Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 10-juil.-06, à 04:58, George Levy a écrit : Stephen Paul King wrote: little discussion has been given to the implications of taking the 1st person aspect as primary or fundamental. Could you point me toward any that you have seen? Hi Stephen Alas, I am a mere engineer, not a philosopher. The only author I can point you to is John Locke who I was told had some view similar to the ones I expressed. I have formed my opinions mostly independently in the process of writing a book (unpublished :'( ) I think that science is moving gradually toward first person - starting with Galileo's relativity, then Einstein's relativity and finally with QM (MWI). As science had progressed, the observer has acquired a greater and greater importance. Extrapolating to the limit, I becomes central and its existence anthropically defines (creates) the world where it resides. I think Stephen Paul king, David Lyman and you are on the same heraclitean track. It is possible to divide the greek 'theologian into the Parmenidians and the Heracliteans. Actually the same division appears in the world of the physicists and mathematicians. The trifle between Brouwer and Cantor is reminiscent of that division. It is the battle between the first person and the third person for the supremacy with respect to the fundamental questions. The first person want time/consciousness to be primary, and is basically Heraclitean. The third person want the primitive elements to be sharable so that their fundamental theories can be scientific (meaning sharable). It is a complex matter, and it is, to be sure, still an open question, depending on the behavior of some arithmetical interpretation of the notion of persons (Plotinus' hypostases). See the recent conversation on the FOR list which bears on that question. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Bruno Marchal wrote: Would you agree that this imaginary 'substantial world' is a figment of our existing (math - comp based) logic and with another one it would be 'that way', not 'this way'? Inescabapbly!? I guess you know that the sum of the 100 first odd numbers is 100^2. If you really believe there is world where such a proposition is false, then I would agree that the comp-physics could be different there for the machines living in that world. The world of necessary logical truths is much larger than the wrord of phsyically possible universes, which is much larger than the observed world (the only one that deserves to be written without scare-quotes). The question is not whether there is a world beyond even logical possibility, but why the observed world is so much smaller than the Platonias. Matter answers that easily. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
George Levy wrote: Stephen Paul King wrote: little discussion has been given to the implications of taking the 1st person aspect as primary or fundamental. Could you point me toward any that you have seen? Hi Stephen Alas, I am a mere engineer, not a philosopher. The only author I can point you to is John Locke who I was told had some view similar to the ones I expressed. I have formed my opinions mostly independently in the process of writing a book (unpublished :'( ) I think that science is moving gradually toward first person - starting with Galileo's relativity, then Einstein's relativity and finally with QM (MWI). As science had progressed, the observer has acquired a greater and greater importance. Extrapolating to the limit, I becomes central and its existence anthropically defines (creates) the world where it resides. Science may have moved close to making the observer central epistemically , but it has not room for the idea that observers are ontologically fundamental. Observers are people, homo sapiens, the product of millions of years of evolution. Scientifically speaking. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Peter, would you consider to identify the 'observer'? (Maybe not as an O -moment...) Many think of The Observer AS me or fellow humans while there may be a broader view, like e.g. anything catching info which comes closer to (my) 'conscious' definition. The observer seems so fundamental in the views of this list (and in wider circles of contemporaryh thinking) that a more general identification may be in order. To Stephens question: the ongoing paradigmic change in views include the image of 'observing' (observER) as well, so I would not rely on older (published?) authors even as reputable as Locke to adjust to recent views. John --- 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: George Levy wrote: Stephen Paul King wrote: little discussion has been given to the implications of taking the 1st person aspect as primary or fundamental. Could you point me toward any that you have seen? Hi Stephen Alas, I am a mere engineer, not a philosopher. The only author I can point you to is John Locke who I was told had some view similar to the ones I expressed. I have formed my opinions mostly independently in the process of writing a book (unpublished :'( ) I think that science is moving gradually toward first person - starting with Galileo's relativity, then Einstein's relativity and finally with QM (MWI). As science had progressed, the observer has acquired a greater and greater importance. Extrapolating to the limit, I becomes central and its existence anthropically defines (creates) the world where it resides. Science may have moved close to making the observer central epistemically , but it has not room for the idea that observers are ontologically fundamental. Observers are people, homo sapiens, the product of millions of years of evolution. Scientifically speaking. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
John M wrote: Peter, would you consider to identify the 'observer'? (Maybe not as an O -moment...) No, I wouldn't care to. There are theories that talk about observations, measurement and so on (that's epistemology), but there aren't any that tell you what an observer *is* ontologically. (The observer of relativity could perfectly well be automated video-cameras for instance). Which is as it should be. If conscious observers had a special role in physics,. that would scupper the observation from other sciences that consciousness is a biological phenomenon, which has not exsited for most of the universes history. The no-metaphysical-role for observers rule is one that maintains the consilience of science. http://www.csicop.org/si/9701/quantum-quackery.html Many think of The Observer AS me or fellow humans while there may be a broader view, like e.g. anything catching info which comes closer to (my) 'conscious' definition. The observer seems so fundamental in the views of this list (and in wider circles of contemporaryh thinking) that a more general identification may be in order. No, no,nooo!!! It is far too general already. The list needs to be a lot more particualr about the difference between ontology and epistemology, between to be and to know. Then they would not slide from X cannot be known without an observer to X cannot exist without an observer. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 08-juil.-06, à 22:10, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: I am just saying that I have faith in the fact that the number 17 is prime, independently of me. That 17 is prime is true, independent of you? Or that 17 exists, independent from you, as a a prime number. ? A priori the first one: [17 is prime] is independent of me. But now I accept also the first order predicate rule that if someone prove 17 is prime, he can infer Ex(x is prime), so that I can take the proposition it exists a number which is prime as independent of me too. I don't interpret numbers existence in any substantial way like if there was a place and a time where you can observe the number 17 sitting on some chair ... Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Bruno Marchal wrote: A priori the first one: [17 is prime] is independent of me. But now I accept also the first order predicate rule that if someone prove 17 is prime, he can infer Ex(x is prime), so that I can take the proposition it exists a number which is prime as independent of me too. I don't interpret numbers existence in any substantial way like if there was a place and a time where you can observe the number 17 sitting on some chair ... So how do insubstantial numbers generate a substantial world ? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
--- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 09-juil.-06, � 14:26, 1Z a �crit : So how do insubstantial numbers generate a substantial world ? I guess there is no substantial world and I explain in all details here http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ (and on this list) why insubstantial numbers generate inescapably, by the mixing of their additive and multiplicative structures, local coherent webs of beliefs in substantial worlds, and how the laws of physics must emerge (with comp) from those purely mathematical webs ... making comp testable in the usual Popperian sense. In that sense comp already succeeds some first tests. Bruno Bruno, please forgive my nitpicking: First: there is no substantial world, - BUTL insubstantial numbers generate inescapably, [by the mixing of their additive and multiplicative structures,] local[[?]] coherent webs of *beliefs* in ((nonexisting)) substantial worlds, ... Do I see here a world generated by a solipsistic comp? Would you agree that this imaginary 'substantial world' is a figment of our existing (math - comp based) logic and with another one it would be 'that way', not 'this way'? Inescabapbly!? Reminds me the joke of the 9 blind scientists who try to catch in a dark room a cat that does not even exiost. Are we the cat? John --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 09-juil.-06, à 14:26, 1Z a écrit : So how do insubstantial numbers generate a substantial world ? I guess there is no substantial world and I explain in all details here http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ (and on this list) why insubstantial numbers generate inescapably, by the mixing of their additive and multiplicative structures, local coherent webs of beliefs in substantial worlds, and how the laws of physics must emerge (with comp) from those purely mathematical webs ... making comp testable in the usual Popperian sense. In that sense comp already succeeds some first tests. Insubstantial numbers can't generate beliefs or appearances unless they are substantial enough to generate some kind of psyhcological reality. Standard solipsistic arguments, like the ones you use, seek to show how the appearance of an objective , physical world can arise given the *assumption* that there is already some kind of psychological or subjective reality for appearances to appear in and beliefs to be believed by. Standard solipsists do not find that assumption problematic because they are starting from their experience of the world. If you are starting from only the assumption of the existence (in some admitedly insubstantial sense) of mathematical objects. you cannot just assume that there are experienceing midns. You have to show how experiencing minds emerge from numbers before you can show ow an apparent physical world arises out of their experience. And there is still the problem that your insubstantial mathematical existence is still too substantial for some tastes. Claiming that mathematical existence falls short of full physical existence is not going to satisfy staunch anti-realists about mathematics, for whom numbers just don't exist at all. And producing mathematical sentences like there exists a number such... is hardly likely to convince them that mathematical objects have any real existnce, after they have spent their lives inisting that such sentences are mere /facons de parler/. Mathematical anti-realists might not be correct of course, but that they are wrong is and additional assumption above and beyond COMP. (And of course anti-realists don't think mathematical realsim is entailed by COMP. They don't think the fact that humans can calculate means numbers exist, why should the fact that comuters calculate persuade them that numbers exist) ? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Stephen Paul King wrote: little discussion has been given to the implications of taking the 1st person aspect as primary or fundamental. Could you point me toward any that you have seen? Hi Stephen Alas, I am a mere engineer, not a philosopher. The only author I can point you to is John Locke who I was told had some view similar to the ones I expressed. I have formed my opinions mostly independently in the process of writing a book (unpublished :'( ) I think that science is moving gradually toward first person - starting with Galileo's relativity, then Einstein's relativity and finally with QM (MWI). As science had progressed, the observer has acquired a greater and greater importance. Extrapolating to the limit, I becomes central and its existence anthropically defines (creates) the world where it resides. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
George Levy writes: StephenPaulKingwrote: Iwouldliketopointoutthatyoumayhaveinadvertentlyveeredinto theproblemthatIseeinthe"YesDoctor"belief!Itisentirely unverifiable. Itisunverifiablefromthe3rdpersonperspective.Fromthefirst personperspectiveitisperfectlyverifiable."I"willnotobserveany changesin"myself"afterthe(brain)substitution.Thisisa fundamentalinvarianceanditisanotherargumentwhythefirstperson perspectiveshouldbetheprimaryoneandthe3rdoneshouldbethe derivedone.Andhereagainspecifyingtheframeofreferenceis importanttoavoidconfusion. Sort of true. The person with the new brain may believe that heis the same person as the original, but he is in the same position as an outside observer as far as proving this goes. The observer says: "he seems to be the same person as far as I can tell, but it is impossible to know whether he might have completely different mental qualities, or no mental qualities at all". The subject himself says: "Ithink that I am the same person as the original, in that I have what I believe to be his memories and sense of personal identity, but there is no way even in theory for me to know that I am not in fact a completely different person with different mental qualities, or indeed that the person I recall having been was alive or sentient at all." Of course, this is also true with living life normally from moment to moment, soI'm not worried as long as the imagined continuity with a new brain is of roughly the same type. I still think it issimpler and and more consistent if we say that 1st person experience can onlybe meaningfulin the present: when we think about other minds, whether that means the minds of strangers, of our duplicates walking out of the teleporter, or of our past selves, then we are making a third person extrapolation of a first person experience. Stathis PapaioannouBe one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 07-juil.-06, à 18:32, 1Z a écrit : Why do you think the Curch thesis needs AR ? There is a conceptual argument in favor of Church Thesis. It is the closure of the (RE) set of partial recursive functions for the diagonalization procedure. I will (re)explain in the solution of the fourth diagonalization problem. You will see that we need to believe that any running turing machine either stop or does not stop, which is equivalent to AR. Actually (but technically) I need only a tiny part of AR. Which misunderstanding are you subsribing to ? [*] Tell me. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi George, - Original Message - From: George Levy [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Saturday, July 08, 2006 12:49 AM Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary? Hi Stephen Stephen Paul King wrote: I would like to point out that you may have inadvertently veered into the problem that I see in the Yes Doctor belief! It is entirely unverifiable. It is unverifiable from the 3rd person perspective. From the first person perspective it is perfectly verifiable. I will not observe any changes in myself after the (brain) substitution. This is a fundamental invariance and it is another argument why the first person perspective should be the primary one and the 3rd one should be the derived one. And here again specifying the frame of reference is important to avoid confusion. I agree completely! The trouble I have is that little discussion has been given to the implications of taking the 1st person aspect as primary or fundamental. Could you point me toward any that you have seen? Onward! Stephen --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 07-juil.-06, à 23:31, John M a écrit : Bruno: I speculated about my problems why I follow your (and others') expressions with difficulty. I was capable to understand concepts in diverse sciences and now I have to reflect about fitting 'comp', 'UDA', 'YesDoctor', even 'arithmetical Plationism' etc. into the flowing considerations. Your remark: ... arithmetical truth is not a personal construction made me muse: is it a Ding an sich? a god? I am just saying that I have faith in the fact that the number 17 is prime, independently of me. together with your absolutistic fundamental 'number' concept it echoes in my mind how reasonable I found David Bohm's words: there are no numbers in nature, they are human inventions with a rebuff at another list: I agree that there is no number in nature, but then I don't believe in nature as something fundamental and primitive. Please accept this as a summary of I have an argument that IF comp is true THEN nature emerge from the number. Are WE not parts of nature? As carbon based organism, yes. Again I don't follow the dogma that nature is primitive. if numbers exist in our mind, are they not IN nature? ... I don't believe that numbers exists in anything. I just believe that I am not so important that would I disappear, suddenly 5 becomes even. I found both the con and pro reasonable. To combine it with your quoted above statement - which I find no less reasonable - I 'tasted' the personal vs. the human. Add to that your undebatable non-solipsistic as well Thanks for telling. NOBODY constructs 'arithmetical truth' or 'numbers', yet both are evolutionary features in recent human intellect (2-3millennia). I do agree with this. But it is a secondary phenomenon, reflecting in fact the invariance of the laws of numbers (you know: 1+1=2, etc.) To mediate on my dichotomy: I may have a mental resistance in the way of absorbing comp etc. because I think (new idea, so far not surfaced in my mind) nature (whatever, existence, wholeness, everything or else) is analogue and at the present evolutionary epistemic level we reached the digital logic and thinking, which is a simpler way in its abrupt quantization than the all-encompassing comparative analoguization. No problem, I am even interested in any attempt to build other varieties of comp. I cannot think analogue-ly, such computers are in dreamland and we only have vague notions about it, as e.g. the famous: qualitative is 'bad' quantitative. I like to reverse it: a further evolved less quantitative (sort of analogue) will include wider aspects than included within the limited quanti models and provide more insight in a 'more dimensional' (not meant as a coordinating axis) analogue view... OK. Such (subconscious?) inhibitions might have prevented me of staying with your iridia (in the English version - my 5th language) or in the better explanatory French version, which language I follow even much poorer. The fact that WE evolved into an understanding in the course of human mental development in which things are 'counted' more than just: 1,2,many - is a beginning. Yes. We (=humanity) absorbed this mentality as we did the reductionist ways of thinking, the mystique (nobody personally invented the religions) the care for the offsprings, or a regular breath-taking. Yet I contemplate in my wholistic views a wider horizon way, close to what we call analogue today, which the digital logic has yet to attain. Keep attention to what we will discover about the comp 1-person, It has many analog aspects. What you say could fit the comp frame. The 'next' level of thinking. Maybe oriental thinking is closer to the analogue, because they learn math 101 not digitally as our kids, Leibniz attributes the digital to the Chineses. but pushing 'groups' of beads on the abacus - giving some analogue image of the changing groups to start with. This is not a criticism of western math skills, not an argument against the Plato to Bruno line, it is an idea and I don't intend to persuade anybody to clomply. (Allegedly the early computer-based anti-aircraft gun aiming device of the Bofors Swedish product (WWII, sold for the Germans) - before Turing got widely known - was NOT digitally operated. I don't know about it, but I heard that it worked by 'image-patterns' and anticipated the moves of the airplane. Somebody may know more about it). With unlimited analogous regards Thanks, we will have the opportunity to come back on the analog/digital and the conituum/discrete opposition many tiùmes. It does matter at some point, but comp shed light of the possible conception of the analogous by digital machines. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group,
Re: Only Existence is necessary? - Math,Numbers
Bruno: #17 IS a prime, not by YOUR decision, within the system of digital (number-based) math - invented and developed(!!!) during a phase in humanity's mental evolution. (and do not forget that 'faith' is the source of evil - ha ha) And: I may reverse your statement: I have an argument that IF comp is true THEN nature emerge from the number. in to: ^I have an argument that IF nature emerge from the number ^THEN comp is true * Nature? wrong choice of word for Brent's 'reality' (or: the one of which we develop the 'percept of reality'): our wholeness. Just musing. I object to US (WE) being 'carbon- based organisms: that is the body (if true) far from being 'us'. We are a complexity of interrelated effects by self-reflective relations in the unlimited environment of an ever changing entirety and our epistemic cognitive inventory included the part of it which can be assigned to some 'atomic-material' functions (wit parts of the ' body' the sum of which is 'less' than the Aris-Total. ). * The invariant laws of numbers is only within the scope of numbers and their churning around (i.e. math). Without such 2+2=4 makes no sense and the world will still exist. * Br: What you say could fit the comp frame. I did not believe that I am that smart. Br: Leibniz attributes the digital to the Chinese. IMO: analogue is a more advanced level than digital and the simpler can come out from the more sophisticated, so there is nothing amazing in Leibnitz's idea - however: The Digital concept changed a lot lately and - maybe - Leibnitz did not analyze his statement in comparison with the Si-chip digital computer science. What he might have referred to - I think - is that the numbers arose from the ancient ways of thinking in the oriental wisdom. (There is a German proverb: Wirf die Katz... = no matter how you throw it, it (me) comes to the same conclusion G) * A final remark: I was hiding the idea that what I 'named' as the 'analogue' may be different from the concept we use it for in our present discourse (cognitive level). I am not sure we CAN understand it at all today. We have a hint, a glimpse - and are SO smart,,, - we talk about it. Thanks for paying attention to my blurb and reflect to ideas I was hiding within. John M - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Saturday, July 08, 2006 1:19 PM Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary? Le 07-juil.-06, à 23:31, John M a écrit : Bruno: I speculated about my problems why I follow your (and others') expressions with difficulty. I was capable to understand concepts in diverse sciences and now I have to reflect about fitting 'comp', 'UDA', 'YesDoctor', even 'arithmetical Plationism' etc. into the flowing considerations. Your remark: ... arithmetical truth is not a personal construction made me muse: is it a Ding an sich? a god? I am just saying that I have faith in the fact that the number 17 is prime, independently of me. together with your absolutistic fundamental 'number' concept it echoes in my mind how reasonable I found David Bohm's words: there are no numbers in nature, they are human inventions with a rebuff at another list: I agree that there is no number in nature, but then I don't believe in nature as something fundamental and primitive. Please accept this as a summary of I have an argument that IF comp is true THEN nature emerge from the number. Are WE not parts of nature? As carbon based organism, yes. Again I don't follow the dogma that nature is primitive. if numbers exist in our mind, are they not IN nature? ... I don't believe that numbers exists in anything. I just believe that I am not so important that would I disappear, suddenly 5 becomes even. I found both the con and pro reasonable. To combine it with your quoted above statement - which I find no less reasonable - I 'tasted' the personal vs. the human. Add to that your undebatable non-solipsistic as well Thanks for telling. NOBODY constructs 'arithmetical truth' or 'numbers', yet both are evolutionary features in recent human intellect (2-3millennia). I do agree with this. But it is a secondary phenomenon, reflecting in fact the invariance of the laws of numbers (you know: 1+1=2, etc.) To mediate on my dichotomy: I may have a mental resistance in the way of absorbing comp etc. because I think (new idea, so far not surfaced in my mind) nature (whatever, existence, wholeness, everything or else) is analogue and at the present evolutionary epistemic level we reached the digital logic and thinking, which is a simpler way in its abrupt quantization than the all-encompassing comparative analoguization. No problem, I am even interested in any attempt to build other varieties of comp. I cannot think analogue-ly, such computers are in dreamland and we only have vague notions about it, as e.g. the famous: qualitative is 'bad' quantitative
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Bruno Marchal wrote: I am just saying that I have faith in the fact that the number 17 is prime, independently of me. That 17 is prime is true, independent of you? Or that 17 exists, independent from you, as a a prime number. ? I agree that there is no number in nature, but then I don't believe in nature as something fundamental and primitive. Please accept this as a summary of I have an argument that IF comp is true THEN nature emerge from the number. But whre do numbers come from ? They don't come from comp, and they don't come from the epistemic version of AR (17 is prime is true, independent of you) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 06-juil.-06, à 23:32, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Remember that comp relies on arithmetical platonism. Your version does. Computationalism is standardly the thesis that cognition is computation. Could you define or explain computation without believing that the relations among numbers are independent of you? In other words, your argument really has two premises -- AR and (standard) computationalism. Standard comp, indeed, does not make AR explicit. But as Dennett and others standard comp cognitivists agree on, comp needs Church thesis (if only to be able to take into account negative limitative result), and church thesis need AR. I just make this explicit, if only because I got a sufficiently counter-intuitive result. Remember that AR is just the presupposition that arithmetical truth is not a personal construction. Put in anoher way, AR is just the non solipsistic view of elementary math. You have bundled them together into comp. Just to make some point clearer. I have not yet met someone who does not believe in AR. (I have met mathematicians who does not believe in AR during the week-end, and I have met some philosopher who pretend not believing in AR, but who does. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 06-juil.-06, à 23:56, 1Z a écrit : The Yes-Doctor scenario using Bruno-comp should really be a case of saying yes to the proposal: I'm just going to shoot you. I'm not going to make the slightest effort to reconsitute you, teleport you, computerise you, or anything else. You already exist in Platonia, you always did, and you will continue to Yes, but (importantly) only with your consent. And the doctor will do that only with 1) a promise of (local and relative) reconstitution at some level, 2) an admission that he is just betting on that level 3) a promise of an annihilation less chancy than a bullet (I would prefer anasthesia followed by molecular desintegration). With comp remember we are already in Platonia. A bullet in the brain? Hardly pleasant, even in Platonia. Now, what you are saying could be said of any theory, model, religion ... (whatever) which makes expect you (form of) immortality. Indeed, you talk like a lawyer who explains how much his 'client' is good and scrupulous: true, the guy I am defending is a serial killer. But note that he kills only innocent people (children) so as to send them directly in paradise. He does not take the risk of sending someone in hell (by killing some bad guy for example). Sending someone in paradise is good, no? Some says that God does it all the time, and God is good, no?. My opinion is that such a layer is ... wrong. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 06-juil.-06, à 23:32, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Remember that comp relies on arithmetical platonism. Your version does. Computationalism is standardly the thesis that cognition is computation. Could you define or explain computation without believing that the relations among numbers are independent of you? I can believe that relations between numbers are epistemically independent of me -- I cannot will them to be different -- without believing they exist ontologically. Furthermore the /locus classicus/ for computation is Turing's work, which defines it in terms an idealisation of humans performing pencil-and-paper procedures. In other words, your argument really has two premises -- AR and (standard) computationalism. Standard comp, indeed, does not make AR explicit. But as Dennett and others standard comp cognitivists agree on, comp needs Church thesis (if only to be able to take into account negative limitative result), and church thesis need AR. Why do you think the Curch thesis needs AR ? Which misunderstanding are you subsribing to ? [*] I just make this explicit, if only because I got a sufficiently counter-intuitive result. Remember that AR is just the presupposition that arithmetical truth is not a personal construction. Put in anoher way, AR is just the non solipsistic view of elementary math. Well, if it is just an epistemological claim, it is not going to provide you with a universal dovetailer. You have bundled them together into comp. Just to make some point clearer. I have not yet met someone who does not believe in AR. Oh yes you have ! (I have met mathematicians who does not believe in AR during the week-end, and I have met some philosopher who pretend not believing in AR, but who does. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ [*] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/church-turing/ __ Misunderstandings of the Thesis A myth seems to have arisen concerning Turing's paper of 1936, namely that he there gave a treatment of the limits of mechanism and established a fundamental result to the effect that the universal Turing machine can simulate the behaviour of any machine. [...] Turing did not show that his machines can solve any problem that can be solved by instructions, explicitly stated rules, or procedures, nor did he prove that the universal Turing machine can compute any function that any computer, with any architecture, can compute. He proved that his universal machine can compute any function that any Turing machine can compute; and he put forward, and advanced philosophical arguments in support of, the thesis here called Turing's thesis. But a thesis concerning the extent of effective methods -- which is to say, concerning the extent of procedures of a certain sort that a human being unaided by machinery is capable of carrying out -- carries no implication concerning the extent of the procedures that machines are capable of carrying out, even machines acting in accordance with 'explicitly stated rules'. For among a machine's repertoire of atomic operations there may be those that no human being unaided by machinery can perform. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Peter, - Original Message - From: 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, July 06, 2006 5:56 PM Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary? 1Z wrote: Remember that comp relies on arithmetical platonism. Your version does. Computationalism is standardly the thesis that cognition is computation. In other words, your argument really has two premises -- AR and (standard) computationalism. You have bundled them together into comp. The Yes-Doctor scenario using Bruno-comp should really be a case of saying yes to the proposal: I'm just going to shoot you. I'm not going to make the slightest effort to reconsitute you, teleport you, computerise you, or anything else. You already exist in Platonia, you always did, and you will continue to [SPK] I would like to point out that you may have inadvertently veered into the problem that I see in the Yes Doctor belief! It is entirely unverifiable. Even worse, your statement here points out that we can not derive the continuance of a 1st person aspect from the mere existence of a number (or class of numbers) that merely exists. We need to have some tacit or explicit *implication* of the number. It is this necessity of implementation of Forms (buying for now into the belief system of Platonia) from which the physical aspect obtains. Onward! Stephen --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Bruno: I speculated about my problems why I follow your (and others') expressions with difficulty. I was capable to understand concepts in diverse sciences and now I have to reflect about fitting 'comp', 'UDA', 'YesDoctor', even 'arithmetical Plationism' etc. into the flowing considerations. Your remark: ... arithmetical truth is not a personal construction made me muse: is it a Ding an sich? a god? together with your absolutistic fundamental 'number' concept it echoes in my mind how reasonable I found David Bohm's words: there are no numbers in nature, they are human inventions with a rebuff at another list: Are WE not parts of nature? if numbers exist in our mind, are they not IN nature? ... I found both the con and pro reasonable. To combine it with your quoted above statement - which I find no less reasonable - I 'tasted' the personal vs. the human. Add to that your undebatable non-solipsistic as well NOBODY constructs 'arithmetical truth' or 'numbers', yet both are evolutionary features in recent human intellect (2-3millennia). To mediate on my dichotomy: I may have a mental resistance in the way of absorbing comp etc. because I think (new idea, so far not surfaced in my mind) nature (whatever, existence, wholeness, everything or else) is analogue and at the present evolutionary epistemic level we reached the digital logic and thinking, which is a simpler way in its abrupt quantization than the all-encompassing comparative analoguization. I cannot think analogue-ly, such computers are in dreamland and we only have vague notions about it, as e.g. the famous: qualitative is 'bad' quantitative. I like to reverse it: a further evolved less quantitative (sort of analogue) will include wider aspects than included within the limited quanti models and provide more insight in a 'more dimensional' (not meant as a coordinating axis) analogue view... Such (subconscious?) inhibitions might have prevented me of staying with your iridia (in the English version - my 5th language) or in the better explanatory French version, which language I follow even much poorer. The fact that WE evolved into an understanding in the course of human mental development in which things are 'counted' more than just: 1,2,many - is a beginning. We (=humanity) absorbed this mentality as we did the reductionist ways of thinking, the mystique (nobody personally invented the religions) the care for the offsprings, or a regular breath-taking. Yet I contemplate in my wholistic views a wider horizon way, close to what we call analogue today, which the digital logic has yet to attain. The 'next' level of thinking. Maybe oriental thinking is closer to the analogue, because they learn math 101 not digitally as our kids, but pushing 'groups' of beads on the abacus - giving some analogue image of the changing groups to start with. This is not a criticism of western math skills, not an argument against the Plato to Bruno line, it is an idea and I don't intend to persuade anybody to clomply. (Allegedly the early computer-based anti-aircraft gun aiming device of the Bofors Swedish product (WWII, sold for the Germans) - before Turing got widely known - was NOT digitally operated. I don't know about it, but I heard that it worked by 'image-patterns' and anticipated the moves of the airplane. Somebody may know more about it). With unlimited analogous regards John Mikes --- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 06-juil.-06, � 23:32, 1Z a �crit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Remember that comp relies on arithmetical platonism. Your version does. Computationalism is standardly the thesis that cognition is computation. Could you define or explain computation without believing that the relations among numbers are independent of you? In other words, your argument really has two premises -- AR and (standard) computationalism. Standard comp, indeed, does not make AR explicit. But as Dennett and others standard comp cognitivists agree on, comp needs Church thesis (if only to be able to take into account negative limitative result), and church thesis need AR. I just make this explicit, if only because I got a sufficiently counter-intuitive result. Remember that AR is just the presupposition that arithmetical truth is not a personal construction. Put in anoher way, AR is just the non solipsistic view of elementary math. You have bundled them together into comp. Just to make some point clearer. I have not yet met someone who does not believe in AR. (I have met mathematicians who does not believe in AR during the week-end, and I have met some philosopher who pretend not believing in AR, but who does. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Stephen Stephen Paul King wrote: I would like to point out that you may have inadvertently veered into the problem that I see in the Yes Doctor belief! It is entirely unverifiable. It is unverifiable from the 3rd person perspective. From the first person perspective it is perfectly verifiable. I will not observe any changes in myself after the (brain) substitution. This is a fundamental invariance and it is another argument why the first person perspective should be the primary one and the 3rd one should be the derived one. And here again specifying the frame of reference is important to avoid confusion. George Levy --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Thanks for the diagonalization solution. I apologize for the delay. 4th of July holiday, and now I'm busy. I will try to give my particular response to the diagonalization solution in the next day or so. I hope that my responses are representative of at least some other people. I think a few others give their responses, like Quentin, and I appreciate it because then I know I'm not the only one. 3rd person plural is better than 3rd person. ;) Tom Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 02-juil.-06, à 08:44, Tom Caylor a écrit : My point is that of the thread title Only Existence is necessary? Not that observers are necessary for existence, but that existence is insufficient for meaning. I'm still holding out for Bruno to work the rest of his diagonalization tricks to maybe try to prove otherwise. OK, and I'm sorry for the interruption. I am also troubled by Norman's post, I am afraid he loses the track just for reason of notation. The beauty of recursion theory is that you can arrive quickly, without prerequisites, to startling fundamental results. Now, as I said recently, it is really the UD Argument (UDA) which makes mental and physical existence secondary to arithmetical truth. The diag stuff just isolates a more constructive path so as to make comp testable. Somehow I agree with you: existence (being physical, mental, or numerical) is not enough for meaning, but once we assume comp, meaning, seen as first person apprehension, is, by definition, related to some relative computations. Now the main point is perhaps that although existence is not enough, it is not necessary either. And that is what really UDA shows, mental and physical existence are appearances (locally stable for purely number theoretical reasons) emerging from arithmetical truth. Comp gives a way to progress without relying on the mystery of first person quale (which makes meaning meaning), nor on the mystery of quanta existence. Our qualitative belief in numbers remains a mystery, like the truly qualitative part of qualia. Don't expect from the diagonalization posts that I solve *that* mystery, although it can be argued, assuming comp and self-referential correctness, that the lobian interview gives the closer third person explanation of why the first persons cannot escape the percept of many non communicable mysteries. I would bet consciousness is one of them, but hardly the only one. That consciousness is a mystery would already follow if you accept the following weak definition of consciousness. Consciousness as a qualitative part of an anticipation of (a) reality. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Tom Caylor wrote: 3rd person plural is better than 3rd person. ;) Tom Or as the wisest person in history wrote in his Ecclesiastes: Two are better than one...A cord of three strands is not quickly broken. I think there is wisdom in looking at what the ancient intellects wrote, and making connections to our present day perspective. Even this process itself is taking advantage of a 3rd person plural perspective, in order to try to see invariance. Sort of like integrating data from telescopes located at different places on the earth to get a better image, the further apart the better. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
George Levy wrote: Is the world fundamentally physical or can it be reduced to ideas? This is an interesting issue. If a TOE exists then it would have to explain the physics and the objects. This reminds me of the Ether controversy. Is there a need for the Ether for waves to propagate? The most up-to-date answer is that waves carry their own physical substrate. They can be waves and/or particles. Similarly there should be equivalence between information and matter/energy. Thus a process or algorithm should have inherently within itself its own physical substrate. Since information is observer-dependent (Shannon) Inasmuch as it is, it isn't somethign that can be equated with physical properties. Inasmuch as it is something that can be equated with physical properties, it isn't observer-dependent. this issue brings us back to the observer. I think that eventually all observables will have to be traced back to the observer who is in fact at the nexus of the mind-body problem. If I say something to you in Sanskrit you will likely not understand it. It will carry zero information. However If I say it in English you will be much more likely to understand it. If I say to you that your name is Lee Corbin, it will not add any information to what you already know. Again, it will carry zero information. This is what Shannon calls Mutual Information. In the first case *you* don't have the decoder to translate Sanskrit to English. In the second case you have the decoder but for *you*, the information is not new: you already know that your name is Lee Corbin. Old information is no information at all. Received mutual information is dependent on the information that already exists in the mind of the receiver (or observer). In this sense Shannon's information theory is a relativity theory of information just like Galileo's dynamics and Einstein's relativity are relativity theories of physics and just like Everett's interpretation is a relativity theory of quantum events. That's mutual information as opposed to other kinds...like the kind that can be equated with the non-observer-dependent quantity of entropy. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi Bruno, Le jeudi 22 juin 2006 15:59, Bruno Marchal a écrit : Dear Stephen, Either we have a definition problem or I do not understand. For me relative computations in platonia are not instantiated by definition as they are in platonia. Being in platonia just means it exists, hence existence is sufficient. If not could you please define what you mean by instantiated. Being one of a number (0 = N = oo) of possible tokens of a type; existing in a space-time location, in the case og physical instantiation. Instantiation is a one-many relationship. One type, many tokens (instances). In Platonia, there is exactly one of everything. There can also be 0 instances -- non-instantiation. Which neatly solves the Harry Potter/White Rabbuit problem. We do not see WR/HP universes, because we are instantiated and they are not. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Bruno Marchal wrote: Remember that comp relies on arithmetical platonism. Your version does. Computationalism is standardly the thesis that cognition is computation. In other words, your argument really has two premises -- AR and (standard) computationalism. You have bundled them together into comp. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
1Z wrote: Remember that comp relies on arithmetical platonism. Your version does. Computationalism is standardly the thesis that cognition is computation. In other words, your argument really has two premises -- AR and (standard) computationalism. You have bundled them together into comp. The Yes-Doctor scenario using Bruno-comp should really be a case of saying yes to the proposal: I'm just going to shoot you. I'm not going to make the slightest effort to reconsitute you, teleport you, computerise you, or anything else. You already exist in Platonia, you always did, and you will continue to --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Lee Corbin wrote: Tom writes The difference between a quark and a lepton can be described with mathematics, even though perhaps it's harder to pin down than the difference between 3 and 34. I think most of us wouldn't have a crucial problem with that. But alas the difference between 3 and 34 is in the counting. Here is the heart of the matter, I believe. It takes an observer to count, since it takes an observer to decide when to start counting, or to define a group of things. Ah ha! So what about numbers so high they haven't been counted yet? Perhaps 10^10^10^10^10 only came into existence after exponentiation had been discovered? And I guess that before humans evolved on Earth, the solar system did not have 8 or 9 planets; after all, there may have been no one in the universe. Or would you say that the solar system did not have 8 or 9 planets unless some distant intelligence in the universe evolved before we did? In that case, did the existence of *eight*, say, spread at the speed of light from the point where someone first thought of it? Lee My point is that of the thread title Only Existence is necessary? Not that observers are necessary for existence, but that existence is insufficient for meaning. I'm still holding out for Bruno to work the rest of his diagonalization tricks to maybe try to prove otherwise. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Only Existence is necessary?
Stephen writes In my previous post I tried to point out that *existence* is not a first-order (or n-th order) predicate and thus does nothing to distinguish one Form, Number, Algorithm, or what-have-you from another. [LC] I don't know about that; I do know that 34 and 3 are not the same thing, nor are they very similar. I wonder if you are joining those who might say that I cannot speak of 34 or 3 without mentioning the process by which I know of them. (In my opinion, that puts the cart before the horse. A lot more people in history were more certain, and rightly so, that there was a moon than that they had brains.) [SPK] Think of the meaning of what you just wrote if you where to remove all references that implied in one form or another some kind of act of distinguishing I am merely trying to drill down to the source of our Okay. Stripped of observers, 34 does not equal 3. Satisfied? Actually, it seems to have improved the interest, as well as the sensibleness of what I wrote :-) Lee --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 02-juil.-06, à 08:44, Tom Caylor a écrit : My point is that of the thread title Only Existence is necessary? Not that observers are necessary for existence, but that existence is insufficient for meaning. I'm still holding out for Bruno to work the rest of his diagonalization tricks to maybe try to prove otherwise. OK, and I'm sorry for the interruption. I am also troubled by Norman's post, I am afraid he loses the track just for reason of notation. The beauty of recursion theory is that you can arrive quickly, without prerequisites, to startling fundamental results. Now, as I said recently, it is really the UD Argument (UDA) which makes mental and physical existence secondary to arithmetical truth. The diag stuff just isolates a more constructive path so as to make comp testable. Somehow I agree with you: existence (being physical, mental, or numerical) is not enough for meaning, but once we assume comp, meaning, seen as first person apprehension, is, by definition, related to some relative computations. Now the main point is perhaps that although existence is not enough, it is not necessary either. And that is what really UDA shows, mental and physical existence are appearances (locally stable for purely number theoretical reasons) emerging from arithmetical truth. Comp gives a way to progress without relying on the mystery of first person quale (which makes meaning meaning), nor on the mystery of quanta existence. Our qualitative belief in numbers remains a mystery, like the truly qualitative part of qualia. Don't expect from the diagonalization posts that I solve *that* mystery, although it can be argued, assuming comp and self-referential correctness, that the lobian interview gives the closer third person explanation of why the first persons cannot escape the percept of many non communicable mysteries. I would bet consciousness is one of them, but hardly the only one. That consciousness is a mystery would already follow if you accept the following weak definition of consciousness. Consciousness as a qualitative part of an anticipation of (a) reality. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Only Existence is necessary?
Tom writes The difference between a quark and a lepton can be described with mathematics, even though perhaps it's harder to pin down than the difference between 3 and 34. I think most of us wouldn't have a crucial problem with that. But alas the difference between 3 and 34 is in the counting. Here is the heart of the matter, I believe. It takes an observer to count, since it takes an observer to decide when to start counting, or to define a group of things. Ah ha! So what about numbers so high they haven't been counted yet? Perhaps 10^10^10^10^10 only came into existence after exponentiation had been discovered? And I guess that before humans evolved on Earth, the solar system did not have 8 or 9 planets; after all, there may have been no one in the universe. Or would you say that the solar system did not have 8 or 9 planets unless some distant intelligence in the universe evolved before we did? In that case, did the existence of *eight*, say, spread at the speed of light from the point where someone first thought of it? Lee --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Lee Corbin wrote: Stephen writes it seems that we have skipped past the question that I am trying to pose: Where does distinguishability and individuation follow from the mere existence of Platonic Forms, if process is merely a relation between Forms (as Bruno et al claim)?! In my previous post I tried to point out that *existence* is not a first-order (or n-th order) predicate and thus does nothing to distinguish one Form, Number, Algorithm, or what-have-you from another. I don't know about that; I do know that 34 and 3 are not the same thing, nor are they very similar. I wonder if you are joining those who might say that I cannot speak of 34 or 3 without mentioning the process by which I know of them. (In my opinion, that puts the cart before the horse. A lot more people in history were more certain, and rightly so, that there was a moon than that they had brains.) The property of individuation requires some manner of distinguishability of one thing, process, etc. from another. Mere existence is insufficient. We are tacitly assuming an observer or something that amounts to the same thing any time we assume some 3rd person PoView and such is required for any coherent notion of distinguishability to obtain and thus something to whom existence means/affects. Well, I just disagree. Before there were people or even atoms, quarks and leptons were not the same thing. They didn't have to be perceived by anyone in order for that to be true. I know that you disagree with this: they didn't even have to affect anything in order for that to be true. If there had been just one quark and one electron in the whole universe, and if they were separately by almost infinitely many light- years, then there would still have been one quark and one electron. Unfortunately, I probably can be of no more assistence to you on this question. Lee Lee, Bruno, Stephen, I think this is an issue that lies at the heart of the matter. (I don't know if it's the same as Smullyan's heart of the matter, but in a sense it very well could be.) The difference between a quark and a lepton can be described with mathematics, even though perhaps it's harder to pin down than the difference between 3 and 34. I think most of us wouldn't have a crucial problem with that. But alas the difference between 3 and 34 is in the counting. Here is the heart of the matter, I believe. It takes an observer to count, since it takes an observer to decide when to start counting, or to define a group of things. This is where meaning and affect comes in. Even numbers require an observer. Bringing in prime numbers and multiplication doesn't prove that you don't need an observer. (=) Yes, numbers are observer-independent (hence the success of looking for invariance), but this doesn't necessarily imply that you don't need an observer in the first place! (=) Extra, to Bruno: In my view, we define numbers with invariance, by recognizing, when we make sense of what is around us, or even when we make sense of our own thoughts. On the TV program Sesame Street they have small children singing One of these things is not like the others even before they introduce numbers. This is what I mean by looking for invariance. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Lee, - Original Message - From: Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, June 28, 2006 1:02 AM Subject: RE: Only Existence is necessary? Stephen writes it seems that we have skipped past the question that I am trying to pose: Where does distinguishability and individuation follow from the mere existence of Platonic Forms, if process is merely a relation between Forms (as Bruno et al claim)?! In my previous post I tried to point out that *existence* is not a first-order (or n-th order) predicate and thus does nothing to distinguish one Form, Number, Algorithm, or what-have-you from another. [LC] I don't know about that; I do know that 34 and 3 are not the same thing, nor are they very similar. I wonder if you are joining those who might say that I cannot speak of 34 or 3 without mentioning the process by which I know of them. (In my opinion, that puts the cart before the horse. A lot more people in history were more certain, and rightly so, that there was a moon than that they had brains.) [SPK] Think of the meaning of what you just wrote if you where to remove all references that implied in one form or another some kind of act of distinguishing I am merely trying to drill down to the source of our notion of the act of distinguishing and to see what remains when we strip away all forms of notions of observers. The property of individuation requires some manner of distinguishability of one thing, process, etc. from another. Mere existence is insufficient. We are tacitly assuming an observer or something that amounts to the same thing any time we assume some 3rd person PoView and such is required for any coherent notion of distinguishability to obtain and thus something to whom existence means/affects. [LC] Well, I just disagree. Before there were people or even atoms, quarks and leptons were not the same thing. They didn't have to be perceived by anyone in order for that to be true. I know that you disagree with this: they didn't even have to affect anything in order for that to be true. If there had been just one quark and one electron in the whole universe, and if they were separately by almost infinitely many light- years, then there would still have been one quark and one electron. [SPK] Interesting claim, especially if we where to buy into the thinking of many prominent physicist today: If we where to go back in time far enough we would find that all the particles would indeed be identical to each other! But I digress. ;-) I am not making any claims about whether or not some statement is true, I am merely trying to make sense of the metaphysical positions that we are taking here on the Everything List. I wish to be sure that we are not allowing assumptions to be made about metaphysical primitives that may lead us into deep errors. For example, my appearent attack on Platonism is an attempt to understand its intricate details and implications, especially when they are taken the the wonderful extreems that Bruno is toiling to explain to us. ;-) [LC] Unfortunately, I probably can be of no more assistence to you on this question. [SPK] Your posts are always valuable and greatly appreciated. Onward! Stephen --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Tom, I completely agree with you on this and could only add that it seems almost impossible for us to comprehend the seemingly subconscious bias that we bring into discussions of the nature of Meaning and Existence. It is as if it is impossible to remove all vestiges of the existence of the act of observation... Onward! Stephen - Original Message - From: Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, June 28, 2006 12:46 PM Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary? snip Lee, Bruno, Stephen, I think this is an issue that lies at the heart of the matter. (I don't know if it's the same as Smullyan's heart of the matter, but in a sense it very well could be.) The difference between a quark and a lepton can be described with mathematics, even though perhaps it's harder to pin down than the difference between 3 and 34. I think most of us wouldn't have a crucial problem with that. But alas the difference between 3 and 34 is in the counting. Here is the heart of the matter, I believe. It takes an observer to count, since it takes an observer to decide when to start counting, or to define a group of things. This is where meaning and affect comes in. Even numbers require an observer. Bringing in prime numbers and multiplication doesn't prove that you don't need an observer. (=) Yes, numbers are observer-independent (hence the success of looking for invariance), but this doesn't necessarily imply that you don't need an observer in the first place! (=) Extra, to Bruno: In my view, we define numbers with invariance, by recognizing, when we make sense of what is around us, or even when we make sense of our own thoughts. On the TV program Sesame Street they have small children singing One of these things is not like the others even before they introduce numbers. This is what I mean by looking for invariance. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 26-juin-06, à 23:09, Tom Caylor a écrit : I also agree that the subject to which the Forms have meaning cannot be a Form itself. But as my previous post(s) on this thread mentioned, I see it as a recognition of what is there. I like to use the word re-cogn-ize (again know). A year ago in a meeting of fathers and sons, the question was asked, What does the word recognize mean? My son, who was 8 years old, said, It's when you know something, and you know that you know it. Jesus said, Unless you become like children, you will not enter the kingdom of God. Bruno, you have brought up examples of children being able to see simple truths, like the 7+7+7+7+7+7 in your fairy-riddle introduction to diagonalization. (Along those lines, there's the classic objection to the Penrose argument, objecting that it shouldn't require the ability see the truth of the Godel statement in order to qualify for having consciousness. I agree, but think the objection portrays a misunderstanding of Penrose's argument, even though I don't necessarily agree with all of Penrose's conclusions.) Anyway, I think this is a pretty good definition of recognize, to know something, and to know that you know it. Now people object that this just produces an infinite regression, but this is assuming that we never can have any direct contact with truth. I think Bruno is partly right in that the key lies in the infinite. I think we adults have gotten so caught up in building our own empire (science), in a computational step-by-step manner, that we often blind ourselves from simple truth. I agree with you. Most theories of knowledge (or knowledgeability) accept the axiom named four: 4: Kp - KKp (knowable p entails knowable knowable p; or if I can cognize the truth of p, then I can (re)cognize that I can cognize the truth of p). Of course we will come back on this. the K here will be defined through the Theaetetical variant of the Godel beweisbar B, which hides many diagonalizations. My comment about math being about invariance was not meant to be a global definition of math. Math is about invariance was meant to imply math is about looking for invariance. This is something that children understand even more naturally than numbers. Invariance is for me mainly the subject matter of group theory or geometry, and I would argue that numbers are more elementary. I am happy because I will have the opportunity this summer to teach math to very little children (6 year old), so I will have perhaps a better idea. I have not so much experience with so young students except a long time ago when I worked with highly mentally disabled one. You could be right in some sense. Piaget wrote about this and I should perhaps reread it. But then this question is also a little bit out of topic given that you seem already agreeing with AR, if only for the sake of the comp argumentation. BTW, I will send asap the solution of the four diagonalization questions. Thanks to you and George for your patience, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Dear Bruno, I would like to cut to a couple parts of your reply. - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, June 26, 2006 4:29 AM Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary? snip [SPK] Pratt does not seek to reify neither a primary notion of matter or time. His Dualism becomes a Russellerian neutral Monism in the limit of Existence in itself. When the notion of distinguishability vanishes, so do all notions of Predicates and Properties, all that is left is mere Existence. This is why I am pounding hard on the apparent problem that monistic Platonism suffers from a severe problem, that it is only a coherent theory if and only if there is some subject to which the Forms have a meaning and this subject can not be a Form! [BM] I agree one hundred percent! With comp this can already be justified in many ways: 1) The (counter)-intuitive comp level: no 1-soul or first person can recognize herself in any third person description done at any level. [SPK] This seem to me to accert that no entity has a subset that has a complete map of the whole within itself *that can be compared to the whole. Here I am considering the ability of self-recognize in terms of the existence of a self-referencing map. Somehow it seems that this is trivially obvious but difficult to comprehend... The 1-soul has no description, no name, it is indeed not a Form. [SPK] Ok, then this implies that Platonia is Incomplete! 2) The limit of the self-extending self cannot be defined by him/her/itself. [SPK] Same as 1). 3) When I interview the lobian machine, I define the first person by the knower, and I take the Theaetetical definitions of knowledge, and this gives thanks, to incompleteness, a non nameable, by any person, person. Technical reasons show how 1 2 and 3 are related. We can come back on this when people get some familarization with the diagonalization stuff. [SPK] I am hoping to comprehend the diagonalization stuff some day, my posts are a part of that attempt... snip [SPK] http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#concur02 http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ratmech http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#P5 [BM] Most of those papers are very interesting. By the way, Stephen, I realize you are the only one I thank in my last (Elsevier paper) and this indeed for having make me read some of Pratt's papers. (The others in the list disappears from the paper when, for reason of conciseness I drop the related works section. Sorry). But Pratt, and Girard (and Abramsky) react to the failure of Hilbert program by mainly weakening logic, at first. I believe that if a mathematical theorem, like Godel's incompleteness, forces us to weaken (or enriche) the logic, then an analysis of the incompleteness phenomenon should help us to chose the exact way of weakening the logic. I would only criticize Girard and Pratt for not providing enough motivation. I have still some hope to get an arithmetical *linear logic* and extract the relevant Chu transforms, in the long run. I appreciate very much those papers, but in this list the closer I have been to that approach is in the combinator posts (prematurely too much technical, I would say now.). But see my Elsevier paper for more on this. [SPK] Could you post a link to the Elsevier paper? [SPK] Bodies are the sets (as point and their interactions = Physics!) and Minds are the Boolean algebras (information structures and their implications = Computations!). Is this so hard to swallow? [BM] I totally agree and swallow this with pleasure :-) (although this is a very abstract immaterial view of bodies) More can be said: the quantum appears through parallelizing the boolean algebras, and generates the many locally classical bodies. No problem. [SPK] I disagree! QM does not follow merely from linear superposition, there is also (at least) the non-commutativity of observables... Pratt et al seems to believe that this latter aspect shows up when we consider the concurrency problem http://www-i2.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/Forschung/MCS/Mailing_List_archive/con_hyperarchive_1988-1990/0075.html http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ql http://www.di.ens.fr/~goubault/link002.html [BM] Pratt would be more convincing about those mind/body issue if he could apply it to the mind/body issues explicitly addressed by the mind/body researchers, also, I think. [SPK] Pratt is dealing with a deeper aspect of the mind/body problem than most reseachers consider, with the notable exeption of David Chalmers and Stuart Hameroff: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/penrose-hameroff/Fundamentality.html snip [SPK] All we are asked to do here is do stop trying to make up a static Universe! [BM] If you talk about the mental or physical Universes, I agree with you. Now
RE: Only Existence is necessary?
Stephen writes it seems that we have skipped past the question that I am trying to pose: Where does distinguishability and individuation follow from the mere existence of Platonic Forms, if process is merely a relation between Forms (as Bruno et al claim)?! In my previous post I tried to point out that *existence* is not a first-order (or n-th order) predicate and thus does nothing to distinguish one Form, Number, Algorithm, or what-have-you from another. I don't know about that; I do know that 34 and 3 are not the same thing, nor are they very similar. I wonder if you are joining those who might say that I cannot speak of 34 or 3 without mentioning the process by which I know of them. (In my opinion, that puts the cart before the horse. A lot more people in history were more certain, and rightly so, that there was a moon than that they had brains.) The property of individuation requires some manner of distinguishability of one thing, process, etc. from another. Mere existence is insufficient. We are tacitly assuming an observer or something that amounts to the same thing any time we assume some 3rd person PoView and such is required for any coherent notion of distinguishability to obtain and thus something to whom existence means/affects. Well, I just disagree. Before there were people or even atoms, quarks and leptons were not the same thing. They didn't have to be perceived by anyone in order for that to be true. I know that you disagree with this: they didn't even have to affect anything in order for that to be true. If there had been just one quark and one electron in the whole universe, and if they were separately by almost infinitely many light- years, then there would still have been one quark and one electron. Unfortunately, I probably can be of no more assistence to you on this question. Lee We can go on and on about relations between states, numbers, UDs, or whatever, but unless we have a consistent way to deal with the source of individuation and thus distinguishability, we are going nowhere... --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Dear Stephen, snip Comp, I am claiming requires more than just the mere a priori existence of AR (Platonic theory of Numbers), it requires a means to relate them to one another. Numbers are related by addition and multiplication. With Church thesis (+ Godel or Matiyasevich) that is enough. The observer says more and relates infinities of numbers through induction. Of course comp is more than just AR, you need Church Thesis and, in practice, the yes doctor faith. This latter requirement seems to require both a means to relate and distinguish Numbers from each other. Only the observer or the intellect will do that, although only the soul will appreciate. (Technical note: Observer, intellect and the soul are given by intensional (modal) variants of the Godel provability predicate; this gives the notions of person or the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus hypostases.) This is more than a linear superposition! We need a means to explain the appearance of Interaction: I read recently that some prominent scientist said something like that the physical realm is the means by which Numbers interact, I agree but go further to claim, with Pratt, that if we are required to have even some appearance of a physical realm, why not go all the way and put it on equal footing with the Ideals? (Symmetry anyone?!) Pratt solves the problem of dualism! Why do we still demand an incomplete and asymmetric Monism? I am not sure comp leads to asymmetric monism. But if you accept AR, third person incompleteness is not a matter of choice. We have to take it into account. The collection of everything computable is not itself computable. As to the notion of personal, it seems to me that what we mean by such is some means of self-referencing that is capable of updating, this brings in the notion of memory... I still do not see how any form of diagonalization obtains self-referencing absent some means that allows the entries in the columns and rows to both be themselves and relate to each other. It depends only of you. Normally the diagonalization post will go through that problem. Just be patient. Goedelization works because we have the tacit idea that we can write a representation of a number as a symbol of something physical, Here I disagree. Frankly. Godelization works for purely number theoretical reasons. giving it a persistence With AR (Arithmetical realism) numbers and their relation persists per se, or better does not need to persist at all, because persistence is only relative to change and numbers are beyond time and space, and change (assuming AR). Where is the Platonic paper tape? In Platonia. And if a platonic universal machine lacks platonic tape, she will continue her computations on platonics walls :-) *** [BM] Concerning Pratt's dualism, it seems to me it is a purely mathematical dualism a priori coherent with number platonism, although further studies could refute this. Open problem. I don't see Pratt reifying either primary matter or primary time, it seems to me. [SPK] Pratt does not seek to reify neither a primary notion of matter or time. His Dualism becomes a Russellerian neutral Monism in the limit of Existence in itself. When the notion of distinguishability vanishes, so do all notions of Predicates and Properties, all that is left is mere Existence. This is why I am pounding hard on the apparent problem that monistic Platonism suffers from a severe problem, that it is only a coherent theory if and only if there is some subject to which the Forms have a meaning and this subject can not be a Form! I agree one hundred percent! With comp this can already be justified in many ways: 1) The (counter)-intuitive comp level: no 1-soul or first person can recognize herself in any third person description done at any level. The 1-soul has no description, no name, it is indeed not a Form. 2) The limit of the self-extending self cannot be defined by him/her/itself. 3) When I interview the lobian machine, I define the first person by the knower, and I take the Theaetetical definitions of knowledge, and this gives thanks, to incompleteness, a non nameable, by any person, person. Technical reasons show how 1 2 and 3 are related. We can come back on this when people get some familarization with the diagonalization stuff. Any form of Monism will have this severe incompleteness that has been heretofore overlooked because of the continued use of the tacit assumption of a 3rd person Point of View. ? It is not tacit. Science prose have to be third person communicable.As Judson Webb argues the severe incompleteness is a lucky event for mechanist. First it makes Church thesis consistent. Indeed Church thesis entails incompleteness, so without incompleteness Church Thesis would be refutable (on this normally we will arrive soon). Strip
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear Stephen, snip Comp, I am claiming requires more than just the mere a priori existence of AR (Platonic theory of Numbers), it requires a means to relate them to one another. Numbers are related by addition and multiplication. With Church thesis (+ Godel or Matiyasevich) that is enough. The observer says more and relates infinities of numbers through induction. Of course comp is more than just AR, you need Church Thesis and, in practice, the yes doctor faith. This latter requirement seems to require both a means to relate and distinguish Numbers from each other. Only the observer or the intellect will do that, although only the soul will appreciate. (Technical note: Observer, intellect and the soul are given by intensional (modal) variants of the Godel provability predicate; this gives the notions of person or the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus hypostases.) This is more than a linear superposition! We need a means to explain the appearance of Interaction: I read recently that some prominent scientist said something like that the physical realm is the means by which Numbers interact, I agree but go further to claim, with Pratt, that if we are required to have even some appearance of a physical realm, why not go all the way and put it on equal footing with the Ideals? (Symmetry anyone?!) Pratt solves the problem of dualism! Why do we still demand an incomplete and asymmetric Monism? I am not sure comp leads to asymmetric monism. But if you accept AR, third person incompleteness is not a matter of choice. We have to take it into account. The collection of everything computable is not itself computable. As to the notion of personal, it seems to me that what we mean by such is some means of self-referencing that is capable of updating, this brings in the notion of memory... I still do not see how any form of diagonalization obtains self-referencing absent some means that allows the entries in the columns and rows to both be themselves and relate to each other. It depends only of you. Normally the diagonalization post will go through that problem. Just be patient. Goedelization works because we have the tacit idea that we can write a representation of a number as a symbol of something physical, Here I disagree. Frankly. Godelization works for purely number theoretical reasons. giving it a persistence With AR (Arithmetical realism) numbers and their relation persists per se, or better does not need to persist at all, because persistence is only relative to change and numbers are beyond time and space, and change (assuming AR). Where is the Platonic paper tape? In Platonia. And if a platonic universal machine lacks platonic tape, she will continue her computations on platonics walls :-) *** [BM] Concerning Pratt's dualism, it seems to me it is a purely mathematical dualism a priori coherent with number platonism, although further studies could refute this. Open problem. I don't see Pratt reifying either primary matter or primary time, it seems to me. [SPK] Pratt does not seek to reify neither a primary notion of matter or time. His Dualism becomes a Russellerian neutral Monism in the limit of Existence in itself. When the notion of distinguishability vanishes, so do all notions of Predicates and Properties, all that is left is mere Existence. This is why I am pounding hard on the apparent problem that monistic Platonism suffers from a severe problem, that it is only a coherent theory if and only if there is some subject to which the Forms have a meaning and this subject can not be a Form! I agree one hundred percent! With comp this can already be justified in many ways: 1) The (counter)-intuitive comp level: no 1-soul or first person can recognize herself in any third person description done at any level. The 1-soul has no description, no name, it is indeed not a Form. 2) The limit of the self-extending self cannot be defined by him/her/itself. 3) When I interview the lobian machine, I define the first person by the knower, and I take the Theaetetical definitions of knowledge, and this gives thanks, to incompleteness, a non nameable, by any person, person. Technical reasons show how 1 2 and 3 are related. We can come back on this when people get some familarization with the diagonalization stuff. I also agree that the subject to which the Forms have meaning cannot be a Form itself. But as my previous post(s) on this thread mentioned, I see it as a recognition of what is there. I like to use the word re-cogn-ize (again know). A year ago in a meeting of fathers and sons, the question was asked, What does the word recognize mean? My son, who was 8 years old, said, It's when you know something, and you know that you know it. Jesus said,
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Dear Stephen, We can go on and on about relations between states, numbers, UDs, or whatever, but unless we have a consistent way to deal with the source of individuation and thus distinguishability, we are going nowhere... The source of individuation could be personal memory I think. Like a sequence of W and M appears in the diary of someone subjected to an iterated WM-self-multiplication experiment. Memory is rather easy to define once we assume comp. The main difficulty here is to get an idea of what personal means, and for this we need a theory of self-reference, ... and that is what the diagonalization posts are all about. *** Concerning Pratt's dualism, it seems to me it is a purely mathematical dualism a priori coherent with number platonism, although further studies could refute this. Open problem. I don't see Pratt reifying either primary matter or primary time, it seems to me. I think a similar dualism appears in Plotinus cosmogony where (simplifying a lot!) *from outside* the Good transforms itself degenerating eventually into Evil (also called Matter by the (neo)platonist!) and by doing so makes the soul falling inexorably in that matter) and *from inside* all souls extract themselves from that matter and are inexorably attracted by the Good and converge toward it. Arrows are reversed. And with comp it can be argued that the choice of the Categories of sets and its dual (which funnily enough gives the category of boolean algebras) is a genuine one, although some quasi-constructive alpha-categories could fit in a still more better way (I think). But I have neither the time nor the competence to really develop such approaches. Also, finding good notion of coherence here seems to me to be a little bit ad hoc so that I refer to you the the comp derivation path of those coherence conditions. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Dear Bruno, Thank you for this wonderful post! Interleaving... - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Saturday, June 24, 2006 1:43 PM Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary? Dear Stephen, We can go on and on about relations between states, numbers, UDs, or whatever, but unless we have a consistent way to deal with the source of individuation and thus distinguishability, we are going nowhere... [BM] The source of individuation could be personal memory I think. Like a sequence of W and M appears in the diary of someone subjected to an iterated WM-self-multiplication experiment. Memory is rather easy to define once we assume comp. The main difficulty here is to get an idea of what personal means, and for this we need a theory of self-reference, ... and that is what the diagonalization posts are all about. [SPK] Does not the notion of memory carry with it some requirement of persistence under changes/transformations. It seems to be a lot like”invariance, but one that can be read and written. Pratt's restatement of Descartes dictum: I think, therefore I was can be easily seem to be equivalent to: I am what I remember (active reading of memory) myself to be. Comp, I am claiming requires more than just the mere a priori existence of AR (Platonic theory of Numbers), it requires a means to relate them to one another. This latter requirement seems to require both a means to relate and distinguish Numbers from each other. This is more than a linear superposition! We need a means to explain the appearance of Interaction: I read recently that some prominent scientist said something like that the physical realm is the means by which Numbers interact, I agree but go further to claim, with Pratt, that if we are required to have even some appearance of a physical realm, why not go all the way and put it on equal footing with the Ideals? (Symmetry anyone?!) Pratt solves the problem of dualism! Why do we still demand an incomplete and asymmetric Monism? As to the notion of personal, it seems to me that what we mean by such is some means of self-referencing that is capable of updating, this brings in the notion of memory... I still do not see how any form of diagonalization obtains self-referencing absent some means that allows the entries in the columns and rows to both be themselves and relate to each other. Goedelization works because we have the tacit idea that we can write a representation of a number as a symbol of something physical, giving it a persistence Where is the Platonic paper tape? *** [BM] Concerning Pratt's dualism, it seems to me it is a purely mathematical dualism a priori coherent with number platonism, although further studies could refute this. Open problem. I don't see Pratt reifying either primary matter or primary time, it seems to me. [SPK] Pratt does not seek to reify neither a primary notion of matter or time. His Dualism becomes a Russellerian neutral Monism in the limit of Existence in itself. When the notion of distinguishability vanishes, so do all notions of Predicates and Properties, all that is left is mere Existence. This is why I am pounding hard on the apparent problem that monistic Platonism suffers from a severe problem, that it is only a coherent theory if and only if there is some subject to which the Forms have a meaning and this subject can not be a Form! Any form of Monism will have this severe incompleteness that has been heretofore overlooked because of the continued use of the tacit assumption of a 3rd person Point of View. Strip away the distinguishability that the 3rd person entails and Forms become exactly isomorphic to each other. Pratt shows how the arrow of Time has a dual aspect, the arrow of logical implication and from this a very elegant explanation of interactions and causality follows, among other things... ;-) (Unfortunately, most readers of his papers do not seem to get past the abstract...) http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#concur02 http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ratmech http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#P5 [BM] I think a similar dualism appears in Plotinus cosmogony where (simplifying a lot!) *from outside* the Good transforms itself degenerating eventually into Evil (also called Matter by the (neo)platonist!) and by doing so makes the soul falling inexorably in that matter) and *from inside* all souls extract themselves from that matter and are inexorably attracted by the Good and converge toward it. Arrows are reversed. And with comp it can be argued that the choice of the Categories of sets and its dual (which funnily enough gives the category of boolean algebras) is a genuine one, although some quasi-constructive alpha-categories could fit in a still more better way (I think). But I have neither the time nor the competence
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Ah, waht is mathematics? I suspect humans could spend their life-times pondering this profound question and never fully understand. I'm a mathematical realist in the sense that I think mathematical entities are real objective properties of reality and not just human inventions, but I've come to seriously doubt the Platonist idea that mathematics is static and timeless. Rather I now favor the idea that mathematical truth can evolve with time. See Greg Chaitin for some ideas about this. As some of you may, know, I've suggested some radical ideas about time on this list: namely the idea that there may be more than one time dimension, in the sense that there may be more than one valid way to define cause and effect relations. My big big idea is that mathematics could be a sort of 'higher order causality' ,or, if you like a 'higher dimensional time'. This is possible if some mathematical truths are not static, but can evolve with time. Suppose that causality itself had a two-level structure, with 'mathematical time' on the top level, and what we think of as physical time on the bottom level. This two level time structure is compatible with David Bohm's interpretation of QM where reality indeed has a two-level structure - both the wave function and the particle are equally real but correspond to different levels of reality. The two-level time structure could also explain the difference between the 1st person and 3rd person perspectives and resolve the puzzle of flowing time versus platonic timelessness. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Marc: your considerations are enlightening. I am no mathematician so I try to evaluate your (and others') remarks in a broader sense - and get diverse thoughts. Your question is more and more relevant and less and less explained by those who live in math. Tom wrote: math is invariant, but is it still? The world is NOT invariant, it is a ceaseless process of change and we take snapshots. Math puts explanatory logic on such snapshots, so far (?) invariance-wise, staying within. (Goedel stepped further and I suspect: Bruno as well). So I had to conclude: mathematicians are conservative, not advancing with the trend of a dynamic view of 'everything' - unless my above hint to newer math holds. I could not explain (1st person) (to myself) WHAT such math could be. Or: what the 'new' sense of NUMBER may be, everything is no answer. Then I do not need a new statement. Then I have an old noumenon: with a new word. I would leave that to the dictionary-writers. About your time-dimension(S): in THIS UNIVERSE a time-concept arose by the inside view according to the restricted qualia forming our world. Not differently from space and the combination of these: movement, referring in abstraction: to change. So we have the 'right' to formulate multiple concepts for them. Mathematics, the invention of the human mind (after Bohm) is a stage in our epistemic enlightenment and is the product of restriction since we (humans) use a materially (figment!) limited tool: the human brain, for thinking. It is not restrictive to the ...(?) existence? nature? everything? even: reality? beyond us. I leave it open that 'other' universes, composed by other qualia, may have 'other' concepts than ours. Time etc. Logic etc. Math on 'variant' units, unrestricted variables and dimensions (whatever these are) I use 'timelessness' as a variation: thought is atemporal, aspatial. We CAN think in those restrictions, but also transcending them. So several time-dimensions are not so 'radical' for me. I may not be able to 'concretize' them, but not excludable. Your use of causality is also universe-bound. In a total interconnectedness I figure a continuous change of everything with influence of everything on everything (is it culminating in Hal R's nothingness?) so all changes are deterministic even if we cannot follow all angles. Change comes from change, influence changes influence. We pick causes in our limited model-view, looking for influences and origins 'within' our (boundary-enclosed) topical? model we can think in. Then we find a most likely cause, just disregarding the 'rest of the world' with its combined entailment, outside our observational limitations. I do not base my speculations on ideas of (maybe ingenious) earlier thinkers too much (how much? good question) because the epistemic cognitive inventory at their time was meager, humanity is continuously increasing the 'stuff' we can think in, with, about, for, by etc. and do not restrict myself by 'accepted' limiting rules - maxims? like e.g.. the 'expanding universe' and its consequences all the way to e.g. the Everett to Tegmar type multiverse or even the Flat Earth as center of the universe (according to Einstein it may (or may not) well be it, since movements are relative, no matter how complicated it may be), adding to that the limited model view of our physicists (including Q-science). The figment of our traditionally built edifice of a physical world and its 'rules' is very impressive and practically exploitable, including 'math' (in which I, too, do differentiate between the 'ideal' (pure?) 'Math' and the applied 'math' (using (Robert Rosen's capitalization) applying the former's results to the latter, with limited model-quantities derived from the (scientific?) physical view. Thank you for triggering the formulation of these thoughts of mine by your post. I am not ready with my speculations to discuss them with people well versed in worldviews based on foundation of different knowledge-base 'sciences'. John Mikes - Original Message - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Friday, June 23, 2006 5:56 AM Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary? Ah, waht is mathematics? I suspect humans could spend their life-times pondering this profound question and never fully understand. I'm a mathematical realist in the sense that I think mathematical entities are real objective properties of reality and not just human inventions, but I've come to seriously doubt the Platonist idea that mathematics is static and timeless. Rather I now favor the idea that mathematical truth can evolve with time. See Greg Chaitin for some ideas about this. As some of you may, know, I've suggested some radical ideas about time on this list: namely the idea that there may be more than one time dimension, in the sense that there may be more than one valid way to define cause and effect relations. My big big idea
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Marc and John, Interesting ideas. Don't have time to comment appropriately. But I want to say one thing about my previous thought. Note that I said that mathematics is *about* invariance; I didn't say that mathematics *is* necessarily invariant. There's a big difference. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Tom, my English may be feeble and artificial (as the 5th), but I see not too much difference IN ESSENCE whether math is dealing with (about!) invariance, or the idea of math is itself (about?) invariance. Invariance is the state itself I like to disregard. John - Original Message - From: Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Friday, June 23, 2006 12:25 PM Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary? Marc and John, Interesting ideas. Don't have time to comment appropriately. But I want to say one thing about my previous thought. Note that I said that mathematics is *about* invariance; I didn't say that mathematics *is* necessarily invariant. There's a big difference. Tom -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.2/372 - Release Date: 06/21/06 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Lee, I have no qualms with your point here, but it seems that we have skipped past the question that I am trying to pose: Where does distinguishability and individuation follow from the mere existence of Platonic Forms, if process is merely a relation between Forms (as Bruno et al claim)?! In my previous post I tried to point out that *existence* is not a first-order (or n-th order) predicate and thus does nothing to distinguish one Form, Number, Algorithm, or what-have-you from another. The property of individuation requires some manner of distinguishability of one thing, process, etc. from another. Mere existence is insufficient. We are tacitly assuming an observer or something that amounts to the same thing any time we assume some 3rd person PoView and such is required for any coherent notion of distinguishability to obtain and thus something to whom existence means/affects. We can go on and on about relations between states, numbers, UDs, or whatever, but unless we have a consistent way to deal with the source of individuation and thus distinguishability, we are going nowhere... Onward! Stephen - Original Message - From: Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 11:14 PM Subject: RE: Only Existence is necessary? Stephen writes What properties do you have in mind that pure platonic algorithms seem to lack? Anything, that is, besides *time* itself? How about an explanation as to how an illusion of time obtains (assuming the theory of Platonic forms if correct)? I can't speak for advocates of a timeless Platonia, because I am not one. I have not yet been reconciled to timelessness. But here is what I think they would say (at least a simplified version of what they'd perhaps say): Future states contain some information about past states in an unambiguous way that past states do not contain about future states. For example, a future version of a photographic plate contains information about the incidence of a particle upon it. In the same way, photons moving outward from a source collectively contain information about their source, but not about their destination. By gradually going to more advance versions of photographic plates and carbon chemistry, it is seen that evolution allows for amoebas and other creatures who contain information about their past chemical environments. Now taking an amoeba for example, all the possible states of it exist in Platonia. 10^10^45 or so of them, if we are to believe Bekenstein. But if you observe the 10^10^45 carefully, you will find a tiny tiny tiny tiny tiny tiny tiny tiny tiny set of them somewhere that seem to tell a story. The story thus told is the life-history of the amoeba, including every possible thing that can happen to it. (Now I myself have some objections to this account---though I reckon it can all be fixed up by a UD, that it by focusing instead on programs that themselves produce sequences of states ---but I have the same sort of objection that I've always had to Hilary Putnam's claims about all computations (within certain huge bounds) taking place in a single rock.) Lee --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hal, Do you have a reference for Moravec's examination of this idea? Stathis Papaioannou Now, if any computation is implemented by any physical process, then if one physical process exists, then all possible computations are implemented. I'll stop at this point, although it is tempting to speculate that if all it takes for every computation to be implemented is a single physical process - a rock, a single subatomic particle, the idle passage of time in an otherwise empty universe - perhaps this is not far from saying that the physical process is superfluous, and all computations are implemented by virtue of their existence as platonic objects. Yes, I think this is close to Moravec's view. He believes in the platonic existence of all conscious experiences, and sees the role of physical implementation as just to allow us to interact with those other entities who are instantiated in our universe. Hal Finney _ Try Live.com: where your online world comes together - with news, sports, weather, and much more. http://www.live.com/getstarted --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Dear Stephen, What makes you think someone (who) asserted (where) that existence is a predicate. I agree with you: existence is not a predicate. Now implementation is a *process*. Again I agree. But this could be just a relative computations (as those living in Platonia. Bruno Le 22-juin-06, à 00:50, Stephen Paul King a écrit : Dear Quentin et al, I keep reading this claim that only the existence of the algorithm itself is necessary and I am still mystified as to how it is reasoned for mere existence of a representation of a process, such as an implementation in terms of some Platonic Number, is sufficient to give a model of that can be used to derive anything like the world of appearences that we have. AFAIK, this claim is that mere existence necessarily entails any property, including properties that involve some notion of chance. First of all *existence* is *not* a property of, or a predicate associable with, an object as Kant, Frege and Russell, et all argued well. http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Existence Per the Wiki article, Miller argued that existence is indeed a predicate since it individuates its subject by being its bounds [from the above web reference] but it seems that Miller's claim disallows any kind of relationship between such things (using that word loosely) as algorithms and thus denies us a mean to distinguish one algorithm from another. If Existence individuates an entity by being its bounds then it seems to follow that any other entity does not *exist* to it and thus no relationship between entities can obtain. I admit that I have not read enough of Miller's work to see if he deals with this problem that I see in his reasoning (as applied here), but nevertheless the basic proposal that existence is sufficient to obtain anything that is even close to a notion of implementation. also see: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existence/ Implementation is a *process*, and as such we have to deal with the properties that are brought into our thinking on this. Onward! Stephen BTW, Plato never gave an explanation that I have seen of how the Forms cast imperfect shadows or even why such shadow casting was necessary... - Original Message - From: Quentin Anciaux [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 4:06 PM Subject: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA Hi Hal, Le Mercredi 21 Juin 2006 19:31, Hal Finney a écrit : What, after all, do these principles mean? They say that the implementation substrate doesn't matter. You can implement a person using neurons or tinkertoys, it's all the same. But if there is no way in principle to tell whether a system implements a person, then this philosophy is meaningless since its basic assumption has no meaning. The MWI doesn't change that. That's exactly the point of Bruno I think... What you've shown is that physicalism is not compatible with computationalism. In the UD vision, there is no real instantiation even the UD itself does not need to be instantiated, only the existence of the algorithm itself is necessary. Quentin http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 22-juin-06, à 03:55, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit (in a reply to Stephen): x-tad-bigger I am reminded of David Chalmer's paper recently mentioned by Hal Finney, Does a Rock Implement Every Finite State Automaton?, which looks at the idea that any physical state such as the vibration of atoms in a rock can be mapped onto any computation, if you look at it the right way. Usually when this idea is brought up (Hilary Putnam, John Searle, the aforementioned Chalmers paper) it is taken as self-evidently wrong. However, I have not seen any argument to convince me that this is so; it just seems people think it *ought* to be so, then look around for a justification having already made up their minds. Now, if any computation is implemented by any physical process, then if one physical process exists, then all possible computations are implemented. I'll stop at this point, although it is tempting to speculate that if all it takes for every computation to be implemented is a single physical process - a rock, a single subatomic particle, the idle passage of time in an otherwise empty universe - perhaps this is not far from saying that the physical process is superfluous, and all computations are implemented by virtue of their existence as platonic objects. /x-tad-bigger Nice point! At least those platonic computations are well-defined as such including the counterfactuals. Now, a real rock implements plausibly a particular (not universal) quantum computation, and as such some finite state automaton, but not a universal computation, still less a DU. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Bruno, Le jeudi 22 juin 2006 15:59, Bruno Marchal a écrit : Dear Stephen, What makes you think someone (who) asserted (where) that existence is a predicate. I agree with you: existence is not a predicate. Now implementation is a *process*. Again I agree. But this could be just a relative computations (as those living in Platonia. Either we have a definition problem or I do not understand. For me relative computations in platonia are not instantiated by definition as they are in platonia. Being in platonia just means it exists, hence existence is sufficient. If not could you please define what you mean by instantiated. Thanks, Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi Bruno, Le jeudi 22 juin 2006 15:59, Bruno Marchal a écrit : Dear Stephen, What makes you think someone (who) asserted (where) that existence is a predicate. I agree with you: existence is not a predicate. Now implementation is a *process*. Again I agree. But this could be just a relative computations (as those living in Platonia. Either we have a definition problem or I do not understand. For me relative computations in platonia are not instantiated by definition as they are in platonia. Being in platonia just means it exists, hence existence is sufficient. If not could you please define what you mean by instantiated. Thanks, Quentin I've been thinking about Platonia lately. I've just finished reading John Barrow's Pi in the Sky book, and he seems to have gotten wrapped around the axle in regard to mathematics and Platonia. I think that mathematics is not primarily about numbers. Mathematics is about invariance. Invariance is not about any *thing* (existence) specifically. Perhaps this thought can shed light on this somehow? Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Quentin, Le 22-juin-06, à 16:16, Quentin Anciaux a écrit : Hi Bruno, Le jeudi 22 juin 2006 15:59, Bruno Marchal a écrit : Dear Stephen, What makes you think someone (who) asserted (where) that existence is a predicate. I agree with you: existence is not a predicate. Now implementation is a *process*. Again I agree. But this could be just a relative computations (as those living in Platonia. Either we have a definition problem or I do not understand. For me relative computations in platonia are not instantiated by definition as they are in platonia. Being in platonia just means it exists, hence existence is sufficient. If not could you please define what you mean by instantiated. Remember that comp relies on arithmetical platonism. Numbers and their additive structure, and their multiplicative structure and the whole mess you get with both of them at once, making *all* theories (generable set of sentences) incomplete with respect to number theoretical truth. The UD lives there under the form of all true arithmetical (Sigma1) sentences, which, and this is eventually justified from the first person point of view, codes the universal dovetailing. So *all* computations, the finite and the infinite one, with their weighting redundancies, exist or better are instantiated under the form of an infinity of (purely) number theoretical relations. By comp, those many computations instantiate, well, wanting to be short I will just say all possible number's or machine's dreams. Those machine's dream obeys to the law of computer science, they differentiates, they overlaps, they get entangled rising parallelism, etc. They get rise to many internal interpretations. Computer Science, is in many different and interesting sense a branch of number theory. To sum up: the dreams are instantiated in the DU-computations, themselves instantiated by the (platonic) number theoretical relations. The invariant and the symmetry (and geometry, and physics) should emerge from them from inside (assuming comp). (I'm afraid Tom just did say sort of opposite. No offense Tom ;-) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Stathis, The paper is found here: http://consc.net/papers/rock.html - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 9:55 PM Subject: RE: Re: Only Existence is necessary? Stephen,I am reminded ofDavid Chalmer'spaper recentlymentioned by Hal Finney, "Does a Rock Implement Every Finite State Automaton?", which looks at the idea that any physical state such as the vibration of atoms in a rock can be mapped onto any computation, if you look at it the right way.Usually whenthis idea is brought up (Hilary Putnam, John Searle, the aforementioned Chalmers paper) it is taken as self-evidently wrong. However, I have not seen any argument to convince me that this is so; it just seems people think it *ought* to be so, then look around for a justification having already made up their minds. Now, if any computation is implemented by any physical process, then if one physical process exists, then all possible computations are implemented. I'll stop at this point, althoughit istempting to speculate that if all it takes forevery computation to be implemented is a single physical process - a rock, a single subatomic particle, the idle passage of time in an otherwise empty universe - perhaps this is not far from saying that the physical process is superfluous, and all computations are implemented by virtue of their existence as platonic objects.StathisPapaioannou Ok, if I am following your argument here, it seems that we are required to have a non-circularexplanation for the existence of a *single* physical process, not an excuse to ignore the explanatory gap between this requirement and the claim that none exist. Again, How is an implementation, which is an obvios process, considered to be identical to theexistence of a Platonic object? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence Frankly, I am wondering why we have such unquestioned faith in the entire theory of Platonic Forms given the plethora of unanswered questions that it leads one to! Onward! Stephen --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Bruno, Ok, but my question is: How is the set of relations between the computations embedded/encoded in Platonia such that a comparison *between* them is possible? We seem to be tacitly reintroducing a distinguisher that is somehow *outside* of Platonia... This is a familiar notion that I thought we are trying to banish! If all that there *is* (Exists) is Platonia, there is no place for a means or mechanism or process that distinguishes one computation from another to exist! Thus if such can not exist, then it inevitably follows that any notion that requires the act of distinguishing one Platonic object from another is logically inconsistent and thus needs to be relegated to the scrap heap of absurd notions. Onward! Stephen - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 9:59 AM Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary? Dear Stephen, What makes you think someone (who) asserted (where) that existence is a predicate. I agree with you: existence is not a predicate. Now implementation is a *process*. Again I agree. But this could be just a relative computations (as those living in Platonia. Bruno --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Tom, I think that you are bring up a good point but I must ask about the nature of invariance! The notion of invariance involves a subject to which the invariance obtains. If there is no such an subject, what meaning does the notion of a invariance have? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invariant_%28mathematics%29 Onward! Stephen - Original Message - From: Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 12:13 PM Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary? snip I've been thinking about Platonia lately. I've just finished reading John Barrow's Pi in the Sky book, and he seems to have gotten wrapped around the axle in regard to mathematics and Platonia. I think that mathematics is not primarily about numbers. Mathematics is about invariance. Invariance is not about any *thing* (existence) specifically. Perhaps this thought can shed light on this somehow? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Hal, - Original Message - From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 10:55 PM Subject: RE: Re: Only Existence is necessary? Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: snip Now, if any computation is implemented by any physical process, then if one physical process exists, then all possible computations are implemented. I'll stop at this point, although it is tempting to speculate that if all it takes for every computation to be implemented is a single physical process - a rock, a single subatomic particle, the idle passage of time in an otherwise empty universe - perhaps this is not far from saying that the physical process is superfluous, and all computations are implemented by virtue of their existence as platonic objects. Yes, I think this is close to Moravec's view. He believes in the platonic existence of all conscious experiences, and sees the role of physical implementation as just to allow us to interact with those other entities who are instantiated in our universe. [SPK] Ok, I am happy to see Moravec idea here, as it is similar to my own, but does it not seem strange that interactions between entities leads to the existence of a structure that we somehow are perpetually lead to believe somehow exists independent of the interactions themselves? Onward! Stephen --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Stephen Stephen Paul King wrote: Since information is observer-dependent (Shannon) this issue brings us back to the observer. I think that eventually all observables will have to be traced back to the observer who is in fact at the nexus of the mind-body problem. [SPK] I agree! What is an Observer? If we are to use an axiomatic formulation of a TOE then the observer should be an axiom or even "The Axiom": ala Descartes "I think" and possibly more precisely and reflexively "I think what I think" with all the implied logical meaning and/or axiomatic system: This should cut through the Gordian Knot of the mind-body problem. We'll have to refer to Bruno's work to flesh out this idea in a formal fashion. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Then we, who are in his image, can recognize that There is The purest form of this recognition, I believe, is mathematics. Of course I'm a mathematician, so I'm biased. :) Tom Tom Caylor wrote: Stephen, I wrote the following before you wrote this post, but I think it addresses it somewhat. My two cents is again to say that mathematics is about invariance. Platonia is about invariance. Invariance is even more fundamental than number. Numbers are defined by invariance. The number 3 is the invariant attribute of all sets of 3. I take it that Bruno's existence is just the interference pattern of computations, as I think he sometimes puts it. According to him, I think the ether that we swim in (exist in) is computations, an ether of consistency. John Barrow in his book Pi in the Sky brought up the possibility that we are part of Platonia, but he concluded that this didn't make sense. My opinion is that it doesn't make sense if Platonia is only numbers, i.e. computation. This is for the very reason you bring up, Stephen. An interference pattern requires a particular point of view. But if all points of view are equally unspecial (modulo consistency), then we are back to the why something instead of nothing? problem (why this particular point of view that I am experiencing, rather than another point of view?). Something has to break the symmetry of the zero information pool. Interference patterns are not sufficient to break the symmetry. (Along the same line of reasoning, even an anthropic principle is not sufficient.) Summing the interference patterns over all points-of-view results in zero. I've taken my answer to this from somewhere outside myself. There has to be someone with universal power to say Let there be Tom Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Tom, I think that you are bring up a good point but I must ask about the nature of invariance! The notion of invariance involves a subject to which the invariance obtains. If there is no such an subject, what meaning does the notion of a invariance have? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invariant_%28mathematics%29 Onward! Stephen - Original Message - From: Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 12:13 PM Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary? snip I've been thinking about Platonia lately. I've just finished reading John Barrow's Pi in the Sky book, and he seems to have gotten wrapped around the axle in regard to mathematics and Platonia. I think that mathematics is not primarily about numbers. Mathematics is about invariance. Invariance is not about any *thing* (existence) specifically. Perhaps this thought can shed light on this somehow? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Tom Caylor writes: I'vebeenthinkingaboutPlatonialately.I'vejustfinishedreading JohnBarrow's"PiintheSky"book,andheseemstohavegottenwrapped aroundtheaxleinregardtomathematicsandPlatonia.Ithinkthat mathematicsisnotprimarilyaboutnumbers.Mathematicsisabout invariance.Invarianceisnotaboutany*thing*(existence) specifically.Perhapsthisthoughtcanshedlightonthissomehow? What do you mean, "mathematics is about invariance"? Stathis PapaioannouWith MSN Spaces email straight to your blog. Upload jokes, photos and more. It's free! --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Stathis, I tried to expand on that a little in my last two posts (to Stephen) on this thread, which somehow got disconnected. Here it is again: Stephen, I wrote the following before you wrote this post, but I think it addresses it somewhat. My two cents is again to say that mathematics is about invariance. Platonia is about invariance. Invariance is even more fundamental than number. Numbers are defined by invariance. The number 3 is the invariant attribute of all sets of 3. I take it that Bruno's existence is just the interference pattern of computations, as I think he sometimes puts it. According to him, I think the ether that we swim in (exist in) is computations, an ether of consistency. John Barrow in his book Pi in the Sky brought up the possibility that we are part of Platonia, but he concluded that this didn't make sense. My opinion is that it doesn't make sense if Platonia is only numbers, i.e. computation. This is for the very reason you bring up, Stephen. An interference pattern requires a particular point of view. But if all points of view are equally unspecial (modulo consistency), then we are back to the why something instead of nothing? problem (why this particular point of view that I am experiencing, rather than another point of view?). Something has to break the symmetry of the zero information pool. Interference patterns are not sufficient to break the symmetry. (Along the same line of reasoning, even an anthropic principle is not sufficient.) Summing the interference patterns over all points-of-view results in zero. I've taken my answer to this from somewhere outside myself. There has to be someone with universal power to say Let there be Then we, who are in his image, can recognize that There is The purest form of this recognition, I believe, is mathematics. Of course I'm a mathematician, so I'm biased. :) Tom Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Tom Caylor writes: I've been thinking about Platonia lately. I've just finished reading John Barrow's Pi in the Sky book, and he seems to have gotten wrapped around the axle in regard to mathematics and Platonia. I think that mathematics is not primarily about numbers. Mathematics is about invariance. Invariance is not about any *thing* (existence) specifically. Perhaps this thought can shed light on this somehow? What do you mean, mathematics is about invariance? Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Only Existence is necessary?
Stephen writes What properties do you have in mind that pure platonic algorithms seem to lack? Anything, that is, besides *time* itself? How about an explanation as to how an illusion of time obtains (assuming the theory of Platonic forms if correct)? I can't speak for advocates of a timeless Platonia, because I am not one. I have not yet been reconciled to timelessness. But here is what I think they would say (at least a simplified version of what they'd perhaps say): Future states contain some information about past states in an unambiguous way that past states do not contain about future states. For example, a future version of a photographic plate contains information about the incidence of a particle upon it. In the same way, photons moving outward from a source collectively contain information about their source, but not about their destination. By gradually going to more advance versions of photographic plates and carbon chemistry, it is seen that evolution allows for amoebas and other creatures who contain information about their past chemical environments. Now taking an amoeba for example, all the possible states of it exist in Platonia. 10^10^45 or so of them, if we are to believe Bekenstein. But if you observe the 10^10^45 carefully, you will find a tiny tiny tiny tiny tiny tiny tiny tiny tiny set of them somewhere that seem to tell a story. The story thus told is the life-history of the amoeba, including every possible thing that can happen to it. (Now I myself have some objections to this account---though I reckon it can all be fixed up by a UD, that it by focusing instead on programs that themselves produce sequences of states ---but I have the same sort of objection that I've always had to Hilary Putnam's claims about all computations (within certain huge bounds) taking place in a single rock.) Lee --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Dear Quentin et al, I keep reading this claim that only the existence of the algorithm itself is necessary and I am still mystified as to how it is reasoned for mere existence of a representation of a process, such as an implementation in terms of some Platonic Number, is sufficient to give a model of that can be used to derive anything like the world of appearences that we have. AFAIK, this claim is that mere existence necessarily entails any property, including properties that involve some notion of chance. First of all *existence* is *not* a property of, or a predicate associable with, an object as Kant, Frege and Russell, et all argued well. http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Existence Per the Wiki article, Miller argued that existence is indeed a predicate since it individuates its subject by being its bounds [from the above web reference] but it seems that Miller's claim disallows any kind of relationship between such things (using that word loosely) as algorithms and thus denies us a mean to distinguish one algorithm from another. If Existence individuates an entity by being its bounds then it seems to follow that any other entity does not *exist* to it and thus no relationship between entities can obtain. I admit that I have not read enough of Miller's work to see if he deals with this problem that I see in his reasoning (as applied here), but nevertheless the basic proposal that existence is sufficient to obtain anything that is even close to a notion of implementation. also see: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existence/ Implementation is a *process*, and as such we have to deal with the properties that are brought into our thinking on this. Onward! Stephen BTW, Plato never gave an explanation that I have seen of how the Forms cast imperfect shadows or even why such shadow casting was necessary... - Original Message - From: Quentin Anciaux [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 4:06 PM Subject: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA Hi Hal, Le Mercredi 21 Juin 2006 19:31, Hal Finney a écrit : What, after all, do these principles mean? They say that the implementation substrate doesn't matter. You can implement a person using neurons or tinkertoys, it's all the same. But if there is no way in principle to tell whether a system implements a person, then this philosophy is meaningless since its basic assumption has no meaning. The MWI doesn't change that. That's exactly the point of Bruno I think... What you've shown is that physicalism is not compatible with computationalism. In the UD vision, there is no real instantiation even the UD itself does not need to be instantiated, only the existence of the algorithm itself is necessary. Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Stephen Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Quentin et al, I keep reading this claim that only the existence of the algorithm itself is necessary and I am still mystified as to how it is reasoned for mere existence of a representation of a process, such as an implementation in terms of some Platonic Number, is sufficient to give a model of that can be used to derive anything like the world of appearences that we have. Is the world fundamentally physical or can it be reduced to ideas? This is an interesting issue. If a TOE exists then it would have to explain the physics and the objects. This reminds me of the Ether controversy. Is there a need for the Ether for waves to propagate? The most up-to-date answer is that waves carry their own physical substrate. They can be waves and/or particles. Similarly there should be equivalence between information and matter/energy. Thus a process or algorithm should have inherently within itself its own physical substrate. Since information is observer-dependent (Shannon) this issue brings us back to the observer. I think that eventually all observables will have to be traced back to the observer who is in fact at the nexus of the mind-body problem. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Only Existence is necessary?
Stephen writes (BTW, thanks for using plain text :-) I keep reading this claim that only the existence of the algorithm itself is necessary and I am still mystified as to how it is reasoned for mere existence of a representation of a process, such as an implementation in terms of some Platonic Number, is sufficient to give a model of that can be used to derive anything like the world of appearences that we have. AFAIK, this claim is that mere existence necessarily entails any property, including properties that involve some notion of chance. What properties do you have in mind that pure platonic algorithms seem to lack? Anything, that is, besides *time* itself? Thanks, Lee P.S. I am not up to speed on this thread at all. That's exactly the point of Bruno I think... What you've shown is that physicalism is not compatible with computationalism. In the UD vision, there is no real instantiation even the UD itself does not need to be instantiated, only the existence of the algorithm itself is necessary. Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Only Existence is necessary?
George writes Is the world fundamentally physical or can it be reduced to ideas? This is an interesting issue. If a TOE exists then it would have to explain the physics and the objects. This reminds me of the Ether controversy. Is there a need for the Ether for waves to propagate? The most up-to-date answer is that waves carry their own physical substrate. They can be waves and/or particles. Similarly there should be equivalence between information and matter/energy. Thus a process or algorithm should have inherently within itself its own physical substrate. Well, that sounds good to me, but what do I know. Since information is observer-dependent (Shannon) this issue brings us back to the observer. I think that eventually all observables will have to be traced back to the observer who is in fact at the nexus of the mind-body problem. But why can't photographic apparatuses, or amoeba, count as observers? (They don't have minds, right, or, uh, do they?) I really confess to not understanding the claim that information is observer dependent; if a region contained one of thirty-two possible binary bit strings of length 5, it seems to me that it would contain five bits, even if no light from it ever reached other parts of the universe. Lee --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Stephen, I am reminded ofDavid Chalmer'spaper recentlymentioned by Hal Finney, "Does a Rock Implement Every Finite State Automaton?", which looks at the idea that any physical state such as the vibration of atoms in a rock can be mapped onto any computation, if you look at it the right way.Usually whenthis idea is brought up (Hilary Putnam, John Searle, the aforementioned Chalmers paper) it is taken as self-evidently wrong. However, I have not seen any argument to convince me that this is so; it just seems people think it *ought* to be so, then look around for a justification having already made up their minds. Now, if any computation is implemented by any physical process, then if one physical process exists, then all possible computations are implemented. I'll stop at this point, althoughit istempting to speculate that if all it takes forevery computation to be implemented is a single physical process - a rock, a single subatomic particle, the idle passage of time in an otherwise empty universe - perhaps this is not far from saying that the physical process is superfluous, and all computations are implemented by virtue of their existence as platonic objects. StathisPapaioannou DearQuentinetal, Ikeepreadingthisclaimthat"onlytheexistenceofthealgorithm itselfisnecessary"andIamstillmystifiedastohowitisreasonedfor mereexistenceofarepresentationofaprocess,suchasanimplementation intermsofsomePlatonicNumber,issufficienttogiveamodelofthatcan beusedtoderiveanythingliketheworldofappearencesthatwehave. AFAIK,thisclaimisthatmereexistencenecessarilyentailsany property,includingpropertiesthatinvolvesomenotionofchance.Firstof all*existence*is*not*apropertyof,orapredicateassociablewith,an objectasKant,FregeandRussell,etallarguedwell. http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Existence PertheWikiarticle,Millerarguedthatexistenceisindeedapredicate "sinceitindividuatesitssubjectbybeingitsbounds"[fromtheaboveweb reference]butitseemsthatMiller'sclaimdisallowsanykindof relationshipbetweensuchthings(usingthatwordloosely)asalgorithmsand thusdeniesusameantodistinguishonealgorithmfromanother.If Existenceindividuatesanentityby"beingitsbounds"thenitseemsto followthatanyotherentitydoesnot*exist*toitandthusnorelationship betweenentitiescanobtain. IadmitthatIhavenotreadenoughofMiller'sworktoseeifhedeals withthisproblemthatIseeinhisreasoning(asappliedhere),but neverthelessthebasicproposalthatexistenceissufficienttoobtain anythingthatisevenclosetoanotionofimplementation. alsosee:http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existence/ Implementationisa*process*,andassuchwehavetodealwiththe propertiesthatarebroughtintoourthinkingonthis. Onward! Stephen BTW,PlatonevergaveanexplanationthatIhaveseenofhowtheForms"cast imperfectshadows"orevenwhysuch"shadowcasting"wasnecessary... -OriginalMessage- From:"QuentinAnciaux"quentin.[EMAIL PROTECTED] To:everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent:Wednesday,June21,20064:06PM Subject:Re:TeleportationthoughtexperimentandUD+ASSAHiHal, LeMercredi21Juin200619:31,HalFinneyaécrit: What,afterall,dotheseprinciplesmean?Theysaythatthe implementationsubstratedoesn'tmatter.Youcanimplementaperson usingneuronsortinkertoys,it'sallthesame.Butifthereisnoway inprincipletotellwhetherasystemimplementsaperson,thenthis philosophyismeaninglesssinceitsbasicassumptionhasnomeaning. TheMWIdoesn'tchangethat. That'sexactlythepointofBrunoIthink...Whatyou'veshownisthat physicalismisnotcompatiblewithcomputationalism.IntheUDvision,there isnoreal"instantiation"eventheUDitselfdoesnotneedtobe instantiated,onlytheexistenceofthealgorithmitselfisnecessary. Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Lee, Lee Corbin wrote: George writes Is the world fundamentally physical or can it be reduced to ideas? This is an interesting issue. If a TOE exists then it would have to explain the physics and the objects. This reminds me of the Ether controversy. Is there a need for the Ether for waves to propagate? The most up-to-date answer is that waves carry their own "physical substrate." They can be waves and/or particles. Similarly there should be equivalence between information and matter/energy. Thus a process or algorithm should have inherently within itself its own physical substrate. Well, that sounds good to me, but what do I know. Since information is observer-dependent (Shannon) this issue brings us back to the observer. I think that eventually all observables will have to be traced back to the observer who is in fact at the nexus of the mind-body problem. But why can't photographic apparatuses, or amoeba, count as observers? (They don't have minds, right, or, uh, do they?) I really confess to not understanding the claim that information is observer dependent; if a region contained one of thirty-two possible binary bit strings of length 5, it seems to me that it would contain five bits, even if no light from it ever reached other parts of the universe. Lee If I say something to you in Sanskrit you will likely not understand it. It will carry zero information. However If I say it in English you will be much more likely to understand it. If I say to you that your name is Lee Corbin, it will not add any information to what you already know. Again, it will carry zero information. This is what Shannon calls Mutual Information. In the first case *you* don't have the decoder to translate Sanskrit to English. In the second case you have the decoder but for *you*, the information is not new: you already know that your name is Lee Corbin. Old information is no information at all. Received mutual information is dependent on the information that already exists in the mind of the receiver (or observer). In this sense Shannon's information theory is a relativity theory of information just like Galileo's dynamics and Einstein's relativity are relativity theories of physics and just like Everett's interpretation is a relativity theory of quantum events. This is the reason I believe that the observer is at the nexus of the mind-body problem and that eventually we'll find that the "mind" and the "body" are two aspects of the same thing. Bruno seems to be in the right track in developing a calculus of the soul (or consciousness). George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I am reminded of David Chalmer's paper recently mentioned by Hal Finney, Does a Rock Implement Every Finite State Automaton?, which looks at the idea that any physical state such as the vibration of atoms in a rock can be mapped onto any computation, if you look at it the right way. Usually when this idea is brought up (Hilary Putnam, John Searle, the aforementioned Chalmers paper) it is taken as self-evidently wrong. However, I have not seen any argument to convince me that this is so; it just seems people think it *ought* to be so, then look around for a justification having already made up their minds. I tend to agree. People find the conclusion unpalatable and then they try to come up with some justification for why it is not true. As I mentioned, at least some people like, I think, Hans Moravec, accept the basic conclusion. Now, if any computation is implemented by any physical process, then if one physical process exists, then all possible computations are implemented. I'll stop at this point, although it is tempting to speculate that if all it takes for every computation to be implemented is a single physical process - a rock, a single subatomic particle, the idle passage of time in an otherwise empty universe - perhaps this is not far from saying that the physical process is superfluous, and all computations are implemented by virtue of their existence as platonic objects. Yes, I think this is close to Moravec's view. He believes in the platonic existence of all conscious experiences, and sees the role of physical implementation as just to allow us to interact with those other entities who are instantiated in our universe. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---