ROGER:
Hi Bruno Marchal
1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).
BRUNO: The ONE is much more than the universal mind, as it is where the
universal minds compete, perhaps before eventually recognizing
themselves and reuniting, or fusing, and coming back to the ONE
(Plotinus' conversion).
ROGER: OK, but this is different from Leibniz, where the supreme monad
is really the only mind, at least the only acting mind, although it
observes/adjusts the individual monads and their minds. I suppose
the changes in the monadic minds could be considered as thinking,
but more in the mode of computers. The monads are essentially
computer operations, the supreme monad more like the
computer CPU chip.
Plotinus' concept of the outgoing and incoming of the many minds is
practically identical to the Tao = the One, out of which yin and
yang elements go out to operate the world and then return.
2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
(the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
theories ?
Not really because the multiverse illusion emerges from the
statistical interference in all realities/dreams. But what you say
might be locally true, if our substitution level is very low, like if
a difference in the 10^(10^1000) decimal of h-bar would prevents
consciousness to occur, or make it completely different (no need of
zombies here). That would be astonishing, given the evidence, but comp
certainly does not exclude, yet, such weird possibility. This would
give a multi-multi-verse, at the least, as we already have evidence
that our branches in the quantum multiverse can, and mostly, do
interfere.
Bruno
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/31/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-30, 12:38:34
Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 30 Oct 2012, at 14:23, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/30/2012 7:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Oct 2012, at 22:38, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/29/2012 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Oct 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote:
[Bruno Marchal wrote:] So numbers are universal and can be treated
mathematically as always.
I agree, but the concept of numbers has no meaning prior to the
existence of objects that can be counted. To think otherwise is
equivalent to claiming that unspecified statements are true or false
even in the absence of the possibility of discovering the fact.
Dear Bruno
I think you confuse numbers, and the concept of numbers.
No, I do not. My claim is that Numbers are objects in the mind of
conscious beings.
This contradicts what you said before. It contradicts comp
immediately, as comp needs the understanding of what a computer can
do, even in absence of any conscious observer.
Dear Bruno,
It contradicts your version of comp, yes, but not mine, as I see
minds and numbers as co-existing simultaneously, there is no
ontological priority between them in my version.
Comp is only the assumption that the brain is a machine, to be
short. Then it is proved that the TOE is arithmetic (or recursively
equivalent). Matter and mind arise from the numbers (and + and *).
If you reintroduce a mind assumption, mind will be epiphenomenal. It
you reintroduce matter, it will be epinomenal.
If there does not exist worlds where entities to whom numbers are
concepts then there is no such thing as a concept of numbers in such
worlds.
But with comp, a conscious observer is explained by number
relations. We explain the concept of numbers, and of human
understanding of numbers, by number relations (computations).
Sure, but we should be able to 'go the other way' as well! You
seem to insist on a well founded relation where as I do not!
I derive proposition. I suggest nothing, nor do I insist on nothing,
except on reasoning validly. I am not a philosopher. you must
understand the technical result before philosophising on it. It is
subtle as comp makes a part of philosophy of mind into a branch of
science (indeed, arithmetic/computer science).
My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems
apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not
to numbers themselves.
Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for
some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense.
Your version, yes.
Not my version. My version is just a technically more precise that
the
