Re: Pedagogy question (was: out-of-line)
Le 27-juil.-07, à 13:31, David Nyman a écrit : How will I ever know? I suppose I'm asking: what specifically are the critical tests? See my answer to Tom. A specific test would be to test some Bell inequality in the comp phys. To say more I have to be more technic, and I am not sure this is not a bit premature. Let me think ... Not all attempt to explain this in the past (of the list) has been successful, so I have to work the technics. What are your knowledge of quantum mechanics? Have you study some quantum algorithm, Deutsch problem, counterfactual quantum computations. You know, to ANY points of view (first, second, third, ..., of machines, angels, Gods,) you can associate formally some multiverse structures. As you know, observation has lead to expect those multiverse to exist in some more palatable ways. The empirical test consists in comparing those multiverse strurctures atatched to entitiess-points of view and what we observe ... indirectly (observation is always indirect, ok?). Either way, could I implore, cajole, wheedle, or simply ask (but never force) you to explain the main thrust in English with as few preconceptions as possible? Yes. You can implore, cajole or simply ask. (I'm a bit less sure for the wheedling given that I don't know what that means!). As for the preconceptions, *you* have to say the relevant Why? and How so? in the relevant places ... I will try asap. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Pedagogy question (was: out-of-line)
Thanks Russell. Note that paying is not a problem for me, as far as the translation is professionnal. Some attempts have been made by willing amateurs, and despite I appreciate the effort, I have not been satisfied with the result, so I don't want to push anybody on this. We can think about it. Also, I would at least try to submit such a translation to some well known publisher (Reidel, World Scientific, Springer ...) before. I am perhaps just presomptuous, I don't know. But I will take your suggestion into account, Best, Bruno Le 26-juil.-07, à 03:48, Russell Standish a écrit : I assume you mean you are interested in doing a translation. I'm happy to assist, within limitations of doing my normal work. It would give me the motivation to read the Brussels thesis. Incidently, one of my jobs is translating fractured English into proper idiomatic English, for which I get paid AUD 31.50 per 1000 words (about EUR 20 at today's rates). I'm not asking to be paid, but obviously something that I do as a labour of love will take longer than a paying proposition. What it does illustrate is that I would first use Google translation to get the fractured English, then work on converting the to something more readable. Once translated, we can use the company Lulu.com to publish it as a printed copy available through Amazon.com and other online booksellers. Lulu don't charge any upfront fees, and still come out with a list price similar to my book, although yours would command a higher price as it has more pages. Cheers On Wed, Jul 25, 2007 at 04:15:54PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Actually, after the computability meeting in Siena, I have change my mind about Russell Standish idea that Conscience et Mecanisme should be translated in English. It is not at all outdated indeed, and contains more than 400 pages just on the Church thesis impact. Comp is mainly Church thesis (more so when you get the idea that the lobian interview eliminates almost completely the need for the thought experiences and thus the need of the yes doctor hypothesis. I have to write more paper on Church thesis, or at least consecrate more lines of explanations on that. (Despite people like Emil Post or Judson Webb seems to me to have already well understood this quite well, ref in my thesis). -- --- - A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --- - http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Pedagogy question (was: out-of-line)
On 27/07/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What are your knowledge of quantum mechanics?
Not very deep - only what I've gleaned in a largely non-mathematical
way from incessantly reading and musing about the topic for years.
But I think I'm sufficiently orientated in the basic ideas and
alternative interpretations to have a chance at following up at least
some specific topics, that you might suggest, in more detail. But
this can wait if you feel it's premature.
The empirical
test consists in comparing those multiverse strurctures atatched to
entitiess-points of view and what we observe ... indirectly
(observation is always indirect, ok?).
Definitely OK. Perhaps an example of a specific comparison of this
kind would be a good starting point? The following may not be
relevant in this context, but I'm particularly interested in something
you said elsewhere ('simulation argument') about how comp can relate
OMs (and presumably the multiverse structures associated with them)
geometrically 'through time'. Is this is an area where comp
consequently can recover 'dynamically experienced' observer histories
within a block or static context more satisfactorily than e.g. the
Deutsch 'disconnected slice' view as propounded in FOR?
Yes. You can implore, cajole or simply ask. (I'm a bit less sure for
the wheedling given that I don't know what that means!).
wheedle
-verb (used with object)
1. to endeavor to influence (a person) by smooth, flattering, or
beguiling words or acts: We wheedled him incessantly, but he would not
consent.
2. to persuade (a person) by such words or acts: She wheedled him into
going with her.
3. to obtain (something) by artful persuasions: I wheedled a new car
out of my father.
-verb (used without object)
4. to use beguiling or artful persuasions: I always wheedle if I
really need something.
[Origin: 1655-65; orig. uncert.]
David
Le 27-juil.-07, à 13:31, David Nyman a écrit :
How will I ever know? I suppose I'm asking: what specifically are the
critical tests?
See my answer to Tom. A specific test would be to test some Bell
inequality in the comp phys. To say more I have to be more technic, and
I am not sure this is not a bit premature. Let me think ... Not all
attempt to explain this in the past (of the list) has been successful,
so I have to work the technics.
What are your knowledge of quantum mechanics? Have you study some
quantum algorithm, Deutsch problem, counterfactual quantum
computations. You know, to ANY points of view (first, second, third,
..., of machines, angels, Gods,) you can associate formally some
multiverse structures. As you know, observation has lead to expect
those multiverse to exist in some more palatable ways. The empirical
test consists in comparing those multiverse strurctures atatched to
entitiess-points of view and what we observe ... indirectly
(observation is always indirect, ok?).
Either way, could I
implore, cajole, wheedle, or simply ask (but never force) you to
explain the main thrust in English with as few preconceptions as
possible?
Yes. You can implore, cajole or simply ask. (I'm a bit less sure for
the wheedling given that I don't know what that means!).
As for the preconceptions, *you* have to say the relevant Why? and
How so? in the relevant places ...
I will try asap.
Best,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Pedagogy question (was: out-of-line)
Le 25-juil.-07, à 18:58, David Nyman a écrit : On Jul 25, 3:15 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Now, even if you were enough clear so that I could find a discrepancy between your talk and the machine's one, it would not necessarily mean you are wrong: it could mean you are not a lobian machine or entity. My point is just that the comp hyp leads to assertions about the physical world which are enough precise to make the comp hyp refutable. I realise that I'm not clear about exactly what you mean by saying that I might not be a lobian machine or entity. Do you mean this to apply to me alone, or that the discrepancy might indicate that humans in general might not in fact be lobian? Would my being 'right' in a 'non-lobian' way amount to a proof that my reasoning could not be computationally based? What are the principal assertions of comp that would be refutable in this regard, and how precisely? Actually you could be lobian, but unsound, or worst, inconsistent. But I have no evidence. You could be an angel ? (Like the PI-1 complete Anomega?): no, because they are lobian too (despite being not turing emulable). You could be a supergod (non computational entities so close to the ONE that they are no more lobian). In that case the reasoning I do would not work for you, and in the case you can supply me with an argument which convince me that you are indeed a supergod, I would conclude indeed that all human are supergod, But this is academic: not only the supergod hypothesis is just not my working hypothesis, but I do think that we have no evidence at all for it. Still, my way of deriving physics works also for that (ridiculous) hypothesis, so supergodness like comp are refutable by deriving the physics and compare with observation. Of course if comp really implies an inflation of white rabbit provably bigger than the observed quantum one, that would be a case that we are supergods, perhaps. Sometimes two different persons discussing in the list seems to have different ideas where I can see that they are both correct, but just doesn't not look at things from the same angle or perspective. All this is obviously related with the very intrinsical difficulty of the subject itself. Difficult indeed. It would be very helpful if we could all find a shared method to make the perspectives commensurable. I suspect for you this would be comp. OK, or just the numbers (with their additive and multiplication structures). The mimit discourse (John would say narrative) can be studied mathematically (thanks to Goel, Lob, Solovay, ...). comp points obviously to computer science (and mathematical logic).. Have you understand that the UDA literally gives no choice about what has to be taken as primitive element for any TOE once we assume the comp hyp? I think so, although my personal expressions of the intuition have been different. For example I was thinking recently of arguments of the sort that seek to refute computationalism as a theory of consciousness by contrasting, say, a (however 'complete') computational model of digestion with a 'real' stomach digesting 'real' food. No one could mistake one for the other, runs the argument. This seems true. But it occurred to me that it wouldn't necessarily be a mistake if 'real' stomachs and 'real' food were 'computational' too. Of course. Imagine that the comp substitution level is so low that the opnly way to restore your consciousness artificially consts in duplicating at the level of elementary fermions and bosons the entire quantum state of the milky way. You can easily see (I think, just tell me if not) that the simulation of you in that galaxy simulation will call real stomach what we, from outside know to be parts of a very detailled computations. IOW, if computation is to be the basis for 'reality', it must be 'computations all the way down'. Not if you are realistic on numbers with + and *. You can stop there. Of course you can take combinators or n-categories or whatever universal system you like. Ontically they are all equivalent. And epistemologically, well there are many differences, but those should emerge from any ontic reality (like the N,+,*) from inside. ISTM that the UDA demonstrates rigorously the consequences of assuming otherwise, and hence is a reductio of 'materialistic computationalism'. That is true for the last (8 steps version) of the UDA. To be sure, in my theses I separate the UDA and the movie graph. UDA(+Movie-graph) shows the absurdity in believing in both primitive matter and computationalism indeed. Concerning the math, do you know the book by Torkel Franzen on the uses and misuses of Godel theorems? Despite some big mistake I will talk about, it is a quite excellent book which I would recommend the reading. I don't know it, and having perused the Davis book, I suspect it may be beyond me
Re: Pedagogy question (was: out-of-line)
On 27/07/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Actually you could be lobian, but unsound, or worst, inconsistent. But I have no evidence. You could be an angel ? (Like the PI-1 complete Anomega?): no, because they are lobian too (despite being not turing emulable). You could be a supergod (non computational entities so close to the ONE that they are no more lobian). In that case the reasoning I do would not work for you, and in the case you can supply me with an argument which convince me that you are indeed a supergod, I would conclude indeed that all human are supergod, But this is academic: not only the supergod hypothesis is just not my working hypothesis, but I do think that we have no evidence at all for it. Still, my way of deriving physics works also for that (ridiculous) hypothesis, so supergodness like comp are refutable by deriving the physics and compare with observation. Of course if comp really implies an inflation of white rabbit provably bigger than the observed quantum one, that would be a case that we are supergods, perhaps. How will I ever know? I suppose I'm asking: what specifically are the critical tests? IOW, if computation is to be the basis for 'reality', it must be 'computations all the way down'. Not if you are realistic on numbers with + and *. You can stop there. Of course you can take combinators or n-categories or whatever universal system you like. Ontically they are all equivalent. And epistemologically, well there are many differences, but those should emerge from any ontic reality (like the N,+,*) from inside. OK, I wasn't precise enough! Well then: computations all the way down, with the number realm at the bottom. It's interesting that if we concede ontic realism to the number realm in this way, then everything else becomes epistemology. This is metaphysically rather economical, ISTM, in a way that is apparently increasingly attractive to physicists (i.e. the numbers, if not necessarily the computationalism). Of course I know that if you are isolated, the ah ah can take time. perhaps in august we can come back at least on the proof of incompleteness based directly on Church thesis? By all means. So the real difficulty now consists in understanding that we can provide rules for transforming those strings in a truth preserving way, without any understanding of those strings. This is the difficulty of logic: to understand where you have to not try to understand strings. In my former work as a technical director in commercial computing I often struggled to convince business colleagues that confidence in the (transformational) equivalence of a new compiler to the one it was replacing was more fundamental (and much more reliable) than attempting an explicit re-confirmation of the logic of the entire suite of compiled applications (i.e. the 'strings'). Perhaps you could search and peruse the archive with key words like godel number, for example quickly: http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_frm/thread/ f5c02229299f1a02/e135df20765c927d? lnk=gstq=godel+numberrnum=8hl=en#e135df20765c927d Or buy the book by Mendelson or the last (fourth) edition of Boolos and Jeffrey (and Burguess now). before buying those books (or searching them in a library) try to know if you are willing to do the effort to understand the real technic. If not, try to force me to explain in english the main idea. Thanks for the pointers. As to the 'effort', I can't yet know whether the variability of my lamentably dilettantish energy in the logico-mathematical sphere will be adequate to the attempt, but nonetheless I'm willing to commence to find out. Either way, could I implore, cajole, wheedle, or simply ask (but never force) you to explain the main thrust in English with as few preconceptions as possible? In a sense, it is not funny to be a lobian machine. That consists in being a universal machine with all the cognitive abilities necessary to worry about the length of its tape, and the poorness of what she can communicate through it, compared to what she can observe, feel, resent, etc. Would you say that what can be directly communicated through the 'tape' is essentially what we may characterise as 'physics', understood as the third person (or first person plural) narrative per se? But then by using the contents of the tape to *refer* back to the first person we obtain the *ostensive* possibility of sharing (with others, but also actually with 'ourselves') our observations, feelings, resentments - i.e. the first-personal world: Look! *This* is what I see, feel, hear. This seems to be perhaps the fundamental distinction between ontology and epistemology: the ontic 'origin' self-manifests fleetingly within the first-person, and although this is not *communicable* - even to the 'self' - communication can *refer* to it. But then Art will develop among such machine too, as a way to pint on the uncommunicable we are
Re: Pedagogy question (was: out-of-line)
On Fri, Jul 27, 2007 at 03:08:18PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Thanks Russell. Note that paying is not a problem for me, as far as the translation is professionnal. Some attempts have been made by willing amateurs, and despite I appreciate the effort, I have not been satisfied with the result, so I don't want to push anybody on this. I would suggest tackling a chapter at a time - that way you can see early on whether this will work. Do you have a word count already? The work I do for Online English typically might take me 1-2 hours for a 5000 word paper. I would guess your thesis would have to be at least 100,000 words, wouldn't it. We can think about it. Also, I would at least try to submit such a translation to some well known publisher (Reidel, World Scientific, Springer ...) before. Absolutely. Its fun to build up a collection of rejection letters. And you never know, you might win the lottery that the mainstream publishing system is these days. I am perhaps just presomptuous, I don't know. But I will take your suggestion into account, Best, Bruno Le 26-juil.-07, à 03:48, Russell Standish a écrit : I assume you mean you are interested in doing a translation. I'm happy to assist, within limitations of doing my normal work. It would give me the motivation to read the Brussels thesis. Incidently, one of my jobs is translating fractured English into proper idiomatic English, for which I get paid AUD 31.50 per 1000 words (about EUR 20 at today's rates). I'm not asking to be paid, but obviously something that I do as a labour of love will take longer than a paying proposition. What it does illustrate is that I would first use Google translation to get the fractured English, then work on converting the to something more readable. Once translated, we can use the company Lulu.com to publish it as a printed copy available through Amazon.com and other online booksellers. Lulu don't charge any upfront fees, and still come out with a list price similar to my book, although yours would command a higher price as it has more pages. Cheers On Wed, Jul 25, 2007 at 04:15:54PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Actually, after the computability meeting in Siena, I have change my mind about Russell Standish idea that Conscience et Mecanisme should be translated in English. It is not at all outdated indeed, and contains more than 400 pages just on the Church thesis impact. Comp is mainly Church thesis (more so when you get the idea that the lobian interview eliminates almost completely the need for the thought experiences and thus the need of the yes doctor hypothesis. I have to write more paper on Church thesis, or at least consecrate more lines of explanations on that. (Despite people like Emil Post or Judson Webb seems to me to have already well understood this quite well, ref in my thesis). -- --- - A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --- - http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Pedagogy question (was: out-of-line)
On Jul 25, 3:15 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Now, even if you were enough clear so that I could find a
discrepancy between your talk and the machine's one, it would not
necessarily mean you are wrong: it could mean you are not a lobian
machine or entity. My point is just that the comp hyp leads to
assertions about the physical world which are enough precise to make
the comp hyp refutable.
I realise that I'm not clear about exactly what you mean by saying
that I might not be a lobian machine or entity. Do you mean this to
apply to me alone, or that the discrepancy might indicate that humans
in general might not in fact be lobian? Would my being 'right' in a
'non-lobian' way amount to a proof that my reasoning could not be
computationally based? What are the principal assertions of comp that
would be refutable in this regard, and how precisely?
Sometimes two different persons discussing in the list seems to have
different ideas where I can see that they are both correct, but just
doesn't not look at things from the same angle or perspective. All this
is obviously related with the very intrinsical difficulty of the
subject itself.
Difficult indeed. It would be very helpful if we could all find a
shared method to make the perspectives commensurable. I suspect for
you this would be comp.
Have you understand that the UDA literally gives no choice about what
has to be taken as primitive element for any TOE once we assume the
comp hyp?
I think so, although my personal expressions of the intuition have
been different. For example I was thinking recently of arguments of
the sort that seek to refute computationalism as a theory of
consciousness by contrasting, say, a (however 'complete')
computational model of digestion with a 'real' stomach digesting
'real' food. No one could mistake one for the other, runs the
argument. This seems true. But it occurred to me that it wouldn't
necessarily be a mistake if 'real' stomachs and 'real' food were
'computational' too. IOW, if computation is to be the basis for
'reality', it must be 'computations all the way down'. ISTM that the
UDA demonstrates rigorously the consequences of assuming otherwise,
and hence is a reductio of 'materialistic computationalism'.
Concerning the math, do you know the book by Torkel Franzen on the uses
and misuses of Godel theorems? Despite some big mistake I will talk
about, it is a quite excellent book which I would recommend the
reading.
I don't know it, and having perused the Davis book, I suspect it may
be beyond me without a lot of steering in the right direction.
Do you have a (passive) knowledge of first order logic? Do you
see that (with x, y ... belonging to the natural numbers).
(x div y) - Ez(x * z = y)
prime(x) - (~(x = 1) Ay((y div x) - (y = 1 V y = x)))
I have a wiki-aided ('just-in-time') understanding, from which I can
appreciate the validity of these propositions.
Do you have an idea how Godel manages to define in a similar way the
provability predicate in the arithmetical language (= first order
logical language + the symbols =, 0, +, *, s).
It would really help to have the precise steps pointed out.
Perhaps you could think of making
some short summary of your points. Your last posts, imo, were a bit
fuzzy by over-determination, I said even close to the 1004 fallacy ...
I'll try - it may not be until I return from Scotland where I will be
all of next week.
What could go possibly wrong in your approach, with respect of comp
(and/or the lobian interview) is that sometimes I understand that you
want that your most primitive element belongs to the first person
realm. My problem here is that this is consistent with the comp hyp,
but this consistency is irrelevant as far as we are trying to make a
communicable and refutable theory.
I think that Plotinus' theology has been helpful for me here in
distinguishing the 'primitive' as the 'solipsism of the One' rather
than the 'first person'. The point here is that there is an
ineliminable identification of the individual self with the One, in
the sense of a part being identified with, and deriving its primitive
characteristics from, the whole of which it is an aspect. However,
although the One is (0) 'personal', it is not 'a person': only the
'parts' are.
This one has to have communicable
(or at lest axiomatizable) third person primitive element. The lobian
soul (alias first person or third hypostase) disagrees somehow with
this, but that lobian soul is not completely willing to make science at
the start!
Since communicability and refutability must indeed occur exclusively
in terms of the third person, this places severe limits on what can be
'relevant' in this sense.The disagreement, I think, comes from the
'soul's' intuition that no amount of such third person discourse seems
to yield an explanation of first person experience as such - only a
possible justification of the belief in it. Is it
Re: Pedagogy question (was: out-of-line)
I assume you mean you are interested in doing a translation. I'm happy to assist, within limitations of doing my normal work. It would give me the motivation to read the Brussels thesis. Incidently, one of my jobs is translating fractured English into proper idiomatic English, for which I get paid AUD 31.50 per 1000 words (about EUR 20 at today's rates). I'm not asking to be paid, but obviously something that I do as a labour of love will take longer than a paying proposition. What it does illustrate is that I would first use Google translation to get the fractured English, then work on converting the to something more readable. Once translated, we can use the company Lulu.com to publish it as a printed copy available through Amazon.com and other online booksellers. Lulu don't charge any upfront fees, and still come out with a list price similar to my book, although yours would command a higher price as it has more pages. Cheers On Wed, Jul 25, 2007 at 04:15:54PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Actually, after the computability meeting in Siena, I have change my mind about Russell Standish idea that Conscience et Mecanisme should be translated in English. It is not at all outdated indeed, and contains more than 400 pages just on the Church thesis impact. Comp is mainly Church thesis (more so when you get the idea that the lobian interview eliminates almost completely the need for the thought experiences and thus the need of the yes doctor hypothesis. I have to write more paper on Church thesis, or at least consecrate more lines of explanations on that. (Despite people like Emil Post or Judson Webb seems to me to have already well understood this quite well, ref in my thesis). -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
