### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 05 Feb 2011, at 12:08, Andrew Soltau wrote: On 05/02/11 01:11, David Nyman wrote: Bruno's argument is that if we nail our colours to computation for an explanation of mind, then we should expect any physics extracted from it to have just such counter-intuitive characteristics. Hi David Thanks, this too is very helpful. 'Looking at' Father Dougal I now always see Ardall O'Hanlon, whom I consider one of the great comic geniuses of all time. An excellent choice of front! Ah! Father Ted is one of my favorite TV series. And, BTW, here is a good father Ted introduction to the difference between dreams and reality: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AB7IDw3PNI :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 06 Feb 2011, at 23:15, Andrew Soltau wrote: Hi Bruno I will attempt to define the terms in a manner satisfactory to both of us, and maybe we will understand each other this way. CTM Computational Theory of Mind is the concept that the mind literally is a digital computer ... and that thought literally is a kind of computation. from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/ So you can see that comp, as defined in sane04, is a weaker version of CTM. (And thus all consequences of comp are inherit by CTM). Expression like mind is a digital computer are category error, and is also ambiguous. It relates also on the identity thesis in the philosophy of mind, which is actually incompatible with comp (and thus with CTM). I think that it is also incompatible with QM, but that is out of topic. With comp you can associate a mind to the execution of a computer, but you cannot attach a computer to a mind. You might attach an infinity of computer executions to a mind. The relation is not one-one. That is among other things a consequence of UDA. To say that thought literally is a kind of computation is ambiguous. That might be enough in some context, but the more precise comp is needed to understand the comp (and thus CTM) necessary reduction of body to mind, or of physics to arithmetic (or computer science). I understand your steps one to seven to be making this point. I have no difficulty with this point. Which point? The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points: 1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy in a deterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original result that I published in 1988 (although I made a dozen of conference on this in the seventies). Many academics have criticize this, but their argument have been debunked. Chalmers did criticize it at the ASSC4. 2) that any measure of uncertainty of the comp first person indeterminacy is independent of the reconstitution delays (step four). 3) that comp entails first person non locality (step this has been more developed in my thesis, long and short version are in my web page). This has been retrieved from sane04 (for reason of place), but is developed in the original 1994 thesis (and in the 1998 short version, recently published). 4) That first person experience does not distinguish real from virtual implementation (this is not original, it is in Galouye, and it is a comp version of the old dream argument in the greek chinese and indian antic literature). Step six. In particular indeterminacy and non locality does not depend on the real or virtual nature of the computation. Step seven itself shows the reversal between physics and arithmetic (or any first order theory of any universal system in post Church Turing sense) in case the physical universe exists primitively and is sufficiently big. So UDA1-7 is the one of the main result of the thesis. A theory which want to explain and unify quanta and qualia, and respect comp, has to derive quanta and qualia without postulating them. You have also that comp + ~solipsisme entails first person plural MW. Normally comp should imply ~solipsisme, but as I explain this part is not yet solved in the concrete. Now most people (among interested) understand UDA1-7, that is, that comp + *very big* universe entails the reversal. If you have no problem with the first person indeterminacy, with the invariance for reconstitution delays, with the inability of first persons to distinguish (in short time) real and virtual, I don't see what you miss in the step seven. 7 is a direct consequence of 4,5,6. Step 8 extends the invariance: it shows that we cannot distinguish virtual reality with arithmetical reality, so we don't need to run physically (and BTW, what would that mean?) a universal dovetailer to get the global first indeterminacy (the one based on a running UD). So step 8 just shows that we don't need the assumption of a big universe to get the reversal. I told the list that a scientist thought having find a refutation of UDA. I got it, and it was that: I would have forget that we might live in a little physical universe. My answer is just a reference to step 8. So later he replied with the idea that the movie-graph can think. That's a progress. Now, I have debunked more than once on this list the idea that a movie can think. (It is an error akin to the confusion between a number and a gödel number of a number, a confusion between a description of a computation and a computation, it is a confusion of the type finger and moon (ultrafrequent in the field). Of course, even without step 8, UDA1-7 is already very nice given that it shows the reversal in the case of 'big universe', and in passing shows that digital mechanism (comp) entails indeterminacy, non locality, and non cloning of matter. Of course the white rabbits remains

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

Hi Bruno So you can see that comp, as defined in sane04, is a weaker version of CTM. (And thus all consequences of comp are inherit by CTM). Certainly it is clear that your /yes doctor/ hypothesis subsumes CTM. But since it is a broader proposition, I fail to see why all consequences of comp are inherit by CTM. One could adopt CTM and yet still debate comp - though I have no interest in doing so. Above all, why should CTM inherit the second of your three comp sub-hypotheses: Church Thesis and Arithmetical Realism? Expression like mind is a digital computer are category error, and is also ambiguous. I am happy to settle with something much more abstract, such as mind is an algorithm of some kind if that helps. It relates also on the identity thesis in the philosophy of mind, which is actually incompatible with comp (and thus with CTM). I wonder what you consider to be the identity thesis in the philosophy of mind I think that it is also incompatible with QM, but that is out of topic. No. Chalmers state categorically this concept is compatible with physics. With comp you can associate a mind to the execution of a computer, but you cannot attach a computer to a mind. I am not sure of the point you are making here. What do you mean by 'attach'? You might attach an infinity of computer executions to a mind. The relation is not one-one. Assuming 'attach' means instantiated, yes, the mind is multiply instantiated. No problem there. This is the basis of my concept multisolipsism - described shortly. That is among other things a consequence of UDA. Now I'm really not sure what you mean by 'attach'. Associate with? Consider instantiated in? Consider supervenient on? Causally dependent on? To say that thought literally is a kind of computation is ambiguous. That might be enough in some context, but the more precise comp is needed to understand the comp (and thus CTM) necessary reduction of body to mind, or of physics to arithmetic (or computer science). And rather than saying that thought literally is a kind of computation, comp says that ...? Indicating the necessary reduction of body to mind, or of physics to arithmetic (or computer science) because ...? I am separating my responses to various parts of your email so I can stay focused on one issue at a time as we exchange our views. My compartmentalised response is continued in email subject: CTM and ALG Andrew -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

Hi Andrew, On 07 Feb 2011, at 19:13, Andrew Soltau wrote: Hi Bruno So you can see that comp, as defined in sane04, is a weaker version of CTM. (And thus all consequences of comp are inherit by CTM). Certainly it is clear that your yes doctor hypothesis subsumes CTM. Not after step seven. The UD, or UD*, makes the reasoning independent of the level. The yes doctor *image* is an help for the first six steps (indeterminacy, non locality, delays invariance). I let open the question of identity between the biological brain and the generalized brain. But since it is a broader proposition, I fail to see why all consequences of comp are inherit by CTM. Because if you can deduce a proposition independently of the choice of a level, all what is proved will get on for all theories narrowing the level. One could adopt CTM and yet still debate comp - I doubt so, frankly. though I have no interest in doing so. Above all, why should CTM inherit the second of your three comp sub-hypotheses: Church Thesis and Arithmetical Realism? Ah! OK. If you want Church thesis out, I am OK. If this is the difference with CTM? Church thesis is really the key and the pointer on theoretical computer science (and diagonalizations) for the fundamental thing. And you can drop out Arithmetical Realism, and replace it by the assumption of believing in enough arithmetical relations to provide a sense to Church thesis. By which I mean the original classical logical thesis by Church, and proposed with different form but provably equivalent meaning, by Post, Markov, Kleene (actually the one who creates the Church thesis. For Church it was a definition). But then that is why I define what I mean by comp: it is Church thesis and the yes doctor, but where yes doctor is a memo for It exist a level such that my consciousness is invariant for digital functional substitutions. At step seven, the level don't depend on the high level, CTM like, chosen for the ease of the first six steps. Expression like mind is a digital computer are category error, and is also ambiguous. I am happy to settle with something much more abstract, such as mind is an algorithm of some kind if that helps. But you mind still be guilty of a forbidden identity ! A guilty of fuzziness which might prevent you to understand the nuance in the movie graph reasoning, or in Olympia. Many would agree that mind might be related to the execution of an algorithm on some physical machine, as I like to explore that idea, but this is at the starting point of the reasoning, and is not, then, related to the fact that physical machines appears as relatively stable products of some unknown number of algorithm too, and that this is already not just described in arithmetic, but emulated in arithmetical truth. It is hard for me to believe in any of this, but I just follow a theory toward its logical consequences. It relates also on the identity thesis in the philosophy of mind, which is actually incompatible with comp (and thus with CTM). I wonder what you consider to be the identity thesis in the philosophy of mind It is long to describe, especially that its foprmulatiosn might depend on the choice of basic ontology. But simply said, the identity mind id the mind-brain identity. It goes from the trivial (and in my opinion incorrect) literal identification, that the mind is the brain, or is the brain activity, to some epiphenomenal one-one association. With DM, I argue that if you can reasonably ascribe a mind to a machine, the machine's mind itself cannot ascribe its mind to its body and is indeed something else. The first person views depend on non formal truth, which change the logic of the p arithmetical nuances. I think that it is also incompatible with QM, but that is out of topic. No. Chalmers state categorically this concept is compatible with physics. I read that defense of dualism in the context of Everett, which I see as a progress in monism. Also X state categoricallly is never convincing. Now the mind-body problem is not solved, neither in DM, nor in QM. Nor is the problem of what is matter, in both DM, and QM, especially QM + gravitation. So I doubt any X can be categorical on this, and serious at the same time. Chalmers stopped at step 3, if you have the slides. He did not accept the first step indeterminacy and leaves the place. But you seem more ... courageous? Taking comp seriously is like taking the quantum seriously, it leads to shocking possibilities. With comp you can associate a mind to the execution of a computer, but you cannot attach a computer to a mind. I am not sure of the point you are making here. What do you mean by 'attach'? Imagine a robot working in some fields, and imagine it equipped with a complex computer, so that it makes a lot of decision including many constrained by an amount

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 06 Feb 2011, at 01:02, 1Z wrote: On Feb 5, 8:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this pov. I dare say. But the Mathematical Multiverses do add a lot more WRs than physical multiverses. Prove this. Once you take into account the relative points of view (of the machines, by using the self-reference logic for example) this is already refuted. Mathematical reality kicks back. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 06/02/11 08:51, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Feb 2011, at 01:02, 1Z wrote: On Feb 5, 8:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this pov. I dare say. But the Mathematical Multiverses do add a lot more WRs than physical multiverses. Prove this. Once you take into account the relative points of view (of the machines, by using the self-reference logic for example) this is already refuted. Mathematical reality kicks back. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Hi Bruno How do you define the relative point of view? Andrew -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On Feb 6, 8:51 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Feb 2011, at 01:02, 1Z wrote: On Feb 5, 8:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this pov. I dare say. But the Mathematical Multiverses do add a lot more WRs than physical multiverses. Prove this. It's already stated by Tegmark. Further proof is given by the fact that physics uses only a subset of mathematics. Once you take into account the relative points of view (of the machines, by using the self-reference logic for example Prove that. ) this is already refuted. Mathematical reality kicks back. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 06 Feb 2011, at 12:26, Andrew Soltau wrote: On 06/02/11 08:51, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Feb 2011, at 01:02, 1Z wrote: On Feb 5, 8:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this pov. I dare say. But the Mathematical Multiverses do add a lot more WRs than physical multiverses. Prove this. Once you take into account the relative points of view (of the machines, by using the self-reference logic for example) this is already refuted. Mathematical reality kicks back. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Hi Bruno How do you define the relative point of view? Do you know Gödel's provability predicate? The points of view are defined by intensional variants of the current provability predicate of the machine with or without some oracle. There are 8 basic points of view p (truth), Bp (provability/believability), Bp p (knowability), Bp Dp (observability), Bp Dp p (sensibility/ feelability). Three of them inherits the G/G* splitting, making a total of 8. It is really 4 + 4*infinity, because the 'material points of view' (with Dp) admits themselves graded variants. But this is in AUDA, and we have not finished the UDA (+MGA) discussion. Have you understand the step 7? Did my last explanations helped? Take your time, my next week will be rather busy. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 06 Feb 2011, at 16:30, 1Z wrote: On Feb 6, 8:51 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Feb 2011, at 01:02, 1Z wrote: On Feb 5, 8:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this pov. I dare say. But the Mathematical Multiverses do add a lot more WRs than physical multiverses. Prove this. It's already stated by Tegmark. Further proof is given by the fact that physics uses only a subset of mathematics. Tegmark is right on third person mathematicalism. I did show before that if you assume comp you don't need more than arithmeticalism. A good thing because mathematical is harder to define than arithmeticalism. Note that mathematicalism subsumes the ontology of arithmeticalism. But Tegmark doesn't take into account neither the first person indeterminacy (local or global), nor a theory of mind (which in case of comp it is easy, given that it is computer science and computer's computer science, ...) Once you take into account the relative points of view (of the machines, by using the self-reference logic for example Prove that. Sorry. I don't have to do that. I am the one translating a problem (the mind-body problem) into a body problem in computer science or in arithmetic. If you believe that comp leads to WR, show them to me, and justify your measure choice. Which is truly an open problem at the least. And then I show that by taking the points of view of the self- referentially correct machine into account (which is perhaps just an elementary politesse) we have to take into account a catalog of points of views to just formulate the problem. Bruno ) this is already refuted. Mathematical reality kicks back. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On Feb 6, 5:30 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Feb 2011, at 16:30, 1Z wrote: On Feb 6, 8:51 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Feb 2011, at 01:02, 1Z wrote: On Feb 5, 8:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this pov. I dare say. But the Mathematical Multiverses do add a lot more WRs than physical multiverses. Prove this. It's already stated by Tegmark. Further proof is given by the fact that physics uses only a subset of mathematics. Tegmark is right on third person mathematicalism. I did show before that if you assume comp you don't need more than arithmeticalism. good thing because mathematical is harder to define than arithmeticalism. Note that mathematicalism subsumes the ontology of arithmeticalism. But Tegmark doesn't take into account neither the first person indeterminacy (local or global), nor a theory of mind (which in case of comp it is easy, given that it is computer science and computer's computer science, ...) Once you take into account the relative points of view (of the machines, by using the self-reference logic for example Prove that. Sorry. I don't have to do that. I am the one translating a problem (the mind-body problem) into a body problem in computer science or in arithmetic. If you believe that comp leads to WR, show them to me, I believe that a level IV multiverse leads to WRs and you haven't explained how comp solves the problem. and justify your measure choice. I already have There are more physically incoherent universes than coherent ones. and there are many more that are mostly incoherent than those that are coherent, and there are many more that contain a little coherent me in a see of incoherence than there are that are wholly coherent. Beyond that, I don;t need any special measure: that's a hoop that those who are seeking to solve the WR problem need to jump through Which is truly an open problem at the least. And then I show that by taking the points of view of the self- referentially correct machine into account (which is perhaps just an elementary politesse) we have to take into account a catalog of points of views to just formulate the problem. Bruno ) this is already refuted. Mathematical reality kicks back. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

Hi Bruno I will attempt to define the terms in a manner satisfactory to both of us, and maybe we will understand each other this way. CTM Computational Theory of Mind is the concept that the mind literally is a digital computer ... and that thought literally is a kind of computation. from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/ I understand your steps one to seven to be making this point. I have no difficulty with this point. This is what seems straightforward to me. Thought is a computation. OK. Experiential reality is a computation. OK. New Point Chalmers defines a 'Computational Hypothesis' The Computational Hypothesis says that physics as we know it is not the fundamental level of reality. and Just as chemical processes underlie biological processes, and microphysical processes underlie chemical processes, something underlies microphysical processes. Underneath the level of quarks, electrons, and photons is a further level: the level of bits. These bits are governed by a computational algorithm, which at a higher level produces the processes that we think of as fundamental particles, forces, and so on. This is what you claim to have established around point 7 in your paper. I do not follow the step from CTM to a Computational Hypothesis. (no, your last explanation did not help) Andrew -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 04 Feb 2011, at 20:34, Andrew Soltau wrote: On 04/02/11 19:22, David Nyman wrote: On 4 February 2011 18:44, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@googlemail.com wrote: From my perspective this debate / clarification is getting lost in language problems. Given that a universal dovetailer must necessarily produce *all* experiential realities, all possible experiencable moments, how do you account for our endlessly repeated observations of an experiential reality that corresponds *precisely* not only with ordinary every day observations of a physical quantum reality, but also all quantum experiments to date. Forgive me butting in, but occasionally I find it helps to reconsider the problem using less technical language (since I'm not very technical). I tend to think about this from a One-Many perspective. Essentially, in talking about consciousness or observation, the comp assumption implies that our perspective is always from the point of view of the One. The infinity of computation, in this analogy the Many, is somehow seen from the point of view of the One. So then the question is - how can any particular set of experiences emerge, or be filtered, from the totality of the Many, from such a perspective? Simple ideas of measure may indeed seem to give the wrong answer, very quickly. It seems that we have to think combinatorially, in terms of higher orders of filtration - perhaps an infinity of them. The Goldilocks enigma of cosmology may be suggestive here - the 20-or-so free parameters, their sometimes exquisite degree of adjustment, and their possible inter-dependence, seems to imply a pitiless winnowing of the Many such that vanishingly few experiential realities with the observed characteristics can survive. Hence the remainder subside into non-experiential oblivion. I suppose that was as clear as mud. But it may give a flavour. David From my perspective this debate / clarification is getting lost in language problems. Given that a universal dovetailer must necessarily produce *all* experiential realities, all possible experiencable moments, how do you account for our endlessly repeated observations of an experiential reality that corresponds *precisely* not only with ordinary every day observations of a physical quantum reality, but also all quantum experiments to date. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. Thank you David, 'butting in' very welcome! It seems quite inevitable that any ordinary concept of measure must give the wrong answer. And it seems to me that since what is proposed is at least radically counter-intuitive, it requires some powerful rationale to support it. I am not clear what possible basis is provided for this rationale. Yes indeed, 'the 20-or-so free parameters, their sometimes exquisite degree of adjustment, and their possible inter-dependence' does indeed imply, surely to all of us, that there is 'a pitiless winnowing of the Many such that vanishingly few experiential realities with the observed characteristics can survive' but surely this implies, or tends to imply, a physical basis, a relativistic and quantum mechanical basis, to reality - it is the physical parameters, and their place in physics, which provides this brutal filtering. Or is there a point here with respect to computational mind that I am missing? If the primitively physical universe does the filtering, then it cannot contain an omega point, given that it will reproduce, as you said, a universal dovetailing, and so the indeterminacy on my computational continuations will bear on that dovetailing, and again physics has to be emerging on the arithmetical dovetailing. That's the point seven. You did miss this in a previews post, and I hope you have well understood this now (tell me please). So, a primitively physical reality can do the 'brutal filtering' only by being 'little'. But then you are facing the movie graph problem, you will have to make consciousness dependent on the primitively physical nature of the running machine and this means you can no more say yes to the doctor for any *digital* substitution which conserves the functionality of your brain: in other word comp is false. That's the point 8. We cannot distinguish an arithmetical emulation from a real, or primitively physical one. The arithmetical creatures are not zombies. So if comp is true, we are led to that radically counter-intuitive conclusion that the laws of physics *have to* emerge from the laws of computation, that is on addition and multiplication. We might believe at this stage that we have just refuted comp,

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 05/02/11 01:11, David Nyman wrote: Bruno's argument is that if we nail our colours to computation for an explanation of mind, then we should expect any physics extracted from it to have just such counter-intuitive characteristics. Hi David Thanks, this too is very helpful. 'Looking at' Father Dougal I now always see Ardall O'Hanlon, whom I consider one of the great comic geniuses of all time. An excellent choice of front! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 05/02/11 09:55, Bruno Marchal wrote: If the primitively physical universe does the filtering, then it cannot contain an omega point, given that it will reproduce, as you said, a universal dovetailing, and so the indeterminacy on my computational continuations will bear on that dovetailing, and again physics has to be emerging on the arithmetical dovetailing. That's the point seven. You did miss this in a previews post, and I hope you have well understood this now (tell me please). No, I do not follow this. I have carefully re read your section seven and I still do not follow it. A very simple explanation would be welcome. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 05 Feb 2011, at 12:12, Andrew Soltau wrote: On 05/02/11 09:55, Bruno Marchal wrote: If the primitively physical universe does the filtering, then it cannot contain an omega point, given that it will reproduce, as you said, a universal dovetailing, and so the indeterminacy on my computational continuations will bear on that dovetailing, and again physics has to be emerging on the arithmetical dovetailing. That's the point seven. You did miss this in a previews post, and I hope you have well understood this now (tell me please). No, I do not follow this. I have carefully re read your section seven and I still do not follow it. A very simple explanation would be welcome. Normally steps 1-6 constitute the simple explanation for swallowing step 7. My feeling is that you fail to understand the importance of the comp first person indeterminacy. You might download the pdf slides: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004Slide.pdf In step 3, you see that you cannot predict in advance where you will be reconstituted after a scanning/annihilation and duplication. In step four you see that the introduction of delays of reconstitution does not change the measure on the uncertainties (in case such a measure exists). In step 5, the absence of the black spot means that there is no annihilation, and you see that an absence of annihilation can be seen as an instantaneous annihilation and reconstitution at the same place, without delay, so that staying at the same place appears as just another possible outcome (this is counter-intuitive). In step 6, you see that the virtual nature of the reconstitution changes again nothing. Then step seven is the case where where the universe contains a virtual reconstitution of all your computational continuations (an omega point, or a universal dovetailing). So if you do any experiments in the physical worlds, your next subjective experience is determined by the reconstitution of your actual state in the omega point. So, if there is an omega point, the probability/credibility that you are already there is about one, and if this does not change the physical laws, it means that the physical laws emerge from the omega point, alias the (sigma_1) arithmetical truth. I am busy right now. If this did not help, we can go more slowly. Just tell me. I sincerely fail to see what you miss. Usually people have more problem with step 8, which is admittedly more involved on the mind-body issue. Step 7 is or should be rather easy once you get the 3, 4, 5, 6 steps which pave the way. Be sure you get them. Sometimes, people understand step 5, but fail to take it into account in step 7. In the drawing for the steps 5, 6, 7 (and 8), you should supply the delays / D / on the arrows. This might help. Have a good week-end, Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On Feb 4, 12:45 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2011/2/4 Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@googlemail.com I did answer to that... the answer is because you are in that environment... That's not answer. There are physical constraints on which enviroment a complex entity could find itself in, but not mathematical ones. Mathematically you stitch an ordered structure to a random one. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

in MWI (and QM) you have WR, so in the multiverse there exists at every moments splitting or differentiation to random universe, so the question of what filter it out remains (if MWI is true)... What I want to say is the answer is because *you* are in that environment, you the consciousness, the constraint come from being conscious, and I don't think you can be conscious where you're not and obviously, for *your* person to be conscious like you are now you must be here (in this universe ?) because that's what you observe, your next moment should be a moment where you are *you* and not someone else, hence all the someone else moments have a zero measure to be your next moments, but it is sure that there are hugely more moments of not you than there are moments which are you... so the filtering is you. Regards, Quentin 2011/2/5 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com On Feb 4, 12:45 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2011/2/4 Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@googlemail.com I did answer to that... the answer is because you are in that environment... That's not answer. There are physical constraints on which enviroment a complex entity could find itself in, but not mathematical ones. Mathematically you stitch an ordered structure to a random one. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On Feb 5, 1:08 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: in MWI (and QM) you have WR, so in the multiverse there exists at every moments splitting or differentiation to random universe, so the question of what filter it out remains (if MWI is true)... What I want to say is the answer is because *you* are in that environment, you the consciousness, the constraint come from being conscious, and I don't think you can be conscious where you're not and obviously, for *your* person to be conscious like you are now you must be here (in this universe ?) because that's what you observe, your next moment should be a moment where you are *you* and not someone else, But I am not defined by having exactly the same experience at all times. I am defined by a having a coherent set of memories, but (in a mathematical multiverse) a coherent set of memories up until time T can be stitched onto surreal experiences at time T+1. (which sort of happens in dreams anyway). I can think to myself Why am I, a person who was born in such-and-such a place and went to school in such-and- such a place and who has every reason to believe there are no talking giant white rabbits now suddenly seeing a WR. hence all the someone else moments have a zero measure to be your next moments, but it is sure that there are hugely more moments of not you than there are moments which are you... so the filtering is you. In a MMV, there have to be many more me's with incoherent future experiences following on from my current memories, that there are me's with coherent future experiences. Regards, Quentin 2011/2/5 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com On Feb 4, 12:45 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2011/2/4 Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@googlemail.com I did answer to that... the answer is because you are in that environment... That's not answer. There are physical constraints on which enviroment a complex entity could find itself in, but not mathematical ones. Mathematically you stitch an ordered structure to a random one. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 05 Feb 2011, at 12:08, Andrew Soltau wrote: On 05/02/11 01:11, David Nyman wrote: Bruno's argument is that if we nail our colours to computation for an explanation of mind, then we should expect any physics extracted from it to have just such counter-intuitive characteristics. Hi David Thanks, this too is very helpful. 'Looking at' Father Dougal I now always see Ardall O'Hanlon, whom I consider one of the great comic geniuses of all time. An excellent choice of front! Ah! Father Ted is one of my favorite TV series. And, BTW, here is a good father Ted introduction to the difference between dreams and reality: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AB7IDw3PNI :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

2011/2/5 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com On Feb 5, 1:08 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: in MWI (and QM) you have WR, so in the multiverse there exists at every moments splitting or differentiation to random universe, so the question of what filter it out remains (if MWI is true)... What I want to say is the answer is because *you* are in that environment, you the consciousness, the constraint come from being conscious, and I don't think you can be conscious where you're not and obviously, for *your* person to be conscious like you are now you must be here (in this universe ?) because that's what you observe, your next moment should be a moment where you are *you* and not someone else, But I am not defined by having exactly the same experience at all times. I am defined by a having a coherent set of memories, but (in a mathematical multiverse) a coherent set of memories up until time T can be stitched onto surreal experiences at time T+1. (which sort of happens in dreams anyway). I can think to myself Why am I, a person who was born in such-and-such a place and went to school in such-and- such a place and who has every reason to believe there are no talking giant white rabbits now suddenly seeing a WR. You can up until you are not you anymore... ie: until you can say I'm am Peter Jones and you know it. So all *your* experiences are filtered amongs only the Peter Jones experiences. hence all the someone else moments have a zero measure to be your next moments, but it is sure that there are hugely more moments of not you than there are moments which are you... so the filtering is you. In a MMV, there have to be many more me's with incoherent future experiences following on from my current memories, that there are me's with coherent future experiences. That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this pov. My point is ***when you are asking why am I in this *coherent* moments is because you are effectively in that coherent moments... you would'nt ask that if you were in incoherent moments, so that question filters out any incoherent moments. This restrict the observer class to the only observers able to ask it.*** Regards, Quentin 2011/2/5 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com On Feb 4, 12:45 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2011/2/4 Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@googlemail.com I did answer to that... the answer is because you are in that environment... That's not answer. There are physical constraints on which enviroment a complex entity could find itself in, but not mathematical ones. Mathematically you stitch an ordered structure to a random one. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.comeverything-list%252bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 2/5/2011 12:44 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2011/2/5 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com On Feb 5, 1:08 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote: in MWI (and QM) you have WR, so in the multiverse there exists at every moments splitting or differentiation to random universe, so the question of what filter it out remains (if MWI is true)... What I want to say is the answer is because *you* are in that environment, you the consciousness, the constraint come from being conscious, and I don't think you can be conscious where you're not and obviously, for *your* person to be conscious like you are now you must be here (in this universe ?) because that's what you observe, your next moment should be a moment where you are *you* and not someone else, But I am not defined by having exactly the same experience at all times. I am defined by a having a coherent set of memories, but (in a mathematical multiverse) a coherent set of memories up until time T can be stitched onto surreal experiences at time T+1. (which sort of happens in dreams anyway). I can think to myself Why am I, a person who was born in such-and-such a place and went to school in such-and- such a place and who has every reason to believe there are no talking giant white rabbits now suddenly seeing a WR. You can up until you are not you anymore... ie: until you can say I'm am Peter Jones and you know it. So all *your* experiences are filtered amongs only the Peter Jones experiences. hence all the someone else moments have a zero measure to be your next moments, but it is sure that there are hugely more moments of not you than there are moments which are you... so the filtering is you. In a MMV, there have to be many more me's with incoherent future experiences following on from my current memories, that there are me's with coherent future experiences. That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this pov. My point is ***when you are asking why am I in this *coherent* moments is because you are effectively in that coherent moments... you would'nt ask that if you were in incoherent moments, so that question filters out any incoherent moments. This restrict the observer class to the only observers able to ask it.*** He couldn't ask it in a world where the physics was incoherent. But he could certainly see apparitions of white rabbits etc as in a dream and still ask. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On Feb 5, 10:07 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 2/5/2011 12:44 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2011/2/5 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com On Feb 5, 1:08 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote: in MWI (and QM) you have WR, so in the multiverse there exists at every moments splitting or differentiation to random universe, so the question of what filter it out remains (if MWI is true)... What I want to say is the answer is because *you* are in that environment, you the consciousness, the constraint come from being conscious, and I don't think you can be conscious where you're not and obviously, for *your* person to be conscious like you are now you must be here (in this universe ?) because that's what you observe, your next moment should be a moment where you are *you* and not someone else, But I am not defined by having exactly the same experience at all times. I am defined by a having a coherent set of memories, but (in a mathematical multiverse) a coherent set of memories up until time T can be stitched onto surreal experiences at time T+1. (which sort of happens in dreams anyway). I can think to myself Why am I, a person who was born in such-and-such a place and went to school in such-and- such a place and who has every reason to believe there are no talking giant white rabbits now suddenly seeing a WR. You can up until you are not you anymore... ie: until you can say I'm am Peter Jones and you know it. So all *your* experiences are filtered amongs only the Peter Jones experiences. hence all the someone else moments have a zero measure to be your next moments, but it is sure that there are hugely more moments of not you than there are moments which are you... so the filtering is you. In a MMV, there have to be many more me's with incoherent future experiences following on from my current memories, that there are me's with coherent future experiences. That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this pov. My point is ***when you are asking why am I in this *coherent* moments is because you are effectively in that coherent moments... you would'nt ask that if you were in incoherent moments, so that question filters out any incoherent moments. This restrict the observer class to the only observers able to ask it.*** He couldn't ask it in a world where the physics was incoherent. But he could certainly see apparitions of white rabbits etc as in a dream and still ask. There's no reason the MMV should consist only of entirely coherent worlds and entirely incoherent worlds. It must contain every intermediate gradation, and, more importantly every combination of coherent and incoherent regions. Just as you can have some digits of pi buried in an otherwise random string. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

Hi Bruno In step seven what is proved is that MEC + 'big universe' entails that physic is a branch of computer science. Do you see that? I have no problem with the concept that psychology is a branch of computer science. Step 5 plays the big role there. You don't need to be annihilated for having your continuations determined by the first person comp indeterminacy on UD*, once a UD, a fortiori an omega point, is in the physical universe. In step eight, the assumption of the existence of a big universe is eliminated. Roughly because no universal machine at all can distinguish arithmetical reality from anything else. This throws away the need of any universe. Physics has to be justified by number relations only (numbers or any elementary terms of a Sigma_1 complete theory). OK? OK in that 'no universal machine at all can distinguish arithmetical reality from anything else.' We cannot tell if we are in a simulation, obviously. This leaves us with the white rabbit problem. With the whole UDA1-8, you should understand that all what has been done, by the use of MEC, is a reduction of the mind body problem to a body problem in computer science. This seems straightforward. At first sight we might think that we are just very close to a refutation of comp, because, as I think you have intuited, there might be an avalanche of first person 'white rabbits' that is aberrant, or just white noisy experiences. To find a proper measure on the consistent continuations is very difficult, and that is why I have restricted myself to the search of the logic of the certainties, for Löbian machines. Löban machines are chosen because they have enough introspection power and cognitive abilities to describe what they can prove about their certainties, and what they can infer interrogatively. That is not entirely trivial and relies mainly on the work of Gödel, Löb and Solovay (and Post, Turing, Kleene, etc.) Perhaps you can explain the principle on which there is a restriction of white rabbits. Our experience, apparently of the phsyical world, is entirely devoid of white rabbits. Thus, at each moment, the range of possible next observations is always observed to be constrained precisely according to the quantum formalism. Given that the only definition of the history of the observer is the record of observations, I am greatly intrigued to know how one can, at each moment, even in principle, derive the sensory specific next moment, according to quantum rules, from this structure of information. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

Hi, 2011/2/4 Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@googlemail.com Hi Bruno In step seven what is proved is that MEC + 'big universe' entails that physic is a branch of computer science. Do you see that? I have no problem with the concept that psychology is a branch of computer science. Step 5 plays the big role there. You don't need to be annihilated for having your continuations determined by the first person comp indeterminacy on UD*, once a UD, a fortiori an omega point, is in the physical universe. In step eight, the assumption of the existence of a big universe is eliminated. Roughly because no universal machine at all can distinguish arithmetical reality from anything else. This throws away the need of any universe. Physics has to be justified by number relations only (numbers or any elementary terms of a Sigma_1 complete theory). OK? OK in that 'no universal machine at all can distinguish arithmetical reality from anything else.' We cannot tell if we are in a simulation, obviously. This leaves us with the white rabbit problem. With the whole UDA1-8, you should understand that all what has been done, by the use of MEC, is a reduction of the mind body problem to a body problem in computer science. This seems straightforward. At first sight we might think that we are just very close to a refutation of comp, because, as I think you have intuited, there might be an avalanche of first person 'white rabbits' that is aberrant, or just white noisy experiences. To find a proper measure on the consistent continuations is very difficult, and that is why I have restricted myself to the search of the logic of the certainties, for Löbian machines. Löban machines are chosen because they have enough introspection power and cognitive abilities to describe what they can prove about their certainties, and what they can infer interrogatively. That is not entirely trivial and relies mainly on the work of Gödel, Löb and Solovay (and Post, Turing, Kleene, etc.) Perhaps you can explain the principle on which there is a restriction of white rabbits. Our experience, apparently of the phsyical world, is entirely devoid of white rabbits. You can't infer that because you do not observe white rabbits that there is none ;) Quite like the anthropic principle, if at each moments there are overwelmingly more moments where you are just turned into gaz dust... there exists a continuation of you (at least one) that is consistent with a world devoid of WR. The WR problem seems the same question as ... Why am I in that particular universe ? You are because that is consistent with you... As you can't feel all the other you who have not your luck you can't say that because you do not observe it, it is not like that after all... If tomorrow you observe a WR (a magical one ;) ) well... You'll know at least you're no more in a physical world devoid of white rabbits... and you can begin to be really scared ;) Also I think you will agree that all continuation where you're not... have a zero measure (from your POV). So you can't be where you can't be, nothing to be astonished here ;) Regards, Quentin Thus, at each moment, the range of possible next observations is always observed to be constrained precisely according to the quantum formalism. Given that the only definition of the history of the observer is the record of observations, I am greatly intrigued to know how one can, at each moment, even in principle, derive the sensory specific next moment, according to quantum rules, from this structure of information. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 04/02/11 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, 2011/2/4 Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@googlemail.com mailto:andrewsol...@googlemail.com Hi Bruno In step seven what is proved is that MEC + 'big universe' entails that physic is a branch of computer science. Do you see that? I have no problem with the concept that psychology is a branch of computer science. Step 5 plays the big role there. You don't need to be annihilated for having your continuations determined by the first person comp indeterminacy on UD*, once a UD, a fortiori an omega point, is in the physical universe. In step eight, the assumption of the existence of a big universe is eliminated. Roughly because no universal machine at all can distinguish arithmetical reality from anything else. This throws away the need of any universe. Physics has to be justified by number relations only (numbers or any elementary terms of a Sigma_1 complete theory). OK? OK in that 'no universal machine at all can distinguish arithmetical reality from anything else.' We cannot tell if we are in a simulation, obviously. This leaves us with the white rabbit problem. With the whole UDA1-8, you should understand that all what has been done, by the use of MEC, is a reduction of the mind body problem to a body problem in computer science. This seems straightforward. At first sight we might think that we are just very close to a refutation of comp, because, as I think you have intuited, there might be an avalanche of first person 'white rabbits' that is aberrant, or just white noisy experiences. To find a proper measure on the consistent continuations is very difficult, and that is why I have restricted myself to the search of the logic of the certainties, for Löbian machines. Löban machines are chosen because they have enough introspection power and cognitive abilities to describe what they can prove about their certainties, and what they can infer interrogatively. That is not entirely trivial and relies mainly on the work of Gödel, Löb and Solovay (and Post, Turing, Kleene, etc.) Perhaps you can explain the principle on which there is a restriction of white rabbits. Our experience, apparently of the phsyical world, is entirely devoid of white rabbits. You can't infer that because you do not observe white rabbits that there is none ;) Quite like the anthropic principle, if at each moments there are overwelmingly more moments where you are just turned into gaz dust... there exists a continuation of you (at least one) that is consistent with a world devoid of WR. The WR problem seems the same question as ... Why am I in that particular universe ? You are because that is consistent with you... As you can't feel all the other you who have not your luck you can't say that because you do not observe it, it is not like that after all... If tomorrow you observe a WR (a magical one ;) ) well... You'll know at least you're no more in a physical world devoid of white rabbits... and you can begin to be really scared ;) Also I think you will agree that all continuation where you're not... have a zero measure (from your POV). So you can't be where you can't be, nothing to be astonished here ;) Regards, Quentin Thus, at each moment, the range of possible next observations is always observed to be constrained precisely according to the quantum formalism. Given that the only definition of the history of the observer is the record of observations, I am greatly intrigued to know how one can, at each moment, even in principle, derive the sensory specific next moment, according to quantum rules, from this structure of information. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. Hi 'White Rabbits' is Bruno's shorthand for physically impossible observations. At least,

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

2011/2/4 Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@googlemail.com On 04/02/11 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, 2011/2/4 Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@googlemail.com Hi Bruno In step seven what is proved is that MEC + 'big universe' entails that physic is a branch of computer science. Do you see that? I have no problem with the concept that psychology is a branch of computer science. Step 5 plays the big role there. You don't need to be annihilated for having your continuations determined by the first person comp indeterminacy on UD*, once a UD, a fortiori an omega point, is in the physical universe. In step eight, the assumption of the existence of a big universe is eliminated. Roughly because no universal machine at all can distinguish arithmetical reality from anything else. This throws away the need of any universe. Physics has to be justified by number relations only (numbers or any elementary terms of a Sigma_1 complete theory). OK? OK in that 'no universal machine at all can distinguish arithmetical reality from anything else.' We cannot tell if we are in a simulation, obviously. This leaves us with the white rabbit problem. With the whole UDA1-8, you should understand that all what has been done, by the use of MEC, is a reduction of the mind body problem to a body problem in computer science. This seems straightforward. At first sight we might think that we are just very close to a refutation of comp, because, as I think you have intuited, there might be an avalanche of first person 'white rabbits' that is aberrant, or just white noisy experiences. To find a proper measure on the consistent continuations is very difficult, and that is why I have restricted myself to the search of the logic of the certainties, for Löbian machines. Löban machines are chosen because they have enough introspection power and cognitive abilities to describe what they can prove about their certainties, and what they can infer interrogatively. That is not entirely trivial and relies mainly on the work of Gödel, Löb and Solovay (and Post, Turing, Kleene, etc.) Perhaps you can explain the principle on which there is a restriction of white rabbits. Our experience, apparently of the phsyical world, is entirely devoid of white rabbits. You can't infer that because you do not observe white rabbits that there is none ;) Quite like the anthropic principle, if at each moments there are overwelmingly more moments where you are just turned into gaz dust... there exists a continuation of you (at least one) that is consistent with a world devoid of WR. The WR problem seems the same question as ... Why am I in that particular universe ? You are because that is consistent with you... As you can't feel all the other you who have not your luck you can't say that because you do not observe it, it is not like that after all... If tomorrow you observe a WR (a magical one ;) ) well... You'll know at least you're no more in a physical world devoid of white rabbits... and you can begin to be really scared ;) Also I think you will agree that all continuation where you're not... have a zero measure (from your POV). So you can't be where you can't be, nothing to be astonished here ;) Regards, Quentin Thus, at each moment, the range of possible next observations is always observed to be constrained precisely according to the quantum formalism. Given that the only definition of the history of the observer is the record of observations, I am greatly intrigued to know how one can, at each moment, even in principle, derive the sensory specific next moment, according to quantum rules, from this structure of information. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. Hi 'White Rabbits' is Bruno's shorthand for physically impossible observations. At least, as I understand it. Yes, that's waht I meant to. My query is that, since we only ever observe the environment to be in accord with physical quantum law, how can a purely arithmetical environment, which necessarily includes all possible computations, give rise to only observations which are self evidently observations of a

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 04 Feb 2011, at 10:29, Andrew Soltau wrote: Hi Bruno In step seven what is proved is that MEC + 'big universe' entails that physic is a branch of computer science. Do you see that? I have no problem with the concept that psychology is a branch of computer science. ? The point was that MEC + big universe' entails that PHYSICS (not psychology) is a branch of computer science. Step 5 plays the big role there. You don't need to be annihilated for having your continuations determined by the first person comp indeterminacy on UD*, once a UD, a fortiori an omega point, is in the physical universe. In step eight, the assumption of the existence of a big universe is eliminated. Roughly because no universal machine at all can distinguish arithmetical reality from anything else. This throws away the need of any universe. Physics has to be justified by number relations only (numbers or any elementary terms of a Sigma_1 complete theory). OK? OK in that 'no universal machine at all can distinguish arithmetical reality from anything else.' We cannot tell if we are in a simulation, obviously. It is more subtle than that. I actually said the contrary somehow: we can tell if we are in a simulation. We cannot tell if we are in a simulation for some finite time, but if we have the time to contemplate and the freedom to explore, we can see if we are in the natural emulation provides by the sum on all UD's fictions. That is why mechanism is testable, and the test (QM) confirms that we are in a simulation. The quantum weirdness can be seen as the trace of the infinitely many digital simulations occurring in arithmetic. If that simulations gives a different physics, it means that - either we are in a secondary simulation (like in some alien made matrix or simulacron, but the first person probability of this happening is of the type white rabbit, by comp indeterminacy), - or, much more probable in *that* case, that comp is not correct. This leaves us with the white rabbit problem. OK. Then. We have to solve it. With the whole UDA1-8, you should understand that all what has been done, by the use of MEC, is a reduction of the mind body problem to a body problem in computer science. This seems straightforward. So, you do agree UDA1-8 does reduce the mind-body problem to the problem of deriving the quantum equation (well the real physics, to be exact) from elementary arithmetic/computer science/machine theology? I am not sure it is that straightforward, although certainly simpler for quantum many-worlders. Even the few people who get it took a long time to understand this. Many academic people still reject the first person indeterminacy (like some reject the notion of consciousness, or even of MW). Straightforwardness is not straightforward in the inter or trans- disciplinary fields. What is obvious for some is not for others and vice versa! If you understand this, you know that no fundamental theory (even on just matter) can still rely on anything inferred from observation. The TOE is already numbers + addition and multiplication (or anything recursively equivalent and of similar complexity). At first sight we might think that we are just very close to a refutation of comp, because, as I think you have intuited, there might be an avalanche of first person 'white rabbits' that is aberrant, or just white noisy experiences. To find a proper measure on the consistent continuations is very difficult, and that is why I have restricted myself to the search of the logic of the certainties, for Löbian machines. Löban machines are chosen because they have enough introspection power and cognitive abilities to describe what they can prove about their certainties, and what they can infer interrogatively. That is not entirely trivial and relies mainly on the work of Gödel, Löb and Solovay (and Post, Turing, Kleene, etc.) Perhaps you can explain the principle on which there is a restriction of white rabbits. The possibility of such a restriction is provided by the non triviality of computer science, and of any notion of machine's point of view, and thus of Gödel, Löb solovay provability logic and their intensional variants. In practice computer science should augment the domain of indeterminacy allowing enough relative computation for stabilizing deep linear (self-multiplying computations). The quantum does it by linearity (mainly thanks to Gleason theorem, as Everett understood), but comp lacks his 'Gleason theorem. For this the arithmetical quantum logics (related to the Bp Dt hypostases) have not been studied enough. To be sure other intensional variants could be at play, and when asked, I explain that all the B^n p D^m p, with m n, and with A^np meaning ...Ap (iterated modal operator) are playing some role. We do have graded quantum logics there. Our

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 04 Feb 2011, at 13:43, Andrew Soltau wrote: 'White Rabbits' is Bruno's shorthand for physically impossible observations. At least, as I understand it. Not really. Just subjective aberrance. Like seeing a white rabbit with clothes and looking at his clock and saying too late, too late. It is physically and computationally possible, but occurs empirically only in dreams. That is what remains to be explained if we bet on comp. My query is that, since we only ever observe the environment to be in accord with physical quantum law, how can a purely arithmetical environment, which necessarily includes all possible computations, give rise to only observations which are self evidently observations of a physical environment, and a quantum environment at that. Yes, that's my point. That is the question which we have to solve if we take comp seriously into account. QM solves the problem by phase randomization (Feynman). Comp should solve the problem by the quantum logics related to self- reference, and their non trivial semantics. And if just one comp white rabbit remains and is located on the dark side of the moon, we have to take a look there. If the white rabbit is there, comp is confirmed, and if it is not there comp is refuted. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

From my perspective this debate / clarification is getting lost in language problems. Given that a universal dovetailer must necessarily produce *all* experiential realities, all possible experiencable moments, how do you account for our endlessly repeated observations of an experiential reality that corresponds *precisely* not only with ordinary every day observations of a physical quantum reality, but also all quantum experiments to date. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 4 February 2011 18:44, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@googlemail.com wrote: From my perspective this debate / clarification is getting lost in language problems. Given that a universal dovetailer must necessarily produce *all* experiential realities, all possible experiencable moments, how do you account for our endlessly repeated observations of an experiential reality that corresponds *precisely* not only with ordinary every day observations of a physical quantum reality, but also all quantum experiments to date. Forgive me butting in, but occasionally I find it helps to reconsider the problem using less technical language (since I'm not very technical). I tend to think about this from a One-Many perspective. Essentially, in talking about consciousness or observation, the comp assumption implies that our perspective is always from the point of view of the One. The infinity of computation, in this analogy the Many, is somehow seen from the point of view of the One. So then the question is - how can any particular set of experiences emerge, or be filtered, from the totality of the Many, from such a perspective? Simple ideas of measure may indeed seem to give the wrong answer, very quickly. It seems that we have to think combinatorially, in terms of higher orders of filtration - perhaps an infinity of them. The Goldilocks enigma of cosmology may be suggestive here - the 20-or-so free parameters, their sometimes exquisite degree of adjustment, and their possible inter-dependence, seems to imply a pitiless winnowing of the Many such that vanishingly few experiential realities with the observed characteristics can survive. Hence the remainder subside into non-experiential oblivion. I suppose that was as clear as mud. But it may give a flavour. David From my perspective this debate / clarification is getting lost in language problems. Given that a universal dovetailer must necessarily produce *all* experiential realities, all possible experiencable moments, how do you account for our endlessly repeated observations of an experiential reality that corresponds *precisely* not only with ordinary every day observations of a physical quantum reality, but also all quantum experiments to date. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 04/02/11 19:22, David Nyman wrote: On 4 February 2011 18:44, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@googlemail.com wrote: From my perspective this debate / clarification is getting lost in language problems. Given that a universal dovetailer must necessarily produce *all* experiential realities, all possible experiencable moments, how do you account for our endlessly repeated observations of an experiential reality that corresponds *precisely* not only with ordinary every day observations of a physical quantum reality, but also all quantum experiments to date. Forgive me butting in, but occasionally I find it helps to reconsider the problem using less technical language (since I'm not very technical). I tend to think about this from a One-Many perspective. Essentially, in talking about consciousness or observation, the comp assumption implies that our perspective is always from the point of view of the One. The infinity of computation, in this analogy the Many, is somehow seen from the point of view of the One. So then the question is - how can any particular set of experiences emerge, or be filtered, from the totality of the Many, from such a perspective? Simple ideas of measure may indeed seem to give the wrong answer, very quickly. It seems that we have to think combinatorially, in terms of higher orders of filtration - perhaps an infinity of them. The Goldilocks enigma of cosmology may be suggestive here - the 20-or-so free parameters, their sometimes exquisite degree of adjustment, and their possible inter-dependence, seems to imply a pitiless winnowing of the Many such that vanishingly few experiential realities with the observed characteristics can survive. Hence the remainder subside into non-experiential oblivion. I suppose that was as clear as mud. But it may give a flavour. David From my perspective this debate / clarification is getting lost in language problems. Given that a universal dovetailer must necessarily produce *all* experiential realities, all possible experiencable moments, how do you account for our endlessly repeated observations of an experiential reality that corresponds *precisely* not only with ordinary every day observations of a physical quantum reality, but also all quantum experiments to date. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. Thank you David, 'butting in' very welcome! It seems quite inevitable that any ordinary concept of measure must give the wrong answer. And it seems to me that since what is proposed is at least radically counter-intuitive, it requires some powerful rationale to support it. I am not clear what possible basis is provided for this rationale. Yes indeed, 'the 20-or-so free parameters, their sometimes exquisite degree of adjustment, and their possible inter-dependence' does indeed imply, surely to all of us, that there is 'a pitiless winnowing of the Many such that vanishingly few experiential realities with the observed characteristics can survive' but surely this implies, or tends to imply, a physical basis, a relativistic and quantum mechanical basis, to reality - it is the physical parameters, and their place in physics, which provides this brutal filtering. Or is there a point here with respect to computational mind that I am missing? Andrew -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

Hi David I have just been trawling the list, and found your wonderfully clear summary: As I've understood Bruno over the years, he has never asserted that comp(utational science) necessarily is the fundamental science of body and mind. Rather, he is saying that IF computational science is assumed (e.g. by proponents of CTM) to be the correct mind-body theory, THEN the appearance of the body (and consequently the rest of matter/energy) must emerge as part of the same theory. In other words, EITHER the correctness of comp as a mind-body theory directly implies the emptiness of any fundamental theory of matter; OR alternatively (i.e. accepting a fundamental theory of matter) comp can't be the correct mind-body theory. This helps enormously, thanks. Your next paragraph is likewise wonderfully clear: The establishment of this disjunction depends on a number of logical steps, culminating in a class of reductio thought experiments including Maudlin's Olympia/Klara and Bruno's MGA, the burden of which is to reveal contradictions inherent in any such conjunction of computationalism and materialism. As it happens, Maudlin uses this result to reject CTM, and Bruno follows the opposite tack of rejecting materialism. There is some controversy over these results from supporters of CTM who continue to find ways to dispute them with auxiliary assumptions. Personally, these auxiliaries strike me as being rather in the nature of epicycles, but then I'm hardly an authority. I have no problem with the basic concept of CTM, as I understand it. The way I understand it is as presented in the paper The Computational Theory of Mind at SEP (that Always makes me think of Douglas Adams' Somebody Else's Problem field, which is such a powerful human emotive force that it can make even a massive spaceship decending into the middle of a cup final, invisible!) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/ Your revelation that ' Maudlin uses this result to reject CTM, and Bruno follows the opposite tack of rejecting materialism. ' makes things very much clearer for me, I had got seriously bogged down in all this. My problem at present with either position is that I cannot see why the fact that an experiential sequence supervenes on more than one physical situation demonstrates anything about anything. (In my view, the entity having such an experience simply exists simultaneously in both physical situations) If anyone can cast some light on this I would be grateful. Andrew -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 4 February 2011 19:59, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@googlemail.com wrote: Your revelation that ' Maudlin uses this result to reject CTM, and Bruno follows the opposite tack of rejecting materialism. ' makes things very much clearer for me, I had got seriously bogged down in all this. My problem at present with either position is that I cannot see why the fact that an experiential sequence supervenes on more than one physical situation demonstrates anything about anything. (In my view, the entity having such an experience simply exists simultaneously in both physical situations) If anyone can cast some light on this I would be grateful. Andrew, thank you for your (excessively) kind comments, but to quote Father Dougal, when requested to elaborate, on the (to the best of my recollection) sole occasion Father Ted praised him for his perspicacity: On no Ted, I want out - I can't take the pressure. That out of the way, I'll say what I can, since that's why we're here. I've always had the intuition that Bruno is pointing to some really important ideas, in problem areas that have worried me these many years, but which I haven't got the technical equipment to get my head around. From time to time I try to formulate these in simpler terms suitable, as it were, to explain the thing to grandma (grandma of course being me). The thing he emphasises most with respect to your question above, it seems to me, is the additive or totalising aspect of an infinity of computational classes, as opposed to their individualisation. That is, the material content of experience is conceived as emerging from a single perspective, as if filtered by a unique consciousness through a sieve of computation. The UD functions, in one sense, to create the structure, but consciousness isn't conceived as operating by differentiating uniquely along each computational path, but rather by integrating certain classes of computational structure. Consequently, neither consciousness, nor the appearance of matter within it, is finitely computable; both are artefacts of the integration of an infinity of computation. That's my understanding, more or less. Of course any of this may turn out to be unintelligible, inconsistent, or just wrong, but Bruno's argument is that if we nail our colours to computation for an explanation of mind, then we should expect any physics extracted from it to have just such counter-intuitive characteristics. Anyway, I really must stop taking his name in vain in this shameless manner, and leave the field to the man himself. David Hi David I have just been trawling the list, and found your wonderfully clear summary: As I've understood Bruno over the years, he has never asserted that comp(utational science) necessarily is the fundamental science of body and mind. Rather, he is saying that IF computational science is assumed (e.g. by proponents of CTM) to be the correct mind-body theory, THEN the appearance of the body (and consequently the rest of matter/energy) must emerge as part of the same theory. In other words, EITHER the correctness of comp as a mind-body theory directly implies the emptiness of any fundamental theory of matter; OR alternatively (i.e. accepting a fundamental theory of matter) comp can't be the correct mind-body theory. This helps enormously, thanks. Your next paragraph is likewise wonderfully clear: The establishment of this disjunction depends on a number of logical steps, culminating in a class of reductio thought experiments including Maudlin's Olympia/Klara and Bruno's MGA, the burden of which is to reveal contradictions inherent in any such conjunction of computationalism and materialism. As it happens, Maudlin uses this result to reject CTM, and Bruno follows the opposite tack of rejecting materialism. There is some controversy over these results from supporters of CTM who continue to find ways to dispute them with auxiliary assumptions. Personally, these auxiliaries strike me as being rather in the nature of epicycles, but then I'm hardly an authority. I have no problem with the basic concept of CTM, as I understand it. The way I understand it is as presented in the paper The Computational Theory of Mind at SEP (that Always makes me think of Douglas Adams' Somebody Else's Problem field, which is such a powerful human emotive force that it can make even a massive spaceship decending into the middle of a cup final, invisible!) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/ Your revelation that ' Maudlin uses this result to reject CTM, and Bruno follows the opposite tack of rejecting materialism. ' makes things very much clearer for me, I had got seriously bogged down in all this. My problem at present with either position is that I cannot see why the fact that an experiential sequence supervenes on more than one physical situation demonstrates anything about anything. (In my view, the entity having such an experience

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 01/02/11 20:07, Bruno Marchal wrote: But it gives only all possible experiential realities, and even if these are by chance consistent with a physical quantum environment up to a certain point, it is tremendously unlikely that at each moment they will continue to be so. If you prove that, and if my reasoning is correct, then you refute comp (and a fortiori CTM). Not that I particularly wish to refute comp, simply to understand the rationale: Taking a very oversimplified example. Lets say the human visual experiential reality is million pixel (quick google suggests 576 million). A universal dovetailer must produce all possible variations of the visual field, 10^12 variations. Clearly, the majority of these will not correspond to physically possible environments. Best Andrew -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 01/02/11 20:07, Bruno Marchal wrote: In step 8 you state that 'a “physical universe” really “exists” and is too little in the sense of not being able to generate the entire UD*, nor any reasonable portions of it,'. However, if we adopt Tipler's Omega point scenario, we get infinite computational power as the universe collapses into the big crunch. Tipler specifically states that all possible computations will be carried out in such a scenario, including all possible experiential realities. Any UD does that, indeed. No need of physical omega point. arithmetic gives you alpha points for any alpha constructive ordinal, and even quasi names for above the constructive ordinals. Machine's theologies are rich. If the rational Mandelbrot is Turing universal (Sigma_1 complete) then it represents already an Omega points. Yes, but your point in step 8 is that a physical universe is *too little*, but with omega point it is not too little, it is as rich as arithmetically possible. Yes, 'If the rational Mandelbrot is Turing universal (Sigma_1 complete) then it represents already an Omega points.', but, also, Omega point represents already the Turing universal rational Mandelbrot. Neither is necessarily richer than or prior to the other. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 03 Feb 2011, at 11:28, Andrew Soltau wrote: On 01/02/11 20:07, Bruno Marchal wrote: But it gives only all possible experiential realities, and even if these are by chance consistent with a physical quantum environment up to a certain point, it is tremendously unlikely that at each moment they will continue to be so. If you prove that, and if my reasoning is correct, then you refute comp (and a fortiori CTM). Not that I particularly wish to refute comp, simply to understand the rationale: Taking a very oversimplified example. Lets say the human visual experiential reality is million pixel (quick google suggests 576 million). A universal dovetailer must produce all possible variations of the visual field, 10^12 variations. Clearly, the majority of these will not correspond to physically possible environments. I typically agree. Now, the point is that by the reasoning I gave, you just cannot postulate physical environments to justify the low probability of aberrant visual experiences. You have to explain why the seemingly 'physically possible' from computer science. Or there is something wrong in the reasoning, 'course. But what? Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 03 Feb 2011, at 12:05, Andrew Soltau wrote: On 01/02/11 20:07, Bruno Marchal wrote: In step 8 you state that 'a “physical universe” really “exists” and is too little in the sense of not being able to generate the entire UD*, nor any reasonable portions of it,'. However, if we adopt Tipler's Omega point scenario, we get infinite computational power as the universe collapses into the big crunch. Tipler specifically states that all possible computations will be carried out in such a scenario, including all possible experiential realities. Any UD does that, indeed. No need of physical omega point. arithmetic gives you alpha points for any alpha constructive ordinal, and even quasi names for above the constructive ordinals. Machine's theologies are rich. If the rational Mandelbrot is Turing universal (Sigma_1 complete) then it represents already an Omega points. Yes, but your point in step 8 is that a physical universe is *too little*, but with omega point it is not too little, it is as rich as arithmetically possible. Not at all. the point is that in step seven, you can still argue for comp + mat, by postulating that the material universe is too little. If you believe at the start that the (apparent) universe is enough big to contain the UD*, then the reversal is done, and we are already in the omega point of arithmetic, and you should then see that physics is a branch of number theory (indeed the branch of the first person sharable number's belief, say). Step 8 is needed only for those willing to save MAT by advocating a little finite physical reality. Yes, 'If the rational Mandelbrot is Turing universal (Sigma_1 complete) then it represents already an Omega points.', but, also, Omega point represents already the Turing universal rational Mandelbrot. Neither is necessarily richer than or prior to the other. So by conceptual OCCAM let us choose the simplest one. Tipler uses arithmetic + QM. But the argument shows that arithmetic is enough, and that we can, or more aptly: we have too, explain QM (or the real physics, in case QM is false) from it. And, as I said, the advantage of doing that (beyond the fact that we have to do it), is that it gives both the quanta and the qualia. QM typically gives only the collapse, not the wave which is presupposed. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

Andrew, Let me try to be a little more precise or helpful. I just said, On 03 Feb 2011, at 15:15, Bruno Marchal wrote: Yes, but your point in step 8 is that a physical universe is *too little*, but with omega point it is not too little, it is as rich as arithmetically possible. Not at all. the point is that in step seven, you can still argue for comp + mat, by postulating that the material universe is too little. If you believe at the start that the (apparent) universe is enough big to contain the UD*, then the reversal is done, and we are already in the omega point of arithmetic, and you should then see that physics is a branch of number theory (indeed the branch of the first person sharable number's belief, say). ++ In step seven what is proved is that MEC + 'big universe' entails that physic is a branch of computer science. Do you see that? Step 5 plays the big role there. You don't need to be annihilated for having your continuations determined by the first person comp indeterminacy on UD*, once a UD, a fortiori an omega point, is in the physical universe. In step eight, the assumption of the existence of a big universe is eliminated. Roughly because no universal machine at all can distinguish arithmetical reality from anything else. This throws away the need of any universe. Physics has to be justified by number relations only (numbers or any elementary terms of a Sigma_1 complete theory). OK? With the whole UDA1-8, you should understand that all what has been done, by the use of MEC, is a reduction of the mind body problem to a body problem in computer science. At first sight we might think that we are just very close to a refutation of comp, because, as I think you have intuited, there might be an avalanche of first person 'white rabbits' that is aberrant, or just white noisy experiences. To find a proper measure on the consistent continuations is very difficult, and that is why I have restricted myself to the search of the logic of the certainties, for Löbian machines. Löban machines are chosen because they have enough introspection power and cognitive abilities to describe what they can prove about their certainties, and what they can infer interrogatively. That is not entirely trivial and relies mainly on the work of Gödel, Löb and Solovay (and Post, Turing, Kleene, etc.) Don't hesitate to ask any question if anything seems insufficiently clear. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 03:29:52PM -0800, Travis Garrett wrote: Hi Russell, No problem at all - I myself confess to having skimmed papers in the past, perhaps even in the last 5 minutes... That I took a bit of umbrage just shows that I haven't yet transcended into a being of pure thought :-) Let me address your 3rd paragraph first. Consider the statements: 3 is a prime number and 4 is a prime number. Both of these are well formed (as opposed to, say, =3==prime4!=!), but the first is true and the second is false. To be slightly pedantic, I would count over the first statement (that is, in the process of counting all information structures) and not the second. Note that the first statement can be rephrased in an infinite number of different ways, 2+1 is a prime number, the square root of 9 is not composite and so forth. However, we should not count over all of these individually, but rather just the invariant information that is preserved from translation to translation (This is the meta-lesson borrowed from Faddeev and Popov). Consider then 4 is a prime number - which we can perhaps rephrase as the square root of 16 is a prime number. In this case we are now carefully translating a false statement - but as it is false there is no longer any invariant core that must be preserved - it would be fine to also say the square root of 17 is a prime number or any other random nonsense... There is no there there, so to speak. The same goes for all of the completely random sequences - there seems to be a huge number of them at first, but none of them actually encode anything nontrivial. When I choose to only count over the nontrivial structures - that which is invariant upon translation - they all disappear in a puff of smoke. Or rather (being a bit more careful), there really never was anything there in the first place: the appearance that the random structures carry a lot of information (due to their incompressibility) was always an illusion. Thus, when I propose only counting over the gauge invariant stuff, it is not that I am skipping over a bunch of other stuff because I don't want to deal with it right now - I really am only counting over the real stuff. Let me give an example that I thought about including in the paper. Say ETs show up one day - the solution to the Fermi paradox is just that they like to take long naps. As a present they offer us the choice of 2 USB drives. USB A) contains a large number of mathematical theorems - some that we have derived, others that we haven't (perhaps including an amazing solution of the Collatz conjecture). For concreteness say that all the thereoms are less than N bits long as the USB drive has some finite capacity. In contrast, USB B) contains all possible statements that are N bits long or less. One should therefore choose B) because it has everything on A), plus a lot more stuff! But of course by filling in the gaps we have not only not added any more information, but have also erased the information that was on A): the entire content of B) can be compactified to the program: print all sequences N bits long or less. The nontrivial information thus forms a sparse subset of all sequences. The sparseness can be seen through combinatorics. Take some very complex nontrivial structure which is composed of many interacting parts: say, a long mathematical theorem, or a biological creature like a frog. Go in and corrupt one of the many interacting parts - now the whole thing doesn't work. Go and randomly change something else instead, and again the structure no longer works: there are many more ways to be wrong than to be right (with complete randomness emerging in the limit of everything being scrambled). Note that it is a bit more subtle than this however - for instance in the case of the frog, small changes in its genotype (and thus in its phenotype) can slightly improve or decrease its fitness (depending on the environment). There is thus still a degree of randomness remaining, as there must be for entities created through iterative trial and error: the boundary between the sparse subset of nontrivial structures and the rest of sequence space is therefore somewhat blurry. However, even if we add a very fat blurry buffer zone the nontrivial structures still comprise a tiny subset of statement space - although they dominate the counting after a gauge choice is made (which removes the redundant and random). Does that make sense? This is, by and large, Tegmark's proposal, which he calls MUH (Mathematical Universe Hypothesis). Note that this proposal is somewhat ill-defined. What mathematical statements are in or out of your proposal? Any of the bizzare zoo of mathematical objects that might take a mathematician's fancy, including any arbitrary finite set of axioms I might dream up and their enumerable theorems. Or are the whole numbers somehow

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 27/01/11 17:44, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Jan 2011, at 18:24, Andrew Soltau wrote: On 24/01/11 21:35, Bruno Marchal wrote: Thanks for all this. I will do some reading and then go through the points again. And get back to you. You are welcome. Ask any question. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ I have been trying to decipher your response to However, structures of information are instantiated in the physical. OK, but this cannot work if DM is correct, by MGA. That's the whole point. There is no physical reality available. It is not obvious to understand this. The UDA+MGA explains this, and the AUDA (the Löbian interview, or Abstract Universal Dovetailer Argument) provides a path to extract physics, and the logic explains why the theory splits into quanta and qualia. Quanta appear as sharable qualia. I have read your paper The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations, but am still at a loss. I confess I find the blizzard of acronyms difficult to follow. (In particular it would help me greatly if we referred to the Computationalist Theory of Mind as CTM, as do wikipedia and Standford philosophy website, rather than COMP) eg Is DU the same as UD? Or is DU the infinte trace of the universal dovetailer, as seems to be suggested by diagram 7? Obviously it is trivial to show that the physical universe is redundant, but the move to show that it is disproven I do not follow. Essentially, I do not follow your argument that I. The Universal Dovetailer Argument shows why comp necessarily *forces* a reversal between physics and machine psychology You quote Maudlin's “Computation and Consciousness,” The Journal of Philosophy, pp 407-432, as having more complete arguments. However, on page 25 he states Olympia has shown us at least that some other level beside the computational must be sought. and Our Olympia demonstrates that running a particular program cannot be a sufficient condition for having any form of mentality The main point of his complex examples seems to be that the same output supervenes on two very different mechanisms, but this does not force a reversal. Could you tell me the central piece of the logic as you see it in simple terms. Andrew -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 31 Jan 2011, at 12:44, Andrew Soltau wrote: On 27/01/11 17:44, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Jan 2011, at 18:24, Andrew Soltau wrote: On 24/01/11 21:35, Bruno Marchal wrote: Thanks for all this. I will do some reading and then go through the points again. And get back to you. You are welcome. Ask any question. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ I have been trying to decipher your response to However, structures of information are instantiated in the physical. OK, but this cannot work if DM is correct, by MGA. That's the whole point. There is no physical reality available. It is not obvious to understand this. The UDA+MGA explains this, and the AUDA (the Löbian interview, or Abstract Universal Dovetailer Argument) provides a path to extract physics, and the logic explains why the theory splits into quanta and qualia. Quanta appear as sharable qualia. I have read your paper The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations, but am still at a loss. I confess I find the blizzard of acronyms difficult to follow. (In particular it would help me greatly if we referred to the Computationalist Theory of Mind as CTM, as do wikipedia and Standford philosophy website, rather than COMP) Comp is just an abbreviation of computationalism. It is synonymous with CTM, DM (digital mechanism), or simply here Mechanism, MEC, ...) etc. I change the wording when people add special meaning to the term. Sometimes comp means the precise theory yes doctor + Church thesis, but it can indeed be shown equivalent with CTM. Some people use CTM having in mind the idea that the computation has to be physically instantiated, but then it is the point of the paper to show this does not work. Also yes doctor is really the assertion of the existence of a level where I am Turing emulable. Quickly we can understand that such a level cannot be found by any machine, but they can bet on them. It does not matter that you need to emulate the entire galactic quantum field to get your experience. In that sense comp is much weaker than the implicit intent of most version of CTM, closer to high level and neurophilosophy. eg Is DU the same as UD? Or is DU the infinte trace of the universal dovetailer, as seems to be suggested by diagram 7? UD is the english for the french DU. Sorry for that typo. I use UD* for the infinite trace of the UD. MGA is the movie graph argument (same consequences as Maudlin's argument). UDA = Universal Dovetailer Argument. In sane04 I add the MGA as a last step of UDA. But in all other publications I put the MGA, before UDA. UDA and MGA were originally introduced to remind people that science has not yet decided between Plato and Aristotle, and to provide motivation for mathematical definition of belief, knowledge, observation and feeling in the case of ideally correct universal (Löbian) machine. A Löbian machine is a universal machine with proving abilities, and knowing in a technical sense that she is universal. My work is a work on Gödel's theorem (and Löb, Solovay, Kleene, etc.) in relation with physics, reality, dreams, etc. By Aristotle, I mean (to simplify) the idea that physical reality is primary, or that physics is the fundamental science. By Plato, I mean (to simplify again) the idea that physical reality is the border, or the shadow, or the projection, or the creation, of a non physical vaster reality (be it mathematical, theological, computer science theoretical, arithmetical ...). MEC makes it arithmetical, because it becomes absolutely undecidable. It makes it also theological when listening to what the machine say and stay mute about, or say with interrogation mark. Obviously it is trivial to show that the physical universe is redundant, It is not trivial. It took me 30 years to make about ten person understanding the entire thing. It is the whole point of the proof. It shows the falsity of physicalism. I have come on this list to explain that Tegmark's idea that the physical universe is a mathematical object among others cannot work, assuming CTM, due to the first person indeterminacy. I think that you are still using the identity thesis in the philosophy of mind. Tegmark is still guilty, if you want, of a form of physicalism, by assuming that the physical universe might be a mathematical structure among another. Physical is undefined, and mechanism, when taken enough seriously, leads to the idea that the coupling consciousness/realities is a purely arithmetical phenomenon. The only way to show that the physical universe is redundant consists in showing how the physical laws appear to be believed in absence of physical universe(s). This makes physics no more a fundamental science, but a science which has to be explained from another science. With MEC it can be shown that the other science is arithmetic, or any first order logical specification of a universal (in

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

Hi Russell, No problem at all - I myself confess to having skimmed papers in the past, perhaps even in the last 5 minutes... That I took a bit of umbrage just shows that I haven't yet transcended into a being of pure thought :-) Let me address your 3rd paragraph first. Consider the statements: 3 is a prime number and 4 is a prime number. Both of these are well formed (as opposed to, say, =3==prime4!=!), but the first is true and the second is false. To be slightly pedantic, I would count over the first statement (that is, in the process of counting all information structures) and not the second. Note that the first statement can be rephrased in an infinite number of different ways, 2+1 is a prime number, the square root of 9 is not composite and so forth. However, we should not count over all of these individually, but rather just the invariant information that is preserved from translation to translation (This is the meta-lesson borrowed from Faddeev and Popov). Consider then 4 is a prime number - which we can perhaps rephrase as the square root of 16 is a prime number. In this case we are now carefully translating a false statement - but as it is false there is no longer any invariant core that must be preserved - it would be fine to also say the square root of 17 is a prime number or any other random nonsense... There is no there there, so to speak. The same goes for all of the completely random sequences - there seems to be a huge number of them at first, but none of them actually encode anything nontrivial. When I choose to only count over the nontrivial structures - that which is invariant upon translation - they all disappear in a puff of smoke. Or rather (being a bit more careful), there really never was anything there in the first place: the appearance that the random structures carry a lot of information (due to their incompressibility) was always an illusion. Thus, when I propose only counting over the gauge invariant stuff, it is not that I am skipping over a bunch of other stuff because I don't want to deal with it right now - I really am only counting over the real stuff. Let me give an example that I thought about including in the paper. Say ETs show up one day - the solution to the Fermi paradox is just that they like to take long naps. As a present they offer us the choice of 2 USB drives. USB A) contains a large number of mathematical theorems - some that we have derived, others that we haven't (perhaps including an amazing solution of the Collatz conjecture). For concreteness say that all the thereoms are less than N bits long as the USB drive has some finite capacity. In contrast, USB B) contains all possible statements that are N bits long or less. One should therefore choose B) because it has everything on A), plus a lot more stuff! But of course by filling in the gaps we have not only not added any more information, but have also erased the information that was on A): the entire content of B) can be compactified to the program: print all sequences N bits long or less. The nontrivial information thus forms a sparse subset of all sequences. The sparseness can be seen through combinatorics. Take some very complex nontrivial structure which is composed of many interacting parts: say, a long mathematical theorem, or a biological creature like a frog. Go in and corrupt one of the many interacting parts - now the whole thing doesn't work. Go and randomly change something else instead, and again the structure no longer works: there are many more ways to be wrong than to be right (with complete randomness emerging in the limit of everything being scrambled). Note that it is a bit more subtle than this however - for instance in the case of the frog, small changes in its genotype (and thus in its phenotype) can slightly improve or decrease its fitness (depending on the environment). There is thus still a degree of randomness remaining, as there must be for entities created through iterative trial and error: the boundary between the sparse subset of nontrivial structures and the rest of sequence space is therefore somewhat blurry. However, even if we add a very fat blurry buffer zone the nontrivial structures still comprise a tiny subset of statement space - although they dominate the counting after a gauge choice is made (which removes the redundant and random). Does that make sense? Sorry about that, but its a sad fact of life that if I don't get the general gist of a paper by the time the introduction is over, or get it wrong, I am unlikely to delve into the technical details unless a) I'm especially interested (as in I need the results for something I'm doing), or b) I'm reviewing the paper. I guess I don't see why there's a problem to solve in why we observe ourselves as being observers. It kind of follows as a truism. However, there is a problem of why we observe ourselves at all, as opposed to disorganised random information

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On Thu, Jan 27, 2011 at 02:32:15PM -0800, Travis Garrett wrote: I am somewhat flabbergasted by Russell's response. He says that he is completely unimpressed - uh, ok, fine - but then he completely ignores entire sections of the paper where I precisely address the issues he raises. Going back to the abstract I say: Sorry about that, but its a sad fact of life that if I don't get the general gist of a paper by the time the introduction is over, or get it wrong, I am unlikely to delve into the technical details unless a) I'm especially interested (as in I need the results for something I'm doing), or b) I'm reviewing the paper. I guess I don't see why there's a problem to solve in why we observe ourselves as being observers. It kind of follows as a truism. However, there is a problem of why we observe ourselves at all, as opposed to disorganised random information (the white rabbit problem) or simple uninteresting information (the occam catastrophe problem). I'm not sure you really address either of the latter two issues - you seem to be assuming away white rabbits in restricting yourself to gauge invariant information (which I assume can be formalised as the set of programs of a universal machine). I would be interested to know if your proposal could address the occam catastrophe issue though. Cheers. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 25 Jan 2011, at 18:24, Andrew Soltau wrote: On 24/01/11 21:35, Bruno Marchal wrote: Thanks for all this. I will do some reading and then go through the points again. And get back to you. You are welcome. Ask any question. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

I am somewhat flabbergasted by Russell's response. He says that he is completely unimpressed - uh, ok, fine - but then he completely ignores entire sections of the paper where I precisely address the issues he raises. Going back to the abstract I say: We then argue that the observers collectively form the largest class of information (where, in analogy with the Faddeev Popov procedure, we only count over ``gauge invariant forms of information). The stipulation that one only counts over gauge-invariant (i.e. nontrivial) information structures is absolutely critical! This is a well known idea in physics (which I am adapting to a new problem) but it probably isn't well known in general. One can see the core idea embedded in the wikipedia article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faddeev–Popov_ghost - or in say Quantum Field Theory in a Nutshell by A. Zee, or Quantum Field Theory by L. Ryder which is where I first learned about it. In general a number of very interesting ideas have been developed in quantum field theory (also including regularization and renormalization) to deal with thorny issues involving infinity, and I think they can be adapted to other problems. In short, all of the uncountable number of uncomputable reals are just infinitely long random sequences, and they are all eliminated (along with the redundant descriptions) by the selection of some gauge. Note also in the abstract that I am equating the observers with the *nontrivial* power set of the set of all information - which is absolutely distinct from the standard power set! I am only counting over nontrivial forms of information - i.e. that which, say, you'd be interested in paying for (at least in pre-internet days!). I am also perfectly well aware that observers are more than just passive information absorbers. As I say in the paper: Observers are included among these complex structures, and we will grant them the special name $y_j$ (although they are also another variety of information structure $x_i$). For instance a young child $y_{c1}$ may know about $x_{3p}$ and $x_{gh}$: $x_{3p}, x_{gh} \in y_{c1}$, while having not yet learned about $x_{eul}$ or $x_{cm}$. This is the key feature of the observers that we will utilize: the $y_j$ are entities that can absorb various $x_i$ from different regions of $\mathcal{U}$. That is: this is the key feature of the observers that we will utilize And 4 paragraphs from the 3rd section: Consider then the proposed observer $y_{r1}$ (i.e. a direct element of $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{U})$): $y_{r1} = \{ x_{tang}, x_3, x_{nept} \}$, where $x_{tang}$ is a tangerine, $x_{3}$ is the number 3, and $x_{nept}$ is the planet Neptune. This random collection of various information structures from $\mathcal{U}$ is clearly not an observer, or any other from of nontrivial information: $y_{r1}$ is redundant to its three elements, and would thus be cut by the selection of a gauge. This is the sense in which most of the direct elements of the power set of $\mathcal{U}$ do not add any new real information. However, one could have a real observer $y_{\alpha}$ whose main interests happened to include types of fruit, the integers, and the planets of the solar system and so forth. The 3 elements of $y_{r1}$ exist as a simple list, with no overarching structure actually uniting them. A physically realized computer, with some finite amount of memory and a capacity to receive input, resolves this by providing a unified architecture for the nontrivial embedding of various forms of information. A physical computer thus provides the glue to combine, say, $x_{tang}$, $x_{3}$, and $x_{nept}$ and form a new nontrivial structure in $\mathcal{U}$. It is possible to also consider the existence of ``randomly organized computers which indiscriminately embed arbitrary elements of $\mathcal{U}$ -- these too would conform to no real $x_i$. This leads to the specification of ``physically realized computers, as the restrictions that arise from existing within a mathematical structure like $\Psi$ results in computers that process information in nontrivial ways. Furthermore, a structure like $\Psi$ allows for these physical computers to spontaneously arise as it evolves forward from an initial state of low entropy. Namely it is possible for replicating molecular structures to emerge, and Darwinian evolution can then drive to them to higher levels of complexity as they compete for limited resources. A fundamental type of evolutionary adaptation then becomes possible: the ability to extract pertinent information from one's environment so that it can be acted upon to one's advantage. The requirement that one extracts useful information is thus one of the key constraints that has guided the evolution of the sensory organs and nervous systems of the species in the animal kingdom. This evolutionary process has reached its current apogee with our species, as our brains are

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

Hi Travis, I have really enjoyed the challenge of your paper. One difficulty that I have with it is that the selection of a gauge is a highly non-trivial problem (related to the fine tuning problem!) and thus needs a lot more attention. More comments soon. Onward! Stephen -Original Message- From: Travis Garrett Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2011 5:32 PM To: Everything List Subject: Re: Observers and Church/Turing I am somewhat flabbergasted by Russell's response. He says that he is completely unimpressed - uh, ok, fine - but then he completely ignores entire sections of the paper where I precisely address the issues he raises. Going back to the abstract I say: We then argue that the observers collectively form the largest class of information (where, in analogy with the Faddeev Popov procedure, we only count over ``gauge invariant forms of information). The stipulation that one only counts over gauge-invariant (i.e. nontrivial) information structures is absolutely critical! This is a well known idea in physics (which I am adapting to a new problem) but it probably isn't well known in general. One can see the core idea embedded in the wikipedia article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faddeev–Popov_ghost - or in say Quantum Field Theory in a Nutshell by A. Zee, or Quantum Field Theory by L. Ryder which is where I first learned about it. In general a number of very interesting ideas have been developed in quantum field theory (also including regularization and renormalization) to deal with thorny issues involving infinity, and I think they can be adapted to other problems. In short, all of the uncountable number of uncomputable reals are just infinitely long random sequences, and they are all eliminated (along with the redundant descriptions) by the selection of some gauge. Note also in the abstract that I am equating the observers with the *nontrivial* power set of the set of all information - which is absolutely distinct from the standard power set! I am only counting over nontrivial forms of information - i.e. that which, say, you'd be interested in paying for (at least in pre-internet days!). I am also perfectly well aware that observers are more than just passive information absorbers. As I say in the paper: Observers are included among these complex structures, and we will grant them the special name $y_j$ (although they are also another variety of information structure $x_i$). For instance a young child $y_{c1}$ may know about $x_{3p}$ and $x_{gh}$: $x_{3p}, x_{gh} \in y_{c1}$, while having not yet learned about $x_{eul}$ or $x_{cm}$. This is the key feature of the observers that we will utilize: the $y_j$ are entities that can absorb various $x_i$ from different regions of $\mathcal{U}$. That is: this is the key feature of the observers that we will utilize And 4 paragraphs from the 3rd section: Consider then the proposed observer $y_{r1}$ (i.e. a direct element of $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{U})$): $y_{r1} = \{ x_{tang}, x_3, x_{nept} \}$, where $x_{tang}$ is a tangerine, $x_{3}$ is the number 3, and $x_{nept}$ is the planet Neptune. This random collection of various information structures from $\mathcal{U}$ is clearly not an observer, or any other from of nontrivial information: $y_{r1}$ is redundant to its three elements, and would thus be cut by the selection of a gauge. This is the sense in which most of the direct elements of the power set of $\mathcal{U}$ do not add any new real information. snip -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On Wed, Jan 12, 2011 at 04:56:00AM -0800, ronaldheld wrote: http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1101/1101.2198v1.pdf Any comments? Ronald I finally got around to reading. I am completely unimpressed. Two points: 1) His use of Physical Church-Turing Thesis is rather unconventional. Normally, this means that the physical universe is Turing simulable, but he uses it to mean something like COMP or Tegmarks MUH. Note that by Bruno's UDA, the physical universe is no longer simulable if COMP is true! 2) More seriously, I don't buy his Observer Class Hypothesis (OCH). Observers do not just absorb information, they model it. In one way, they could be said to search for short algorithms that predict/reproduce the information at hand. So there will only ever be a countable number of observers. They cannot be power sets of the set of information strings. This becomes most absurd when talking about observers observing themselves. Yet the number of information strings in the plenitude will be uncountable (2^\aleph_0). There is an analogous relationship with the concept of computable numbers versus all real numbers. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 24/01/11 21:35, Bruno Marchal wrote: Thanks for all this. I will do some reading and then go through the points again. And get back to you. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 22 Jan 2011, at 17:22, Andrew Soltau wrote: On 22/01/11 08:44, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Andrew, On 21 Jan 2011, at 16:08, Andrew Soltau wrote: Hi I have an answer to the nature of the relation between the first- person and specific third-person phenomena. It is based very simply on logical type. Here's the concept as brief as I can make it. As Deutsch, Barbour, Davies, and others hold, the universe is clearly static. Relativity shows us a static block universe, since the whole of space-time is actual. The linear dynamics similarly shows us a static block universe, a four dimensional array of probability amplitudes for possible events. As with the relativistic universe, progression along the linear time dimension of space-time provides a moving picture, a changing reality. As Penrose states, in the universe described by special relativity: ... particles do not even move, being represented by “static” curves drawn in space–time’. Thus what we perceive as moving 3D objects are really successive cross-sections of immobile 4D objects past which our field of observation is sweeping. (1994, p. 389) The collapse dynamics is the change to the linear dynamics. This does not work at a global level, due to observers having different simultaneities. In a relational qm, however, this is straightforwardly the time evolution of the frame of reference of the observer in the collapse dynamics, as described by Everett. As Tegmark points out, Everett brings us the clear distinction between the outside and inside views of a quantum state. On the outside view, there is only the linear dynamics. On the inside view, there are sporadic collapses as observations are made. The remaining problem is that there is no viewpoint, in any physical frame of reference, from which to view the change in the frame of reference as observations are made. This is where logical types comes in handy. Taking the relational view: The quantum state of the effective physical environment of the observer defines a block universe of probability amplitudes. This is like one frame of a movie, a four dimensional space-time matter and energy movie. The quantum concept of time shows that all possible such frames exist. Barbour ... calls each specific state a 'Now', and this is what he is emphasising when he says that: “Every Now is a complete, self-contained, timeless, unchanging universe” (Folger, 2000). Each Now is a moment in the quantum concept of time. All the moments exist, complete, 'already', like the frames of a movie film. Thus Barbour: “... likens his view of reality to a strip of movie film. Each frame captures one possible Now” (Folger, 2000) With regard to a movie, a frame is a member of the set of the frames comprising the movie: they are of different logical type. With regard to the quantum concept of time, the same principle holds. The quantum state of a physical environment at a specific moment in the quantum concept of time is of the first, primitive, logical type, while the set of all possible frames is of a second logical type. In order to run, the movie requires iteration. This is of a third logical type: it is an operation which apples to all possible movies, all possible sequences of frames. Similarly, in order for there to be a transtemporal reality, even subjectively, there has to be an iterator of the frames of reference defined by the quantum state - I call them quantum mechanical frames of reference. There can be no such physical process, as Deutsch, Barbour, Davies, and others hold, and I'm with them. At the same time, Everett shows how straightforward it is to explain the appearance of collapse: as each observation is made, the frame of reference changes to that of the next moment. The observer becomes correlated with a different quantum state. as he states ... it is not so much the system which is affected by an observation as the observer, who becomes correlated to the system. (1973, p. 116; his italics) But from what perspective does this change take place? According to Bitbol (1991, p. 7) this is the conversation out of which Everett very much wishes to keep. But the question, of course, stands. My view is that we have experiential evidence of the answer, bizarre though it is. I notice the world changing. So I am a transtemporal observer. However, I also notice my body changing, and my mind. Everything changes. This change is encountered from the perspective of phenomenal consciousness. That would be just odd, except for the fact that Chalmers that phenomenal consciousness must necessarily be a fundamental feature of the universe “... alongside mass energy and space-time” (1995). In other words, in my view, it is an emergent property of the system as a whole. And as such it is of the third logical type. And the problem is solved. What we have discovered in the

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

Hi Andrew, On 21 Jan 2011, at 16:08, Andrew Soltau wrote: Hi I have an answer to the nature of the relation between the first- person and specific third-person phenomena. It is based very simply on logical type. Here's the concept as brief as I can make it. As Deutsch, Barbour, Davies, and others hold, the universe is clearly static. Relativity shows us a static block universe, since the whole of space-time is actual. The linear dynamics similarly shows us a static block universe, a four dimensional array of probability amplitudes for possible events. As with the relativistic universe, progression along the linear time dimension of space-time provides a moving picture, a changing reality. As Penrose states, in the universe described by special relativity: ... particles do not even move, being represented by “static” curves drawn in space– time’. Thus what we perceive as moving 3D objects are really successive cross-sections of immobile 4D objects past which our field of observation is sweeping. (1994, p. 389) The collapse dynamics is the change to the linear dynamics. This does not work at a global level, due to observers having different simultaneities. In a relational qm, however, this is straightforwardly the time evolution of the frame of reference of the observer in the collapse dynamics, as described by Everett. As Tegmark points out, Everett brings us the clear distinction between the outside and inside views of a quantum state. On the outside view, there is only the linear dynamics. On the inside view, there are sporadic collapses as observations are made. The remaining problem is that there is no viewpoint, in any physical frame of reference, from which to view the change in the frame of reference as observations are made. This is where logical types comes in handy. Taking the relational view: The quantum state of the effective physical environment of the observer defines a block universe of probability amplitudes. This is like one frame of a movie, a four dimensional space-time matter and energy movie. The quantum concept of time shows that all possible such frames exist. Barbour ... calls each specific state a 'Now', and this is what he is emphasising when he says that: “Every Now is a complete, self-contained, timeless, unchanging universe” (Folger, 2000). Each Now is a moment in the quantum concept of time. All the moments exist, complete, 'already', like the frames of a movie film. Thus Barbour: “... likens his view of reality to a strip of movie film. Each frame captures one possible Now” (Folger, 2000) With regard to a movie, a frame is a member of the set of the frames comprising the movie: they are of different logical type. With regard to the quantum concept of time, the same principle holds. The quantum state of a physical environment at a specific moment in the quantum concept of time is of the first, primitive, logical type, while the set of all possible frames is of a second logical type. In order to run, the movie requires iteration. This is of a third logical type: it is an operation which apples to all possible movies, all possible sequences of frames. Similarly, in order for there to be a transtemporal reality, even subjectively, there has to be an iterator of the frames of reference defined by the quantum state - I call them quantum mechanical frames of reference. There can be no such physical process, as Deutsch, Barbour, Davies, and others hold, and I'm with them. At the same time, Everett shows how straightforward it is to explain the appearance of collapse: as each observation is made, the frame of reference changes to that of the next moment. The observer becomes correlated with a different quantum state. as he states ... it is not so much the system which is affected by an observation as the observer, who becomes correlated to the system. (1973, p. 116; his italics) But from what perspective does this change take place? According to Bitbol (1991, p. 7) this is the conversation out of which Everett very much wishes to keep. But the question, of course, stands. My view is that we have experiential evidence of the answer, bizarre though it is. I notice the world changing. So I am a transtemporal observer. However, I also notice my body changing, and my mind. Everything changes. This change is encountered from the perspective of phenomenal consciousness. That would be just odd, except for the fact that Chalmers that phenomenal consciousness must necessarily be a fundamental feature of the universe “... alongside mass energy and space-time” (1995). In other words, in my view, it is an emergent property of the system as a whole. And as such it is of the third logical type. And the problem is solved. What we have discovered in the collapse dynamics, but completely failed to recognise, is a system process. Just as only a computer is in

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 22/01/11 08:44, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Andrew, On 21 Jan 2011, at 16:08, Andrew Soltau wrote: Hi I have an answer to the nature of the relation between the first-person and specific third-person phenomena. It is based very simply on logical type. Here's the concept as brief as I can make it. As Deutsch, Barbour, Davies, and others hold, the universe is clearly static. Relativity shows us a static block universe, since the whole of space-time is actual. The linear dynamics similarly shows us a static block universe, a four dimensional array of probability amplitudes for possible events. As with the relativistic universe, progression along the linear time dimension of space-time provides a moving picture, a changing reality. As Penrose states, in the universe described by special relativity: ... particles do not even move, being represented by “static” curves drawn in space–time’. Thus what we perceive as moving 3D objects are really successive cross-sections of immobile 4D objects past which our field of observation is sweeping. (1994, p. 389) The collapse dynamics is the change to the linear dynamics. This does not work at a global level, due to observers having different simultaneities. In a relational qm, however, this is straightforwardly the time evolution of the frame of reference of the observer in the collapse dynamics, as described by Everett. As Tegmark points out, Everett brings us the clear distinction between the outside and inside views of a quantum state. On the outside view, there is only the linear dynamics. On the inside view, there are sporadic collapses as observations are made. The remaining problem is that there is no viewpoint, in any physical frame of reference, from which to view the change in the frame of reference as observations are made. This is where logical types comes in handy. Taking the relational view: The quantum state of the effective physical environment of the observer defines a block universe of probability amplitudes. This is like one frame of a movie, a four dimensional space-time matter and energy movie. The quantum concept of time shows that all possible such frames exist. Barbour... calls each specific state a 'Now', and this is what he is emphasising when he says that: “Every Now is a complete, self-contained, timeless, unchanging universe”(Folger, 2000). Each Now is a moment in the quantum concept of time. All the moments exist, complete, 'already', like the frames of a movie film. Thus Barbour: “... likens his view of reality to a strip of movie film. Each frame captures one possible Now”(Folger, 2000) With regard to a movie, a frame is a member of the set of the frames comprising the movie: they are of different logical type. With regard to the quantum concept of time, the same principle holds. The quantum state of a physical environment at a specific moment in the quantum concept of time is of the first, primitive, logical type, while the set of all possible frames is of a second logical type. In order to run, the movie requires iteration. This is of a third logical type: it is an operation which apples to all possible movies, all possible sequences of frames. Similarly, in order for there to be a transtemporal reality, even subjectively, there has to be an iterator of the frames of reference defined by the quantum state - I call them quantum mechanical frames of reference. There can be no such physical process, as Deutsch, Barbour, Davies, and others hold, and I'm with them. At the same time, Everett shows how straightforward it is to explain the appearance of collapse: as each observation is made, the frame of reference changes to that of the next moment. The observer becomes correlated with a different quantum state. as he states/... it is not so much the system which is affected by an observation as the observer, who becomes correlated to the system./(1973, p. 116; his italics) But from what perspective does this change take place? According to Bitbol (1991, p. 7) this is the conversation out of which Everett very much wishes to keep. But the question, of course, stands. My view is that we have experiential evidence of the answer, bizarre though it is. I notice the world changing. So I am a transtemporal observer. However, I also notice my body changing, and my mind. Everything changes. This change is encountered from the perspective of phenomenal consciousness. That would be just odd, except for the fact that Chalmers that phenomenal consciousnessmust necessarily be a fundamental feature of the universe “... alongside mass energy and space-time”(1995). In other words, in my view, it is an emergent property of the system as a whole. And as such it is of the third logical type. And the problem is solved. What we have discovered in the collapse dynamics, but completely failed to recognise, is a system process. Just as only a computer is in a position to access a

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

Hi I have an answer to the nature of the relation between the first-person and specific third-person phenomena. It is based very simply on logical type. Here's the concept as brief as I can make it. As Deutsch, Barbour, Davies, and others hold, the universe is clearly static. Relativity shows us a static block universe, since the whole of space-time is actual. The linear dynamics similarly shows us a static block universe, a four dimensional array of probability amplitudes for possible events. As with the relativistic universe, progression along the linear time dimension of space-time provides a moving picture, a changing reality. As Penrose states, in the universe described by special relativity: ... particles do not even move, being represented by static curves drawn in space--time'. Thus what we perceive as moving 3D objects are really successive cross-sections of immobile 4D objects past which our field of observation is sweeping. (1994, p. 389) The collapse dynamics is the change to the linear dynamics. This does not work at a global level, due to observers having different simultaneities. In a relational qm, however, this is straightforwardly the time evolution of the frame of reference of the observer in the collapse dynamics, as described by Everett. As Tegmark points out, Everett brings us the clear distinction between the outside and inside views of a quantum state. On the outside view, there is only the linear dynamics. On the inside view, there are sporadic collapses as observations are made. The remaining problem is that there is no viewpoint, in any physical frame of reference, from which to view the change in the frame of reference as observations are made. This is where logical types comes in handy. Taking the relational view: The quantum state of the effective physical environment of the observer defines a block universe of probability amplitudes. This is like one frame of a movie, a four dimensional space-time matter and energy movie. The quantum concept of time shows that all possible such frames exist. Barbour... calls each specific state a 'Now', and this is what he is emphasising when he says that: Every Now is a complete, self-contained, timeless, unchanging universe (Folger, 2000). Each Now is a moment in the quantum concept of time. All the moments exist, complete, 'already', like the frames of a movie film. Thus Barbour: ... likens his view of reality to a strip of movie film. Each frame captures one possible Now (Folger, 2000) With regard to a movie, a frame is a member of the set of the frames comprising the movie: they are of different logical type. With regard to the quantum concept of time, the same principle holds. The quantum state of a physical environment at a specific moment in the quantum concept of time is of the first, primitive, logical type, while the set of all possible frames is of a second logical type. In order to run, the movie requires iteration. This is of a third logical type: it is an operation which apples to all possible movies, all possible sequences of frames. Similarly, in order for there to be a transtemporal reality, even subjectively, there has to be an iterator of the frames of reference defined by the quantum state - I call them quantum mechanical frames of reference. There can be no such physical process, as Deutsch, Barbour, Davies, and others hold, and I'm with them. At the same time, Everett shows how straightforward it is to explain the appearance of collapse: as each observation is made, the frame of reference changes to that of the next moment. The observer becomes correlated with a different quantum state. as he states /... it is not so much the system which is affected by an observation as the observer, who becomes correlated to the system./(1973, p. 116; his italics) But from what perspective does this change take place? According to Bitbol (1991, p. 7) this is the conversation out of which Everett very much wishes to keep. But the question, of course, stands. My view is that we have experiential evidence of the answer, bizarre though it is. I notice the world changing. So I am a transtemporal observer. However, I also notice my body changing, and my mind. Everything changes. This change is encountered from the perspective of phenomenal consciousness. That would be just odd, except for the fact that Chalmers that phenomenal consciousnessmust necessarily be a fundamental feature of the universe ... alongside mass energy and space-time (1995). In other words, in my view, it is an emergent property of the system as a whole. And as such it is of the third logical type. And the problem is solved. What we have discovered in the collapse dynamics, but completely failed to recognise, is a system process. Just as only a computer is in a position to access a sequence of addresses in memory, containing a sequence of structures of information defining the frames of a

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On Jan 12, 10:50 pm, Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au wrote: I confess to the usual level of exasperation. Yet again the great culturally maintained mental block subverts real progress. And, yet again, the participant doesn;t even know they are doing it. Garrett says /The key is that observers are just a particular type of information, as is everything else. That is, we assume that the Physical Church Turing Thesis (PCTT) ..blah blah blah / WRONG WRONG WRONG. The author has somehow remained completely uninformed by the real message in the consciousness material cited in the article. *Observers are NOT just a particular type of information* The word information _was defined by an observer_, The word observer was defined by an observer. Cannot observers describe themselves exactly? Is a description necessarily inaccurate because it is a description? Are observers not observers because they define themselves as observers, and their descriptions are necessarily wrong? a human, USING observation. Like every other word it's just a metaphoric description of as thing, with meaning to a human. No matter what logical steps one proceeds to enact from this juncture, you are not describing anything that can be used to build or explain an observer. You are merely describing what an observer will see. What does it take to get something so simple across to physics? I'll have yet another go at it. Consider a SET_X = {BALL1, BALL2, BALL3, BALL4} This is a traditional 3-rd person (3P) view of the set created by a scientific act of OBSERVATION of the set of balls. BALL SET SCIENCE then proceeds to construct very clever mathematical descriptions of set member behaviour. BUT If you are the observer = BALL1, INSIDE SET X, the very act of observation results from the 1ST PERSON (1-P) relationship between [you, observer = BALL 1 ] and [the rest of the set, from within SET_X]. This description is not the same as the above description of SET_X Merely being different is not much of an issue. A 2D perspective is differerent to a 3D model, but given a 3D model of something you can derive any 2D perspective you like. You need to explain why a 1p observation is not similarly derivable from the 3p perspective Can't anyone see that ?? The ability to observe anything arises from that circumstance, not from the 3P-circumstance constructed by having observed *Why* can't you have 3P descriptions of observers and observations? Science has not even begun to characterise SET_X in the 1P way. Maybe you could say what the explanatory gap is. = Every single attempt so far in science has the following generic form. I am human scientist FRED. How we humans do observation is a real mystery. I like mysteries. And I am really good at maths. I will do the very clever maths of observation. Now where do I begin...ASSUMING OBSERVATION ... blah blah blah. Then off we go into the weeds, YET AGAIN. FRED just doesn't get the difference between 1-P and 3-P. It's a systemic blindness. I'll just crawl off and fume for a while. I'll be OK soon enough! :-) Colin Hales if you can't formulaically predict/build an observer with what you produced, you haven't explained observation and you don't really understand it ronaldheld wrote: http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1101/1101.2198v1.pdf Any comments? Ronald -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

On 14 Jan 2011, at 06:55, Colin Hales wrote: Hi David, I think feisty/curmudgeon is more apt than fierce... but yeah ... :-) RE: In other words, what is the relation, in your theory, between the first-person and specific third-person phenomena? Right to it eh? Call the two perspective 1-P and 3P OK. First, there may be a bit of a misdirection in the words first- person and specific third-person phenomena?. Phenomena are 100% encountered by a scientist's 1-P experience. It's 100% of our access to anything. It's 'scientific observation'. There's no such thing as 3rd person phenomena. 3rd person is a description of the 'contents of consciousness as scientific observation'...These descriptions have no more reality than that of an abstract set of rules prescribing/proscribing regularity between agreed 1st-person percepts. Their predictive success entails no claim to any capture of ontology or necessity for causal relations. The 1-P/3-P divide is, in my system, a duality of equivalent descriptions pivoting on mutual consistency in the production of an observer that acquires the 'what it is like, 1-P experience' as a result of the fundamental properties of being within the system thus described. This is not a duality of substance. It is a duality of knowledge resulting from being in and made of a system's componentry and describing it from within. That's all you have to do. The usual mistake that's made at this point is to fail to discriminate between the 'why/how' of 1-P and the 'what'. It's extemely easy to isolate the 'what': ELECTROMAGNETISM (EM). This is the beautiful 3-P description of a brain. The list of possible 'what' is delivering 1-P is of length 1. 'Being' electromagnetism results in 1-P. The real WHY/HOW is in asking 'why is it that EM delivers it?' Well there you go. You know that the description yuo have of EM and the description that says WHY EM does 1-P (when configured like a brain) are not the same descriptions. In other words you have to start describing the universe in a manner prior to the observer. How do you empirically justify this new set of descriptions? Whatever this new descriptive realm is, it should predict an observer that sees the world as we do AND that appears to be a brain when you look at it 3-P. Neither description set need be unique. I hope that's enough! Not sure. I think David alluded to the 1-3 distinction introduced so that people can understand that mechanism leads to 1-indeterminacy, 1- non-locality, even 1-non-clonability, which are steps to understand that the physical reality emerges in a 1-plural way (assuming I can survive with a digital (generalized) brain. The 1 and 3 are just the difference between inside a teleportation box, or outside. It is a simple transparent 3-definition of a notion of 1-view. It makes also the 3-view a sort of relative notion, given that you can duplicate population of machines practicing internal teleportation and self- multiplication. But I do agree with your duality view. In the arithmetical translation you get it by the difference, for the machine, between Bp and Bp p. G* proves them equivalent, but G does not, and machines lived them as different. The machine is modest: she does not always believe that Bp - p, but she always believe that (Bp p) - p, of course. But this duality is a part of an octality (the eight hypostases). I am never sure what you mean by world, nor what is your ontology, and you don't seem aware, or convinced perhaps, that the physical realities does exist as shared dream by universal machines, assuming we are *no more* than universal (Löbian) machine (it is easy to show that we are all *at least* such machine). May be the question is: how do you relate your approach with UDA (and perhaps AUDA, but that is more technically involved). I took time to explain this in this list. You might relate to older posts if you have already said something on this which I don't remember. I do remember the feisty/curmudgeon style though :) Regards, Bruno cheers colin David Nyman wrote: Gawd, I've missed you Colin, you fierce old thing! Is it wet where you are or is the inundation confined to poor old Brisbane? I suppose you know that Bruno and you agree (at least in my estimation of your lines of argument) that observation is the key phenomenon to be explained at the outset, instead - as you rightly say - of just being taken for granted. If this cardinal error is committed at the starting gate, the rest of the argument inevitably runs in a circle. Of course you and Bruno start from different premisses vis-a-vis the primitives, but on the positive side either theory is (I presume) open to empirical falsification. One thing I haven't been able to fathom so far about your own ideas is where you stand on what Bruno calls first-person indeterminacy, which has come up again in a

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

Hi David, I think feisty/curmudgeon is more apt than fierce... but yeah ... :-) RE: In other words, what is the relation, in your theory, between the first-person and specific third-person phenomena? Right to it eh? Call the two perspective 1-P and 3P OK. First, there may be a bit of a misdirection in the words first-person and specific third-person phenomena?. Phenomena are 100% encountered by a scientist's 1-P experience. It's 100% of our access to anything. It's 'scientific observation'. There's no such thing as 3rd person phenomena. 3rd person is a description of the 'contents of consciousness as scientific observation'...These descriptions have no more reality than that of an abstract set of rules prescribing/proscribing regularity between agreed 1st-person percepts. Their predictive success entails no claim to any capture of ontology or necessity for causal relations. The 1-P/3-P divide is, in my system, a duality of equivalent descriptions pivoting on mutual consistency in the production of an observer that acquires the 'what it is like, 1-P experience' as a result of the fundamental properties of being within the system thus described. This is not a duality of substance. It is a duality of knowledge resulting from being in and made of a system's componentry and describing it from within. That's all you have to do. The usual mistake that's made at this point is to fail to discriminate between the 'why/how' of 1-P and the 'what'. It's extemely easy to isolate the 'what': ELECTROMAGNETISM (EM). This is the beautiful 3-P description of a brain. The list of possible 'what' is delivering 1-P is of length 1. 'Being' electromagnetism results in 1-P. The real WHY/HOW is in asking 'why is it that EM delivers it?' Well there you go. You know that the description yuo have of EM and the description that says WHY EM does 1-P (when configured like a brain) are not the same descriptions. In other words you have to start describing the universe in a manner prior to the observer. How do you empirically justify this new set of descriptions? Whatever this new descriptive realm is, it should predict an observer that sees the world as we do AND that appears to be a brain when you look at it 3-P. Neither description set need be unique. I hope that's enough! cheers colin David Nyman wrote: Gawd, I've missed you Colin, you fierce old thing! Is it wet where you are or is the inundation confined to poor old Brisbane? I suppose you know that Bruno and you agree (at least in my estimation of your lines of argument) that observation is the key phenomenon to be explained at the outset, instead - as you rightly say - of just being taken for granted. If this cardinal error is committed at the starting gate, the rest of the argument inevitably runs in a circle. Of course you and Bruno start from different premisses vis-a-vis the primitives, but on the positive side either theory is (I presume) open to empirical falsification. One thing I haven't been able to fathom so far about your own ideas is where you stand on what Bruno calls first-person indeterminacy, which has come up again in a recent thread. You know, the transporter thought experiment, or just the question in general of why I find myself to be in this particular observer position (as raised in the target paper). In other words, what is the relation, in your theory, between the first-person and specific third-person phenomena? In Bruno's computational approach, the relation seems to emerge via a kind of filtering process or sieve of consciousness considered as a whole through the infinity of possible computations. In this way the computational everything is conceived as converging on consistent first-person narratives as a consequence of various kinds of measure - a very rough analogy would be the emergence of all possible books in Borges' Library of Babel. What would be the analogous ideas in your own approach? David On 12 January 2011 22:50, Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au wrote: I confess to the usual level of exasperation. Yet again the great culturally maintained mental block subverts real progress. And, yet again, the participant doesn;t even know they are doing it. Garrett says The key is that observers are just a particular type of information, as is everything else. That is, we assume that the Physical Church Turing Thesis (PCTT) ..blah blah blah WRONG WRONG WRONG. The author has somehow remained completely uninformed by the real message in the consciousness material cited in the article. Observers are NOT just a particular type of information The word information _was defined by an observer_, a human, USING observation. Like every other word it's just a metaphoric description of as thing, with meaning to a human. No matter what logical steps one proceeds to enact from this juncture, you are not describing anything that can be used to build or explain an observer.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

Dear Ronald, Thank you very much to submitting this paper for comment! I must preface my initial comment with the statement that I am a mere amateur so you might choose to take my claims and arguments with a measure of sodium chloride. This paper contains a crude material monist facsimile of the idea that I have been exploring and exploring for about 10 years now, even down to the use of the symbol ~ for the equivalence relation. I am in the process of writing up a detailed commentary on it but could not help but to put out this post asap. Kindest regards, Stephen Paul King -Original Message- From: ronaldheld Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2011 7:56 AM To: Everything List Subject: Observers and Church/Turing http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1101/1101.2198v1.pdf Any comments? Ronald -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. wlEmoticon-winkingsmile[1].png

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

I confess to the usual level of exasperation. Yet again the great culturally maintained mental block subverts real progress. And, yet again, the participant doesn;t even know they are doing it. Garrett says /The key is that observers are just a particular type of information, as is everything else. That is, we assume that the Physical Church Turing Thesis (PCTT) ..blah blah blah / WRONG WRONG WRONG. The author has somehow remained completely uninformed by the real message in the consciousness material cited in the article. *Observers are NOT just a particular type of information* The word information _was defined by an observer_, a human, USING observation. Like every other word it's just a metaphoric description of as thing, with meaning to a human. No matter what logical steps one proceeds to enact from this juncture, you are not describing anything that can be used to build or explain an observer. You are merely describing what an observer will see. What does it take to get something so simple across to physics? I'll have yet another go at it. Consider a SET_X = {BALL1, BALL2, BALL3, BALL4} This is a traditional 3-rd person (3P) view of the set created by a scientific act of OBSERVATION of the set of balls. BALL SET SCIENCE then proceeds to construct very clever mathematical descriptions of set member behaviour. BUT If you are the observer = BALL1, INSIDE SET X, the very act of observation results from the 1ST PERSON (1-P) relationship between [you, observer = BALL 1 ] and [the rest of the set, from within SET_X]. This description is not the same as the above description of SET_X Can't anyone see that ?? The ability to observe anything arises from that circumstance, not from the 3P-circumstance constructed by having observed. Science has not even begun to characterise SET_X in the 1P way. = Every single attempt so far in science has the following generic form. I am human scientist FRED. How we humans do observation is a real mystery. I like mysteries. And I am really good at maths. I will do the very clever maths of observation. Now where do I begin...ASSUMING OBSERVATION ... blah blah blah. Then off we go into the weeds, YET AGAIN. FRED just doesn't get the difference between 1-P and 3-P. It's a systemic blindness. I'll just crawl off and fume for a while. I'll be OK soon enough! :-) Colin Hales if you can't formulaically predict/build an observer with what you produced, you haven't explained observation and you don't really understand it ronaldheld wrote: http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1101/1101.2198v1.pdf Any comments? Ronald -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

### Re: Observers and Church/Turing

Gawd, I've missed you Colin, you fierce old thing! Is it wet where you are or is the inundation confined to poor old Brisbane? I suppose you know that Bruno and you agree (at least in my estimation of your lines of argument) that observation is the key phenomenon to be explained at the outset, instead - as you rightly say - of just being taken for granted. If this cardinal error is committed at the starting gate, the rest of the argument inevitably runs in a circle. Of course you and Bruno start from different premisses vis-a-vis the primitives, but on the positive side either theory is (I presume) open to empirical falsification. One thing I haven't been able to fathom so far about your own ideas is where you stand on what Bruno calls first-person indeterminacy, which has come up again in a recent thread. You know, the transporter thought experiment, or just the question in general of why I find myself to be in this particular observer position (as raised in the target paper). In other words, what is the relation, in your theory, between the first-person and specific third-person phenomena? In Bruno's computational approach, the relation seems to emerge via a kind of filtering process or sieve of consciousness considered as a whole through the infinity of possible computations. In this way the computational everything is conceived as converging on consistent first-person narratives as a consequence of various kinds of measure - a very rough analogy would be the emergence of all possible books in Borges' Library of Babel. What would be the analogous ideas in your own approach? David On 12 January 2011 22:50, Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au wrote: I confess to the usual level of exasperation. Yet again the great culturally maintained mental block subverts real progress. And, yet again, the participant doesn;t even know they are doing it. Garrett says The key is that observers are just a particular type of information, as is everything else. That is, we assume that the Physical Church Turing Thesis (PCTT) ..blah blah blah WRONG WRONG WRONG. The author has somehow remained completely uninformed by the real message in the consciousness material cited in the article. Observers are NOT just a particular type of information The word information _was defined by an observer_, a human, USING observation. Like every other word it's just a metaphoric description of as thing, with meaning to a human. No matter what logical steps one proceeds to enact from this juncture, you are not describing anything that can be used to build or explain an observer. You are merely describing what an observer will see. What does it take to get something so simple across to physics? I'll have yet another go at it. Consider a SET_X = {BALL1, BALL2, BALL3, BALL4} This is a traditional 3-rd person (3P) view of the set created by a scientific act of OBSERVATION of the set of balls. BALL SET SCIENCE then proceeds to construct very clever mathematical descriptions of set member behaviour. BUT If you are the observer = BALL1, INSIDE SET X, the very act of observation results from the 1ST PERSON (1-P) relationship between [you, observer = BALL 1 ] and [the rest of the set, from within SET_X]. This description is not the same as the above description of SET_X Can't anyone see that ?? The ability to observe anything arises from that circumstance, not from the 3P-circumstance constructed by having observed. Science has not even begun to characterise SET_X in the 1P way. = Every single attempt so far in science has the following generic form. I am human scientist FRED. How we humans do observation is a real mystery. I like mysteries. And I am really good at maths. I will do the very clever maths of observation. Now where do I begin...ASSUMING OBSERVATION ... blah blah blah. Then off we go into the weeds, YET AGAIN. FRED just doesn't get the difference between 1-P and 3-P. It's a systemic blindness. I'll just crawl off and fume for a while. I'll be OK soon enough! :-) Colin Hales if you can't formulaically predict/build an observer with what you produced, you haven't explained observation and you don't really understand it ronaldheld wrote: http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1101/1101.2198v1.pdf Any comments? Ronald -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from