Re: Numbers
On 03 May 2013, at 17:09, John Mikes wrote: Never argue with a logician! I try to insert some re-remarks into ''-induced lines below John On Fri, May 3, 2013 at 5:52 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 May 2013, at 18:03, John Mikes wrote: Bruno asked: are you OK with this? - NO, I am not OK: as I follow, 0 is NOT a number, it does not change a number. 0 * 1000 = 0. read in English: 'zero times thousand is zero, - which is -funny: it is not additional/subtractional only states that if I take the '1000' NOT AT ALL I get nothing. You are right: I have no problem with 0.00089, 0s as position markers for the order of magnitude of the 89. I have problems if (some of the) 0-s are NOT zeros, like 0.20489: to use NUMBERS as position-markers (the dirty trick of a decimal point -G) Well, I have to say you are the first to refuse to 0 the number status, with the notable exception of the greeks, but they did not really discovered it. I am sure you have no problem with expression like the concentration of this product is 0.00089 cc. It uses the number 0, which is very useful in the decimal or base notation of the natural and real, and complex numbers. But how do you A D D a number to another one if it is not identified as a quantity? quantity is already part of some interpretation, but you can use it, it is very well. so you do not IDENTIFY, you just INTERPRET? (and do so 'practically') Yes, and if we are cautious enough, the reasoning and the conclusion will not depend on the interpretation. It is not well known, but this has made clear by Gödel, Henkin in the frame of the first order predicate logic. Can you add an electric train to the taste of a lolly-pop? No, but those are not numbers. How would you know, if you do not know what NUMBERS are? So far (my) 'Ding an Sich' can be anything. We might not know what numbers are, and be pretty sure what they are not. You speak about 'axioms' (- in my words they are inventions to prove a theory's applicability.) They are just hypotheses that we accept at the start for doing the reasoning. Nobody ever says that an axiom is true, except in some philosophical context. does that mean that 'an axiom is untrue'? if it is 'not true', why should I accept the hypothesis based on it? Maria said I lack a proposal substituting the accepted reasoning. Pardon me, I am not smarter than those zillion wise men who so far used 'numbers' - yet I have the right to question. We don't know if the hypotheses are true. That does not entail that an hypothesis is untrue. It means that we are agnostic. This should not prevent us to reason as IF they are true, in case the theory (hypotheses) shed light on some subject. So no reversing please: proving the theory by axioms. We never do that. We always prove FROM axioms, and we always know that proving does not entail truth or knowledge. Only pseudo- scientists believe that we can prove things about some reality. I am not for 'proving', do not accept 'reality' and 'truth'. I am just a simpleminded agnostic who asks questions. And I am a simple minded agnostic who try to answer them. The point is that proving does not mean at all making true. Proving just shows a shatable path (for good willing people readu to do some work) between hypothesis and consequences. It does not mean that the hypotheses, nor the consequences, are true. May I repeat the main question: is YOUR number a quantity? Natural number have both. A quantity aspect, and an ordinality aspects, like in the first, the second, the third, etc. so you can add (two = II to three = III and get five = I) ?? That's correct. Now I really do not get it. You marked the quantity-aspect by pegs - au lieu de anything better. ? you did. So WHAT is that NUMBER TWO marked by 'II'? Do you COUNT them? (what?) In the theory I gave, two is the successor of one, and one is the successor of zero, and zero is that unique number which is such that when added to some number, it gives that number. If THAT is your axiom then numbers are quantity specifiers. You can see it that way, but we don't need to agree on this, as long as you agree with the axioms given. Agreeing in science does not mean that we believe those axioms to be true, but that we can understand them and use it to develop some other theories. Now 2+3 = 5 was not an axiom, but it can be derived from them easily. As an agnostic I cannot agree in science or it's axiomatic bases just to submerge into a conventional belief system, which includes the interlaced assumption-conclusion mass we call 'science'. Numbers, or not. Science is agnostic. (well, before Nobel Prize and before pension, and out of the coffee room, actually). When science is not agnostic it is pseudo-religion or pseudo-science. We may AGREE on that, but then
Re: Numbers
Bruno, I apologize for taking so much time from you to reply. And thanks for the highly entertaining reading how your mind (to which mine is no knowledgeable match) rebuffs. One question if you still can take one: *JM: I would leave out mind, matter, consciousness* *Br: Well, that is what I am working on. * (Q: on 'leaving them out' or 'working on THEM'?) And I offer my take developed over the past 2 decades of my agnostic (religious non-faithful) belief system - not for an argument (I am not ready for that) just as a MAYBE usable idea: I INTERPRET (thanks for the word) * * *mind* as the unknowable mentality we 'work with' - an agent we (you?) are willing to assign to our (physiological/physical tool) brain as the tool, though far from understanding it. Then again *matter* as the interactive figment for our sensors (known and still unknown ones) as effects of relations (some knowable) in that 'infinite complexity' of which we have access only to a portion and which gave rise to the greatest hypothesis of man: the FEELING and SCIENCE (physics) of some 'material world'. (I have no idea how other 'creatures' THINK about matter). And: *consciousness *(not related to human terms) as the response to relations in that 'infinite complexity'. Thanks for providing the opportunity to think about these definitions. I may improve on them and would be glad to do so. John Mikes On Sat, May 4, 2013 at 8:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 03 May 2013, at 17:09, John Mikes wrote: Never argue with a logician! I try to insert some re-remarks into ''-induced lines below John On Fri, May 3, 2013 at 5:52 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 May 2013, at 18:03, John Mikes wrote: Bruno asked:* are you OK with this?* - NO, I am not OK: as I follow, 0 is NOT a number, it does not change a number. 0 * 1000 = 0. read in English: 'zero times thousand is zero, - which is -funny: it is not additional/subtractional only states that if I take the '1000' *NOT AT ALL* I get nothing. You are right: I have no problem with 0.000*89, 0*s as position markers for the order of magnitude of the *89*. I have problems if (some of the) 0-s are NOT zeros, like 0.204* 89:* to use NUMBERS as position-markers (the dirty trick of a decimal point -G) Well, I have to say you are the first to refuse to 0 the number status, with the notable exception of the greeks, but they did not really discovered it. I am sure you have no problem with expression like the concentration of this product is 0.00089 cc. It uses the number 0, which is very useful in the decimal or base notation of the natural and real, and complex numbers. But how do you * A D D * a number to another one if it is not identified as a quantity? quantity is already part of some interpretation, but you can use it, it is very well. so you do not IDENTIFY, you just INTERPRET? (and do so 'practically') Yes, and if we are cautious enough, the reasoning and the conclusion will not depend on the interpretation. It is not well known, but this has made clear by Gödel, Henkin in the frame of the first order predicate logic. Can you add an electric train to the taste of a lolly-pop? No, but those are not numbers. How would you know, if you do not know what NUMBERS are? So far (my) 'Ding an Sich' can be anything. We might not know what numbers are, and be pretty sure what they are not. You speak about 'axioms' (- in my words they are inventions to prove a theory's applicability.) They are just hypotheses that we accept at the start for doing the reasoning. Nobody ever says that an axiom is true, except in some philosophical context. does that mean that 'an axiom is untrue'? if it is 'not true', why should I accept the hypothesis based on it? Maria said I lack a proposal substituting the accepted reasoning. Pardon me, I am not smarter than those zillion wise men who so far used 'numbers' - yet I have the right to question. We don't know if the hypotheses are true. That does not entail that an hypothesis is untrue. It means that we are agnostic. This should not prevent us to reason as IF they are true, in case the theory (hypotheses) shed light on some subject. So no *reversing* please: proving the theory by axioms. We never do that. We always prove FROM axioms, and we always know that proving does not entail truth or knowledge. Only pseudo-scientists believe that we can prove things about some reality. I am not for 'proving', do not accept 'reality' and 'truth'. I am just a simpleminded agnostic who asks questions. And I am a simple minded agnostic who try to answer them. The point is that proving does not mean at all making true. Proving just shows a shatable path (for good willing people readu to do some work) between hypothesis and consequences. It does not mean that the hypotheses, nor the consequences, are true. May I repeat the main
Re: Numbers
On 02 May 2013, at 18:03, John Mikes wrote: Bruno asked: are you OK with this? - NO, I am not OK: as I follow, 0 is NOT a number, it does not change a number. 0 * 1000 = 0. Well, I have to say you are the first to refuse to 0 the number status, with the notable exception of the greeks, but they did not really discovered it. I am sure you have no problem with expression like the concentration of this product is 0.00089 cc. It uses the number 0, which is very useful in the decimal or base notation of the natural and real, and complex numbers. But how do you A D D a number to another one if it is not identified as a quantity? quantity is already part of some interpretation, but you can use it, it is very well. Can you add an electric train to the taste of a lolly-pop? No, but those are not numbers. You speak about 'axioms' (- in my words they are inventions to prove a theory's applicability.) They are just hypotheses that we accept at the start for doing the reasoning. Nobody ever says that an axiom is true, except in some philosophical context. So no reversing please: proving the theory by axioms. We never do that. We always prove FROM axioms, and we always know that proving does not entail truth or knowledge. Only pseudo-scientists believe that we can prove things about some reality. May I repeat the main question: is YOUR number a quantity? Natural number have both. A quantity aspect, and an ordinality aspects, like in the first, the second, the third, etc. so you can add (two = II to three = III and get five = I) ?? That's correct. If THAT is your axiom then numbers are quantity specifiers. You can see it that way, but we don't need to agree on this, as long as you agree with the axioms given. Agreeing in science does not mean that we believe those axioms to be true, but that we can understand them and use it to develop some other theories. Now 2+3 = 5 was not an axiom, but it can be derived from them easily. We may AGREE on that, but then numbers are indeed the products of human thinking applied as humans think. Q E D In which theory? I do not assume the humans as primitive, I try to explain them in the theory which assumes that human can be Turing emulated. The result is that the physical laws evolve from the relation between numbers, and this in a testable way. the advantage is that we get an explanation (perhaps wrong, of course) of why we have consciousness and qualia. Bruno: ...That's very good, but we can also develop general statement. We would not have discover the universal number (the computers) without agreeing on those principles. That's a practicality and very fortunate. It is also a conceptual very deep discovery. Before it, mathematicians thought that no epistemiological concept (like computability) could have a universal nature. They believe we could use Cantor's diagonalization to refute all prtendion to universality in math, but computability seems to be an exception (cf the Church Turing thesis). Does not enlighten the problem of what 'numbers' may be, if not quantifiers. The problem is what mind and matter are. The numbers are tools that we use, and we don't even try to explain them, if only because we can already explain (in the comp theory) why it is impossible to understand what they are from anything simpler than them. BrunO :) JOhn On Thu, May 2, 2013 at 4:54 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 May 2013, at 22:09, John Mikes wrote: Bruno asked why I have problems how to figure out 'numbers'. In his texts (as I remember and I have no quotes at hand) the world can be construed from a large enough amount of numbers in simple arithmetical ways (addition-subtraction). Also: numbers do not mean quantities. If his older post with pegs (II=two, =four etc.) is OK, the 'words' two and four DO mean quantities. If not, as 'numbers' they are meaningless combinations of letters (sounds?) we could call the series any way, as well as e.g.: tylba, chuggon, rpais, etc. for 1,2,3 - or take them from any other language (eins,zwei,drei, - egy, kettő, három) as they developed in diverse domains/lifestyles. The 'numbers' would be like Ding an Sich (German) however used as qualifiers for quantities if so applied (see Bruno's 'pegs' above). The terms we are using are not important. All we need is some agreement on some theory. Most things we need for the natural numbers can be derived from the following axioms (written in english): any number added to zero gives the number we started with (= x + 0 = x) 0 is not the successor of any natural number if two numbers are different, then they have different successors a number x added to a successor of a number y gives a successor of the sum of x and y. Are you OK with this? In science we know that we cannot define what we are
Re: Numbers
Never argue with a logician! I try to insert some re-remarks into ''-induced lines below John On Fri, May 3, 2013 at 5:52 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 May 2013, at 18:03, John Mikes wrote: Bruno asked:* are you OK with this?* - NO, I am not OK: as I follow, 0 is NOT a number, it does not change a number. 0 * 1000 = 0. read in English: 'zero times thousand is zero, - which is -funny: it is not additional/subtractional only states that if I take the '1000' *NOT AT ALL* I get nothing. You are right: I have no problem with 0.000*89, 0*s as position markers for the order of magnitude of the *89*. I have problems if (some of the) 0-s are NOT zeros, like 0.204*89:* to use NUMBERS as position-markers (the dirty trick of a decimal point -G) Well, I have to say you are the first to refuse to 0 the number status, with the notable exception of the greeks, but they did not really discovered it. I am sure you have no problem with expression like the concentration of this product is 0.00089 cc. It uses the number 0, which is very useful in the decimal or base notation of the natural and real, and complex numbers. But how do you * A D D * a number to another one if it is not identified as a quantity? quantity is already part of some interpretation, but you can use it, it is very well. so you do not IDENTIFY, you just INTERPRET? (and do so 'practically') Can you add an electric train to the taste of a lolly-pop? No, but those are not numbers. How would you know, if you do not know what NUMBERS are? So far (my) 'Ding an Sich' can be anything. You speak about 'axioms' (- in my words they are inventions to prove a theory's applicability.) They are just hypotheses that we accept at the start for doing the reasoning. Nobody ever says that an axiom is true, except in some philosophical context. does that mean that 'an axiom is untrue'? if it is 'not true', why should I accept the hypothesis based on it? Maria said I lack a proposal substituting the accepted reasoning. Pardon me, I am not smarter than those zillion wise men who so far used 'numbers' - yet I have the right to question. So no *reversing* please: proving the theory by axioms. We never do that. We always prove FROM axioms, and we always know that proving does not entail truth or knowledge. Only pseudo-scientists believe that we can prove things about some reality. I am not for 'proving', do not accept 'reality' and 'truth'. I am just a simpleminded agnostic who asks questions. May I repeat the main question: is YOUR number a quantity? Natural number have both. A quantity aspect, and an ordinality aspects, like in the first, the second, the third, etc. so you can add (two = *II *to three = *III* and get five = *I*) ?? That's correct. Now I really do not get it. You marked the quantity-aspect by pegs - au lieu de anything better. So WHAT is that NUMBER TWO marked by 'II'? Do you COUNT them? (what?) If THAT is your axiom then numbers are quantity specifiers. You can see it that way, but we don't need to agree on this, as long as you agree with the axioms given. Agreeing in science does not mean that we believe those axioms to be true, but that we can understand them and use it to develop some other theories. Now 2+3 = 5 was not an axiom, but it can be derived from them easily. As an agnostic I cannot agree in science or it's axiomatic bases just to submerge into a conventional belief system, which includes the interlaced assumption-conclusion mass we call 'science'. Numbers, or not. We may AGREE on that, but then numbers are indeed the products of human thinking applied as humans think. *Q E D * In which theory? Maybe in the overall 'belief' that we can understand the world. I do not assume the humans as primitive, I try to explain them in the theory which assumes that human can be Turing emulated. The result is that the physical laws evolve from the relation between numbers, and this in a testable way. the advantage is that we get an explanation (perhaps wrong, of course) of why we have consciousness and qualia. Please do not forget all those knowables we may acquire later on - they may change the 'physical Law' of yesterday even the Turing emulation of the 'HUMAN'. Which raises again the question how reliable the numbers may be. (If we agree in their identification). * * *Bruno: ...**That's very good, but we can also develop general statement. We would not have discover the universal number (the computers) without agreeing on those principles.* * * That's a practicality and very fortunate. It is also a conceptual very deep discovery. Before it, mathematicians thought that no epistemiological concept (like computability) could have a universal nature. They believe we could use Cantor's diagonalization to refute all prtendion to universality in math, but computability seems to be an exception (cf the Church Turing
Re: Numbers
On 01 May 2013, at 22:09, John Mikes wrote: Bruno asked why I have problems how to figure out 'numbers'. In his texts (as I remember and I have no quotes at hand) the world can be construed from a large enough amount of numbers in simple arithmetical ways (addition-subtraction). Also: numbers do not mean quantities. If his older post with pegs (II=two, =four etc.) is OK, the 'words' two and four DO mean quantities. If not, as 'numbers' they are meaningless combinations of letters (sounds?) we could call the series any way, as well as e.g.: tylba, chuggon, rpais, etc. for 1,2,3 - or take them from any other language (eins,zwei,drei, - egy, kettő, három) as they developed in diverse domains/lifestyles. The 'numbers' would be like Ding an Sich (German) however used as qualifiers for quantities if so applied (see Bruno's 'pegs' above). The terms we are using are not important. All we need is some agreement on some theory. Most things we need for the natural numbers can be derived from the following axioms (written in english): any number added to zero gives the number we started with (= x + 0 = x) 0 is not the successor of any natural number if two numbers are different, then they have different successors a number x added to a successor of a number y gives a successor of the sum of x and y. Are you OK with this? In science we know that we cannot define what we are talking about, but we can agree on some principles about them. More reasonably sounds the idea of my wife, Maria, who assigns the primitive development of quantities originally to proportions: larger (amount) - smaller (amount) evolving in some thousand centuries into the process of 'counting' the included units. That's very good, but we can also develop general statement. We would not have discover the universal number (the computers) without agreeing on those principles. I published on this list my thought for developing the Roman numbering signs. I started with 2 - a PAIR of hands etc. (not with one, which means only the existence) and branching into 5 (as fingers, as in pentaton music) already as 'many'. OK. I still have no idea what description could fit 'number' in Bruno's usage (I did not study number - theory - to keep my common sense (agnostic?) thinking free). See above. Bruno John Mikes -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Numbers
Bruno asked:* are you OK with this?* - NO, I am not OK: as I follow, 0 is NOT a number, it does not change a number. But how do you * A D D * a number to another one if it is not identified as a quantity? Can you add an electric train to the taste of a lolly-pop? You speak about 'axioms' (- in my words they are inventions to prove a theory's applicability.) So no *reversing* please: proving the theory by axioms. May I repeat the main question: is YOUR number a quantity? so you can add (two = *II *to three = *III* and get five = *I*) ?? If THAT is your axiom then numbers are quantity specifiers. We may AGREE on that, but then numbers are indeed the products of human thinking applied as humans think. *Q E D * * * *Bruno: ...**That's very good, but we can also develop general statement. We would not have discover the universal number (the computers) without agreeing on those principles.* * * That's a practicality and very fortunate. Does not enlighten the problem of what 'numbers' may be, if not quantifiers. JOhn On Thu, May 2, 2013 at 4:54 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 May 2013, at 22:09, John Mikes wrote: Bruno asked why I have problems how to figure out *'numbers'*. * * In his texts (as I remember and I have no quotes at hand) the world can be construed from a large enough amount of numbers in simple arithmetical ways (addition-subtraction). Also: numbers do not mean quantities. If his older post with pegs (II=two, =four etc.) is OK, the 'words' two and four DO mean quantities. If not, as 'numbers' they are meaningless combinations of letters (sounds?) we could call the series any way, as well as e.g.: tylba, chuggon, rpais, etc. for 1,2,3 - or take them from any other language (eins,zwei,drei, - egy, kettő, három) as they developed in diverse domains/lifestyles. The 'numbers' would be like Ding an Sich (German) however used as qualifiers for quantities if so applied (see Bruno's 'pegs' above). The terms we are using are not important. All we need is some agreement on some theory. Most things we need for the natural numbers can be derived from the following axioms (written in english): any number added to zero gives the number we started with (= x + 0 = x) 0 is not the successor of any natural number if two numbers are different, then they have different successors a number x added to a successor of a number y gives a successor of the sum of x and y. Are you OK with this? In science we know that we cannot define what we are talking about, but we can agree on some principles about them. Bruno: *...We would not have discover(ed) the universal number (the computers) without agreeing on those principles. * * * To have discovered the 'universal number'(?) (i.e. computers) is fine but that does not imply understanding on numbers: like numbers are such as to be applicable for... etc. My agnosticism needs more than that. Sorry. More reasonably sounds the idea of my wife, Maria, who assigns the primitive development of quantities originally to proportions: larger (amount) - smaller (amount) evolving in some thousand centuries into the process of 'counting' the included units. That's very good, but we can also develop general statement. We would not have discover the universal number (the computers) without agreeing on those principles. I published on this list my thought for developing the Roman numbering signs. I started with 2 - a PAIR of hands etc. (not with one, which means only the existence) and branching into 5 (as fingers, as in pentaton music) already as 'many'. OK. I still have no idea what description could fit *'number'* in Bruno's usage (I did not study number - theory - to keep my common sense (agnostic?) thinking free). See above. Bruno John John Mikes -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
Re: Numbers
On Wednesday, May 1, 2013 4:09:03 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote: Bruno asked why I have problems how to figure out *'numbers'*. * * In his texts (as I remember and I have no quotes at hand) the world can be construed from a large enough amount of numbers in simple arithmetical ways (addition-subtraction). Also: numbers do not mean quantities. If his older post with pegs (II=two, =four etc.) is OK, the 'words' two and four DO mean quantities. If not, as 'numbers' they are meaningless combinations of letters (sounds?) we could call the series any way, as well as e.g.: tylba, chuggon, rpais, etc. for 1,2,3 - or take them from any other language (eins,zwei,drei, - egy, kettő, három) as they developed in diverse domains/lifestyles. The 'numbers' would be like Ding an Sich (German) however used as qualifiers for quantities if so applied (see Bruno's 'pegs' above). More reasonably sounds the idea of my wife, Maria, who assigns the primitive development of quantities originally to proportions: larger (amount) - smaller (amount) Yes, I think that is a good place to start. Larger and smaller are aesthetic qualities - feelings which we use to discern objects from one another and changes in objects (the pond is larger after it rains). Craig evolving in some thousand centuries into the process of 'counting' the included units. I published on this list my thought for developing the Roman numbering signs. I started with 2 - a PAIR of hands etc. (not with one, which means only the existence) and branching into 5 (as fingers, as in pentaton music) already as 'many'. I still have no idea what description could fit *'number'* in Bruno's usage (I did not study number - theory - to keep my common sense (agnostic?) thinking free). John Mikes -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 02 Dec 2012, at 19:33, meekerdb wrote: On 12/2/2012 1:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Nov 2012, at 21:28, meekerdb wrote: On 11/30/2012 10:02 AM, Roger Clough wrote: And a transcendent truth could be arithmetic truth or the truth of necessary logic. True in logic and formal mathematics is just marker T that is preserved by the rules of inference. This makes no sense. You confuse the propositional constant T, with the semantical notion of truth. The first is expressible/definable formally (indeed by T, or by 0 = 0 in arithmetic), the second is not (Tarski theorem). On the contrary, I'm pointing out that they are NOT the same thing. Apology, but it was not clear. Bruno Brent When we say that truth is preserved by the rules of inference, we are concerned with the second notion. In applications it is interpreted as if it were the correspondence meaning of 'true'. Like in arithmetic. Truth of ExP(x) means that it exists a n such that P(n), at the metalevel, which is the bare level in logic (that explains many confusion). But like all applications of mathematics, it may be only approximate. Yes, but for arithmetic it is pretty clear, as we share our intuition on the so-called standard finite numbers. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2012.0.2221 / Virus Database: 2634/5431 - Release Date: 12/01/12 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 30 Nov 2012, at 21:28, meekerdb wrote: On 11/30/2012 10:02 AM, Roger Clough wrote: And a transcendent truth could be arithmetic truth or the truth of necessary logic. True in logic and formal mathematics is just marker T that is preserved by the rules of inference. This makes no sense. You confuse the propositional constant T, with the semantical notion of truth. The first is expressible/definable formally (indeed by T, or by 0 = 0 in arithmetic), the second is not (Tarski theorem). When we say that truth is preserved by the rules of inference, we are concerned with the second notion. In applications it is interpreted as if it were the correspondence meaning of 'true'. Like in arithmetic. Truth of ExP(x) means that it exists a n such that P(n), at the metalevel, which is the bare level in logic (that explains many confusion). But like all applications of mathematics, it may be only approximate. Yes, but for arithmetic it is pretty clear, as we share our intuition on the so-called standard finite numbers. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 12/2/2012 1:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Nov 2012, at 21:28, meekerdb wrote: On 11/30/2012 10:02 AM, Roger Clough wrote: And a transcendent truth could be arithmetic truth or the truth of necessary logic. True in logic and formal mathematics is just marker T that is preserved by the rules of inference. This makes no sense. You confuse the propositional constant T, with the semantical notion of truth. The first is expressible/definable formally (indeed by T, or by 0 = 0 in arithmetic), the second is not (Tarski theorem). On the contrary, I'm pointing out that they are NOT the same thing. Brent When we say that truth is preserved by the rules of inference, we are concerned with the second notion. In applications it is interpreted as if it were the correspondence meaning of 'true'. Like in arithmetic. Truth of ExP(x) means that it exists a n such that P(n), at the metalevel, which is the bare level in logic (that explains many confusion). But like all applications of mathematics, it may be only approximate. Yes, but for arithmetic it is pretty clear, as we share our intuition on the so-called standard finite numbers. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2012.0.2221 / Virus Database: 2634/5431 - Release Date: 12/01/12 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
Hi meekerdb My reaction is that nothing is perfect in this world anyway. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/1/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-30, 15:28:31 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 11/30/2012 10:02 AM, Roger Clough wrote: And a transcendent truth could be arithmetic truth or the truth of necessary logic. True in logic and formal mathematics is just marker T that is preserved by the rules of inference. In applications it is interpreted as if it were the correspondence meaning of 'true'. But like all applications of mathematics, it may be only approximate. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
Hi Stephen P. King Hintakka's concept of truth is what is called pragmatic truth, or scientific truth. It's the same as Peirce's-- namely, what results when you carry out a particular protocol. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/30/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-02, 18:20:11 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Are you familiar with Jaakko Hintikka's ideas? I am using his concept of game theoretic semantics to derive truth valuations. I read this. yes. I don't see relevant at all. I do appreciate his linking of intention and intension, but it is a bit trivial in the comp theory. Dear Bruno, Hintikka's idea is to show how truth values can be coherently considered to be the result of a process and not necessarily just some a priori valuation. This makes Truth an emergent valuation, just as I content all definite properties are emergent from mutual agreements between entities. Properties, in the absence of the possibility of measurement or apprehension of some type, do not exist; they are what the 1p project onto existence. Nothing more. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/30/2012 9:10 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Hintakka's concept of truth is what is called pragmatic truth, or scientific truth. It's the same as Peirce's-- namely, what results when you carry out a particular protocol. Dear Roger, Sure, I agree. My point is that such is the only notion of truth that is within our ability to grasp. We obtain the transcendent notions of truth by abstraction in some infinite limit of the pragmatic truths. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] mailto:rclo...@verizon.net] 11/30/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - *From:* Stephen P. King mailto:stephe...@charter.net *Receiver:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-11-02, 18:20:11 *Subject:* Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Are you familiar with Jaakko Hintikka's ideas? I am using his concept of game theoretic semantics to derive truth valuations. I read this. yes. I don't see relevant at all. I do appreciate his linking of intention and intension, but it is a bit trivial in the comp theory. Dear Bruno, Hintikka's idea is to show how truth values can be coherently considered to be the result of a process and not necessarily just some a priori valuation. This makes Truth an emergent valuation, just as I content all definite properties are emergent from mutual agreements between entities. Properties, in the absence of the possibility of measurement or apprehension of some type, do not exist; they are what the 1p project onto existence. Nothing more. -- -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
Hi Stephen P. King No, we can grasp truth by correspondence. And a transcendent truth could be arithmetic truth or the truth of necessary logic. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/30/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-30, 11:17:12 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 11/30/2012 9:10 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Hintakka's concept of truth is what is called pragmatic truth, or scientific truth. It's the same as Peirce's-- namely, what results when you carry out a particular protocol. Dear Roger, Sure, I agree. My point is that such is the only notion of truth that is within our ability to grasp. We obtain the transcendent notions of truth by abstraction in some infinite limit of the pragmatic truths. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/30/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-02, 18:20:11 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Are you familiar with Jaakko Hintikka's ideas? I am using his concept of game theoretic semantics to derive truth valuations. I read this. yes. I don't see relevant at all. I do appreciate his linking of intention and intension, but it is a bit trivial in the comp theory. Dear Bruno, Hintikka's idea is to show how truth values can be coherently considered to be the result of a process and not necessarily just some a priori valuation. This makes Truth an emergent valuation, just as I content all definite properties are emergent from mutual agreements between entities. Properties, in the absence of the possibility of measurement or apprehension of some type, do not exist; they are what the 1p project onto existence. Nothing more. -- -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/30/2012 10:02 AM, Roger Clough wrote: And a transcendent truth could be arithmetic truth or the truth of necessary logic. True in logic and formal mathematics is just marker T that is preserved by the rules of inference. In applications it is interpreted as if it were the correspondence meaning of 'true'. But like all applications of mathematics, it may be only approximate. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
Hi Stephen P. King Plato in the end confessed that the best he could offer was a likely story. I see no reason to doubt his authority. Nor of the Bible, for that matter. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 10:18:16 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 11/3/2012 8:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 11:46, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? Dear Bruno, No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be complete and consistent simultaneously, Why not? The One is not a theory. Why does it have to be a theory? The concept of the One is a fragment of a theory... You make the same coinfusion again and again. The One is not the same as the concept of the One. Does the One have a Concept of The One as its unique 1p? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/5/2012 1:14 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Plato in the end confessed that the best he could offer was a likely story. I see no reason to doubt his authority. Nor of the Bible, for that matter. Dear Roger, This tells me that you are OK with arguments from authority. This saddens me! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
Hi Stephen P. King I don't think there's a better standard of truth. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 13:39:57 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 11/5/2012 1:14 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Plato in the end confessed that the best he could offer was a likely story. I see no reason to doubt his authority. Nor of the Bible, for that matter. Dear Roger, This tells me that you are OK with arguments from authority. This saddens me! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 03 Nov 2012, at 16:18, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 11:46, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? Dear Bruno, No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be complete and consistent simultaneously, Why not? The One is not a theory. Why does it have to be a theory? The concept of the One is a fragment of a theory... You make the same coinfusion again and again. The One is not the same as the concept of the One. Does the One have a Concept of The One as its unique 1p? I think the inner God, alias the arithmetical 1p (not arithmetical in the logician sense, but still applying to the machine) , alias Bp p (Theaetetus on Bp) can be said to be a unique abstract person. But it is not the 1p of the one, it is the 1p of the Man. Open problem for me if Arithmetical truth can be seen as a person or not. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/4/2012 12:01 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] Does the One have a Concept of The One as its unique 1p? I think the inner God, alias the arithmetical 1p (not arithmetical in the logician sense, but still applying to the machine) , alias Bp p (Theaetetus on Bp) can be said to be a unique abstract person. But it is not the 1p of the one, it is the 1p of the Man. Open problem for me if Arithmetical truth can be seen as a person or not. Dear Bruno, I am making a conjecture that Arithmetical truth (AT) cannot be seen as a singular person and pursuing the consequences of that conjecture. I claim that, at best, AT is the mutual consistent set of predicates (?) within the individual 1p of at least 3 entities. This follows from my definitions of information and Reality. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 02 Nov 2012, at 19:35, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:21, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to not assume a concrete robust physical universe. ? Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I explicitly do assume a primitive physicalreality. In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum. Dear Bruno, I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you still didn't understand... From: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf ...what if we don’t grant a concrete robust physical universe? Actually the 8th present step will explain that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the notion of concrete and existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power. It will follow that a much weaker and usual form of Ockham’s razor can be used to conclude that not only physics has been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ‘‘matter’’ has been ontologically reduced to ‘‘mind’’ where mind is defined as the object study of fundamental machine psychology. My claim is that neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any other object that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically primitive. Both must emerge from a neutral ground that is neither and has no particular properties. How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? Dear Bruno, No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be complete and consistent simultaneously, Why not? The One is not a theory. thus it must stratify itself into Many. Each of the Many is claimed to have aspects that when recombined cancel to neutrality. [SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I just prove this from comp. That's the originality. A bit of metaphysics is made into a theorem in a theory (comp). Can we agree that physical worlds emerge somehow from sharable aspects of multiple sheaves of computations? This is what I have shown to be a consequence of comp. I agree. [SPK] given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or derived from irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive - Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, *} that are operating somehow in an atemporal way. We should be able to make the argument run without ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of 'realism'. In my thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a TOE and run the TOE to generate our world, then that power should be obvious. My problem is that it looks tooo much like the 'explanation' of creation that we find in mythology, whether it is the Ptah of ancient Egypt or the egg of Pangu or whatever other myth one might like. What makes an explanation framed in the sophisticated and formal language of modal logic any different? I use the self-reference logic, for obvious reason. Again, this entails the sue of some modal logics, due to a *theorem* by Solovay. All correct machine whose beliefs extend RA obeys to G and G*. There is no choice in the matter. That is not changed or involved by my argument. [SPK] I agree 10% with your point about 'miracles'. I am very suspicions of special explanations' or 'natural conspiracies'. (This comes from my upbringing as a Bible- believing Fundamentalist and eventual rejection of that literalist mental straight-jacket.) As I see things, any condition or situation that can be used to 'explain' some other conceptually difficult condition or situation should be either universal in that they apply anywhere and anytime But even in your theory anywhere and anytime must be defined by something more primitive, given that you agree that physics cannot be the fundamental theory, given that the physical reality is not primitive. The concepts of where and when (positions in a space-time) would seem to be rendered meaningless if there is no space-time (or observers/measurements to define it), no? OH, BTW, I don't think that we disagree that physics cannot be the fundamental theory. Physics requires measurements/observations to be meaningful. Where I agree with you is in your considerations of 1p and observer indeterminacy. Where you and I disagree is on the question of resources. Resources are required for computations to run so there has to be the availability of resources involved in *any* consideration of computations. Ignoring these considerations by only considering computations as Platonic objects is wrong, IMHO. You seem to be OK with computations as purely timeless objects (in Platonia) that are such that
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/3/2012 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? Dear Bruno, No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be complete and consistent simultaneously, Why not? The One is not a theory. Why does it have to be a theory? The concept of the One is a fragment of a theory... -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/3/2012 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I read Russell. Never found something that non sensical. If the basic object have no properties, I don't see how anything can emerge from it. You have to explain your point, not to refer to the literature. Dear Bruno, Did you notice that I distinguish between having no properties and having no particular properties? The former is undefinable, the latter is equivalent to having all possible properties. The word particular seems to cause confusion. It is used to bracket one against many, like a figure and its ground. It implies a choice... -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 02 Nov 2012, at 23:12, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way to physically implement them. Those notion have nothing to do with physical implementation. So your thinking about them is not a physical act? Too much ambiguous. Even staying in comp I can answer yes and no. Yes, because my human thinking is locally supported by physical events. No, because the whole couple mind/physical events is supported by platonic arithmetical truth. Dear Bruno, Where is the evidence of the existence of a Platonic realm? It is part of the assumption. We postulate arithmetic. I try to avoid the use of platonic there, as I used the term in Plato sense. In that sense Platonia = the greek Noùs, and it is derived from arithmetic and comp. All you need is the belief that 43 is prime independently of 43 is prime. The mere self-consistency of an idea is proof of existence Already in arithmetic we have the consistence of the existence of a prrof of the false, this certainly does not mean that there exist a proof of the false. So self-consistency is doubtfully identifiable with truth, and still less with existence. but the idea must be understood by a multiplicity of entities with the capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood to have any coherence as an idea! Not at all. 43 is prime might be true, even in absence of universe and observer. We cannot just assume that the mere existence of some undefined acts to determine the properties of the undefined. Truth and falsity are possible properties, they are not ontological aspects of existence. Truth is no more a property than existence. It makes no sense. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 02 Nov 2012, at 23:16, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You are the one saying that truth is limited to the means of knowing!!! Yes and no, Truth is limited to the *possibility* of knowledge of it. In the absence of the possibility of a statement being true (or false), there is not such thing as true or false. I use the standard notion, which are simpler than possibility and knowledge. I use only things like ExP(x) is true if there is a n such that P(n), etc. read a textbook in logic, as you introduce metaphysical baggage where logician have been able to discard them. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 02 Nov 2012, at 23:20, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Are you familiar with Jaakko Hintikka's ideas? I am using his concept of game theoretic semantics to derive truth valuations. I read this. yes. I don't see relevant at all. I do appreciate his linking of intention and intension, but it is a bit trivial in the comp theory. Dear Bruno, Hintikka's idea is to show how truth values can be coherently considered to be the result of a process and not necessarily just some a priori valuation. This makes Truth an emergent valuation, just as I content all definite properties are emergent from mutual agreements between entities. But how will you define entities? Where and how will the truth of truth is an emergent valuation emerge? What you say does not make sense for me. But if someone else understand please help Stephen in conveying the idea. Properties, in the absence of the possibility of measurement or apprehension of some type, do not exist; they are what the 1p project onto existence. Nothing more. Existence of what, of who, where, how? It is very bad philosophy to throw doubt on scientific results just by using non standard unclear philosophical definition in a context where honest scientist have no problem at all, and use what everybody understand to show that there is some problem indeed, and attempt to make a formulation of such problems. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 03 Nov 2012, at 11:46, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? Dear Bruno, No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be complete and consistent simultaneously, Why not? The One is not a theory. Why does it have to be a theory? The concept of the One is a fragment of a theory... You make the same coinfusion again and again. The One is not the same as the concept of the One. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
Hi Quentin Anciaux Any statement that cannot be contradicted is always true. As such these truths are called a priori. They were here before the world or you or me was created. Prime numbers seem to be such. A posteriori truths are truths of existence called facts. They may be contradicted, may not be always true or false. Today it is raining is such. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Quentin Anciaux Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-02, 20:25:00 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm 2012/11/2 Stephen P. King On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way to physically implement them. Those notion have nothing to do with physical implementation. ? ? So your thinking about them is not a physical act? Too much ambiguous. Even staying in comp I can answer yes and no. Yes, because my human thinking is locally supported by physical events. No, because the whole couple mind/physical events is supported by platonic arithmetical truth. Dear Bruno, ? ? Where is the evidence of the existence of a Platonic realm? The mere self-consistency of an idea is proof of existence but the idea must be understood by a multiplicity of entities with the capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood to have any coherence as an idea! We cannot just assume that the mere existence of some undefined acts to determine the properties of the undefined. Truth and falsity are possible properties, they are not ontological aspects of existence. Either? you can have emerging properties of nothing or you can't. Either there is infinite regress or not, whatever is true (and one or the other is), it's not an obstacle. Quentin -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
Hi Stephen P. King The Platonic Realm doesn't exactly exist, because it is non-contradictory truth beyond spacetime. It is the a priori, the One, from which all things come. Sometimes I think of it as Cosmic Mind, Universal Intelligence, which has the attributes of God. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-02, 18:12:19 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way to physically implement them. Those notion have nothing to do with physical implementation. So your thinking about them is not a physical act? Too much ambiguous. Even staying in comp I can answer yes and no. Yes, because my human thinking is locally supported by physical events. No, because the whole couple mind/physical events is supported by platonic arithmetical truth. Dear Bruno, Where is the evidence of the existence of a Platonic realm? The mere self-consistency of an idea is proof of existence but the idea must be understood by a multiplicity of entities with the capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood to have any coherence as an idea! We cannot just assume that the mere existence of some undefined acts to determine the properties of the undefined. Truth and falsity are possible properties, they are not ontological aspects of existence. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
Hi Stephen P. King 1 + 1 =2 is a necessary truth, not a fact. It is always true. A priori. So there are necessary truths such as arithmetical truths which were here before the contingent world of facts was created. And will always be. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-02, 18:16:09 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You are the one saying that truth is limited to the means of knowing!!! Yes and no, Truth is limited to the *possibility* of knowledge of it. In the absence of the possibility of a statement being true (or false), there is not such thing as true or false. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
Hi Stephen P. King The platonic realm is nothing. Intelligence is nothing. Life itself is nothing. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-02, 23:17:40 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 11/2/2012 8:25 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Either you can have emerging properties of nothing or you can't. Either there is infinite regress or not, whatever is true (and one or the other is), it's not an obstacle. Hi Questin, It depends on whether you think of Nothing as merely an absence of properties or a complete lack of existence. I believe in the former case. I don't have problems with infinite regress as I understand that an actual regress requires infinite stuff to be real. Explanation that push the problem behind a insurmountable curtain are not infinite regressive, they are merely evasions of the problem. They are attempt to get people to stop asking hard questions. I will not ever stop asking questions as I am not afraid of being wrong or foolish. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/3/2012 8:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 11:46, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? Dear Bruno, No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be complete and consistent simultaneously, Why not? The One is not a theory. Why does it have to be a theory? The concept of the One is a fragment of a theory... You make the same coinfusion again and again. The One is not the same as the concept of the One. Does the One have a Concept of The One as its unique 1p? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/3/2012 8:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King 1 + 1 =2 is a necessary truth, not a fact. It is always true. A priori. So there are necessary truths such as arithmetical truths which were here before the contingent world of facts was created. And will always be. Hi Roger, It seems to me that is there are necessary truths that have no connection to facts in any way, then they are unknowable. I am just reversing that thought to define the relations between a priori and a posteriori truths. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/3/2012 8:51 AM, Roger Clough wrote: The platonic realm is nothing. Intelligence is nothing. Life itself is nothing. 1-1 = 0 2-2 = 0 3-3 = 0 ... -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:21, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to not assume a concrete robust physical universe. ? Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I explicitly do assume a primitive physical reality. In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum. Dear Bruno, I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you still didn't understand... From: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf ...what if we don’t grant a concrete robust physical universe? Actually the 8th present step will explain that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the notion of concrete and existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power. It will follow that a much weaker and usual form of Ockham’s razor can be used to conclude that not only physics has been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ‘‘matter’’ has been ontologically reduced to ‘‘mind’’ where mind is defined as the object study of fundamental machine psychology. My claim is that neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any other object that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically primitive. Both must emerge from a neutral ground that is neither and has no particular properties. How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? [SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I just prove this from comp. That's the originality. A bit of metaphysics is made into a theorem in a theory (comp). Can we agree that physical worlds emerge somehow from sharable aspects of multiple sheaves of computations? This is what I have shown to be a consequence of comp. [SPK] given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or derived from irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive - Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, *} that are operating somehow in an atemporal way. We should be able to make the argument run without ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of 'realism'. In my thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a TOE and run the TOE to generate our world, then that power should be obvious. My problem is that it looks tooo much like the 'explanation' of creation that we find in mythology, whether it is the Ptah of ancient Egypt or the egg of Pangu or whatever other myth one might like. What makes an explanation framed in the sophisticated and formal language of modal logic any different? I use the self-reference logic, for obvious reason. Again, this entails the sue of some modal logics, due to a *theorem* by Solovay. All correct machine whose beliefs extend RA obeys to G and G*. There is no choice in the matter. That is not changed or involved by my argument. [SPK] I agree 10% with your point about 'miracles'. I am very suspicions of special explanations' or 'natural conspiracies'. (This comes from my upbringing as a Bible- believing Fundamentalist and eventual rejection of that literalist mental straight-jacket.) As I see things, any condition or situation that can be used to 'explain' some other conceptually difficult condition or situation should be either universal in that they apply anywhere and anytime But even in your theory anywhere and anytime must be defined by something more primitive, given that you agree that physics cannot be the fundamental theory, given that the physical reality is not primitive. The concepts of where and when (positions in a space-time) would seem to be rendered meaningless if there is no space-time (or observers/measurements to define it), no? OH, BTW, I don't think that we disagree that physics cannot be the fundamental theory. Physics requires measurements/observations to be meaningful. Where I agree with you is in your considerations of 1p and observer indeterminacy. Where you and I disagree is on the question of resources. Resources are required for computations to run so there has to be the availability of resources involved in *any* consideration of computations. Ignoring these considerations by only considering computations as Platonic objects is wrong, IMHO. You seem to be OK with computations as purely timeless objects (in Platonia) that are such that somehow we finite entities can create physical objects that can implement (in their dynamical functions) instances of such, while I claim that computations are equivalence classes of functions that physical systems can implement *and* abstract objects. I see these two views as two poles of a spectrum. There is a lot more detail in my considerations that I do not have time to go into at this time... My
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 01 Nov 2012, at 22:50, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/1/2012 12:04 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Nov 2012, at 01:18, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/31/2012 12:45 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: can stop reading as you need to assume the numbers (or anything Turing equivalent) to get them. Dear Bruno, So it is OK to assume that which I seek to explain? You can't explain the numbers without assuming the numbers. This has been foreseen by Dedekind, and vert well justified by many theorem in mathematical logic. Below the number, you are lead to version of ultrafinitism, which is senseless in the comp theory. Dear Bruno, I disagree with ultrafinitists, they seem to be the mathematical equivalent of flat-earthers'. *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. I just assume x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x And hope you understand. I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way to physically implement them. Those notion have nothing to do with physical implementation. So your thinking about them is not a physical act? Too much ambiguous. Even staying in comp I can answer yes and no. Yes, because my human thinking is locally supported by physical events. No, because the whole couple mind/physical events is supported by platonic arithmetical truth. Implementation and physical will be explained from them. A natural thing as they are much more complex than the laws above. Numbers are meaningless in the absence of a means to define them. Theories do not free-float. Truth is free floating, and theories lived through truth, they are truth floating, even when false. In the absence of some common media, even if it is generated by sheaves of computations, there simply is no way to understand anything. Why ? Because there is not way to know of them otherwise. Our knowing as nothing to do with truth. If an asteroid would have destroy Earth before the Oresme bishop dicovered that the harmonic series diverge, she would have still diverge, despite no humans would know it. Unless you can communicate with me, I have no way of knowing anything about your ideas. Similarly if there is no physical implementation of a mathematical statement, there is no meaning to claims to truth ofsuch statements. To claim, no. To be true is independent of the claim of the apes. You must accept non-well foundedness for your result to work, but you seem fixated against that. 1004. Pfft. Nice custom made quip. You are often escaping answers by inappropriate mathematical precision, which meaning contradicts your mathematical super- relativism. It is really 1004+contradiction. A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable of understanding the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. Do you agree that during the five seconds just after the Big Bang (assuming that theory) there might not have been any possible observers. But then the Big Bang has no more sense. No, I don't. Why? Because that concept of the five seconds just after the Big Bang is an assumption of a special case or pleading. I might as well postulate the existence of Raindow Dash to act as the entity to whom the Truth of mathematical statements have absolute meaning. To be frank, I thing that the Big Bang theory, as usually explained is a steaming pile of rubbish, as it asks us to believe that thetotality of all that exists sprang into being from Nothing. I actually agree, by accident, on this. But this is not relevant for my point. It is very relevant to mine. Imagine that we can show that some solution to GR equantion have universe so poor that life cannot exist in there, would you say that such universe cannot exist? If there does not exist a means to show the solution there is no solution. Mathematical solipsism. I believe that the totality of what exists is eternal, having no beginning and no end. I am OK with that. It is close to Platonism. But with comp we can restrict this to the arithmetical truth (a highly non computable structure, but still conceivable by universal numbers, relatively). Well, can we work with that agreement? Come on, you say that you can escape the consequence of comp, you have to find the flaw, or to be
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/2/2012 5:29 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 10:55 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 11/1/2012 12:23 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: Don't get me started on reductionism! I don't believe in it as I don't believe in ontologically primitive objects that have particular properties. Then I don't see how you can make an ontological bet. You're at the table, betting on 24 or whatever, but you won't place your chips. Hi Cowboy, Where is the Doctor's Office? I want to make an appointment! Until its tech is proven, I am taking Dr. McCoy's stance: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HxKJyeCRVek Dear Stephen, That's funny. I'll follow you. But I know that show and all its incarnations since my childhood. Bad red herring to evade the bet question ;) The thing about where is the Doctors office? is a guarded agreement on my saying Yes to the Doctor. So, I do accept the betting. This fictional universe, and the doctor, accept UDA step 8 eventually, as I will demonstrate through examples: 1) The transporter did work in the end, so the original series does assume comp in this sense. 2) Kirk is probably not aware of reconstitution delay, when he gets back, and they've all learned to live with this weirdness. 3) McCoy, or the doctor, also uses the transporter throughout the series. So if you took an appointment and told him that you don't want to be transported and cited this video: Just get up on that platform and do it. We all do and it works in this fictional universe. Or are you out of your Vulcan mind? 4) McCoy is simultaneously occupied by his soul and Spock's soul in search for Spock which slowly kills him + makes him act very strangely until Spock's soul is given a new body in Vulcan. = Dr. McCoy understands after this, that his materialist bias is offset by Vulcan's spiritual practice, who are all logicians since childhood, and that spirit is transferable and independent of particular physical bodies. 5) With the Doctor in Voyager extension of the show (who is a pure medical doctor hologram/program, but realizes his universality and demands his freedom, which the crew eventually grant him) = program, strings of code, becomes conscious. 6) And the total denial of physical resources, in line with UDA step 8, needed for consciousness is here: The species Q in the next Generation version of the show, completely eliminate the need for physical resources to maintain or run them. This species is clearly not limited by physical resources, space, or time restraints. Thus, your portrayal of McCoy's stance is not faithful to the fictional universe of that television series, which does support Step 8 on numerous occasions :) I agree with a weak version Step 8, one that allows for the appearance of a robust physical universe but in the way I explained in my posts yesterday. Spacecowboy Buckaroo? Banzai! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:21, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to not assume a concrete robust physical universe. ? Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I explicitly do assume a primitive physical reality. In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum. Dear Bruno, I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you still didn't understand... From: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf ...what if we don’t grant a concrete robust physical universe? Actually the 8th present step will explain that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the notion of concrete and existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power. It will follow that a much weaker and usual form of Ockham’s razor can be used to conclude that not only physics has been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ‘‘matter’’ has been ontologically reduced to ‘‘mind’’ where mind is defined as the object study of fundamental machine psychology. My claim is that _/*neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any other object that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically primitive*/_. Both must emerge from a neutral ground that is neither and has no particular properties. How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? Dear Bruno, No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be complete and consistent simultaneously, thus it must stratify itself into Many. Each of the Many is claimed to have aspects that when recombined cancel to neutrality. [SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I just prove this from comp. That's the originality. A bit of metaphysics is made into a theorem in a theory (comp). Can we agree that physical worlds emerge somehow from sharable aspects of multiple sheaves of computations? This is what I have shown to be a consequence of comp. I agree. [SPK] given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or derived from irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive - Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, *} that are operating somehow in an atemporal way. We should be able to make the argument run without ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of 'realism'. In my thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a TOE and run the TOE to generate our world, then that power should be obvious. My problem is that it looks tooo much like the 'explanation' of creation that we find in mythology, whether it is the Ptah http://ancientegyptonline.co.uk/ptah.html of ancient Egypt or the egg of Pangu http://www.livingmyths.com/Chinese.htm or whatever other myth one might like. What makes an explanation framed in the sophisticated and formal language of modal logic any different? I use the self-reference logic, for obvious reason. Again, this entails the sue of some modal logics, due to a *theorem* by Solovay. All correct machine whose beliefs extend RA obeys to G and G*. There is no choice in the matter. That is not changed or involved by my argument. [SPK] I agree 10% with your point about 'miracles'. I am very suspicions of special explanations' or 'natural conspiracies'. (This comes from my upbringing as a Bible-believing Fundamentalist and eventual rejection of that literalist mental straight-jacket.) As I see things, any condition or situation that can be used to 'explain' some other conceptually difficult condition or situation should be either universal in that they apply anywhere and anytime But even in your theory anywhere and anytime must be defined by something more primitive, given that you agree that physics cannot be the fundamental theory, given that the physical reality is not primitive. The concepts of where and when (positions in a space-time) would seem to be rendered meaningless if there is no space-time (or observers/measurements to define it), no? OH, BTW, I don't think that we disagree that physics cannot be the fundamental theory. Physics requires measurements/observations to be meaningful. Where I agree with you is in your considerations of 1p and observer indeterminacy. Where you and I disagree is on the question of resources. Resources are required for computations to run so there has to be the availability of resources involved in *any* consideration of computations. Ignoring these considerations by only considering computations as Platonic objects is wrong, IMHO. You seem to be OK with computations as purely timeless objects (in Platonia) that are such that
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way to physically implement them. Those notion have nothing to do with physical implementation. So your thinking about them is not a physical act? Too much ambiguous. Even staying in comp I can answer yes and no. Yes, because my human thinking is locally supported by physical events. No, because the whole couple mind/physical events is supported by platonic arithmetical truth. Dear Bruno, Where is the evidence of the existence of a Platonic realm? The mere self-consistency of an idea is proof of existence but the idea must be understood by a multiplicity of entities with the capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood to have any coherence as an idea! We cannot just assume that the mere existence of some undefined acts to determine the properties of the undefined. Truth and falsity are possible properties, they are not ontological aspects of existence. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: bundles of arithmetic statements generate many individual observers that in turn interact (which I model via a combination of cyclic gossiping on graphs and bisimulations) with each other to define a common physical world which in turn acts to implement the arithmetic. It is a loop, an eternal cyclical process that never exactly repeats. It is in this infinite loop that I see your UD. It is not a loop. It is more like a recurring abyss, like the Mandelbrot set. Sure! I like the idea of a recurrent abyss! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You are the one saying that truth is limited to the means of knowing!!! Yes and no, Truth is limited to the *possibility* of knowledge of it. In the absence of the possibility of a statement being true (or false), there is not such thing as true or false. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Are you familiar with Jaakko Hintikka's ideas? I am using his concept of game theoretic semantics to derive truth valuations. I read this. yes. I don't see relevant at all. I do appreciate his linking of intention and intension, but it is a bit trivial in the comp theory. Dear Bruno, Hintikka's idea is to show how truth values can be coherently considered to be the result of a process and not necessarily just some a priori valuation. This makes Truth an emergent valuation, just as I content all definite properties are emergent from mutual agreements between entities. Properties, in the absence of the possibility of measurement or apprehension of some type, do not exist; they are what the 1p project onto existence. Nothing more. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
2012/11/2 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way to physically implement them. Those notion have nothing to do with physical implementation. So your thinking about them is not a physical act? Too much ambiguous. Even staying in comp I can answer yes and no. Yes, because my human thinking is locally supported by physical events. No, because the whole couple mind/physical events is supported by platonic arithmetical truth. Dear Bruno, Where is the evidence of the existence of a Platonic realm? The mere self-consistency of an idea is proof of existence but the idea must be understood by a multiplicity of entities with the capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood to have any coherence as an idea! We cannot just assume that the mere existence of some undefined acts to determine the properties of the undefined. Truth and falsity are possible properties, they are not ontological aspects of existence. Either you can have emerging properties of nothing or you can't. Either there is infinite regress or not, whatever is true (and one or the other is), it's not an obstacle. Quentin -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ **googlegroups.com everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/2/2012 8:25 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Either you can have emerging properties of nothing or you can't. Either there is infinite regress or not, whatever is true (and one or the other is), it's not an obstacle. Hi Questin, It depends on whether you think of Nothing as merely an absence of properties or a complete lack of existence. I believe in the former case. I don't have problems with infinite regress as I understand that an actual regress requires infinite stuff to be real. Explanation that push the problem behind a insurmountable curtain are not infinite regressive, they are merely evasions of the problem. They are attempt to get people to stop asking hard questions. I will not ever stop asking questions as I am not afraid of being wrong or foolish. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/1/2012 1:19 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/31/2012 6:58 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Enumerate the programs computing functions fro N to N, (or the equivalent notion according to your chosen system). let us call those functions: phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, ... (the phi_i) Let B be a fixed bijection from N x N to N. So B(x,y) is a number. The number u is universal if phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y). And the equality means really that either both phi_u(B(x,y)) and phi_x(y) are defined (number) and that they are equal, OR they are both undefined. In phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y), x is called the program, and y the data. u is the computer. u i said to emulate the program (machine, ...) x on the input y. So u could be any number, depending on how you enumerated the functions and what bijection is used? Brent -- Oh, BTW, Bruno wrote the above ... not me. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 1:42 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 10/31/2012 6:14 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 7:59 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: Dear Cowboy, One question. Was the general outline that I was trying to explain make any sense to you? Without being obvious about it, I am trying to finely parse the difference between the logic of temporal systems and the logic of atemporal systems - such as the Platonic Realm - such that I might show that reasonings that are correct in one are not necessarily correct in the other. This was not obvious to me, and going over the posts, I see how you're leaning that way... but why not just say that, then? Don't get me wrong, I love Joycean labyrinths as much as the next guy, but if the topic is on some level tending towards sincerity, then I don't see the benefit in not being obvious. Then again, I'm a Captain Obvious type. Should get the shirt. Hi Cowboy, I am dyslexic, this colors/flavors everything I write One problem that I have discovered (I thank Brent for bringing this up!) is that in our reasoning we set up constructions - such as the person on the desert island - that blur the very distinction that I am trying to frame. We should never assume temporal situations to argue for relations that are atemporal unless we are prepared to show the morphisms between the two situations. Isn't this already physical framework when you seem to be arguing for time as primitive (n incompatible with comp to begin with, after which you seek to carve out a distinction, when you've already mixed at the base? My argument is that it is impossible to 'derive Becoming from Being, but we can derive Being from Becoming. So why not work with the latter idea? I am trying to get Bruno to admit, among other things, that he has to assume a non-well founded logic for his result to work.;-) I see less and less how you'd be able to do that, as I said, by making process/linear time primitive in comp, and by assuming physical universe with so many statements. Quantum Logic is part of the picture (see SANE 2004). Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to not assume a concrete robust physical universe. He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or derived from irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive - Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, *} that are operating somehow in an atemporal way. UDA does not contradict itself here. Restraints on processing power, on memory and print capacities, implying time as some illusion emanating from eternal primitives, don't exist when framed non-constructively, more like sets of assignments, rather than operations in your sense, by which you seem to mean physically primitive operations on par with ontologically primitive arrow of time. Isn't this like cracking open the axioms, and then complaining that the building has cracks in it? There are simply a pile of concepts that are just assumed without explanation in any discussion of philosophy/logic/math. My point is that a theory must be have the capacity of being communicable ab initio for it to even be considered. When I am confronted with a theory or a result or an argument that seems to disallow for communicability I am going to baulk at it! And the possibility that you are baulking at your preconceptions rather than engaging the theory has never happened to you? Happens to me all the time. We should be able to make the argument run without ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of 'realism'. It's hard for me to see bets being made without some cash/investment/gap of faith on the table. Sure. Then it would be easy for you to directly address the question: why assume non-comp and then complain about comp's implications of time and physics arising from dream interaction of universal numbers, therefore being not primary or existing primitively? In my thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a TOE and run the TOE to generate our world, then that power should be obvious. My problem is that it looks tooo much like the 'explanation' of creation that we find in mythology, whether it is the Ptahhttp://ancientegyptonline.co.uk/ptah.htmlof ancient Egypt or the egg of Pangu http://www.livingmyths.com/Chinese.htm or whatever other myth one might like. What makes an explanation framed in the sophisticated and formal language of modal logic any different? Nothing, at its base. Appearances and looks can deceive, as numbers can too. Would this not make that deception something in our understanding and not the fault of numbers? After all, numbers are supposedly the least ambiguous of entities! On the surface, but not when you look under the hood. That's a
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/1/2012 6:54 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 1:42 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 10/31/2012 6:14 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 7:59 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: [SPK] One problem that I have discovered (I thank Brent for bringing this up!) is that in our reasoning we set up constructions - such as the person on the desert island - that blur the very distinction that I am trying to frame. We should never assume temporal situations to argue for relations that are atemporal unless we are prepared to show the morphisms between the two situations. Isn't this already physical framework when you seem to be arguing for time as primitive (n incompatible with comp to begin with, after which you seek to carve out a distinction, when you've already mixed at the base? My argument is that it is impossible to 'derive Becoming from Being, but we can derive Being from Becoming. So why not work with the latter idea? I am trying to get Bruno to admit, among other things, that he has to assume a non-well founded logic for his result to work.;-) I see less and less how you'd be able to do that, as I said, by making process/linear time primitive in comp, and by assuming physical universe with so many statements. Quantum Logic is part of the picture (see SANE 2004). Hi Cowboy, I think of it this way: Change is fundamental (ala Heraclitus http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heraclitus/#PhiPri and Bergson http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bergson/#5) and Being is its automorphism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automorphism. Is that a bit more clear? Linear time (why 'linear'? Is there such a thing as non-linear time? Cyclic time is still linear, AFAIK...) is, IMHO, change + a measure. Without a measure of change, there is no time; there is just change. If we take relativity seriously, we might even claim that there is no difference between change minus measure and staticness... I should mention that any change that has no measure associated with it is zeroth order change. Without the means to compare two different things to each other, does it make any sense to be able to make coherent statements about some change in one relative to the other. If there is just one thing, how do we know anything about its possible change(s) unless we are looking at it and gauging (measuring) its change against some thing else that has some measure associated - but our observation of it violates the stipulation of if there is just one thing. The idea that somehow the observer is irrelevant in physics and philosophy is, IMHO, one of the worse errors ever. Sure, we need to minimize and even eliminate observer bias and preferred reference framing, but eliminating the observer and replacing it with some ambiguous 'view from nowhere' is undiluted hogwash. This is where realist chafe me, they act as if the universe of objects is out there and has definite properties in the complete absence of any clear explanation for how those properties came to be defined in the first place. OK, OK, I will stop ranting... Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to not assume a concrete robust physical universe. He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or derived from irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive - Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, *} that are operating somehow in an atemporal way. UDA does not contradict itself here. Restraints on processing power, on memory and print capacities, implying time as some illusion emanating from eternal primitives, don't exist when framed non-constructively, more like sets of assignments, rather than operations in your sense, by which you seem to mean physically primitive operations on par with ontologically primitive arrow of time. Isn't this like cracking open the axioms, and then complaining that the building has cracks in it? There are simply a pile of concepts that are just assumed without explanation in any discussion of philosophy/logic/math. My point is that a theory must be have the capacity of being communicable ab initio for it to even be considered. When I am confronted with a theory or a result or an argument that seems to disallow for communicability I am going to baulk at it! And the possibility that you are baulking at your preconceptions rather than engaging the theory has never happened to you? Happens to me all the time. OK, got any ideas what these might be other
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 31 Oct 2012, at 19:59, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 7:36 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Tue, Oct 30, 2012 at 11:39 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 10/30/2012 5:39 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 2:27 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 5:15 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 1:53 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Dear Brent, What is it that distinguishes between tokens and propositions? Tokens are the physical elements (e.g. letters, words, sounds) that are used to represent a proposition in a particular language. What determines the map between the letters, words, sounds and the content of propositions? The proposition is the abstracted meaning which is independent of particular language. Does this independence do so far as to disallow for an arbitrary physical entity to know of it? Independence of abstractions from particular individuals is not independence from all. So Zwei est ein und ein. are tokens expressing the same proposition as Two equals one plus one. which is that 2=1+1. That Which 'that' do you refer to, the tokens or the proposition. is true only because multiple persons came to believe that it is true You previously agreed that one person alone could come to know that 2=1+1 or 17 is prime and express it symbolically, i.e. in tokens. So multiple persons are only necessary in order for the tokens to be used for communicating from one to another; which is the case whether the thing communicated is true or false. Reread this: In 10/30/2012 5:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 3:05 PM, meekerdb wrote: [SPK] Unless multiple entities can agree that the sequence of symbols 17 is prime is an indicator of some particular mathematical object and one of its particular properties, then how does 17 is prime come to mean anything at all? I agree with that. But you're talking about the tokens 17 is prime not the concept that 17 is prime. Could not a person who grew up alone on an island realize that 17 has no divisors, and he could even invent a private language in which he could write down Peano's axioms. Why are you using such trivial and parochial framing for abstract questions? Why the reference to single individuals? Did you not understand that I am claiming that meaningfulness requires at least the possibility of interaction between many entities such that each can evaluate the truth value of a proposition and thus can truthfully claim to have knowledge of true statements? A person that grew and died on a desert island may have discovered for itself that 17 objects cannot be divided into equal subsets, but our statements about that are mere figemnts of our imagination as we could know nothing objective and non-imaginative at all about that person. We are imagining ourselves to have powers that we simply do not have. We are not omniscient voyeurs of Reality and there is not anything that is. How is an imaginary entity come to aquire a real 1p or actual real properties? It might if that imaginary entity is deemed to have 1p content within some narrative. But outside of that narrative, it does not even exist! Languaging more about this is getting us nowhere. Brent and acted to cause it to be true. Remove one person from the multiplicity and the meaning still is there. Remove all of them and the meaning vanishes. This needs a cowboy's few cents: Every bet on ontological primitive is, despite the infinite models and conjectures we can weave from them, just that: a bet. If this is stated clearly and honestly then it's cool, no matter if it turns out an error, as we've eliminated something at least. But this is unfortunately rarer than to pound people with real, reality, authentic vs imaginary, artificial in discourse where axioms are not shared: if somebody can demarcate this boundary clearly for all discourse, then I fail to see/understand how anybody could do this outside of being high with a smile on their face and comic implication. My intelligence is limited insofar as I cannot understand, how this is not some form of needless force, in face of our vast ignorance. Meaning is not some magical quality bestowed upon the discoverer of a set of relations. That's everybody's flavor of semantics working there. As for human; if this is close to philosophical humanism semantically, then it's safe to say that, paired with standard model of physics, it's nice epistemologies with a lot of bs for its close association to ideological atheism; particularly the assertion no supernatural miracle shit when asserting singularity as big bang is just that: another miracle; when the rules of the humanist bet said no miracles. m Dear Cowboy, One question. Was the general outline that I was trying to explain make any sense to you? Without being obvious about it,
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:58, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/31/2012 12:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 18:29, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 12:38 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: No? If they do not have something equivalent to concepts, how can they dream? Yes, the universal numbers can have concept. Dear Bruno, Let's start over. Please plain in detail what is a universal number and how it (and not ordinary numbers) have concepts or 1p. I will give more detail on FOAR, soon or later. But let me explains quickly. Fix your favorite Turing universal system. It can be a programming language, a universal Turing machine, or a sigma_1 complete theory, or even a computer. Dear Bruno, That 'fixing occurs at our level only. We are free (relatively) to fix our axiomatic objects from the wide variety that have been proven to exist within the Mathematical universe of concepts or, if we are clever, we can invent new concepts and work with them; but we cannot do things in our logic that are self-contradictory unless we make sure that the contradictions are not allowed to be pathological. OK. No problem. Enumerate the programs computing functions fro N to N, (or the equivalent notion according to your chosen system). let us call those functions: phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, ... (the phi_i) Let B be a fixed bijection from N x N to N. So B(x,y) is a number. The number u is universal if phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y). And the equality means really that either both phi_u(B(x,y)) and phi_x(y) are defined (number) and that they are equal, OR they are both undefined. In phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y), x is called the program, and y the data. u is the computer. u i said to emulate the program (machine, ...) x on the input y. OK, but this does not answer my question. What is the ontological level mechanism that distinguishes the u and the x and the y from each other? The one you have chosen above. But let continue to use elementary arithmetic, as everyone learn it in school. So the answer is: elementary arithmetic. What I am trying to explain to you that ontological level objects cannot have any logical mechanism that requires temporarily unless you are assuming some form of Becoming as an ontological primitive. Platonism, as far as I know, disallows this. Indeed. becoming, like the whole physicalness, emerges from inside. It is 1p (plural). Bruno Comp is the thesis that I can survive with a physical digital computer in place of the physical brain, as far as it emulates me close enough. Comp gives a special role to computer (physical incarnation of a universal number). The comp idea is that computer can supports thinking and consciousness, and makes them capable of manifestation relatively to other universal structure (physical universes if that exists, people, etc.). This should answer your question. The lobian machines are only universal numbers, having the knowledge that they are universal. I can prove to any patient human that he/she is Löbian (I cannot prove that he/she is sound or correct, note). The UDA results is that whatever you mean by physical for making comp meaningful, that physicalness has to emerge entirely and only, from a 'competition' between all universal numbers. There is no need to go out of arithmetic, and worst, there is no possible use of going out of arithmetic, once betting on comp. By arithmetic I mean arithmetical truth, or the standard model of arithmetic, I don't mean a theory. I mean the whole set of true arithmetical propositions, or of their Gödel numbers. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 01 Nov 2012, at 01:18, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/31/2012 12:45 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 18:39, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. So your are agreeing? Two has no truth value, but Two equals one plus one. does. Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that the truth of, say Two equals one plus one. depend on some numbers or subject having to discover it, or prove it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Dear Bruno, My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological primitive Then I can stop reading as you need to assume the numbers (or anything Turing equivalent) to get them. Dear Bruno, So it is OK to assume that which I seek to explain? You can't explain the numbers without assuming the numbers. This has been foreseen by Dedekind, and vert well justified by many theorem in mathematical logic. Below the number, you are lead to version of ultrafinitism, which is senseless in the comp theory. *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. I just assume x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x And hope you understand. I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way to physically implement them. Those notion have nothing to do with physical implementation. Implementation and physical will be explained from them. A natural thing as they are much more complex than the laws above. In the absence of some common media, even if it is generated by sheaves of computations, there simply isno way to understand anything. Why ? You must accept non-well foundedness for your result to work, but you seem fixated against that. 1004. A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable of understanding the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. Do you agree that during the five seconds just after the Big Bang (assuming that theory) there might not have been any possible observers. But then the Big Bang has no more sense. No, I don't. Why? Because that concept of the five seconds just after the Big Bang is an assumption of a special case or pleading. I might as well postulate the existence of Raindow Dash to act as the entity to whom the Truth of mathematical statements have absolute meaning. To be frank, I thing that the Big Bang theory, as usually explained is a steaming pile of rubbish, as it asks us to believe that the totality of all that exists sprang into being from Nothing. I actually agree, by accident, on this. But this is not relevant for my point. Imagine that we can show that some solution to GR equantion have universe so poor that life cannot exist in there, would you say that such universe cannot exist? I believe that the totality of what exists is eternal, having no beginning and no end. I am OK with that. It is close to Platonism. But with comp we can restrict this to the arithmetical truth (a highly non computable structure, but still conceivable by universal numbers, relatively). What we infer from our observations of Hubble expansion is just an effect that follows, ultimately, from our finiteness. Including time and space. So we do agree again. I think Brent is right, and Quentin. You confuse 1+1=2 with human expression for pointing on that proposition. You obviously needs human to understand those 1+1=2 , but the content of 1+1=2 has simply no relation at all with the human, or with a physical universe. No, none of you have yet to be able to understand my counter- argument. It is not complicated. We cannot assume to have something when the means for its existence is not allowed. My claim is that meaningfulness supervenes on the possibility of interaction of *many* entities and is independent of any *one* (or some lesser finite subset) of that Many. But arithmetical truth is full of entities, even
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 01 Nov 2012, at 05:27, meekerdb wrote: On 10/31/2012 11:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't see why denying mathematical realism would entail saying no to the doctor. It implies not saying yes qua computatio. It implies NOT understanding what Church thesis is about, as to show it consistent you need the diagonalization, which use the excluded middle principle. You can still say yes, but only by using some magic. The doctor isn't proposing to replace part of you brain with a piece of Platonia, he has a real physical device to implant. This is not related. That will follow step 8. Here, you have to be arithmetical realist to get an idea of what a computer is, and how it functions, as the physical one will approximate it, well enough, it is hoped. Of course you can say yes to the doctor, just because you trust him. But comp is not saying yes to the doctor. Comp is the doctrine that saying yes will indeed work, once the artificial brain is a *computer*. The definition of computer makes no sense with arithmetical realism. ?? If I'm a materialist I could say yes because I think the artificial brain produces the same input/output signals. But you need to be arithmetical realist to define what you mean by same input-output. Arithmetical realism is not a big deal. It means that you believe that 2+2=5 OR 2+2≠5. I don't see why I would have believe in Platonia. Comp use only arithmetical platonia, and that is just a poetical expression to say that you believe that 17 is prime independently of the existence of the Higgs boson. I may believe that only some computations are instantiated and there are no infinities. OK, but again, that is different. That's the move toward physical ultrafinitism. You can keep comp, up to step seven, and we are back on the fact that step 8 (the movie-graph argument) makes such move senseless. But note that to just define the term computation, you need to be arithmetical realist. But if there were no step 8, indeed, you might have succeed in saving a form of materialism. I still miss what you don't understand in the step 8. you did not comment my recent answer on this. Maybe you could try to elaborate on your intuition. Why and how does a primitive matter change something in a computation or in the consciousness associated to it, and this in a Turing emulable manner? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 01 Nov 2012, at 06:19, meekerdb wrote: On 10/31/2012 6:58 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: (actually it was Bruno) Enumerate the programs computing functions fro N to N, (or the equivalent notion according to your chosen system). let us call those functions: phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, ... (the phi_i) Let B be a fixed bijection from N x N to N. So B(x,y) is a number. The number u is universal if phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y). And the equality means really that either both phi_u(B(x,y)) and phi_x(y) are defined (number) and that they are equal, OR they are both undefined. In phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y), x is called the program, and y the data. u is the computer. u i said to emulate the program (machine, ...) x on the input y. So u could be any number, depending on how you enumerated the functions and what bijection is used? Any number. I am not sure, the enumeration has to be given by an algorithm. But yes, the notion of computation, universality, etc. are intensional notion, and makes sense only relatively to the other number. That is why a often add relative before number. This should be obvious. The doctor who scan your brain will also have some flexibility in the encoding of your current local and relative state. I doubt it can encode it with the number 4, though. You might say, that 4 is for the fourth compact disk on the shell doctor, but then 4 is no more an encoding, but only a pointer to an encoding. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 01 Nov 2012, at 14:25, Stephen P. King wrote: But I agree with comp up to the strong version of step 8! But then you have to find the flaw in step 8. as step 8 is done in comp, without adding any assumptions, of course. I accept comp with a weak version of step 8 or, I think equivalently, a weak version of computational universality: A computation is universal if it is not dependent on any one particular physical system. This is called functional, not universal. It has nothing to do with Turing universality. This implies, to me, that there is at least one physical system that such a universal computation can be said to actually run on! I don't see this. This goes against the Parmenidean/Platonistic idea of computation as static objects in eternity that are completely independent of physical stuff! Sorry but, by definition, computations are static objects in arithmetic (or in fortanic, Lispic, combinatoric, lambdaic, etc There are a lot of equivalent ontological choices here.). The physicist have not (yet) found a definition of computation which does not use that mathematical definition. This exists, though, has *many* physical systems are in principle Turing universal. But Turing universal is a mathematical, even arithmetical, (even in the strong logician sense). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to not assume a concrete robust physical universe. ? Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I explicitly do assume a primitive physical reality. In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum. Dear Bruno, I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you still didn't understand... From: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf ...what if we don't grant a concrete robust physical universe? Actually the 8th present step will explain that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the notion of concrete and existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power. It will follow that a much weaker and usual form of Ockham's razor can be used to conclude that not only physics has been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ''matter'' has been ontologically reduced to ''mind'' where mind is defined as the object study of fundamental machine psychology. My claim is that _/*neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any other object that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically primitive*/_. Both must emerge from a neutral ground that is neither and has no particular properties. [SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I just prove this from comp. That's the originality. A bit of metaphysics is made into a theorem in a theory (comp). Can we agree that physical worlds emerge somehow from sharable aspects of multiple sheaves of computations? [SPK] given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or derived from irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive - Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, *} that are operating somehow in an atemporal way. We should be able to make the argument run without ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of 'realism'. In my thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a TOE and run the TOE to generate our world, then that power should be obvious. My problem is that it looks tooo much like the 'explanation' of creation that we find in mythology, whether it is the Ptah http://ancientegyptonline.co.uk/ptah.html of ancient Egypt or the egg of Pangu http://www.livingmyths.com/Chinese.htm or whatever other myth one might like. What makes an explanation framed in the sophisticated and formal language of modal logic any different? I use the self-reference logic, for obvious reason. Again, this entails the sue of some modal logics, due to a *theorem* by Solovay. All correct machine whose beliefs extend RA obeys to G and G*. There is no choice in the matter. That is not changed or involved by my argument. [SPK] I agree 10% with your point about 'miracles'. I am very suspicions of special explanations' or 'natural conspiracies'. (This comes from my upbringing as a Bible-believing Fundamentalist and eventual rejection of that literalist mental straight-jacket.) As I see things, any condition or situation that can be used to 'explain' some other conceptually difficult condition or situation should be either universal in that they apply anywhere and anytime But even in your theory anywhere and anytime must be defined by something more primitive, given that you agree that physics cannot be the fundamental theory, given that the physical reality is not primitive. The concepts of where and when (positions in a space-time) would seem to be rendered meaningless if there is no space-time (or observers/measurements to define it), no? OH, BTW, I don't think that we disagree that physics cannot be the fundamental theory. Physics requires measurements/observations to be meaningful. Where I agree with you is in your considerations of 1p and observer indeterminacy. Where you and I disagree is on the question of resources. Resources are required for computations to run so there has to be the availability of resources involved in *any* consideration of computations. Ignoring these considerations by only considering computations as Platonic objects is wrong, IMHO. You seem to be OK with computations as purely timeless objects (in Platonia) that are such that somehow we finite entities can create physical objects that can implement (in their dynamical functions) instances of such, while I claim that computations are equivalence classes of functions that physical systems can implement *and* abstract objects. I see these two views as two poles of a spectrum. There is a lot more detail in my considerations that I do not have time to go into at this time... My Theory of comp: Sheaves of Computations/arithmetic - define - particular physical states
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/1/2012 12:23 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: Don't get me started on reductionism! I don't believe in it as I don't believe in ontologically primitive objects that have particular properties. Then I don't see how you can make an ontological bet. You're at the table, betting on 24 or whatever, but you won't place your chips. Hi Cowboy, Where is the Doctor's Office? I want to make an appointment! Until its tech is proven, I am taking Dr. McCoy's stance: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HxKJyeCRVek -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 30 Oct 2012, at 18:29, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 12:38 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: No? If they do not have something equivalent to concepts, how can they dream? Yes, the universal numbers can have concept. Dear Bruno, Let's start over. Please plain in detail what is a universal number and how it (and not ordinary numbers) have concepts or 1p. I will give more detail on FOAR, soon or later. But let me explains quickly. Fix your favorite Turing universal system. It can be a programming language, a universal Turing machine, or a sigma_1 complete theory, or even a computer. Enumerate the programs computing functions fro N to N, (or the equivalent notion according to your chosen system). let us call those functions: phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, ... (the phi_i) Let B be a fixed bijection from N x N to N. So B(x,y) is a number. The number u is universal if phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y). And the equality means really that either both phi_u(B(x,y)) and phi_x(y) are defined (number) and that they are equal, OR they are both undefined. In phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y), x is called the program, and y the data. u is the computer. u i said to emulate the program (machine, ...) x on the input y. Comp is the thesis that I can survive with a physical digital computer in place of the physical brain, as far as it emulates me close enough. Comp gives a special role to computer (physical incarnation of a universal number). The comp idea is that computer can supports thinking and consciousness, and makes them capable of manifestation relatively to other universal structure (physical universes if that exists, people, etc.). This should answer your question. The lobian machines are only universal numbers, having the knowledge that they are universal. I can prove to any patient human that he/she is Löbian (I cannot prove that he/she is sound or correct, note). The UDA results is that whatever you mean by physical for making comp meaningful, that physicalness has to emerge entirely and only, from a 'competition' between all universal numbers. There is no need to go out of arithmetic, and worst, there is no possible use of going out of arithmetic, once betting on comp. By arithmetic I mean arithmetical truth, or the standard model of arithmetic, I don't mean a theory. I mean the whole set of true arithmetical propositions, or of their Gödel numbers. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
Hi meekerdb I think the = sign allows a concept to be predicated, such as 2 = 1+1 where 1+1 is the predicate. A concept and a predicate form a proposition, and you need a proposition to judge whether something is true or false. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/31/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-30, 14:50:24 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 10/30/2012 10:39 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. So your are agreeing? Two has no truth value, but Two equals one plus one. does. Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that the truth of, say Two equals one plus one. depend on some numbers or subject having to discover it, or prove it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Dear Bruno, My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological primitive *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable of understanding the statement, I think you are confusing the tokens 2 = 1+1 with the proposition 2 = 1+1. The former requires someone who understands the notation to interpret it, but the latter is the interpretation, i.e. the concept. A concept has meaning by definition, otherwise we say we cannot conceptualize it, e.g. klognee flarbles myrable, and so there is nothing to assign a truth value to. there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! That sounds like idealism, but whatever it is sll theories that will explain the world to us are going to have to apply to times and places where there are no humans. So I guess the question is whether 2=1+1 means to you what it means to the rest of us. If it does it can be part of our explanation. Brent You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 30 Oct 2012, at 18:39, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. So your are agreeing? Two has no truth value, but Two equals one plus one. does. Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that the truth of, say Two equals one plus one. depend on some numbers or subject having to discover it, or prove it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Dear Bruno, My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological primitive Then I can stop reading as you need to assume the numbers (or anything Turing equivalent) to get them. *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. I just assume x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x And hope you understand. A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable of understanding the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. Do you agree that during the five seconds just after the Big Bang (assuming that theory) there might not have been any possible observers. But then the Big Bang has no more sense. I think Brent is right, and Quentin. You confuse 1+1=2 with human expression for pointing on that proposition. You obviously needs human to understand those 1+1=2 , but the content of 1+1=2 has simply no relation at all with the human, or with a physical universe. I asked you some time ago if you agree with the use of the excluded middle in arithmetic. It asserts that for any arithmetical proposition P, even highly non computably verifiable, you can accept as new arithmetical truth the proposition asserting that P v ~P. Which intuitive meaning that the proposition is unambiguously either true, or false, despite you have no idea if it is P or ~P which is the true one. To accept this means that you accept that such truth are independent of the means to prove or verify them. Even intuitionist (who are sort of mathematical solipsist) accept, for P arithmetical, the proposition ~ ~ (P v ~P), which makes them already realist in the sense used in comp. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 30 Oct 2012, at 19:52, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/10/30 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. So your are agreeing? Two has no truth value, but Two equals one plus one. does. Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that the truth of, say Two equals one plus one. depend on some numbers or subject having to discover it, or prove it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Dear Bruno, My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological primitive *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable of understanding the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. Hmm... but that's what arithmetical realism is all about... If you deny meaning to '17 is prime' absent an entity which gives to it its meaning... then you're simply negating arithmetical realism and with it computationalism (ie: consciousness is emulable qua computatio). I don't see why denying mathematical realism would entail saying no to the doctor. It implies not saying yes qua computatio. It implies NOT understanding what Church thesis is about, as to show it consistent you need the diagonalization, which use the excluded middle principle. You can still say yes, but only by using some magic. The doctor isn't proposing to replace part of you brain with a piece of Platonia, he has a real physical device to implant. This is not related. That will follow step 8. Here, you have to be arithmetical realist to get an idea of what a computer is, and how it functions, as the physical one will approximate it, well enough, it is hoped. Of course you can say yes to the doctor, just because you trust him. But comp is not saying yes to the doctor. Comp is the doctrine that saying yes will indeed work, once the artificial brain is a *computer*. The definition of computer makes no sense with arithmetical realism. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 30 Oct 2012, at 19:58, meekerdb wrote: If there were no humans, no human level consciousness, would it still be true that Holmes assistant is Watson? If there are no humans, Conan Doyle would not have created the Holmes and Watson characters, to which the use of the names refer, and the question would be meaningless. But in our branch of reality, it is true that Holmes assistant is Watson (and not Crick, for example). I a quiz, you would lose the point if you answer Crick to the question what's the name of Holmes assistant?. Holmes and Watson are sufficiently famous that we get the point such names denote characters of some of the novels written by Doyle. Even if the earth is destroyed, and no humans survive, it will remain true that Watson was the assistant of Holmes, (in Conan Doyle's fiction) even if nobody care. Some alien might rediscovered that fact when studying the humanity debris with some efficient tools. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 7:36 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Tue, Oct 30, 2012 at 11:39 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 10/30/2012 5:39 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 2:27 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 5:15 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 1:53 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Dear Brent, What is it that distinguishes between tokens and propositions? Tokens are the physical elements (e.g. letters, words, sounds) that are used to represent a proposition in a particular language. What determines the map between the letters, words, sounds and the content of propositions? The proposition is the abstracted meaning which is independent of particular language. Does this independence do so far as to disallow for an arbitrary physical entity to know of it? Independence of abstractions from particular individuals is not independence from all. So Zwei est ein und ein. are tokens expressing the same proposition as Two equals one plus one. which is that 2=1+1. That Which 'that' do you refer to, the tokens or the proposition. is true only because multiple persons came to believe that it is true You previously agreed that one person alone could come to know that 2=1+1 or 17 is prime and express it symbolically, i.e. in tokens. So multiple persons are only necessary in order for the tokens to be used for communicating from one to another; which is the case whether the thing communicated is true or false. Reread this: In 10/30/2012 5:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 3:05 PM, meekerdb wrote: [SPK] Unless multiple entities can agree that the sequence of symbols 17 is prime is an indicator of some particular mathematical object and one of its particular properties, then how does 17 is prime come to mean anything at all? I agree with that. But you're talking about the tokens 17 is prime not the concept that 17 is prime. Could not a person who grew up alone on an island realize that 17 has no divisors, and he could even invent a private language in which he could write down Peano's axioms. /* Why are you using such trivial and parochial framing for abstract questions? Why the reference to single individuals? Did you not understand that I am claiming that meaningfulness requires at least the possibility of interaction between many entities such that each can evaluate the truth value of a proposition and thus can truthfully claim to have knowledge of true statements? *//* */ /*A person that grew and died on a desert island may have discovered for itself that 17 objects cannot be divided into equal subsets, but our statements about that are mere figemnts of our imagination as we could know nothing objective and non-imaginative at all about that person. We are imagining ourselves to have powers that we simply do not have. We are not omniscient voyeurs of Reality and there is not anything that is. */ How is an imaginary entity come to aquire a real 1p or actual real properties? It might if that imaginary entity is deemed to have 1p content within some narrative. But outside of that narrative, it does not even exist! Languaging more about this is getting us nowhere. Brent and acted to cause it to be true. Remove one person from the multiplicity and the meaning still is there. Remove all of them and the meaning vanishes. This needs a cowboy's few cents: Every bet on ontological primitive is, despite the infinite models and conjectures we can weave from them, just that: a bet. If this is stated clearly and honestly then it's cool, no matter if it turns out an error, as we've eliminated something at least. But this is unfortunately rarer than to pound people with real, reality, authentic vs imaginary, artificial in discourse where axioms are not shared: if somebody can demarcate this boundary clearly for all discourse, then I fail to see/understand how anybody could do this outside of being high with a smile on their face and comic implication. My intelligence is limited insofar as I cannot understand, how this is not some form of needless force, in face of our vast ignorance. Meaning is not some magical quality bestowed upon the discoverer of a set of relations. That's everybody's flavor of semantics working there. As for human; if this is close to philosophical humanism semantically, then it's safe to say that, paired with standard model of physics, it's nice epistemologies with a lot of bs for its close association to ideological atheism; particularly the assertion no supernatural miracle shit when asserting singularity as big bang is just that: another miracle; when the rules of the humanist bet said no
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 7:59 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: Dear Cowboy, One question. Was the general outline that I was trying to explain make any sense to you? Without being obvious about it, I am trying to finely parse the difference between the logic of temporal systems and the logic of atemporal systems - such as the Platonic Realm - such that I might show that reasonings that are correct in one are not necessarily correct in the other. This was not obvious to me, and going over the posts, I see how you're leaning that way... but why not just say that, then? Don't get me wrong, I love Joycean labyrinths as much as the next guy, but if the topic is on some level tending towards sincerity, then I don't see the benefit in not being obvious. Then again, I'm a Captain Obvious type. Should get the shirt. One problem that I have discovered (I thank Brent for bringing this up!) is that in our reasoning we set up constructions - such as the person on the desert island - that blur the very distinction that I am trying to frame. We should never assume temporal situations to argue for relations that are atemporal unless we are prepared to show the morphisms between the two situations. Isn't this already physical framework when you seem to be arguing for time as primitive (n incompatible with comp to begin with, after which you seek to carve out a distinction, when you've already mixed at the base? Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to not assume a concrete robust physical universe. He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or derived from irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive - Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, *} that are operating somehow in an atemporal way. UDA does not contradict itself here. Restraints on processing power, on memory and print capacities, implying time as some illusion emanating from eternal primitives, don't exist when framed non-constructively, more like sets of assignments, rather than operations in your sense, by which you seem to mean physically primitive operations on par with ontologically primitive arrow of time. Isn't this like cracking open the axioms, and then complaining that the building has cracks in it? We should be able to make the argument run without ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of 'realism'. It's hard for me to see bets being made without some cash/investment/gap of faith on the table. In my thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a TOE and run the TOE to generate our world, then that power should be obvious. My problem is that it looks tooo much like the 'explanation' of creation that we find in mythology, whether it is the Ptahhttp://ancientegyptonline.co.uk/ptah.htmlof ancient Egypt or the egg of Pangu http://www.livingmyths.com/Chinese.htm or whatever other myth one might like. What makes an explanation framed in the sophisticated and formal language of modal logic any different? Nothing, at its base. Appearances and looks can deceive, as numbers can too. I agree 10% with your point about 'miracles'. I am very suspicions of special explanations' or 'natural conspiracies'. Same here. My point with humanism + natural sciences, including standard model, is that you have to be straight about your wager: there's my magic primitive right there, warts and all. Its deceiving to, on the one hand assert no miracles whatsoever, and then ask for it at the instant of Big Bang. Human in this sense is both deceptive through error and useful for power. (This comes from my upbringing as a Bible-believing Fundamentalist and eventual rejection of that literalist mental straight-jacket.) As I see things, any condition or situation that can be used to 'explain' some other conceptually difficult condition or situation should be either universal in that they apply anywhere and anytime or are such that there must be a particular configuration of events for them to occur. This principle (?) applies to everything, be it the Big Bang initial state/singularity or consciousness. One point about the Big Bang. It seems to me that if we are considering conditions in our current physical universe that involve sufficiently small scales and/or high enough energies that there should be the equivalent to the Big Bang initial conditions, thus the Big Bang should be considered as an ongoing process even now and not some epochally special event. You argue both comp (universal, anywhere, eternal) and physically primitive universe (current physical universe, ongoing process etc). That's why I ask above why you burn your money before you put it on the (comp) table and claim the game is rigged? Just because eternal is foundation, doesn't imply that process isn't possible on some higher level. Your alluding to mysticism points
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/31/2012 6:14 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 7:59 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: Dear Cowboy, One question. Was the general outline that I was trying to explain make any sense to you? Without being obvious about it, I am trying to finely parse the difference between the logic of temporal systems and the logic of atemporal systems - such as the Platonic Realm - such that I might show that reasonings that are correct in one are not necessarily correct in the other. This was not obvious to me, and going over the posts, I see how you're leaning that way... but why not just say that, then? Don't get me wrong, I love Joycean labyrinths as much as the next guy, but if the topic is on some level tending towards sincerity, then I don't see the benefit in not being obvious. Then again, I'm a Captain Obvious type. Should get the shirt. Hi Cowboy, I am dyslexic, this colors/flavors everything I write One problem that I have discovered (I thank Brent for bringing this up!) is that in our reasoning we set up constructions - such as the person on the desert island - that blur the very distinction that I am trying to frame. We should never assume temporal situations to argue for relations that are atemporal unless we are prepared to show the morphisms between the two situations. Isn't this already physical framework when you seem to be arguing for time as primitive (n incompatible with comp to begin with, after which you seek to carve out a distinction, when you've already mixed at the base? My argument is that it is impossible to 'derive Becoming from Being, but we can derive Being from Becoming. So why not work with the latter idea? I am trying to get Bruno to admit, among other things, that he has to assume a non-well founded logic for his result to work.;-) Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to not assume a concrete robust physical universe. He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or derived from irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive - Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, *} that are operating somehow in an atemporal way. UDA does not contradict itself here. Restraints on processing power, on memory and print capacities, implying time as some illusion emanating from eternal primitives, don't exist when framed non-constructively, more like sets of assignments, rather than operations in your sense, by which you seem to mean physically primitive operations on par with ontologically primitive arrow of time. Isn't this like cracking open the axioms, and then complaining that the building has cracks in it? There are simply a pile of concepts that are just assumed without explanation in any discussion of philosophy/logic/math. My point is that a theory must be have the capacity of being communicable ab initio for it to even be considered. When I am confronted with a theory or a result or an argument that seems to disallow for communicability I am going to baulk at it! We should be able to make the argument run without ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of 'realism'. It's hard for me to see bets being made without some cash/investment/gap of faith on the table. Sure. In my thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a TOE and run the TOE to generate our world, then that power should be obvious. My problem is that it looks tooo much like the 'explanation' of creation that we find in mythology, whether it is the Ptah http://ancientegyptonline.co.uk/ptah.html of ancient Egypt or the egg of Pangu http://www.livingmyths.com/Chinese.htm or whatever other myth one might like. What makes an explanation framed in the sophisticated and formal language of modal logic any different? Nothing, at its base. Appearances and looks can deceive, as numbers can too. Would this not make that deception something in our understanding and not the fault of numbers? After all, numbers are supposedly the least ambiguous of entities! I agree 10% with your point about 'miracles'. I am very suspicions of special explanations' or 'natural conspiracies'. Same here. My point with humanism + natural sciences, including standard model, is that you have to be straight about your wager: there's my magic primitive right there, warts and all. Its deceiving to, on the one hand assert no miracles whatsoever, and then ask for it at the instant of Big Bang. Human in this sense is both deceptive through error and useful for power. I think that we are too eager for explanations and are willing to play fast and lose with concepts so long as we can hand wave problems away.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/31/2012 11:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't see why denying mathematical realism would entail saying no to the doctor. It implies not saying yes qua computatio. It implies NOT understanding what Church thesis is about, as to show it consistent you need the diagonalization, which use the excluded middle principle. You can still say yes, but only by using some magic. The doctor isn't proposing to replace part of you brain with a piece of Platonia, he has a real physical device to implant. This is not related. That will follow step 8. Here, you have to be arithmetical realist to get an idea of what a computer is, and how it functions, as the physical one will approximate it, well enough, it is hoped. Of course you can say yes to the doctor, just because you trust him. But comp is not saying yes to the doctor. Comp is the doctrine that saying yes will indeed work, once the artificial brain is a *computer*. The definition of computer makes no sense with arithmetical realism. ?? If I'm a materialist I could say yes because I think the artificial brain produces the same input/output signals. I don't see why I would have believe in Platonia. I may believe that only some computations are instantiated and there are no infinities. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/31/2012 6:58 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Enumerate the programs computing functions fro N to N, (or the equivalent notion according to your chosen system). let us call those functions: phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, ... (the phi_i) Let B be a fixed bijection from N x N to N. So B(x,y) is a number. The number u is universal if phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y). And the equality means really that either both phi_u(B(x,y)) and phi_x(y) are defined (number) and that they are equal, OR they are both undefined. In phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y), x is called the program, and y the data. u is the computer. u i said to emulate the program (machine, ...) x on the input y. So u could be any number, depending on how you enumerated the functions and what bijection is used? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. So your are agreeing? Two has no truth value, but Two equals one plus one. does. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. So your are agreeing? Two has no truth value, but Two equals one plus one. does. Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that the truth of, say Two equals one plus one. depend on some numbers or subject having to discover it, or prove it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 12:38 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: No? If they do not have something equivalent to concepts, how can they dream? Yes, the universal numbers can have concept. Dear Bruno, Let's start over. Please plain in detail what is a universal number and how it (and not ordinary numbers) have concepts or 1p. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. So your are agreeing? Two has no truth value, but Two equals one plus one. does. Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that the truth of, say Two equals one plus one. depend on some numbers or subject having to discover it, or prove it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ Dear Bruno, My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological primitive *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable of understanding the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
2012/10/30 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. So your are agreeing? Two has no truth value, but Two equals one plus one. does. Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that the truth of, say Two equals one plus one. depend on some numbers or subject having to discover it, or prove it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Dear Bruno, My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological primitive *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable of understanding the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. Hmm... but that's what arithmetical realism is all about... If you deny meaning to '17 is prime' absent an entity which gives to it its meaning... then you're simply negating arithmetical realism and with it computationalism (ie: consciousness is emulable qua computatio). Quentin -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 1:43 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/10/30 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. So your are agreeing? Two has no truth value, but Two equals one plus one. does. Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that the truth of, say Two equals one plus one. depend on some numbers or subject having to discover it, or prove it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ Dear Bruno, My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological primitive *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable of understanding the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. Hmm... but that's what arithmetical realism is all about... If you deny meaning to '17 is prime' absent an entity which gives to it its meaning... then you're simply negating arithmetical realism and with it computationalism (ie: consciousness is emulable qua computatio). Quentin Hi Quentin, Well, therefore I must reject arithmetical realism as unreal by definition! Individual entities are incapable of giving meaning to things, be they puppies or prime numbers. It requires an *agreement between many entities* to have meaningfulness. I claim that it takes at least three entities... If objects that are proposed to be real are not observable by anyone then they don't exist! Where am I going off the rails? I think that the problem here is that the distinction between not observable by any particular entity and not observable by any entity are being confused. I am reminded of Einstein's silly quip about the Moon still existing even if he was not looking at it. The poor old fellow neglected to notice that he was not the only entity that was capable of being affected by the presence or non-presence of the Moon! You might have seen my definition of Reality. Do you recall it? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
2012/10/30 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 10/30/2012 1:43 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/10/30 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. So your are agreeing? Two has no truth value, but Two equals one plus one. does. Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that the truth of, say Two equals one plus one. depend on some numbers or subject having to discover it, or prove it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Dear Bruno, My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological primitive *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable of understanding the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. Hmm... but that's what arithmetical realism is all about... If you deny meaning to '17 is prime' absent an entity which gives to it its meaning... then you're simply negating arithmetical realism and with it computationalism (ie: consciousness is emulable qua computatio). Quentin Hi Quentin, Well, therefore I must reject arithmetical realism as unreal by definition! Individual entities are incapable of giving meaning to things, be they puppies or prime numbers. It requires an *agreement between many entities* to have meaningfulness. I claim that it takes at least three entities... If objects that are proposed to be real are not observable by anyone then they don't exist! Where am I going off the rails? I think that the problem here is that the distinction between not observable by any particular entity and not observable by any entity are being confused. I am reminded of Einstein's silly quip about the Moon still existing even if he was not looking at it. The poor old fellow neglected to notice that he was not the only entity that was capable of being affected by the presence or non-presence of the Moon! You might have seen my definition of Reality. Do you recall it? So in your view, no humans (no consciouness) implies... 17 is prime or not is not meaningful ? Only consciousness gives meaning to thing... yet it seems absurd that truth value would disappear without consciousness. Quentin -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 2:00 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/10/30 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 10/30/2012 1:43 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/10/30 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. So your are agreeing? Two has no truth value, but Two equals one plus one. does. Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that the truth of, say Two equals one plus one. depend on some numbers or subject having to discover it, or prove it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ Dear Bruno, My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological primitive *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable of understanding the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. Hmm... but that's what arithmetical realism is all about... If you deny meaning to '17 is prime' absent an entity which gives to it its meaning... then you're simply negating arithmetical realism and with it computationalism (ie: consciousness is emulable qua computatio). Quentin Hi Quentin, Well, therefore I must reject arithmetical realism as unreal by definition! Individual entities are incapable of giving meaning to things, be they puppies or prime numbers. It requires an *agreement between many entities* to have meaningfulness. I claim that it takes at least three entities... If objects that are proposed to be real are not observable by anyone then they don't exist! Where am I going off the rails? I think that the problem here is that the distinction between not observable by any particular entity and not observable by any entity are being confused. I am reminded of Einstein's silly quip about the Moon still existing even if he was not looking at it. The poor old fellow neglected to notice that he was not the only entity that was capable of being affected by the presence or non-presence of the Moon! You might have seen my definition of Reality. Do you recall it? So in your view, no humans (no consciouness) implies... 17 is prime or not is not meaningful ? Only consciousness gives meaning to thing... yet it seems absurd that truth value would disappear without consciousness. Quentin Unless multiple entities can agree that the sequence of symbols 17 is prime is an indicator of some particular mathematical object and one of its particular properties, then how does 17 is prime come to mean anything at all? Can you stop subconsciously assuming an invisible observer whose sole job is to observe everything from infinity? It seems that you cannot if what I am writing is mysterious to you! How is it not absurd that meaningfulness exists in the absence of anyone that can apprehend it? Please note that I am not considering the absence of any one entity; I am considering the absence of all possible entities in the degenerativeness or vanishing of meaningfulness. I am asking Why is it OK to think that meaningfulness exists in the absence of any means to determine it?. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
2012/10/30 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 10/30/2012 2:00 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/10/30 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 10/30/2012 1:43 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/10/30 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. So your are agreeing? Two has no truth value, but Two equals one plus one. does. Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that the truth of, say Two equals one plus one. depend on some numbers or subject having to discover it, or prove it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Dear Bruno, My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological primitive *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable of understanding the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. Hmm... but that's what arithmetical realism is all about... If you deny meaning to '17 is prime' absent an entity which gives to it its meaning... then you're simply negating arithmetical realism and with it computationalism (ie: consciousness is emulable qua computatio). Quentin Hi Quentin, Well, therefore I must reject arithmetical realism as unreal by definition! Individual entities are incapable of giving meaning to things, be they puppies or prime numbers. It requires an *agreement between many entities* to have meaningfulness. I claim that it takes at least three entities... If objects that are proposed to be real are not observable by anyone then they don't exist! Where am I going off the rails? I think that the problem here is that the distinction between not observable by any particular entity and not observable by any entity are being confused. I am reminded of Einstein's silly quip about the Moon still existing even if he was not looking at it. The poor old fellow neglected to notice that he was not the only entity that was capable of being affected by the presence or non-presence of the Moon! You might have seen my definition of Reality. Do you recall it? So in your view, no humans (no consciouness) implies... 17 is prime or not is not meaningful ? Only consciousness gives meaning to thing... yet it seems absurd that truth value would disappear without consciousness. Quentin Unless multiple entities can agree that the sequence of symbols 17 is prime is an indicator of some particular mathematical object and one of its particular properties, then how does 17 is prime come to mean anything at all? Can you stop subconsciously assuming an invisible observer whose sole job is to observe everything from infinity? It seems that you cannot if what I am writing is mysterious to you! How is it not absurd that meaningfulness exists in the absence of anyone that can apprehend it? Please note that I am not considering the absence of any one entity; I am considering the absence of all possible entities in the degenerativeness or vanishing of meaningfulness. I am asking Why is it OK to think that meaningfulness exists in the absence of any means to determine it?. Well what you're explaining just feels like the egg and the chicken... meaning is an internal view, if computationalism is true, observer and meaning arise through computation... computation would be ontologically real and primitive. Quentin -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 10:39 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. So your are agreeing? Two has no truth value, but Two equals one plus one. does. Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that the truth of, say Two equals one plus one. depend on some numbers or subject having to discover it, or prove it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ Dear Bruno, My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological primitive *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable of understanding the statement, I think you are confusing the tokens 2 = 1+1 with the proposition 2 = 1+1. The former requires someone who understands the notation to interpret it, but the latter is the interpretation, i.e. the concept. A concept has meaning by definition, otherwise we say we cannot conceptualize it, e.g. klognee flarbles myrable, and so there is nothing to assign a truth value to. there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! That sounds like idealism, but whatever it is sll theories that will explain the world to us are going to have to apply to times and places where there are no humans. So I guess the question is whether 2=1+1 means to you what it means to the rest of us. If it does it can be part of our explanation. Brent You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 10:43 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/10/30 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. So your are agreeing? Two has no truth value, but Two equals one plus one. does. Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that the truth of, say Two equals one plus one. depend on some numbers or subject having to discover it, or prove it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ Dear Bruno, My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological primitive *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable of understanding the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. Hmm... but that's what arithmetical realism is all about... If you deny meaning to '17 is prime' absent an entity which gives to it its meaning... then you're simply negating arithmetical realism and with it computationalism (ie: consciousness is emulable qua computatio). I don't see why denying mathematical realism would entail saying no to the doctor. The doctor isn't proposing to replace part of you brain with a piece of Platonia, he has a real physical device to implant. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 11:00 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/10/30 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 10/30/2012 1:43 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/10/30 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. So your are agreeing? Two has no truth value, but Two equals one plus one. does. Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that the truth of, say Two equals one plus one. depend on some numbers or subject having to discover it, or prove it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ Dear Bruno, My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological primitive *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable of understanding the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. Hmm... but that's what arithmetical realism is all about... If you deny meaning to '17 is prime' absent an entity which gives to it its meaning... then you're simply negating arithmetical realism and with it computationalism (ie: consciousness is emulable qua computatio). Quentin Hi Quentin, Well, therefore I must reject arithmetical realism as unreal by definition! Individual entities are incapable of giving meaning to things, be they puppies or prime numbers. It requires an *agreement between many entities* to have meaningfulness. I claim that it takes at least three entities... If objects that are proposed to be real are not observable by anyone then they don't exist! Where am I going off the rails? I think that the problem here is that the distinction between not observable by any particular entity and not observable by any entity are being confused. I am reminded of Einstein's silly quip about the Moon still existing even if he was not looking at it. The poor old fellow neglected to notice that he was not the only entity that was capable of being affected by the presence or non-presence of the Moon! You might have seen my definition of Reality. Do you recall it? So in your view, no humans (no consciouness) implies... 17 is prime or not is not meaningful ? Only consciousness gives meaning to thing... yet it seems absurd that truth value would disappear without consciousness. If there were no humans, no human level consciousness, would it still be true that Holmes assistant is Watson? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 11:22 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 2:00 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/10/30 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 10/30/2012 1:43 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/10/30 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. So your are agreeing? Two has no truth value, but Two equals one plus one. does. Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that the truth of, say Two equals one plus one. depend on some numbers or subject having to discover it, or prove it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ Dear Bruno, My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological primitive *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable of understanding the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. Hmm... but that's what arithmetical realism is all about... If you deny meaning to '17 is prime' absent an entity which gives to it its meaning... then you're simply negating arithmetical realism and with it computationalism (ie: consciousness is emulable qua computatio). Quentin Hi Quentin, Well, therefore I must reject arithmetical realism as unreal by definition! Individual entities are incapable of giving meaning to things, be they puppies or prime numbers. It requires an *agreement between many entities* to have meaningfulness. I claim that it takes at least three entities... If objects that are proposed to be real are not observable by anyone then they don't exist! Where am I going off the rails? I think that the problem here is that the distinction between not observable by any particular entity and not observable by any entity are being confused. I am reminded of Einstein's silly quip about the Moon still existing even if he was not looking at it. The poor old fellow neglected to notice that he was not the only entity that was capable of being affected by the presence or non-presence of the Moon! You might have seen my definition of Reality. Do you recall it? So in your view, no humans (no consciouness) implies... 17 is prime or not is not meaningful ? Only consciousness gives meaning to thing... yet it seems absurd that truth value would disappear without consciousness. Quentin Unless multiple entities can agree that the sequence of symbols 17 is prime is an indicator of some particular mathematical object and one of its particular properties, then how does 17 is prime come to mean anything at all? I agree with that. But you're talking about the tokens 17 is prime not the concept that 17 is prime. Could not a person who grew up alone on an island realize that 17 has no divisors, and he could even invent a private language in which he could write down Peano's axioms. Brent Can you stop subconsciously assuming an invisible observer whose sole job is to observe everything from infinity? It seems that you cannot if what I am writing is mysterious to you! How is it not absurd that meaningfulness exists in the absence of anyone that can apprehend it? Please note that I am not considering the absence of any one entity; I am considering the absence of all possible entities in the degenerativeness or vanishing of meaningfulness. I am asking Why is it OK to think that meaningfulness exists in the absence of any means to determine it?. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 2:27 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/10/30 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 10/30/2012 2:00 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/10/30 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 10/30/2012 1:43 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/10/30 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. So your are agreeing? Two has no truth value, but Two equals one plus one. does. Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that the truth of, say Two equals one plus one. depend on some numbers or subject having to discover it, or prove it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ Dear Bruno, My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological primitive *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable of understanding the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. Hmm... but that's what arithmetical realism is all about... If you deny meaning to '17 is prime' absent an entity which gives to it its meaning... then you're simply negating arithmetical realism and with it computationalism (ie: consciousness is emulable qua computatio). Quentin Hi Quentin, Well, therefore I must reject arithmetical realism as unreal by definition! Individual entities are incapable of giving meaning to things, be they puppies or prime numbers. It requires an *agreement between many entities* to have meaningfulness. I claim that it takes at least three entities... If objects that are proposed to be real are not observable by anyone then they don't exist! Where am I going off the rails? I think that the problem here is that the distinction between not observable by any particular entity and not observable by any entity are being confused. I am reminded of Einstein's silly quip about the Moon still existing even if he was not looking at it. The poor old fellow neglected to notice that he was not the only entity that was capable of being affected by the presence or non-presence of the Moon! You might have seen my definition of Reality. Do you recall it? So in your view, no humans (no consciouness) implies... 17 is prime or not is not meaningful ? Only consciousness gives meaning to thing... yet it seems absurd that truth value would disappear without consciousness. Quentin Unless multiple entities can agree that the sequence of symbols 17 is prime is an indicator of some particular mathematical object and one of its particular properties, then how does 17 is prime come to mean anything at all? Can you stop subconsciously assuming an invisible observer whose sole job is to observe everything from infinity? It seems that you cannot if what I am writing is mysterious to you! How is it not absurd that meaningfulness exists in the absence of anyone that can apprehend it? Please note that I am not considering the absence of any one entity; I am considering the absence of all possible entities in the degenerativeness or vanishing of meaningfulness. I am asking Why is it OK to think that meaningfulness exists in the absence of any means to determine it?.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 2:50 PM, meekerdb wrote: I think you are confusing the tokens 2 = 1+1 with the proposition 2 = 1+1. The former requires someone who understands the notation to interpret it, but the latter is the interpretation, i.e. the concept. A concept has meaning by definition, otherwise we say we cannot conceptualize it, e.g. klognee flarbles myrable, and so there is nothing to assign a truth value to. Dear Brent, What is it that distinguishes between tokens and propositions? there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! That sounds like idealism, but whatever it is sll theories that will explain the world to us are going to have to apply to times and places where there are no humans. So I guess the question is whether 2=1+1 means to you what it means to the rest of us. If it does it can be part of our explanation. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism In philosophy, idealism is the group of philosophies which assert that reality, or reality as we can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial. Epistemologically, idealism manifests as a skepticism about the possibility of knowing any mind-independent thing. ... As an ontological doctrine, idealism goes further, asserting that all entities are composed of mind or spirit.[2] Idealism thus rejects physicalist and dualist theories that fail to ascribe priority to the mind. An extreme version of this idealism can exist in the philosophical notion of solipsism. Does that seem like what I am claiming? NO! That is the wiki definition of Idealism, and I agree with that definition and its implications and I reject idealism. Brent -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 2:58 PM, meekerdb wrote: If there were no humans, no human level consciousness, would it still be true that Holmes assistant is Watson? Brent If there there where no humans and no human level consciousness, what meaning would the sentence It is true that Holmes assistant is Watson have? It would be an empty syllogism at best for some non-human with non-human consciousness to evaluate. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 3:05 PM, meekerdb wrote: [SPK] Unless multiple entities can agree that the sequence of symbols 17 is prime is an indicator of some particular mathematical object and one of its particular properties, then how does 17 is prime come to mean anything at all? I agree with that. But you're talking about the tokens 17 is prime not the concept that 17 is prime. Could not a person who grew up alone on an island realize that 17 has no divisors, and he could even invent a private language in which he could write down Peano's axioms. Why are you using such trivial and parochial framing for abstract questions? Why the reference to single individuals? Did you not understand that I am claiming that meaningfulness requires at least the possibility of interaction between many entities such that each can evaluate the truth value of a proposition and thus can truthfully claim to have knowledge of true statements? A person that grew and died on a desert island may have discovered for itself that 17 objects cannot be divided into equal subsets, but our statements about that are mere figemnts of our imagination as we could know nothing objective and non-imaginative at all about that person. We are imagining ourselves to have powers that we simply do not have. We are not omniscient voyeurs of Reality and there is not anything that is. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 1:53 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 2:50 PM, meekerdb wrote: I think you are confusing the tokens 2 = 1+1 with the proposition 2 = 1+1. The former requires someone who understands the notation to interpret it, but the latter is the interpretation, i.e. the concept. A concept has meaning by definition, otherwise we say we cannot conceptualize it, e.g. klognee flarbles myrable, and so there is nothing to assign a truth value to. Dear Brent, What is it that distinguishes between tokens and propositions? Tokens are the physical elements (e.g. letters, words, sounds) that are used to represent a proposition in a particular language. The proposition is the abstracted meaning which is independent of particular language. So Zwei est ein und ein. are tokens expressing the same proposition as Two equals one plus one. which is that 2=1+1. Brent there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! That sounds like idealism, but whatever it is sll theories that will explain the world to us are going to have to apply to times and places where there are no humans. So I guess the question is whether 2=1+1 means to you what it means to the rest of us. If it does it can be part of our explanation. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism In philosophy, idealism is the group of philosophies which assert that reality, or reality as we can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial. Epistemologically, idealism manifests as a skepticism about the possibility of knowing any mind-independent thing. ... As an ontological doctrine, idealism goes further, asserting that all entities are composed of mind or spirit.[2] Idealism thus rejects physicalist and dualist theories that fail to ascribe priority to the mind. An extreme version of this idealism can exist in the philosophical notion of solipsism. Does that seem like what I am claiming? NO! That is the wiki definition of Idealism, and I agree with that definition and its implications and I reject idealism. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 2:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 3:05 PM, meekerdb wrote: [SPK] Unless multiple entities can agree that the sequence of symbols 17 is prime is an indicator of some particular mathematical object and one of its particular properties, then how does 17 is prime come to mean anything at all? I agree with that. But you're talking about the tokens 17 is prime not the concept that 17 is prime. Could not a person who grew up alone on an island realize that 17 has no divisors, and he could even invent a private language in which he could write down Peano's axioms. Why are you using such trivial and parochial framing for abstract questions? Why the reference to single individuals? Did you not understand that I am claiming that meaningfulness requires at least the possibility of interaction between many entities such that each can evaluate the truth value of a proposition and thus can truthfully claim to have knowledge of true statements? A person that grew and died on a desert island may have discovered for itself that 17 objects cannot be divided into equal subsets, So no additional entities are needed for a person know that 17 is prime and to express it symbollically. You seem to contradict what you just wrote in the prior paragraph. Brent but our statements about that are mere figemnts of our imagination as we could know nothing objective and non-imaginative at all about that person. We are imagining ourselves to have powers that we simply do not have. We are not omniscient voyeurs of Reality and there is not anything that is. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 5:15 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 1:53 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Dear Brent, What is it that distinguishes between tokens and propositions? Tokens are the physical elements (e.g. letters, words, sounds) that are used to represent a proposition in a particular language. What determines the map between the letters, words, sounds and the content of propositions? The proposition is the abstracted meaning which is independent of particular language. Does this independence do so far as to disallow for an arbitrary physical entity to know of it? Independence of abstractions from particular individuals is not independence from all. So Zwei est ein und ein. are tokens expressing the same proposition as Two equals one plus one. which is that 2=1+1. That is true only because multiple persons came to believe that it is true and acted to cause it to be true. Remove one person from the multiplicity and the meaning still is there. Remove all of them and the meaning vanishes. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 5:21 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 2:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 3:05 PM, meekerdb wrote: [SPK] Unless multiple entities can agree that the sequence of symbols 17 is prime is an indicator of some particular mathematical object and one of its particular properties, then how does 17 is prime come to mean anything at all? I agree with that. But you're talking about the tokens 17 is prime not the concept that 17 is prime. Could not a person who grew up alone on an island realize that 17 has no divisors, and he could even invent a private language in which he could write down Peano's axioms. Why are you using such trivial and parochial framing for abstract questions? Why the reference to single individuals? Did you not understand that I am claiming that meaningfulness requires at least the possibility of interaction between many entities such that each can evaluate the truth value of a proposition and thus can truthfully claim to have knowledge of true statements? A person that grew and died on a desert island may have discovered for itself that 17 objects cannot be divided into equal subsets, So no additional entities are needed for a person know that 17 is prime and to express it symbollically. You seem to contradict what you just wrote in the prior paragraph. Rubbish. You are projecting your concept of 17 is prime onto an imaginary entity and discussing the idea of that entity with me, that makes 3 people - not one; even if one - the person on the island - of them is just in your and my mind. Brent but our statements about that are mere figemnts of our imagination as we could know nothing objective and non-imaginative at all about that person. We are imagining ourselves to have powers that we simply do not have. We are not omniscient voyeurs of Reality and there is not anything that is. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 2:27 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 5:15 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 1:53 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Dear Brent, What is it that distinguishes between tokens and propositions? Tokens are the physical elements (e.g. letters, words, sounds) that are used to represent a proposition in a particular language. What determines the map between the letters, words, sounds and the content of propositions? The proposition is the abstracted meaning which is independent of particular language. Does this independence do so far as to disallow for an arbitrary physical entity to know of it? Independence of abstractions from particular individuals is not independence from all. So Zwei est ein und ein. are tokens expressing the same proposition as Two equals one plus one. which is that 2=1+1. That Which 'that' do you refer to, the tokens or the proposition. is true only because multiple persons came to believe that it is true You previously agreed that one person alone could come to know that 2=1+1 or 17 is prime and express it symbolically, i.e. in tokens. So multiple persons are only necessary in order for the tokens to be used for communicating from one to another; which is the case whether the thing communicated is true or false. Brent and acted to cause it to be true. Remove one person from the multiplicity and the meaning still is there. Remove all of them and the meaning vanishes. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/30/2012 2:31 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 5:21 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 2:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 3:05 PM, meekerdb wrote: [SPK] Unless multiple entities can agree that the sequence of symbols 17 is prime is an indicator of some particular mathematical object and one of its particular properties, then how does 17 is prime come to mean anything at all? I agree with that. But you're talking about the tokens 17 is prime not the concept that 17 is prime. Could not a person who grew up alone on an island realize that 17 has no divisors, and he could even invent a private language in which he could write down Peano's axioms. Why are you using such trivial and parochial framing for abstract questions? Why the reference to single individuals? Did you not understand that I am claiming that meaningfulness requires at least the possibility of interaction between many entities such that each can evaluate the truth value of a proposition and thus can truthfully claim to have knowledge of true statements? A person that grew and died on a desert island may have discovered for itself that 17 objects cannot be divided into equal subsets, So no additional entities are needed for a person know that 17 is prime and to express it symbollically. You seem to contradict what you just wrote in the prior paragraph. Rubbish. You are projecting your concept of 17 is prime onto an imaginary entity and discussing the idea of that entity with me, that makes 3 people - not one; even if one - the person on the island - of them is just in your and my mind. And another dozen people may be reading this. What different does that make to the question of whether one person alone can know a mathematical truth? You seem to agree that he can and yet deny it is meaningful at the same time. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in Leibniz
On 10/29/2012 1:15 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Still waiting for the storm to shut things down. Numbers are not discussed specifically as far as I can find yet, in my books on Leibniz. Which probably means that they are simply numbers, with no ontological status. Sort of like space or time. Inextended and everywhere. Numbers are definitely not monads, because no corporeal body is attached. Although they can whenever thought of appear in the minds of particular men in the intellects of their monads. Hi Roger, Physical bodies and, by extension, physical worlds follow from mutually consistent aspects of the individual 1p of monads; they are not attached. Leibniz, IMHO, bungled this badly in his discussions of the Monadology. Given that monads have no windows, it logically follows that /they do not have any external aspect/. Monads do not see the outsides of each other in any direct way. All that monads have as percepts of that which is other than themselves are those aspects of their own 1p that cannot be reconsidered as belonging to their identity in the moment of the observation/appearance. Leibniz does refer to a proposed universal language, which is simply everywhere as well as possibly in each head. Numbers would no doubt be the same, both everywhere and in individual minds at times. Yes, this is the Pre-Established Harmony, but as I have argued before this concept is deeply flawed because it tries to claim that the solution to NP-Hard problem (of choosing the best possible world) is somehow accessible (for the creation of the monads by God) prior to the availability of resources with which to actually perform the computation of the solution. One cannot know the content of a solution before one computes it, even if one is omniscient! So numbers are universal and can be treated mathematically as always. I agree, but the concept of numbers has no meaning prior to the existence of objects that can be counted. To think otherwise is equivalent to claiming that unspecified statements are true or false even in the absence of the possibility of discovering the fact. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in Leibniz
On 29 Oct 2012, at 06:15, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Still waiting for the storm to shut things down. Take care. Numbers are not discussed specifically as far as I can find yet, in my books on Leibniz. Which probably means that they are simply numbers, with no ontological status. Sort of like space or time. Inextended and everywhere. I can be OK. I think that numbers are not even 'inextended' as extension does not apply to them. Then, of course variant of extension, like length in base 10, or number of Kb, can of course be defined. Numbers are definitely not monads, because no corporeal body is attached. For me, numbers, body, language, machine, etc. are basically synonymous. There are nuances, be they are not useful before they play a (usually relative) rôle. Although they can whenever thought of appear in the minds of particular men in the intellects of their monads. Leibniz does refer to a proposed universal language, which is simply everywhere as well as possibly in each head. I think Leibniz got the intuition of universal number (machine, language, program, etc.). Numbers would no doubt be the same, both everywhere and in individual minds at times. OK. So numbers are universal and can be treated mathematically as always. They are universal in that sense. But some numbers are universal in the Turing sense, and, as language, might be closer to Leibniz intuition. Such universal numbers can emulate the behavior of all other number. typical incarnation: the brain, the computer, the three bodies problem, the quantum zero body problem, game of life, fortran, lisp, algol, c++, combinators, arithmetic, etc. They all faithfully mirrors each other. They are like the golem. You can instruct them by using words, or numbers, so that they become slave, like your PC or MAC. Like the golem, the math explain it is risky and that you can loose control. With comp, you can make them becoming yourself, and an infinitely of them already are. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/29/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-28, 18:31:25 Subject: Re: Re: A mirror of the universe. Hi Bruno Marchal I still haven't sorted the issue of numbers out. I suppose I ought to do some research in my Leibniz books. Aside from that, monads have to be attached to corporeal bodies, and numbers aren't like that. I find the following unsatisfactory, but since numbers are like ideas, they can be in the minds of individual homunculi in individual monads, but that doesn't sound satisfactoriy to me. Not universakl enough. My best guess for now is that the supreme monad (the One) undoubtedly somehow possesses the numbers. Hurricane coming. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/28/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-27, 09:31:59 Subject: Re: A mirror of the universe. On 26 Oct 2012, at 14:44, Roger Clough wrote: Dear Bruno and Alberto, I agree some what with both of you. As to the idea of a genetic algorithm can isolate anticipative programs, I think that anticipation is the analogue of inertia for computations, as Mach saw inertia. It is a relation between any one and the class of computations that it belongs to such that any incomplete string has a completion in the collections of others like it. This is like an error correction or compression mechanism. -- Onward! Stephen ROGER: For what it's worth--- like Mach's inertia, each monad mirrors the rest of the universe. In arithmetic, each universal numbers mirrors all other universal numbers. The tiny Turing universal part of arithmetical truth is already a dynamical Indra Net. Your monad really looks like the (universal) intensional numbers. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group,
Re: Numbers in Leibniz
On 29 Oct 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote: So numbers are universal and can be treated mathematically as always. I agree, but the concept of numbers has no meaning prior to the existence of objects that can be counted. To think otherwise is equivalent to claiming that unspecified statements are true or false even in the absence of the possibility of discovering the fact. I think you confuse numbers, and the concept of numbers. And then your argument is not valid, as with numbers, the miracle is that we can specify the concept of numbers, as this result in defining some arithmetical sigma_1 complete theory in terms of 0, s(0), ... and the laws of addition and multiplication, that everybody understands (unless philosophers?). Bruno PS BTW, from a computer scientist perspective, your use of NP never succeed to make sense. I don't dare to ask you to elaborate, as I am afraid you might aggravate your case. The NP question is fundamental and has many interesting feature, but it concerns a local tractability issue, and is a priori, unless justification, not relevant for the arithmetical body issue, nor number's theology (including physics) issue, etc. When you say: Yes, this is the Pre-Established Harmony, but as I have argued before this concept is deeply flawed because it tries to claim that the solution to NP-Hard problem (of choosing the best possible world) is somehow accessible (for the creation of the monads by God) prior to the availability of resources with which to actually perform the computation of the solution. One cannot know the content of a solution before one computes it, even if one is omniscient! I don't find any sense. I hope you don't mind my frankness. I wouldn't say this if I did not respect some intuition of yours. But math and formalism can't be a pretext for not doing the elementary reasoning in the philosophy of mind. If you use math, you have to be clearer on the link with philosophy or theology. To be understandable by others. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 10/29/2012 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote: [Bruno Marchal wrote:] So numbers are universal and can be treated mathematically as always. I agree, but the concept of numbers has no meaning prior to the existence of objects that can be counted. To think otherwise is equivalent to claiming that unspecified statements are true or false even in the absence of the possibility of discovering the fact. Dear Bruno I think you confuse numbers, and the concept of numbers. No, I do not. My claim is that Numbers are objects in the mind of conscious beings. If there does not exist worlds where entities to whom numbers are concepts then there is no such thing as a concept of numbers in such worlds. My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. And then your argument is not valid, as with numbers, the miracle is that we can specify the concept of numbers, as this result in defining some arithmetical sigma_1 complete theory in terms of 0, s(0), ... and the laws of addition and multiplication, that everybody understands (unless philosophers?). I am a philosopher! My argument rests only on the fact that the 'miracle' is exactly as you state it here: we exist and have a concept of numbers and can ascertain the truth of arithmetic statements. My claim is that truth valuations supervene on the ability of consciousness to form concepts of numbers. I question the entire idea of numbers existing as separate Platonic entities. In the absence of consciousness, there is no such thing as a concept! Bruno PS BTW, from a computer scientist perspective, your use of NP never succeed to make sense. I don't dare to ask you to elaborate, as I am afraid you might aggravate your case. The NP question is fundamental and has many interesting feature, but it concerns a local tractability issue, and is a priori, unless justification, not relevant for the arithmetical body issue, nor number's theology (including physics) issue, etc. It is the argument is sound and is the same kind of argument as what Kripke used to discuss the idea of possible worlds. http://www.philosophy-index.com/kripke/ In http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_world we read: There is a close relation between propositions and possible worlds. We note that every proposition is either true or false at any given possible world; then the modal status of a proposition is understood in terms of the worlds in which it is true and worlds in which it is false. Solutions to equations or computations are not available until after they are actually solved. My solution to this is to not go so far as you do in Step 8. Let me try to be more explicit: From your paper http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf : Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). I am pointing out that the idea of computations existing independently of our selves is wrong in that it conflates *the meaning and truth valuation of numbers* with *t**he existence of numbers as Platonic objects*. It is absurd to refer to the claim that the truth of 17 is prime depends on any one person or entity, but the claim that the truth of 17 is prime is knowable by any person is not absurd. If we stipulate that the content of knowledge exists somehow prior to that which knowledge supervenes upon, we are being absurd. The content of knowledge and the ability of knowledge occur simultaneously or not at all. Absent the concept of numbers there is no such thing as valuations of numbers because the notion of Platonic objects considers objects as existing independently as some singular perfect version that is then plurally projected somehow into the physical realm, as we see in the Allegory of the Cave. This is a one-to-many mapping, not a one-to-one mapping. How exactly is a type or sheaf a singular and perfect version of each and every computation and yet be something that has individuated valuations? Individual valuations of computations are only those that occur as physical instantiations of computations and thus they do not exist in Platonia. The Many exist in the physical worlds, no? I propose a rephrasing of your statement above: We identify the 1p qualia to a sheaf of computations (as bisimilar Boolean Algebras) that is dual to physical machine states at diffeomorphically equivalent space-time coordinates (x, y, z, t). This is a restatement of the Stone duality into COMP-like terms. ;-) (The idea of
Re: Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitantsofmonads
Hi Richard Ruquist Absolutely. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/2/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-01, 16:51:44 Subject: Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitantsofmonads String theory and variable fine-structure measurements across the universe suggest that the discrete and distinct monads are ennumerable. On Mon, Oct 1, 2012 at 4:32 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/1/2012 10:17 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Good idea, but unfortunately monads are not numbers, numbers will now guide them or replace them. Monads have to be associated with corporeal bodies down here in contingia, where crap happens. Hi Roger, I agree, monads are not numbers. Monads use numbers. Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/1/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-30, 14:22:03 Subject: Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitants ofmonads On 9/30/2012 8:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue, so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads. Previously I noted that numbers could not be monads because monads constantly change. Another argument against numbers being monads is that all monads must be attached to corporeal bodies. So monads refer to objects in the (already) created world, whose identities persist, while ideas and numbers are not created objects. While numbers and ideas cannot be monads, they have to be are entities in the mind, feelings, and bodily aspects of monads. For Leibniz refers to the intellect of human monads. And similarly, numbers and ideas must be used in the fictional construction of matter-- in the bodily aspect of material monads, as well as the construction of our bodies and brains. Dear Roger, Bruno's idea is a form of Pre-Established Hamony, in that the truth of the numbers is a pre-established ontological primitive. -- Onward! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitants ofmonads
Hi Stephen P. King Good idea, but unfortunately monads are not numbers, numbers will now guide them or replace them. Monads have to be associated with corporeal bodies down here in contingia, where crap happens. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/1/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-30, 14:22:03 Subject: Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitants ofmonads On 9/30/2012 8:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue, so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads. Previously I noted that numbers could not be monads because monads constantly change. Another argument against numbers being monads is that all monads must be attached to corporeal bodies. So monads refer to objects in the (already) created world, whose identities persist, while ideas and numbers are not created objects. While numbers and ideas cannot be monads, they have to be are entities in the mind, feelings, and bodily aspects of monads. For Leibniz refers to the intellect of human monads. And similarly, numbers and ideas must be used in the fictional construction of matter-- in the bodily aspect of material monads, as well as the construction of our bodies and brains. Dear Roger, Bruno's idea is a form of Pre-Established Hamony, in that the truth of the numbers is a pre-established ontological primitive. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers vs monads
Hi Roger Clough, ### ROGER: Quanta are different from particles. They don't move from A to B along particular paths through space (or even through space), they move through all possible mathematical paths - which is to say that they are everywhere at once- until one particular path is selected by a measurement (or selected by passing through slits). Do you agree with Everett that all path exists, and that the selection might equivalent with a first person indeterminacy? ... Note that intelligence requires the ability to select. OK. But the ability to selct does not require intelligence, just interaction and some memory. Selection of a quantum path (collapse or reduction of the jungle of brain wave paths) produces consciousness, according to Penrose et al. They call it orchestrated reduction. . Penrose is hardly convincing on this. Its basic argument based on Gödel is invalid, and its theory is quite speculative, like the wave collapse, which has never make any sense to me. Why would the physical not be infinitely divisible and extensible, especially if not real? ROGER: Objects can be physical and also infinitely divisible, but L considered this infinite divisibility to disqualify an object to be real because there's no end to the process, one wouldn't end up with something to refer to. In comp we end up with what is similar above the substitution level. What we call macro, but which is really only what we can isolate. The picture is of course quite counter-intuitive. Personally. I substitute Heisenberg's uncertainty principle as the basis for this view because the fundamental particles are supposedly divisible. By definition an atom is not divisible, and the atoms today are the elementary particles. Not sure you can divide an electron or a Higgs boson. With comp particles might get the sme explanation as the physicist, as fixed points for some transformation in a universal group or universal symmetrical system. The simple groups, the exceptional groups, the Monster group can play some role there (I speculate). ROGER: You can split an atom because it has parts, reactors do that all of the time. of this particular point, Electrons and other fundamental particles do not have parts. You lost me with the rest of this comment, but that's OK. Yes. Atoms are no atoms (in greek άτομο means not divisible). But if string theory is correct even electron are still divisible (conceptually). I still don't know with comp. Normally some observable have a real continuum spectrum. Physical reality cannot be entirely discrete. I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue, so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads. OK. I will interpret your monad by intensional number. let me be explicit on this. I fixe once and for all a universal system: I chose the programming language LISP. Actually, a subset of it: the programs LISP computing only (partial) functions from N to N, with some list representation of the numbers like (0), (S 0), (S S 0), ... I enumerate in lexicographic way all the programs LISP. P_1, P_2, P_3, ... The ith partial computable functions phi_i is the one computed by P_i. I can place on N a new operation, written #, with a # b = phi_a(b), that is the result of the application of the ath program LISP, P_a, in the enumeration of all the program LISP above, on b. Then I define a number as being intensional when it occurs at the left of an expression like a # b. The choice of a universal system transforms each number into a (partial) function from N to N. A number u is universal if phi_u(a, b) = phi_a(b). u interprets or understands the program a and apply it to on b to give the result phi_a(b). a is the program, b is the data, and u is the computer. (a, b) here abbreviates some number coding the couple (a, b), to stay withe function having one argument (so u is a P_i, there is a universal program P_u). Universal is an intensional notion, it concerns the number playing the role of a name for the function. The left number in the (partial) operation #. ROGER: Despisers of religion would do well to understand this point, as follows: Numbers, like all beings in Platonia are intensional and necessary, so are not contingent, as monads are. Thus, arithmetical theorems and proofs do not change with time, are always true or always false. Perfect, heavenly, eternal truths, as they say. Angelic. Life itself. Free spirits. .. Monads are intensional but are contingent, so they change (very rapidly) with time (like other inhabitants of Contingia). Monads are a bit corrupt like the rest of us. Although not perfect, they tend to strive to be so, at least those motivated by intellect (the principles of Platonia, so not entropic. Otherwise, those dominated by the lesser quality, passion,
Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitants ofmonads
On 10/1/2012 10:17 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Good idea, but unfortunately monads are not numbers, numbers will now guide them or replace them. Monads have to be associated with corporeal bodies down here in contingia, where crap happens. Hi Roger, I agree, monads are not numbers. Monads use numbers. Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/1/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-30, 14:22:03 Subject: Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitants ofmonads On 9/30/2012 8:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue, so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads. Previously I noted that numbers could not be monads because monads constantly change. Another argument against numbers being monads is that all monads must be attached to corporeal bodies. So monads refer to objects in the (already) created world, whose identities persist, while ideas and numbers are not created objects. While numbers and ideas cannot be monads, they have to be are entities in the mind, feelings, and bodily aspects of monads. For Leibniz refers to the intellect of human monads. And similarly, numbers and ideas must be used in the fictional construction of matter-- in the bodily aspect of material monads, as well as the construction of our bodies and brains. Dear Roger, Bruno's idea is a form of Pre-Established Hamony, in that the truth of the numbers is a pre-established ontological primitive. -- Onward! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitants ofmonads
String theory and variable fine-structure measurements across the universe suggest that the discrete and distinct monads are ennumerable. On Mon, Oct 1, 2012 at 4:32 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 10/1/2012 10:17 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Good idea, but unfortunately monads are not numbers, numbers will now guide them or replace them. Monads have to be associated with corporeal bodies down here in contingia, where crap happens. Hi Roger, I agree, monads are not numbers. Monads use numbers. Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/1/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-30, 14:22:03 Subject: Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitants ofmonads On 9/30/2012 8:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue, so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads. Previously I noted that numbers could not be monads because monads constantly change. Another argument against numbers being monads is that all monads must be attached to corporeal bodies. So monads refer to objects in the (already) created world, whose identities persist, while ideas and numbers are not created objects. While numbers and ideas cannot be monads, they have to be are entities in the mind, feelings, and bodily aspects of monads. For Leibniz refers to the intellect of human monads. And similarly, numbers and ideas must be used in the fictional construction of matter-- in the bodily aspect of material monads, as well as the construction of our bodies and brains. Dear Roger, Bruno's idea is a form of Pre-Established Hamony, in that the truth of the numbers is a pre-established ontological primitive. -- Onward! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitants of monads
On 9/30/2012 8:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue, so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads. Previously I noted that numbers could not be monads because monads constantly change. Another argument against numbers being monads is that all monads must be attached to corporeal bodies. So monads refer to objects in the (already) created world, whose identities persist, while ideas and numbers are not created objects. While numbers and ideas cannot be monads, they have to be are entities in the mind, feelings, and bodily aspects of monads. For Leibniz refers to the intellect of human monads. And similarly, numbers and ideas must be used in the fictional construction of matter-- in the bodily aspect of material monads, as well as the construction of our bodies and brains. Dear Roger, Bruno's idea is a form of Pre-Established Hamony, in that the truth of the numbers is a pre-established ontological primitive. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Numbers in Space
Hi Craig Weinberg How does ideal spacetime differ from what physicists refer to as spacetime. Real spacetime can be integrated over dxdydzdt. Anyway, even a physical vacuum can contain things such as radio waves, light, intelligence, Platonia, etc. There is no such thing as nothing, IMHO. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/22/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-21, 12:58:41 Subject: Re: Re: Numbers in Space On Friday, September 21, 2012 11:51:10 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg Thwe ideal vacuum is still in spacetime. It's in ideal spacetime. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 9/21/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-21, 11:27:56 Subject: Re: Numbers in Space On Friday, September 21, 2012 4:18:47 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Sep 2012, at 19:16, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, September 20, 2012 12:26:07 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Sep 2012, at 17:02, Craig Weinberg wrote: Here's another reductio ad absurdum illustration of comp. If the version of comp we are discussing here is independent of physics, then shouldn't it be possible for us to program universal machines using only empty space? You are quite quick here, but have a good insight, as comp makes space non clonable, indeterministic in the details, and plausibly Turing universal, as QM confirms. The 0-body problem (the quantum vacuum) is already Turing universal (I think). For classical physics you need three bodies at least). What about an ideal vacuum? Just lengths multiplying and adding enumerated bundles of lengths. No quantum. It would not be Turing universal. If it isn't then that seems to me an argument for primitive physics. Length can be quantified, so why can't we just use millimeters or Planck lengths as the basis for our enumeration, addition, and multiplication and directly program from our mind to space? Who we? In the universe nearby it costs a lot of energy/money/time to handle matter already gigantic compared to the Planck length. Or are you suggesting we are already simulated by the quantum vacuum. Very plausible, but comp asks for justifying this in arithmetic. I'm saying that whatever program we access when we choose what we think about should be able to run just as easily in space as it does through the brain. Or just arithmetic. You don't need space. Only addition and multiplication of integers. Or justapplication and abstraction on lambda terms, etc. I was going to do another post upping the ante from Numbers in Space to Numbers in Xpace (imaginary space). To me this is the fading qualia argument that could be a Waterloo for comp. The transition from Turing machines executed in matter to execution in space and then xpace would have to be consistent to support the claim that arithmetic is independent from physics. If that isn't the case, why not? What is different other than physical properties between matter, space, and xpace? I should be able to pick an area of my house and leave a bunch of memories there and then come back to them later just be occupying the same space. Not at all. You are distributed in the whole UD*. You can go back to your memory only if the measure on computations makes such a persistence possible. This needs to be justified with the self-reference logics, and that is what is done with S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*. I don't know what that means exactly but if I am getting the gist, it still doesn't tell me why it is easier for me to remember something in my mind than to offload my memories onto objects, places, times of the year, whatever. Why not make a Turing machine out of time that uses moments instead of tape and tape instead of numbers? It seems to me that the universality of UMs is wildly overstated. That's if we define space as relative to my house and not the rotating planet, revolving sun, etc. So it sounds like you are not opposed to this idea of computation with no resources whatsoever besides space, No need for spaces. To invoke it is already too much physicalist for comp. So we can pretty much call comp magic then. It needs nothing whatsoever and can ultimately control anything from anywhere. provided that it could be justified arithmetically (which I don't understand why it wouldn't be. how does comp know if it's running on matter or space?) By UDA. Anything physical must be justified with the material hypostases. Up to now, this works, even by giving the shadows of the reason why destructive interference of the computations occurs below our substitution
Re: Numbers in Space
On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote: On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. The problem is learning their results. The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant to go through the formality of executing any functionis already executed non-locally. Why 'do' anything? Bruno can 't answer that question. He is afraid that it will corrupt Olympia. Not at all, the answer is easy here. In the big picture, that is arithmetic, nothing is done. The computations are already done in it. doing things is a relative internal notion coming from the first person perspectives. Also, Platonia does not really exist, nor God, as existence is what belongs to Platonia. Comp follows Plotinus on this, both God and Matter does not belong to the category exist (ontologically). They are epistemological beings. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.