Re: Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism

2012-10-24 Thread Roger Clough
SNIP

ROGER:  2) I can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific 
temporal order only if I perceive 
 something permanent by reference to which I can determine their 
 temporal order. (premise) 

RUSSELL: What motivates this premise? 

ROGER:   The permanent entity could be the first event.


(previously)  3) No conscious state of my own can serve as the permanent 
entity by reference to which 
 I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) 
 

RUSSELL: Even assuming 2), what motivates this premise? 

ROGER: Temporal order means that, besides images of perceived events, recording 
an intuition of time passing is necessary.


(previously)  4) Time itself cannot serve as this permanent entity by 
reference to which I can 
 determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) 
 

RUSSELL: Well, I don't accept an objective concept of time anyway, so I have 
no problem with this, although I don't see why this should hold, 
assuming an objective (eg Newtonian) concept of time is valid. 



 (5) If (2), (3), and (4), are true, then I can be aware of having experiences 
 that occur in a 
 specific temporal order only if I perceive persisting objects in space 
 outside me by reference 
 to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) 
 

Yes, I can see this follows. 

 (6) Therefore, I perceive persisting objects in space outside me by reference 
 to which 
 I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (1?5) 
 
 
 Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
 10/23/2012 
 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 
 
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Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
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Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au 
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
 

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Re: Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism

2012-10-24 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Russell Standish  

I agree. 

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/24/2012  
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Russell Standish  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-23, 18:20:35 
Subject: Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism 


On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 02:47:12PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: 
 On 10/23/2012 2:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote: 
  
  2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal 
  order only if I perceive 
  something permanent by reference to which I can determine their 
  temporal order. (premise) 
 What motivates this premise? 
  
 I think it is implicitly assuming that experiences have no 'fuzz' in 
 their duration, they are discrete like states of a Turing machine 
 computation. I'd say we perceive temporal order by overlap between 
 successive experiences. This is consistent with the idea that an 
 experience is not just a state of a computation, but a bundle of 
 states that constitute the same stream of consciousness. 
  
 Brent 
  

Whilst I'm sympathetic to that model, I can also imagine comparing 
one's current state, or a memory of one's current state, with a memory 
of a previous state, which is a discrete state model that is in 
contradiction to 2). I think this model implies one cannot be aware of 
the totality of one's state (ie that a subconsciousness exists), but 
does not entail the existence of an external world. 

As some whit put it, information is the difference that makes a 
difference (ie you have to compare two states in order to process 
information at all).  

Cheers 

--  

 
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
Principal, High Performance Coders 
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au 
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
 

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Re: Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism

2012-10-24 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Stathis Papaioannou  

OK, but I think you are still left with the I. 

I doubted' still means there's an I present.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/24/2012  
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stathis Papaioannou  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-23, 17:51:43 
Subject: Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism 


On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 11:04 PM, Roger Clough  wrote: 
 Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism 
 
 Problematic Idealism (Berkeley's idealism, not that of Leibniz) is the 
 thesis that we cannot 
 prove that objects outside us exist. This results directly from Descartes' 
 proposition 
 that the only thing I cannot doubt is that I exist (solipsism). 
 
 If solipsism is true, it seems to raise the problem that we cannot prove 
 that objects outside 
 us exist . But Kant refutes this thesis by his observation that we cannot 
 observe the 
 passing of time (in itself inextended or nonphysical) unless there is some 
 fixed inextended substrate 
 on which to observe the change in time. Thus there must exist a fixed (only 
 necessarily over a small 
 duration of time) nonphysical substrate to reality. A similar conclusion 
 can be made regarding 
 space. 

I cannot doubt that I exist *at this moment*, but I can doubt that I 
existed before, or that any other moments have or will exist. 


--  
Stathis Papaioannou 

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Re: Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism

2012-10-24 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 12:58 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
 Hi Stathis Papaioannou

 OK, but I think you are still left with the I.

 I doubted' still means there's an I present.

There's an I present but not necessarily a world to contain it,
which is what Kant set out to prove.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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