Re: Planck Length

2019-02-14 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, February 13, 2019 at 10:17:57 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 Feb 2019, at 10:22, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, February 8, 2019 at 5:53:01 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 4 Feb 2019, at 19:09, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>> As I have said, I am language-oriented. What this means is that I say 
>> that science (from that perspective) is a collection of domain-specific 
>> languages - general relativity, particle physics, chemistry, microbiology, 
>> cellular biology, neurobiology, psychology, sociology,  ,… 
>>
>>
>> They all use English. The theories differ but sometimes can be related, 
>> like chemistry is in principle reducible to quantum mechanics, with 
>> electron playing a preponderant role. Yet, high level chemistry will 
>> develop higher level tools not always easily reducible to quantum physics. 
>> For the mind body problem, with mechanism, we have the choice of choosing 
>> any language, and any Turing complete theory. The machine theology (G*), 
>> which should include physics, is theory independent. The physical reality 
>> is phi_i independent.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> There is English. But there is also also a collection of mathematical 
> language "dialects", like "Lagrangian":
>
> *This Is What The Standard Model of Physics Actually Looks Like*
>
> https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like
>
> "The Lagrangian is a fancy way of writing an equation to determine the 
> state of a changing system and explain the maximum possible energy the 
> system can maintain ... Despite appearances, the Lagrangian is one of the 
> easiest and most compact ways of presenting the theory.”
>
>
> That is technical language. It is just natural language with some 
> technical terms added to it. Yes, a Lagrangian contains a lot of 
> information, but it is open if the setting is classical or quantum, which 
> changes a lot the interpretation problem.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Suppose there is a conference *Languages for the Mind-Body Problem*, 
> including
>
> G*
> EMPL⁺ 
>
>
>
> G* is a theory, not a language. G* is the same whatever classical 
> ontological (Turing-complete) theory you take. (Even if you add infinity 
> axioms, or super-Turing elements).
>
>
>
>
> The irony to me is that there are people talking about those languages 
> which could refer to themselves at a conference presenting those languages.
>
> ⁺ *Experiential Modalities Programing Language* 
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
>
>
> With mechanism, experiential modalities are given by the variant of 
> provability using “ & p” in the definition, like []p & p, or []p & <>t & p. 
> That “& p” makes them qualitative and undefinable by the machine concerned, 
> but a rich consistent machine can study the complete theology (at the 
> propositional level) of a simpler machine that she knows/believes to be 
> sound (or just consistent).
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> - however one wants to carve them up (they are all human inventions 
>> anyway). 
>>
>>
>>
>> “Brain” is an invention of the human, but the brain itself is more an 
>> invention of nature. With mechanism, eventually nature is a result of 
>> “consciousness selection or projection”. A result of sharable first person 
>> indterminacies, from all “relative computational states existing in the 
>> sigma_1 arithmetic"
>>
>>
>>
>> The terms 'reduction', 'emergence' are really about how expressions (aka 
>> theories) in one domain language relate to (can compile to, translate to, 
>> can be defined in terms of) another domain language, rather than some 
>> teleological, causal relation.
>>
>>
>> Non problem with this. But the representation have to be faithful, and 
>> proved to be so when used. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> But languages have semantics, including the "what" they are about.
>>
>>
>> Yes. Languages and theories have semantics. That is what mathematical 
>> logic is all about. Proof theory, Model theory, and the relation between 
>> proofs and model, where a model is usually a mathematical structure 
>> verifying the statements of the theory.
>>
>>
>>
>>
> Even though the terms "model", "interpretation", "domain of discourse" 
> etc. are used  in mathematical logic [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/True_arithmetic : "The *domain of discourse* 
> is the set N  of natural numbers..This structure is known as the standard 
> *model* or intended *interpretation* of first-order arithmetic."], I've 
> thought more recently of using *substrate *instead.
>
>
>
> Hmm… that would augment the probability of doing a mistake already done by 
> early pythagoreans: to believe that arithmeticalism (only numbers) entails 
> that there are things made of numbers. But Mechanism is more idealistic; 
> the only “non-number-theoretical things” are only dreamed by numbers, 
> through the computations mimicking them correctly in arithmetic (which 
> exist by the digital mechanist assumption).

Re: Planck Length

2019-02-13 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 9 Feb 2019, at 10:22, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, February 8, 2019 at 5:53:01 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 4 Feb 2019, at 19:09, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> As I have said, I am language-oriented. What this means is that I say that 
>> science (from that perspective) is a collection of domain-specific languages 
>> - general relativity, particle physics, chemistry, microbiology, cellular 
>> biology, neurobiology, psychology, sociology,  ,…
> 
> They all use English. The theories differ but sometimes can be related, like 
> chemistry is in principle reducible to quantum mechanics, with electron 
> playing a preponderant role. Yet, high level chemistry will develop higher 
> level tools not always easily reducible to quantum physics. 
> For the mind body problem, with mechanism, we have the choice of choosing any 
> language, and any Turing complete theory. The machine theology (G*), which 
> should include physics, is theory independent. The physical reality is phi_i 
> independent.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> There is English. But there is also also a collection of mathematical 
> language "dialects", like "Lagrangian":
> 
> This Is What The Standard Model of Physics Actually Looks Like
> https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like
> 
> "The Lagrangian is a fancy way of writing an equation to determine the state 
> of a changing system and explain the maximum possible energy the system can 
> maintain ... Despite appearances, the Lagrangian is one of the easiest and 
> most compact ways of presenting the theory.”

That is technical language. It is just natural language with some technical 
terms added to it. Yes, a Lagrangian contains a lot of information, but it is 
open if the setting is classical or quantum, which changes a lot the 
interpretation problem.





> 
> 
> 
> Suppose there is a conference Languages for the Mind-Body Problem, including
> 
> G*
> EMPL⁺ 


G* is a theory, not a language. G* is the same whatever classical ontological 
(Turing-complete) theory you take. (Even if you add infinity axioms, or 
super-Turing elements).



> 
> The irony to me is that there are people talking about those languages which 
> could refer to themselves at a conference presenting those languages.
> 
> ⁺ Experiential Modalities Programing Language 
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/

With mechanism, experiential modalities are given by the variant of provability 
using “ & p” in the definition, like []p & p, or []p & <>t & p. That “& p” 
makes them qualitative and undefinable by the machine concerned, but a rich 
consistent machine can study the complete theology (at the propositional level) 
of a simpler machine that she knows/believes to be sound (or just consistent).




> 
>  
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> - however one wants to carve them up (they are all human inventions anyway).
> 
> 
> “Brain” is an invention of the human, but the brain itself is more an 
> invention of nature. With mechanism, eventually nature is a result of 
> “consciousness selection or projection”. A result of sharable first person 
> indterminacies, from all “relative computational states existing in the 
> sigma_1 arithmetic"
> 
> 
> 
>> The terms 'reduction', 'emergence' are really about how expressions (aka 
>> theories) in one domain language relate to (can compile to, translate to, 
>> can be defined in terms of) another domain language, rather than some 
>> teleological, causal relation.
> 
> Non problem with this. But the representation have to be faithful, and proved 
> to be so when used. 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> But languages have semantics, including the "what" they are about.
> 
> Yes. Languages and theories have semantics. That is what mathematical logic 
> is all about. Proof theory, Model theory, and the relation between proofs and 
> model, where a model is usually a mathematical structure verifying the 
> statements of the theory.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Even though the terms "model", "interpretation", "domain of discourse" etc. 
> are used  in mathematical logic [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/True_arithmetic : "The domain of discourse is 
> the set N  of natural numbers..This structure is known as the standard model 
> or intended interpretation of first-order arithmetic."], I've thought more 
> recently of using substrate instead.


Hmm… that would augment the probability of doing a mistake already done by 
early pythagoreans: to believe that arithmeticalism (only numbers) entails that 
there are things made of numbers. But Mechanism is more idealistic; the only 
“non-number-theoretical things” are only dreamed by numbers, through the 
computations mimicking them correctly in arithmetic (which exist by the digital 
mechanist assumption).


> 
>  
> 
> 
>> In the case of an experience processing language, there would be some 
>> fundamental "atoms" or "units" of experientiality, like  ψbits.
> 
> 
> Experience is usually 

Re: Planck Length

2019-02-09 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, February 8, 2019 at 5:53:01 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 4 Feb 2019, at 19:09, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> As I have said, I am language-oriented. What this means is that I say that 
> science (from that perspective) is a collection of domain-specific 
> languages - general relativity, particle physics, chemistry, microbiology, 
> cellular biology, neurobiology, psychology, sociology,  ,… 
>
>
> They all use English. The theories differ but sometimes can be related, 
> like chemistry is in principle reducible to quantum mechanics, with 
> electron playing a preponderant role. Yet, high level chemistry will 
> develop higher level tools not always easily reducible to quantum physics. 
> For the mind body problem, with mechanism, we have the choice of choosing 
> any language, and any Turing complete theory. The machine theology (G*), 
> which should include physics, is theory independent. The physical reality 
> is phi_i independent.
>
>
>
>

There is English. But there is also also a collection of mathematical 
language "dialects", like "Lagrangian":

*This Is What The Standard Model of Physics Actually Looks Like*
https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like

"The Lagrangian is a fancy way of writing an equation to determine the 
state of a changing system and explain the maximum possible energy the 
system can maintain ... Despite appearances, the Lagrangian is one of the 
easiest and most compact ways of presenting the theory."



Suppose there is a conference *Languages for the Mind-Body Problem*, 
including

G*
EMPL⁺ 

The irony to me is that there are people talking about those languages 
which could refer to themselves at a conference presenting those languages.

⁺ *Experiential Modalities Programing Language* 
https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/

 

>
>
>
>
> - however one wants to carve them up (they are all human inventions 
> anyway). 
>
>
>
> “Brain” is an invention of the human, but the brain itself is more an 
> invention of nature. With mechanism, eventually nature is a result of 
> “consciousness selection or projection”. A result of sharable first person 
> indterminacies, from all “relative computational states existing in the 
> sigma_1 arithmetic"
>
>
>
> The terms 'reduction', 'emergence' are really about how expressions (aka 
> theories) in one domain language relate to (can compile to, translate to, 
> can be defined in terms of) another domain language, rather than some 
> teleological, causal relation.
>
>
> Non problem with this. But the representation have to be faithful, and 
> proved to be so when used. 
>
>
>
>
> But languages have semantics, including the "what" they are about.
>
>
> Yes. Languages and theories have semantics. That is what mathematical 
> logic is all about. Proof theory, Model theory, and the relation between 
> proofs and model, where a model is usually a mathematical structure 
> verifying the statements of the theory.
>
>
>
>
Even though the terms "model", "interpretation", "domain of discourse" etc. 
are used  in mathematical logic [ 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/True_arithmetic : "The *domain of discourse* 
is the set N  of natural numbers..This structure is known as the standard 
*model* or intended *interpretation* of first-order arithmetic."], I've 
thought more recently of using *substrate *instead.

 

>
>
> In the case of an experience processing language, there would be some 
> fundamental "atoms" or "units" of experientiality, like  ψbits.
>
>
>
> Experience is usually private and non provable. But when machine’s 
> introspect themselves they got reason to believe in such true, from their 
> perspective, statement which are non provable.
>
> A unit of experience does not make sense to me, to be honest. Subjective 
> experience does not admit third person description at all, although they do 
> admit meta-pointers to them, thanks our Mechanist admission of the 
> invariance of consciousness for some digital transformation.
>
> Consciousness is not material. It indexical, relational, and the attribute 
> of some higher order “hero” or person. Person are conscious, not things. I 
> tend to believe that bacteria are already conscious, but that consciousness 
> is not much more differentiate than the universal consciousness of its 
> environment. It is an altered state of consciousness, quite unlike the 
> usual mundane one, which refers to long and complex path. With mechanism 
> there might be reason to expect us being very rare in the physical reality.
>
> Consciousness is primitively the knowledge of our existence, but it is not 
> definable, nor provable, yet indubitable. All (Löbian) universal machine 
> already knows that. Consciousness is not really just consistency, but it is 
> the semantic, or truth, of that consistency. The hero get that something is 
> happening.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
On the "units of experience", that's the concern of 

Re: Planck Length

2019-02-08 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 4 Feb 2019, at 19:09, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, February 4, 2019 at 10:06:45 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 1 Feb 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 9:41:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 1 Feb 2019, at 14:52, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 7:19:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 31 Jan 2019, at 15:40, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 6:28:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 30 Jan 2019, at 23:14, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:45:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> As I try to solve the mind-body problem in the Mechanist frame, I cannot 
>> use any ontological commitment other than the term of some arbitrary but 
>> fixed universal system. 
>> 
>> You assume some God, but that makes everything more complex, without 
>> evidences why to do so, except naive physical realism, but that does not 
>> work with Mechanism.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> There is no mind|body problem.
>> Only a language|body problem.
> 
> 
> With mechanism, we can identify body, words, numbers, and it is a pure 
> third person notion, but mind has a first person part (indeed called the 
> soul or the personal consciousness) which is pure 1p. The mind body 
> problem consists in linking, without magic or ontological commitment 
> those two things. The solution suggested by Theaetetus in Plato, has been 
> refuted by Socrates (in Plato) but incompleteness refutes Socrates 
> argument, and rehabilitates Theatetus’idea (the soul or the first person 
> knower is the true-believer).
> You can compare this with the semantic problem for language/body. To 
> associate a semantic to a program or machine is related to the problem of 
> associating a mind or a meaning to a body or to a code. The problem is 
> virtually the same: once a theory/body is “rich enough”, its semantics 
> escapes it and get multiple. Rich theories have many non isomorphic 
> models/semantics, a bit like any computational state is supported by 
> infinitely many computational situation, and some indeterminacy has to be 
> taken into account.
> 
> Bruno
> 
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/ 
>> 
>> 
>> - pt
> 
> 
> 
> Epicurus was born about the time Plato died. His "atomism" had atoms for 
> consciousness (mind) that were mixed with the bodily atoms. Modern 
> science rejected that concept, until the recent revival of (material) 
> panpsychism has a updated version of it.
 
 
 Unfortunately this does not explain neither what the atoms and where they 
 comes from, nor what is consciousness and where it comes from. Mechanism 
 explains this entirely, up to the testability of all its consequences, 
 which, like every where in fundamental science, needs a perpetual doubt 
 and constant verification and re-verification. 
 
 If the theory S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* violate nature, then we will have some 
 evidence for no-mechanism, and thus for primitive matter. But assuming 
 primitive matter a priori seems like wanting to not understand the 
 problem, or hiding it under ontological commitment, like materialists do 
 since 1500 years, if not right since Aristotle.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 
 On "where do atoms come from" I guess any physicist  you meet today has as 
 good (or bad) an answer as any, in their way of thinking, anyway.
>>> 
>>> They usually assume a primary physical reality. They make the physical 
>>> universe into a (non personal god). But that explains nothing, even if very 
>>> interesting in physics. Physicists are just NOT meta physicists, except 
>>> very bad one the week-end or after retirement.
>>> 
>>> An explanation of X must not assume X, or, if it does, the recursion 
>>> employed must be entirely justified too.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 On consciousness: 
 
 In a micropsychist* approach, the lowest-level psychical properties could 
 appear in the form of their own material subatomic entities, like quarks — 
  quirks? :) —  in current physical theories. Thus human-level 
 consciousness is "constituted" from lower-level material entities 
 possessing lower-level psychical features.
>>> 
>>> I don’t see an atom of explanation of consciousness here. That seems just 
>>> like a more sophisticated way to hide the problem under the rug of 
>>> microphysics, without addressing any of the question raised by the 
>>> philosopher of mind or the cognitive scientist. If you dig in that 
>>> direction, both matter 

Re: Planck Length

2019-02-04 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, February 4, 2019 at 10:06:45 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 1 Feb 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 9:41:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 1 Feb 2019, at 14:52, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 7:19:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 31 Jan 2019, at 15:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 6:28:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 30 Jan 2019, at 23:14, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:45:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>> As I try to solve the mind-body problem in the Mechanist frame, I 
>> cannot use any ontological commitment other than the term of some 
>> arbitrary 
>> but fixed universal system. 
>>
>> You assume some God, but that makes everything more complex, without 
>> evidences why to do so, except naive physical realism, but that does not 
>> work with Mechanism.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> There is no mind|body problem.
> Only a language|body problem.
>
>
>
> With mechanism, we can identify body, words, numbers, and it is a pure 
> third person notion, but mind has a first person part (indeed called the 
> soul or the personal consciousness) which is pure 1p. The mind body 
> problem 
> consists in linking, without magic or ontological commitment those two 
> things. The solution suggested by Theaetetus in Plato, has been refuted 
> by 
> Socrates (in Plato) but incompleteness refutes Socrates argument, and 
> rehabilitates Theatetus’idea (the soul or the first person knower is the 
> true-believer).
> You can compare this with the semantic problem for language/body. To 
> associate a semantic to a program or machine is related to the problem of 
> associating a mind or a meaning to a body or to a code. The problem is 
> virtually the same: once a theory/body is “rich enough”, its semantics 
> escapes it and get multiple. Rich theories have many non isomorphic 
> models/semantics, a bit like any computational state is supported by 
> infinitely many computational situation, and some indeterminacy has to be 
> taken into account.
>
> Bruno
>

 https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/
>
> - pt
>
>

 Epicurus was born about the time Plato died. His "atomism" had atoms 
 for consciousness (mind) that were mixed with the bodily atoms. Modern 
 science rejected that concept, until the recent revival of (material) 
 panpsychism has a updated version of it.



 Unfortunately this does not explain neither what the atoms and where 
 they comes from, nor what is consciousness and where it comes from. 
 Mechanism explains this entirely, up to the testability of all its 
 consequences, which, like every where in fundamental science, needs a 
 perpetual doubt and constant verification and re-verification. 

 If the theory S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* violate nature, then we will have some 
 evidence for no-mechanism, and thus for primitive matter. But assuming 
 primitive matter a priori seems like wanting to not understand the 
 problem, 
 or hiding it under ontological commitment, like materialists do since 1500 
 years, if not right since Aristotle.

 Bruno




>>> On "where do atoms come from" I guess *any physicist*  you meet today 
>>> has as good (or bad) an answer as any, in their way of thinking, anyway.
>>>
>>>
>>> They usually assume a primary physical reality. They make the physical 
>>> universe into a (non personal god). But that explains nothing, even if very 
>>> interesting in physics. Physicists are just NOT meta physicists, except 
>>> very bad one the week-end or after retirement.
>>>
>>> An explanation of X must not assume X, or, if it does, the recursion 
>>> employed must be entirely justified too.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On consciousness: 
>>>
>>> In a micropsychist* approach, the lowest-level psychical properties 
>>> could appear in the form of their own material subatomic entities, like 
>>> quarks —  quirks? :) —  in current physical theories. Thus human-level 
>>> consciousness is "constituted" from lower-level material entities 
>>> possessing lower-level psychical features.
>>>
>>>
>>> I don’t see an atom of explanation of consciousness here. That seems 
>>> just like a more sophisticated way to hide the problem under the rug of 
>>> microphysics, without addressing any of the question raised by the 
>>> philosopher of mind or the cognitive scientist. If you dig in that 
>>> direction, both matter and consciousness becomes only more obscure. 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *According to constitutive micropsychism, the smallest parts of my brain 
>>> have 

Re: Planck Length

2019-02-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 1 Feb 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 9:41:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 1 Feb 2019, at 14:52, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 7:19:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 31 Jan 2019, at 15:40, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 6:28:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 30 Jan 2019, at 23:14, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:45:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> As I try to solve the mind-body problem in the Mechanist frame, I cannot 
> use any ontological commitment other than the term of some arbitrary but 
> fixed universal system. 
> 
> You assume some God, but that makes everything more complex, without 
> evidences why to do so, except naive physical realism, but that does not 
> work with Mechanism.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> There is no mind|body problem.
> Only a language|body problem.
 
 
 With mechanism, we can identify body, words, numbers, and it is a pure 
 third person notion, but mind has a first person part (indeed called the 
 soul or the personal consciousness) which is pure 1p. The mind body 
 problem consists in linking, without magic or ontological commitment those 
 two things. The solution suggested by Theaetetus in Plato, has been 
 refuted by Socrates (in Plato) but incompleteness refutes Socrates 
 argument, and rehabilitates Theatetus’idea (the soul or the first person 
 knower is the true-believer).
 You can compare this with the semantic problem for language/body. To 
 associate a semantic to a program or machine is related to the problem of 
 associating a mind or a meaning to a body or to a code. The problem is 
 virtually the same: once a theory/body is “rich enough”, its semantics 
 escapes it and get multiple. Rich theories have many non isomorphic 
 models/semantics, a bit like any computational state is supported by 
 infinitely many computational situation, and some indeterminacy has to be 
 taken into account.
 
 Bruno
 
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/ 
> 
> 
> - pt
 
 
 
 Epicurus was born about the time Plato died. His "atomism" had atoms for 
 consciousness (mind) that were mixed with the bodily atoms. Modern science 
 rejected that concept, until the recent revival of (material) panpsychism 
 has a updated version of it.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Unfortunately this does not explain neither what the atoms and where they 
>>> comes from, nor what is consciousness and where it comes from. Mechanism 
>>> explains this entirely, up to the testability of all its consequences, 
>>> which, like every where in fundamental science, needs a perpetual doubt and 
>>> constant verification and re-verification. 
>>> 
>>> If the theory S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* violate nature, then we will have some 
>>> evidence for no-mechanism, and thus for primitive matter. But assuming 
>>> primitive matter a priori seems like wanting to not understand the problem, 
>>> or hiding it under ontological commitment, like materialists do since 1500 
>>> years, if not right since Aristotle.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On "where do atoms come from" I guess any physicist  you meet today has as 
>>> good (or bad) an answer as any, in their way of thinking, anyway.
>> 
>> They usually assume a primary physical reality. They make the physical 
>> universe into a (non personal god). But that explains nothing, even if very 
>> interesting in physics. Physicists are just NOT meta physicists, except very 
>> bad one the week-end or after retirement.
>> 
>> An explanation of X must not assume X, or, if it does, the recursion 
>> employed must be entirely justified too.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> On consciousness: 
>>> 
>>> In a micropsychist* approach, the lowest-level psychical properties could 
>>> appear in the form of their own material subatomic entities, like quarks —  
>>> quirks? :) —  in current physical theories. Thus human-level consciousness 
>>> is "constituted" from lower-level material entities possessing lower-level 
>>> psychical features.
>> 
>> I don’t see an atom of explanation of consciousness here. That seems just 
>> like a more sophisticated way to hide the problem under the rug of 
>> microphysics, without addressing any of the question raised by the 
>> philosopher of mind or the cognitive scientist. If you dig in that 
>> direction, both matter and consciousness becomes only more obscure. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> According to constitutive micropsychism, the smallest parts of my brain 
>>> have very basic forms of consciousness, and the consciousness of my brain 
>>> as a whole is in some 

Re: Planck Length

2019-02-02 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, February 2, 2019 at 2:56:45 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/2/2019 11:04 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
> > 
> > "Experiential atoms" are sort of " just words" - like "atoms" was just 
> > a word to the Atomists of ancient Greece. And then a lot of people 
> > ignored them. Hopefully things will go better in this round of history. 
> > 
> > - pt 
>
> Democritus didn't just define atoms as "the uncuttable".  He built a 
> theory on it.  Atoms had hook-and-loop interactions that explained the 
> coherence and interaction of bodies.  They flowed downward explaining 
> gravity.  They swerved explaining interactions.  I don't see any 
> explantory or predictive power in experiential atoms.  It's easy to see 
> how anesthetics may work by blocking ion channels in neurons.  No 
> experiential atoms need be considered. 
>
> Brent 
>



It is Epicurus that wrote of psychical (in addition to physical) atoms:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epicurus/#PsycEthi

- pt
 

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Re: Planck Length

2019-02-02 Thread Brent Meeker




On 2/2/2019 11:04 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:


"Experiential atoms" are sort of " just words" - like "atoms" was just 
a word to the Atomists of ancient Greece. And then a lot of people 
ignored them. Hopefully things will go better in this round of history.


- pt


Democritus didn't just define atoms as "the uncuttable".  He built a 
theory on it.  Atoms had hook-and-loop interactions that explained the 
coherence and interaction of bodies.  They flowed downward explaining 
gravity.  They swerved explaining interactions.  I don't see any 
explantory or predictive power in experiential atoms.  It's easy to see 
how anesthetics may work by blocking ion channels in neurons.  No 
experiential atoms need be considered.


Brent

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Re: Planck Length

2019-02-02 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, February 2, 2019 at 12:48:00 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/1/2019 10:58 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 1:54:15 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2/1/2019 5:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>> In any case, one of the "micropsychists"  has a new paper just out:
>>
>>
>> "According to the *fusion* view ... when micro- or protoconscious 
>> entities come together in the right way, they fuse or 'blend' together to 
>> form a single unified consciousness. ..."
>>
>> *Is Consciousness Intrinsic? A Problem for the Integrated Information 
>> Theory*
>> Hedda Hassel Mørch
>> Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):133-162(30) (2019)
>>
>> https://philpapers.org/rec/MRCICI
>> https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCICI.pdf
>>
>> *Abstract*
>> The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT) claims that 
>> consciousness is identical to maximal integrated information, or maximal Φ. 
>> One objection to IIT is based on what may be called the intrinsicality 
>> problem: consciousness is an intrinsic property, but maximal Φ is an 
>> extrinsic property; therefore, they cannot be identical. 
>>
>>
>> A more cogent objection is that it attributes lots of consciousness to a 
>> Vandermonde matrix:
>>
>> https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>
> Scott Aaronson wrote this about 5 years ago. I haven't looked if he has 
> has anything new.
>
> Regarding informationism vs. panpsychism, he only addresses the former.
>
> *I’ve just conjured into my imagination beings whose Φ-values are a 
> thousand, nay a trillion times larger than humans’, yet who are also 
> philosophical zombies: entities that there’s nothing that it’s like to be.*
>   
>
> That of course panpsychists agree with.
>
> He procedes:
>
> *Let S=F_p, where p is some prime sufficiently larger than n, and let V be 
> an n×n Vandermonde matrix over F_p—that is, a matrix whose (i,j) entry 
> equals i^(j-1) (mod p).  Then let f:S^n→S^n be the update function defined 
> by f(x)=Vx. *
>
> Concludes: *the fact that Integrated Information Theory is 
> wrong—demonstrably wrong, for reasons that go to its core—puts it in 
> something like the top 2% of all mathematical theories of consciousness 
> ever proposed.*
>
>
> Now here is where panpsychists diverge from this way of thinking: 
> Everything Scott wrote above involves ultimately computing with numerical 
> entities as the "atoms" (so to speak) of what the "computer" is computing 
> with. What the panpsychists are saying is that it is not numerical entities 
> (numericals: Ns) at all that are at the base of the computing, but 
> experiential entities (experientials: Es). *Es are as basic 
> (ontologically) as Ns*.
>
> *Defining what Es are* is the fundamental problem for panpsychists (vs. 
> numerists, or informationists).
>
>
> Yes, Scott's analysis assumes that consciousness is characterized by some 
> kind of computation...as does Tononi. 
>




So do I. It's called *experience processing* (vs. information processing). 

https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/


 

> But he observes that whatever your theory of consciousness is it needs to 
> at least roughly agree as to who and what is conscious.  A theory that says 
> a large Vandermonde matrix is conscious fails that test.
>
> But to introduce experiential atoms is just words.  It doesn't explain 
> anything.  Where do your experiential atoms go when you are unconscious?  
> when you die?  How do they interact with non-experiential atoms?  Are 
> experiential atoms necessary for intelligence?
>
> Brent
>


All good questions.

"Experiential atoms" are sort of " just words" - like "atoms" was just a 
word to the Atomists of ancient Greece. And then a lot of people ignored 
them. Hopefully things will go better in this round of history.

- pt


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Re: Planck Length

2019-02-02 Thread Brent Meeker



On 2/1/2019 10:58 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 1:54:15 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 2/1/2019 5:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:

In any case, one of the "micropsychists"  has a new paper just out:


"According to the *fusion* view ... when micro- or protoconscious
entities come together in the right way, they fuse or 'blend'
together to form a single unified consciousness. ..."

*Is Consciousness Intrinsic? A Problem for the Integrated
Information Theory*
Hedda Hassel Mørch
Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):133-162(30) (2019)

https://philpapers.org/rec/MRCICI 
https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCICI.pdf


/Abstract/
The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT) claims
that consciousness is identical to maximal integrated
information, or maximal Φ. One objection to IIT is based on what
may be called the intrinsicality problem: consciousness is an
intrinsic property, but maximal Φ is an extrinsic property;
therefore, they cannot be identical.


A more cogent objection is that it attributes lots of
consciousness to a Vandermonde matrix:

https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799


Brent




Scott Aaronson wrote this about 5 years ago. I haven't looked if he 
has has anything new.


Regarding informationism vs. panpsychism, he only addresses the former.

/I’ve just conjured into my imagination beings whose Φ-values are a 
thousand, nay a trillion times larger than humans’, yet who are also 
philosophical zombies: entities that there’s nothing that it’s like to 
be./


That of course panpsychists agree with.

He procedes:

/Let S=F_p, where p is some prime sufficiently larger than n, and let 
V be an n×n Vandermonde matrix over F_p—that is, a matrix whose (i,j) 
entry equals i^(j-1) (mod p).  Then let f:S^n→S^n be the update 
function defined by f(x)=Vx. /


Concludes: /the fact that Integrated Information Theory is 
wrong—demonstrably wrong, for reasons that go to its core—puts it in 
something like the top 2% of all mathematical theories of 
consciousness ever proposed./



Now here is where panpsychists diverge from this way of thinking: 
Everything Scott wrote above involves ultimately computing with 
numerical entities as the "atoms" (so to speak) of what the "computer" 
is computing with. What the panpsychists are saying is that it is not 
numerical entities (numericals: Ns) at all that are at the base of the 
computing, but experiential entities (experientials: Es). /Es are as 
basic (ontologically) as Ns/.


*Defining what Es are* is the fundamental problem for panpsychists 
(vs. numerists, or informationists).


Yes, Scott's analysis assumes that consciousness is characterized by 
some kind of computation...as does Tononi.  But he observes that 
whatever your theory of consciousness is it needs to at least roughly 
agree as to who and what is conscious.  A theory that says a large 
Vandermonde matrix is conscious fails that test.


But to introduce experiential atoms is just words.  It doesn't explain 
anything.  Where do your experiential atoms go when you are 
unconscious?  when you die?  How do they interact with non-experiential 
atoms?  Are experiential atoms necessary for intelligence?


Brent

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Re: Planck Length

2019-02-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, February 2, 2019 at 12:58:14 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 1:54:15 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2/1/2019 5:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>> In any case, one of the "micropsychists"  has a new paper just out:
>>
>>
>> "According to the *fusion* view ... when micro- or protoconscious 
>> entities come together in the right way, they fuse or 'blend' together to 
>> form a single unified consciousness. ..."
>>
>> *Is Consciousness Intrinsic? A Problem for the Integrated Information 
>> Theory*
>> Hedda Hassel Mørch
>> Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):133-162(30) (2019)
>>
>> https://philpapers.org/rec/MRCICI
>> https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCICI.pdf
>>
>> *Abstract*
>> The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT) claims that 
>> consciousness is identical to maximal integrated information, or maximal Φ. 
>> One objection to IIT is based on what may be called the intrinsicality 
>> problem: consciousness is an intrinsic property, but maximal Φ is an 
>> extrinsic property; therefore, they cannot be identical. 
>>
>>
>> A more cogent objection is that it attributes lots of consciousness to a 
>> Vandermonde matrix:
>>
>> https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>
> Scott Aaronson wrote this about 5 years ago. I haven't looked if he has 
> has anything new.
>
> Regarding informationism vs. panpsychism, he only addresses the former.
>
> *I’ve just conjured into my imagination beings whose Φ-values are a 
> thousand, nay a trillion times larger than humans’, yet who are also 
> philosophical zombies: entities that there’s nothing that it’s like to be.*
>   
>
> That of course panpsychists agree with.
>
> He procedes:
>
> *Let S=F_p, where p is some prime sufficiently larger than n, and let V be 
> an n×n Vandermonde matrix over F_p—that is, a matrix whose (i,j) entry 
> equals i^(j-1) (mod p).  Then let f:S^n→S^n be the update function defined 
> by f(x)=Vx. *
>
> Concludes: *the fact that Integrated Information Theory is 
> wrong—demonstrably wrong, for reasons that go to its core—puts it in 
> something like the top 2% of all mathematical theories of consciousness 
> ever proposed.*
>
>
> Now here is where panpsychists diverge from this way of thinking: 
> Everything Scott wrote above involves ultimately computing with numerical 
> entities as the "atoms" (so to speak) of what the "computer" is computing 
> with. What the panpsychists are saying is that it is not numerical entities 
> (numericals: Ns) at all that are at the base of the computing, but 
> experiential entities (experientials: Es). *Es are as basic 
> (ontologically) as Ns*.
>
> *Defining what Es are* is the fundamental problem for panpsychists (vs. 
> numerists, or informationists).
>
>
> - pt
>
>  
>


The commenters to Scott's post seem to try to get into this with 
ψ-properties vs. Φ-properties.

- pt

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Re: Planck Length

2019-02-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 1:54:15 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/1/2019 5:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
> In any case, one of the "micropsychists"  has a new paper just out:
>
>
> "According to the *fusion* view ... when micro- or protoconscious 
> entities come together in the right way, they fuse or 'blend' together to 
> form a single unified consciousness. ..."
>
> *Is Consciousness Intrinsic? A Problem for the Integrated Information 
> Theory*
> Hedda Hassel Mørch
> Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):133-162(30) (2019)
>
> https://philpapers.org/rec/MRCICI
> https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCICI.pdf
>
> *Abstract*
> The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT) claims that 
> consciousness is identical to maximal integrated information, or maximal Φ. 
> One objection to IIT is based on what may be called the intrinsicality 
> problem: consciousness is an intrinsic property, but maximal Φ is an 
> extrinsic property; therefore, they cannot be identical. 
>
>
> A more cogent objection is that it attributes lots of consciousness to a 
> Vandermonde matrix:
>
> https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799
>
> Brent
>
>
>

Scott Aaronson wrote this about 5 years ago. I haven't looked if he has has 
anything new.

Regarding informationism vs. panpsychism, he only addresses the former.

*I’ve just conjured into my imagination beings whose Φ-values are a 
thousand, nay a trillion times larger than humans’, yet who are also 
philosophical zombies: entities that there’s nothing that it’s like to be.*
  

That of course panpsychists agree with.

He procedes:

*Let S=F_p, where p is some prime sufficiently larger than n, and let V be 
an n×n Vandermonde matrix over F_p—that is, a matrix whose (i,j) entry 
equals i^(j-1) (mod p).  Then let f:S^n→S^n be the update function defined 
by f(x)=Vx. *

Concludes: *the fact that Integrated Information Theory is 
wrong—demonstrably wrong, for reasons that go to its core—puts it in 
something like the top 2% of all mathematical theories of consciousness 
ever proposed.*


Now here is where panpsychists diverge from this way of thinking: 
Everything Scott wrote above involves ultimately computing with numerical 
entities as the "atoms" (so to speak) of what the "computer" is computing 
with. What the panpsychists are saying is that it is not numerical entities 
(numericals: Ns) at all that are at the base of the computing, but 
experiential entities (experientials: Es). *Es are as basic (ontologically) 
as Ns*.

*Defining what Es are* is the fundamental problem for panpsychists (vs. 
numerists, or informationists).


- pt

 

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Re: Planck Length

2019-02-01 Thread Brent Meeker



On 2/1/2019 5:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:

In any case, one of the "micropsychists"  has a new paper just out:


"According to the *fusion* view ... when micro- or protoconscious 
entities come together in the right way, they fuse or 'blend' together 
to form a single unified consciousness. ..."


*Is Consciousness Intrinsic? A Problem for the Integrated Information 
Theory*

Hedda Hassel Mørch
Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):133-162(30) (2019)

https://philpapers.org/rec/MRCICI
https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCICI.pdf

/Abstract/
The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT) claims that 
consciousness is identical to maximal integrated information, or 
maximal Φ. One objection to IIT is based on what may be called the 
intrinsicality problem: consciousness is an intrinsic property, but 
maximal Φ is an extrinsic property; therefore, they cannot be identical.


A more cogent objection is that it attributes lots of consciousness to a 
Vandermonde matrix:


https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799

Brent


In this paper, I show that this problem is not unique to IIT, but 
rather derives from a trilemma that confronts almost any theory of 
consciousness. Given most theories of consciousness, the following 
three claims are inconsistent. INTRINSICALITY: Consciousness is 
intrinsic. NON-OVERLAP: Conscious systems do not overlap with other 
conscious systems (a la Unger’s problem of the many). REDUCTIONISM: 
Consciousness is constituted by more fundamental properties (as per 
standard versions of physicalism and Russellian monism). In view of 
this, I will consider whether rejecting INTRINSICALITY is necessarily 
less plausible than rejecting NON-OVERLAP or REDUCTIONISM. I will also 
consider whether IIT is necessarily committed to rejecting 
INTRINSICALITY or whether it could also accept solutions that reject 
NON-OVERLAP or REDUCTIONISM instead. I will suggest that the best 
option for IIT may be a solution that rejects REDUCTIONISM rather than 
INTRINSICALITY or NON-OVERLAP.



- pt


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Re: Planck Length

2019-02-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 9:41:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 1 Feb 2019, at 14:52, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 7:19:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 31 Jan 2019, at 15:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 6:28:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 30 Jan 2019, at 23:14, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:45:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


> As I try to solve the mind-body problem in the Mechanist frame, I 
> cannot use any ontological commitment other than the term of some 
> arbitrary 
> but fixed universal system. 
>
> You assume some God, but that makes everything more complex, without 
> evidences why to do so, except naive physical realism, but that does not 
> work with Mechanism.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
 There is no mind|body problem.
 Only a language|body problem.



 With mechanism, we can identify body, words, numbers, and it is a pure 
 third person notion, but mind has a first person part (indeed called the 
 soul or the personal consciousness) which is pure 1p. The mind body 
 problem 
 consists in linking, without magic or ontological commitment those two 
 things. The solution suggested by Theaetetus in Plato, has been refuted by 
 Socrates (in Plato) but incompleteness refutes Socrates argument, and 
 rehabilitates Theatetus’idea (the soul or the first person knower is the 
 true-believer).
 You can compare this with the semantic problem for language/body. To 
 associate a semantic to a program or machine is related to the problem of 
 associating a mind or a meaning to a body or to a code. The problem is 
 virtually the same: once a theory/body is “rich enough”, its semantics 
 escapes it and get multiple. Rich theories have many non isomorphic 
 models/semantics, a bit like any computational state is supported by 
 infinitely many computational situation, and some indeterminacy has to be 
 taken into account.

 Bruno

>>>
>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/

 - pt


>>>
>>> Epicurus was born about the time Plato died. His "atomism" had atoms for 
>>> consciousness (mind) that were mixed with the bodily atoms. Modern science 
>>> rejected that concept, until the recent revival of (material) panpsychism 
>>> has a updated version of it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Unfortunately this does not explain neither what the atoms and where 
>>> they comes from, nor what is consciousness and where it comes from. 
>>> Mechanism explains this entirely, up to the testability of all its 
>>> consequences, which, like every where in fundamental science, needs a 
>>> perpetual doubt and constant verification and re-verification. 
>>>
>>> If the theory S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* violate nature, then we will have some 
>>> evidence for no-mechanism, and thus for primitive matter. But assuming 
>>> primitive matter a priori seems like wanting to not understand the problem, 
>>> or hiding it under ontological commitment, like materialists do since 1500 
>>> years, if not right since Aristotle.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> On "where do atoms come from" I guess *any physicist*  you meet today 
>> has as good (or bad) an answer as any, in their way of thinking, anyway.
>>
>>
>> They usually assume a primary physical reality. They make the physical 
>> universe into a (non personal god). But that explains nothing, even if very 
>> interesting in physics. Physicists are just NOT meta physicists, except 
>> very bad one the week-end or after retirement.
>>
>> An explanation of X must not assume X, or, if it does, the recursion 
>> employed must be entirely justified too.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On consciousness: 
>>
>> In a micropsychist* approach, the lowest-level psychical properties could 
>> appear in the form of their own material subatomic entities, like quarks —  
>> quirks? :) —  in current physical theories. Thus human-level consciousness 
>> is "constituted" from lower-level material entities possessing lower-level 
>> psychical features.
>>
>>
>> I don’t see an atom of explanation of consciousness here. That seems just 
>> like a more sophisticated way to hide the problem under the rug of 
>> microphysics, without addressing any of the question raised by the 
>> philosopher of mind or the cognitive scientist. If you dig in that 
>> direction, both matter and consciousness becomes only more obscure. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *According to constitutive micropsychism, the smallest parts of my brain 
>> have very basic forms of consciousness, and the consciousness of my brain 
>> as a whole is in some sense made up from the consciousness of its parts. 
>> This is the form of panpsychism that suffers most acutely from the 
>> combination problem, which we will explore below. 

Re: Planck Length

2019-02-01 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 1 Feb 2019, at 14:52, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 7:19:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 31 Jan 2019, at 15:40, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 6:28:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 30 Jan 2019, at 23:14, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:45:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 As I try to solve the mind-body problem in the Mechanist frame, I cannot 
 use any ontological commitment other than the term of some arbitrary but 
 fixed universal system. 
 
 You assume some God, but that makes everything more complex, without 
 evidences why to do so, except naive physical realism, but that does not 
 work with Mechanism.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 
 There is no mind|body problem.
 Only a language|body problem.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> With mechanism, we can identify body, words, numbers, and it is a pure 
>>> third person notion, but mind has a first person part (indeed called the 
>>> soul or the personal consciousness) which is pure 1p. The mind body problem 
>>> consists in linking, without magic or ontological commitment those two 
>>> things. The solution suggested by Theaetetus in Plato, has been refuted by 
>>> Socrates (in Plato) but incompleteness refutes Socrates argument, and 
>>> rehabilitates Theatetus’idea (the soul or the first person knower is the 
>>> true-believer).
>>> You can compare this with the semantic problem for language/body. To 
>>> associate a semantic to a program or machine is related to the problem of 
>>> associating a mind or a meaning to a body or to a code. The problem is 
>>> virtually the same: once a theory/body is “rich enough”, its semantics 
>>> escapes it and get multiple. Rich theories have many non isomorphic 
>>> models/semantics, a bit like any computational state is supported by 
>>> infinitely many computational situation, and some indeterminacy has to be 
>>> taken into account.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
 https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/ 
 
 
 - pt
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Epicurus was born about the time Plato died. His "atomism" had atoms for 
>>> consciousness (mind) that were mixed with the bodily atoms. Modern science 
>>> rejected that concept, until the recent revival of (material) panpsychism 
>>> has a updated version of it.
>> 
>> 
>> Unfortunately this does not explain neither what the atoms and where they 
>> comes from, nor what is consciousness and where it comes from. Mechanism 
>> explains this entirely, up to the testability of all its consequences, 
>> which, like every where in fundamental science, needs a perpetual doubt and 
>> constant verification and re-verification. 
>> 
>> If the theory S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* violate nature, then we will have some 
>> evidence for no-mechanism, and thus for primitive matter. But assuming 
>> primitive matter a priori seems like wanting to not understand the problem, 
>> or hiding it under ontological commitment, like materialists do since 1500 
>> years, if not right since Aristotle.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On "where do atoms come from" I guess any physicist  you meet today has as 
>> good (or bad) an answer as any, in their way of thinking, anyway.
> 
> They usually assume a primary physical reality. They make the physical 
> universe into a (non personal god). But that explains nothing, even if very 
> interesting in physics. Physicists are just NOT meta physicists, except very 
> bad one the week-end or after retirement.
> 
> An explanation of X must not assume X, or, if it does, the recursion employed 
> must be entirely justified too.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> On consciousness: 
>> 
>> In a micropsychist* approach, the lowest-level psychical properties could 
>> appear in the form of their own material subatomic entities, like quarks —  
>> quirks? :) —  in current physical theories. Thus human-level consciousness 
>> is "constituted" from lower-level material entities possessing lower-level 
>> psychical features.
> 
> I don’t see an atom of explanation of consciousness here. That seems just 
> like a more sophisticated way to hide the problem under the rug of 
> microphysics, without addressing any of the question raised by the 
> philosopher of mind or the cognitive scientist. If you dig in that direction, 
> both matter and consciousness becomes only more obscure. 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> According to constitutive micropsychism, the smallest parts of my brain have 
>> very basic forms of consciousness, and the consciousness of my brain as a 
>> whole is in some sense made up from the consciousness of its parts. This is 
>> the form of panpsychism that suffers most acutely from the combination 
>> problem, which we will explore below. However, if it can be made sense of, 
>> constitutive micropsychism promises an 

Re: Planck Length

2019-02-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 7:19:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 31 Jan 2019, at 15:40, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 6:28:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 30 Jan 2019, at 23:14, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:45:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
 As I try to solve the mind-body problem in the Mechanist frame, I 
 cannot use any ontological commitment other than the term of some 
 arbitrary 
 but fixed universal system. 

 You assume some God, but that makes everything more complex, without 
 evidences why to do so, except naive physical realism, but that does not 
 work with Mechanism.

 Bruno




>>> There is no mind|body problem.
>>> Only a language|body problem.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> With mechanism, we can identify body, words, numbers, and it is a pure 
>>> third person notion, but mind has a first person part (indeed called the 
>>> soul or the personal consciousness) which is pure 1p. The mind body problem 
>>> consists in linking, without magic or ontological commitment those two 
>>> things. The solution suggested by Theaetetus in Plato, has been refuted by 
>>> Socrates (in Plato) but incompleteness refutes Socrates argument, and 
>>> rehabilitates Theatetus’idea (the soul or the first person knower is the 
>>> true-believer).
>>> You can compare this with the semantic problem for language/body. To 
>>> associate a semantic to a program or machine is related to the problem of 
>>> associating a mind or a meaning to a body or to a code. The problem is 
>>> virtually the same: once a theory/body is “rich enough”, its semantics 
>>> escapes it and get multiple. Rich theories have many non isomorphic 
>>> models/semantics, a bit like any computational state is supported by 
>>> infinitely many computational situation, and some indeterminacy has to be 
>>> taken into account.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Epicurus was born about the time Plato died. His "atomism" had atoms for 
>> consciousness (mind) that were mixed with the bodily atoms. Modern science 
>> rejected that concept, until the recent revival of (material) panpsychism 
>> has a updated version of it.
>>
>>
>>
>> Unfortunately this does not explain neither what the atoms and where they 
>> comes from, nor what is consciousness and where it comes from. Mechanism 
>> explains this entirely, up to the testability of all its consequences, 
>> which, like every where in fundamental science, needs a perpetual doubt and 
>> constant verification and re-verification. 
>>
>> If the theory S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* violate nature, then we will have some 
>> evidence for no-mechanism, and thus for primitive matter. But assuming 
>> primitive matter a priori seems like wanting to not understand the problem, 
>> or hiding it under ontological commitment, like materialists do since 1500 
>> years, if not right since Aristotle.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> On "where do atoms come from" I guess *any physicist*  you meet today has 
> as good (or bad) an answer as any, in their way of thinking, anyway.
>
>
> They usually assume a primary physical reality. They make the physical 
> universe into a (non personal god). But that explains nothing, even if very 
> interesting in physics. Physicists are just NOT meta physicists, except 
> very bad one the week-end or after retirement.
>
> An explanation of X must not assume X, or, if it does, the recursion 
> employed must be entirely justified too.
>
>
>
>
>
> On consciousness: 
>
> In a micropsychist* approach, the lowest-level psychical properties could 
> appear in the form of their own material subatomic entities, like quarks —  
> quirks? :) —  in current physical theories. Thus human-level consciousness 
> is "constituted" from lower-level material entities possessing lower-level 
> psychical features.
>
>
> I don’t see an atom of explanation of consciousness here. That seems just 
> like a more sophisticated way to hide the problem under the rug of 
> microphysics, without addressing any of the question raised by the 
> philosopher of mind or the cognitive scientist. If you dig in that 
> direction, both matter and consciousness becomes only more obscure. 
>
>
>
>
>
> *According to constitutive micropsychism, the smallest parts of my brain 
> have very basic forms of consciousness, and the consciousness of my brain 
> as a whole is in some sense made up from the consciousness of its parts. 
> This is the form of panpsychism that suffers most acutely from the 
> combination problem, which we will explore below. However, if it can be 
> made sense of, constitutive micropsychism promises an elegant and 
> parsimonious view of nature, with all the richness of nature accounted for 
> in terms of facts at the micro-level.*
>
>
> I am skeptical this can work, and of course, it is 

Re: Planck Length

2019-02-01 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 31 Jan 2019, at 15:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 6:28:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 30 Jan 2019, at 23:14, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:45:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>> As I try to solve the mind-body problem in the Mechanist frame, I cannot 
>>> use any ontological commitment other than the term of some arbitrary but 
>>> fixed universal system. 
>>> 
>>> You assume some God, but that makes everything more complex, without 
>>> evidences why to do so, except naive physical realism, but that does not 
>>> work with Mechanism.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> There is no mind|body problem.
>>> Only a language|body problem.
>> 
>> 
>> With mechanism, we can identify body, words, numbers, and it is a pure third 
>> person notion, but mind has a first person part (indeed called the soul or 
>> the personal consciousness) which is pure 1p. The mind body problem consists 
>> in linking, without magic or ontological commitment those two things. The 
>> solution suggested by Theaetetus in Plato, has been refuted by Socrates (in 
>> Plato) but incompleteness refutes Socrates argument, and rehabilitates 
>> Theatetus’idea (the soul or the first person knower is the true-believer).
>> You can compare this with the semantic problem for language/body. To 
>> associate a semantic to a program or machine is related to the problem of 
>> associating a mind or a meaning to a body or to a code. The problem is 
>> virtually the same: once a theory/body is “rich enough”, its semantics 
>> escapes it and get multiple. Rich theories have many non isomorphic 
>> models/semantics, a bit like any computational state is supported by 
>> infinitely many computational situation, and some indeterminacy has to be 
>> taken into account.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/ 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> - pt
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Epicurus was born about the time Plato died. His "atomism" had atoms for 
>> consciousness (mind) that were mixed with the bodily atoms. Modern science 
>> rejected that concept, until the recent revival of (material) panpsychism 
>> has a updated version of it.
> 
> 
> Unfortunately this does not explain neither what the atoms and where they 
> comes from, nor what is consciousness and where it comes from. Mechanism 
> explains this entirely, up to the testability of all its consequences, which, 
> like every where in fundamental science, needs a perpetual doubt and constant 
> verification and re-verification. 
> 
> If the theory S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* violate nature, then we will have some 
> evidence for no-mechanism, and thus for primitive matter. But assuming 
> primitive matter a priori seems like wanting to not understand the problem, 
> or hiding it under ontological commitment, like materialists do since 1500 
> years, if not right since Aristotle.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On "where do atoms come from" I guess any physicist  you meet today has as 
> good (or bad) an answer as any, in their way of thinking, anyway.

They usually assume a primary physical reality. They make the physical universe 
into a (non personal god). But that explains nothing, even if very interesting 
in physics. Physicists are just NOT meta physicists, except very bad one the 
week-end or after retirement.

An explanation of X must not assume X, or, if it does, the recursion employed 
must be entirely justified too.




> 
> On consciousness: 
> 
> In a micropsychist* approach, the lowest-level psychical properties could 
> appear in the form of their own material subatomic entities, like quarks —  
> quirks? :) —  in current physical theories. Thus human-level consciousness is 
> "constituted" from lower-level material entities possessing lower-level 
> psychical features.

I don’t see an atom of explanation of consciousness here. That seems just like 
a more sophisticated way to hide the problem under the rug of microphysics, 
without addressing any of the question raised by the philosopher of mind or the 
cognitive scientist. If you dig in that direction, both matter and 
consciousness becomes only more obscure. 



> 
> 
> According to constitutive micropsychism, the smallest parts of my brain have 
> very basic forms of consciousness, and the consciousness of my brain as a 
> whole is in some sense made up from the consciousness of its parts. This is 
> the form of panpsychism that suffers most acutely from the combination 
> problem, which we will explore below. However, if it can be made sense of, 
> constitutive micropsychism promises an elegant and parsimonious view of 
> nature, with all the richness of nature accounted for in terms of facts at 
> the micro-level.

I am skeptical this can work, and of course, it is incompatible with Digital 
mechanism. This one explains consciousness in the most standard 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-31 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 6:28:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 30 Jan 2019, at 23:14, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:45:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>> As I try to solve the mind-body problem in the Mechanist frame, I cannot 
>>> use any ontological commitment other than the term of some arbitrary but 
>>> fixed universal system. 
>>>
>>> You assume some God, but that makes everything more complex, without 
>>> evidences why to do so, except naive physical realism, but that does not 
>>> work with Mechanism.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> There is no mind|body problem.
>> Only a language|body problem.
>>
>>
>>
>> With mechanism, we can identify body, words, numbers, and it is a pure 
>> third person notion, but mind has a first person part (indeed called the 
>> soul or the personal consciousness) which is pure 1p. The mind body problem 
>> consists in linking, without magic or ontological commitment those two 
>> things. The solution suggested by Theaetetus in Plato, has been refuted by 
>> Socrates (in Plato) but incompleteness refutes Socrates argument, and 
>> rehabilitates Theatetus’idea (the soul or the first person knower is the 
>> true-believer).
>> You can compare this with the semantic problem for language/body. To 
>> associate a semantic to a program or machine is related to the problem of 
>> associating a mind or a meaning to a body or to a code. The problem is 
>> virtually the same: once a theory/body is “rich enough”, its semantics 
>> escapes it and get multiple. Rich theories have many non isomorphic 
>> models/semantics, a bit like any computational state is supported by 
>> infinitely many computational situation, and some indeterminacy has to be 
>> taken into account.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/
>>
>> - pt
>>
>>
>
> Epicurus was born about the time Plato died. His "atomism" had atoms for 
> consciousness (mind) that were mixed with the bodily atoms. Modern science 
> rejected that concept, until the recent revival of (material) panpsychism 
> has a updated version of it.
>
>
>
> Unfortunately this does not explain neither what the atoms and where they 
> comes from, nor what is consciousness and where it comes from. Mechanism 
> explains this entirely, up to the testability of all its consequences, 
> which, like every where in fundamental science, needs a perpetual doubt and 
> constant verification and re-verification. 
>
> If the theory S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* violate nature, then we will have some 
> evidence for no-mechanism, and thus for primitive matter. But assuming 
> primitive matter a priori seems like wanting to not understand the problem, 
> or hiding it under ontological commitment, like materialists do since 1500 
> years, if not right since Aristotle.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
On "where do atoms come from" I guess *any physicist*  you meet today has 
as good (or bad) an answer as any, in their way of thinking, anyway.

On consciousness: 

In a micropsychist* approach, the lowest-level psychical properties could 
appear in the form of their own material subatomic entities, like quarks —  
quirks? :) —  in current physical theories. Thus human-level consciousness 
is "constituted" from lower-level material entities possessing lower-level 
psychical features.


*According to constitutive micropsychism, the smallest parts of my brain 
have very basic forms of consciousness, and the consciousness of my brain 
as a whole is in some sense made up from the consciousness of its parts. 
This is the form of panpsychism that suffers most acutely from the 
combination problem, which we will explore below. However, if it can be 
made sense of, constitutive micropsychism promises an elegant and 
parsimonious view of nature, with all the richness of nature accounted for 
in terms of facts at the micro-level.*

* [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/ ]  

- pt 

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-31 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 30 Jan 2019, at 23:14, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:45:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 29 Jan 2019, at 15:03, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, January 29, 2019 at 5:30:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 28 Jan 2019, at 15:07, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Monday, January 28, 2019 at 6:27:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 25 Jan 2019, at 14:53, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 6:27:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 24 Jan 2019, at 15:19, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 7:14:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 23 Jan 2019, at 19:01, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, January 23, 2019 at 5:52:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 22 Jan 2019, at 01:49, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> One of the oddest of things is when physicists use the language of 
>>> (various) theories of physics to express what can or cannot be the 
>>> case. It's just a language, which is probably wrong.
>>> 
>>> There is a sense in which the Church/Turing thesis is true: All out 
>>> languages are Turing in their syntax and grammar. What they refer to is 
>>> another matter (pun intended).
>> 
>> They refer to the set of computable functions, or to the universal 
>> machine which understand that language. But not all language are Turing 
>> universal. Only the context sensitive automata (in Chomski hierarchy) 
>> are Turing universal. Simple languages, like the “regular” one are 
>> typically not Turing universal. Bounded loops formalism cannot be either.
>> 
>> But the notion of language is ambiguous with respect to computability, 
>> and that is why I prefer to avoid that expression and always talk about 
>> theories (set of beliefs) or machine (recursively enumerable set of 
>> beliefs), which avoids ambiguity. 
>> For example, is “predicate calculus” Turing universal? We can say yes, 
>> given that the programming language PROLOG (obviously Turing universal) 
>> is a tiny subset of predicate logic. But we can say know, if we look at 
>> predicate logic as a theory. A prolog program is then an extension of 
>> that theory, not something proved in predicate calculus.
>> Thus, I can make sense of your remark. Even the language with only one 
>> symbol {I}, and the rules that “I” is a wff, and if x is wwf, then Ix is 
>> too, can be said Turing universal, as each program can be coded by a 
>> number, which can be coded by a finite sequence of I. But of course, 
>> that makes the notion of “universality” empty, as far as language are 
>> concerned. 
>> Seen as a theory, predicate calculus is notoriously not universal. Even 
>> predicate calculus + the natural numbers, and the law of addition, 
>> (Pressburger arithmetic) is not universal. Or take RA with its seven 
>> axioms. Taking any axiom out of it, and you get a complete-able theory, 
>> and thus it cannot be Turing complete.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Here's an example of a kind of "non-digital" language:
>> 
>> More Analog Computing Is on the Way
>> https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The door on this new generation of analog computer programming is 
>> definitely open. Last month, at the Association for Computing 
>> Machinery’s (ACM) conference on Programming Language Design and 
>> Implementation, a paper  
>> was presented 
>> that described a compiler that uses a text based, high-level, 
>> abstraction language to generate the necessary low-level circuit wiring 
>> that defines the physical analog computing implementation. This research 
>> was done at MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence 
>> Laboratory (CSAIL) and Dartmouth College. The main focus of their 
>> investigation was to improve the simulation of biological systems. 
>> 
>> 
>> Configuration Synthesis for ProgrammableAnalog Devices with Arco
>> https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf 
>> 
>> 
>> Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful
>> computing substrate for performing complex neuromorphic
>> and cytomorphic computations. We present Arco, a new
>> solver that, given a dynamical system specification in the
>> form of a set of differential equations, generates physically
>> realizable configurations for programmable analog devices
>> that are algebraically equivalent to the specified 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-30 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:45:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 29 Jan 2019, at 15:03, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, January 29, 2019 at 5:30:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 28 Jan 2019, at 15:07, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 28, 2019 at 6:27:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 25 Jan 2019, at 14:53, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 6:27:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 24 Jan 2019, at 15:19, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 7:14:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 Jan 2019, at 19:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, January 23, 2019 at 5:52:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 22 Jan 2019, at 01:49, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>> One of the oddest of things is when physicists use the language of 
>> (various) theories of physics to express what can or cannot be the case. 
>> It's just a language, which is probably wrong.
>>
>> There is a sense in which the Church/Turing thesis is true: All out 
>> languages are Turing in their syntax and grammar. What they refer to is 
>> another matter (pun intended).
>>
>>
>> They refer to the set of computable functions, or to the universal 
>> machine which understand that language. But not all language are Turing 
>> universal. Only the context sensitive automata (in Chomski hierarchy) 
>> are 
>> Turing universal. Simple languages, like the “regular” one are typically 
>> not Turing universal. Bounded loops formalism cannot be either.
>>
>> But the notion of language is ambiguous with respect to 
>> computability, and that is why I prefer to avoid that expression and 
>> always 
>> talk about theories (set of beliefs) or machine (recursively enumerable 
>> set 
>> of beliefs), which avoids ambiguity. 
>> For example, is “predicate calculus” Turing universal? We can say 
>> yes, given that the programming language PROLOG (obviously Turing 
>> universal) is a tiny subset of predicate logic. But we can say know, if 
>> we 
>> look at predicate logic as a theory. A prolog program is then an 
>> extension 
>> of that theory, not something proved in predicate calculus.
>> Thus, I can make sense of your remark. Even the language with only 
>> one symbol {I}, and the rules that “I” is a wff, and if x is wwf, then 
>> Ix 
>> is too, can be said Turing universal, as each program can be coded by a 
>> number, which can be coded by a finite sequence of I. But of course, 
>> that 
>> makes the notion of “universality” empty, as far as language are 
>> concerned. 
>> Seen as a theory, predicate calculus is notoriously not universal. 
>> Even predicate calculus + the natural numbers, and the law of addition, 
>> (Pressburger arithmetic) is not universal. Or take RA with its seven 
>> axioms. Taking any axiom out of it, and you get a complete-able theory, 
>> and 
>> thus it cannot be Turing complete.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> Here's an example of a kind of "non-digital" language:
>
> *More Analog Computing Is on the Way*
> https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way
>
>
>
> *The door on this new generation of analog computer programming is 
> definitely open. Last month, at the Association for Computing Machinery’s 
> (ACM) conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, 
> a paper  was 
> presented that described a compiler that uses a text based, high-level, 
> abstraction language to generate the necessary low-level circuit wiring 
> that defines the physical analog computing implementation. This research 
> was done at MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory 
> (CSAIL) and Dartmouth College. The main focus of their investigation was 
> to 
> improve the simulation of biological systems. *
>
>
> *Configuration Synthesis for ProgrammableAnalog Devices with Arco*
> https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf
>
> *Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful*
> *computing substrate for performing complex neuromorphic*
> *and cytomorphic computations. We present Arco, a new*
> *solver that, given a dynamical system specification in the*
> *form of a set of differential equations, generates physically*
> *realizable configurations for programmable analog devices*
> *that are algebraically equivalent to the specified system.*
> *On a set of benchmarks from the biological domain, Arco*
> *generates configurations with 35 to 534 connections and 28*
> *to 326 components in 1 to 54 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-30 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 29 Jan 2019, at 15:03, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, January 29, 2019 at 5:30:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 28 Jan 2019, at 15:07, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, January 28, 2019 at 6:27:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 25 Jan 2019, at 14:53, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 6:27:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 24 Jan 2019, at 15:19, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 7:14:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 23 Jan 2019, at 19:01, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, January 23, 2019 at 5:52:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 22 Jan 2019, at 01:49, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> One of the oddest of things is when physicists use the language of 
>> (various) theories of physics to express what can or cannot be the case. 
>> It's just a language, which is probably wrong.
>> 
>> There is a sense in which the Church/Turing thesis is true: All out 
>> languages are Turing in their syntax and grammar. What they refer to is 
>> another matter (pun intended).
> 
> They refer to the set of computable functions, or to the universal 
> machine which understand that language. But not all language are Turing 
> universal. Only the context sensitive automata (in Chomski hierarchy) are 
> Turing universal. Simple languages, like the “regular” one are typically 
> not Turing universal. Bounded loops formalism cannot be either.
> 
> But the notion of language is ambiguous with respect to computability, 
> and that is why I prefer to avoid that expression and always talk about 
> theories (set of beliefs) or machine (recursively enumerable set of 
> beliefs), which avoids ambiguity. 
> For example, is “predicate calculus” Turing universal? We can say yes, 
> given that the programming language PROLOG (obviously Turing universal) 
> is a tiny subset of predicate logic. But we can say know, if we look at 
> predicate logic as a theory. A prolog program is then an extension of 
> that theory, not something proved in predicate calculus.
> Thus, I can make sense of your remark. Even the language with only one 
> symbol {I}, and the rules that “I” is a wff, and if x is wwf, then Ix is 
> too, can be said Turing universal, as each program can be coded by a 
> number, which can be coded by a finite sequence of I. But of course, that 
> makes the notion of “universality” empty, as far as language are 
> concerned. 
> Seen as a theory, predicate calculus is notoriously not universal. Even 
> predicate calculus + the natural numbers, and the law of addition, 
> (Pressburger arithmetic) is not universal. Or take RA with its seven 
> axioms. Taking any axiom out of it, and you get a complete-able theory, 
> and thus it cannot be Turing complete.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> Here's an example of a kind of "non-digital" language:
> 
> More Analog Computing Is on the Way
> https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way 
> 
> 
> 
> The door on this new generation of analog computer programming is 
> definitely open. Last month, at the Association for Computing Machinery’s 
> (ACM) conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, a 
> paper  was 
> presented that described a compiler that uses a text based, high-level, 
> abstraction language to generate the necessary low-level circuit wiring 
> that defines the physical analog computing implementation. This research 
> was done at MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory 
> (CSAIL) and Dartmouth College. The main focus of their investigation was 
> to improve the simulation of biological systems. 
> 
> 
> Configuration Synthesis for ProgrammableAnalog Devices with Arco
> https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf 
> 
> 
> Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful
> computing substrate for performing complex neuromorphic
> and cytomorphic computations. We present Arco, a new
> solver that, given a dynamical system specification in the
> form of a set of differential equations, generates physically
> realizable configurations for programmable analog devices
> that are algebraically equivalent to the specified system.
> On a set of benchmarks from the biological domain, Arco
> generates configurations with 35 to 534 connections and 28
> to 326 components in 1 to 54 minutes.
> 
> 
> - pt
 
 Intersting.
 
 Yet, that 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-29 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, January 29, 2019 at 5:30:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Jan 2019, at 15:07, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, January 28, 2019 at 6:27:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 25 Jan 2019, at 14:53, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 6:27:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 24 Jan 2019, at 15:19, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 7:14:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 23 Jan 2019, at 19:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Wednesday, January 23, 2019 at 5:52:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Jan 2019, at 01:49, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
> One of the oddest of things is when physicists use the language of 
> (various) theories of physics to express what can or cannot be the case. 
> It's just a language, which is probably wrong.
>
> There is a sense in which the Church/Turing thesis is true: All out 
> languages are Turing in their syntax and grammar. What they refer to is 
> another matter (pun intended).
>
>
> They refer to the set of computable functions, or to the universal 
> machine which understand that language. But not all language are Turing 
> universal. Only the context sensitive automata (in Chomski hierarchy) are 
> Turing universal. Simple languages, like the “regular” one are typically 
> not Turing universal. Bounded loops formalism cannot be either.
>
> But the notion of language is ambiguous with respect to computability, 
> and that is why I prefer to avoid that expression and always talk about 
> theories (set of beliefs) or machine (recursively enumerable set of 
> beliefs), which avoids ambiguity. 
> For example, is “predicate calculus” Turing universal? We can say yes, 
> given that the programming language PROLOG (obviously Turing universal) 
> is 
> a tiny subset of predicate logic. But we can say know, if we look at 
> predicate logic as a theory. A prolog program is then an extension of 
> that 
> theory, not something proved in predicate calculus.
> Thus, I can make sense of your remark. Even the language with only one 
> symbol {I}, and the rules that “I” is a wff, and if x is wwf, then Ix is 
> too, can be said Turing universal, as each program can be coded by a 
> number, which can be coded by a finite sequence of I. But of course, that 
> makes the notion of “universality” empty, as far as language are 
> concerned. 
> Seen as a theory, predicate calculus is notoriously not universal. 
> Even predicate calculus + the natural numbers, and the law of addition, 
> (Pressburger arithmetic) is not universal. Or take RA with its seven 
> axioms. Taking any axiom out of it, and you get a complete-able theory, 
> and 
> thus it cannot be Turing complete.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
 Here's an example of a kind of "non-digital" language:

 *More Analog Computing Is on the Way*
 https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way



 *The door on this new generation of analog computer programming is 
 definitely open. Last month, at the Association for Computing Machinery’s 
 (ACM) conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, 
 a paper  was 
 presented that described a compiler that uses a text based, high-level, 
 abstraction language to generate the necessary low-level circuit wiring 
 that defines the physical analog computing implementation. This research 
 was done at MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory 
 (CSAIL) and Dartmouth College. The main focus of their investigation was 
 to 
 improve the simulation of biological systems. *


 *Configuration Synthesis for ProgrammableAnalog Devices with Arco*
 https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf

 *Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful*
 *computing substrate for performing complex neuromorphic*
 *and cytomorphic computations. We present Arco, a new*
 *solver that, given a dynamical system specification in the*
 *form of a set of differential equations, generates physically*
 *realizable configurations for programmable analog devices*
 *that are algebraically equivalent to the specified system.*
 *On a set of benchmarks from the biological domain, Arco*
 *generates configurations with 35 to 534 connections and 28*
 *to 326 components in 1 to 54 minutes.*


 - pt


 Intersting.

 Yet, that does not violate the Church-Thesis, even if very useful FAPP. 
 But such computations arise in arithmetic, either directly, or through a 
 infinite sequence of approximations. If all decimals of the 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-29 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 28 Jan 2019, at 15:07, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, January 28, 2019 at 6:27:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 25 Jan 2019, at 14:53, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 6:27:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 24 Jan 2019, at 15:19, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 7:14:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 23 Jan 2019, at 19:01, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Wednesday, January 23, 2019 at 5:52:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 22 Jan 2019, at 01:49, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> One of the oddest of things is when physicists use the language of 
> (various) theories of physics to express what can or cannot be the case. 
> It's just a language, which is probably wrong.
> 
> There is a sense in which the Church/Turing thesis is true: All out 
> languages are Turing in their syntax and grammar. What they refer to is 
> another matter (pun intended).
 
 They refer to the set of computable functions, or to the universal machine 
 which understand that language. But not all language are Turing universal. 
 Only the context sensitive automata (in Chomski hierarchy) are Turing 
 universal. Simple languages, like the “regular” one are typically not 
 Turing universal. Bounded loops formalism cannot be either.
 
 But the notion of language is ambiguous with respect to computability, and 
 that is why I prefer to avoid that expression and always talk about 
 theories (set of beliefs) or machine (recursively enumerable set of 
 beliefs), which avoids ambiguity. 
 For example, is “predicate calculus” Turing universal? We can say yes, 
 given that the programming language PROLOG (obviously Turing universal) is 
 a tiny subset of predicate logic. But we can say know, if we look at 
 predicate logic as a theory. A prolog program is then an extension of that 
 theory, not something proved in predicate calculus.
 Thus, I can make sense of your remark. Even the language with only one 
 symbol {I}, and the rules that “I” is a wff, and if x is wwf, then Ix is 
 too, can be said Turing universal, as each program can be coded by a 
 number, which can be coded by a finite sequence of I. But of course, that 
 makes the notion of “universality” empty, as far as language are 
 concerned. 
 Seen as a theory, predicate calculus is notoriously not universal. Even 
 predicate calculus + the natural numbers, and the law of addition, 
 (Pressburger arithmetic) is not universal. Or take RA with its seven 
 axioms. Taking any axiom out of it, and you get a complete-able theory, 
 and thus it cannot be Turing complete.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 Here's an example of a kind of "non-digital" language:
 
 More Analog Computing Is on the Way
 https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way 
 
 
 
 The door on this new generation of analog computer programming is 
 definitely open. Last month, at the Association for Computing Machinery’s 
 (ACM) conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, a 
 paper  was 
 presented that described a compiler that uses a text based, high-level, 
 abstraction language to generate the necessary low-level circuit wiring 
 that defines the physical analog computing implementation. This research 
 was done at MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory 
 (CSAIL) and Dartmouth College. The main focus of their investigation was 
 to improve the simulation of biological systems. 
 
 
 Configuration Synthesis for ProgrammableAnalog Devices with Arco
 https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf 
 
 
 Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful
 computing substrate for performing complex neuromorphic
 and cytomorphic computations. We present Arco, a new
 solver that, given a dynamical system specification in the
 form of a set of differential equations, generates physically
 realizable configurations for programmable analog devices
 that are algebraically equivalent to the specified system.
 On a set of benchmarks from the biological domain, Arco
 generates configurations with 35 to 534 connections and 28
 to 326 components in 1 to 54 minutes.
 
 
 - pt
>>> 
>>> Intersting.
>>> 
>>> Yet, that does not violate the Church-Thesis, even if very useful FAPP. But 
>>> such computations arise in arithmetic, either directly, or through a 
>>> infinite sequence of approximations. If all decimals of the analog 
>>> phenomenon needs to be 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-28 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, January 28, 2019 at 6:27:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Jan 2019, at 14:53, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 6:27:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 24 Jan 2019, at 15:19, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 7:14:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 23 Jan 2019, at 19:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 23, 2019 at 5:52:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 22 Jan 2019, at 01:49, Philip Thrift  wrote:

 One of the oddest of things is when physicists use the language of 
 (various) theories of physics to express what can or cannot be the case. 
 It's just a language, which is probably wrong.

 There is a sense in which the Church/Turing thesis is true: All out 
 languages are Turing in their syntax and grammar. What they refer to is 
 another matter (pun intended).


 They refer to the set of computable functions, or to the universal 
 machine which understand that language. But not all language are Turing 
 universal. Only the context sensitive automata (in Chomski hierarchy) are 
 Turing universal. Simple languages, like the “regular” one are typically 
 not Turing universal. Bounded loops formalism cannot be either.

 But the notion of language is ambiguous with respect to computability, 
 and that is why I prefer to avoid that expression and always talk about 
 theories (set of beliefs) or machine (recursively enumerable set of 
 beliefs), which avoids ambiguity. 
 For example, is “predicate calculus” Turing universal? We can say yes, 
 given that the programming language PROLOG (obviously Turing universal) is 
 a tiny subset of predicate logic. But we can say know, if we look at 
 predicate logic as a theory. A prolog program is then an extension of that 
 theory, not something proved in predicate calculus.
 Thus, I can make sense of your remark. Even the language with only one 
 symbol {I}, and the rules that “I” is a wff, and if x is wwf, then Ix is 
 too, can be said Turing universal, as each program can be coded by a 
 number, which can be coded by a finite sequence of I. But of course, that 
 makes the notion of “universality” empty, as far as language are 
 concerned. 
 Seen as a theory, predicate calculus is notoriously not universal. Even 
 predicate calculus + the natural numbers, and the law of addition, 
 (Pressburger arithmetic) is not universal. Or take RA with its seven 
 axioms. Taking any axiom out of it, and you get a complete-able theory, 
 and 
 thus it cannot be Turing complete.

 Bruno



>>> Here's an example of a kind of "non-digital" language:
>>>
>>> *More Analog Computing Is on the Way*
>>> https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *The door on this new generation of analog computer programming is 
>>> definitely open. Last month, at the Association for Computing Machinery’s 
>>> (ACM) conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, 
>>> a paper  was 
>>> presented that described a compiler that uses a text based, high-level, 
>>> abstraction language to generate the necessary low-level circuit wiring 
>>> that defines the physical analog computing implementation. This research 
>>> was done at MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory 
>>> (CSAIL) and Dartmouth College. The main focus of their investigation was to 
>>> improve the simulation of biological systems. *
>>>
>>>
>>> *Configuration Synthesis for ProgrammableAnalog Devices with Arco*
>>> https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf
>>>
>>> *Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful*
>>> *computing substrate for performing complex neuromorphic*
>>> *and cytomorphic computations. We present Arco, a new*
>>> *solver that, given a dynamical system specification in the*
>>> *form of a set of differential equations, generates physically*
>>> *realizable configurations for programmable analog devices*
>>> *that are algebraically equivalent to the specified system.*
>>> *On a set of benchmarks from the biological domain, Arco*
>>> *generates configurations with 35 to 534 connections and 28*
>>> *to 326 components in 1 to 54 minutes.*
>>>
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>>
>>> Intersting.
>>>
>>> Yet, that does not violate the Church-Thesis, even if very useful FAPP. 
>>> But such computations arise in arithmetic, either directly, or through a 
>>> infinite sequence of approximations. If all decimals of the analog 
>>> phenomenon needs to be taken into account, then we are out of my working 
>>> hypothesis, and even evolution theory becomes wrong, as evolution and life 
>>> becomes sequences of miracles. But the goal of the authors here is not 
>>> learning anything in 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-28 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 25 Jan 2019, at 14:53, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 6:27:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 24 Jan 2019, at 15:19, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 7:14:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 23 Jan 2019, at 19:01, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, January 23, 2019 at 5:52:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 22 Jan 2019, at 01:49, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 One of the oddest of things is when physicists use the language of 
 (various) theories of physics to express what can or cannot be the case. 
 It's just a language, which is probably wrong.
 
 There is a sense in which the Church/Turing thesis is true: All out 
 languages are Turing in their syntax and grammar. What they refer to is 
 another matter (pun intended).
>>> 
>>> They refer to the set of computable functions, or to the universal machine 
>>> which understand that language. But not all language are Turing universal. 
>>> Only the context sensitive automata (in Chomski hierarchy) are Turing 
>>> universal. Simple languages, like the “regular” one are typically not 
>>> Turing universal. Bounded loops formalism cannot be either.
>>> 
>>> But the notion of language is ambiguous with respect to computability, and 
>>> that is why I prefer to avoid that expression and always talk about 
>>> theories (set of beliefs) or machine (recursively enumerable set of 
>>> beliefs), which avoids ambiguity. 
>>> For example, is “predicate calculus” Turing universal? We can say yes, 
>>> given that the programming language PROLOG (obviously Turing universal) is 
>>> a tiny subset of predicate logic. But we can say know, if we look at 
>>> predicate logic as a theory. A prolog program is then an extension of that 
>>> theory, not something proved in predicate calculus.
>>> Thus, I can make sense of your remark. Even the language with only one 
>>> symbol {I}, and the rules that “I” is a wff, and if x is wwf, then Ix is 
>>> too, can be said Turing universal, as each program can be coded by a 
>>> number, which can be coded by a finite sequence of I. But of course, that 
>>> makes the notion of “universality” empty, as far as language are concerned. 
>>> Seen as a theory, predicate calculus is notoriously not universal. Even 
>>> predicate calculus + the natural numbers, and the law of addition, 
>>> (Pressburger arithmetic) is not universal. Or take RA with its seven 
>>> axioms. Taking any axiom out of it, and you get a complete-able theory, and 
>>> thus it cannot be Turing complete.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Here's an example of a kind of "non-digital" language:
>>> 
>>> More Analog Computing Is on the Way
>>> https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The door on this new generation of analog computer programming is 
>>> definitely open. Last month, at the Association for Computing Machinery’s 
>>> (ACM) conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, a paper 
>>>  was presented 
>>> that described a compiler that uses a text based, high-level, abstraction 
>>> language to generate the necessary low-level circuit wiring that defines 
>>> the physical analog computing implementation. This research was done at 
>>> MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL) and 
>>> Dartmouth College. The main focus of their investigation was to improve the 
>>> simulation of biological systems. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Configuration Synthesis for ProgrammableAnalog Devices with Arco
>>> https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful
>>> computing substrate for performing complex neuromorphic
>>> and cytomorphic computations. We present Arco, a new
>>> solver that, given a dynamical system specification in the
>>> form of a set of differential equations, generates physically
>>> realizable configurations for programmable analog devices
>>> that are algebraically equivalent to the specified system.
>>> On a set of benchmarks from the biological domain, Arco
>>> generates configurations with 35 to 534 connections and 28
>>> to 326 components in 1 to 54 minutes.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> - pt
>> 
>> Intersting.
>> 
>> Yet, that does not violate the Church-Thesis, even if very useful FAPP. But 
>> such computations arise in arithmetic, either directly, or through a 
>> infinite sequence of approximations. If all decimals of the analog 
>> phenomenon needs to be taken into account, then we are out of my working 
>> hypothesis, and even evolution theory becomes wrong, as evolution and life 
>> becomes sequences of miracles. But the goal of the authors here is not 
>> learning anything in metaphysics, 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-27 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, January 27, 2019 at 1:09:05 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, January 27, 2019 at 7:19:05 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 26, 2019 at 5:01:02 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, January 26, 2019 at 4:54:58 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Saturday, January 26, 2019 at 2:25:59 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 6:06:09 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 4:48:38 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 2:03:10 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift 
>>> wrote:



 On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 12:57:00 PM UTC-6, Lawrence 
 Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 8:59:42 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 5:54:46 AM UTC-6, Lawrence 
>> Crowell wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>> My point is that in physics what might be called a halting 
>>> condition is an attractor point or limit cycle. Equilibrium is the 
>>> terminal 
>>> point in the evolution of some system, say thinking according to 
>>> Landauer's 
>>> original paper on thermodynamics and information. The quantum field 
>>> theory 
>>> of black holes has no equilibrium condition. Now if the black hole 
>>> runs 
>>> away with Hawking radiation it will “explode” in a burst of gamma 
>>> rays and 
>>> other quanta. A Turing machine that does not halt can also be said 
>>> to burn 
>>> itself out, and if anyone has programmed assembler there were loops 
>>> you 
>>> could put a machine into that might do damage. 
>>>
>>> Sorry for being slow on this. I forgot to get flu shots this 
>>> year and I have been hit with a real doozy of a flu. Since Sunday 
>>> night 
>>> until yesterday I was horribly ill, and only now am beginning to 
>>> feel 
>>> normal. Get the shots, you really do not want this flu!
>>>
>>> LC
>>>
>>
>> I used to think that there *could be* true hypercomputation 
>> (what is called super-Turing machines) in nature, but now I think 
>> that 
>> there is no such thing (but anything remains possible, of course).
>>
>> *But the idea of substrate-independent Turing machines is 
>> incomplete.*
>>
>> I shouldn't say (if will jinx me!) but I've never gotten a flu 
>> shot and I haven't gotten the flu in over 40 years.
>>
>> But I hope the flu program doesn't start running in / affect my 
>> substrate!
>>
>> - pt
>>
>
> I hate to pop your bubble here, but a few years ago at a New 
> Year's party a person who had cancer go into remission made this 
> statement 
> that she never got colds or flus. A doctor I know was there and 
> responded 
> with how not getting these sicknesses is a risk factor for cancer! 
> The 
> woman died a last summer with the return of her non-Hodgkins 
> lymphoma. 
>
> Hyper-Turing computations or results are not accessible to local 
> observers.
>
> LC
>



 What about the interviews of people over 100 who say they've never 
 had a cold or the flu? 

 And where are these hyper-Turing processes occurring?

 - pt

>>>  
>>> Hypercomputations run into extreme energy or frequency, so the 
>>> conclusion of it occurs in black holes or in trans-Plankian scales we 
>>> can't 
>>> observe. In a sense it is a sort of renormailization and treated as a 
>>> p-adic regularization of quantum gravity.
>>>
>>> When it comes to cold and flu I am just echoing what I was told. You 
>>> would have to research this out more extensively.
>>>
>>> LC
>>>
>>
>>
>> I think "hypercomputing" is not needed in the quantum space (LQG) 
>> model of black holes (the recent Penn State, LSU model).
>>
>> As for the flu, I'm afraid researching it might jinx me. :)
>>
>> - pt
>>
>
> LQG of course breaks Lorentz symmetry near the Planck scale. The 
> finite elements have reduced diffeomorphic symmetry, and which buries 
> away 
> any such problems. The numerical simulations you reference are a typical 
> case of computer science, input variables in, output variable result. LQG 
> has a hard renormalization UV cutoff that breaks the symmetry of the 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-27 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, January 27, 2019 at 7:19:05 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, January 26, 2019 at 5:01:02 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 26, 2019 at 4:54:58 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, January 26, 2019 at 2:25:59 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>>> wrote:



 On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 6:06:09 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 4:48:38 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
> wrote:
>>
>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 2:03:10 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 12:57:00 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>>> wrote:

 On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 8:59:42 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 5:54:46 AM UTC-6, Lawrence 
> Crowell wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> My point is that in physics what might be called a halting 
>> condition is an attractor point or limit cycle. Equilibrium is the 
>> terminal 
>> point in the evolution of some system, say thinking according to 
>> Landauer's 
>> original paper on thermodynamics and information. The quantum field 
>> theory 
>> of black holes has no equilibrium condition. Now if the black hole 
>> runs 
>> away with Hawking radiation it will “explode” in a burst of gamma 
>> rays and 
>> other quanta. A Turing machine that does not halt can also be said 
>> to burn 
>> itself out, and if anyone has programmed assembler there were loops 
>> you 
>> could put a machine into that might do damage. 
>>
>> Sorry for being slow on this. I forgot to get flu shots this year 
>> and I have been hit with a real doozy of a flu. Since Sunday night 
>> until 
>> yesterday I was horribly ill, and only now am beginning to feel 
>> normal. Get 
>> the shots, you really do not want this flu!
>>
>> LC
>>
>
> I used to think that there *could be* true hypercomputation (what 
> is called super-Turing machines) in nature, but now I think that 
> there is 
> no such thing (but anything remains possible, of course).
>
> *But the idea of substrate-independent Turing machines is 
> incomplete.*
>
> I shouldn't say (if will jinx me!) but I've never gotten a flu 
> shot and I haven't gotten the flu in over 40 years.
>
> But I hope the flu program doesn't start running in / affect my 
> substrate!
>
> - pt
>

 I hate to pop your bubble here, but a few years ago at a New Year's 
 party a person who had cancer go into remission made this statement 
 that 
 she never got colds or flus. A doctor I know was there and responded 
 with 
 how not getting these sicknesses is a risk factor for cancer! The 
 woman 
 died a last summer with the return of her non-Hodgkins lymphoma. 

 Hyper-Turing computations or results are not accessible to local 
 observers.

 LC

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What about the interviews of people over 100 who say they've never 
>>> had a cold or the flu? 
>>>
>>> And where are these hyper-Turing processes occurring?
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>  
>> Hypercomputations run into extreme energy or frequency, so the 
>> conclusion of it occurs in black holes or in trans-Plankian scales we 
>> can't 
>> observe. In a sense it is a sort of renormailization and treated as a 
>> p-adic regularization of quantum gravity.
>>
>> When it comes to cold and flu I am just echoing what I was told. You 
>> would have to research this out more extensively.
>>
>> LC
>>
>
>
> I think "hypercomputing" is not needed in the quantum space (LQG) 
> model of black holes (the recent Penn State, LSU model).
>
> As for the flu, I'm afraid researching it might jinx me. :)
>
> - pt
>

 LQG of course breaks Lorentz symmetry near the Planck scale. The finite 
 elements have reduced diffeomorphic symmetry, and which buries away any 
 such problems. The numerical simulations you reference are a typical case 
 of computer science, input variables in, output variable result. LQG has a 
 hard renormalization UV cutoff that breaks the symmetry of the field. 

 LC
  

>>> In LQG, or quantum space models in general, the *Lorenz group* [ 
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorentz_group ] would be replaced by a 
>>> different mathematics. 
>>>
>>> *All of the mathematics 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-27 Thread Lawrence Crowell


On Saturday, January 26, 2019 at 5:01:02 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, January 26, 2019 at 4:54:58 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 26, 2019 at 2:25:59 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 6:06:09 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 4:48:38 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 2:03:10 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 12:57:00 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 8:59:42 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift 
>>> wrote:



 On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 5:54:46 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
 wrote:
>
>
>
>  
>
> My point is that in physics what might be called a halting 
> condition is an attractor point or limit cycle. Equilibrium is the 
> terminal 
> point in the evolution of some system, say thinking according to 
> Landauer's 
> original paper on thermodynamics and information. The quantum field 
> theory 
> of black holes has no equilibrium condition. Now if the black hole 
> runs 
> away with Hawking radiation it will “explode” in a burst of gamma 
> rays and 
> other quanta. A Turing machine that does not halt can also be said to 
> burn 
> itself out, and if anyone has programmed assembler there were loops 
> you 
> could put a machine into that might do damage. 
>
> Sorry for being slow on this. I forgot to get flu shots this year 
> and I have been hit with a real doozy of a flu. Since Sunday night 
> until 
> yesterday I was horribly ill, and only now am beginning to feel 
> normal. Get 
> the shots, you really do not want this flu!
>
> LC
>

 I used to think that there *could be* true hypercomputation (what 
 is called super-Turing machines) in nature, but now I think that there 
 is 
 no such thing (but anything remains possible, of course).

 *But the idea of substrate-independent Turing machines is 
 incomplete.*

 I shouldn't say (if will jinx me!) but I've never gotten a flu shot 
 and I haven't gotten the flu in over 40 years.

 But I hope the flu program doesn't start running in / affect my 
 substrate!

 - pt

>>>
>>> I hate to pop your bubble here, but a few years ago at a New Year's 
>>> party a person who had cancer go into remission made this statement 
>>> that 
>>> she never got colds or flus. A doctor I know was there and responded 
>>> with 
>>> how not getting these sicknesses is a risk factor for cancer! The woman 
>>> died a last summer with the return of her non-Hodgkins lymphoma. 
>>>
>>> Hyper-Turing computations or results are not accessible to local 
>>> observers.
>>>
>>> LC
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> What about the interviews of people over 100 who say they've never 
>> had a cold or the flu? 
>>
>> And where are these hyper-Turing processes occurring?
>>
>> - pt
>>
>  
> Hypercomputations run into extreme energy or frequency, so the 
> conclusion of it occurs in black holes or in trans-Plankian scales we 
> can't 
> observe. In a sense it is a sort of renormailization and treated as a 
> p-adic regularization of quantum gravity.
>
> When it comes to cold and flu I am just echoing what I was told. You 
> would have to research this out more extensively.
>
> LC
>


 I think "hypercomputing" is not needed in the quantum space (LQG) model 
 of black holes (the recent Penn State, LSU model).

 As for the flu, I'm afraid researching it might jinx me. :)

 - pt

>>>
>>> LQG of course breaks Lorentz symmetry near the Planck scale. The finite 
>>> elements have reduced diffeomorphic symmetry, and which buries away any 
>>> such problems. The numerical simulations you reference are a typical case 
>>> of computer science, input variables in, output variable result. LQG has a 
>>> hard renormalization UV cutoff that breaks the symmetry of the field. 
>>>
>>> LC
>>>  
>>>
>> In LQG, or quantum space models in general, the *Lorenz group* [ 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorentz_group ] would be replaced by a 
>> different mathematics. 
>>
>> *All of the mathematics of conventional physics has to be "quantized" all 
>> the way down.*
>>
>> - pt
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>
> It's a subject worth exploring of course:
>
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.00924
>
>
> Discrete Lorentz symmetry and discrete time translational symmetry

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-26 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, January 26, 2019 at 4:54:58 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, January 26, 2019 at 2:25:59 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 6:06:09 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 4:48:38 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

 On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 2:03:10 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 12:57:00 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
> wrote:
>>
>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 8:59:42 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 5:54:46 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>>> wrote:



  

 My point is that in physics what might be called a halting 
 condition is an attractor point or limit cycle. Equilibrium is the 
 terminal 
 point in the evolution of some system, say thinking according to 
 Landauer's 
 original paper on thermodynamics and information. The quantum field 
 theory 
 of black holes has no equilibrium condition. Now if the black hole 
 runs 
 away with Hawking radiation it will “explode” in a burst of gamma rays 
 and 
 other quanta. A Turing machine that does not halt can also be said to 
 burn 
 itself out, and if anyone has programmed assembler there were loops 
 you 
 could put a machine into that might do damage. 

 Sorry for being slow on this. I forgot to get flu shots this year 
 and I have been hit with a real doozy of a flu. Since Sunday night 
 until 
 yesterday I was horribly ill, and only now am beginning to feel 
 normal. Get 
 the shots, you really do not want this flu!

 LC

>>>
>>> I used to think that there *could be* true hypercomputation (what 
>>> is called super-Turing machines) in nature, but now I think that there 
>>> is 
>>> no such thing (but anything remains possible, of course).
>>>
>>> *But the idea of substrate-independent Turing machines is 
>>> incomplete.*
>>>
>>> I shouldn't say (if will jinx me!) but I've never gotten a flu shot 
>>> and I haven't gotten the flu in over 40 years.
>>>
>>> But I hope the flu program doesn't start running in / affect my 
>>> substrate!
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>
>> I hate to pop your bubble here, but a few years ago at a New Year's 
>> party a person who had cancer go into remission made this statement that 
>> she never got colds or flus. A doctor I know was there and responded 
>> with 
>> how not getting these sicknesses is a risk factor for cancer! The woman 
>> died a last summer with the return of her non-Hodgkins lymphoma. 
>>
>> Hyper-Turing computations or results are not accessible to local 
>> observers.
>>
>> LC
>>
>
>
>
> What about the interviews of people over 100 who say they've never had 
> a cold or the flu? 
>
> And where are these hyper-Turing processes occurring?
>
> - pt
>
  
 Hypercomputations run into extreme energy or frequency, so the 
 conclusion of it occurs in black holes or in trans-Plankian scales we 
 can't 
 observe. In a sense it is a sort of renormailization and treated as a 
 p-adic regularization of quantum gravity.

 When it comes to cold and flu I am just echoing what I was told. You 
 would have to research this out more extensively.

 LC

>>>
>>>
>>> I think "hypercomputing" is not needed in the quantum space (LQG) model 
>>> of black holes (the recent Penn State, LSU model).
>>>
>>> As for the flu, I'm afraid researching it might jinx me. :)
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>
>> LQG of course breaks Lorentz symmetry near the Planck scale. The finite 
>> elements have reduced diffeomorphic symmetry, and which buries away any 
>> such problems. The numerical simulations you reference are a typical case 
>> of computer science, input variables in, output variable result. LQG has a 
>> hard renormalization UV cutoff that breaks the symmetry of the field. 
>>
>> LC
>>  
>>
> In LQG, or quantum space models in general, the *Lorenz group* [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorentz_group ] would be replaced by a 
> different mathematics. 
>
> *All of the mathematics of conventional physics has to be "quantized" all 
> the way down.*
>
> - pt
>
>
>  
>

It's a subject worth exploring of course:

https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.00924


Discrete Lorentz symmetry and discrete time translational symmetry
Pei Wang 

(Submitted on 1 Aug 2017 (v1 ), last 
revised 19 Feb 2018 (this version, v2))

The Lorentz symmetry and the space and time 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-26 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, January 26, 2019 at 2:25:59 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 6:06:09 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 4:48:38 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 2:03:10 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 12:57:00 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
 wrote:
>
> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 8:59:42 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 5:54:46 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>> My point is that in physics what might be called a halting condition 
>>> is an attractor point or limit cycle. Equilibrium is the terminal point 
>>> in 
>>> the evolution of some system, say thinking according to Landauer's 
>>> original 
>>> paper on thermodynamics and information. The quantum field theory of 
>>> black 
>>> holes has no equilibrium condition. Now if the black hole runs away 
>>> with 
>>> Hawking radiation it will “explode” in a burst of gamma rays and other 
>>> quanta. A Turing machine that does not halt can also be said to burn 
>>> itself 
>>> out, and if anyone has programmed assembler there were loops you could 
>>> put 
>>> a machine into that might do damage. 
>>>
>>> Sorry for being slow on this. I forgot to get flu shots this year 
>>> and I have been hit with a real doozy of a flu. Since Sunday night 
>>> until 
>>> yesterday I was horribly ill, and only now am beginning to feel normal. 
>>> Get 
>>> the shots, you really do not want this flu!
>>>
>>> LC
>>>
>>
>> I used to think that there *could be* true hypercomputation (what is 
>> called super-Turing machines) in nature, but now I think that there is 
>> no 
>> such thing (but anything remains possible, of course).
>>
>> *But the idea of substrate-independent Turing machines is incomplete.*
>>
>> I shouldn't say (if will jinx me!) but I've never gotten a flu shot 
>> and I haven't gotten the flu in over 40 years.
>>
>> But I hope the flu program doesn't start running in / affect my 
>> substrate!
>>
>> - pt
>>
>
> I hate to pop your bubble here, but a few years ago at a New Year's 
> party a person who had cancer go into remission made this statement that 
> she never got colds or flus. A doctor I know was there and responded with 
> how not getting these sicknesses is a risk factor for cancer! The woman 
> died a last summer with the return of her non-Hodgkins lymphoma. 
>
> Hyper-Turing computations or results are not accessible to local 
> observers.
>
> LC
>



 What about the interviews of people over 100 who say they've never had 
 a cold or the flu? 

 And where are these hyper-Turing processes occurring?

 - pt

>>>  
>>> Hypercomputations run into extreme energy or frequency, so the 
>>> conclusion of it occurs in black holes or in trans-Plankian scales we can't 
>>> observe. In a sense it is a sort of renormailization and treated as a 
>>> p-adic regularization of quantum gravity.
>>>
>>> When it comes to cold and flu I am just echoing what I was told. You 
>>> would have to research this out more extensively.
>>>
>>> LC
>>>
>>
>>
>> I think "hypercomputing" is not needed in the quantum space (LQG) model 
>> of black holes (the recent Penn State, LSU model).
>>
>> As for the flu, I'm afraid researching it might jinx me. :)
>>
>> - pt
>>
>
> LQG of course breaks Lorentz symmetry near the Planck scale. The finite 
> elements have reduced diffeomorphic symmetry, and which buries away any 
> such problems. The numerical simulations you reference are a typical case 
> of computer science, input variables in, output variable result. LQG has a 
> hard renormalization UV cutoff that breaks the symmetry of the field. 
>
> LC
>  
>
In LQG, or quantum space models in general, the *Lorenz group* 
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorentz_group ] would be replaced by a 
different mathematics. 

*All of the mathematics of conventional physics has to be "quantized" all 
the way down.*

- pt


 

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-26 Thread Lawrence Crowell
On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 10:14:24 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 9:59 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> > *I shouldn't say (if will jinx me!) but I've never gotten a flu shot 
>> and I haven't gotten the flu in over 40 years.*
>
>
> It's odd, no invention in human history has saved more lives than vaccines 
> and yet from the day the first one was invented in 1796 there has been 
> unscientific resistance against its use; it is the reason Polio was not 
> eliminated from the face of the Earth decades ago and the reason there is 
> currently a measles outbreak in anti-vaccine hotspots in the USA. And no 
> less a person than the presadent has spread the ridiculous rumor that 
> vaccinations cause autism. 
>
>   John K Clark
>

I simply forgot to get flu shots this year. I have gotten two of cases of 
the flu, Last week was a fairly ordinary flu that was annoying. The flu I 
had this week was horrible. It hit me Sunday evening and within 10 minutes 
I was staggering. I had 102 F fever and had these bizarre delerium dreams. 
The fever ended on Tuesday, but the prolonged part began. Influenza can 
cause the lungs to fill with fluid, and my left lung was filled and this 
hurt a lot. I felt as if I was impaled through the left chest. It took 
until today to finally expectorate that out. There are some vestiges of 
this, but it is largely gone. I am completely exhausted.

LC

>  
>

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-26 Thread Lawrence Crowell


On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 6:06:09 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 4:48:38 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 2:03:10 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 12:57:00 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>>> wrote:

 On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 8:59:42 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 5:54:46 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> My point is that in physics what might be called a halting condition 
>> is an attractor point or limit cycle. Equilibrium is the terminal point 
>> in 
>> the evolution of some system, say thinking according to Landauer's 
>> original 
>> paper on thermodynamics and information. The quantum field theory of 
>> black 
>> holes has no equilibrium condition. Now if the black hole runs away with 
>> Hawking radiation it will “explode” in a burst of gamma rays and other 
>> quanta. A Turing machine that does not halt can also be said to burn 
>> itself 
>> out, and if anyone has programmed assembler there were loops you could 
>> put 
>> a machine into that might do damage. 
>>
>> Sorry for being slow on this. I forgot to get flu shots this year and 
>> I have been hit with a real doozy of a flu. Since Sunday night until 
>> yesterday I was horribly ill, and only now am beginning to feel normal. 
>> Get 
>> the shots, you really do not want this flu!
>>
>> LC
>>
>
> I used to think that there *could be* true hypercomputation (what is 
> called super-Turing machines) in nature, but now I think that there is no 
> such thing (but anything remains possible, of course).
>
> *But the idea of substrate-independent Turing machines is incomplete.*
>
> I shouldn't say (if will jinx me!) but I've never gotten a flu shot 
> and I haven't gotten the flu in over 40 years.
>
> But I hope the flu program doesn't start running in / affect my 
> substrate!
>
> - pt
>

 I hate to pop your bubble here, but a few years ago at a New Year's 
 party a person who had cancer go into remission made this statement that 
 she never got colds or flus. A doctor I know was there and responded with 
 how not getting these sicknesses is a risk factor for cancer! The woman 
 died a last summer with the return of her non-Hodgkins lymphoma. 

 Hyper-Turing computations or results are not accessible to local 
 observers.

 LC

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What about the interviews of people over 100 who say they've never had a 
>>> cold or the flu? 
>>>
>>> And where are these hyper-Turing processes occurring?
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>  
>> Hypercomputations run into extreme energy or frequency, so the conclusion 
>> of it occurs in black holes or in trans-Plankian scales we can't observe. 
>> In a sense it is a sort of renormailization and treated as a p-adic 
>> regularization of quantum gravity.
>>
>> When it comes to cold and flu I am just echoing what I was told. You 
>> would have to research this out more extensively.
>>
>> LC
>>
>
>
> I think "hypercomputing" is not needed in the quantum space (LQG) model of 
> black holes (the recent Penn State, LSU model).
>
> As for the flu, I'm afraid researching it might jinx me. :)
>
> - pt
>

LQG of course breaks Lorentz symmetry near the Planck scale. The finite 
elements have reduced diffeomorphic symmetry, and which buries away any 
such problems. The numerical simulations you reference are a typical case 
of computer science, input variables in, output variable result. LQG has a 
hard renormalization UV cutoff that breaks the symmetry of the field. 

LC
 

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-25 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 10:14:24 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 9:59 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> > *I shouldn't say (if will jinx me!) but I've never gotten a flu shot 
>> and I haven't gotten the flu in over 40 years.*
>
>
> It's odd, no invention in human history has saved more lives than vaccines 
> and yet from the day the first one was invented in 1796 there has been 
> unscientific resistance against its use; it is the reason Polio was not 
> eliminated from the face of the Earth decades ago and the reason there is 
> currently a measles outbreak in anti-vaccine hotspots in the USA. And no 
> less a person than the presadent has spread the ridiculous rumor that 
> vaccinations cause autism. 
>
>   John K Clark
>
 


I had the usual childhood diseases (measles and mumps). Salk announced the 
successful test of his polio vaccine  the month I was born. ("Salk went on 
CBS radio to report a successful test on a small group of adults and 
children on 26 March 1953; two days later, the results were published in 
JAMA." - Wikipedia)

When I was 21 (in college) I had an extremely bad flu and I was in a 
college infirmary bed for 3 or 4 days. I think I had some minor flus in my 
20s, but since age 30 I can't recall anything that kept me out of work. And 
after 40 I can't remember any flu. Simple colds, yes.

I should be getting the yearly flu shot (or shots?).


- pt

>

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-25 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 9:59 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

> *I shouldn't say (if will jinx me!) but I've never gotten a flu shot and
> I haven't gotten the flu in over 40 years.*


It's odd, no invention in human history has saved more lives than vaccines
and yet from the day the first one was invented in 1796 there has been
unscientific resistance against its use; it is the reason Polio was not
eliminated from the face of the Earth decades ago and the reason there is
currently a measles outbreak in anti-vaccine hotspots in the USA. And no
less a person than the presadent has spread the ridiculous rumor that
vaccinations cause autism.

  John K Clark

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-25 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 6:27:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Jan 2019, at 15:19, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 7:14:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 23 Jan 2019, at 19:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 23, 2019 at 5:52:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 22 Jan 2019, at 01:49, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>> One of the oddest of things is when physicists use the language of 
>>> (various) theories of physics to express what can or cannot be the case. 
>>> It's just a language, which is probably wrong.
>>>
>>> There is a sense in which the Church/Turing thesis is true: All out 
>>> languages are Turing in their syntax and grammar. What they refer to is 
>>> another matter (pun intended).
>>>
>>>
>>> They refer to the set of computable functions, or to the universal 
>>> machine which understand that language. But not all language are Turing 
>>> universal. Only the context sensitive automata (in Chomski hierarchy) are 
>>> Turing universal. Simple languages, like the “regular” one are typically 
>>> not Turing universal. Bounded loops formalism cannot be either.
>>>
>>> But the notion of language is ambiguous with respect to computability, 
>>> and that is why I prefer to avoid that expression and always talk about 
>>> theories (set of beliefs) or machine (recursively enumerable set of 
>>> beliefs), which avoids ambiguity. 
>>> For example, is “predicate calculus” Turing universal? We can say yes, 
>>> given that the programming language PROLOG (obviously Turing universal) is 
>>> a tiny subset of predicate logic. But we can say know, if we look at 
>>> predicate logic as a theory. A prolog program is then an extension of that 
>>> theory, not something proved in predicate calculus.
>>> Thus, I can make sense of your remark. Even the language with only one 
>>> symbol {I}, and the rules that “I” is a wff, and if x is wwf, then Ix is 
>>> too, can be said Turing universal, as each program can be coded by a 
>>> number, which can be coded by a finite sequence of I. But of course, that 
>>> makes the notion of “universality” empty, as far as language are concerned. 
>>> Seen as a theory, predicate calculus is notoriously not universal. Even 
>>> predicate calculus + the natural numbers, and the law of addition, 
>>> (Pressburger arithmetic) is not universal. Or take RA with its seven 
>>> axioms. Taking any axiom out of it, and you get a complete-able theory, and 
>>> thus it cannot be Turing complete.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> Here's an example of a kind of "non-digital" language:
>>
>> *More Analog Computing Is on the Way*
>> https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way
>>
>>
>>
>> *The door on this new generation of analog computer programming is 
>> definitely open. Last month, at the Association for Computing Machinery’s 
>> (ACM) conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, 
>> a paper  was 
>> presented that described a compiler that uses a text based, high-level, 
>> abstraction language to generate the necessary low-level circuit wiring 
>> that defines the physical analog computing implementation. This research 
>> was done at MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory 
>> (CSAIL) and Dartmouth College. The main focus of their investigation was to 
>> improve the simulation of biological systems. *
>>
>>
>> *Configuration Synthesis for ProgrammableAnalog Devices with Arco*
>> https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf
>>
>> *Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful*
>> *computing substrate for performing complex neuromorphic*
>> *and cytomorphic computations. We present Arco, a new*
>> *solver that, given a dynamical system specification in the*
>> *form of a set of differential equations, generates physically*
>> *realizable configurations for programmable analog devices*
>> *that are algebraically equivalent to the specified system.*
>> *On a set of benchmarks from the biological domain, Arco*
>> *generates configurations with 35 to 534 connections and 28*
>> *to 326 components in 1 to 54 minutes.*
>>
>>
>> - pt
>>
>>
>> Intersting.
>>
>> Yet, that does not violate the Church-Thesis, even if very useful FAPP. 
>> But such computations arise in arithmetic, either directly, or through a 
>> infinite sequence of approximations. If all decimals of the analog 
>> phenomenon needs to be taken into account, then we are out of my working 
>> hypothesis, and even evolution theory becomes wrong, as evolution and life 
>> becomes sequences of miracles. But the goal of the authors here is not 
>> learning anything in metaphysics, just doing efficacious machine. In that 
>> case mechanism explains the plausible necessity of such moves, including 
>> quantum computations (which also do not violate Church’s thesis).
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> I don't believe 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-25 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 24 Jan 2019, at 19:57, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 8:59:42 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 5:54:46 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
> 
> 
>  
> 
> My point is that in physics what might be called a halting condition is an 
> attractor point or limit cycle. Equilibrium is the terminal point in the 
> evolution of some system, say thinking according to Landauer's original paper 
> on thermodynamics and information. The quantum field theory of black holes 
> has no equilibrium condition. Now if the black hole runs away with Hawking 
> radiation it will “explode” in a burst of gamma rays and other quanta. A 
> Turing machine that does not halt can also be said to burn itself out, and if 
> anyone has programmed assembler there were loops you could put a machine into 
> that might do damage. 
> 
> Sorry for being slow on this. I forgot to get flu shots this year and I have 
> been hit with a real doozy of a flu. Since Sunday night until yesterday I was 
> horribly ill, and only now am beginning to feel normal. Get the shots, you 
> really do not want this flu!
> 
> LC
> 
> I used to think that there could be true hypercomputation (what is called 
> super-Turing machines) in nature, but now I think that there is no such thing 
> (but anything remains possible, of course).
> 
> But the idea of substrate-independent Turing machines is incomplete.
> 
> I shouldn't say (if will jinx me!) but I've never gotten a flu shot and I 
> haven't gotten the flu in over 40 years.
> 
> But I hope the flu program doesn't start running in / affect my substrate!
> 
> - pt
> 
> I hate to pop your bubble here, but a few years ago at a New Year's party a 
> person who had cancer go into remission made this statement that she never 
> got colds or flus. A doctor I know was there and responded with how not 
> getting these sicknesses is a risk factor for cancer! The woman died a last 
> summer with the return of her non-Hodgkins lymphoma. 
> 
> Hyper-Turing computations or results are not accessible to local observers.

That is not obvious. Have you understand the first person indeterminacy (step 3 
in the sane04 paper). This imposes a sort of random oracle to the first person 
associated with the infinitely many computations going through their actual 
state. It is hard in that case to prove that non computable processes are not 
available, even to local observer. But I agree that except for the quantum 
randomness there are not much evidence for more on this.

Bruno



> 
> LC
> 
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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-25 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 24 Jan 2019, at 15:19, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 7:14:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 23 Jan 2019, at 19:01, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, January 23, 2019 at 5:52:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 22 Jan 2019, at 01:49, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> One of the oddest of things is when physicists use the language of 
>>> (various) theories of physics to express what can or cannot be the case. 
>>> It's just a language, which is probably wrong.
>>> 
>>> There is a sense in which the Church/Turing thesis is true: All out 
>>> languages are Turing in their syntax and grammar. What they refer to is 
>>> another matter (pun intended).
>> 
>> They refer to the set of computable functions, or to the universal machine 
>> which understand that language. But not all language are Turing universal. 
>> Only the context sensitive automata (in Chomski hierarchy) are Turing 
>> universal. Simple languages, like the “regular” one are typically not Turing 
>> universal. Bounded loops formalism cannot be either.
>> 
>> But the notion of language is ambiguous with respect to computability, and 
>> that is why I prefer to avoid that expression and always talk about theories 
>> (set of beliefs) or machine (recursively enumerable set of beliefs), which 
>> avoids ambiguity. 
>> For example, is “predicate calculus” Turing universal? We can say yes, given 
>> that the programming language PROLOG (obviously Turing universal) is a tiny 
>> subset of predicate logic. But we can say know, if we look at predicate 
>> logic as a theory. A prolog program is then an extension of that theory, not 
>> something proved in predicate calculus.
>> Thus, I can make sense of your remark. Even the language with only one 
>> symbol {I}, and the rules that “I” is a wff, and if x is wwf, then Ix is 
>> too, can be said Turing universal, as each program can be coded by a number, 
>> which can be coded by a finite sequence of I. But of course, that makes the 
>> notion of “universality” empty, as far as language are concerned. 
>> Seen as a theory, predicate calculus is notoriously not universal. Even 
>> predicate calculus + the natural numbers, and the law of addition, 
>> (Pressburger arithmetic) is not universal. Or take RA with its seven axioms. 
>> Taking any axiom out of it, and you get a complete-able theory, and thus it 
>> cannot be Turing complete.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Here's an example of a kind of "non-digital" language:
>> 
>> More Analog Computing Is on the Way
>> https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The door on this new generation of analog computer programming is definitely 
>> open. Last month, at the Association for Computing Machinery’s (ACM) 
>> conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, a paper  
>> was presented that 
>> described a compiler that uses a text based, high-level, abstraction 
>> language to generate the necessary low-level circuit wiring that defines the 
>> physical analog computing implementation. This research was done at MIT’s 
>> Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL) and 
>> Dartmouth College. The main focus of their investigation was to improve the 
>> simulation of biological systems. 
>> 
>> 
>> Configuration Synthesis for ProgrammableAnalog Devices with Arco
>> https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf 
>> 
>> 
>> Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful
>> computing substrate for performing complex neuromorphic
>> and cytomorphic computations. We present Arco, a new
>> solver that, given a dynamical system specification in the
>> form of a set of differential equations, generates physically
>> realizable configurations for programmable analog devices
>> that are algebraically equivalent to the specified system.
>> On a set of benchmarks from the biological domain, Arco
>> generates configurations with 35 to 534 connections and 28
>> to 326 components in 1 to 54 minutes.
>> 
>> 
>> - pt
> 
> Intersting.
> 
> Yet, that does not violate the Church-Thesis, even if very useful FAPP. But 
> such computations arise in arithmetic, either directly, or through a infinite 
> sequence of approximations. If all decimals of the analog phenomenon needs to 
> be taken into account, then we are out of my working hypothesis, and even 
> evolution theory becomes wrong, as evolution and life becomes sequences of 
> miracles. But the goal of the authors here is not learning anything in 
> metaphysics, just doing efficacious machine. In that case mechanism explains 
> the plausible necessity of such moves, including quantum computations (which 
> also do not violate Church’s thesis).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I don't believe in 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-25 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 4:48:38 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 2:03:10 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 12:57:00 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 8:59:42 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 5:54:46 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
 wrote:
>
>
>
>  
>
> My point is that in physics what might be called a halting condition 
> is an attractor point or limit cycle. Equilibrium is the terminal point 
> in 
> the evolution of some system, say thinking according to Landauer's 
> original 
> paper on thermodynamics and information. The quantum field theory of 
> black 
> holes has no equilibrium condition. Now if the black hole runs away with 
> Hawking radiation it will “explode” in a burst of gamma rays and other 
> quanta. A Turing machine that does not halt can also be said to burn 
> itself 
> out, and if anyone has programmed assembler there were loops you could 
> put 
> a machine into that might do damage. 
>
> Sorry for being slow on this. I forgot to get flu shots this year and 
> I have been hit with a real doozy of a flu. Since Sunday night until 
> yesterday I was horribly ill, and only now am beginning to feel normal. 
> Get 
> the shots, you really do not want this flu!
>
> LC
>

 I used to think that there *could be* true hypercomputation (what is 
 called super-Turing machines) in nature, but now I think that there is no 
 such thing (but anything remains possible, of course).

 *But the idea of substrate-independent Turing machines is incomplete.*

 I shouldn't say (if will jinx me!) but I've never gotten a flu shot and 
 I haven't gotten the flu in over 40 years.

 But I hope the flu program doesn't start running in / affect my 
 substrate!

 - pt

>>>
>>> I hate to pop your bubble here, but a few years ago at a New Year's 
>>> party a person who had cancer go into remission made this statement that 
>>> she never got colds or flus. A doctor I know was there and responded with 
>>> how not getting these sicknesses is a risk factor for cancer! The woman 
>>> died a last summer with the return of her non-Hodgkins lymphoma. 
>>>
>>> Hyper-Turing computations or results are not accessible to local 
>>> observers.
>>>
>>> LC
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> What about the interviews of people over 100 who say they've never had a 
>> cold or the flu? 
>>
>> And where are these hyper-Turing processes occurring?
>>
>> - pt
>>
>  
> Hypercomputations run into extreme energy or frequency, so the conclusion 
> of it occurs in black holes or in trans-Plankian scales we can't observe. 
> In a sense it is a sort of renormailization and treated as a p-adic 
> regularization of quantum gravity.
>
> When it comes to cold and flu I am just echoing what I was told. You would 
> have to research this out more extensively.
>
> LC
>


I think "hypercomputing" is not needed in the quantum space (LQG) model of 
black holes (the recent Penn State, LSU model).

As for the flu, I'm afraid researching it might jinx me. :)

- pt

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-25 Thread Lawrence Crowell
On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 2:03:10 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 12:57:00 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 8:59:42 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 5:54:46 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>>> wrote:



  

 My point is that in physics what might be called a halting condition is 
 an attractor point or limit cycle. Equilibrium is the terminal point in 
 the 
 evolution of some system, say thinking according to Landauer's original 
 paper on thermodynamics and information. The quantum field theory of black 
 holes has no equilibrium condition. Now if the black hole runs away with 
 Hawking radiation it will “explode” in a burst of gamma rays and other 
 quanta. A Turing machine that does not halt can also be said to burn 
 itself 
 out, and if anyone has programmed assembler there were loops you could put 
 a machine into that might do damage. 

 Sorry for being slow on this. I forgot to get flu shots this year and I 
 have been hit with a real doozy of a flu. Since Sunday night until 
 yesterday I was horribly ill, and only now am beginning to feel normal. 
 Get 
 the shots, you really do not want this flu!

 LC

>>>
>>> I used to think that there *could be* true hypercomputation (what is 
>>> called super-Turing machines) in nature, but now I think that there is no 
>>> such thing (but anything remains possible, of course).
>>>
>>> *But the idea of substrate-independent Turing machines is incomplete.*
>>>
>>> I shouldn't say (if will jinx me!) but I've never gotten a flu shot and 
>>> I haven't gotten the flu in over 40 years.
>>>
>>> But I hope the flu program doesn't start running in / affect my 
>>> substrate!
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>
>> I hate to pop your bubble here, but a few years ago at a New Year's party 
>> a person who had cancer go into remission made this statement that she 
>> never got colds or flus. A doctor I know was there and responded with how 
>> not getting these sicknesses is a risk factor for cancer! The woman died a 
>> last summer with the return of her non-Hodgkins lymphoma. 
>>
>> Hyper-Turing computations or results are not accessible to local 
>> observers.
>>
>> LC
>>
>
>
>
> What about the interviews of people over 100 who say they've never had a 
> cold or the flu? 
>
> And where are these hyper-Turing processes occurring?
>
> - pt
>
 
Hypercomputations run into extreme energy or frequency, so the conclusion 
of it occurs in black holes or in trans-Plankian scales we can't observe. 
In a sense it is a sort of renormailization and treated as a p-adic 
regularization of quantum gravity.

When it comes to cold and flu I am just echoing what I was told. You would 
have to research this out more extensively.

LC

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-24 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 12:57:00 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 8:59:42 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 5:54:46 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>> My point is that in physics what might be called a halting condition is 
>>> an attractor point or limit cycle. Equilibrium is the terminal point in the 
>>> evolution of some system, say thinking according to Landauer's original 
>>> paper on thermodynamics and information. The quantum field theory of black 
>>> holes has no equilibrium condition. Now if the black hole runs away with 
>>> Hawking radiation it will “explode” in a burst of gamma rays and other 
>>> quanta. A Turing machine that does not halt can also be said to burn itself 
>>> out, and if anyone has programmed assembler there were loops you could put 
>>> a machine into that might do damage. 
>>>
>>> Sorry for being slow on this. I forgot to get flu shots this year and I 
>>> have been hit with a real doozy of a flu. Since Sunday night until 
>>> yesterday I was horribly ill, and only now am beginning to feel normal. Get 
>>> the shots, you really do not want this flu!
>>>
>>> LC
>>>
>>
>> I used to think that there *could be* true hypercomputation (what is 
>> called super-Turing machines) in nature, but now I think that there is no 
>> such thing (but anything remains possible, of course).
>>
>> *But the idea of substrate-independent Turing machines is incomplete.*
>>
>> I shouldn't say (if will jinx me!) but I've never gotten a flu shot and I 
>> haven't gotten the flu in over 40 years.
>>
>> But I hope the flu program doesn't start running in / affect my substrate!
>>
>> - pt
>>
>
> I hate to pop your bubble here, but a few years ago at a New Year's party 
> a person who had cancer go into remission made this statement that she 
> never got colds or flus. A doctor I know was there and responded with how 
> not getting these sicknesses is a risk factor for cancer! The woman died a 
> last summer with the return of her non-Hodgkins lymphoma. 
>
> Hyper-Turing computations or results are not accessible to local observers.
>
> LC
>



What about the interviews of people over 100 who say they've never had a 
cold or the flu? 

And where are these hyper-Turing processes occurring?

- pt

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-24 Thread Lawrence Crowell
On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 8:59:42 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 5:54:46 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> My point is that in physics what might be called a halting condition is 
>> an attractor point or limit cycle. Equilibrium is the terminal point in the 
>> evolution of some system, say thinking according to Landauer's original 
>> paper on thermodynamics and information. The quantum field theory of black 
>> holes has no equilibrium condition. Now if the black hole runs away with 
>> Hawking radiation it will “explode” in a burst of gamma rays and other 
>> quanta. A Turing machine that does not halt can also be said to burn itself 
>> out, and if anyone has programmed assembler there were loops you could put 
>> a machine into that might do damage. 
>>
>> Sorry for being slow on this. I forgot to get flu shots this year and I 
>> have been hit with a real doozy of a flu. Since Sunday night until 
>> yesterday I was horribly ill, and only now am beginning to feel normal. Get 
>> the shots, you really do not want this flu!
>>
>> LC
>>
>
> I used to think that there *could be* true hypercomputation (what is 
> called super-Turing machines) in nature, but now I think that there is no 
> such thing (but anything remains possible, of course).
>
> *But the idea of substrate-independent Turing machines is incomplete.*
>
> I shouldn't say (if will jinx me!) but I've never gotten a flu shot and I 
> haven't gotten the flu in over 40 years.
>
> But I hope the flu program doesn't start running in / affect my substrate!
>
> - pt
>

I hate to pop your bubble here, but a few years ago at a New Year's party a 
person who had cancer go into remission made this statement that she never 
got colds or flus. A doctor I know was there and responded with how not 
getting these sicknesses is a risk factor for cancer! The woman died a last 
summer with the return of her non-Hodgkins lymphoma. 

Hyper-Turing computations or results are not accessible to local observers.

LC

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-24 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 5:54:46 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Monday, January 21, 2019 at 6:49:12 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 21, 2019 at 6:19:07 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 21, 2019 at 5:09:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 21 Jan 2019, at 00:17, Lawrence Crowell  
 wrote:

 On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 9:16:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 19 Jan 2019, at 01:42, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
>
> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 6:31:06 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:25:16 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 8:03 AM  wrote:
>>>
>>> *> How does one calculate Planck length using the fundamental 
 constants G, h, and c, and having calculated it, how does one show 
 that 
 measuring a length that small with photons of the same approximate 
 wave 
 length, would result in a black hole? TIA, AG*
>>>
>>>  
>>> In any wave the speed of the wave is wavelength times frequency and 
>>> according to 
>>> Planck E= h*frequency  so E= C*h/wavelength.  Thus the smaller the 
>>> wavelength the greater the energy. According to Einstein energy is 
>>> just another form of mass (E = MC^2) so at some point the wavelength
>>>  is so small and the light photon is so energetic (aka massive) 
>>> that the escape velocity is greater than the speed of light and the 
>>> object 
>>> becomes a Black Hole.
>>>
>>> Or you can look at it another way, we know from Heisenberg that to 
>>> determine the position of a particle more precisely with light you have 
>>> to 
>>> use a smaller wavelength, and there is something called the  "Compton 
>>> wavelength" (Lc) ; to pin down the position of a particle of mass m to 
>>> within one Compton wavelength would require light of enough energy to 
>>> create another particle of that mass. The formula for the Compton 
>>> Wavelength is Lc= h/(2PI*M*c).
>>>
>>> Schwarzschild told us that the radius of a Black Hole (Rs), that is 
>>> to say where the escape velocity is the speed of light  is:  Rs= 
>>> GM/c^2. At 
>>> some mass Lc will equal Rs and that mass is the Planck mass, and that 
>>> Black 
>>> Hole will have the radius of the Planck Length, 1.6*10^-35 meters.
>>>
>>> Then if you do a little algebra: 
>>> GM/c^2 = h/(2PI*M*c)
>>> GM= hc/2PI*M
>>> GM^2 = hc/2*PI
>>> M^2 = hc/2*PI*G
>>> M = (hc/2*PI*G)^1/2and that is the formula for the Planck Mass , 
>>> it's .02 milligrams.
>>>
>>> And the Planck Length turns out to be (G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 and the 
>>> Planck time is the time it takes light to travel the Planck length. 
>>>
>>> The Planck Temperature Tp is sort of the counterpoint to Absolute 
>>> Zero, Tp is as hot as things can get because the black-body radiation 
>>> given 
>>> off by things when they are at temperature Tp have a wavelength equal 
>>> to 
>>> the Planck Length, the distance light can move in the Planck Time of 
>>> 10^-44 
>>> seconds. The formula for the Planck temperature is Tp = Mp*c^2/k where 
>>> Mp 
>>> is the Planck Mass and K is Boltzmann's constant and it works out to be 
>>> 1.4*10^32 degrees Kelvin.  Beyond that point both Quantum Mechanics and 
>>> General Relativity break down and nobody understands what if anything 
>>> is 
>>> going on.
>>>
>>> The surface temperature of the sun is at 5.7 *10^3  degrees Kelvin 
>>> so if it were 2.46*10^28 times hotter it would be at the Planck 
>>> Temperature, and because radiant energy is proportional to T^4 the sun 
>>> would be 3.67*10^113 times brighter. At that temperature to equal the 
>>> sun's 
>>> brightness the surface area would have to be reduced by a factor 
>>> of 3.67*10^113, the surface area of a sphere is proportional to the 
>>> radius 
>>> squared, so you'd have to reduce the sun's radius by (3.67*10^113)^1/2, 
>>> and that is  6.05*10^56. The sun's radius is 6.95*10^8   meters and 
>>>  6.95*10^8/ 6.05*10^56  is 1.15^10^-48 meters. 
>>>
>>> That means a sphere at the Planck Temperature with a radius 10 
>>> thousand billion times SMALLER than the Planck Length would be as 
>>> bright as 
>>> the sun, but as far as we know nothing can be that small. If the radius 
>>> was 
>>> 10^13 times longer it would be as small as things can get and the 
>>> object 
>>> would be (10^13)^2 = 10^26 times as bright as the sun. I'm just 
>>> speculating 
>>> but perhaps that's the luminosity of the Big Bang; I say that because 
>>> that's how bright 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-24 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, January 24, 2019 at 7:14:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 Jan 2019, at 19:01, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, January 23, 2019 at 5:52:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 22 Jan 2019, at 01:49, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>> One of the oddest of things is when physicists use the language of 
>> (various) theories of physics to express what can or cannot be the case. 
>> It's just a language, which is probably wrong.
>>
>> There is a sense in which the Church/Turing thesis is true: All out 
>> languages are Turing in their syntax and grammar. What they refer to is 
>> another matter (pun intended).
>>
>>
>> They refer to the set of computable functions, or to the universal 
>> machine which understand that language. But not all language are Turing 
>> universal. Only the context sensitive automata (in Chomski hierarchy) are 
>> Turing universal. Simple languages, like the “regular” one are typically 
>> not Turing universal. Bounded loops formalism cannot be either.
>>
>> But the notion of language is ambiguous with respect to computability, 
>> and that is why I prefer to avoid that expression and always talk about 
>> theories (set of beliefs) or machine (recursively enumerable set of 
>> beliefs), which avoids ambiguity. 
>> For example, is “predicate calculus” Turing universal? We can say yes, 
>> given that the programming language PROLOG (obviously Turing universal) is 
>> a tiny subset of predicate logic. But we can say know, if we look at 
>> predicate logic as a theory. A prolog program is then an extension of that 
>> theory, not something proved in predicate calculus.
>> Thus, I can make sense of your remark. Even the language with only one 
>> symbol {I}, and the rules that “I” is a wff, and if x is wwf, then Ix is 
>> too, can be said Turing universal, as each program can be coded by a 
>> number, which can be coded by a finite sequence of I. But of course, that 
>> makes the notion of “universality” empty, as far as language are concerned. 
>> Seen as a theory, predicate calculus is notoriously not universal. Even 
>> predicate calculus + the natural numbers, and the law of addition, 
>> (Pressburger arithmetic) is not universal. Or take RA with its seven 
>> axioms. Taking any axiom out of it, and you get a complete-able theory, and 
>> thus it cannot be Turing complete.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> Here's an example of a kind of "non-digital" language:
>
> *More Analog Computing Is on the Way*
> https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way
>
>
>
> *The door on this new generation of analog computer programming is 
> definitely open. Last month, at the Association for Computing Machinery’s 
> (ACM) conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, 
> a paper  was 
> presented that described a compiler that uses a text based, high-level, 
> abstraction language to generate the necessary low-level circuit wiring 
> that defines the physical analog computing implementation. This research 
> was done at MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory 
> (CSAIL) and Dartmouth College. The main focus of their investigation was to 
> improve the simulation of biological systems. *
>
>
> *Configuration Synthesis for ProgrammableAnalog Devices with Arco*
> https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf
>
> *Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful*
> *computing substrate for performing complex neuromorphic*
> *and cytomorphic computations. We present Arco, a new*
> *solver that, given a dynamical system specification in the*
> *form of a set of differential equations, generates physically*
> *realizable configurations for programmable analog devices*
> *that are algebraically equivalent to the specified system.*
> *On a set of benchmarks from the biological domain, Arco*
> *generates configurations with 35 to 534 connections and 28*
> *to 326 components in 1 to 54 minutes.*
>
>
> - pt
>
>
> Intersting.
>
> Yet, that does not violate the Church-Thesis, even if very useful FAPP. 
> But such computations arise in arithmetic, either directly, or through a 
> infinite sequence of approximations. If all decimals of the analog 
> phenomenon needs to be taken into account, then we are out of my working 
> hypothesis, and even evolution theory becomes wrong, as evolution and life 
> becomes sequences of miracles. But the goal of the authors here is not 
> learning anything in metaphysics, just doing efficacious machine. In that 
> case mechanism explains the plausible necessity of such moves, including 
> quantum computations (which also do not violate Church’s thesis).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>


I don't believe in (or know what are) miracles (although a real 
hypercomputer - one you could give any statement of arithmetic to - e.g. 
*Goldbach's 
conjecture*  -  and it could check through all - infinite number of -  
integers and tell you "true" or 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-24 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 24 Jan 2019, at 12:54, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Monday, January 21, 2019 at 6:49:12 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Monday, January 21, 2019 at 6:19:07 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
> On Monday, January 21, 2019 at 5:09:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 21 Jan 2019, at 00:17, Lawrence Crowell > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 9:16:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 19 Jan 2019, at 01:42, Lawrence Crowell > 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 6:31:06 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:22, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 
 
 
 On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:25:16 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
 On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 8:03 AM > wrote:
 
 > How does one calculate Planck length using the fundamental constants G, 
 > h, and c, and having calculated it, how does one show that measuring a 
 > length that small with photons of the same approximate wave length, 
 > would result in a black hole? TIA, AG
  
 In any wave the speed of the wave is wavelength times frequency and 
 according to Planck E= h*frequency  so E= C*h/wavelength.  Thus the 
 smaller the wavelength the greater the energy. According to Einstein 
 energy is just another form of mass (E = MC^2) so at some point the 
 wavelength is so small and the light photon is so energetic (aka massive) 
 that the escape velocity is greater than the speed of light and the object 
 becomes a Black Hole.
 
 Or you can look at it another way, we know from Heisenberg that to 
 determine the position of a particle more precisely with light you have to 
 use a smaller wavelength, and there is something called the  "Compton 
 wavelength" (Lc) ; to pin down the position of a particle of mass m to 
 within one Compton wavelength would require light of enough energy to 
 create another particle of that mass. The formula for the Compton 
 Wavelength is Lc= h/(2PI*M*c).
 
 Schwarzschild told us that the radius of a Black Hole (Rs), that is to say 
 where the escape velocity is the speed of light  is:  Rs= GM/c^2. At some 
 mass Lc will equal Rs and that mass is the Planck mass, and that Black 
 Hole will have the radius of the Planck Length, 1.6*10^-35 meters.
 
 Then if you do a little algebra:
 GM/c^2 = h/(2PI*M*c)
 GM= hc/2PI*M
 GM^2 = hc/2*PI
 M^2 = hc/2*PI*G
 M = (hc/2*PI*G)^1/2and that is the formula for the Planck Mass , it's 
 .02 milligrams.
 
 And the Planck Length turns out to be (G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 and the Planck 
 time is the time it takes light to travel the Planck length. 
 
 The Planck Temperature Tp is sort of the counterpoint to Absolute Zero, Tp 
 is as hot as things can get because the black-body radiation given off by 
 things when they are at temperature Tp have a wavelength equal to the 
 Planck Length, the distance light can move in the Planck Time of 10^-44 
 seconds. The formula for the Planck temperature is Tp = Mp*c^2/k where Mp 
 is the Planck Mass and K is Boltzmann's constant and it works out to be 
 1.4*10^32 degrees Kelvin.  Beyond that point both Quantum Mechanics and 
 General Relativity break down and nobody understands what if anything is 
 going on.
 
 The surface temperature of the sun is at 5.7 *10^3  degrees Kelvin so if 
 it were 2.46*10^28 times hotter it would be at the Planck Temperature, and 
 because radiant energy is proportional to T^4 the sun would be 3.67*10^113 
 times brighter. At that temperature to equal the sun's brightness the 
 surface area would have to be reduced by a factor of 3.67*10^113, the 
 surface area of a sphere is proportional to the radius squared, so you'd 
 have to reduce the sun's radius by (3.67*10^113)^1/2, and that is  
 6.05*10^56. The sun's radius is 6.95*10^8   meters and  6.95*10^8/ 
 6.05*10^56  is 1.15^10^-48 meters. 
 
 That means a sphere at the Planck Temperature with a radius 10 thousand 
 billion times SMALLER than the Planck Length would be as bright as the 
 sun, but as far as we know nothing can be that small. If the radius was 
 10^13 times longer it would be as small as things can get and the object 
 would be (10^13)^2 = 10^26 times as bright as the sun. I'm just 
 speculating but perhaps that's the luminosity of the Big Bang; I say that 
 because that's how bright things would be if the smallest thing we think 
 can exist was as hot as we think things can get. 
 
 John K Clark
 
 Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the Planck 
 length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any 
 difference between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or 
 conjecture that we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-24 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 23 Jan 2019, at 19:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, January 23, 2019 at 5:52:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 22 Jan 2019, at 01:49, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> One of the oddest of things is when physicists use the language of (various) 
>> theories of physics to express what can or cannot be the case. It's just a 
>> language, which is probably wrong.
>> 
>> There is a sense in which the Church/Turing thesis is true: All out 
>> languages are Turing in their syntax and grammar. What they refer to is 
>> another matter (pun intended).
> 
> They refer to the set of computable functions, or to the universal machine 
> which understand that language. But not all language are Turing universal. 
> Only the context sensitive automata (in Chomski hierarchy) are Turing 
> universal. Simple languages, like the “regular” one are typically not Turing 
> universal. Bounded loops formalism cannot be either.
> 
> But the notion of language is ambiguous with respect to computability, and 
> that is why I prefer to avoid that expression and always talk about theories 
> (set of beliefs) or machine (recursively enumerable set of beliefs), which 
> avoids ambiguity. 
> For example, is “predicate calculus” Turing universal? We can say yes, given 
> that the programming language PROLOG (obviously Turing universal) is a tiny 
> subset of predicate logic. But we can say know, if we look at predicate logic 
> as a theory. A prolog program is then an extension of that theory, not 
> something proved in predicate calculus.
> Thus, I can make sense of your remark. Even the language with only one symbol 
> {I}, and the rules that “I” is a wff, and if x is wwf, then Ix is too, can be 
> said Turing universal, as each program can be coded by a number, which can be 
> coded by a finite sequence of I. But of course, that makes the notion of 
> “universality” empty, as far as language are concerned. 
> Seen as a theory, predicate calculus is notoriously not universal. Even 
> predicate calculus + the natural numbers, and the law of addition, 
> (Pressburger arithmetic) is not universal. Or take RA with its seven axioms. 
> Taking any axiom out of it, and you get a complete-able theory, and thus it 
> cannot be Turing complete.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> Here's an example of a kind of "non-digital" language:
> 
> More Analog Computing Is on the Way
> https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way
> 
> 
> The door on this new generation of analog computer programming is definitely 
> open. Last month, at the Association for Computing Machinery’s (ACM) 
> conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, a paper  
> was presented that 
> described a compiler that uses a text based, high-level, abstraction language 
> to generate the necessary low-level circuit wiring that defines the physical 
> analog computing implementation. This research was done at MIT’s Computer 
> Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL) and Dartmouth College. 
> The main focus of their investigation was to improve the simulation of 
> biological systems. 
> 
> 
> Configuration Synthesis for ProgrammableAnalog Devices with Arco
> https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf
> 
> Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful
> computing substrate for performing complex neuromorphic
> and cytomorphic computations. We present Arco, a new
> solver that, given a dynamical system specification in the
> form of a set of differential equations, generates physically
> realizable configurations for programmable analog devices
> that are algebraically equivalent to the specified system.
> On a set of benchmarks from the biological domain, Arco
> generates configurations with 35 to 534 connections and 28
> to 326 components in 1 to 54 minutes.
> 
> 
> - pt

Intersting.

Yet, that does not violate the Church-Thesis, even if very useful FAPP. But 
such computations arise in arithmetic, either directly, or through a infinite 
sequence of approximations. If all decimals of the analog phenomenon needs to 
be taken into account, then we are out of my working hypothesis, and even 
evolution theory becomes wrong, as evolution and life becomes sequences of 
miracles. But the goal of the authors here is not learning anything in 
metaphysics, just doing efficacious machine. In that case mechanism explains 
the plausible necessity of such moves, including quantum computations (which 
also do not violate Church’s thesis).

Bruno





>  
> 
> -- 
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> 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-24 Thread Lawrence Crowell
On Monday, January 21, 2019 at 6:49:12 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, January 21, 2019 at 6:19:07 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Monday, January 21, 2019 at 5:09:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 21 Jan 2019, at 00:17, Lawrence Crowell  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 9:16:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 19 Jan 2019, at 01:42, Lawrence Crowell  
 wrote:

 On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 6:31:06 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:25:16 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 8:03 AM  wrote:
>>
>> *> How does one calculate Planck length using the fundamental 
>>> constants G, h, and c, and having calculated it, how does one show that 
>>> measuring a length that small with photons of the same approximate wave 
>>> length, would result in a black hole? TIA, AG*
>>
>>  
>> In any wave the speed of the wave is wavelength times frequency and 
>> according to 
>> Planck E= h*frequency  so E= C*h/wavelength.  Thus the smaller the 
>> wavelength the greater the energy. According to Einstein energy is 
>> just another form of mass (E = MC^2) so at some point the wavelength is 
>> so small and the light photon is so energetic (aka massive) that the 
>> escape 
>> velocity is greater than the speed of light and the object becomes a 
>> Black 
>> Hole.
>>
>> Or you can look at it another way, we know from Heisenberg that to 
>> determine the position of a particle more precisely with light you have 
>> to 
>> use a smaller wavelength, and there is something called the  "Compton 
>> wavelength" (Lc) ; to pin down the position of a particle of mass m to 
>> within one Compton wavelength would require light of enough energy to 
>> create another particle of that mass. The formula for the Compton 
>> Wavelength is Lc= h/(2PI*M*c).
>>
>> Schwarzschild told us that the radius of a Black Hole (Rs), that is 
>> to say where the escape velocity is the speed of light  is:  Rs= GM/c^2. 
>> At 
>> some mass Lc will equal Rs and that mass is the Planck mass, and that 
>> Black 
>> Hole will have the radius of the Planck Length, 1.6*10^-35 meters.
>>
>> Then if you do a little algebra: 
>> GM/c^2 = h/(2PI*M*c)
>> GM= hc/2PI*M
>> GM^2 = hc/2*PI
>> M^2 = hc/2*PI*G
>> M = (hc/2*PI*G)^1/2and that is the formula for the Planck Mass , 
>> it's .02 milligrams.
>>
>> And the Planck Length turns out to be (G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 and the 
>> Planck time is the time it takes light to travel the Planck length. 
>>
>> The Planck Temperature Tp is sort of the counterpoint to Absolute 
>> Zero, Tp is as hot as things can get because the black-body radiation 
>> given 
>> off by things when they are at temperature Tp have a wavelength equal to 
>> the Planck Length, the distance light can move in the Planck Time of 
>> 10^-44 
>> seconds. The formula for the Planck temperature is Tp = Mp*c^2/k where 
>> Mp 
>> is the Planck Mass and K is Boltzmann's constant and it works out to be 
>> 1.4*10^32 degrees Kelvin.  Beyond that point both Quantum Mechanics and 
>> General Relativity break down and nobody understands what if anything is 
>> going on.
>>
>> The surface temperature of the sun is at 5.7 *10^3  degrees Kelvin so 
>> if it were 2.46*10^28 times hotter it would be at the Planck 
>> Temperature, 
>> and because radiant energy is proportional to T^4 the sun would 
>> be 3.67*10^113 times brighter. At that temperature to equal the sun's 
>> brightness the surface area would have to be reduced by a factor 
>> of 3.67*10^113, the surface area of a sphere is proportional to the 
>> radius 
>> squared, so you'd have to reduce the sun's radius by (3.67*10^113)^1/2, 
>> and that is  6.05*10^56. The sun's radius is 6.95*10^8   meters and 
>>  6.95*10^8/ 6.05*10^56  is 1.15^10^-48 meters. 
>>
>> That means a sphere at the Planck Temperature with a radius 10 
>> thousand billion times SMALLER than the Planck Length would be as bright 
>> as 
>> the sun, but as far as we know nothing can be that small. If the radius 
>> was 
>> 10^13 times longer it would be as small as things can get and the object 
>> would be (10^13)^2 = 10^26 times as bright as the sun. I'm just 
>> speculating 
>> but perhaps that's the luminosity of the Big Bang; I say that because 
>> that's how bright things would be if the smallest thing we think can 
>> exist 
>> was as hot as we think things can get. 
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
>
>
> *Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-23 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, January 23, 2019 at 5:52:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Jan 2019, at 01:49, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
> One of the oddest of things is when physicists use the language of 
> (various) theories of physics to express what can or cannot be the case. 
> It's just a language, which is probably wrong.
>
> There is a sense in which the Church/Turing thesis is true: All out 
> languages are Turing in their syntax and grammar. What they refer to is 
> another matter (pun intended).
>
>
> They refer to the set of computable functions, or to the universal machine 
> which understand that language. But not all language are Turing universal. 
> Only the context sensitive automata (in Chomski hierarchy) are Turing 
> universal. Simple languages, like the “regular” one are typically not 
> Turing universal. Bounded loops formalism cannot be either.
>
> But the notion of language is ambiguous with respect to computability, and 
> that is why I prefer to avoid that expression and always talk about 
> theories (set of beliefs) or machine (recursively enumerable set of 
> beliefs), which avoids ambiguity. 
> For example, is “predicate calculus” Turing universal? We can say yes, 
> given that the programming language PROLOG (obviously Turing universal) is 
> a tiny subset of predicate logic. But we can say know, if we look at 
> predicate logic as a theory. A prolog program is then an extension of that 
> theory, not something proved in predicate calculus.
> Thus, I can make sense of your remark. Even the language with only one 
> symbol {I}, and the rules that “I” is a wff, and if x is wwf, then Ix is 
> too, can be said Turing universal, as each program can be coded by a 
> number, which can be coded by a finite sequence of I. But of course, that 
> makes the notion of “universality” empty, as far as language are concerned. 
> Seen as a theory, predicate calculus is notoriously not universal. Even 
> predicate calculus + the natural numbers, and the law of addition, 
> (Pressburger arithmetic) is not universal. Or take RA with its seven 
> axioms. Taking any axiom out of it, and you get a complete-able theory, and 
> thus it cannot be Turing complete.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
Here's an example of a kind of "non-digital" language:

*More Analog Computing Is on the Way*
https://dzone.com/articles/more-analog-computing-is-on-the-way



*The door on this new generation of analog computer programming is 
definitely open. Last month, at the Association for Computing Machinery’s 
(ACM) conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, 
a paper  was 
presented that described a compiler that uses a text based, high-level, 
abstraction language to generate the necessary low-level circuit wiring 
that defines the physical analog computing implementation. This research 
was done at MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory 
(CSAIL) and Dartmouth College. The main focus of their investigation was to 
improve the simulation of biological systems. *


*Configuration Synthesis for ProgrammableAnalog Devices with Arco*
https://people.csail.mit.edu/sachour/res/pldi16_arco.pdf

*Programmable analog devices have emerged as a powerful*
*computing substrate for performing complex neuromorphic*
*and cytomorphic computations. We present Arco, a new*
*solver that, given a dynamical system specification in the*
*form of a set of differential equations, generates physically*
*realizable configurations for programmable analog devices*
*that are algebraically equivalent to the specified system.*
*On a set of benchmarks from the biological domain, Arco*
*generates configurations with 35 to 534 connections and 28*
*to 326 components in 1 to 54 minutes.*


- pt
 

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-23 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 22 Jan 2019, at 01:49, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, January 21, 2019 at 6:19:07 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
> On Monday, January 21, 2019 at 5:09:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 21 Jan 2019, at 00:17, Lawrence Crowell > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 9:16:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 19 Jan 2019, at 01:42, Lawrence Crowell > 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 6:31:06 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:22, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 
 
 
 On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:25:16 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
 On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 8:03 AM > wrote:
 
 > How does one calculate Planck length using the fundamental constants G, 
 > h, and c, and having calculated it, how does one show that measuring a 
 > length that small with photons of the same approximate wave length, 
 > would result in a black hole? TIA, AG
  
 In any wave the speed of the wave is wavelength times frequency and 
 according to Planck E= h*frequency  so E= C*h/wavelength.  Thus the 
 smaller the wavelength the greater the energy. According to Einstein 
 energy is just another form of mass (E = MC^2) so at some point the 
 wavelength is so small and the light photon is so energetic (aka massive) 
 that the escape velocity is greater than the speed of light and the object 
 becomes a Black Hole.
 
 Or you can look at it another way, we know from Heisenberg that to 
 determine the position of a particle more precisely with light you have to 
 use a smaller wavelength, and there is something called the  "Compton 
 wavelength" (Lc) ; to pin down the position of a particle of mass m to 
 within one Compton wavelength would require light of enough energy to 
 create another particle of that mass. The formula for the Compton 
 Wavelength is Lc= h/(2PI*M*c).
 
 Schwarzschild told us that the radius of a Black Hole (Rs), that is to say 
 where the escape velocity is the speed of light  is:  Rs= GM/c^2. At some 
 mass Lc will equal Rs and that mass is the Planck mass, and that Black 
 Hole will have the radius of the Planck Length, 1.6*10^-35 meters.
 
 Then if you do a little algebra:
 GM/c^2 = h/(2PI*M*c)
 GM= hc/2PI*M
 GM^2 = hc/2*PI
 M^2 = hc/2*PI*G
 M = (hc/2*PI*G)^1/2and that is the formula for the Planck Mass , it's 
 .02 milligrams.
 
 And the Planck Length turns out to be (G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 and the Planck 
 time is the time it takes light to travel the Planck length. 
 
 The Planck Temperature Tp is sort of the counterpoint to Absolute Zero, Tp 
 is as hot as things can get because the black-body radiation given off by 
 things when they are at temperature Tp have a wavelength equal to the 
 Planck Length, the distance light can move in the Planck Time of 10^-44 
 seconds. The formula for the Planck temperature is Tp = Mp*c^2/k where Mp 
 is the Planck Mass and K is Boltzmann's constant and it works out to be 
 1.4*10^32 degrees Kelvin.  Beyond that point both Quantum Mechanics and 
 General Relativity break down and nobody understands what if anything is 
 going on.
 
 The surface temperature of the sun is at 5.7 *10^3  degrees Kelvin so if 
 it were 2.46*10^28 times hotter it would be at the Planck Temperature, and 
 because radiant energy is proportional to T^4 the sun would be 3.67*10^113 
 times brighter. At that temperature to equal the sun's brightness the 
 surface area would have to be reduced by a factor of 3.67*10^113, the 
 surface area of a sphere is proportional to the radius squared, so you'd 
 have to reduce the sun's radius by (3.67*10^113)^1/2, and that is  
 6.05*10^56. The sun's radius is 6.95*10^8   meters and  6.95*10^8/ 
 6.05*10^56  is 1.15^10^-48 meters. 
 
 That means a sphere at the Planck Temperature with a radius 10 thousand 
 billion times SMALLER than the Planck Length would be as bright as the 
 sun, but as far as we know nothing can be that small. If the radius was 
 10^13 times longer it would be as small as things can get and the object 
 would be (10^13)^2 = 10^26 times as bright as the sun. I'm just 
 speculating but perhaps that's the luminosity of the Big Bang; I say that 
 because that's how bright things would be if the smallest thing we think 
 can exist was as hot as we think things can get. 
 
 John K Clark
 
 Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the Planck 
 length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any 
 difference between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or 
 conjecture that we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the 
 Planck length? 
 TIA, AG 
>>> 
>>> That is a very good question. I have 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-21 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, January 21, 2019 at 6:19:07 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Monday, January 21, 2019 at 5:09:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 21 Jan 2019, at 00:17, Lawrence Crowell  
>> wrote:
>>
>> On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 9:16:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 19 Jan 2019, at 01:42, Lawrence Crowell  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 6:31:06 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:25:16 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 8:03 AM  wrote:
>
> *> How does one calculate Planck length using the fundamental 
>> constants G, h, and c, and having calculated it, how does one show that 
>> measuring a length that small with photons of the same approximate wave 
>> length, would result in a black hole? TIA, AG*
>
>  
> In any wave the speed of the wave is wavelength times frequency and 
> according to 
> Planck E= h*frequency  so E= C*h/wavelength.  Thus the smaller the 
> wavelength the greater the energy. According to Einstein energy is 
> just another form of mass (E = MC^2) so at some point the wavelength is 
> so small and the light photon is so energetic (aka massive) that the 
> escape 
> velocity is greater than the speed of light and the object becomes a 
> Black 
> Hole.
>
> Or you can look at it another way, we know from Heisenberg that to 
> determine the position of a particle more precisely with light you have 
> to 
> use a smaller wavelength, and there is something called the  "Compton 
> wavelength" (Lc) ; to pin down the position of a particle of mass m to 
> within one Compton wavelength would require light of enough energy to 
> create another particle of that mass. The formula for the Compton 
> Wavelength is Lc= h/(2PI*M*c).
>
> Schwarzschild told us that the radius of a Black Hole (Rs), that is 
> to say where the escape velocity is the speed of light  is:  Rs= GM/c^2. 
> At 
> some mass Lc will equal Rs and that mass is the Planck mass, and that 
> Black 
> Hole will have the radius of the Planck Length, 1.6*10^-35 meters.
>
> Then if you do a little algebra: 
> GM/c^2 = h/(2PI*M*c)
> GM= hc/2PI*M
> GM^2 = hc/2*PI
> M^2 = hc/2*PI*G
> M = (hc/2*PI*G)^1/2and that is the formula for the Planck Mass , 
> it's .02 milligrams.
>
> And the Planck Length turns out to be (G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 and the 
> Planck time is the time it takes light to travel the Planck length. 
>
> The Planck Temperature Tp is sort of the counterpoint to Absolute 
> Zero, Tp is as hot as things can get because the black-body radiation 
> given 
> off by things when they are at temperature Tp have a wavelength equal to 
> the Planck Length, the distance light can move in the Planck Time of 
> 10^-44 
> seconds. The formula for the Planck temperature is Tp = Mp*c^2/k where Mp 
> is the Planck Mass and K is Boltzmann's constant and it works out to be 
> 1.4*10^32 degrees Kelvin.  Beyond that point both Quantum Mechanics and 
> General Relativity break down and nobody understands what if anything is 
> going on.
>
> The surface temperature of the sun is at 5.7 *10^3  degrees Kelvin so 
> if it were 2.46*10^28 times hotter it would be at the Planck Temperature, 
> and because radiant energy is proportional to T^4 the sun would 
> be 3.67*10^113 times brighter. At that temperature to equal the sun's 
> brightness the surface area would have to be reduced by a factor 
> of 3.67*10^113, the surface area of a sphere is proportional to the 
> radius 
> squared, so you'd have to reduce the sun's radius by (3.67*10^113)^1/2, 
> and that is  6.05*10^56. The sun's radius is 6.95*10^8   meters and 
>  6.95*10^8/ 6.05*10^56  is 1.15^10^-48 meters. 
>
> That means a sphere at the Planck Temperature with a radius 10 
> thousand billion times SMALLER than the Planck Length would be as bright 
> as 
> the sun, but as far as we know nothing can be that small. If the radius 
> was 
> 10^13 times longer it would be as small as things can get and the object 
> would be (10^13)^2 = 10^26 times as bright as the sun. I'm just 
> speculating 
> but perhaps that's the luminosity of the Big Bang; I say that because 
> that's how bright things would be if the smallest thing we think can 
> exist 
> was as hot as we think things can get. 
>
> John K Clark
>


 *Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the 
 Planck length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any 
 difference between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or 
 conjecture that we cannot in 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-21 Thread Lawrence Crowell
On Monday, January 21, 2019 at 5:09:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Jan 2019, at 00:17, Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 9:16:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 19 Jan 2019, at 01:42, Lawrence Crowell  
>> wrote:
>>
>> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 6:31:06 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:25:16 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:

 On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 8:03 AM  wrote:

 *> How does one calculate Planck length using the fundamental constants 
> G, h, and c, and having calculated it, how does one show that measuring a 
> length that small with photons of the same approximate wave length, would 
> result in a black hole? TIA, AG*

  
 In any wave the speed of the wave is wavelength times frequency and 
 according to 
 Planck E= h*frequency  so E= C*h/wavelength.  Thus the smaller the 
 wavelength the greater the energy. According to Einstein energy is 
 just another form of mass (E = MC^2) so at some point the wavelength is 
 so small and the light photon is so energetic (aka massive) that the 
 escape 
 velocity is greater than the speed of light and the object becomes a Black 
 Hole.

 Or you can look at it another way, we know from Heisenberg that to 
 determine the position of a particle more precisely with light you have to 
 use a smaller wavelength, and there is something called the  "Compton 
 wavelength" (Lc) ; to pin down the position of a particle of mass m to 
 within one Compton wavelength would require light of enough energy to 
 create another particle of that mass. The formula for the Compton 
 Wavelength is Lc= h/(2PI*M*c).

 Schwarzschild told us that the radius of a Black Hole (Rs), that is to 
 say where the escape velocity is the speed of light  is:  Rs= GM/c^2. At 
 some mass Lc will equal Rs and that mass is the Planck mass, and that 
 Black 
 Hole will have the radius of the Planck Length, 1.6*10^-35 meters.

 Then if you do a little algebra: 
 GM/c^2 = h/(2PI*M*c)
 GM= hc/2PI*M
 GM^2 = hc/2*PI
 M^2 = hc/2*PI*G
 M = (hc/2*PI*G)^1/2and that is the formula for the Planck Mass , 
 it's .02 milligrams.

 And the Planck Length turns out to be (G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 and the Planck 
 time 
 is the time it takes light to travel the Planck length. 

 The Planck Temperature Tp is sort of the counterpoint to Absolute Zero, 
 Tp is as hot as things can get because the black-body radiation given off 
 by things when they are at temperature Tp have a wavelength equal to the 
 Planck Length, the distance light can move in the Planck Time of 10^-44 
 seconds. The formula for the Planck temperature is Tp = Mp*c^2/k where Mp 
 is the Planck Mass and K is Boltzmann's constant and it works out to be 
 1.4*10^32 degrees Kelvin.  Beyond that point both Quantum Mechanics and 
 General Relativity break down and nobody understands what if anything is 
 going on.

 The surface temperature of the sun is at 5.7 *10^3  degrees Kelvin so 
 if it were 2.46*10^28 times hotter it would be at the Planck Temperature, 
 and because radiant energy is proportional to T^4 the sun would 
 be 3.67*10^113 times brighter. At that temperature to equal the sun's 
 brightness the surface area would have to be reduced by a factor 
 of 3.67*10^113, the surface area of a sphere is proportional to the radius 
 squared, so you'd have to reduce the sun's radius by (3.67*10^113)^1/2, 
 and that is  6.05*10^56. The sun's radius is 6.95*10^8   meters and 
  6.95*10^8/ 6.05*10^56  is 1.15^10^-48 meters. 

 That means a sphere at the Planck Temperature with a radius 10 thousand 
 billion times SMALLER than the Planck Length would be as bright as the 
 sun, 
 but as far as we know nothing can be that small. If the radius was 10^13 
 times longer it would be as small as things can get and the object would 
 be 
 (10^13)^2 = 10^26 times as bright as the sun. I'm just speculating but 
 perhaps that's the luminosity of the Big Bang; I say that because that's 
 how bright things would be if the smallest thing we think can exist was as 
 hot as we think things can get. 

 John K Clark

>>>
>>>
>>> *Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the 
>>> Planck length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any 
>>> difference between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or 
>>> conjecture that we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the 
>>> Planck length? *
>>> *TIA, AG *
>>>
>>>
>>> That is a very good question. I have no answer. I don’t think physicists 
>>> have an answer either, and I do think that this requires the solution 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-21 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 21 Jan 2019, at 00:17, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 9:16:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 19 Jan 2019, at 01:42, Lawrence Crowell > > wrote:
>> 
>> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 6:31:06 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:22, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:25:16 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 8:03 AM > wrote:
>>> 
>>> > How does one calculate Planck length using the fundamental constants G, 
>>> > h, and c, and having calculated it, how does one show that measuring a 
>>> > length that small with photons of the same approximate wave length, would 
>>> > result in a black hole? TIA, AG
>>>  
>>> In any wave the speed of the wave is wavelength times frequency and 
>>> according to Planck E= h*frequency  so E= C*h/wavelength.  Thus the smaller 
>>> the wavelength the greater the energy. According to Einstein energy is just 
>>> another form of mass (E = MC^2) so at some point the wavelength is so small 
>>> and the light photon is so energetic (aka massive) that the escape velocity 
>>> is greater than the speed of light and the object becomes a Black Hole.
>>> 
>>> Or you can look at it another way, we know from Heisenberg that to 
>>> determine the position of a particle more precisely with light you have to 
>>> use a smaller wavelength, and there is something called the  "Compton 
>>> wavelength" (Lc) ; to pin down the position of a particle of mass m to 
>>> within one Compton wavelength would require light of enough energy to 
>>> create another particle of that mass. The formula for the Compton 
>>> Wavelength is Lc= h/(2PI*M*c).
>>> 
>>> Schwarzschild told us that the radius of a Black Hole (Rs), that is to say 
>>> where the escape velocity is the speed of light  is:  Rs= GM/c^2. At some 
>>> mass Lc will equal Rs and that mass is the Planck mass, and that Black Hole 
>>> will have the radius of the Planck Length, 1.6*10^-35 meters.
>>> 
>>> Then if you do a little algebra:
>>> GM/c^2 = h/(2PI*M*c)
>>> GM= hc/2PI*M
>>> GM^2 = hc/2*PI
>>> M^2 = hc/2*PI*G
>>> M = (hc/2*PI*G)^1/2and that is the formula for the Planck Mass , it's 
>>> .02 milligrams.
>>> 
>>> And the Planck Length turns out to be (G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 and the Planck 
>>> time is the time it takes light to travel the Planck length. 
>>> 
>>> The Planck Temperature Tp is sort of the counterpoint to Absolute Zero, Tp 
>>> is as hot as things can get because the black-body radiation given off by 
>>> things when they are at temperature Tp have a wavelength equal to the 
>>> Planck Length, the distance light can move in the Planck Time of 10^-44 
>>> seconds. The formula for the Planck temperature is Tp = Mp*c^2/k where Mp 
>>> is the Planck Mass and K is Boltzmann's constant and it works out to be 
>>> 1.4*10^32 degrees Kelvin.  Beyond that point both Quantum Mechanics and 
>>> General Relativity break down and nobody understands what if anything is 
>>> going on.
>>> 
>>> The surface temperature of the sun is at 5.7 *10^3  degrees Kelvin so if it 
>>> were 2.46*10^28 times hotter it would be at the Planck Temperature, and 
>>> because radiant energy is proportional to T^4 the sun would be 3.67*10^113 
>>> times brighter. At that temperature to equal the sun's brightness the 
>>> surface area would have to be reduced by a factor of 3.67*10^113, the 
>>> surface area of a sphere is proportional to the radius squared, so you'd 
>>> have to reduce the sun's radius by (3.67*10^113)^1/2, and that is  
>>> 6.05*10^56. The sun's radius is 6.95*10^8   meters and  6.95*10^8/ 
>>> 6.05*10^56  is 1.15^10^-48 meters. 
>>> 
>>> That means a sphere at the Planck Temperature with a radius 10 thousand 
>>> billion times SMALLER than the Planck Length would be as bright as the sun, 
>>> but as far as we know nothing can be that small. If the radius was 10^13 
>>> times longer it would be as small as things can get and the object would be 
>>> (10^13)^2 = 10^26 times as bright as the sun. I'm just speculating but 
>>> perhaps that's the luminosity of the Big Bang; I say that because that's 
>>> how bright things would be if the smallest thing we think can exist was as 
>>> hot as we think things can get. 
>>> 
>>> John K Clark
>>> 
>>> Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the Planck 
>>> length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any 
>>> difference between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or 
>>> conjecture that we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the 
>>> Planck length? 
>>> TIA, AG 
>> 
>> That is a very good question. I have no answer. I don’t think physicists 
>> have an answer either, and I do think that this requires the solution of the 
>> “quantum gravity” or the “quantum space-time” problem. 
>> With loop-gravity theory, I would say that the continuum is eventually 
>> replaced by something discrete, but not so with string 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-20 Thread Lawrence Crowell
On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 9:16:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 19 Jan 2019, at 01:42, Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 6:31:06 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:22, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:25:16 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 8:03 AM  wrote:
>>>
>>> *> How does one calculate Planck length using the fundamental constants 
 G, h, and c, and having calculated it, how does one show that measuring a 
 length that small with photons of the same approximate wave length, would 
 result in a black hole? TIA, AG*
>>>
>>>  
>>> In any wave the speed of the wave is wavelength times frequency and 
>>> according to 
>>> Planck E= h*frequency  so E= C*h/wavelength.  Thus the smaller the 
>>> wavelength the greater the energy. According to Einstein energy is just 
>>> another form of mass (E = MC^2) so at some point the wavelength is so 
>>> small and the light photon is so energetic (aka massive) that the escape 
>>> velocity is greater than the speed of light and the object becomes a Black 
>>> Hole.
>>>
>>> Or you can look at it another way, we know from Heisenberg that to 
>>> determine the position of a particle more precisely with light you have to 
>>> use a smaller wavelength, and there is something called the  "Compton 
>>> wavelength" (Lc) ; to pin down the position of a particle of mass m to 
>>> within one Compton wavelength would require light of enough energy to 
>>> create another particle of that mass. The formula for the Compton 
>>> Wavelength is Lc= h/(2PI*M*c).
>>>
>>> Schwarzschild told us that the radius of a Black Hole (Rs), that is to 
>>> say where the escape velocity is the speed of light  is:  Rs= GM/c^2. At 
>>> some mass Lc will equal Rs and that mass is the Planck mass, and that Black 
>>> Hole will have the radius of the Planck Length, 1.6*10^-35 meters.
>>>
>>> Then if you do a little algebra: 
>>> GM/c^2 = h/(2PI*M*c)
>>> GM= hc/2PI*M
>>> GM^2 = hc/2*PI
>>> M^2 = hc/2*PI*G
>>> M = (hc/2*PI*G)^1/2and that is the formula for the Planck Mass , 
>>> it's .02 milligrams.
>>>
>>> And the Planck Length turns out to be (G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 and the Planck 
>>> time 
>>> is the time it takes light to travel the Planck length. 
>>>
>>> The Planck Temperature Tp is sort of the counterpoint to Absolute Zero, 
>>> Tp is as hot as things can get because the black-body radiation given off 
>>> by things when they are at temperature Tp have a wavelength equal to the 
>>> Planck Length, the distance light can move in the Planck Time of 10^-44 
>>> seconds. The formula for the Planck temperature is Tp = Mp*c^2/k where Mp 
>>> is the Planck Mass and K is Boltzmann's constant and it works out to be 
>>> 1.4*10^32 degrees Kelvin.  Beyond that point both Quantum Mechanics and 
>>> General Relativity break down and nobody understands what if anything is 
>>> going on.
>>>
>>> The surface temperature of the sun is at 5.7 *10^3  degrees Kelvin so if 
>>> it were 2.46*10^28 times hotter it would be at the Planck Temperature, and 
>>> because radiant energy is proportional to T^4 the sun would be 3.67*10^113 
>>> times brighter. At that temperature to equal the sun's brightness the 
>>> surface area would have to be reduced by a factor of 3.67*10^113, the 
>>> surface area of a sphere is proportional to the radius squared, so you'd 
>>> have to reduce the sun's radius by (3.67*10^113)^1/2, and that is  
>>> 6.05*10^56. 
>>> The sun's radius is 6.95*10^8   meters and  6.95*10^8/ 6.05*10^56  is 
>>> 1.15^10^-48 meters. 
>>>
>>> That means a sphere at the Planck Temperature with a radius 10 thousand 
>>> billion times SMALLER than the Planck Length would be as bright as the sun, 
>>> but as far as we know nothing can be that small. If the radius was 10^13 
>>> times longer it would be as small as things can get and the object would be 
>>> (10^13)^2 = 10^26 times as bright as the sun. I'm just speculating but 
>>> perhaps that's the luminosity of the Big Bang; I say that because that's 
>>> how bright things would be if the smallest thing we think can exist was as 
>>> hot as we think things can get. 
>>>
>>> John K Clark
>>>
>>
>>
>> *Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the 
>> Planck length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any 
>> difference between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or 
>> conjecture that we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the 
>> Planck length? *
>> *TIA, AG *
>>
>>
>> That is a very good question. I have no answer. I don’t think physicists 
>> have an answer either, and I do think that this requires the solution of 
>> the “quantum gravity” or the “quantum space-time” problem. 
>> With loop-gravity theory, I would say that the continuum is eventually 
>> replaced by something discrete, but not so with string theory; for example. 
>> With Mechanism, there are 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-20 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 19 Jan 2019, at 11:36, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, January 19, 2019 at 2:36:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 18 Jan 2019, at 15:44, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, January 18, 2019 at 7:36:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 21:02, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 12:45:31 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 1/17/2019 12:22 AM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the Planck 
 length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any 
 difference between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or 
 conjecture that we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the 
 Planck length? 
 TIA, AG
>>> 
>>> The theory that predicts there is a shortest measured interval assumes a 
>>> continuum.  There's no logical contradiction is this. But physicists tend 
>>> to have a positivist attitude and think that a theory that assumes things, 
>>> like arbitrarily short intervals, might be better expressed and simpler in 
>>> some way that avoids those assumptions.  This attitude does not assume the 
>>> mathematics itself is the reality, but only a description of reality; so 
>>> there can be different descriptions of the same reality.
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> A theory that does this assumes a continuous mathematics.
>>> But that doesn't mean every theory has to.
>>> 
>>> As Max Tegmark's little lecture to physicists says:
>>> 
>>> Our challenge as physicists is to discover ... infinity-free equations.
>>> 
>>> http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2015/02/20/infinity-ruining-physics/#.XEDdLs9KiCQ
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Unless he is wrong in his premise, of course!
>> 
>> 
>> That assumes non-mechanism, and thus bigger infinities. Tegmark is right: we 
>> cannot assume infinity at the ontological level (just the finite numbers 0, 
>> s(0), s(s(0)), …). But the physical reality is phenomenological, and 
>> requires infinite domain of indetermination, making some “observable” having 
>> an infinite range. The best candidate could be graham-Preskill frequency 
>> operator (that they use more or less rigorously to derive the Born rule from 
>> some “many-worlds” interpretation of QM.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> I think it is possible some of this can be approached with what is referred 
>> to as higher-type computing, where 
>> 
>> higher-type computing is about
>> 
>> -  the characterization of the sets that can be exhaustively searched [1] by 
>> an algorithm, in the sense of Turing, in finite time, as those that are 
>> topologically compact
>> 
>> - infinite sets that can be completely inspected in finite time in an 
>> algorithmic way, which perhaps defies intuition
>> 
>> [1] Exhaustible sets in higher-type computation
>>  https://arxiv.org/abs/0808.0441 
>> [2] A Haskell monad for infinite search in finite time
>>  
>> http://math.andrej.com/2008/11/21/a-haskell-monad-for-infinite-search-in-finite-time/
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> from Martin Escardo's page
>>  http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/ 
>> 
>>  - pt
> 
> 
> That is the constructive move. With mechanism, this is given by S4Grz1, 
> and/or typing the combinators. It corresponds to the first person. Tegmark 
> seems oscillate between third and first person views, but when taking 
> mechanism seriously *in the cognitive science* (and not in physics), we have 
> to take both points of view, and derive their relations from self-reference. 
> As I said, the 1p/3p relation is more subtle than the bird/frog change of 
> scale.
> 
> You might try to explain Haskell monad for infinite search in finite time. 
> Mechanism explains this from the first person point of view, but is not seen 
> as being something algorithmic.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> The key to the higher-type computing approach
> 
> from Infinite sets that admit fast exhaustive search
>  http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/exhaustive.pdf
> 
> 
> is to relate a certain kind of computing to topology
> 
>exhaustible sets are to compact sets as 
>computable functions are to continuous maps
> 
> There is one example in the above paper [code below]  (I haven't run any of 
> his code).
> 
> 
> It should be really be called something like  topological computing: 
> 
> Programs that are like continuous maps have the property that even though 
> they apparently deal with infinite objects, because these objects are (in a 
> computationally-defined way) topological compact, their computing time is 
> finite (and maybe even efficient).


As I said, a sort of topological intuition arise from the modes []p & p (p 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-20 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 19 Jan 2019, at 01:42, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 6:31:06 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:22, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:25:16 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 8:03 AM > wrote:
>> 
>> > How does one calculate Planck length using the fundamental constants G, h, 
>> > and c, and having calculated it, how does one show that measuring a length 
>> > that small with photons of the same approximate wave length, would result 
>> > in a black hole? TIA, AG
>>  
>> In any wave the speed of the wave is wavelength times frequency and 
>> according to Planck E= h*frequency  so E= C*h/wavelength.  Thus the smaller 
>> the wavelength the greater the energy. According to Einstein energy is just 
>> another form of mass (E = MC^2) so at some point the wavelength is so small 
>> and the light photon is so energetic (aka massive) that the escape velocity 
>> is greater than the speed of light and the object becomes a Black Hole.
>> 
>> Or you can look at it another way, we know from Heisenberg that to determine 
>> the position of a particle more precisely with light you have to use a 
>> smaller wavelength, and there is something called the  "Compton wavelength" 
>> (Lc) ; to pin down the position of a particle of mass m to within one 
>> Compton wavelength would require light of enough energy to create another 
>> particle of that mass. The formula for the Compton Wavelength is Lc= 
>> h/(2PI*M*c).
>> 
>> Schwarzschild told us that the radius of a Black Hole (Rs), that is to say 
>> where the escape velocity is the speed of light  is:  Rs= GM/c^2. At some 
>> mass Lc will equal Rs and that mass is the Planck mass, and that Black Hole 
>> will have the radius of the Planck Length, 1.6*10^-35 meters.
>> 
>> Then if you do a little algebra:
>> GM/c^2 = h/(2PI*M*c)
>> GM= hc/2PI*M
>> GM^2 = hc/2*PI
>> M^2 = hc/2*PI*G
>> M = (hc/2*PI*G)^1/2and that is the formula for the Planck Mass , it's 
>> .02 milligrams.
>> 
>> And the Planck Length turns out to be (G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 and the Planck time 
>> is the time it takes light to travel the Planck length. 
>> 
>> The Planck Temperature Tp is sort of the counterpoint to Absolute Zero, Tp 
>> is as hot as things can get because the black-body radiation given off by 
>> things when they are at temperature Tp have a wavelength equal to the Planck 
>> Length, the distance light can move in the Planck Time of 10^-44 seconds. 
>> The formula for the Planck temperature is Tp = Mp*c^2/k where Mp is the 
>> Planck Mass and K is Boltzmann's constant and it works out to be 1.4*10^32 
>> degrees Kelvin.  Beyond that point both Quantum Mechanics and General 
>> Relativity break down and nobody understands what if anything is going on.
>> 
>> The surface temperature of the sun is at 5.7 *10^3  degrees Kelvin so if it 
>> were 2.46*10^28 times hotter it would be at the Planck Temperature, and 
>> because radiant energy is proportional to T^4 the sun would be 3.67*10^113 
>> times brighter. At that temperature to equal the sun's brightness the 
>> surface area would have to be reduced by a factor of 3.67*10^113, the 
>> surface area of a sphere is proportional to the radius squared, so you'd 
>> have to reduce the sun's radius by (3.67*10^113)^1/2, and that is  
>> 6.05*10^56. The sun's radius is 6.95*10^8   meters and  6.95*10^8/ 
>> 6.05*10^56  is 1.15^10^-48 meters. 
>> 
>> That means a sphere at the Planck Temperature with a radius 10 thousand 
>> billion times SMALLER than the Planck Length would be as bright as the sun, 
>> but as far as we know nothing can be that small. If the radius was 10^13 
>> times longer it would be as small as things can get and the object would be 
>> (10^13)^2 = 10^26 times as bright as the sun. I'm just speculating but 
>> perhaps that's the luminosity of the Big Bang; I say that because that's how 
>> bright things would be if the smallest thing we think can exist was as hot 
>> as we think things can get. 
>> 
>> John K Clark
>> 
>> Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the Planck 
>> length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any difference 
>> between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or conjecture that 
>> we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the Planck length? 
>> TIA, AG 
> 
> That is a very good question. I have no answer. I don’t think physicists have 
> an answer either, and I do think that this requires the solution of the 
> “quantum gravity” or the “quantum space-time” problem. 
> With loop-gravity theory, I would say that the continuum is eventually 
> replaced by something discrete, but not so with string theory; for example. 
> With Mechanism, there are argument that something must stay “continuous”, but 
> it might be only the distribution of probability (the real-complex 
> amplitude). 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> The Planck length is just the 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-19 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, January 19, 2019 at 2:36:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Jan 2019, at 15:44, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 18, 2019 at 7:36:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 21:02, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 12:45:31 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 1/17/2019 12:22 AM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> *Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the 
>>> Planck length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any 
>>> difference between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or 
>>> conjecture that we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the 
>>> Planck length? *
>>> *TIA, AG *
>>>
>>>
>>> The theory that predicts there is a shortest measured interval assumes a 
>>> continuum.  There's no logical contradiction is this. But physicists tend 
>>> to have a positivist attitude and think that a theory that assumes things, 
>>> like arbitrarily short intervals, might be better expressed and simpler in 
>>> some way that avoids those assumptions.  This attitude does not assume the 
>>> mathematics itself is the reality, but only a description of reality; so 
>>> there can be different descriptions of the same reality.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *A* theory that does this assumes a continuous mathematics.
>> But that doesn't mean *every* theory has to.
>>
>> As Max Tegmark's little lecture to physicists says:
>>
>> Our challenge as physicists is to discover ... infinity-free 
>> equations.
>>
>>
>> http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2015/02/20/infinity-ruining-physics/#.XEDdLs9KiCQ
>>
>> Unless he is wrong in his premise, of course!
>>
>>
>>
>> That assumes non-mechanism, and thus bigger infinities. Tegmark is right: 
>> we cannot assume infinity at the ontological level (just the finite numbers 
>> 0, s(0), s(s(0)), …). But the physical reality is phenomenological, and 
>> requires infinite domain of indetermination, making some “observable” 
>> having an infinite range. The best candidate could be graham-Preskill 
>> frequency operator (that they use more or less rigorously to derive the 
>> Born rule from some “many-worlds” interpretation of QM.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> I think it is possible some of this can be approached with what is 
> referred to as *higher-type computing*, where 
>
> higher-type computing is about
>
> -  *the characterization of the sets that can be exhaustively searched 
> [1] by an algorithm, in the sense of Turing, in finite time, as those that 
> are topologically compact*
>
> - *infinite sets that can be completely inspected in finite time in an 
> algorithmic way, which perhaps defies intuition*
>
> [1] Exhaustible sets in higher-type computation
>  https://arxiv.org/abs/0808.0441
> [2] A Haskell monad for infinite search in finite time
>  
> http://math.andrej.com/2008/11/21/a-haskell-monad-for-infinite-search-in-finite-time/
>
> from Martin Escardo's page
>  http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/
>
>  - pt
>
>
>
> That is the constructive move. With mechanism, this is given by S4Grz1, 
> and/or typing the combinators. It corresponds to the first person. Tegmark 
> seems oscillate between third and first person views, but when taking 
> mechanism seriously *in the cognitive science* (and not in physics), we 
> have to take both points of view, and derive their relations from 
> self-reference. As I said, the 1p/3p relation is more subtle than the 
> bird/frog change of scale.
>
> You might try to explain Haskell monad for infinite search in finite time. 
> Mechanism explains this from the first person point of view, but is not 
> seen as being something algorithmic.
>
> Bruno
>
>

The key to the higher-type computing approach

from *Infinite sets that admit fast exhaustive search*
 http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/exhaustive.pdf


is to relate a certain kind of computing to topology

   *exhaustible sets are to compact sets as *
*   computable functions are to continuous maps*

There is one example in the above paper [code below]  (I haven't run any of 
his code).


It should be really be called something like  *topological computing*: 

Programs that are like continuous maps have the property that even though 
they apparently deal with infinite objects, because these objects are (in a 
computationally-defined way) topological compact, their computing time is 
finite (and maybe even efficient).



[code from paper]
type Cantor = N -> Bit
foreveryC :: (Cantor -> Bool) -> Bool
equalC :: (Cantor -> N) -> (Cantor -> N) -> Bool
equalC f g = foreveryC(\a -> f a == g a)

f,g,h :: Cantor -> N
f a = a(10*a(3ˆ80)+100*a(4ˆ80)+1000*a(5ˆ80))
g a = a(10*a(3ˆ80)+100*a(4ˆ80)+1000*a(6ˆ80))
h a = if a(4ˆ80) == 0 then a j else a(100+j)
where i = if a(5ˆ80) == 0 then 0 else 1000
   j = if a(3ˆ80) == 1 then 10+i else i


The queries “equalC f g” and “equalC f h” answer
False and 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 18 Jan 2019, at 15:44, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, January 18, 2019 at 7:36:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 21:02, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 12:45:31 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 1/17/2019 12:22 AM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the Planck 
>>> length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any 
>>> difference between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or 
>>> conjecture that we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the 
>>> Planck length? 
>>> TIA, AG
>> 
>> The theory that predicts there is a shortest measured interval assumes a 
>> continuum.  There's no logical contradiction is this. But physicists tend to 
>> have a positivist attitude and think that a theory that assumes things, like 
>> arbitrarily short intervals, might be better expressed and simpler in some 
>> way that avoids those assumptions.  This attitude does not assume the 
>> mathematics itself is the reality, but only a description of reality; so 
>> there can be different descriptions of the same reality.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> A theory that does this assumes a continuous mathematics.
>> But that doesn't mean every theory has to.
>> 
>> As Max Tegmark's little lecture to physicists says:
>> 
>> Our challenge as physicists is to discover ... infinity-free equations.
>> 
>> http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2015/02/20/infinity-ruining-physics/#.XEDdLs9KiCQ
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> Unless he is wrong in his premise, of course!
> 
> 
> That assumes non-mechanism, and thus bigger infinities. Tegmark is right: we 
> cannot assume infinity at the ontological level (just the finite numbers 0, 
> s(0), s(s(0)), …). But the physical reality is phenomenological, and requires 
> infinite domain of indetermination, making some “observable” having an 
> infinite range. The best candidate could be graham-Preskill frequency 
> operator (that they use more or less rigorously to derive the Born rule from 
> some “many-worlds” interpretation of QM.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think it is possible some of this can be approached with what is referred 
> to as higher-type computing, where 
> 
> higher-type computing is about
> 
> -  the characterization of the sets that can be exhaustively searched [1] by 
> an algorithm, in the sense of Turing, in finite time, as those that are 
> topologically compact
> 
> - infinite sets that can be completely inspected in finite time in an 
> algorithmic way, which perhaps defies intuition
> 
> [1] Exhaustible sets in higher-type computation
>  https://arxiv.org/abs/0808.0441
> [2] A Haskell monad for infinite search in finite time
>  
> http://math.andrej.com/2008/11/21/a-haskell-monad-for-infinite-search-in-finite-time/
> 
> from Martin Escardo's page
>  http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/
> 
>  - pt


That is the constructive move. With mechanism, this is given by S4Grz1, and/or 
typing the combinators. It corresponds to the first person. Tegmark seems 
oscillate between third and first person views, but when taking mechanism 
seriously *in the cognitive science* (and not in physics), we have to take both 
points of view, and derive their relations from self-reference. As I said, the 
1p/3p relation is more subtle than the bird/frog change of scale.

You might try to explain Haskell monad for infinite search in finite time. 
Mechanism explains this from the first person point of view, but is not seen as 
being something algorithmic.

Bruno





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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-18 Thread Lawrence Crowell
On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 6:31:06 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:22, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:25:16 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 8:03 AM  wrote:
>>
>> *> How does one calculate Planck length using the fundamental constants 
>>> G, h, and c, and having calculated it, how does one show that measuring a 
>>> length that small with photons of the same approximate wave length, would 
>>> result in a black hole? TIA, AG*
>>
>>  
>> In any wave the speed of the wave is wavelength times frequency and 
>> according to 
>> Planck E= h*frequency  so E= C*h/wavelength.  Thus the smaller the 
>> wavelength the greater the energy. According to Einstein energy is just 
>> another form of mass (E = MC^2) so at some point the wavelength is so 
>> small and the light photon is so energetic (aka massive) that the escape 
>> velocity is greater than the speed of light and the object becomes a Black 
>> Hole.
>>
>> Or you can look at it another way, we know from Heisenberg that to 
>> determine the position of a particle more precisely with light you have to 
>> use a smaller wavelength, and there is something called the  "Compton 
>> wavelength" (Lc) ; to pin down the position of a particle of mass m to 
>> within one Compton wavelength would require light of enough energy to 
>> create another particle of that mass. The formula for the Compton 
>> Wavelength is Lc= h/(2PI*M*c).
>>
>> Schwarzschild told us that the radius of a Black Hole (Rs), that is to 
>> say where the escape velocity is the speed of light  is:  Rs= GM/c^2. At 
>> some mass Lc will equal Rs and that mass is the Planck mass, and that Black 
>> Hole will have the radius of the Planck Length, 1.6*10^-35 meters.
>>
>> Then if you do a little algebra: 
>> GM/c^2 = h/(2PI*M*c)
>> GM= hc/2PI*M
>> GM^2 = hc/2*PI
>> M^2 = hc/2*PI*G
>> M = (hc/2*PI*G)^1/2and that is the formula for the Planck Mass , 
>> it's .02 milligrams.
>>
>> And the Planck Length turns out to be (G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 and the Planck time 
>> is the time it takes light to travel the Planck length. 
>>
>> The Planck Temperature Tp is sort of the counterpoint to Absolute Zero, 
>> Tp is as hot as things can get because the black-body radiation given off 
>> by things when they are at temperature Tp have a wavelength equal to the 
>> Planck Length, the distance light can move in the Planck Time of 10^-44 
>> seconds. The formula for the Planck temperature is Tp = Mp*c^2/k where Mp 
>> is the Planck Mass and K is Boltzmann's constant and it works out to be 
>> 1.4*10^32 degrees Kelvin.  Beyond that point both Quantum Mechanics and 
>> General Relativity break down and nobody understands what if anything is 
>> going on.
>>
>> The surface temperature of the sun is at 5.7 *10^3  degrees Kelvin so if 
>> it were 2.46*10^28 times hotter it would be at the Planck Temperature, and 
>> because radiant energy is proportional to T^4 the sun would be 3.67*10^113 
>> times brighter. At that temperature to equal the sun's brightness the 
>> surface area would have to be reduced by a factor of 3.67*10^113, the 
>> surface area of a sphere is proportional to the radius squared, so you'd 
>> have to reduce the sun's radius by (3.67*10^113)^1/2, and that is  
>> 6.05*10^56. 
>> The sun's radius is 6.95*10^8   meters and  6.95*10^8/ 6.05*10^56  is 
>> 1.15^10^-48 meters. 
>>
>> That means a sphere at the Planck Temperature with a radius 10 thousand 
>> billion times SMALLER than the Planck Length would be as bright as the sun, 
>> but as far as we know nothing can be that small. If the radius was 10^13 
>> times longer it would be as small as things can get and the object would be 
>> (10^13)^2 = 10^26 times as bright as the sun. I'm just speculating but 
>> perhaps that's the luminosity of the Big Bang; I say that because that's 
>> how bright things would be if the smallest thing we think can exist was as 
>> hot as we think things can get. 
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
>
>
> *Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the Planck 
> length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any 
> difference between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or 
> conjecture that we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the 
> Planck length? *
> *TIA, AG *
>
>
> That is a very good question. I have no answer. I don’t think physicists 
> have an answer either, and I do think that this requires the solution of 
> the “quantum gravity” or the “quantum space-time” problem. 
> With loop-gravity theory, I would say that the continuum is eventually 
> replaced by something discrete, but not so with string theory; for example. 
> With Mechanism, there are argument that something must stay “continuous”, 
> but it might be only the distribution of probability (the real-complex 
> amplitude). 
>
> Bruno
>

The Planck length is just the smallest length beyond which you can isolate 
a 

Re: Planck Length

2019-01-18 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, January 18, 2019 at 7:36:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Jan 2019, at 21:02, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 12:45:31 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 1/17/2019 12:22 AM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> *Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the 
>> Planck length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any 
>> difference between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or 
>> conjecture that we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the 
>> Planck length? *
>> *TIA, AG *
>>
>>
>> The theory that predicts there is a shortest measured interval assumes a 
>> continuum.  There's no logical contradiction is this. But physicists tend 
>> to have a positivist attitude and think that a theory that assumes things, 
>> like arbitrarily short intervals, might be better expressed and simpler in 
>> some way that avoids those assumptions.  This attitude does not assume the 
>> mathematics itself is the reality, but only a description of reality; so 
>> there can be different descriptions of the same reality.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> *A* theory that does this assumes a continuous mathematics.
> But that doesn't mean *every* theory has to.
>
> As Max Tegmark's little lecture to physicists says:
>
> Our challenge as physicists is to discover ... infinity-free equations.
>
>
> http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2015/02/20/infinity-ruining-physics/#.XEDdLs9KiCQ
>
> Unless he is wrong in his premise, of course!
>
>
>
> That assumes non-mechanism, and thus bigger infinities. Tegmark is right: 
> we cannot assume infinity at the ontological level (just the finite numbers 
> 0, s(0), s(s(0)), …). But the physical reality is phenomenological, and 
> requires infinite domain of indetermination, making some “observable” 
> having an infinite range. The best candidate could be graham-Preskill 
> frequency operator (that they use more or less rigorously to derive the 
> Born rule from some “many-worlds” interpretation of QM.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>


I think it is possible some of this can be approached with what is referred 
to as *higher-type computing*, where 

higher-type computing is about

-  *the characterization of the sets that can be exhaustively searched [1] 
by an algorithm, in the sense of Turing, in finite time, as those that are 
topologically compact*

- *infinite sets that can be completely inspected in finite time in an 
algorithmic way, which perhaps defies intuition*

[1] Exhaustible sets in higher-type computation
 https://arxiv.org/abs/0808.0441
[2] A Haskell monad for infinite search in finite time

 
http://math.andrej.com/2008/11/21/a-haskell-monad-for-infinite-search-in-finite-time/

from Martin Escardo's page
 http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/

 - pt

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-18 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 17 Jan 2019, at 21:02, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 12:45:31 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 1/17/2019 12:22 AM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the Planck 
>> length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any difference 
>> between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or conjecture that 
>> we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the Planck length? 
>> TIA, AG
> 
> The theory that predicts there is a shortest measured interval assumes a 
> continuum.  There's no logical contradiction is this. But physicists tend to 
> have a positivist attitude and think that a theory that assumes things, like 
> arbitrarily short intervals, might be better expressed and simpler in some 
> way that avoids those assumptions.  This attitude does not assume the 
> mathematics itself is the reality, but only a description of reality; so 
> there can be different descriptions of the same reality.
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> 
> A theory that does this assumes a continuous mathematics.
> But that doesn't mean every theory has to.
> 
> As Max Tegmark's little lecture to physicists says:
> 
> Our challenge as physicists is to discover ... infinity-free equations.
> 
> http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2015/02/20/infinity-ruining-physics/#.XEDdLs9KiCQ
> 
> Unless he is wrong in his premise, of course!


That assumes non-mechanism, and thus bigger infinities. Tegmark is right: we 
cannot assume infinity at the ontological level (just the finite numbers 0, 
s(0), s(s(0)), …). But the physical reality is phenomenological, and requires 
infinite domain of indetermination, making some “observable” having an infinite 
range. The best candidate could be graham-Preskill frequency operator (that 
they use more or less rigorously to derive the Born rule from some 
“many-worlds” interpretation of QM.

Bruno



> 
> - pt
>  
> 
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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-17 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 12:45:31 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/17/2019 12:22 AM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
> *Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the Planck 
> length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any 
> difference between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or 
> conjecture that we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the 
> Planck length? *
> *TIA, AG *
>
>
> The theory that predicts there is a shortest measured interval assumes a 
> continuum.  There's no logical contradiction is this. But physicists tend 
> to have a positivist attitude and think that a theory that assumes things, 
> like arbitrarily short intervals, might be better expressed and simpler in 
> some way that avoids those assumptions.  This attitude does not assume the 
> mathematics itself is the reality, but only a description of reality; so 
> there can be different descriptions of the same reality.
>
> Brent
>



*A* theory that does this assumes a continuous mathematics.
But that doesn't mean *every* theory has to.

As Max Tegmark's little lecture to physicists says:

Our challenge as physicists is to discover ... infinity-free equations.

http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2015/02/20/infinity-ruining-physics/#.XEDdLs9KiCQ

Unless he is wrong in his premise, of course!

- pt
 

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-17 Thread Brent Meeker



On 1/17/2019 12:22 AM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
*Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the 
Planck length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there 
any difference between the claim that space is discrete, from the 
claim or conjecture that we cannot in principle measure a length 
shorter than the Planck length?

*
*TIA, AG *


The theory that predicts there is a shortest measured interval assumes a 
continuum.  There's no logical contradiction is this. But physicists 
tend to have a positivist attitude and think that a theory that assumes 
things, like arbitrarily short intervals, might be better expressed and 
simpler in some way that avoids those assumptions.  This attitude does 
not assume the mathematics itself is the reality, but only a description 
of reality; so there can be different descriptions of the same reality.


Brent

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-17 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:22, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:25:16 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 8:03 AM > wrote:
> 
> > How does one calculate Planck length using the fundamental constants G, h, 
> > and c, and having calculated it, how does one show that measuring a length 
> > that small with photons of the same approximate wave length, would result 
> > in a black hole? TIA, AG
>  
> In any wave the speed of the wave is wavelength times frequency and according 
> to Planck E= h*frequency  so E= C*h/wavelength.  Thus the smaller the 
> wavelength the greater the energy. According to Einstein energy is just 
> another form of mass (E = MC^2) so at some point the wavelength is so small 
> and the light photon is so energetic (aka massive) that the escape velocity 
> is greater than the speed of light and the object becomes a Black Hole.
> 
> Or you can look at it another way, we know from Heisenberg that to determine 
> the position of a particle more precisely with light you have to use a 
> smaller wavelength, and there is something called the  "Compton wavelength" 
> (Lc) ; to pin down the position of a particle of mass m to within one Compton 
> wavelength would require light of enough energy to create another particle of 
> that mass. The formula for the Compton Wavelength is Lc= h/(2PI*M*c).
> 
> Schwarzschild told us that the radius of a Black Hole (Rs), that is to say 
> where the escape velocity is the speed of light  is:  Rs= GM/c^2. At some 
> mass Lc will equal Rs and that mass is the Planck mass, and that Black Hole 
> will have the radius of the Planck Length, 1.6*10^-35 meters.
> 
> Then if you do a little algebra:
> GM/c^2 = h/(2PI*M*c)
> GM= hc/2PI*M
> GM^2 = hc/2*PI
> M^2 = hc/2*PI*G
> M = (hc/2*PI*G)^1/2and that is the formula for the Planck Mass , it's .02 
> milligrams.
> 
> And the Planck Length turns out to be (G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 and the Planck time 
> is the time it takes light to travel the Planck length. 
> 
> The Planck Temperature Tp is sort of the counterpoint to Absolute Zero, Tp is 
> as hot as things can get because the black-body radiation given off by things 
> when they are at temperature Tp have a wavelength equal to the Planck Length, 
> the distance light can move in the Planck Time of 10^-44 seconds. The formula 
> for the Planck temperature is Tp = Mp*c^2/k where Mp is the Planck Mass and K 
> is Boltzmann's constant and it works out to be 1.4*10^32 degrees Kelvin.  
> Beyond that point both Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity break down 
> and nobody understands what if anything is going on.
> 
> The surface temperature of the sun is at 5.7 *10^3  degrees Kelvin so if it 
> were 2.46*10^28 times hotter it would be at the Planck Temperature, and 
> because radiant energy is proportional to T^4 the sun would be 3.67*10^113 
> times brighter. At that temperature to equal the sun's brightness the surface 
> area would have to be reduced by a factor of 3.67*10^113, the surface area of 
> a sphere is proportional to the radius squared, so you'd have to reduce the 
> sun's radius by (3.67*10^113)^1/2, and that is  6.05*10^56. The sun's radius 
> is 6.95*10^8   meters and  6.95*10^8/ 6.05*10^56  is 1.15^10^-48 meters. 
> 
> That means a sphere at the Planck Temperature with a radius 10 thousand 
> billion times SMALLER than the Planck Length would be as bright as the sun, 
> but as far as we know nothing can be that small. If the radius was 10^13 
> times longer it would be as small as things can get and the object would be 
> (10^13)^2 = 10^26 times as bright as the sun. I'm just speculating but 
> perhaps that's the luminosity of the Big Bang; I say that because that's how 
> bright things would be if the smallest thing we think can exist was as hot as 
> we think things can get. 
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the Planck 
> length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any difference 
> between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or conjecture that 
> we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the Planck length? 
> TIA, AG 

That is a very good question. I have no answer. I don’t think physicists have 
an answer either, and I do think that this requires the solution of the 
“quantum gravity” or the “quantum space-time” problem. 
With loop-gravity theory, I would say that the continuum is eventually replaced 
by something discrete, but not so with string theory; for example. With 
Mechanism, there are argument that something must stay “continuous”, but it 
might be only the distribution of probability (the real-complex amplitude). 

Bruno




> 
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> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-17 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 2:22:29 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:25:16 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 8:03 AM  wrote:
>>
>> *> How does one calculate Planck length using the fundamental constants 
>>> G, h, and c, and having calculated it, how does one show that measuring a 
>>> length that small with photons of the same approximate wave length, would 
>>> result in a black hole? TIA, AG*
>>
>>  
>> In any wave the speed of the wave is wavelength times frequency and 
>> according to 
>> Planck E= h*frequency  so E= C*h/wavelength.  Thus the smaller the 
>> wavelength the greater the energy. According to Einstein energy is just 
>> another form of mass (E = MC^2) so at some point the wavelength is so 
>> small and the light photon is so energetic (aka massive) that the escape 
>> velocity is greater than the speed of light and the object becomes a Black 
>> Hole.
>>
>> Or you can look at it another way, we know from Heisenberg that to 
>> determine the position of a particle more precisely with light you have to 
>> use a smaller wavelength, and there is something called the  "Compton 
>> wavelength" (Lc) ; to pin down the position of a particle of mass m to 
>> within one Compton wavelength would require light of enough energy to 
>> create another particle of that mass. The formula for the Compton 
>> Wavelength is Lc= h/(2PI*M*c).
>>
>> Schwarzschild told us that the radius of a Black Hole (Rs), that is to 
>> say where the escape velocity is the speed of light  is:  Rs= GM/c^2. At 
>> some mass Lc will equal Rs and that mass is the Planck mass, and that Black 
>> Hole will have the radius of the Planck Length, 1.6*10^-35 meters.
>>
>> Then if you do a little algebra: 
>> GM/c^2 = h/(2PI*M*c)
>> GM= hc/2PI*M
>> GM^2 = hc/2*PI
>> M^2 = hc/2*PI*G
>> M = (hc/2*PI*G)^1/2and that is the formula for the Planck Mass , 
>> it's .02 milligrams.
>>
>> And the Planck Length turns out to be (G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 and the Planck time 
>> is the time it takes light to travel the Planck length. 
>>
>> The Planck Temperature Tp is sort of the counterpoint to Absolute Zero, 
>> Tp is as hot as things can get because the black-body radiation given off 
>> by things when they are at temperature Tp have a wavelength equal to the 
>> Planck Length, the distance light can move in the Planck Time of 10^-44 
>> seconds. The formula for the Planck temperature is Tp = Mp*c^2/k where Mp 
>> is the Planck Mass and K is Boltzmann's constant and it works out to be 
>> 1.4*10^32 degrees Kelvin.  Beyond that point both Quantum Mechanics and 
>> General Relativity break down and nobody understands what if anything is 
>> going on.
>>
>> The surface temperature of the sun is at 5.7 *10^3  degrees Kelvin so if 
>> it were 2.46*10^28 times hotter it would be at the Planck Temperature, and 
>> because radiant energy is proportional to T^4 the sun would be 3.67*10^113 
>> times brighter. At that temperature to equal the sun's brightness the 
>> surface area would have to be reduced by a factor of 3.67*10^113, the 
>> surface area of a sphere is proportional to the radius squared, so you'd 
>> have to reduce the sun's radius by (3.67*10^113)^1/2, and that is  
>> 6.05*10^56. 
>> The sun's radius is 6.95*10^8   meters and  6.95*10^8/ 6.05*10^56  is 
>> 1.15^10^-48 meters. 
>>
>> That means a sphere at the Planck Temperature with a radius 10 thousand 
>> billion times SMALLER than the Planck Length would be as bright as the sun, 
>> but as far as we know nothing can be that small. If the radius was 10^13 
>> times longer it would be as small as things can get and the object would be 
>> (10^13)^2 = 10^26 times as bright as the sun. I'm just speculating but 
>> perhaps that's the luminosity of the Big Bang; I say that because that's 
>> how bright things would be if the smallest thing we think can exist was as 
>> hot as we think things can get. 
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
>
>
> *Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the Planck 
> length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any 
> difference between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or 
> conjecture that we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the 
> Planck length? *
> *TIA, AG *
>


There are *claims* (theories, e.g. a LQG theory of space, essentially that 
"space is discrete") and *measurements* (data, collected from instruments). 
There is no fundamental regime for matching claims and measurements. Just 
whatever the scientific community ends up liking, in the end. 

What you stated are two claims: *space is discrete *and *cannot measure a 
length shorter than the Planck length*. Both claims are subject to whatever 
measurements are recorded. These two claims appear to be close, but I think 
there is wiggle room for them to be different. 

- pt

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-17 Thread agrayson2000


On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:25:16 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 8:03 AM > wrote:
>
> *> How does one calculate Planck length using the fundamental constants G, 
>> h, and c, and having calculated it, how does one show that measuring a 
>> length that small with photons of the same approximate wave length, would 
>> result in a black hole? TIA, AG*
>
>  
> In any wave the speed of the wave is wavelength times frequency and according 
> to 
> Planck E= h*frequency  so E= C*h/wavelength.  Thus the smaller the 
> wavelength the greater the energy. According to Einstein energy is just 
> another form of mass (E = MC^2) so at some point the wavelength is so 
> small and the light photon is so energetic (aka massive) that the escape 
> velocity is greater than the speed of light and the object becomes a Black 
> Hole.
>
> Or you can look at it another way, we know from Heisenberg that to 
> determine the position of a particle more precisely with light you have to 
> use a smaller wavelength, and there is something called the  "Compton 
> wavelength" (Lc) ; to pin down the position of a particle of mass m to 
> within one Compton wavelength would require light of enough energy to 
> create another particle of that mass. The formula for the Compton 
> Wavelength is Lc= h/(2PI*M*c).
>
> Schwarzschild told us that the radius of a Black Hole (Rs), that is to 
> say where the escape velocity is the speed of light  is:  Rs= GM/c^2. At 
> some mass Lc will equal Rs and that mass is the Planck mass, and that Black 
> Hole will have the radius of the Planck Length, 1.6*10^-35 meters.
>
> Then if you do a little algebra: 
> GM/c^2 = h/(2PI*M*c)
> GM= hc/2PI*M
> GM^2 = hc/2*PI
> M^2 = hc/2*PI*G
> M = (hc/2*PI*G)^1/2and that is the formula for the Planck Mass , it's 
> .02 milligrams.
>
> And the Planck Length turns out to be (G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 and the Planck time 
> is the time it takes light to travel the Planck length. 
>
> The Planck Temperature Tp is sort of the counterpoint to Absolute Zero, Tp 
> is as hot as things can get because the black-body radiation given off by 
> things when they are at temperature Tp have a wavelength equal to the 
> Planck Length, the distance light can move in the Planck Time of 10^-44 
> seconds. The formula for the Planck temperature is Tp = Mp*c^2/k where Mp 
> is the Planck Mass and K is Boltzmann's constant and it works out to be 
> 1.4*10^32 degrees Kelvin.  Beyond that point both Quantum Mechanics and 
> General Relativity break down and nobody understands what if anything is 
> going on.
>
> The surface temperature of the sun is at 5.7 *10^3  degrees Kelvin so if 
> it were 2.46*10^28 times hotter it would be at the Planck Temperature, and 
> because radiant energy is proportional to T^4 the sun would be 3.67*10^113 
> times brighter. At that temperature to equal the sun's brightness the 
> surface area would have to be reduced by a factor of 3.67*10^113, the 
> surface area of a sphere is proportional to the radius squared, so you'd 
> have to reduce the sun's radius by (3.67*10^113)^1/2, and that is  
> 6.05*10^56. 
> The sun's radius is 6.95*10^8   meters and  6.95*10^8/ 6.05*10^56  is 
> 1.15^10^-48 meters. 
>
> That means a sphere at the Planck Temperature with a radius 10 thousand 
> billion times SMALLER than the Planck Length would be as bright as the sun, 
> but as far as we know nothing can be that small. If the radius was 10^13 
> times longer it would be as small as things can get and the object would be 
> (10^13)^2 = 10^26 times as bright as the sun. I'm just speculating but 
> perhaps that's the luminosity of the Big Bang; I say that because that's 
> how bright things would be if the smallest thing we think can exist was as 
> hot as we think things can get. 
>
> John K Clark
>


*Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the Planck 
length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any 
difference between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or 
conjecture that we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the 
Planck length? *
*TIA, AG *

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-09 Thread Lawrence Crowell
This is the basic argument. The Compton wavelength or equivalently the de 
Broglie wavelength with v = c is equal to the Schwarzschild radius. That is 
how to derive the Planck length. The argument that nothing smaller exists 
just means the Heisenberg uncertainty principle can't isolate something 
smaller than its wavelength, a Fourier transform version of the Nyquist 
frequency, and for general relativity anything smaller than a black hole is 
not observable. There is then some odd equivalency between black hole 
physics or general relativity and quantum physics. This means one is not 
able to isolate a quantum bit in some region smaller than a Planck area, or 
volume. The event horizon of a black hole is then a system of Planck are 
pixels or units of area. The Bekenstein formula is that the entropy of a 
black hole is

S = k A/4ℓ_p^2

for ℓ_p = sqrt{Għ/c^3} the Planck length. The area of the black hole 
horizon is A = 4πr^2 and r = 2GM/c^2. This Schwarzschild horizon area is 
then some integer multiple of the Planck areas,  A_p = πℓ_p^2, A =  4Nℓ_p^2 
and we find S = Nk. It is an equipartition result.

LC

On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 3:25:16 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 8:03 AM > wrote:
>
> *> How does one calculate Planck length using the fundamental constants G, 
>> h, and c, and having calculated it, how does one show that measuring a 
>> length that small with photons of the same approximate wave length, would 
>> result in a black hole? TIA, AG*
>
>  
> In any wave the speed of the wave is wavelength times frequency and according 
> to 
> Planck E= h*frequency  so E= C*h/wavelength.  Thus the smaller the 
> wavelength the greater the energy. According to Einstein energy is just 
> another form of mass (E = MC^2) so at some point the wavelength is so 
> small and the light photon is so energetic (aka massive) that the escape 
> velocity is greater than the speed of light and the object becomes a Black 
> Hole.
>
> Or you can look at it another way, we know from Heisenberg that to 
> determine the position of a particle more precisely with light you have to 
> use a smaller wavelength, and there is something called the  "Compton 
> wavelength" (Lc) ; to pin down the position of a particle of mass m to 
> within one Compton wavelength would require light of enough energy to 
> create another particle of that mass. The formula for the Compton 
> Wavelength is Lc= h/(2PI*M*c).
>
> Schwarzschild told us that the radius of a Black Hole (Rs), that is to 
> say where the escape velocity is the speed of light  is:  Rs= GM/c^2. At 
> some mass Lc will equal Rs and that mass is the Planck mass, and that Black 
> Hole will have the radius of the Planck Length, 1.6*10^-35 meters.
>
> Then if you do a little algebra: 
> GM/c^2 = h/(2PI*M*c)
> GM= hc/2PI*M
> GM^2 = hc/2*PI
> M^2 = hc/2*PI*G
> M = (hc/2*PI*G)^1/2and that is the formula for the Planck Mass , it's 
> .02 milligrams.
>
> And the Planck Length turns out to be (G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 and the Planck time 
> is the time it takes light to travel the Planck length. 
>
> The Planck Temperature Tp is sort of the counterpoint to Absolute Zero, Tp 
> is as hot as things can get because the black-body radiation given off by 
> things when they are at temperature Tp have a wavelength equal to the 
> Planck Length, the distance light can move in the Planck Time of 10^-44 
> seconds. The formula for the Planck temperature is Tp = Mp*c^2/k where Mp 
> is the Planck Mass and K is Boltzmann's constant and it works out to be 
> 1.4*10^32 degrees Kelvin.  Beyond that point both Quantum Mechanics and 
> General Relativity break down and nobody understands what if anything is 
> going on.
>
> The surface temperature of the sun is at 5.7 *10^3  degrees Kelvin so if 
> it were 2.46*10^28 times hotter it would be at the Planck Temperature, and 
> because radiant energy is proportional to T^4 the sun would be 3.67*10^113 
> times brighter. At that temperature to equal the sun's brightness the 
> surface area would have to be reduced by a factor of 3.67*10^113, the 
> surface area of a sphere is proportional to the radius squared, so you'd 
> have to reduce the sun's radius by (3.67*10^113)^1/2, and that is  
> 6.05*10^56. 
> The sun's radius is 6.95*10^8   meters and  6.95*10^8/ 6.05*10^56  is 
> 1.15^10^-48 meters. 
>
> That means a sphere at the Planck Temperature with a radius 10 thousand 
> billion times SMALLER than the Planck Length would be as bright as the sun, 
> but as far as we know nothing can be that small. If the radius was 10^13 
> times longer it would be as small as things can get and the object would be 
> (10^13)^2 = 10^26 times as bright as the sun. I'm just speculating but 
> perhaps that's the luminosity of the Big Bang; I say that because that's 
> how bright things would be if the smallest thing we think can exist was as 
> hot as we think things can get. 
>
> John K Clark
>
>

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-07 Thread John Clark
On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 8:03 AM  wrote:

*> How does one calculate Planck length using the fundamental constants G,
> h, and c, and having calculated it, how does one show that measuring a
> length that small with photons of the same approximate wave length, would
> result in a black hole? TIA, AG*


In any wave the speed of the wave is wavelength times frequency and
according to
Planck E= h*frequency  so E= C*h/wavelength.  Thus the smaller the
wavelength the greater the energy. According to Einstein energy is just
another form of mass (E = MC^2) so at some point the wavelength is so small
and the light photon is so energetic (aka massive) that the escape velocity
is greater than the speed of light and the object becomes a Black Hole.

Or you can look at it another way, we know from Heisenberg that to
determine the position of a particle more precisely with light you have to
use a smaller wavelength, and there is something called the  "Compton
wavelength" (Lc) ; to pin down the position of a particle of mass m to
within one Compton wavelength would require light of enough energy to
create another particle of that mass. The formula for the Compton
Wavelength is Lc= h/(2PI*M*c).

Schwarzschild told us that the radius of a Black Hole (Rs), that is to say
where the escape velocity is the speed of light  is:  Rs= GM/c^2. At some
mass Lc will equal Rs and that mass is the Planck mass, and that Black Hole
will have the radius of the Planck Length, 1.6*10^-35 meters.

Then if you do a little algebra:
GM/c^2 = h/(2PI*M*c)
GM= hc/2PI*M
GM^2 = hc/2*PI
M^2 = hc/2*PI*G
M = (hc/2*PI*G)^1/2and that is the formula for the Planck Mass , it's .02
milligrams.

And the Planck Length turns out to be (G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 and the Planck time
is the time it takes light to travel the Planck length.

The Planck Temperature Tp is sort of the counterpoint to Absolute Zero, Tp
is as hot as things can get because the black-body radiation given off by
things when they are at temperature Tp have a wavelength equal to the
Planck Length, the distance light can move in the Planck Time of 10^-44
seconds. The formula for the Planck temperature is Tp = Mp*c^2/k where Mp
is the Planck Mass and K is Boltzmann's constant and it works out to be
1.4*10^32 degrees Kelvin.  Beyond that point both Quantum Mechanics and
General Relativity break down and nobody understands what if anything is
going on.

The surface temperature of the sun is at 5.7 *10^3  degrees Kelvin so if it
were 2.46*10^28 times hotter it would be at the Planck Temperature, and
because radiant energy is proportional to T^4 the sun would be 3.67*10^113
times brighter. At that temperature to equal the sun's brightness the
surface area would have to be reduced by a factor of 3.67*10^113, the
surface area of a sphere is proportional to the radius squared, so you'd
have to reduce the sun's radius by (3.67*10^113)^1/2, and that is  6.05*10^56.
The sun's radius is 6.95*10^8   meters and  6.95*10^8/ 6.05*10^56  is
1.15^10^-48 meters.

That means a sphere at the Planck Temperature with a radius 10 thousand
billion times SMALLER than the Planck Length would be as bright as the sun,
but as far as we know nothing can be that small. If the radius was 10^13
times longer it would be as small as things can get and the object would be
(10^13)^2 = 10^26 times as bright as the sun. I'm just speculating but
perhaps that's the luminosity of the Big Bang; I say that because that's
how bright things would be if the smallest thing we think can exist was as
hot as we think things can get.

John K Clark

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-07 Thread agrayson2000


On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 11:39:03 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/6/2019 1:56 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 7:53:52 AM UTC, Brent wrote: 
>>
>> To measure small things you need comparably short wavelengths.  If you 
>> make a photon with a wavelength so short it can measure the Planck 
>> length it will have so much mass-energy that it will fold spacetime 
>> around it and become a black hole...so you won't be able to use it to 
>> measure anything. 
>>
>> Brent 
>>
>
> TY. That's clear enough. But there's a related question I was unable to 
> explain to a friend recently. Suppose we have a small spherical cork 
> floating on a lake, and we introduce a wave disturbance. If the wave length 
> is much larger than the diameter of the sphere, it will just bob up and 
> down as the wave passes. But if the wave length is comparable to the 
> diameter, the wave will be partially reflected. What is a good *physical* 
> argument for the existence of the reflected wave, tantamount to a detection 
> of the cork? I am at loss to offer a physical explanation. TIA, AG
>
>
> When the wavelength is on the order of the cork dimension or smaller the 
> cork can't react to the wave as if it were just part of the water. Because 
> of its extent it cannot move with the water at all points, so there are 
> pressure gradients around the cork which become the source of scattered 
> ripples.
>
> Brent
>

Thank you, but I am unable to intuit the physicality of those pressure 
gradients and their wave length dependencies. I think I need to look up how 
scattering amplitudes are calculated to see the wave length dependencies 
for scattering. I don't recall it being done in my classical or quantum 
physics courses, a long long time ago, in a galaxy far far away. AG 

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-07 Thread agrayson2000


On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 2:59:39 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> There is a related concept, the Planck Mass that also involves the 3 most 
> fundamental constants in nature, the speed of light the Planck constant and 
> the Gravitational constant. If you take the Planck energy 
> (c^5*h/2*PI*G)^1/2 and confine it in a box one Planck length 
> (G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 on a side it will turn into a Black Hole. To find the 
> Planck Mass we use E=MC^2 and divide the Planck Energy by c^2. The Planck 
> Mass works out to be .02 milligrams, about the mass of a single grain of 
> salt; nothing less massive than the Planck Mass can form a Black Hole 
> regardless of how much you compress it. Some, such as Roger Penrose, 
> think this marks the boundary between the quantum realm and the realm of 
> classical physics but most think that's a oversimplification.
>
>  John K Clark  
>

*How does one calculate Planck length using the fundamental constants G, h, 
and c, and having calculated it, how does one show that measuring a length 
that small with photons of the same approximate wave length, would result 
in a black hole? TIA, AG *

>   
>

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-06 Thread Brent Meeker



On 1/6/2019 1:56 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:



On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 7:53:52 AM UTC, Brent wrote:

To measure small things you need comparably short wavelengths. If you
make a photon with a wavelength so short it can measure the Planck
length it will have so much mass-energy that it will fold spacetime
around it and become a black hole...so you won't be able to use it to
measure anything.

Brent


TY. That's clear enough. But there's a related question I was unable 
to explain to a friend recently. Suppose we have a small spherical 
cork floating on a lake, and we introduce a wave disturbance. If the 
wave length is much larger than the diameter of the sphere, it will 
just bob up and down as the wave passes. But if the wave length is 
comparable to the diameter, the wave will be partially reflected. What 
is a good *physical* argument for the existence of the reflected wave, 
tantamount to a detection of the cork? I am at loss to offer a 
physical explanation. TIA, AG


When the wavelength is on the order of the cork dimension or smaller the 
cork can't react to the wave as if it were just part of the water. 
Because of its extent it cannot move with the water at all points, so 
there are pressure gradients around the cork which become the source of 
scattered ripples.


Brent

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-06 Thread agrayson2000


On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 7:53:52 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
> To measure small things you need comparably short wavelengths.  If you 
> make a photon with a wavelength so short it can measure the Planck 
> length it will have so much mass-energy that it will fold spacetime 
> around it and become a black hole...so you won't be able to use it to 
> measure anything. 
>
> Brent 
>

TY. That's clear enough. But there's a related question I was unable to 
explain to a friend recently. Suppose we have a small spherical cork 
floating on a lake, and we introduce a wave disturbance. If the wave length 
is much larger than the diameter of the sphere, it will just bob up and 
down as the wave passes. But if the wave length is comparable to the 
diameter, the wave will be partially reflected. What is a good *physical* 
argument for the existence of the reflected wave, tantamount to a detection 
of the cork? I am at loss to offer a physical explanation. TIA, AG 

>
> On 1/5/2019 11:39 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote: 
> > What is the argument for the claim that we cannot, in principle, 
> > measure any length smaller than Planck length? TIA, AG 
>
>

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-06 Thread John Clark
There is a related concept, the Planck Mass that also involves the 3 most
fundamental constants in nature, the speed of light the Planck constant and
the Gravitational constant. If you take the Planck energy
(c^5*h/2*PI*G)^1/2 and confine it in a box one Planck length
(G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 on a side it will turn into a Black Hole. To find the
Planck Mass we use E=MC^2 and divide the Planck Energy by c^2. The Planck
Mass works out to be .02 milligrams, about the mass of a single grain of
salt; nothing less massive than the Planck Mass can form a Black Hole
regardless of how much you compress it. Some, such as Roger Penrose, think
this marks the boundary between the quantum realm and the realm of
classical physics but most think that's a oversimplification.

 John K Clark

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Re: Planck Length

2019-01-05 Thread Brent Meeker
To measure small things you need comparably short wavelengths.  If you 
make a photon with a wavelength so short it can measure the Planck 
length it will have so much mass-energy that it will fold spacetime 
around it and become a black hole...so you won't be able to use it to 
measure anything.


Brent

On 1/5/2019 11:39 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
What is the argument for the claim that we cannot, in principle, 
measure any length smaller than Planck length? TIA, AG


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