Re: Re: Are monads tokens ?
Hi Stephen P. King I don't see why not. Donaldson was certainly aware of all of that stuff. I have gotten myself into deep waters, need to study this stuff more. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-16, 14:25:48 Subject: Re: Are monads tokens ? On 12/16/2012 8:36 AM, Roger Clough wrote: ? Are monads tokens ?? I'm going to say yes, because each monad refers to a corporeal body as a whole (so it is nonreductive at the physical end) even though each monad, being specific about what it refers to, identifies the type of object it refers to. Dear Roger, ?? Does the type-token duality apply? ? Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen ? - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-16, 08:17:27 Subject: Davidson on truth Donald Davidson on truth ? I don't think you can do any better on understanding truth than studying Donald Davidson. ? As I understand him, in ? 1) he justifies?omp (the use of tokens, because they are nonreductive) as long as we allow for (a) mental causation of physical events; (b) that there is a strict exceptionless relation? (iff)? between the events; (c) that we?se tokens and not types to relate mental? to physical events? ? 2) He narrows down what form of language can be used. Not sure but this seems to allow only?inite, learnable context-free expressions only ? 3) He clarifies the meaning and use of 1p vs 3p. Observed that Hume accepted only 1p knowledege, the logical positivists accepted only 3p knowledge, where 1p is knowledge by acquaintance and 3p is knowledge by description.? I might add that IMHO 1p is Kierkegaard's view that truth is subjective, so K is close to Hume. ? ? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Davidson_%28philosopher%29#Mental_events 1. Token Mental events ( A justification of token physicalism: these being comp and purely token functionalism) In Mental Events (1970) Davidson advanced a form of token identity theory about the mind: token mental events are identical to token physical events. One previous difficulty with such a view was that it did not seem feasible to provide laws relating mental states?or example, believing that the sky is blue, or wanting a hamburger?o physical states, such as patterns of neural activity in the brain. Davidson argued that such a reduction would not be necessary to a token identity thesis: it is possible that each individual mental event just is the corresponding physical event, without there being laws relating types (as opposed to tokens) of mental events to types of physical events. But, Davidson argued, the fact that we could not have such a reduction does not entail that the mind is anything more than the brain. Hence, Davidson called his position anomalous monism: monism, because it claims that only one thing is at issue in questions of mental and physical events; anomalous (from a-, not, and omalos, regular) because mental and physical event types could not be connected by strict laws (laws without exceptions). Davidson argued that anomalous monism follows from three plausible theses. First, he assumes the denial of epiphenomenalism?hat is, the denial of the view that mental events do not cause physical events. Second, he assumes a nomological view of causation, according to which one event causes another if (and only if) there is a strict, exceptionless law governing the relation between the events. Third, he assumes the principle of the anomalism of the mental, according to which there are no strict laws that govern the relationship between mental event types and physical event types. By these three theses, Davidson argued, it follows that the causal relations between the mental and the physical hold only between mental event tokens, but that mental events as types are anomalous. This ultimately secures token physicalism and a supervenience relation between the mental and the physical, while respecting the autonomy of the mental (Malpas, 2005, ?2). 2. Truth and meaning (A justification of the use of certain types of language--- I think this might mean context-free (finite) language) In 1967 Davidson published Truth and Meaning, in which he argued that any learnable language must be statable in a finite form, even if it is capable of a theoretically infinite number of expressions?s we may assume that natural human languages are, at least in principle. If it could not be stated in a finite way then it could not be learned through a finite, empirical method such as the way humans learn their languages. It follows that it must be possible to give a theoretical semantics for any natural language which could give the meanings of an infinite number
Re: Re: Are monads tokens ?
Hi Craig Weinberg No, the monads are (inextended) tokens of corporeal (extended) bodies of one part. But in comp, tokens are simple (nonreductive), ie contain no parts, while types such as are used in Functionalism, has parts on both ends. So comp. which uses tokens, is not functionalist. A monad contains a many-parts (functionalistic) description of a corporeal body of one part, which is therefore nonreductive. So it is like a type on one end and a token on the other. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-16, 10:38:14 Subject: Re: Are monads tokens ? On Sunday, December 16, 2012 8:36:55 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote: Are monads tokens ? I'm going to say yes, because each monad refers to a corporeal body as a whole (so it is nonreductive at the physical end) even though each monad, being specific about what it refers to, identifies the type of object it refers to. Monads are self-tokenizing tokenizers but not actually tokens (tokens of what? other Monads?). Tokens don't 'exist', they are figures of computation, which is semiosis, a sensory-motive experience within the cognitive symbolic ranges of awareness. Craig Roger Clough], [rcl...@verizon.net] 12/16/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-16, 08:17:27 Subject: Davidson on truth Donald Davidson on truth I don't think you can do any better on understanding truth than studying Donald Davidson. As I understand him, in 1) he justifies comp (the use of tokens, because they are nonreductive) as long as we allow for (a) mental causation of physical events; (b) that there is a strict exceptionless relation (iff) between the events; (c) that we use tokens and not types to relate mental to physical events 2) He narrows down what form of language can be used. Not sure but this seems to allow only finite, learnable context-free expressions only 3) He clarifies the meaning and use of 1p vs 3p. Observed that Hume accepted only 1p knowledege, the logical positivists accepted only 3p knowledge, where 1p is knowledge by acquaintance and 3p is knowledge by description. I might add that IMHO 1p is Kierkegaard's view that truth is subjective, so K is close to Hume. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Davidson_%28philosopher%29#Mental_events 1. Token Mental events ( A justification of token physicalism: these being comp and purely token functionalism) In Mental Events (1970) Davidson advanced a form of token identity theory about the mind: token mental events are identical to token physical events. One previous difficulty with such a view was that it did not seem feasible to provide laws relating mental states?for example, believing that the sky is blue, or wanting a hamburger?to physical states, such as patterns of neural activity in the brain. Davidson argued that such a reduction would not be necessary to a token identity thesis: it is possible that each individual mental event just is the corresponding physical event, without there being laws relating types (as opposed to tokens) of mental events to types of physical events. But, Davidson argued, the fact that we could not have such a reduction does not entail that the mind is anything more than the brain. Hence, Davidson called his position anomalous monism: monism, because it claims that only one thing is at issue in questions of mental and physical events; anomalous (from a-, not, and omalos, regular) because mental and physical event types could not be connected by strict laws (laws without exceptions). Davidson argued that anomalous monism follows from three plausible theses. First, he assumes the denial of epiphenomenalism?that is, the denial of the view that mental events do not cause physical events. Second, he assumes a nomological view of causation, according to which one event causes another if (and only if) there is a strict, exceptionless law governing the relation between the events. Third, he assumes the principle of the anomalism of the mental, according to which there are no strict laws that govern the relationship between mental event types and physical event types. By these three theses, Davidson argued, it follows that the causal relations between the mental and the physical hold only between mental event tokens, but that mental events as types are anomalous. This ultimately secures token physicalism and a supervenience relation between the mental and the physical, while respecting the autonomy of the mental (Malpas, 2005, ?2). 2. Truth and meaning (A justification of the use of certain types of language--- I think this might mean context-free (finite) language) In 1967 Davidson published Truth and Meaning
