Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 6/11/2012 7:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Does it imply that we have an infinite number of levels between mind and physics? You can say that. Imagine yourself in front of the UD. By the invariance of the first person experience for the delays, you have to take into account all computations accessing to your 3-actual computational states (in comp). This will include some computation made by some universal number (computer) u, but also the computation made by the universal number j when simulating u, and then those made by the universal number k simulating j simulating u, and so on ad infinitum. So there is an infinity of dream layers, or mind levels between mind and physics. Physics does not really relies on any particular computations a priori, but on *all* computations, as defined by the UD processing (or equivalently by the true sigma_1 sentences weighted by their proofs). But that seems to invoke realizes, not just potential, infinities. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 11 Jun 2012, at 15:14, David Nyman wrote: On 11 June 2012 13:19, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Yes worse. I am very sorry for my random spelling, which becomes easily phonetical when I type too fast. It's only phonetical if you pronounce worth and worse the same way ;-) Which illustrates that my pronunciation, which you cannot know (lucky you), is worse than my spelling! Bruno PS Heavy day. I will comment other posts asap. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 09 Jun 2012, at 20:57, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 09.06.2012 20:27 Quentin Anciaux said the following: Le 9 juin 2012 20:22, Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru a écrit : ... No, I have meant a) simulated computer b) simulated myself (but not in a) Now I consider a) and b). This is after all some instructions executed by some Turing machine. It seems that there is no difference. How would you define the difference then in this case? If you are running at the same level (inside the same simulation, meaning what is simulating the computer is also simulating you and the world you share) then you're able to affect the computer. And computer in a way cannot affect me. This what I actually wanted to say in the beginning. Even if we assume simulation hypothesis, nothing changes and the business continues as usual. On Monday for example it is necessary to go to work. On the other hand, if I understand Bruno's theorem correctly a) and b) imply quite different things. While a) brings no problem, b) leads to arithmetic - mind - physics That is, I am not sure if according to Bruno, mind simulation in simulation is possible. Yes it is possible. And worth, it is necessary the case. Let me explain why. Let us fix a universal system, FORTRAN for example, or c++, game of life, arithmetic, S K, etc. Let us enumerate the one argument programs: p_i, and let us called phi_i the partial (that include the total) corresponding computable functions. This is equivalent of choosing a base in linear algebra. We can associate a number to each partial computable functions. A universal number (a computer) is a number u such that phi_u(x, y) = phi_x(y). x is the program, y is the data and u is the computer. In that case we can say that u emulates the program x (first approximation of a definition to be sure). Now, phi_u, to be in the phi_i, needs to be a one variable function, so we better have a good computable bijection between NxN and N. With this you can see that a universal emulation can itself be emulated by yet another universal number, and you can easily understand that the universal dovetailer generates the infinitely many layers of simulations, showing that they correspond to true arithmetical relations. They are solution of a universal diophantine equation. We cannot avoid them in the measure problem. The key is that below our substitution level we belong to infinities computations/emulation, defining our physical realities, and above the substitution level, it can (re)define our identities. We never know our level of substitution, but we can know that below, it is a matter of experience, and above it is a matter of private opinion, something like that. In UD*, or in a tiny part of arithmetic, there are a lot of even infinite trails of simulation in simulation in simulation, etc. with variants etc. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following: Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of observations of the physical universe and its processes. This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and computations. Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled? For example the impedance model of a Li-ion battery http://www.unibw.de/eit8_2/forschung-en/projekte/battery/battery is not the Li-ion battery. Even the Newman model of a Li-ion battery http://www.cadfem.de/uploads/pics/EMobilitaet-01_w530.jpg is not the Li-ion battery. By the way, when you talk about a representation, you come to the territory of semiotics (the world of signs) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/ What we see here is Peirce's basic claim that signs consist of three interrelated parts: a sign, an object, and an interpretant. From such a viewpoint, simulation as such represents nothing. Evgenii 1) Does this mean that mathematics is *en-coded* as formulas in matter and energy? 2) If so, are models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations, a mathematical computational *decoding* of an *en-coded* mathematical physical reality? Thanks -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following: Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of observations of the physical universe and its processes. This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and computations. Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled? That is usually the case. But this does not mean that it is always the case. In particular digital processes, or relations, can be emulated exactly, so if you assume the brain is a natural computer, there are possible exact model, like a digital brain and its corresponding relative state in arithmetic. From the 1p-view, those cannot be distinguished in any immediate way. If I simulate a typhoon on a computer in front of you, you will never become wet by it. But if I read and cut you, and simulate with that computer you + the typhoon at the right comp level (assuming it exists) then you will, in that case, feel to be wet due to the simulated typhoon. Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). Bruno For example the impedance model of a Li-ion battery http://www.unibw.de/eit8_2/forschung-en/projekte/battery/battery is not the Li-ion battery. Even the Newman model of a Li-ion battery http://www.cadfem.de/uploads/pics/EMobilitaet-01_w530.jpg is not the Li-ion battery. By the way, when you talk about a representation, you come to the territory of semiotics (the world of signs) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/ What we see here is Peirce's basic claim that signs consist of three interrelated parts: a sign, an object, and an interpretant. From such a viewpoint, simulation as such represents nothing. Evgenii 1) Does this mean that mathematics is *en-coded* as formulas in matter and energy? 2) If so, are models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations, a mathematical computational *decoding* of an *en-coded* mathematical physical reality? Thanks -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following: Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of observations of the physical universe and its processes. This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and computations. Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled? That is usually the case. But this does not mean that it is always the case. In particular digital processes, or relations, can be emulated exactly, so if you assume the brain is a natural computer, there are possible exact model, like a digital brain and its corresponding relative state in arithmetic. From the 1p-view, those cannot be distinguished in any immediate way. If I simulate a typhoon on a computer in front of you, you will never become wet by it. But if I read and cut you, and simulate with that computer you + the typhoon at the right comp level (assuming it exists) then you will, in that case, feel to be wet due to the simulated typhoon. Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). But then even in this case, I distinguish between a typhoon on a computer in front of me and a real typhoon. I mean that let us assume comp for a moment. Let me agree with you for a moment that arithmetics - mind - physics Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer cluster at work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I guess this does not matter). In other words, even after having accepted your theorem, I do not observe that the typhoon in the computer in front of me makes me wet. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following: Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of observations of the physical universe and its processes. This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and computations. Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled? That is usually the case. But this does not mean that it is always the case. In particular digital processes, or relations, can be emulated exactly, so if you assume the brain is a natural computer, there are possible exact model, like a digital brain and its corresponding relative state in arithmetic. From the 1p-view, those cannot be distinguished in any immediate way. If I simulate a typhoon on a computer in front of you, you will never become wet by it. But if I read and cut you, and simulate with that computer you + the typhoon at the right comp level (assuming it exists) then you will, in that case, feel to be wet due to the simulated typhoon. Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). But then even in this case, I distinguish between a typhoon on a computer in front of me and a real typhoon. I mean that let us assume comp for a moment. Let me agree with you for a moment that arithmetics - mind - physics Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer cluster at work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I guess this does not matter). In other words, even after having accepted your theorem, I do not observe that the typhoon in the computer in front of me makes me wet. Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't expect that... Bruno said Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). Quentin Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ **googlegroups.com everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 09.06.2012 14:06 Quentin Anciaux said the following: 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following: Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of observations of the physical universe and its processes. This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and computations. Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled? That is usually the case. But this does not mean that it is always the case. In particular digital processes, or relations, can be emulated exactly, so if you assume the brain is a natural computer, there are possible exact model, like a digital brain and its corresponding relative state in arithmetic. From the 1p-view, those cannot be distinguished in any immediate way. If I simulate a typhoon on a computer in front of you, you will never become wet by it. But if I read and cut you, and simulate with that computer you + the typhoon at the right comp level (assuming it exists) then you will, in that case, feel to be wet due to the simulated typhoon. Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). But then even in this case, I distinguish between a typhoon on a computer in front of me and a real typhoon. I mean that let us assume comp for a moment. Let me agree with you for a moment that arithmetics - mind - physics Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer cluster at work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I guess this does not matter). In other words, even after having accepted your theorem, I do not observe that the typhoon in the computer in front of me makes me wet. Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't expect that... Bruno said Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). Nothing special, I agree. Yet, let us imagine that we are at the same level. Let me assume that I am in simulation. Yet, even being in simulation, my simulated computer in front of simulated myself will not make simulated myself wet. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 14:06 Quentin Anciaux said the following: 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following: Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of observations of the physical universe and its processes. This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and computations. Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled? That is usually the case. But this does not mean that it is always the case. In particular digital processes, or relations, can be emulated exactly, so if you assume the brain is a natural computer, there are possible exact model, like a digital brain and its corresponding relative state in arithmetic. From the 1p-view, those cannot be distinguished in any immediate way. If I simulate a typhoon on a computer in front of you, you will never become wet by it. But if I read and cut you, and simulate with that computer you + the typhoon at the right comp level (assuming it exists) then you will, in that case, feel to be wet due to the simulated typhoon. Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). But then even in this case, I distinguish between a typhoon on a computer in front of me and a real typhoon. I mean that let us assume comp for a moment. Let me agree with you for a moment that arithmetics - mind - physics Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer cluster at work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I guess this does not matter). In other words, even after having accepted your theorem, I do not observe that the typhoon in the computer in front of me makes me wet. Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't expect that... Bruno said Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). Nothing special, I agree. Yet, let us imagine that we are at the same level. Let me assume that I am in simulation. Yet, even being in simulation, my simulated computer ?? No it will make your simulated self in the simulated computer wet... but your simulated self in front of a simulated computer simulating you in front of a typhoon will not... same thing you (the 1st level simulated you) are *not* at the same level (as the simulated simulated you). Quentin in front of simulated myself will not make simulated myself wet. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ **googlegroups.com everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On Friday, June 8, 2012 1:36:31 PM UTC-7, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Jun 8, 3:00 pm, Pzomby htra...@gmail.com wrote: Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of observations of the physical universe and its processes. We can create models for ourselves, but nothing else in the universe reads them that way. This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and computations. 1) Does this mean that mathematics is *en-coded* as formulas in matter and energy? If so that would mean that mathematics is either: a) encoded in something other than mathematics - if so, whatever it is that math can be encoded into (matter) makes encoding redundant and unexplainable. If you have something other than math, then why does math need to be encoded as it? b) encoded as some other mathematical formula - if so, then the appearance of the encoded non-math is redundant and unexplainable. 2) If so, are models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations, a mathematical computational *decoding* of an *en-coded* mathematical physical reality? They are a partial decoding. The modeling process allows our mind to recover some essential sense experience of the physics, thereby superimposing a supersignifying abstraction layer on our experience of it's reality. My view in a nutshell: Sense is not an emergent property of information. Significance is a recovered property* of sense. Thanks for your input. Some of what you state I follow, but some I do not, but I set that aside. To further clarify: The best analogy as to what I was considering is the role of DNA in biological processes. DNA is coded by/with classified amino acids that eventually through time and growth display the physical results of the coding. Interpreting the DNA code or *decoding* gives rise to theoretical mathematically described simulations, emulations or models, etc of a physical body containing a physical brain. DNA is a dimensional physical exemplification or instantiation that can be *decoded* and then be simulated or modeled as a complete body brain (if there is such a thing). If it is assumed the brain is a natural computer, the DNA should contain an encoded version of that same brain. This in turn gives rise to the questions of interpretations or maybe more importantly misinterpretations (beliefs) by the brain (natural computer) of what the 6 senses observe. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/ml2ND3NB_XAJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 09.06.2012 18:07 Quentin Anciaux said the following: 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 14:06 Quentin Anciaux said the following: 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following: ... Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer cluster at work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I guess this does not matter). In other words, even after having accepted your theorem, I do not observe that the typhoon in the computer in front of me makes me wet. Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't expect that... Bruno said Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). Nothing special, I agree. Yet, let us imagine that we are at the same level. Let me assume that I am in simulation. Yet, even being in simulation, my simulated computer ?? No it will make your simulated self in the simulated computer wet... but your simulated self in front of a simulated computer simulating you in front of a typhoon will not... same thing you (the 1st level simulated you) are *not* at the same level (as the simulated simulated you). This I do not quite understand. What does it mean simulated levels in simulation? After all my computer is simulated and I is simulated. Then what is difference between my computer that is simulated and myself that is simulated? Where the difference comes from? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 18:07 Quentin Anciaux said the following: 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 14:06 Quentin Anciaux said the following: 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following: ... Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer cluster at work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I guess this does not matter). In other words, even after having accepted your theorem, I do not observe that the typhoon in the computer in front of me makes me wet. Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't expect that... Bruno said Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). Nothing special, I agree. Yet, let us imagine that we are at the same level. Let me assume that I am in simulation. Yet, even being in simulation, my simulated computer ?? No it will make your simulated self in the simulated computer wet... but your simulated self in front of a simulated computer simulating you in front of a typhoon will not... same thing you (the 1st level simulated you) are *not* at the same level (as the simulated simulated you). This I do not quite understand. What does it mean simulated levels in simulation? After all my computer is simulated and I is simulated. Then what is difference between my computer that is simulated and myself that is simulated? Where the difference comes from? You were talking about a 'you' being simulated inside a simulated computer (so that you is one level down from a simulated you in front of that simulated computer). So you have: real computer running a simulation. In that simulation a universal computer is built and on it (the simulated computer) a simulated being (part of the simulation at the level where the computer has been built) run another simulation, what is running on the simulated computer cannot affect the simulated being (which is in front of it, if the computer is a real simulation of a computer) but can affect simulated being running on the simulated world of that simulated computer. Quentin Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 09.06.2012 20:00 Quentin Anciaux said the following: 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 18:07 Quentin Anciaux said the following: 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 14:06 Quentin Anciaux said the following: 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following: ... Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer cluster at work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I guess this does not matter). In other words, even after having accepted your theorem, I do not observe that the typhoon in the computer in front of me makes me wet. Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't expect that... Bruno said Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp). Nothing special, I agree. Yet, let us imagine that we are at the same level. Let me assume that I am in simulation. Yet, even being in simulation, my simulated computer ?? No it will make your simulated self in the simulated computer wet... but your simulated self in front of a simulated computer simulating you in front of a typhoon will not... same thing you (the 1st level simulated you) are *not* at the same level (as the simulated simulated you). This I do not quite understand. What does it mean simulated levels in simulation? After all my computer is simulated and I is simulated. Then what is difference between my computer that is simulated and myself that is simulated? Where the difference comes from? You were talking about a 'you' being simulated inside a simulated computer (so that you is one level down from a simulated you in front of that simulated computer). So you have: real computer running a simulation. In that simulation a universal computer is built and on it (the simulated computer) a simulated being (part of the simulation at the level where the computer has been built) run another simulation, what is running on the simulated computer cannot affect the simulated being (which is in front of it, if the computer is a real simulation of a computer) but can affect simulated being running on the simulated world of that simulated computer. No, I have meant a) simulated computer b) simulated myself (but not in a) Now I consider a) and b). This is after all some instructions executed by some Turing machine. It seems that there is no difference. How would you define the difference then in this case? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 9 June 2012 19:22, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: No, I have meant a) simulated computer b) simulated myself (but not in a) Now I consider a) and b). This is after all some instructions executed by some Turing machine. It seems that there is no difference. How would you define the difference then in this case? I agree with you that there is no difference if you are thinking in terms of a physical machine, and assume primitive physicality. In that case the very notion of computation itself is an unnecessary auxiliary assumption in explaining the machine's physical behaviour. But then how can you justify the computational theory of mind on which the whole notion of simulation of consciousness depends? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On 09.06.2012 20:39 David Nyman said the following: On 9 June 2012 19:22, Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru wrote: No, I have meant a) simulated computer b) simulated myself (but not in a) Now I consider a) and b). This is after all some instructions executed by some Turing machine. It seems that there is no difference. How would you define the difference then in this case? I agree with you that there is no difference if you are thinking in terms of a physical machine, and assume primitive physicality. In that case the very notion of computation itself is an unnecessary auxiliary assumption in explaining the machine's physical behaviour. But then how can you justify the computational theory of mind on which the whole notion of simulation of consciousness depends? I am not sure if I want to justify something. I am rather in a mood for anarchy. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On Jun 9, 12:08 pm, Pzomby htra...@gmail.com wrote: Thanks for your input. Some of what you state I follow, but some I do not, but I set that aside. To further clarify: The best analogy as to what I was considering is the role of DNA in biological processes. DNA is coded by/with classified amino acids that eventually through time and growth display the physical results of the coding. Interpreting the DNA code or *decoding* gives rise to theoretical mathematically described simulations, emulations or models, etc of a physical body containing a physical brain. Not necessarily. All we really know is that genes code for protein. Protein synthesis, epigenetics, a whole universe of environmental interaction and top-down influence contribute to the overall development of a physical body. It's like saying that tcp/ip packets give rise to YouTube content. DNA is a dimensional physical exemplification or instantiation that can be *decoded* and then be simulated or modeled as a complete body brain (if there is such a thing). If it is assumed the brain is a natural computer, the DNA should contain an encoded version of that same brain. Our fingers are natural computers if we use them that way. Computation isn't necessarily a causally efficacious principle in the universe. I think that it's a sensory theme which is instrumental in maintaining solid objects through time, but that's about it. It has no feeling, meaning, power, or desire. The lowest, most common end of what we are looks like a brain, and computation is what goes on when we look at matter with matter. This in turn gives rise to the questions of interpretations or maybe more importantly misinterpretations (beliefs) by the brain (natural computer) of what the 6 senses observe. The brain computes, but it is also a collection of living organism. An electronic computer computes but it is not a living organism, and it is an inorganic assembly. The commonality is paper thin, and the difference extends back billions of years. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.
On Jun 8, 3:00 pm, Pzomby htra...@gmail.com wrote: Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of observations of the physical universe and its processes. We can create models for ourselves, but nothing else in the universe reads them that way. This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and computations. 1) Does this mean that mathematics is *en-coded* as formulas in matter and energy? If so that would mean that mathematics is either: a) encoded in something other than mathematics - if so, whatever it is that math can be encoded into (matter) makes encoding redundant and unexplainable. If you have something other than math, then why does math need to be encoded as it? b) encoded as some other mathematical formula - if so, then the appearance of the encoded non-math is redundant and unexplainable. 2) If so, are models, simulations, emulations, depictions, replications, representations, a mathematical computational *decoding* of an *en-coded* mathematical physical reality? They are a partial decoding. The modeling process allows our mind to recover some essential sense experience of the physics, thereby superimposing a supersignifying abstraction layer on our experience of it's reality. My view in a nutshell: Sense is not an emergent property of information. Significance is a recovered property* of sense. Matter is a form of significance. A sensible persistence through time which we perceive as volume-densities divided from us and each other by space. To be informed is to recover significance through sense. Sense is primordial, concrete, essential, and viscerally real. Information is a derivative, redundant term which models sense from a hypothetical third person view (a view which, taken literally, could only be that of a formless, non-sense, omniscient voyeur), rendering consciousness a generic, sterile, and meaningless wireframe of experience. Extrapolating a worldview based on this inversion of sense-making and inert data is useful for modeling computation but is catastrophic if applied literally to consciousness, as it makes life, order, emotion, and intelligence itself into a meaningless function for the sake of function. It makes sense into a kind of non-sense. Craig *By recovered property I mean that significance cannot emerge from nothing, it can only be recovered or discovered from everything. Consciousness is a splinter or temporal diffraction of the cosmos as a whole, which, when experienced outside of ‘our world’ (umwelt, perceptual inertial frame, or cumulative history of perception), would be an undiffracted totality or eternal instant…devoid of everything except absence of any absence and filled with nothing except the presence of presence …and I mean that in the most non-mystical and unambiguous sense (/ Cheshire grin) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.