Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

2012-06-11 Thread meekerdb

On 6/11/2012 7:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Does it imply that we have an infinite number of levels between mind and 
physics?


You can say that.

Imagine yourself in front of the UD. By the invariance of the first person experience 
for the delays, you have to take into account all computations accessing to your 
3-actual computational states (in comp).


This will include some computation made by some universal number (computer) u, but also 
the computation made by the universal number j when simulating u, and then those made by 
the universal number k simulating j simulating u, and so on ad infinitum. So there is an 
infinity of dream layers, or mind levels between mind and physics. Physics does not 
really relies on any particular computations a priori, but on *all* computations, as 
defined by the UD processing (or equivalently by the true sigma_1 sentences weighted by 
their proofs). 


But that seems to invoke realizes, not just potential, infinities.

Brent

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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

2012-06-11 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Jun 2012, at 15:14, David Nyman wrote:


On 11 June 2012 13:19, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

Yes worse. I am very sorry for my random spelling, which becomes  
easily

phonetical when I type too fast.


It's only phonetical if you pronounce worth and worse the same way ;-)


Which illustrates that my pronunciation, which you cannot know (lucky  
you), is worse than my spelling!


Bruno

PS Heavy day. I will comment other posts asap.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

2012-06-10 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 09 Jun 2012, at 20:57, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 09.06.2012 20:27 Quentin Anciaux said the following:

Le 9 juin 2012 20:22, Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru  a écrit :




...




No, I have meant

a) simulated computer

b) simulated myself (but not in a)

Now I consider a) and b). This is after all some instructions
executed by

some Turing machine. It seems that there is no difference. How would
you define the difference then in this case?




If you are running at the same level (inside the same simulation,
meaning what is simulating the computer is also simulating you and
the world you share) then you're able to affect the computer.


And computer in a way cannot affect me. This what I actually wanted  
to say in the beginning. Even if we assume simulation hypothesis,  
nothing changes and the business continues as usual. On Monday for  
example it is necessary to go to work.


On the other hand, if I understand Bruno's theorem correctly a) and  
b) imply quite different things. While a) brings no problem, b)  
leads to


arithmetic - mind - physics

That is, I am not sure if according to Bruno, mind simulation in  
simulation is possible.


Yes it is possible. And worth, it is necessary the case.

Let me explain why.

Let us fix a universal system, FORTRAN for example, or c++, game of  
life, arithmetic, S  K, etc.


Let us enumerate the one argument programs: p_i, and let us called  
phi_i the partial (that include the total) corresponding computable  
functions. This is equivalent of choosing a base in linear algebra. We  
can associate a number to each partial computable functions.


A universal number (a computer) is a number u such that phi_u(x, y) =  
phi_x(y). x is the program, y is the data and u is the computer. In  
that case we can say that u emulates the program x (first  
approximation of a definition to be sure).


Now, phi_u, to be in the phi_i, needs to be a one variable function,  
so we better have a good computable bijection between NxN and N. With  
this you can see that a universal emulation can itself be emulated by  
yet another universal number, and you can easily understand that the  
universal dovetailer generates the infinitely many layers of  
simulations, showing that they correspond to true arithmetical  
relations. They are solution of a universal diophantine equation. We  
cannot avoid them in the measure problem.


The key is that below our substitution level we belong to infinities  
computations/emulation, defining our physical realities, and above the  
substitution level, it can (re)define our identities. We never know  
our level of substitution, but we can know that below, it is a matter  
of experience, and above it is a matter of private opinion, something  
like that.


In UD*, or in a tiny part of arithmetic,  there are a lot of even  
infinite trails of simulation in simulation in simulation, etc. with  
variants etc.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

2012-06-09 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following:

Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied
consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations,
emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of
observations of the physical universe and its processes.

This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is
exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and
computations.


Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled? For example 
the impedance model of a Li-ion battery


http://www.unibw.de/eit8_2/forschung-en/projekte/battery/battery

is not the Li-ion battery. Even the Newman model of a Li-ion battery

http://www.cadfem.de/uploads/pics/EMobilitaet-01_w530.jpg

is not the Li-ion battery.

By the way, when you talk about a representation, you come to the 
territory of semiotics (the world of signs)


http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/

What we see here is Peirce's basic claim that signs consist of three 
interrelated parts: a sign, an object, and an interpretant.


From such a viewpoint, simulation as such represents nothing.

Evgenii



1) Does this mean that mathematics is *en-coded* as formulas in
matter and energy?

2) If so, are models, simulations, emulations, depictions,
replications, representations, a mathematical computational
*decoding* of an *en-coded* mathematical physical reality?

Thanks



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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

2012-06-09 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following:

Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied
consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations,
emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of
observations of the physical universe and its processes.

This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is
exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and
computations.


Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled?


That is usually the case. But this does not mean that it is always the  
case. In particular digital processes, or relations, can be emulated  
exactly, so if you assume the brain is a natural computer, there are  
possible exact model, like a digital brain and its corresponding  
relative state in arithmetic. From the 1p-view, those cannot be  
distinguished in any immediate way.


If I simulate a typhoon on a computer in front of you, you will never  
become wet by it. But if I read and cut you, and simulate with that  
computer  you + the typhoon at the right comp level (assuming it  
exists) then you will, in that case, feel to be wet due to the  
simulated typhoon. Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet  
the relative arithmetical entities (with comp).


Bruno





For example the impedance model of a Li-ion battery

http://www.unibw.de/eit8_2/forschung-en/projekte/battery/battery

is not the Li-ion battery. Even the Newman model of a Li-ion battery

http://www.cadfem.de/uploads/pics/EMobilitaet-01_w530.jpg

is not the Li-ion battery.

By the way, when you talk about a representation, you come to the  
territory of semiotics (the world of signs)


http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/

What we see here is Peirce's basic claim that signs consist of  
three interrelated parts: a sign, an object, and an interpretant.


From such a viewpoint, simulation as such represents nothing.

Evgenii



1) Does this mean that mathematics is *en-coded* as formulas in
matter and energy?

2) If so, are models, simulations, emulations, depictions,
replications, representations, a mathematical computational
*decoding* of an *en-coded* mathematical physical reality?

Thanks



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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

2012-06-09 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following:

Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied
consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations,
emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of
observations of the physical universe and its processes.

This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is
exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and
computations.


Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled?


That is usually the case. But this does not mean that it is always
the case. In particular digital processes, or relations, can be
emulated exactly, so if you assume the brain is a natural computer,
there are possible exact model, like a digital brain and its
corresponding relative state in arithmetic. From the 1p-view, those
cannot be distinguished in any immediate way.

If I simulate a typhoon on a computer in front of you, you will never
 become wet by it. But if I read and cut you, and simulate with that
 computer you + the typhoon at the right comp level (assuming it
exists) then you will, in that case, feel to be wet due to the
simulated typhoon. Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet
the relative arithmetical entities (with comp).


But then even in this case, I distinguish between a typhoon on a 
computer in front of me and a real typhoon. I mean that let us assume 
comp for a moment. Let me agree with you for a moment that


arithmetics - mind - physics

Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer cluster 
at work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I guess this 
does not matter). In other words, even after having accepted your 
theorem, I do not observe that the typhoon in the computer in front of 
me makes me wet.


Evgenii




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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

2012-06-09 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru

 On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following:


 On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

  On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following:

 Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied
 consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations,
 emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of
 observations of the physical universe and its processes.

 This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is
 exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and
 computations.


 Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled?


 That is usually the case. But this does not mean that it is always
 the case. In particular digital processes, or relations, can be
 emulated exactly, so if you assume the brain is a natural computer,
 there are possible exact model, like a digital brain and its
 corresponding relative state in arithmetic. From the 1p-view, those
 cannot be distinguished in any immediate way.

 If I simulate a typhoon on a computer in front of you, you will never
  become wet by it. But if I read and cut you, and simulate with that
  computer you + the typhoon at the right comp level (assuming it
 exists) then you will, in that case, feel to be wet due to the
 simulated typhoon. Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet
 the relative arithmetical entities (with comp).


 But then even in this case, I distinguish between a typhoon on a computer
 in front of me and a real typhoon. I mean that let us assume comp for a
 moment. Let me agree with you for a moment that

 arithmetics - mind - physics

 Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer cluster at
 work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I guess this does
 not matter). In other words, even after having accepted your theorem, I do
 not observe that the typhoon in the computer in front of me makes me wet.

 Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't expect that...
Bruno said Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the relative
arithmetical entities (with comp).

Quentin


 Evgenii





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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

2012-06-09 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

On 09.06.2012 14:06 Quentin Anciaux said the following:

2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru


On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following:



On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following:



Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied
consciousness can (using computers) create models,
simulations, emulations, depictions, replications,
representations etc. of observations of the physical universe
and its processes.

This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is
exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and
computations.



Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled?



That is usually the case. But this does not mean that it is
always the case. In particular digital processes, or relations,
can be emulated exactly, so if you assume the brain is a natural
computer, there are possible exact model, like a digital brain
and its corresponding relative state in arithmetic. From the
1p-view, those cannot be distinguished in any immediate way.

If I simulate a typhoon on a computer in front of you, you will
never become wet by it. But if I read and cut you, and simulate
with that computer you + the typhoon at the right comp level
(assuming it exists) then you will, in that case, feel to be wet
due to the simulated typhoon. Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons
can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp).



But then even in this case, I distinguish between a typhoon on a
computer in front of me and a real typhoon. I mean that let us
assume comp for a moment. Let me agree with you for a moment that

arithmetics -  mind -  physics

Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer
cluster at work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I
guess this does not matter). In other words, even after having
accepted your theorem, I do not observe that the typhoon in the
computer in front of me makes me wet.


Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't expect
that...
Bruno said Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the
relative arithmetical entities (with comp).


Nothing special, I agree. Yet, let us imagine that we are at the same 
level. Let me assume that I am in simulation. Yet, even being in 
simulation, my simulated computer in front of simulated myself will not 
make simulated myself wet.


Evgenii

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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

2012-06-09 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru

 On 09.06.2012 14:06 Quentin Anciaux said the following:

  2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru

  On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following:


  On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

 On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following:


  Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied
 consciousness can (using computers) create models,
 simulations, emulations, depictions, replications,
 representations etc. of observations of the physical universe
 and its processes.

 This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is
 exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and
 computations.


 Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled?


 That is usually the case. But this does not mean that it is
 always the case. In particular digital processes, or relations,
 can be emulated exactly, so if you assume the brain is a natural
 computer, there are possible exact model, like a digital brain
 and its corresponding relative state in arithmetic. From the
 1p-view, those cannot be distinguished in any immediate way.

 If I simulate a typhoon on a computer in front of you, you will
 never become wet by it. But if I read and cut you, and simulate
 with that computer you + the typhoon at the right comp level
 (assuming it exists) then you will, in that case, feel to be wet
 due to the simulated typhoon. Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons
 can make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp).


 But then even in this case, I distinguish between a typhoon on a
 computer in front of me and a real typhoon. I mean that let us
 assume comp for a moment. Let me agree with you for a moment that

 arithmetics -  mind -  physics

 Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer
 cluster at work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I
 guess this does not matter). In other words, even after having
 accepted your theorem, I do not observe that the typhoon in the
 computer in front of me makes me wet.

  Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't expect
 that...
 Bruno said Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet the
 relative arithmetical entities (with comp).


 Nothing special, I agree. Yet, let us imagine that we are at the same
 level. Let me assume that I am in simulation. Yet, even being in
 simulation, my simulated computer

??
No it will make your simulated self in the simulated computer wet... but
your simulated self in front of a simulated computer simulating you in
front of a typhoon will not... same thing you (the 1st level simulated you)
are *not* at the same level (as the simulated simulated you).

Quentin


 in front of simulated myself will not make simulated myself wet.

 Evgenii

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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

2012-06-09 Thread Pzomby

On Friday, June 8, 2012 1:36:31 PM UTC-7, Craig Weinberg wrote:

 On Jun 8, 3:00 pm, Pzomby htra...@gmail.com wrote: 
  Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied 
  consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations, 
  emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of 
  observations of the physical universe and its processes. 

 We can create models for ourselves, but nothing else in the universe 
 reads them that way. 

  
  This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is 
  exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and 
  computations. 
  
  1) Does this mean that mathematics is *en-coded* as formulas in matter 
  and energy? 

 If so that would mean that mathematics is either: 

 a) encoded in something other than mathematics - if so, whatever it is 
 that math can be encoded into (matter) makes encoding redundant and 
 unexplainable. If you have something other than math, then why does 
 math need to be encoded as it? 

 b) encoded as some other mathematical formula - if so, then the 
 appearance of the encoded non-math is redundant and unexplainable. 

  
  2) If so, are models, simulations, emulations, depictions, 
  replications, representations, a mathematical computational *decoding* 
  of an *en-coded* mathematical physical reality? 

 They are a partial decoding. The modeling process allows our mind to 
 recover some essential sense experience of the physics, thereby 
 superimposing a supersignifying abstraction layer on our experience of 
 it's reality. 

 My view in a nutshell: 

 Sense is not an emergent property of information. 

 Significance is a recovered property* of sense. 
  
 Thanks for your input.  Some of what you state I follow, but some I do 
 not, but I set that aside.

   

 To further clarify: The best analogy as to what I was considering is the 
 role of DNA in biological processes. DNA is coded by/with classified amino 
 acids that eventually through time and growth display the physical results 
 of the coding.  Interpreting the DNA code or *decoding* gives rise to 
 theoretical mathematically described simulations, emulations or models, etc 
 of a physical body containing a physical brain. 

  

 DNA is a dimensional physical exemplification or instantiation that can be 
 *decoded* and then be simulated or modeled as a complete body  brain (if 
 there is such a thing).  

  

 If it is assumed the brain is a natural computer, the DNA should contain 
 an encoded version of that same brain. 

 

 This in turn gives rise to the questions of interpretations or maybe more 
 importantly misinterpretations (beliefs) by the brain (natural computer) of 
 what the 6 senses observe. 
  

  

  

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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

2012-06-09 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

On 09.06.2012 18:07 Quentin Anciaux said the following:

2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru


On 09.06.2012 14:06 Quentin Anciaux said the following:

2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru


On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following:



On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following:


...


Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a
computer cluster at work, well I do not see it there but rather
access but I guess this does not matter). In other words, even
after having accepted your theorem, I do not observe that the
typhoon in the computer in front of me makes me wet.

Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't expect

that... Bruno said Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make
wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp).



Nothing special, I agree. Yet, let us imagine that we are at the
same level. Let me assume that I am in simulation. Yet, even being
in simulation, my simulated computer


?? No it will make your simulated self in the simulated computer
wet... but your simulated self in front of a simulated computer
simulating you in front of a typhoon will not... same thing you (the
1st level simulated you) are *not* at the same level (as the
simulated simulated you).



This I do not quite understand. What does it mean simulated levels in 
simulation? After all my computer is simulated and I is simulated. Then 
what is difference between my computer that is simulated and myself that 
is simulated? Where the difference comes from?


Evgenii

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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

2012-06-09 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru

 On 09.06.2012 18:07 Quentin Anciaux said the following:

  2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru

  On 09.06.2012 14:06 Quentin Anciaux said the following:

 2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru


 On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following:



 On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


 On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following:


 ...


  Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a
 computer cluster at work, well I do not see it there but rather
 access but I guess this does not matter). In other words, even
 after having accepted your theorem, I do not observe that the
 typhoon in the computer in front of me makes me wet.

 Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't expect

 that... Bruno said Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make
 wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp).


 Nothing special, I agree. Yet, let us imagine that we are at the
 same level. Let me assume that I am in simulation. Yet, even being
 in simulation, my simulated computer


 ?? No it will make your simulated self in the simulated computer
 wet... but your simulated self in front of a simulated computer
 simulating you in front of a typhoon will not... same thing you (the
 1st level simulated you) are *not* at the same level (as the
 simulated simulated you).


 This I do not quite understand. What does it mean simulated levels in
 simulation? After all my computer is simulated and I is simulated. Then
 what is difference between my computer that is simulated and myself that is
 simulated? Where the difference comes from?


You were talking about a 'you' being simulated inside a simulated computer
(so that you is one level down from a simulated you in front of that
simulated computer).

So you have:

real computer running a simulation.

In that simulation a universal computer is built and on it (the simulated
computer) a simulated being (part of the simulation at the level where the
computer has been built) run another simulation, what is running on the
simulated computer cannot affect the simulated being (which is in front of
it, if the computer is a real simulation of a computer) but can affect
simulated being running on the simulated world of that simulated computer.

Quentin

Evgenii

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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

2012-06-09 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

On 09.06.2012 20:00 Quentin Anciaux said the following:

2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru


On 09.06.2012 18:07 Quentin Anciaux said the following:

2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru


On 09.06.2012 14:06 Quentin Anciaux said the following:


2012/6/9 Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru



On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following:




On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following:




...


Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a

computer cluster at work, well I do not see it there but
rather access but I guess this does not matter). In other
words, even after having accepted your theorem, I do not
observe that the typhoon in the computer in front of me
makes me wet.

Yes so what ? you're not at the same level so you can't
expect


that... Bruno said Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can
make wet the relative arithmetical entities (with comp).



Nothing special, I agree. Yet, let us imagine that we are at
the same level. Let me assume that I am in simulation. Yet,
even being in simulation, my simulated computer



?? No it will make your simulated self in the simulated computer
wet... but your simulated self in front of a simulated computer
simulating you in front of a typhoon will not... same thing you
(the 1st level simulated you) are *not* at the same level (as
the simulated simulated you).



This I do not quite understand. What does it mean simulated levels
in simulation? After all my computer is simulated and I is
simulated. Then what is difference between my computer that is
simulated and myself that is simulated? Where the difference comes
from?



You were talking about a 'you' being simulated inside a simulated
computer (so that you is one level down from a simulated you in front
of that simulated computer).

So you have:

real computer running a simulation.

In that simulation a universal computer is built and on it (the
simulated computer) a simulated being (part of the simulation at the
level where the computer has been built) run another simulation, what
is running on the simulated computer cannot affect the simulated
being (which is in front of it, if the computer is a real simulation
of a computer) but can affect simulated being running on the
simulated world of that simulated computer.


No, I have meant

a) simulated computer

b) simulated myself (but not in a)

Now I consider a) and b). This is after all some instructions executed 
by some Turing machine. It seems that there is no difference. How would 
you define the difference then in this case?


Evgenii

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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

2012-06-09 Thread David Nyman
On 9 June 2012 19:22, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote:

 No, I have meant

 a) simulated computer

 b) simulated myself (but not in a)

 Now I consider a) and b). This is after all some instructions executed by
 some Turing machine. It seems that there is no difference. How would you
 define the difference then in this case?

I agree with you that there is no difference if you are thinking in
terms of a physical machine, and assume primitive physicality.  In
that case the very notion of computation itself is an unnecessary
auxiliary assumption in explaining the machine's physical behaviour.
But then how can you justify the computational theory of mind on which
the whole notion of simulation of consciousness depends?

David

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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

2012-06-09 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi

On 09.06.2012 20:39 David Nyman said the following:

On 9 June 2012 19:22, Evgenii Rudnyiuse...@rudnyi.ru  wrote:


No, I have meant

a) simulated computer

b) simulated myself (but not in a)

Now I consider a) and b). This is after all some instructions
executed by some Turing machine. It seems that there is no
difference. How would you define the difference then in this case?


I agree with you that there is no difference if you are thinking in
terms of a physical machine, and assume primitive physicality.  In
that case the very notion of computation itself is an unnecessary
auxiliary assumption in explaining the machine's physical behaviour.
But then how can you justify the computational theory of mind on
which the whole notion of simulation of consciousness depends?


I am not sure if I want to justify something. I am rather in a mood for 
anarchy.


Evgenii

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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

2012-06-09 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Jun 9, 12:08 pm, Pzomby htra...@gmail.com wrote:

  Thanks for your input.  Some of what you state I follow, but some I do
  not, but I set that aside.

  To further clarify: The best analogy as to what I was considering is the
  role of DNA in biological processes. DNA is coded by/with classified amino
  acids that eventually through time and growth display the physical results
  of the coding.

 Interpreting the DNA code or *decoding* gives rise to
  theoretical mathematically described simulations, emulations or models, etc
  of a physical body containing a physical brain.

Not necessarily. All we really know is that genes code for protein.
Protein synthesis, epigenetics, a whole universe of environmental
interaction and top-down influence contribute to the overall
development of a physical body. It's like saying that tcp/ip packets
give rise to YouTube content.


  DNA is a dimensional physical exemplification or instantiation that can be
  *decoded* and then be simulated or modeled as a complete body  brain (if
  there is such a thing).

  If it is assumed the brain is a natural computer, the DNA should contain
  an encoded version of that same brain.

Our fingers are natural computers if we use them that way. Computation
isn't necessarily a causally efficacious principle in the universe. I
think that it's a sensory theme which is instrumental in maintaining
solid objects through time, but that's about it. It has no feeling,
meaning, power, or desire. The lowest, most common end of what we are
looks like a brain, and computation is what goes on when we look at
matter with matter.


  This in turn gives rise to the questions of interpretations or maybe more
  importantly misinterpretations (beliefs) by the brain (natural computer) of
  what the 6 senses observe.

The brain computes, but it is also a collection of living organism. An
electronic computer computes but it is not a living organism, and it
is an inorganic assembly. The commonality is paper thin, and the
difference extends back billions of years.

Craig

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Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

2012-06-08 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Jun 8, 3:00 pm, Pzomby htra...@gmail.com wrote:
 Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied
 consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations,
 emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of
 observations of the physical universe and its processes.

We can create models for ourselves, but nothing else in the universe
reads them that way.


 This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is
 exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and
 computations.

 1) Does this mean that mathematics is *en-coded* as formulas in matter
 and energy?

If so that would mean that mathematics is either:

a) encoded in something other than mathematics - if so, whatever it is
that math can be encoded into (matter) makes encoding redundant and
unexplainable. If you have something other than math, then why does
math need to be encoded as it?

b) encoded as some other mathematical formula - if so, then the
appearance of the encoded non-math is redundant and unexplainable.


 2) If so, are models, simulations, emulations, depictions,
 replications, representations, a mathematical computational *decoding*
 of an *en-coded* mathematical physical reality?

They are a partial decoding. The modeling process allows our mind to
recover some essential sense experience of the physics, thereby
superimposing a supersignifying abstraction layer on our experience of
it's reality.

My view in a nutshell:

Sense is not an emergent property of information.

Significance is a recovered property* of sense.

Matter is a form of significance. A sensible persistence through time
which we perceive as volume-densities divided from us and each other
by space.

To be informed is to recover significance through sense.

Sense is primordial, concrete, essential, and viscerally real.

Information is a derivative, redundant term which models sense from a
hypothetical third person view (a view which, taken literally, could
only be that of a formless, non-sense, omniscient voyeur), rendering
consciousness a generic, sterile, and meaningless wireframe of
experience.

Extrapolating a worldview based on this inversion of sense-making and
inert data is useful for modeling computation but is catastrophic if
applied literally to consciousness, as it makes life, order, emotion,
and intelligence itself into a meaningless function for the sake of
function. It makes sense into a kind of non-sense.

Craig

*By recovered property I mean that significance cannot emerge from
nothing, it can only be recovered or discovered from everything.

Consciousness is a splinter or temporal diffraction of the cosmos as a
whole, which, when experienced outside of ‘our world’ (umwelt,
perceptual inertial frame, or cumulative history of perception), would
be an undiffracted totality or eternal instant…devoid of everything
except absence of any absence and filled with nothing except the
presence of presence

…and I mean that in the most non-mystical and unambiguous sense (/
Cheshire grin)

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