Hi Bruno Marchal 1) To borrow from Dr. Johnson, matter exists out there because I can stub my toe on it.
2) And I should have said that is necessary for the world to operate properly. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/17/2013 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-17, 06:24:59 Subject: Re: Aquinas' analogy of being On 16 Jan 2013, at 18:06, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Bruno Marchal > > 1) I was thinking of physical science, which cannot > know the meaning of things. > > 2) OK, I had overlooked the nonexistence in a mental > sense, or matter. Well, matter exists in a mental sense. It just does not exist "out there". I am not sure of that. But it follows from comp and occam. > > 3) Aquinas was able to get away with basing his theology > on Aristotle by invoking what he called the "analogy of Being, " > which by fiat merges philosophy with theology: > > http://jackkilcrease.blogspot.com/2011/12/analogy-of-being.html > > "First, let's define the analogy of being. The analogy of being > presupposes that there is a similarity between > God and his creatures. God of course does not exist as his creatures > exist. He is infinite, eternal, and non-contingent. Ah! Aquinad answer your question about the necessity of God. I think this is correct except when you say so. It is a bit impolite to think that God is necessary. It is probably a theological secret: a G* minus G (or variant) proposition. > Nevertheless, he can be said to exist, as can his creatures even if > there existence is profoundly different. Yes, and that's very 'neoplatonist". God, the outer god, is above being, like matter is below being. The being is constituted only on the intelligible things, for them. Which is true at the ontological level for comp, but of course, we use "existence" always in some epistemological way in the 'numdane life/consensual reality". > Hence there is an analogy of being existing between them. Moreover, > God's attributes (wisdom, power, goodness, etc.) > though infinite and eternal, can be observed as existing in > analogous manner in creatures who also possess them. > There is a similarity with a still greater dissimilarity between > God's reality and his creatures. Such a claim about God allowed > the Medieval theologians (particularly Thomists) to claim that their > doctrinal statements about God's nature were realistically true, > while at the same time allowing for divine mystery." The Thomists are not bad :) Bruno > > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 1/16/2013 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2013-01-15, 10:16:10 > Subject: Re: Idealism, theology, and the world of science > > > On 14 Jan 2013, at 14:34, Roger Clough wrote: > >> Hi (socratus) >> >> Idealism is the belief that reality can be more accurately understood >> philosophically than scientifically. Theology is a similar belief, >> namely that reality can be more accurately understood >> philosophically than scientifically. > > I disagree. We have to be scientist in all domain, because science is > basically just trying to be clear and modest. > > > >> >> If you accept the philosophical-theological view, you need read no >> further. >> >> Although philosophy and theology do not deny the physicality, > > Itv depends which one, and at which level. Comp does not deny > physicality, but its denies physical fundamentalness. > > > >> the laws and >> formulas, of the physical world, their explanations for how things >> "really' happen differs between philsopher-theologians >> and scientsts. > > But many scientist use Aristotelian theology in the background. Some > get nervous when you show to them their implicit assumption. > Some very good scientists, in their field, becomes sunday-philosopher > when talking on theology. > > > > >> >> Idealists were turned off by materialism's denial that >> there is no real difference between the mental and the >> physical world. > > But there is a difference. In comp the physical is the tip of the > iceberg of truth. > > Bruno > > > >> So while they took science seriously, >> they took the philosophy of mind more seriously, >> in order to more correctly (though not necessarily more simply) >> to describe reality. >> >> that they adopted the idea that everything >> is mental in reality, and went on from there. >> >> For a more detailed answer, see below. >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> I can't speak for all idealisms, but Leibniz considers the whole >> (or at least the essential components of) the physical world to >> have a corresponding mental representation of monads, >> Kant only how we perceive and think. >> >> With L, each of us can only perceive the phenomenal world ( >> what we see from our perspective). >> >> Both are anthropomorphic. Both separate the phenomenal world >> (what we can perceive) from the actual or "thing in itself" world. >> Both do not deny the existence of the "thing in itself" world, >> both accept science as it appears to be. The formulas, laws, etc. >> >> I say "appears to be" because L believes , like all idealisms, >> that only the mental world is the real one, although these two, >> unlike Berkiely, >> do not treat our phenomenal world as an illusion. >> >> You can still stub your toe, but the explanation for what happens >> is for these two entirely mental, while not sure what K says. >> >> But they both deal with those weevents from the viewpoint of >> philsophy of mind, only through descriptions of physical >> events using the languyage of mental events. >> >> But they deal with different turfs. K takes the phenomenol world >> and his philosophy of mind >> is essentially a very good and generally accepted >> teory of perception, >> >> >> >> >> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >> 1/14/2013 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: socra...@bezeqint.net >> Receiver: Everything List >> Time: 2013-01-13, 09:16:48 >> Subject: Re: Science is a religion by itself. >> >> >> Thanks. >> Is it possible to explain ' monads' of Leibniz or >> Kant's ' thing-in-itself ' from physical point of view ? >> >> Is it possible to explain the 'philosophy of Idealism ' >> using physical laws and formulas ? >> >> =. >> >> On Jan 13, 2:30?m, "Roger Clough" wrote: >>> Hi socra...@bezeqint.net >>> >>> Not exactly prove but explain: >>> >>> 1. means that there is an intelligence beyond the universe >>> 2. is not true according to Leibniz. Above is perfect, below is >>> contingent. >>> 3. According to Leibniz, all existence is active (because alive) >>> 4. I have linked Leibniz to Sheldrake, and he speaks of morphic >>> resonances. >>> 5. Is the principle of sufficent reason. >>> 6. Can't give a basis for this. >>> 7. same as 4. >>> >>> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >>> 1/13/2013 >>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen >>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>> From: socra...@bezeqint.net >>> Receiver: Everything List >>> Time: 2013-01-13, 01:22:32 >>> Subject: Science is a religion by itself. >>> >>> ? The Seven Hermetic Principleshttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eTFCpkrM2iI >>> =. >>> 1. The Universe is something Intellectual. >>> 2. As above, so below. >>> 3. From potential to active existence. >>> 4. Everything in the Universe can vibrate. >>> 5. Everything in the Universe has its cause. >>> 6. Everything in the Universe has its opposite. >>> 7. The Universe has its own rhythm. >>> >>> ?/ Hermes Trismegistus / >>> =. >>> Can these Seven Hermetic Principles be explained >>> ?y physical laws and formulas ? >>> >>> ===? >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything- >>> l...@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group >>> athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything- >> l...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >> . >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything- >> l...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >> . >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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