it be proved?

It seems to me neither assumed, nor used (but it is a bit unclear,
also, so I might miss something).

Because I don't otherwise see how one can go from showing lack of
supervenience on an emulation to showing lack of supervenience on
the original.

It would mean that the emulation is not done at the right (or below)
level.

It is not used in Maudlin's argument, but in your extension to handle
multiversal supervenience.

You might make this precise, because I don't see the point. But the
multiverse has to be robust to handle the universal counterfactuals,
but then it contains a UD*, and we are back at the step 7, and *in
that case* the step seven is enough for the reversal physics/
mathematical computer science (arithmetic).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:44:41PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the concreteness or
otherwise of the supervened on.

Maudlin uses supervenience for physical supervenience, like Kim
and most expert on supervenience.
I use physical supervenience, because in the dilemma mechanism/
materialsim I choose mechanism. I keep comp, and withdraw the
physical supervenience, so what remains is comp-supervenience, which
do no more refer to anything physical. the physical belongs at this
stage to the appearance of physical, and we have to retrieve the
physical laws from machine's psychology/theology. Which motivates
for AUDA.

Even if the physics is not concrete, but purely phenomenological as
indicated by steps 1-7 of the UDA, and if the consciousness
supervenes on
it, it is still physical supervenience, surely.

Not in the usual sense of supervenience, or what I call sup-phys. It
is a notion invented by the materialist/naturalist.
We can still have (and we shoud have) a remaining comp-phys
supervenience.
I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.

This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
primitiveness is defined, or comes into the argument. Maudlin's
argument is about regular supervenience, with no mention of primitiveness.

Good analogy. Let's explore it further. Tommy is in the classroom. So
is Samantha. Let's swap Tommy's consciousness for Samantha's. But the
classroom does not change!

Are you swapping the brain? That would be a change in the classroom.
If you swap just the consciousness, I don't see the meaning, nor the
relevance.

No, swapping the consciousness, not the brains. First consider whether
Tommy's consciousness supervenes on the classroom. If yes, then
consider whether Samantha's consciousness supervenes on the
classroom. By symmetry with Tommy, one should also say yes. In that
case you have two conscious entities supervening on the same
hardware, which contradicts the definition of supervenience.

Therefore we must conclude that nobody supervenes on the classroom.

So neither Tommy's nor Samantha's
consciousness supervenes on the classroom as a whole, only (possibly)
on subsystems of the classroom.

They supervene on the whole activity of the classroom, in
particular. A change in their consciousness (like seeing a bird)
entails some change in the classroom.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 26 Dec 2011, at 12:06, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:44:41PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the concreteness
or

otherwise of the supervened on.

Maudlin uses supervenience for physical supervenience, like Kim
and most expert on supervenience.
I use physical supervenience, because in the dilemma mechanism/
materialsim I choose mechanism. I keep comp, and withdraw the
physical supervenience, so what remains is comp-supervenience,
which

do no more refer to anything physical. the physical belongs at this
stage to the appearance of physical, and we have to retrieve the
physical laws from machine's psychology/theology. Which motivates
for AUDA.

Even if the physics is not concrete, but purely phenomenological as
indicated by steps 1-7 of the UDA, and if the consciousness
supervenes on
it, it is still physical supervenience, surely.

Not in the usual sense of supervenience, or what I call sup-phys. It
is a notion invented by the materialist/naturalist.
We can still have (and we shoud have) a remaining comp-phys
supervenience.
I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.

This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
primitiveness is defined, or comes into the argument. Maudlin's
argument is about regular supervenience, with no mention of
primitiveness.

Suopervenience, as used in today's philosophy of mind, is a 100%
Aristotelian notion, relating consciousness to physical events,
thought as being primitive by definition. It is naturalism, weak
materialism. Maudlins completely lacks the idea that physics might not
be the fundamental science. This is clear in his book on QM too.
Most people conceive matter as being primitive. The notion of non
primitive matter has been completely abandoned since the dismissing of
Platonist conception of reality. Nobody doubts the primitive nature of
matter, except when they begin to grasp the comp mind-body problem.
Thare has been a time where I use the word matter in the its
primitive Aristotelian sense, but this leads to the shocking statement
that matter does not exist (which of course meant (Aristotle primary
matter does not exist in any sense relating it to consciousness).

Good analogy. Let's explore it further. Tommy is in the classroom.
So
is Samantha. Let's swap Tommy's consciousness for Samantha's. But
the

classroom does not change!

Are you swapping the brain? That would be a change in the classroom.
If you swap just the consciousness, I don't see the meaning, nor the
relevance.

No, swapping the consciousness, not the brains.

What would that mean?

First consider whether
Tommy's consciousness supervenes on the classroom. If yes, then
consider whether Samantha's consciousness supervenes on the
classroom. By symmetry with Tommy, one should also say yes. In that
case you have two conscious entities supervening on the same
hardware, which contradicts the definition of supervenience.

I don't see this at all. If I run the UD, an infinity of different
consciousness will supervene on the physical phenomenon consisting in
that execution. I do already believe that different consciousness
occur in my own brain: they supervene on the activity of the whole
brain though. Supervenience of Y on X, means only that a change of Y
needs a change on X, not the reverse.

If Y supervene on X, Y supervene on X united to anything.

Therefore we must conclude that nobody supervenes on the classroom.

I have no understanding of what you mean by swapping consciousness of
two people.

Bruno

So neither Tommy's nor Samantha's
consciousness supervenes on the classroom as a whole, only
(possibly)

on subsystems of the classroom.

They supervene on the whole activity of the classroom, in
particular. A change in their consciousness (like seeing a bird)
entails some change in the classroom.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On 26 December 2011 11:06, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:

I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.

This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
primitiveness is defined, or comes into the argument. Maudlin's
argument is about regular supervenience, with no mention of primitiveness.

The confusion is surely a consequence of a studied ambiguity in the
definition of supervention in the computational theory of mind: it is
simply not stipulated explicitly whether consciousness is supposed to
supervene on a physical system - qua materia - or on the abstract
computation it implements - qua computatio.  Maudlin's argument is
supposed to pump our intuition about the absurdity of the former
option, by showing that it is possible to reduce the structure and
activity of a physical implementation (qua materia) to some
arbitrarily trivial level.

But if we remove the aforesaid ambiguity, the qua materia option is
surely empty of content from the outset.  If primitive physical
activity is supposed to be what ultimately determines what is real,
then second-order notions such as computation must be, in the final
analysis, explanatorily irrelevant - we have no need of such
hypotheses.  The behaviour of any physical system can always be shown
to be fully adequate, qua materia, in its own terms, and further
explanation is consequently otiose (i.e. the zombie argument, in
effect).  The ambiguity in the definition of CTM is that it makes an
appeal to computation without making the explicit ontological
distinction between qua computatio and qua materia that is
required to make any sense of the supervention claim.  On reflection,
this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or they
are ultimately indistinguishable (i.e. frank eliminativism about
consciousness, or immaterialism - take your pick).  That's it, in a
nutshell.

David

On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:44:41PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the concreteness or
otherwise of the supervened on.

Maudlin uses supervenience for physical supervenience, like Kim
and most expert on supervenience.
I use physical supervenience, because in the dilemma mechanism/
materialsim I choose mechanism. I keep comp, and withdraw the
physical supervenience, so what remains is comp-supervenience, which
do no more refer to anything physical. the physical belongs at this
stage to the appearance of physical, and we have to retrieve the
physical laws from machine's psychology/theology. Which motivates
for AUDA.

Even if the physics is not concrete, but purely phenomenological as
indicated by steps 1-7 of the UDA, and if the consciousness
supervenes on
it, it is still physical supervenience, surely.

Not in the usual sense of supervenience, or what I call sup-phys. It
is a notion invented by the materialist/naturalist.
We can still have (and we shoud have) a remaining comp-phys
supervenience.
I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.

This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
primitiveness is defined, or comes into the argument. Maudlin's
argument is about regular supervenience, with no mention of primitiveness.

Good analogy. Let's explore it further. Tommy is in the classroom. So
is Samantha. Let's swap Tommy's consciousness for Samantha's. But the
classroom does not change!

Are you swapping the brain? That would be a change in the classroom.
If you swap just the consciousness, I don't see the meaning, nor the
relevance.

No, swapping the consciousness, not the brains. First consider whether
Tommy's consciousness supervenes on the classroom. If yes, then
consider whether Samantha's consciousness supervenes on the
classroom. By symmetry with Tommy, one should also say yes. In that
case you have two conscious entities supervening on the same
hardware, which contradicts the definition of supervenience.

Therefore we must conclude that nobody supervenes on the classroom.

So neither Tommy's nor Samantha's
consciousness supervenes on the classroom as a whole, only (possibly)
on subsystems of the classroom.

They supervene on the whole activity of the classroom, in
particular. A change in their consciousness (like seeing a bird)
entails some change in the classroom.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 26 Dec 2011, at 14:50, David Nyman wrote:

On 26 December 2011 11:06, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:

I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.

This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
primitiveness is defined, or comes into the argument. Maudlin's
argument is about regular supervenience, with no mention of
primitiveness.

The confusion is surely a consequence of a studied ambiguity in the
definition of supervention in the computational theory of mind: it is
simply not stipulated explicitly whether consciousness is supposed to
supervene on a physical system - qua materia - or on the abstract
computation it implements - qua computatio.  Maudlin's argument is
supposed to pump our intuition about the absurdity of the former
option, by showing that it is possible to reduce the structure and
activity of a physical implementation (qua materia) to some
arbitrarily trivial level.

Yet, it never occurs to Maudlin that we might just abandon the
supervenience of mind or computation on matter.
In his book on quantum mechanics, he seems reluctant to accept the MW,
for similar reason.

But if we remove the aforesaid ambiguity, the qua materia option is
surely empty of content from the outset.  If primitive physical
activity is supposed to be what ultimately determines what is real,
then second-order notions such as computation must be, in the final
analysis, explanatorily irrelevant - we have no need of such
hypotheses.

This is not entirely obvious. Many people, like Peter Jones on this
list, will define real by primitively material, and will believe
that a computation can bring consciousness only if that computation is
implemented in some primitively material set up.

The behaviour of any physical system can always be shown
to be fully adequate, qua materia, in its own terms, and further
explanation is consequently otiose (i.e. the zombie argument, in
effect).

For a reductionist materialist only, not for a dualist. We do explain
complex program behavior from a higher level description of a program,
but most people will think that what makes Deep Blue (say) real is
provided by its real (physical) implementation.

The ambiguity in the definition of CTM is that it makes an
appeal to computation without making the explicit ontological
distinction between qua computatio and qua materia that is
required to make any sense of the supervention claim.

Because they take the very idea of qua materia for granted. Of
course we know better, I guess.

On reflection,
this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or they
are ultimately indistinguishable (i.e. frank eliminativism about
consciousness, or immaterialism - take your pick).

Some people, like Peter Jones (and many others) believe that
consciousness might need both a computation together with at least one
concrete primitive physical implementation. MGA is supposed to help
those people to see that such an option cannot work.

That's it, in a
nutshell.

Good summary, but I am not sure it can convince some die hard
atheists, believing in both primitive matter and abstract computation,
which does not really exists for them, unless they are concretely
implemented.

Bruno

On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:44:41PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the
concreteness or

otherwise of the supervened on.

Maudlin uses supervenience for physical supervenience, like
Kim

and most expert on supervenience.
I use physical supervenience, because in the dilemma mechanism/
materialsim I choose mechanism. I keep comp, and withdraw the
physical supervenience, so what remains is comp-supervenience,
which
do no more refer to anything physical. the physical belongs at
this

stage to the appearance of physical, and we have to retrieve the
physical laws from machine's psychology/theology. Which motivates
for AUDA.

Even if the physics is not concrete, but purely phenomenological as
indicated by steps 1-7 of the UDA, and if the consciousness
supervenes on
it, it is still physical supervenience, surely.

Not in the usual sense of supervenience, or what I call sup-phys. It
is a notion invented by the materialist/naturalist.
We can still have (and we shoud have) a remaining comp-phys
supervenience.
I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.

This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
primitiveness is defined, or comes into the argument. Maudlin's
argument is about regular supervenience, with no mention of
primitiveness.

Good analogy. Let's explore it further. Tommy is in the
classroom. So
is Samantha. Let's swap Tommy's consciousness for Samantha's. But
the

classroom does not ```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On 26 December 2011 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On reflection,
this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or they
are ultimately indistinguishable (i.e. frank eliminativism about
consciousness, or immaterialism - take your pick).

Some people, like Peter Jones (and many others) believe that consciousness
might need both a computation together with at least one concrete primitive
physical implementation. MGA is supposed to help those people to see that
such an option cannot work.

But then they are dualists, even if they can't or won't admit it.  The
fact that they go on thinking and talking in a dualist way but won't
confess to it is why I say the ambiguity is studied.  Dennett, for
example, winks at it when he describes himself as a third-person
absolutist, revealing in the process perhaps a stronger commitment to
doctrine than truth; and consequently, despite his analytical rigour,
he is often led to use bullying and sophistry to defend absolutism
where truthfulness does not serve his purpose.

But once the central ontological distinction is made between qua
materia and qua computatio, a truthful eye cannot avoid seeing that
either there are two primitives in play here or only one.  If the
former, then a dualism of some kind must be contemplated, though a
duality in which one pole is placed at an unbridgeable epistemic
distance from the other (as Kant shows us).  Should one consequently
lean towards the latter option as more parsimonious, one of the pair
of ontological primitives must be dispensed with - i.e. redefined in
terms of the other.

If we attempt to collapse computation into the primitive physics
that implements it, then we are left just with physics; everything
must in the end be accounted for qua materia.  But in the presence of
consciousness, this is frankly incoherent, or more simply, impossible.
In the light of this, as Sherlock Holmes sagaciously observed, the
alternative, however improbable, must be true: if computation is to be
the chosen supervention base for consciousness, there can be no sense
in further appeal to any more primitive ontology.  Quod erat
demonstrandum.

David

On 26 Dec 2011, at 14:50, David Nyman wrote:

On 26 December 2011 11:06, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:

I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.

This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
primitiveness is defined, or comes into the argument. Maudlin's
argument is about regular supervenience, with no mention of
primitiveness.

The confusion is surely a consequence of a studied ambiguity in the
definition of supervention in the computational theory of mind: it is
simply not stipulated explicitly whether consciousness is supposed to
supervene on a physical system - qua materia - or on the abstract
computation it implements - qua computatio.  Maudlin's argument is
supposed to pump our intuition about the absurdity of the former
option, by showing that it is possible to reduce the structure and
activity of a physical implementation (qua materia) to some
arbitrarily trivial level.

Yet, it never occurs to Maudlin that we might just abandon the supervenience
of mind or computation on matter.
In his book on quantum mechanics, he seems reluctant to accept the MW, for
similar reason.

But if we remove the aforesaid ambiguity, the qua materia option is
surely empty of content from the outset.  If primitive physical
activity is supposed to be what ultimately determines what is real,
then second-order notions such as computation must be, in the final
analysis, explanatorily irrelevant - we have no need of such
hypotheses.

This is not entirely obvious. Many people, like Peter Jones on this list,
will define real by primitively material, and will believe that a
computation can bring consciousness only if that computation is implemented
in some primitively material set up.

The behaviour of any physical system can always be shown
to be fully adequate, qua materia, in its own terms, and further
explanation is consequently otiose (i.e. the zombie argument, in
effect).

For a reductionist materialist only, not for a dualist. We do explain
complex program behavior from a higher level description of a program, but
most people will think that what makes Deep Blue (say) real is provided by
its real (physical) implementation.

The ambiguity in the definition of CTM is that it makes an
appeal to computation without making the explicit ontological
distinction between qua computatio and qua materia that is
required to make any sense of the supervention claim.

Because they take the very idea of qua materia for granted. Of course we
know better, I guess.

On reflection,
this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or ```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 12/26/2011 2:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Even if the physics is not concrete, but purely phenomenological as
indicated by steps 1-7 of the UDA, and if the consciousness supervenes on
it, it is still physical supervenience, surely.

Not in the usual sense of supervenience, or what I call sup-phys. It is a notion
invented by the materialist/naturalist.

We can still have (and we shoud have) a remaining comp-phys supervenience.
I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.

So are saying that consciousness must always supervene on physics, but that the physics
(and the consciousness) is not fundamental; Both arise from computation?

Brent

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 12/26/2011 2:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If a low level emulate a high level, and if something does not supervene on the low
level X *when doing that emulation*, it will not supervene on the higher level too.
That's why once we can say yes to the doctor for a correct level, we can automatically
say yes for any coarse grained level (if we can afford it).

You mean fine grained, don't you?

Brent

If I emulate my brain at the level of quantum strings, and if my consciousness is not
present in that emulation, it means the real level is lower, not higher.

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 12/26/2011 5:50 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 26 December 2011 11:06, Russell Standishli...@hpcoders.com.au  wrote:

I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.

This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
primitiveness is defined, or comes into the argument. Maudlin's
argument is about regular supervenience, with no mention of primitiveness.

The confusion is surely a consequence of a studied ambiguity in the
definition of supervention in the computational theory of mind: it is
simply not stipulated explicitly whether consciousness is supposed to
supervene on a physical system - qua materia - or on the abstract
computation it implements - qua computatio.  Maudlin's argument is
supposed to pump our intuition about the absurdity of the former
option, by showing that it is possible to reduce the structure and
activity of a physical implementation (qua materia) to some
arbitrarily trivial level.

But if we remove the aforesaid ambiguity, the qua materia option is
surely empty of content from the outset.  If primitive physical
activity is supposed to be what ultimately determines what is real,
then second-order notions such as computation must be, in the final
analysis, explanatorily irrelevant - we have no need of such
hypotheses.  The behaviour of any physical system can always be shown
to be fully adequate, qua materia, in its own terms, and further
explanation is consequently otiose (i.e. the zombie argument, in
effect).  The ambiguity in the definition of CTM is that it makes an
appeal to computation without making the explicit ontological
distinction between qua computatio and qua materia that is
required to make any sense of the supervention claim.  On reflection,
this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or they
are ultimately indistinguishable (i.e. frank eliminativism about
consciousness, or immaterialism - take your pick).  That's it, in a
nutshell.

Or a neutral monism in which they are different ways of organizing the same data - as
quantum field theory can be done with either fields or particles.

Brent

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On 26 December 2011 17:59, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

Or a neutral monism in which they are different ways of organizing the same
data - as quantum field theory can be done with either fields or particles.

Yes, perhaps, but then what precisely is the word neutral supposed
to signify here?  Can one distinguish it meaningfully from
immaterial (i.e. not material)?  At any rate, organizing data is
an implicit appeal to computation, so in so far as consciousness is
deemed to supervene on something, we still seem to be appealing to
some sort of computational organisation.  That said, another question
obtrudes: if we are to think in terms of two different ways of
organizing the same data - perhaps physical ways and mental ways
- can either be considered as taking logical precedence over the
other?

ISTM that in Bruno's schema, the physical computations are to be
seen as emerging from (or being filtered by) the mental ones.  Or
more precisely, the physical computations to which we have access (and
which define us) as observers seem so to emerge; but both of these are
embedded within the much more extensive totality of computable
functions which are neither physical nor mental.  Perhaps this is
indeed a neutral background, in something like the sense you intend.

David

On 12/26/2011 5:50 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 26 December 2011 11:06, Russell Standishli...@hpcoders.com.au  wrote:

I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.

This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
primitiveness is defined, or comes into the argument. Maudlin's
argument is about regular supervenience, with no mention of
primitiveness.

The confusion is surely a consequence of a studied ambiguity in the
definition of supervention in the computational theory of mind: it is
simply not stipulated explicitly whether consciousness is supposed to
supervene on a physical system - qua materia - or on the abstract
computation it implements - qua computatio.  Maudlin's argument is
supposed to pump our intuition about the absurdity of the former
option, by showing that it is possible to reduce the structure and
activity of a physical implementation (qua materia) to some
arbitrarily trivial level.

But if we remove the aforesaid ambiguity, the qua materia option is
surely empty of content from the outset.  If primitive physical
activity is supposed to be what ultimately determines what is real,
then second-order notions such as computation must be, in the final
analysis, explanatorily irrelevant - we have no need of such
hypotheses.  The behaviour of any physical system can always be shown
to be fully adequate, qua materia, in its own terms, and further
explanation is consequently otiose (i.e. the zombie argument, in
effect).  The ambiguity in the definition of CTM is that it makes an
appeal to computation without making the explicit ontological
distinction between qua computatio and qua materia that is
required to make any sense of the supervention claim.  On reflection,
this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or they
are ultimately indistinguishable (i.e. frank eliminativism about
consciousness, or immaterialism - take your pick).  That's it, in a
nutshell.

Or a neutral monism in which they are different ways of organizing the same
data - as quantum field theory can be done with either fields or particles.

Brent

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 12/26/2011 11:37 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 26 December 2011 17:59, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

Or a neutral monism in which they are different ways of organizing the same
data - as quantum field theory can be done with either fields or particles.

Yes, perhaps, but then what precisely is the word neutral supposed
to signify here?  Can one distinguish it meaningfully from
immaterial (i.e. not material)?

You can distinguish computation from both material and consciousness.

At any rate, organizing data is
an implicit appeal to computation, so in so far as consciousness is
deemed to supervene on something, we still seem to be appealing to
some sort of computational organisation.  That said, another question
obtrudes: if we are to think in terms of two different ways of
organizing the same data - perhaps physical ways and mental ways
- can either be considered as taking logical precedence over the
other?

ISTM that in Bruno's schema, the physical computations are to be
seen as emerging from (or being filtered by) the mental ones.

He's often taken that way.  But I think I now understand Bruno's idea that consciousness
still supervenes on (some kind of) physics. It's just that neither is fundamental.  They
are both generated by computation.

Or
more precisely, the physical computations to which we have access (and
which define us) as observers seem so to emerge; but both of these are
embedded within the much more extensive totality of computable
functions which are neither physical nor mental.  Perhaps this is
indeed a neutral background, in something like the sense you intend.

Right.

Brent

David

On 12/26/2011 5:50 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 26 December 2011 11:06, Russell Standishli...@hpcoders.com.auwrote:

I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.

This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
primitiveness is defined, or comes into the argument. Maudlin's
argument is about regular supervenience, with no mention of
primitiveness.

The confusion is surely a consequence of a studied ambiguity in the
definition of supervention in the computational theory of mind: it is
simply not stipulated explicitly whether consciousness is supposed to
supervene on a physical system - qua materia - or on the abstract
computation it implements - qua computatio.  Maudlin's argument is
supposed to pump our intuition about the absurdity of the former
option, by showing that it is possible to reduce the structure and
activity of a physical implementation (qua materia) to some
arbitrarily trivial level.

But if we remove the aforesaid ambiguity, the qua materia option is
surely empty of content from the outset.  If primitive physical
activity is supposed to be what ultimately determines what is real,
then second-order notions such as computation must be, in the final
analysis, explanatorily irrelevant - we have no need of such
hypotheses.  The behaviour of any physical system can always be shown
to be fully adequate, qua materia, in its own terms, and further
explanation is consequently otiose (i.e. the zombie argument, in
effect).  The ambiguity in the definition of CTM is that it makes an
appeal to computation without making the explicit ontological
distinction between qua computatio and qua materia that is
required to make any sense of the supervention claim.  On reflection,
this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or they
are ultimately indistinguishable (i.e. frank eliminativism about
consciousness, or immaterialism - take your pick).  That's it, in a
nutshell.

Or a neutral monism in which they are different ways of organizing the same
data - as quantum field theory can be done with either fields or particles.

Brent

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```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On Dec 26, 12:35 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:

But once the central ontological distinction is made between qua
materia and qua computatio, a truthful eye cannot avoid seeing that
either there are two primitives in play here or only one.  If the
former, then a dualism of some kind must be contemplated, though a
duality in which one pole is placed at an unbridgeable epistemic
distance from the other (as Kant shows us).  Should one consequently
lean towards the latter option as more parsimonious, one of the pair
of ontological primitives must be dispensed with - i.e. redefined in
terms of the other.

Not if the sense of dualism *is* the primitive. A single continuum
which is ontologically perpendicular to itself in one sense,
unambiguously unified in another, and explicated as a spectrum of
combinatorial sense channels at every point in between. It's the
possibility of topological symmetry and algebraic-sequential
progression that gives rise to realism. Each primitive can be
redefined in terms of the other figuratively but not literally.
Computation is not realism. It is an analytical extraction through
which our intellectual sense can model many common exterior behaviors
and experiences, but I think it is not a primitive and has no causal
efficacy independent of a physical mechanism. Computationalism is
seductive as a primitive because it's purpose is to transparently
model universality and in so doing becomes conflated with universality
in our minds, but this equivalence is figurative, not literal.

Craig

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On 26 December 2011 19:49, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

ISTM that in Bruno's schema, the physical computations are to be
seen as emerging from (or being filtered by) the mental ones.

He's often taken that way.  But I think I now understand Bruno's idea that
consciousness still supervenes on (some kind of) physics. It's just that
neither is fundamental.  They are both generated by computation.

Yes, I get that too - the recent conversations have been helpful.

Or more precisely, the physical computations to which we have access (and
which define us) as observers seem so to emerge; but both of these are
embedded within the much more extensive totality of computable
functions which are neither physical nor mental.  Perhaps this is
indeed a neutral background, in something like the sense you intend.

Right.

Good.

David

On 12/26/2011 11:37 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 26 December 2011 17:59, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net  wrote:

Or a neutral monism in which they are different ways of organizing the
same
data - as quantum field theory can be done with either fields or
particles.

Yes, perhaps, but then what precisely is the word neutral supposed
to signify here?  Can one distinguish it meaningfully from
immaterial (i.e. not material)?

You can distinguish computation from both material and consciousness.

At any rate, organizing data is
an implicit appeal to computation, so in so far as consciousness is
deemed to supervene on something, we still seem to be appealing to
some sort of computational organisation.  That said, another question
obtrudes: if we are to think in terms of two different ways of
organizing the same data - perhaps physical ways and mental ways
- can either be considered as taking logical precedence over the
other?

ISTM that in Bruno's schema, the physical computations are to be
seen as emerging from (or being filtered by) the mental ones.

He's often taken that way.  But I think I now understand Bruno's idea that
consciousness still supervenes on (some kind of) physics. It's just that
neither is fundamental.  They are both generated by computation.

Or
more precisely, the physical computations to which we have access (and
which define us) as observers seem so to emerge; but both of these are
embedded within the much more extensive totality of computable
functions which are neither physical nor mental.  Perhaps this is
indeed a neutral background, in something like the sense you intend.

Right.

Brent

David

On 12/26/2011 5:50 AM, David Nyman wrote:

On 26 December 2011 11:06, Russell Standishli...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:

I guess I should make this clearer. SUP-PHYS is SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS.

This does clarify some things. But I still don't see where
primitiveness is defined, or comes into the argument. Maudlin's
argument is about regular supervenience, with no mention of
primitiveness.

The confusion is surely a consequence of a studied ambiguity in the
definition of supervention in the computational theory of mind: it is
simply not stipulated explicitly whether consciousness is supposed to
supervene on a physical system - qua materia - or on the abstract
computation it implements - qua computatio.  Maudlin's argument is
supposed to pump our intuition about the absurdity of the former
option, by showing that it is possible to reduce the structure and
activity of a physical implementation (qua materia) to some
arbitrarily trivial level.

But if we remove the aforesaid ambiguity, the qua materia option is
surely empty of content from the outset.  If primitive physical
activity is supposed to be what ultimately determines what is real,
then second-order notions such as computation must be, in the final
analysis, explanatorily irrelevant - we have no need of such
hypotheses.  The behaviour of any physical system can always be shown
to be fully adequate, qua materia, in its own terms, and further
explanation is consequently otiose (i.e. the zombie argument, in
effect).  The ambiguity in the definition of CTM is that it makes an
appeal to computation without making the explicit ontological
distinction between qua computatio and qua materia that is
required to make any sense of the supervention claim.  On reflection,
this distinction can be made explicit in two ways: either they are
distinct and separable (i.e. physico-computational dualism), or they
are ultimately indistinguishable (i.e. frank eliminativism about
consciousness, or immaterialism - take your pick).  That's it, in a
nutshell.

Or a neutral monism in which they are different ways of organizing the
same
data - as quantum field theory can be done with either fields or
particles.

Brent

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On 26 December 2011 19:50, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:

Not if the sense of dualism *is* the primitive.

My comments, like the OP, were directed towards the assumptions of the
computational theory of mind, and the various ways in which this is
generally interpreted.  Do bear in mind that consciousness is assumed
(i.e. in the relevant theory) to *supervene on* computation, not to be
identical with it.  Any theory in this domain aspires to give detailed
and falsifiable predictions of how complex systems, defined in terms
of the supervention basis of the theory, emerge, behave, have beliefs,
possess dispositions, make specific claims, about themselves and their
environments, in the precisely the terms they do, and so forth.  This
is of course a monumental endeavour, hardly yet begun, but it is in
the end an empirical one; it can be falsified by intractable
inconsistency with observation, or with the dictates of logic.

It seems to me on the other hand that we simply have no idea how to
give an explanatory account of the direct first-hand phenomena of
consciousness per se.  We don't even know what it would be like to
have such an idea.  I don't believe that it's an attainable goal of
any theory we possess.

David

On Dec 26, 12:35 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:

But once the central ontological distinction is made between qua
materia and qua computatio, a truthful eye cannot avoid seeing that
either there are two primitives in play here or only one.  If the
former, then a dualism of some kind must be contemplated, though a
duality in which one pole is placed at an unbridgeable epistemic
distance from the other (as Kant shows us).  Should one consequently
lean towards the latter option as more parsimonious, one of the pair
of ontological primitives must be dispensed with - i.e. redefined in
terms of the other.

Not if the sense of dualism *is* the primitive. A single continuum
which is ontologically perpendicular to itself in one sense,
unambiguously unified in another, and explicated as a spectrum of
combinatorial sense channels at every point in between. It's the
possibility of topological symmetry and algebraic-sequential
progression that gives rise to realism. Each primitive can be
redefined in terms of the other figuratively but not literally.
Computation is not realism. It is an analytical extraction through
which our intellectual sense can model many common exterior behaviors
and experiences, but I think it is not a primitive and has no causal
efficacy independent of a physical mechanism. Computationalism is
seductive as a primitive because it's purpose is to transparently
model universality and in so doing becomes conflated with universality
in our minds, but this equivalence is figurative, not literal.

Craig

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```
On 12/26/2011 1:45 PM, David Nyman wrote:

On 26 December 2011 19:50, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com  wrote:

Not if the sense of dualism*is*  the primitive.

My comments, like the OP, were directed towards the assumptions of the
computational theory of mind, and the various ways in which this is
generally interpreted.  Do bear in mind that consciousness is assumed
(i.e. in the relevant theory) to*supervene on*  computation, not to be
identical with it.  Any theory in this domain aspires to give detailed
and falsifiable predictions of how complex systems, defined in terms
of the supervention basis of the theory, emerge, behave, have beliefs,
possess dispositions, make specific claims, about themselves and their
environments, in the precisely the terms they do, and so forth.  This
is of course a monumental endeavour, hardly yet begun, but it is in
the end an empirical one; it can be falsified by intractable
inconsistency with observation, or with the dictates of logic.

It seems to me on the other hand that we simply have no idea how to
give an explanatory account of the direct first-hand phenomena of
consciousness per se.  We don't even know what it would be like to
have such an idea.  I don't believe that it's an attainable goal of
any theory we possess.

David

As I have remarked before, I don't think the problem of consciousness will be solved, it
will just come to be seen as an uninteresting question.  Instead we will talk about how to
design the ethics module in a robot or what internal perceptions to provide.

Brent

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 01:08:25PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Dec 2011, at 12:06, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:09:27AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:00, Russell Standish wrote:

Good analogy. Let's explore it further. Tommy is in the
classroom. So
is Samantha. Let's swap Tommy's consciousness for Samantha's.
But the
classroom does not change!

Are you swapping the brain? That would be a change in the classroom.
If you swap just the consciousness, I don't see the meaning, nor the
relevance.

No, swapping the consciousness, not the brains.

What would that mean?

First consider whether
Tommy's consciousness supervenes on the classroom. If yes, then
consider whether Samantha's consciousness supervenes on the
classroom. By symmetry with Tommy, one should also say yes. In that
case you have two conscious entities supervening on the same
hardware, which contradicts the definition of supervenience.

I don't see this at all. If I run the UD, an infinity of different
consciousness will supervene on the physical phenomenon consisting
in that execution. I do already believe that different consciousness
occur in my own brain: they supervene on the activity of the whole
brain though. Supervenience of Y on X, means only that a change of Y
needs a change on X, not the reverse.

If Y supervene on X, Y supervene on X united to anything.

Therefore we must conclude that nobody supervenes on the classroom.

I have no understanding of what you mean by swapping consciousness
of two people.

Bruno

This is purely a technical result deriving from the definition of
supervenience. It says that if two conscious states differ, then so
must the sates of the hardware being supervened on.

In this case we have two conscious states (Tommy's and
Samantha's). They clearly differ. Therefore, the supervened hardware
must be in a different state for each consciousness.

So therefore, it is incorrect to say that both Tommy and Samantha
supervene on the same classroom. Although, presumably they do supervene on
their own bodies which are within the classroom.

This is a direct counter example to your statement:

If Y supervene on X, Y supervene on X united to anything.

I suspect you might have a different notion of supervenience than
usually deployed. But in that case, perhaps a different term might be
called for (if it is important).

--

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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On Mon, Dec 26, 2011 at 11:34:52AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

It is not used in Maudlin's argument, but in your extension to handle
multiversal supervenience.

You might make this precise, because I don't see the point. But the
multiverse has to be robust to handle the universal
counterfactuals, but then it contains a UD*, and we are back at the
step 7, and *in that case* the step seven is enough for the reversal
physics/mathematical computer science (arithmetic).

Bruno

It is true I was thinking in terms of a multiverse big enough to
contain a UD*, and I agree that steps 1-7 are sufficient for the
reversal here.

My problem, perhaps, is a lack of intuition of how to push through the
MGA when the multiverse is not big enough to support a universal
dovetailer. Does that last sentence even make sense? If not, then the
MGA only applies to a single universe, in which case my critique
simply doesn't apply.

Cheers.

--

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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:44:41PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the concreteness or
otherwise of the supervened on.

Maudlin uses supervenience for physical supervenience, like Kim
and most expert on supervenience.
I use physical supervenience, because in the dilemma mechanism/
materialsim I choose mechanism. I keep comp, and withdraw the
physical supervenience, so what remains is comp-supervenience, which
do no more refer to anything physical. the physical belongs at this
stage to the appearance of physical, and we have to retrieve the
physical laws from machine's psychology/theology. Which motivates
for AUDA.

Even if the physics is not concrete, but purely phenomenological as
indicated by steps 1-7 of the UDA, and if the consciousness supervenes on
it, it is still physical supervenience, surely.

That is why I say supervenience has no purchase on concreteness.

So the consciousness are not
supervening on the UD, by definition of supervenience.

The consciousness of mister x does supervene on the running of the
relevant computation done by the UD. His consciousness supervene on
(infinitely many) subcomputations of the UD computation. That's why
in UDA step seven we have already the reversal physics/computer
science in the case we suppose our physical universe to be robust (=
executing concretely a universal dovetailer).
The consciousness of one student in a classroom, full of many
students, does supervene on the physical activity occurring in the
classroom as a whole, despite the classroom does not change itself
per se. (It does it in some sense, but then the UD does it to, after
all he changes itself into an infinity of different programs,
including many which changes themselves).

Good analogy. Let's explore it further. Tommy is in the classroom. So
is Samantha. Let's swap Tommy's consciousness for Samantha's. But the
classroom does not change! So neither Tommy's nor Samantha's
consciousness supervenes on the classroom as a whole, only (possibly)
on subsystems of the classroom.

--

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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:25:58PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Sorry - perhaps static is the wrong word. I meant there is only one
UD, like there is only one number 1, so there's no way the UD could be
different in the case of difference consious states.

This is ambiguous. There are infinities of UD programs. And the
consciousness instantiated in the UD, is never the UD's
consciousness, but the consciousness of the person executed in some
part of the UD processing. With sup-phys, this entails that there
are finite portion of UD* which do the conscious person
computation. We can apply MGA. It might be that in some of those
computation some register are not used, and, with 323, we can remove
them.

...

I don't see the need to apply Maudlin's argument to the whole
UD, just the
branches that are relevant. There are surely counterfactuals
between these
branches?

Again, all one proves with Maudlin's argument is that consciousness
does not supervene on the physical implementation of the dovetailer,

That is enough to throw out physicalism.

This seems to contradict your earlier statement in this post where you
say consciousness only supervenes on part of the UD.

it may still supervene on the multiversal physics.

Like it may still supervene on a God's created multiversal physics.
Yes. Why not. But you need to say that it might still supervene ONLY
on a multiversal physics. But then why not ONLY a God's created
multiversal physics? Such move can always be done, but it is a
crime against Occam, because the reasoning shows that there is
nothing computationally relevant in those additions.
If it where, it would mean we have been incorrect in the choice of
the substitution level.

So long as the supervenience is on phenomoinal physics experienced by
the conscious entitity, it really matters not whether the physics is
made by a God. I don't particularly care if I supervene on a computer
located on the 3rd planet of beta Carianae - what matters is that I
supervene on the physics of this world, right here and now - whatever
that physics actually is.

Maybe the implied assumption here is that if physics is emulable, and
something does not supervene on the emulated physics, then it cannot
supervene on the original.

?

Its a pretty straight forward question. I'll put it in symbols. Let sup
mean supervene and em mean emulates:

If X em Y, then A not sup X = A not sup Y.

Is this true? If so, why?

Is this assumption being made? Can it be proved?

It seems to me neither assumed, nor used (but it is a bit unclear,
also, so I might miss something).

Because I don't otherwise see how one can go from showing lack of
supervenience on an emulation to showing lack of supervenience on the original.

It is not used in Maudlin's argument, but in your extension to handle
multiversal supervenience.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 23 Dec 2011, at 20:16, Joseph Knight wrote:

On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:

On 22 Dec 2011, at 23:27, Joseph Knight wrote:

Hello everyone and everything,

I have pompously made my own thread for this, even though we have
another MGA thread going, because the other one (sigh, I created
that one too) seems to have split into at least two different
discussions, both of which are largely different from what I have
to say, so I want to avoid confusion.

Here, I will explain why I believe the Movie Graph Argument (MGA)
is invalid. I will start with an exegesis of my understanding of
the MGA, so that Bruno or others can point out if I have failed to
understand some important aspect of the argument. Then I will
explain what is wrong. I believe confusion regarding the concept of
supervenience has been responsible for some invalid reasoning. (At
the end I will also explain why I find Maudlin’s thought experiment
to be inconclusive.)

As it is explained here, here, and here, the MGA consists of three
parts. Throughout the argument we are assuming comp and materialism
to be true.

The MGA

In Part 1, Bruno asks us to consider Alice. Alice is a conscious
being. Alice already has an artificial brain, to make the reasoning
easier. We are assuming here (with no loss of generality) that,
under normal circumstances, Alice’s consciousness supervenes on
this artificial brain. Alice is taking a math exam, when at a
certain moment one of the logic gates A fails to signal logic gate
B. At this precise moment, however, a particle arrives from some
far-away cosmic explosion and triggers gate B anyway. Assuming comp
we (pretty safely) conclude that Alice’s consciousness is
unaffected by this change in causation – after all, the computation
has been performed.Moreover, we can assume any number –
thousands, say – of such failures in Alice’s brain, with lucky
cosmic rays arriving to save the day. Indeed, all of Alice’s
neurons could be disabled, with cosmic rays triggering each one in
just the right way so as to maintain her consciousness. Bruno
(wisely, in my opinion) likes to end the steps of his argument with
questions. At the end of MGA 1, he asks, is Alice a zombie during
the exam? We are really forced to say that she isn’t, because of
our comp assumption. So Alice is just as conscious as she was
before her brain started short-circuiting.

In Part 2, we build on the ideas of part 1 but without cosmic rays.
Bruno assumes for the sake of argument, again with no loss of
generality, that Alice is dreaming and that her brain has no inputs
or outputs. Now, Alice’s (artificial) brain is a 3D Boolean graph
(network being the more common term), which, with a few wiring
changes, can be deformed into a 2D Boolean graph and thus laid out
on a plane. Next Bruno asks us to imagine us instantiating Alice’s
2D graph-brain as a system of laser beams connecting nodes (instead
of wires, and with destructive interference helping out with NOR,
etc.), all in some special material. The graph is placed between
two glass plates, and a special crystalline material is sandwiched
between the plates which has the property that if a beam of light
connects two nodes, the “right” laser is triggered to signal the
right node at that location. (Unlikely, but conceivable and valid,
which is all we intrepid philosophers need anyway!)

So Alice is dreaming (conscious), with her dream supervening on the
2D optical graph, and with no malfunctions. Suppose we film these
computations with a video camera. Now suppose Alice begins to dream
the same dream again but after a while, Alice’s 2D graph begins
making mistakes, i.e. not sending signals where signals should be
sent. But if we, in all our humanitarian goodwill, project the
(perfectly aligned) film onto the optical material/graph, we can
preserve Alice’s consciousness completely. If it worked with the
cosmic rays from part 1, it works here too, by comp. Alice remains
conscious.

Finally, in Part 3, we reach some apparent contradictions. Bruno
introduces a (safe) principle at the beginning, namely that if some
part of a system is not used for the functioning of that system in
some given task, then it can be removed and still complete that
task. If Alice doesn’t use neuron X to complete her math exam, we
can remove neuron X during the exam and she will perform the same
way. I will call this the principle of irrelevant subsystems.

So, back to Alice and the filmed 2D optical graph. We are
apparently forced, at this point, to conclude that Alice’s
consciousness supervenes on the projection of the movie. In Bruno’s
words:

Is it necessary that someone look at that movie? Certainly not. No
more than it is needed that someone is look at your reconstitution
in Moscow for you to be conscious in Moscow after a ```

### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 23 Dec 2011, at 23:24, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 01:39:56PM -0600, Joseph Knight wrote:

In the case of dovetailing a region of the Multiverse, it is not the
case that consciousness can supervene on a universal dovetailer. If
the conscious content differs in some way, the universal dovetailer
does not - as it is a static, quite singular object.

Surely it is only static in the sense that any program is static
(in a
Platonic sense)? For now, I am referring to a concrete UD. A
concrete UD
can be in different states at different times, so I don't see a
problem.

Sorry - perhaps static is the wrong word. I meant there is only one
UD, like there is only one number 1, so there's no way the UD could be
different in the case of difference consious states.

This is ambiguous. There are infinities of UD programs. And the
consciousness instantiated in the UD, is never the UD's consciousness,
but the consciousness of the person executed in some part of the UD
processing. With sup-phys, this entails that there are finite portion
of UD* which do the conscious person computation. We can apply MGA.
It might be that in some of those computation some register are not
used, and, with 323, we can remove them.

...

I don't see the need to apply Maudlin's argument to the whole UD,
just the
branches that are relevant. There are surely counterfactuals
between these

branches?

Again, all one proves with Maudlin's argument is that consciousness
does not supervene on the physical implementation of the dovetailer,

That is enough to throw out physicalism.

it may still supervene on the multiversal physics.

Like it may still supervene on a God's created multiversal physics.
Yes. Why not. But you need to say that it might still supervene ONLY
on a multiversal physics. But then why not ONLY a God's created
multiversal physics? Such move can always be done, but it is a crime
against Occam, because the reasoning shows that there is nothing
If it where, it would mean we have been incorrect in the choice of the
substitution level.

Maybe the implied assumption here is that if physics is emulable, and
something does not supervene on the emulated physics, then it cannot
supervene on the original.

?

Is this assumption being made? Can it be proved?

It seems to me neither assumed, nor used (but it is a bit unclear,
also, so I might miss something).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 23 Dec 2011, at 23:30, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 03:30:00PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Dec 2011, at 06:18, Russell Standish wrote:

In the case of dovetailing a region of the Multiverse, it is not the
case that consciousness can supervene on a universal dovetailer.

I guess you mean on  universal dovetailing. It is still ambiguous
if you mean it to be concrete/primitively-physical, or immaterial,
like with its arithmetical implementations.

The concept of supervenience has no purchase on the concreteness or
otherwise of the supervened on.

Maudlin uses supervenience for physical supervenience, like Kim
and most expert on supervenience.
I use physical supervenience, because in the dilemma mechanism/
materialsim I choose mechanism. I keep comp, and withdraw the physical
supervenience, so what remains is comp-supervenience, which do no more
refer to anything physical. the physical belongs at this stage to the
appearance of physical, and we have to retrieve the physical laws from
machine's psychology/theology. Which motivates for AUDA.

But what I meant here by universal dovetailer was any physically
instantiated universal dovetailer, otherwise we're no longer talking

Yes. That's what we do in the MGA, and in Maudlin's Olympia.

If
the conscious content differs in some way, the universal dovetailer
does not - as it is a static, quite singular object.

If the conscious content differs, it cannot be related to the same
executions among the infinitely many done by the UD.

True, but the UD does not change itself.

OK.

So the consciousness are not
supervening on the UD, by definition of supervenience.

The consciousness of mister x does supervene on the running of the
relevant computation done by the UD. His consciousness supervene on
(infinitely many) subcomputations of the UD computation. That's why in
UDA step seven we have already the reversal physics/computer science
in the case we suppose our physical universe to be robust (= executing
concretely a universal dovetailer).
The consciousness of one student in a classroom, full of many
students, does supervene on the physical activity occurring in the
classroom as a whole, despite the classroom does not change itself per
se. (It does it in some sense, but then the UD does it to, after all
he changes itself into an infinity of different programs, including
many which changes themselves).

Actually my responses to Joe Knight's comments may be more useful at
getting to why I'm dissatisfied with Maudlin's argument.

I try hard to understand the point.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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### Re: Movie Graph Argument: A Refutation

```

On 22 Dec 2011, at 23:27, Joseph Knight wrote:

Hello everyone and everything,

I have pompously made my own thread for this, even though we have
another MGA thread going, because the other one (sigh, I created
that one too) seems to have split into at least two different
discussions, both of which are largely different from what I have to
say, so I want to avoid confusion.

Here, I will explain why I believe the Movie Graph Argument (MGA) is
invalid. I will start with an exegesis of my understanding of the
MGA, so that Bruno or others can point out if I have failed to
understand some important aspect of the argument. Then I will
explain what is wrong. I believe confusion regarding the concept of
supervenience has been responsible for some invalid reasoning. (At
the end I will also explain why I find Maudlin’s thought experiment
to be inconclusive.)

As it is explained here, here, and here, the MGA consists of three
parts. Throughout the argument we are assuming comp and materialism
to be true.

The MGA

In Part 1, Bruno asks us to consider Alice. Alice is a conscious
being. Alice already has an artificial brain, to make the reasoning
easier. We are assuming here (with no loss of generality) that,
under normal circumstances, Alice’s consciousness supervenes on this
artificial brain. Alice is taking a math exam, when at a certain
moment one of the logic gates A fails to signal logic gate B. At
this precise moment, however, a particle arrives from some far-away
cosmic explosion and triggers gate B anyway. Assuming comp we
(pretty safely) conclude that Alice’s consciousness is unaffected by
this change in causation – after all, the computation has been
performed.Moreover, we can assume any number – thousands, say –
of such failures in Alice’s brain, with lucky cosmic rays arriving
to save the day. Indeed, all of Alice’s neurons could be disabled,
with cosmic rays triggering each one in just the right way so as to
maintain her consciousness. Bruno (wisely, in my opinion) likes to
end the steps of his argument with questions. At the end of MGA 1,
he asks, is Alice a zombie during the exam? We are really forced to
say that she isn’t, because of our comp assumption. So Alice is just
as conscious as she was before her brain started short-circuiting.

In Part 2, we build on the ideas of part 1 but without cosmic rays.
Bruno assumes for the sake of argument, again with no loss of
generality, that Alice is dreaming and that her brain has no inputs
or outputs. Now, Alice’s (artificial) brain is a 3D Boolean graph
(network being the more common term), which, with a few wiring
changes, can be deformed into a 2D Boolean graph and thus laid out
on a plane. Next Bruno asks us to imagine us instantiating Alice’s
2D graph-brain as a system of laser beams connecting nodes (instead
of wires, and with destructive interference helping out with NOR,
etc.), all in some special material. The graph is placed between two
glass plates, and a special crystalline material is sandwiched
between the plates which has the property that if a beam of light
connects two nodes, the “right” laser is triggered to signal the
right node at that location. (Unlikely, but conceivable and valid,
which is all we intrepid philosophers need anyway!)

So Alice is dreaming (conscious), with her dream supervening on the
2D optical graph, and with no malfunctions. Suppose we film these
computations with a video camera. Now suppose Alice begins to dream
the same dream again but after a while, Alice’s 2D graph begins
making mistakes, i.e. not sending signals where signals should be
sent. But if we, in all our humanitarian goodwill, project the
(perfectly aligned) film onto the optical material/graph, we can
preserve Alice’s consciousness completely. If it worked with the
cosmic rays from part 1, it works here too, by comp. Alice remains
conscious.

Finally, in Part 3, we reach some apparent contradictions. Bruno
introduces a (safe) principle at the beginning, namely that if some
part of a system is not used for the functioning of that system in
some given task, then it can be removed and still complete that
task. If Alice doesn’t use neuron X to complete her math exam, we
can remove neuron X during the exam and she will perform the same
way. I will call this the principle of irrelevant subsystems.

So, back to Alice and the filmed 2D optical graph. We are apparently
forced, at this point, to conclude that Alice’s consciousness
supervenes on the projection of the movie. In Bruno’s words:

Is it necessary that someone look at that movie? Certainly not. No
more than it is needed that someone is look at your reconstitution
in Moscow for you to be conscious in Moscow after a teleportation.
All right? (with MEC [comp] assumed of course). Is it necessary to
have a screen? Well, the range of activity here ```