Lee and others: I was surprised to see your remark that functional(ism) and computational(ism) are in the same camp (comp?). I treat (my) functions vaguely, leave it to "nature" to invent (use?) whatever she can while all comp-related isms are applicable within human logic. At least said to be approachable. I consider ourselves a tiny segment of 'everything' and would not denigrate the totality to our choices. (I am no solipsist rather a not-so-naive realist without a reality to show).
John Mikes PS: I heard your 'duck' argument already, and agreed, untill I realized that it is valid only on (and within) a "duck" model we construed for a 'duck'. Move the boundaries (or just widen them) to include a more comprehensive view and your 'ducky' will include characteristics beyond those you mentioned. JM --- Lee Corbin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Bruno writes > > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > > I find an assumption of COMP far more tenuous > than an assumption of a natural world > > > > I respect this. > > I think that there has been a good deal of confusion > between > > (I) computationalism: the doctrine that robots > running classical > programs can be conscious > > (II) Bruno's theories which build on this > long-standing belief > (computationalism) and which go much further. > > This confusion has not been helped at all by Bruno > continuing to > use the term "comp" indiscriminately for both > computationalism > (which is also basically "functionalism") and his > valiant attempts > to derive his "comp" from computationalism > (involving use of Gödel's > Theorem, etc.) > > It must be added that I have *never* --- since 1965 > when I argued > for (what I didn't know was called) computationalism > against others > in my high school. > > It must also be stressed that Turing's most famous > essay embraced > what is today called *computationalism* and > which---basically--- > was called functionalism in the 1980's and 1990's. > SNIP > > TO BE SURE: the main point of contention among > people is still whether > functionalism is true. Is it true, in other words, > that "if it sounds > like a duck, walks like a duck, and acts in every > way like a duck, then > it's a duck!"? > SNIP > Lee > >