Re: Objects, Lists, and continuums
Hal Ruhl wrote: I have tried to find material discussing the following idea but have not found any yet so I would appreciate comments. The idea is based in the description of objects. It was recently pointed out to me as being an aspect of my model by Alastair Malcolm. The idea is presented below and its result appears to be to exclude continuums from universes. Assumptions: 1) There is a list of all possible properties of objects. The above object #1 is countable by definition. 2) The list and all its sublists are the descriptions of all possible objects. The above object #2 is uncountable by Cantor's diagonal argument. It is the power set of the first list. It is not a list. By Cantor's diagonal argument lists can be no more than countably infinite in length. An object's spacial coordinates are part of its description [its sublist] but because the full list is at most only countably infinite in length there can not be a continuum of spacial coordinates on it. The same would apply to an object's time coordinates. If you assume that space and/or time is a continuum, then there exists an uncountable set of space and/or time coordinates, even in every interval of non-zero measure. But if you take a particular object, as you are doing here, which has one set of space-time coordinate (4-tuple), this is describable with a countable set of symbols. Yes, assuming a space-time continuum that is really a continuum is rather hard to believe, as Feynman pointed out (at one point in his life ;). But as I have been trying to point out, this kind of belief is something that we do without thinking about it. And yet it is faith. It is based on evidence, a finite set of points of evidence, but it takes faith to integrate over those points. Universes are objects described by sub lists of the full list and consist of sets of other sub lists but as such universes can not contain continuums of spacial or temporal coordinates or continuums of any other property its objects might have. As an aside, in my current model the full list and its sub lists are both description and object. Objects interact by mutually changing just one property - their location on a Physical Reality dimension. The change is just a shifting of boundaries between sublists. Hal Ruhl Perhaps this is a good new angle to try to say what I'm trying to say. If there is ultimately no such thing as a person, then there is no subject-object distinction (needed for science, and even more for scientists). This is talking at the deepest level of philosophy, not the common sense (sometimes the word naive is used) sense that is used in everyday science. I think it is best to always look at the whole week (the living of everyday life at the finite level) from the perspective of the weekend (personal eternity, the grand scheme of things which the impersonal Everything does not provide). The only way to the continuum is to start with it. No amount of making lists is going to get you there. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Objects, Lists, and continuums
Tom Caylor wrote: Hal Ruhl wrote: I have tried to find material discussing the following idea but have not found any yet so I would appreciate comments. The idea is based in the description of objects. It was recently pointed out to me as being an aspect of my model by Alastair Malcolm. The idea is presented below and its result appears to be to exclude continuums from universes. Assumptions: 1) There is a list of all possible properties of objects. The above object #1 is countable by definition. 2) The list and all its sublists are the descriptions of all possible objects. The above object #2 is uncountable by Cantor's diagonal argument. It is the power set of the first list. It is not a list. By Cantor's diagonal argument lists can be no more than countably infinite in length. An object's spacial coordinates are part of its description [its sublist] but because the full list is at most only countably infinite in length there can not be a continuum of spacial coordinates on it. The same would apply to an object's time coordinates. If you assume that space and/or time is a continuum, then there exists an uncountable set of space and/or time coordinates, even in every interval of non-zero measure. But if you take a particular object, as you are doing here, which has one set of space-time coordinate (4-tuple), this is describable with a countable set of symbols. Yes, assuming a space-time continuum that is really a continuum is rather hard to believe, as Feynman pointed out (at one point in his life ;). Actually, since Feynam's point seems to be meaningful, then he probably made the point over an interval of non-zero measure of his life. ;) But as I have been trying to point out, this kind of belief is something that we do without thinking about it. And yet it is faith. It is based on evidence, a finite set of points of evidence, but it takes faith to integrate over those points. It also takes faith to use a finite number of points to predict nature, investing an interval of non-zero measure of your life to do it. The personal involvement is what adds the meaning and significance to faith. Believing against evidence is a totally different thing that we can all bad talk with integrity as much as we want. Tom Universes are objects described by sub lists of the full list and consist of sets of other sub lists but as such universes can not contain continuums of spacial or temporal coordinates or continuums of any other property its objects might have. As an aside, in my current model the full list and its sub lists are both description and object. Objects interact by mutually changing just one property - their location on a Physical Reality dimension. The change is just a shifting of boundaries between sublists. Hal Ruhl Perhaps this is a good new angle to try to say what I'm trying to say. If there is ultimately no such thing as a person, then there is no subject-object distinction (needed for science, and even more for scientists). This is talking at the deepest level of philosophy, not the common sense (sometimes the word naive is used) sense that is used in everyday science. I think it is best to always look at the whole week (the living of everyday life at the finite level) from the perspective of the weekend (personal eternity, the grand scheme of things which the impersonal Everything does not provide). The only way to the continuum is to start with it. No amount of making lists is going to get you there. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Objects, Lists, and continuums
Hi Tom At 11:10 AM 12/4/2006, you wrote: Hal Ruhl wrote: The idea is presented below and its result appears to be to exclude continuums from universes. Assumptions: 1) There is a list of all possible properties of objects. The above object #1 is countable by definition. It is only countable as I say in my model but by Cantor's argument as far as I know and not by definition. If it was by definition then why his argument? 2) The list and all its sublists are the descriptions of all possible objects. The above object #2 is uncountable by Cantor's diagonal argument. It is the power set of the first list. As I say in my model it is indeed the power set and thus makes for an uncountable number of objects. It is not a list. I did not say it was. By Cantor's diagonal argument lists can be no more than countably infinite in length. The above refers to #1. I thought that was clear since I did not try to say #2 was a list. An object's spacial coordinates are part of its description [its sublist] but because the full list is at most only countably infinite in length there can not be a continuum of spacial coordinates on it. The same would apply to an object's time coordinates. If you assume that space and/or time is a continuum, then there exists an uncountable set of space and/or time coordinates, even in every interval of non-zero measure. Well the idea that you can map the points in an N dimensional continuum to the points on any line segment makes me wonder how continuums can play a role in the description of universes especially since it does not seem necessary - at least to me. But if you take a particular object, as you are doing here, which has one set of space-time coordinate (4-tuple), this is describable with a countable set of symbols. If so then why is a continuum necessary? My Physical reality dimension with countable - finite will do I think - values seems enough. Yes, assuming a space-time continuum that is really a continuum is rather hard to believe, as Feynman pointed out (at one point in his life ;). But as I have been trying to point out, this kind of belief is something that we do without thinking about it. And yet it is faith. It is based on evidence, a finite set of points of evidence, but it takes faith to integrate over those points. As I indicated appeal to continuums seems odd and unnecessary. I have found no evidence that convinces me otherwise and I have no faith in the odd and unnecessary. Universes are objects described by sub lists of the full list and consist of sets of other sub lists but as such universes can not contain continuums of spacial or temporal coordinates or continuums of any other property its objects might have. As an aside, in my current model the full list and its sub lists are both description and object. Objects interact by mutually changing just one property - their location on a Physical Reality dimension. The change is just a shifting of boundaries between sublists. Hal Ruhl Perhaps this is a good new angle to try to say what I'm trying to say. If there is ultimately no such thing as a person, Well a result of what I am saying seems to be that there are a countably infinite number of objects that are exactly as I am now but having every possible space-time combination. However, one has to consider their location on the physical reality dimension. This would allow a dynamic [which occurs by the nature of the # 1 list] to trace out chains of such as I could ever be objects that would appear as a person moving through space-time so long as at least several adjacent such objects all have non zero but first rising and then falling physical reality so that flow and apparent have a reference. Must go it is late. Hal then there is no subject-object distinction (needed for science, and even more for scientists). This is talking at the deepest level of philosophy, not the common sense (sometimes the word naive is used) sense that is used in everyday science. I think it is best to always look at the whole week (the living of everyday life at the finite level) from the perspective of the weekend (personal eternity, the grand scheme of things which the impersonal Everything does not provide). The only way to the continuum is to start with it. No amount of making lists is going to get you there. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
