Re: Q Wars Episode 10^9: the Phantom Measure

1999-06-08 Thread Christopher Maloney

Higgo James wrote:
 
 Well said, but I'm not sure your definition of 'I' holds. There are
 infinitely many 'Chris Maloneys' born in a hospital of the same name of
 parents of the same name... etc etc etc who are in no way connected with
 you. Besides, these identifiers are all social naming conventions. And
 perhaps you'll change your name tomorrow.
 

Okay, you're right.  I was just trying to define a root of the tree 
somewhere.  Perhaps I should have said, go back in time along the
thread that me-here-now is on, to the exact time of my birth, and
then define that thing as C(0,{}).  There are still conceivably
problems with that, if you consider that worlds might fuse as well
as split, then there's no unique path back in time.

But another point I was trying to make, and which you emphasize when
you say perhaps you'll change your name tomorrow, is that there
are people walking around who are me in the sense that they are in
the set C(t,B), but who have very little resemblance to me-here-now.
So you have to be careful when using terms like me, or even
me-like objects.


-- 
Chris Maloney
http://www.chrismaloney.com

Knowledge is good
-- Emil Faber




Re: Q Wars Episode 10^9: the Phantom Measure

1999-06-02 Thread Marchal

Hi Jacques MM,  Russell, and other Everythingers/ManyWorlders

Jacques M Mallah wrote:

   At least, unlike some q-immorters, you admit that you do not think
measure decreases with time.

Indeed. Although such a question deserves more attention, I would say
that my current *feeling* is that relative self-measure cannot decrease
with time. But we must be carefull with the notion of time involved
here. By time I mean something like the number of steps in the execution
(real, virtual or just arithmetical) of a universal dovetailing algorithm.
It is not physical time. Physical space-time is a higher order 
first-personal subjective construction. Relations between DU-Time and 
Physical-(space)-time exists. There are order preserving map between 
the branches of Physical-(local)-time and DU-time, but it is difficult to 
say more than that. And even that is more complex if we take into account 
the fusing phenomenon (cf George Levy's remark in preceeding posts of 
this thread).

Jacques M Mallah wrote also:

 [...] I want to establish a key point.  Do you admit that
if, in fact, your measure were to decrease (for example) exponentially
with time, you would not be immortal in any meaningful sense?
If you admit that, then we could have a discussion about whether
measure does decrease or not.  If you do not admit it, then we can't have
much of a discussion since we apparently wouldn't be speaking the same
language.

Unfortunately, I do not agree. A measure is needed for explaining the 
*normality* of experiences, and eventually deriving physics from comp, 
and showing the consistency of comp with empirical facts.
I would not be immortal only if all branches in which some of my 
computationnal state has belong are finite. If just only one such branch 
remains, I will be there (for the best or the worst).

Concerning the same Mallah's key point, Russell Standish wrote:

I, for one, disagree with this. Immortality depends on continuity of
 concious experience, not on measure. This depends (at least) on there
 being at least one future history for each and every event.
Now the
measure being discussed here is the proportion of events containing
your conciousness relative to the total number of events at the point
in time. Since the total number of events increases exponentially, if
not combinatorically with time, the fact that the measure is
diminishing in no way precludes the continuity of concious
histories. You argument would only work if the total number of
possible events remains constant, or diminishes with time.

Exactly, would I say. To sum up: the immortality question is not linked 
to the measure problem.
Both with MWI and comp, we must solve the measure problem only to prove 
the consistency of either MWI or Comp with the normal and deterministic 
empirical evidence.

Bruno 




















Bruno




Re: Q Wars Episode 10^9: the Phantom Measure

1999-06-01 Thread Jacques M Mallah

On 31 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
 I have probably missed something (in the 10^9 episodes!), but I still 
 cannot figure out why should my  measure decrease with time.

At least, unlike some q-immorters, you admit that you do not think
measure decreases with time.

 At least with comp, it seems to me that the measure can only grow, 
 for I can have only a countable set of past histories, and (even without 
 immortality) I have a uncountable set of futur histories 
 (continuations).
 
 If you (or any one else) could elaborate on this, and/or refer me to the 
 discussion-list, or to an URL, it would help me to understand the point.

Before that, I want to establish a key point.  Do you admit that
if, in fact, your measure were to decrease (for example) exponentially
with time, you would not be immortal in any meaningful sense?
If you admit that, then we could have a discussion about whether
measure does decrease or not.  If you do not admit it, then we can't have
much of a discussion since we apparently wouldn't be speaking the same
language.

 I'm still
 open to the idea that such a measure doesn't exist (in wich case comp 
 would be false).
 Where does your assurance come from ?

If implementations of computations are well defined, I take the
measure to be proportional to the number of such (there may be possible
generalizations); more generally one could have a new law of physics to
assign some other measure.  If computationalism is false, one would need
some new law to assign a measure on observations.  Either way I don't see
a problem with the idea of measure.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
I know what no one else knows - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/




Re: Q Wars Episode 10^9: the Phantom Measure

1999-05-31 Thread Marchal

Jacques Mallah wrote: 

On Sun, 23 May 1999 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Jacques M Mallah, [EMAIL PROTECTED], writes:
 It is surely true that in the MWI, old copies of you-like beings 
  will exist.  It is also true that they will be of very small measure, and
  that the effective probability of being one of those copies is very tiny.
 
 We would agree that someone is going to be those people.  One way to
 ask the question at hand is, would that someone be you.  This then
 depends on the definition of identity.
 
 If you define all beings who follow from your present state by the laws
 of physics as you, then that someone will be you.  In that case,
 you will eventually find yourself to be very old.

   Things that are consequences of such a definition:
   You would have multiple futures.  In some worlds you will
become physically identical to a being such as I currently am.  You
(IIRC) will die and be reborn many times.  Your measure would decrease
with time.  In some worlds there will be many of you that reproduce by
dividing like ameobas.
   Things that are NOT consequences of such a definition:
   Immortality, since you can't manufacture measure with word games.


I have probably missed something (in the 10^9 episodes!), but I still 
cannot figure out why should my  measure decrease with time.
At least with comp, it seems to me that the measure can only grow, 
for I can have only a countable set of past histories, and (even without 
immortality) I have a uncountable set of futur histories 
(continuations).

If you (or any one else) could elaborate on this, and/or refer me to the 
discussion-list, or to an URL, it would help me to understand the point.

You also seem to know what precisely the measure is. In 
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal I give a *proof*
that if comp is correct then we MUST isolate physics from such a 
measure. 
After that,
I use modal and provability logic to illustrate how to construct a path 
TOWARD such a measure.
I aknowledge that I am at a billion miles from having isolate it ..., and 
I'm still
open to the idea that such a measure doesn't exist (in wich case comp 
would be false).
Where does your assurance come from ?

Bruno.




Re: Q Wars Episode 10^9: the Phantom Measure

1999-05-30 Thread Jacques M Mallah

On Sun, 23 May 1999 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Jacques M Mallah, [EMAIL PROTECTED], writes:
  It is surely true that in the MWI, old copies of you-like beings 
  will exist.  It is also true that they will be of very small measure, and
  that the effective probability of being one of those copies is very tiny.
 
 We would agree that someone is going to be those people.  One way to
 ask the question at hand is, would that someone be you.  This then
 depends on the definition of identity.
 
 If you define all beings who follow from your present state by the laws
 of physics as you, then that someone will be you.  In that case,
 you will eventually find yourself to be very old.

Things that are consequences of such a definition:
You would have multiple futures.  In some worlds you will
become physically identical to a being such as I currently am.  You
(IIRC) will die and be reborn many times.  Your measure would decrease
with time.  In some worlds there will be many of you that reproduce by
dividing like ameobas.
Things that are NOT consequences of such a definition:
Immortality, since you can't manufacture measure with word games.

 - - - - - - -
  Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
   Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
I know what no one else knows - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/




Re: Q Wars Episode 10^9: the Phantom Measure

1999-05-23 Thread hal

Jacques M Mallah, [EMAIL PROTECTED], writes:
   It is surely true that in the MWI, old copies of you-like beings 
 will exist.  It is also true that they will be of very small measure, and
 that the effective probability of being one of those copies is very tiny.

We would agree that someone is going to be those people.  One way to
ask the question at hand is, would that someone be you.  This then
depends on the definition of identity.

If you define all beings who follow from your present state by the laws
of physics as you, then that someone will be you.  In that case,
you will eventually find yourself to be very old.

Hal