Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-04-20 Thread David Nyman
On 21 March 2010 19:50, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Bruno, I've been continuing to pummel my brain, on and off, about the issues in this thread, and also reading and thinking about different perspectives on the knowledge paradox (such as Gregg Rosenberg's). If I may, let me put some

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-03-21 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 20 Mar 2010, at 21:34, David Nyman wrote: On 20 March 2010 18:22, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Well, if by 3-p Chalmers you mean some 'body', such a body *is* a zombie. The 1-p Chalmers is Chalmers, the person. Its body does not think, but makes higher the probability that

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-03-20 Thread David Nyman
On 24 February 2010 17:57, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Please, keep in mind I may miss your point, even if I prefer to say that you are missing something, for being shorter and keeping to the point. You really put your finger right on the hardest part of the mind-body problem.

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-03-20 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 20 Mar 2010, at 16:56, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2010 17:57, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Please, keep in mind I may miss your point, even if I prefer to say that you are missing something, for being shorter and keeping to the point. You really put your finger right

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-03-20 Thread David Nyman
On 20 March 2010 18:22, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Well, if by 3-p Chalmers you mean some 'body', such a body *is* a zombie. The 1-p Chalmers is Chalmers, the person. Its body does not think, but makes higher the probability that the 1-p thoughts refers to the most probable

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-26 Thread Bruno Marchal
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, February 24, 2010 1:59 PM Subject: Re: On the computability of consciousness On 24 Feb 2010, at 08:22, Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 23 Feb 2010, at 06:45, Rex Allen wrote

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-26 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 23 Feb 2010, at 15:38, Diego Caleiro wrote: I'm not reading the whole discussion here, but the reason I recommended those readings is that I sensed a mix between accounting for phenomenal consciousness and access conciousness in the discussion.Both were used as 1p and 3p, depending

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-26 Thread m.a.
Subject: Re: On the computability of consciousness Hi Marty, On 25 Feb 2010, at 15:03, m.a. wrote: Bruno: Does the following relate at all to your theory of Comp? I am not so sure, or I don't see how. I don't address the question of individual life. What I show is true for all

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-25 Thread m.a.
and important. These people feel fulfilled no matter which group they come from. marty a. - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, February 24, 2010 1:59 PM Subject: Re: On the computability of consciousness

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-25 Thread Rex Allen
On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 7:17 AM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 24 February 2010 07:03, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: With this in mind, I'm not sure what you mean by two undeniably manifest perpectives. Only ONE seems undeniable to me, and that's 1-p. My proposal is

RE: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-25 Thread Stephen P. King
Hi, -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Rex Allen Sent: Thursday, February 25, 2010 10:31 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the computability of consciousness On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 7:17

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-25 Thread Rex Allen
On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 7:28 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Rex and Members,        There is a very compelling body of work in logic that allows for circularity. Please take a look at: http://www.springerlink.com/content/m06t7w0163945350/ and

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-25 Thread Rex Allen
On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 12:08 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: Is hard determinism as bad an outcome as solipsism? If not, why not? I don't know about good or bad - but since you post on the internet I infer that you are not a solipist. Since posting on the

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-25 Thread Rex Allen
On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 1:59 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: No representation is conscious. Nor any body (which are relative representations). Consciousness or knowledge, like truth, but unlike consistency, has no finite representation whatsoever. It is more the platonic and non

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-24 Thread David Nyman
On 24 February 2010 07:03, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: With this in mind, I'm not sure what you mean by two undeniably manifest perpectives. Only ONE seems undeniable to me, and that's 1-p. My proposal is that seeming is all there is to reality. It's all surface, no depth.

RE: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-24 Thread Stephen P. King
24, 2010 2:48 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the computability of consciousness On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 1:52 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused while giving rise

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-24 Thread John Mikes
David, please, do not put me down as a Schopenhauerist. My mini-solipsist views stem from Colin Hayes' earlier Everything-list posts about perceived reality as we MAY know it. I condone the existence (?!) of the world I am part of, just restrict whatever I CAN know to the content (and function,

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-24 Thread David Nyman
2010/2/23 Diego Caleiro diegocale...@gmail.com: Thanks for this. I have to say, though, that Yablo's approach strikes me again as waving-away, or defining-out-of-existence, a real issue that doesn't deserve such treatment. The motive for this seems to be that academic philosophy has become

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-24 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 1:52 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused while giving rise to conscious experience is no more coherent than the idea that conscious experience

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-24 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 24 Feb 2010, at 08:22, Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 23 Feb 2010, at 06:45, Rex Allen wrote: It seems to me that there are two easy ways to get rid of the hard problem. 1) Get rid of 1-p. (A la Dennettian eliminative

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-24 Thread David Nyman
On 24 Feb, 16:09, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: We would seek unambiguous evidence that, in the absence of specific subjective 1-p qualitative states, certain subsequent 3-p events would be unaccountable without the hypothesis of 1-p -- 3-p causal influence. In the unlikely event

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-23 Thread David Nyman
On 23 February 2010 05:45, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: For the reasons I've touched on above I don't see that introducing the idea of a material world explains anything at all. Therefore, I vote for getting rid of 3-p, except as a calculational device. The idea of a material

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-23 Thread Diego Caleiro
I'm not reading the whole discussion here, but the reason I recommended those readings is that I sensed a mix between accounting for phenomenal consciousness and access conciousness in the discussion.Both were used as 1p and 3p, depending on what was being talked about. This is the reason for

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 23 Feb 2010, at 06:45, Rex Allen wrote: It seems to me that there are two easy ways to get rid of the hard problem. 1) Get rid of 1-p. (A la Dennettian eliminative materialism) OR 2) Get rid of 3-p. (subjective idealism) For the reasons I've touched on above I don't see that

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
David, First of all, as I have already said, you seem to be well aware of the hardest part of the hard problem of consciousness. And this gives me the opportunity to try to explain what you are missing. Indeed, in this post, I will try to explain how comp does solve completely the

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-23 Thread David Nyman
Bruno, I want to thank you for such a complete commentary on my recent posts - I will need to spend quite a bit of time thinking carefully about everything you have said before I respond at length. I'm sure that I'm quite capable of becoming confused between a theory and its subject, though I am

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-23 Thread David Nyman
On 22 February 2010 21:03, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: I think the hard problem is not just 'hard to solve': it requires knowledge of necessary ingredients (steps in the 'process') still unknown - but cleverly spoken about in the sciences, within the framework of those portions we

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-23 Thread Rex Allen
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 7:18 AM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 23 February 2010 05:45, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused while giving rise to conscious experience is no more coherent than the idea that

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-23 Thread Rex Allen
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 23 Feb 2010, at 06:45, Rex Allen wrote: It seems to me that there are two easy ways to get rid of the hard problem. 1)  Get rid of 1-p.  (A la Dennettian eliminative materialism) OR 2)  Get rid of 3-p.  

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-23 Thread Rex Allen
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 1:52 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused while giving rise to conscious experience is no more coherent than the idea that conscious experience exists fundamentally and

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-22 Thread David Nyman
On 22 February 2010 07:37, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: What do you mean by implicit here? What is implicit is that the subjectivity (1-p), to make sense, has to be referentially correct relatively to the most probable histories/consistent extensions. What I mean by implicit is

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-22 Thread John Mikes
David: how about: we have our 1p and THINK about a 3p - only as adjusted (interpreted) by our 1p AS an imagined realistic 3p world? Nobody walks the shoes of another person (mentally, I mean). Even reading books or learning from lectures does not impart the message of the 'author', only the

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-22 Thread Rex Allen
On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 8:50 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 21 February 2010 23:25, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p. However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the weaker subordinate

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-22 Thread Rex Allen
On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 9:52 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: The only rationale for adducing the additional existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-22 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 8:50 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 21 February 2010 23:25, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p. However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-22 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 9:52 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: The only rationale for adducing the additional existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-21 Thread David Nyman
On 17 February 2010 18:08, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You may already understand (by uda) that the first person notions are related to infinite sum of computations (and this is not obviously computable, not even partially). Yes, I do understand that. What I'm particularly

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-21 Thread Rex Allen
On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: The only rationale for adducing the additional existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we possess it (or seem to, according to some). We can't compute the existence of any 1-p experiential

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-21 Thread David Nyman
On 21 February 2010 23:25, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p. However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the weaker subordinate position of needing to be explained in terms of 3-p, while 3-p is

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-21 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: The only rationale for adducing the additional existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we possess it (or seem to, according to some). We can't compute the existence of any

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-21 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 21 Feb 2010, at 17:31, David Nyman wrote: On 17 February 2010 18:08, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You may already understand (by uda) that the first person notions are related to infinite sum of computations (and this is not obviously computable, not even partially). Yes, I do

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-17 Thread David Nyman
On 17 February 2010 02:08, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: I'm not sure in what sense you mean gratuitous. In a sense it is gratuitous to describe anything - hence the new catch-phrase, It is what it is. If one is just a different description of the other then they have the same

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-17 Thread David Nyman
On 17 February 2010 07:28, Diego Caleiro diegocale...@gmail.com wrote: You guys should Read Chalmers: Philosophy of Mind, Classical and contemporary Readings and Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Richard Rorty In particular The Concepts of Counsciousness By Ned Block and Mental

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-17 Thread David Nyman
On 17 February 2010 02:39, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: My intuition is that once we have a really good 3-p theory, 1-p will seem like a kind of shorthand way of speaking about brain processes. That doesn't mean you questions will be answered. It will be like Bertrand

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-17 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 16 Feb 2010, at 19:07, David Nyman wrote: Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first- person experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third- person perspective? There is an ambiguity in you phrasing. I will proceed like I always do, by interpreting your term favorably,

RE: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-16 Thread Stephen P. King
Hi, Is there a problem with the idea that 3-p can be derived from some combinatorics of many interacting 1-p's? Is there a reason why we keep trying to derive 1-p from 3-p? Onward! Stephen -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-16 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: This is old hat, but I've been thinking about it on awakening every morning for the last week. Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first- person experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third- person perspective? The only rationale for adducing the additional

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-16 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On 17 February 2010 05:07, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: This is old hat, but I've been thinking about it on awakening every morning for the last week.  Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first- person experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third- person perspective?  

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-16 Thread David Nyman
Is there a problem with the idea that 3-p can be derived from some combinatorics of many interacting 1-p's? Is there a reason why we keep trying to derive 1-p from 3-p? I suspect there's a problem either way. AFAICS the issue is that, in 3-p and 1-p, there exist two irreducibly different

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-16 Thread David Nyman
On 16 February 2010 22:21, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Consciousness could be computable in the sense that if you are the computation, you have the experience. Yes, but that's precisely not the sense I was referring to. Rather the sense I'm picking out is that neither the

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-16 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: Is there a problem with the idea that 3-p can be derived from some combinatorics of many interacting 1-p's? Is there a reason why we keep trying to derive 1-p from 3-p? I suspect there's a problem either way. AFAICS the issue is that, in 3-p and 1-p, there exist two

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-16 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: On 16 February 2010 22:21, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Consciousness could be computable in the sense that if you are the computation, you have the experience. Yes, but that's precisely not the sense I was referring to. Rather the sense I'm

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-16 Thread David Nyman
On 17 February 2010 00:06, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: I don't see that my 1-p experience is at all causally closed. In fact, thoughts pop into my head all the time with no provenance and no hint of what caused them. The problem is that if one believes that the 3-p narrative

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-16 Thread David Nyman
On 17 February 2010 00:16, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: But suppose we had a really good theory and understanding of the brain so that we could watch yours in operation on some kind of scope (like an fMRI, except in great detail) and from our theory we could infer that David's

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-16 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: On 17 February 2010 00:06, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: I don't see that my 1-p experience is at all causally closed. In fact, thoughts pop into my head all the time with no provenance and no hint of what caused them. The problem is that if one

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-16 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: On 17 February 2010 00:16, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: But suppose we had a really good theory and understanding of the brain so that we could watch yours in operation on some kind of scope (like an fMRI, except in great detail) and from our theory we

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-16 Thread Diego Caleiro
You guys should Read Chalmers: Philosophy of Mind, Classical and contemporary Readings and Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Richard Rorty In particular The Concepts of Counsciousness By Ned Block and Mental Causation by stephen Yablo will get you nearer to where you are trying to get. Best