STEPHAN: Is it necessary that monads are a "substance"? Could we think of
them as pure process the product of which is the content of experience
of the monad? Is this formulation antithetical to the definition that
Leibniz gives monads?
ROGER: Keep in mind that Leibniz formulated his ideas in the 17th century,
when aside from Spinoza, there had been little new done since Aristotle.
Leibniz was trying to establish something fundamental to base his metaphysics
on.
Something specific that you could essentially point to. He had done away with
two-substance
cartesian dualism by considering both mind and body from a mental or logical
aspect.
Of course the phenomenol world still existed, so he still needed some
appropriate
way of mentally designating material objects. These were all substances, but
L only considered as real or permanent only indivisible substances (substances
of only
one part-- without internal boundaries.) These indivisible real objects he
called monads.
These have the same or at least very similar characteristics as morphic fields.
Time is not a feature in monadic space, which essentially rules out
experiemnces
except as snapshots. Only the supreme monad can have experiences, IMHO.
The monads below only have fixed sets of perceptions, which are like
snapshots in an album of memories.
ROGER (previously)
> So had the monads windows, they would be in continual
> direct instant communcation with each other, which L
> disallows by not permitting them to have windows.
STEPHAN: Or they could be in a continuous state of simulating the effects of
said communications on themselves an behaving 'as if' they where
observing each other. What the 'no windows' postulate provides is a
denial of 'exchange of substances' - which makes sense if there are no
substances at all anyway!
ROGER: OK. Except the time continuity would only be "as if".
Personally I believe that the denial of windows is deliberately
to disempower the monads so that only the omniscient supreme
monad is aware, as we ordinarily think of the term. In essence
the physical universe is simply the body of one great soul or person.
(ROGER previously) > The supreme monad however can see everything
> with perfect undistorted clarity from ts domain and
> instantly updates the "perceptions" of each monad.
STEPHAN: Why is this necessary? Why not have any one monad reflect in its
process all other monads? Every monad is in a sense 'the supreme monad'
in this way. No need for a hierarchical structure...
ROGER: A single monad reflects all of the other monads, but only from his
perspective. Only the
Supreme Monad sees things as they really are (from all perspectives at once
(incomprehensible to us)
instead of the single perspective we call the phenomenol world).
> I use the "" since the actual perceptions are indirect
> as described above.
STEPHEN: Sure.
ROGER: > It is "as if" they have continual direct communication
> with each other. But they do not have perfect or equal
> undistorted clarity of vision, so telepathy is individual and
> can be sketchy.
>
Sure. QM allows for this kind of telepathy!
--
Onward!
Stephen
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