### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On 20 Nov 2008, at 19:08, m.a. wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC + MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is equivalent with - the proposition saying that MEC implies NON MAT (mechanism refutes materialism). -

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

And how much is that 2 kg in that 'other' universe? JM On 11/23/08, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 20 Nov 2008, at 19:08, m.a. wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC + MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On 23 Nov 2008, at 17:46, John Mikes wrote: And how much is that 2 kg in that 'other' universe? Like two kg, when weighted on Earth. I was literal for the sake of the reasoning. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You

### Re: QTI euthanasia

Brent, thanks for the paper recommendations! I will have a look at them. Cheers, Günther Brent Meeker wrote: Günther Greindl wrote: Hello Brent, That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function.

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On 19 Nov 2008, at 22:16, m.a. wrote: Bruno, I was just quoting you: And if you do the math, you get a physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm mechanism or to refute it. Did you mean refutes materialism? Thanks for quoting the entire sentence,

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

Bruno Marchal wrote: Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC + MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is equivalent with - the proposition saying that MEC implies NON MAT (mechanism refutes materialism). - the proposition saying that MAT implies NON

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

*So you're saying that a physics extracted from mechanism which (let's assume) refutes mechanism, leads inescapably to a mathematical structure in logic-space which actually constitutes the physical universe. And thus we can justify and explain the physical laws without any reference to

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:01, m.a. wrote: So you're saying that a physics extracted from mechanism which (let's assume) refutes mechanism, If a physics extracted from mechanism refutes mechanism, then mechanism is refuted. (p implies not p) is equivalent with (not p). I guess you meant

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

Bruno, I was just quoting you: And if you do the math, you get a physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm mechanism or to refute it. Did you mean refutes materialism? Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:01, m.a. wrote: *So you're saying that a

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On Nov 16, 2008, at 1:32 PM, Günther Greindl wrote: nicely put (the below), it captures my current metaphysical position quite accurately :-) Thanks, Günther! It'll be interesting to see if we continue to agree as the MGA thread progresses. :) -- Kory

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

*So you're saying that matter is as much a delusion as the luminiferous aether and could be a logical extension of Kant's subjective definitions of space and time? And the splitting of the MWI is just permutations of equations? Gosh.

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On 18 Nov 2008, at 15:30, m.a. wrote: So you're saying that matter is as much a delusion as the luminiferous aether Yes. If you mean matter by fundamental matter. It does not mean the Higgs boson is an illusion (in case the LHC shows it). It means that the idea that there are

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

Dear Bruno, Needless to say I feel honored that you've taken the time to answer my naive questions. But since you invite such questions, I do have a problem with the phrase highlighted below. Exactly what feature of the fundamental status of physics is questioned by

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

Hi m.a. On 18 Nov 2008, at 20:18, m.a. wrote: Dear Bruno, Needless to say I feel honored that you've taken the time to answer my naive questions. Naive questions I love. But since you invite such questions, I do have a problem with the phrase highlighted

### Re: QTI euthanasia

On 17 Nov 2008, at 00:29, Michael Rosefield wrote: If there is a split, does it create differentiated consciousnesses? I doubt it. I guess you are talking about the QM splitting, and not the comp- splitting. In both case it is better to talk about consciousness differentiation instead

### Re: QTI euthanasia

On 17 Nov 2008, at 04:41, Brent Meeker wrote: But does un-implemented mean not implemented in any language? This is a vague question depending of the context. If you have find a beautiful algorithm, and your boss asks you if you have implemented it, well, if you have not implemente,

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon

the arithmetic truth by looking inside' (pardon my poetic distortion). How close can we look? The light is on but nobody's home? Gordon --- On Thu, 11/13/08, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On Nov 16, 2008, at 6:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Some believe that for having a real conscious person, you have to implement it in a real primary material universe. It is clearly what Peter Jones thinks. I am saying that a person can be fully conscious like you or me, even when implemented

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On 16 Nov 2008, at 11:20, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:22 PM, m.a. wrote: Isn't some sort of substrate necessary for any mathematical event, whether it be a brain or a screen or a universe? And isn't that substrate sufficiently different from the math to be called physical

### Re: QTI euthanasia

On 17 Nov 2008, at 04:41, Brent Meeker wrote: But all possible implementations is a logical concept that exists only in platonia - Any program for the universal dovetailer like this one GEN DU implements all computations in our (apparently) material world we are sharing now. so what

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On 16 Nov 2008, at 09:52, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: It's computations supporting consciousness that makes this idea interesting. Otherwise, it's like claiming that a block of marble contains any given statue: in a sense it's true, but you need a sculptor to allow the statue to interact

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On 17 Nov 2008, at 16:22, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 16, 2008, at 6:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Some believe that for having a real conscious person, you have to implement it in a real primary material universe. It is clearly what Peter Jones thinks. I am saying that a person can be fully

### Re: QTI euthanasia

Günther Greindl wrote: Hello Brent, That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function. But these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other classical objects. Those objects are not in

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

2008/11/16 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]: But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not the null state? I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any computation can be mapped

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

2008/11/16 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]: But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not the null state? I'm not sure that works. In the original idea the mapping was to be one-to-one (which is

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:22 PM, m.a. wrote: Isn't some sort of substrate necessary for any mathematical event, whether it be a brain or a screen or a universe? And isn't that substrate sufficiently different from the math to be called physical existence? That's certainly the prevailing

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote: My impression is that you're more interested in exploring the consequences of that conclusion after you accept it. Not at all. I am just a logician showing that any consistent being (human, machine, extraterrestrial, angels, gods, etc.) cannot

### Re: QTI euthanasia

On 14 Nov 2008, at 19:46, Brent Meeker wrote: That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function. But these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other classical objects. This would

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On 15 Nov 2008, at 12:12, Michael Rosefield wrote: Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness, racketeering, or just an attempt to push his own reality in a certain direction on the character's part. For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

Hi Kory, nicely put (the below), it captures my current metaphysical position quite accurately :-) Cheers, Günther Imagine again the mathematical description of Conway's Life applied to the binary digits of PI. Somewhere within that description there may be descriptions of beings who

### Re: QTI euthanasia

Hello Brent, That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function. But these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other classical objects. Those objects are not in some pure state anyway.

### Re: QTI euthanasia

If there is a split, does it create differentiated consciousnesses? I doubt it. Perhaps there are two main causes of splitting: where an event would cause different 'observables', or where an event by necessity breaks the mechanism of consciousness into different streams. In the latter case, there

### Re: QTI euthanasia

*I wonder whether my selves, after a split, retain their memories from the world before the split or now have all the memories appropriate to the self in the new universe. Theoretically of course, they wouldn't know the difference, but it seems strange to think that we might perceive entirely

### Re: QTI euthanasia

Surely the split is from a single history to multiple histories consistent with the original? Sure, you could say we move from identity to identity at random, but that is unlikely under QM and should be similarly improbable from any other metatheory. 2008/11/17 m.a. [EMAIL PROTECTED] *I wonder

### Re: QTI euthanasia

Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Nov 2008, at 19:46, Brent Meeker wrote: That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function. But these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other classical

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness, racketeering, or just an attempt to push his own reality in a certain direction on the character's part. For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible computations is that you end up with no possible way of knowing

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

2008/11/15 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Actually, I think my formulation already goes further than the theory outlined in PC. Although it's a subtle point, I get the feeling that reality in PC is still materialist, in the sense that at the root there still is material stuff which is

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

2008/11/15 Michael Rosefield [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness, racketeering, or just an attempt to push his own reality in a certain direction on the character's part. For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible computations

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

2008/11/15 Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] 2008/11/15 Michael Rosefield [EMAIL PROTECTED]: 'Nothing' := 'Something' - 'Everything' Just what I was saying! I was about to say that... --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon

is on but nobody's home? Gordon --- On Thu, 11/13/08, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon) To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 12

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

*Is it wrong to ask what the lattice is made of? Isn't some sort of substrate necessary for any mathematical event, whether it be a brain or a screen or a universe? And isn't that substrate sufficiently different from the math to be called physical existence? m.a. * Kory Heath wrote

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not the null state? I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any computation

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

If you look at the structure and relationships of maths, it's all rather an incestuous family tree anyway. You can get from any one point to another if you try hard enough. It's like 6 degrees of Kevin Bacon. Now think of any physical system embedded in the maths. It's easy enough to get to other

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not the null state? I'm not sure that works. In the original idea the

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

2008/11/14 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the conclusion. So ... Yes, I'd be interested in an explanation of the MGA in English; I read French only with

### Re: QTI euthanasia

I've always thought - and this might just be betraying my lack of understanding - that these are simply two sides of the same coin: we can't distinguish between these quantum events, so we can consider ourselves as either being a classical being 'above' a sea of quantum noise, or as being a bundle

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

] wrote: From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon) To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: First, I have never stop to work

### Re: QTI euthanasia

Hi Brent, On 14 Nov 2008, at 07:02, Brent Meeker wrote: I think there is a misunderstanding of the MWI. Although the details haven't been worked out (and maybe they won't be, c.f. Dowker and Kent) it is generally thought that you, as a big hot macroscopic body, do not split into

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On 14 Nov 2008, at 11:54, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2008/11/14 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the conclusion. So ... Yes, I'd be interested in an

### Re: QTI euthanasia

Hi Bruno, a very cool series of posts. I would also like to express my interest in your MGA argument (my French is very rusty). I have read the Maudlin Olympia paper, but would like to hear your version. Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

Bruno Marchal skrev: For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and me, i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness. There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material. Now a materialist can and even should interpret this as a

### Re: QTI euthanasia

Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Brent, On 14 Nov 2008, at 07:02, Brent Meeker wrote: I think there is a misunderstanding of the MWI. Although the details haven't been worked out (and maybe they won't be, c.f. Dowker and Kent) it is generally thought that you, as a big hot macroscopic

### Re: QTI euthanasia

Thanks Günther. A long time ago Russell asks me to explain the UDA, and I have made the first presentation of it into steps for the everything-list. It was UDA in 15 steps, and it has converge to 7 steps, and that has helped a bit. I have also made on the list (with Joel, George and

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember that only *person* are

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On 14 Nov 2008, at 18:43, Torgny Tholerus wrote: Bruno Marchal skrev: For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and me, i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness. There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material. Now a

### Re: QTI euthanasia

On Fri, 2008-11-14 at 10:46 -0800, Brent Meeker wrote: That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function. But these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other classical objects. Those

### Re: QTI euthanasia

On Nov 13, 2008, at 10:02 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: I think there is a misunderstanding of the MWI. Ok. I wanted to try putting things in terms of the MWI rather than a more extreme version of many-worlds like Bruno's, since a lot more people accept the MWI. But of course, I can make the

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On Nov 14, 2008, at 9:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Now a computationalist cannot say I believe that persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious for the reason that all computations have to be implemented. Ok, I see your point. Computations are actions that people (or

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

Take this level of abstraction much further and what you have essentially is the 'dust theory' from Greg Egan's Permutation City. -- - Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven? - Mmm. - That was me... and six other guys. 2008/11/15 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Nov

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On Nov 14, 2008, at 11:22 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: For a non-materialist it seems that an un-implemented idea or program is an incoherent concept. So for the non-materialist there can be no such distinction as implemented or not implemented. I can't answer for Bruno, but in my

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On Nov 14, 2008, at 5:09 PM, Michael Rosefield wrote: Take this level of abstraction much further and what you have essentially is the 'dust theory' from Greg Egan's Permutation City. Actually, I think my formulation already goes further than the theory outlined in PC. Although it's a

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

2008/11/13 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to tell us what he means by a physical universe. I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say, What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe. What's

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the argument with people interested in the matter. True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.) Second, it happens that sometimes

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

PROTECTED] wrote: From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon) To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: First, I have never stop to work

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be it soft or hard wired). Good point.

### Re: QTI euthanasia

Sorry for the long delay on this reply. On Nov 2, 2008, at 7:04 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: Kory Heath wrote: In this mundane sense, it's perfectly sensible for me to say, as I'm sitting here typing this email, I expect to still be sitting in this room one second from now. If I'm about to step

### Re: QTI euthanasia

Kory Heath wrote: Sorry for the long delay on this reply. On Nov 2, 2008, at 7:04 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: Kory Heath wrote: In this mundane sense, it's perfectly sensible for me to say, as I'm sitting here typing this email, I expect to still be sitting in this room one second from now.

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On Nov 11, 2008, at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The problem with Dennett is that he takes physical reality for granted. I agree. But from his perspective, the burden is on us to explain why we can't take physical reality for granted. I've never seen the arguments laid out quite clearly

### Re: QTI euthanasia

On 11 Nov 2008, at 20:10, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to

### Re: QTI euthanasia

On 11 Nov 2008, at 22:44, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Nov 11, 2008 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: PS I think I see the point that you are still

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

I think the most compelling arguments against a fundamental physical reality go along the lines of starting with one, and showing you can abstract away from it until it becomes just another arbitrary perspective. -- - Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven? - Mmm. - That

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On 12 Nov 2008, at 12:11, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 11, 2008, at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The problem with Dennett is that he takes physical reality for granted. I agree. But from his perspective, the burden is on us to explain why we can't take physical reality for granted.

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the argument with people interested in the matter. True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.) Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to tell us what he

### Re: QTI euthanasia

Hi Brent, On 09 Nov 2008, at 20:29, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: You don't get the point. Mechanism is incompatible with naturalism. To solve the mind body problem, keeping mechanism, the laws of physicist have to be explained from computer science, even from the gap

### Re: QTI euthanasia

Bruno Marchal skrev: On 09 Nov 2008, at 20:29, Brent Meeker wrote: Many physicists think that an ultimate theory would be discrete, This is highly implausible, assuming comp. I know that if we want quantize gravitation, then space and time should be quantized, but then I hope

### Re: QTI euthanasia

On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to explain that whatever the physical universe is, in the case I am Turing emulable, the physical

### Re: QTI euthanasia

Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to explain that whatever the physical universe

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On 09 Nov 2008, at 23:38, Kory Heath wrote: Actually, I find it the easiest part of the whole thing to understand. But to echo something someone else said earlier in this thread, I think Bruno's arguments for step 8 could be shored up. As they stand, they wouldn't convince a philosopher

### Re: QTI euthanasia

On Tue, Nov 11, 2008 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to explain that whatever the

### Re: QTI euthanasia

John, I meant loosely a universe conceivable by anyone (that might conceivably exist [?]), not limited to human conceptions. Jason On Tue, Nov 11, 2008 at 1:30 PM, John Mikes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Jason, I don't have anything against your question just pick one expression from your post:

### Re: QTI euthanasia

On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to explain that whatever the physical universe is, in the case I am Turing emulable, the physical universe is NOT turing emulable. Bruno, this was the

### Re: QTI euthanasia

Le 09-nov.-08, à 20:29, Brent Meeker a écrit : You don't get the point. Mechanism is incompatible with naturalism. To solve the mind body problem, keeping mechanism, the laws of physicist have to be explained from computer science, even from the gap between computer science and computer's

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On Nov 9, 2008, at 3:24 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: I'm with you and Dennett - except I'm reserved about the use of logical possibility. Fair enough. I might be misusing that term. Maybe a better way to state my position would be that I think the standard conception of philosophical zombie

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On Nov 7, 2008, at 10:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Do you understand that if comp is false, then arithmetical truth contains (immaterial) zombies (because it contains already the relative implementations of all solutions of Schroedinger equations and variant, if only that for example ...)?

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On Nov 7, 2008, at 9:34 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: I think I agree with Bruno that it is *logically* possible, e.g. accidental zombies. It's just not nomologically possible. I'm not sure what counts as an accidental zombie. Do you mean something like the following: I can write a very short

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

2008/11/9 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Yes, I do see what you mean, and in fact I agree with you. The point I was making was that most philosophers - including those like Dennett who believe in the logical impossibility of zombies - believe that (for instance) you would have to implement a

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On 07 Nov 2008, at 20:10, Brent Meeker wrote: It's easy enough to agree with describes, but is describing something the same as creating it? Yes, for effective things like numbers and programs, (machines, or finite pieces of computations). How can we decide these entities (what makes

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 7, 2008, at 9:34 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: I think I agree with Bruno that it is *logically* possible, e.g. accidental zombies. It's just not nomologically possible. I'm not sure what counts as an accidental zombie. Do you mean something like the following: I

### Re: QTI euthanasia

Bruno Marchal wrote: Replies to Jason Resch and Brent Meeker: On 01 Nov 2008, at 12:26, Jason Resch wrote: I've thought of an interesting modification to the original UDA argument which would suggest that one's consciousness is at both locations simultaneously. Since the UDA

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

Hi Jason, On 07 Nov 2008, at 22:39, Jason Resch wrote: Bruno, Thanks for your answers, I think it is safe to say we are on the same page with the UDA. I accept mathematical realism and therefore the existence of abstract Turing machines defining the computational histories of all

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Nov 2008, at 20:10, Brent Meeker wrote: It's easy enough to agree with describes, but is describing something the same as creating it? Yes, for effective things like numbers and programs, (machines, or finite pieces of computations). How can we decide

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On Nov 9, 2008, at 9:56 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: It's sort of what I meant; except I imagined a kind of robot that, like your Turing test program, had it's behavior run by a random number generator but just happened to behave as if it were conscious. Ok. That works just as well for me.

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 9, 2008, at 9:56 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: It's sort of what I meant; except I imagined a kind of robot that, like your Turing test program, had it's behavior run by a random number generator but just happened to behave as if it were conscious. Ok. That works

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

Hello Günther, Hello Bruno, More exactly: I can conceive fake policemen in paper are not conscious, and that is all I need to accept I can be fail by some zombie. Thus I can conceive zombies. Ok, but conceivability does not entail possibilty. I think philosophical zombies are

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

Hi Bruno, I can agree for all computational states of some (universal) machine. If you don't precise what you mean by state it is a bit too much general. Imo. I mean either: all computational states OR all physical states - depending on whether comp or phys is true. Where the difference

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On 07 Nov 2008, at 03:27, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Nov 5, 2008 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Jason, Le 04-nov.-08, à 23:21, Jason Resch a écrit : although I agree with Brent, if the simulated world in the computer is entirely cut off from causal

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

On 07 Nov 2008, at 08:51, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed

### Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)

Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Nov 2008, at 08:51, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the Universal Deploiement,